The Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy (BCLBE) is the hub of Berkeley Law's research and teaching on the impact of law on business and the U.S. and global economies.
The French Revolution of Close Corporation: A Model for Europe?
Prof. Pierre-Henri Conac, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, University of Luxembourg
Professor Pierre-Henri Conac of the University of Luxembourg will discuss French laws related to close corporations, and how two waves of reform over the past 20 years have enhanced competitiveness and flexibility. Prof. Conac will provide examples of how other EU Member States have adopted similar reforms or otherwise been inspired by those in France. He will further discuss the dynamics at play in Europe, where the reforms are likely headed, and their limits. Read more>
Fundamentals of Banking LawOctober 8-10, 2014
Bancroft Hotel, Berkeley
In collaboration with the Boston University School of Law, BCLBE is pleased to announce the sponsorship of Fundamentals of Banking Law (formerly Banking Law Basics), an intensive 2½ day program designed to familiarize participants with the basics of banking law, including the critical policies, concepts and regulations that have shaped 150 years of banking law from the passage of the 1863 National Bank Act to the present. Agenda> Website>
Managing Tax Audits and AppealsOctober 23-24, 2014
In collaboration with Crowell & Moring, this two day seminar will discuss current issues that impact the tax audit process. Designed for those with an interest in tax controversies, this seminar will enable corporate and tax executives to expand their knowledge of key features of the audit process and to focus on opportunities to improve an audit’s outcome through proper management at the early stages and during the administrative appeals process. The focus will be on current developments in the audit and appeals process.
Speakers will include attorneys from Crowell & Moring, government representatives, and academics who will address emerging issues relating to National Appeals Office developments, large case audits, transfer pricing audits, and recent legislative changes relating to tax procedure and administration. Preliminary Agenda>
BCLBE is currently looking for an Associate Director of Corporate & Foundation Relations to work closely with the BCLBE Executive Director and the Berkeley Law development team to secure grants and gifts to support BCLBE's research, education, and policy activities. This is an exciting opportunity to join a dynamic team at Berkeley Law. Go to Berkeley Jobs and search #16419 (no registration required).
NEWS AND PUBLICATIONS
Shareholder Activism Symposium
Shareholder Activism: Bird's Eye-View
Hot-Button Issues: How Should We Interpret the Current State of Play?
Future of Shareholder Activism: Where Do We Go From Here?
In the Deal Professor column, Prof. Steven Davidoff Solomon argued that the unsolicited offer for Chiquita Brands International by the Cutrale Group and the Safra Group illustrates the problems that tax inversions can create. He also wrote about how a buying spree among technology companies such as Facebook and Google has revolutionized the venture capital business model. In a later post, he discussed how the Zillow-Trulia acquisition deal puts bulk of risk on Trulia if regulatory restrictions are imposed. He also wrote about how the scandal over the ouster of Dov Charney from American Apparel shows the consequences of confidentiality agreements. To read more of Davidoff Solomon’s articles click here.
On July 9, Ken Taymor presented "From Corruption to Good Governance: Lessons from the FCPA and the OECD" at the Goldman School's Ethics and Governance executive education program. The program serves senior-level Indian government administrative officers responsible for making policy in areas such as education, health, transportation and energy.
In “Actavis and Error Costs”, Prof. Aaron Edlin et al. defend the position they took in “Activating Actavis” that payments from a patent holder to fend off litigation from a competitor should be suspect whenever the payment exceeds the cost of litigation and the competitor agrees to stay out of the market. Such “reverse payments” can too easily be a subterfuge for allowing the competitors to split profits even when the patent is of dubious value or validity. This position has been criticized by some economists as too easily marking legitimate, pro-competitive agreements for antitrust litigation, and that SCOTUS never intended Actavis to be applied so broadly. Edlin et al. argue that their approach follows directly from Actavis, and that large reverse payments are generally not economically rational. In the unlikely case where competitors have legitimate pro-competitive reasons for large reverse payments, they would still be able to offer these reasons in defense.
The May 2014 update is now available.