Principal-Agent Models of Legal Institutions

Center for the Study of Law and Society
Miniseries in Empirical Research Methods

Friday, March 15, 2013, 9 a.m. – 12 noon. Lunch to follow.
Philip Selznick Seminar Room, 2240 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley

Sean Gailmard
Associate Professor of Political Science
Berkeley Empirical Legal Studies (BELS) Faculty Fellow, CSLS, Berkeley Law
University of California, Berkeley

Principal-agent models draw on game theory to represent situations in which one actor attempts to induce another actor to take a favorable decision on his or her behalf. In recent years this family of models has become an increasingly important perspective in analysis of law and lawmaking institutions. This workshop will review the framework of principal-agent models, including their basic elements, varieties, and value for applied researchers. It will cover theory through examples in the literature from political science, law, and economics to illustrate how principal-agent models have been used to interpret legal institutions and institutional reforms, as well as to structure empirical analysis in these areas.

Workshop materials