CLOSING INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INNOCENCE GAP

95 S. Cal. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming)

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ABSTRACT

Over the last decade, a growing number of countries have adopted new laws and other mechanisms to address a gap in national criminal legal systems: the absence of meaningful procedures to raise post-conviction claims of factual innocence. These legal and policy reforms have responded to a global surge of exonerations facilitated by the growth of national innocence organizations that increasingly collaborate across borders. It is striking that these developments have occurred with little direct help from international law. Although numerous treaties recognize extensive fair trial and appeal rights, no international human rights instrument—in its text, existing interpretation, or implementation—explicitly and fully recognizes the right to assert a claim of factual innocence.

We label this omission international law’s innocence gap. The gap appears increasingly anomalous given how foundational innocence protection has become at the national level, as well as international law’s longstanding commitment to the presumption of innocence, fair trial, and other criminal process guarantees. We argue the time has come to close this innocence gap by recognizing a new international human right to assert post-trial claims of factual innocence.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, a growing number of countries have established mechanisms for persons convicted of crimes to raise post-trial claims of innocence.1 Take the example of Taiwan, which experienced its first DNA exoneration in 2014, when the Taiwan High Court granted Long-Qi Chen a retrial after serving four years in prison.2 In response, Taiwanese lawmakers promptly revised the standard for reopening a conviction to make clear that “new evidence”—either alone or considered as part of the totality of the circumstances—is grounds for reversing a criminal conviction.3 Many other countries have similarly enacted new laws or taken other steps to address a longstanding gap in national criminal legal systems: the absence of a meaningful procedure to raise post-conviction claims of innocence.4 These national legal and policy reforms have responded to a global surge in exonerations, including high-profile and capital cases in Australia, China, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.5

Exonerations in these and other states have been facilitated by the growth of national innocence organizations, which have secured exonerations for wrongful convictions in many jurisdictions.6 For example, in the United States, more than 370 convictions have been overturned based on post-conviction DNA testing,7 resulting in an “innocence movement.”

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3. For discussions of the Long-Qi Chen case and the statutory reforms it prompted, see Case: B03陳龍綺 Chen, Long-Qi, supra note 2. See also CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 420 (Taiwan), https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=C0010001 [https://perma.cc/FJN2-V3WL].
4. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1173–74.
5. See infra Section I.B.
Echoed by advocacy campaigns in several other countries, this innocence movement has now gone global. The resulting exonerations have attracted substantial public and media attention in documentaries, films, podcasts, and books, sparking urgent and profound debates about “the fallibility of human justice.”

The achievements of the transnational innocence movement are unmistakable. Yet it is equally striking that these achievements have occurred with little direct help from international law. Although numerous human rights treaties recognize detailed rights to a fair trial and to appeal, no international instrument—in its text, existing interpretation, or implementation—has fully and explicitly recognized the right to assert a claim of innocence following a criminal conviction and sentence. We argue that human rights treaties are capable of being—and should be—interpreted to protect such a right. To date, however, international law has fallen short by failing to comprehensively articulate the full scope of this guarantee. Instead, human rights law and its interpretative bodies tend to assume the existence of national-level mechanisms to assert innocence claims, without either mandating the creation of those mechanisms or regulating their substantive standards or procedural safeguards.

We label this omission international law’s “innocence gap.” The gap appears increasingly anomalous, given how important innocence claims have become at the national level as well as international human rights law’s abiding commitment to the presumption of innocence and the possibility of interpreting existing treaties to recognize this right.

What explains the innocence gap in international law? Where does this leave convicted persons who have new evidence of innocence in countries

11. See infra Section II.C.
12. See infra Section II.C.
13. See infra Section II.C.
that do not yet recognize this right? What does such recognition reveal about current debates over so-called rights inflation? And, perhaps most important, how would a new right to claim innocence be recognized in international law?

This Article is the first to ask these questions. We argue that the time has come to close international law’s innocence gap by recognizing a new human right to assert post-trial claims of factual innocence. The recognition of such a new right has several important benefits. It reflects a burgeoning transnational social movement and progressive changes to national criminal laws. It consolidates recent international law developments that, as we analyze infra, reveal a solid normative foundation for a human right to claim innocence. And it advances the core values of fairness and justice shared by domestic and international legal systems that protect individual liberties and civil and political rights in general.

Arguments in favor of new rights have been made since the emergence of international human rights law following World War II. Such claims are especially fraught in the current political environment, in which governments, civil society groups, and commentators are trenchantly debating whether international courts and monitoring bodies have appropriately expanded or unduly proliferated human rights. We take these concerns seriously, but we demonstrate that the right to claim innocence can be defended as a necessary expansion of international law’s protective reach, whether derived from several established human rights (to life, fair trial, appeal, remedy, and compensation for miscarriages of justice) or recognized as a new, freestanding international right.

Part I of this Article reviews different definitions of innocence and summarizes recent domestic law trends concerning post-trial claims of innocence. No prior scholarship has comprehensively documented the gap in international law regarding a post-conviction right to raise innocence claims, nor argued that human rights treaties should affirmatively recognize such a right. But see Garrett, supra note 1, at 1217–18 (noting the gap and briefly suggesting that the right might one day be accepted in customary international law). Scholars have, however, addressed related topics in ways that support the claims made in this Article. For example, there is considerable research on international law requirements regarding the burden of proof and fair trial rights, including the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law 206–16 (2021). Scholars have also analyzed the right to an appeal and touched on its relation to preventing wrongful convictions. See, e.g., Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 Duke J. Compar. & Int’l L. 1, 3 (2011). And one recent publication has reviewed the right to compensation following an exoneration. See Jamil Ddamulira Musujzi, The Right to Compensation for Wrongful Conviction/Miscarriage of Justice in International Law, 8 Int’l Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 215, 215 (2019).

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15. See infra Sections III.B–C.

16. See infra Part II.

17. See infra Section III.D.
innocence. We discuss three national models for constructing claims of innocence and highlight international law’s limited direct influence on the development and implementation of these models.

Part II provides the analytical and empirical foundation for recognizing a right to claim innocence in international law. We begin by cataloguing the many advantages that are likely to flow from such recognition. We next describe two primary pathways by which new international human rights have been recognized, explain why the right to claim innocence satisfies both of these approaches, and discuss the relative merits of each.

Part III sets forth our proposal for closing international law’s innocence gap. We explore the normative content of the right to claim innocence, as well as the modalities and practical consequences of its more formal recognition. We also consider potential objections to our proposal, including critiques that the number and scope of internationally recognized human rights should not be further expanded.

A brief conclusion highlights the implications of our proposal for efforts to redress racial disparities in wrongful convictions globally and, more broadly, to reform criminal legal systems and law enforcement practices to address racial injustice and to protect human rights.

I. POST-TRIAL CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE IN NATIONAL LAW

This Part begins by exploring the definition of innocence claims applied in this Article. Next, we explain how the transnational innocence movement has pressured countries to relax and revise traditional rules of finality that impeded the ability to raise such claims. We then set out three models by which such claims have been recognized at the national level: a post-

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18. See infra Sections I.A–B.
19. See infra Sections I.C–D.
20. See infra Sections II.A–B.
21. See infra Sections II.C–D.
22. See infra Section III.D.
conviction model, an appellate model, and an administrative model. Part I concludes by highlighting the limited direct influence of international law on the development, implementation, and transnational spread of these models, identifying lacunae that can be filled by a new right to claim innocence.

A. DEFINING INNOCENCE CLAIMS

Cases and commentators have broadly distinguished between two types of innocence claims: factual innocence—in which the wrong person was convicted of a crime or no crime occurred at all—and legal innocence—which refers to legal defects in a conviction, ranging from unfair trials and other errors in the criminal process to evidence that is legally insufficient to convict. This Article focuses primarily on international law’s gap regarding factual innocence claims, but it also discusses legal innocence claims involving procedural errors.

We emphasize factual innocence for both normative and strategic reasons. These claims constitute the most urgent gap in international law. They provide an incisive critique of finality rules and illustrate, in stark terms, the need for post-conviction exoneration mechanisms. These claims also, as Part II explains, have a firm textual and doctrinal foundation in global and regional treaties, without, however, being explicitly or fully guaranteed in those international instruments.

We recognize that legal innocence claims sometimes overlap with claims of factual innocence. For example, the reversal of a conviction resulting from a fair trial violation is often accompanied by a finding that the procedural error impacted the verdict, such that no reasonable juror would convict. In addition, the transnational movement, described infra, focuses on a range of legal and factual innocence issues and confronts obstacles to overturning wrongful convictions for both types of claims.

Our focus on factual innocence does not seek to deter these efforts; on the contrary, national governments and domestic innocence organizations could extend our proposal to other miscarriages of justice and gross procedural errors. We nevertheless believe that closing international law’s innocence gap requires—at least as a first step—explicitly recognizing factual


27. See infra Section I.C.
innocence claims in order to complement existing procedural guarantees whose violation provides the basis for legal innocence claims.

Limiting our focus to factual innocence still raises a host of complex questions. These include what counts as “evidence” of innocence, when such evidence is sufficiently “new,” and whether to include cases in which a sentence or sentencing enhancement, rather than guilt, is called into question, as well as guilty pleas in which no evidence was presented at a trial. Limitation issues relate to whether and in what circumstances a convicted person later found to be innocent should receive compensation. National jurisdictions have grappled with these issues and adopted laws to address some of them, as we discuss in the next section. Even so, the absence of an international right to claim innocence has left gaps in these domestic laws and impeded the transnational spread of post-conviction procedures and sharing of best practices.

B. THE TRANSNATIONAL INNOCENCE MOVEMENT’S FOCUS ON THE FINALITY OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

Traditionally, rules of finality in criminal proceedings have barred re-litigating factual evidence of innocence after a conviction becomes final or a relatively short statute of limitations period expires. These finality rules have, however, eroded rapidly as government officials and judges in numerous countries have confronted unequivocal evidence of wrongful convictions.

These changes have been driven by “functional similarities” in the causes of wrongful conviction determinations across jurisdictions, especially in such emerging technologies such as DNA testing. Researchers have documented exonerations in several countries, including China, Germany, and the United States; in other countries, there is anecdotal awareness of wrongful convictions, but comprehensive data is lacking. These exonerations,

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28. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1210.
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. We develop these arguments in detail infra Part III.
32. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1177 (“[F]inality is entering a period of new international ferment.”).
whether occurring in large numbers or in high-profile cases, have, in turn, created awareness that existing post-conviction remedies are inadequate when new evidence of innocence arises.35

Beginning with the first innocence projects in several countries, including the United Kingdom (with the creation of the Criminal Cases Review Commission) and the United States (which saw several innocence projects established by the mid-1990s), national innocence organizations have increasingly investigated potential wrongful convictions and harnessed DNA technology to assert claims of factual innocence.36 Today, there is not only an Innocence Network that spans the globe, but regional networks of innocence projects in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America.37 This movement comprises a diverse set of actors—non-governmental organizations, law school clinics, pro bono attorneys at private law firms,38 and a growing number of conviction review units in prosecutors’ offices.39 Additionally, individual exonerees have formed organizations to advocate for legal reforms, including broader access to remedies for innocence claims.40

The national-level changes in response to these advocacy efforts are striking. For example, in the United States, all fifty states and the federal government have enacted post-conviction statutes permitting access to DNA [https://perma.cc/C2SU-JFZ4] [hereinafter National Registry] (detailing over 2,500 exonerations in the United States since 1989); DUKE L. WILSON CTR. FOR SCI. & JUST., supra note 7. For data from China, Australia, Switzerland, and Germany, see generally Moulin Xiong & Michelle Miao, Miscarriage of Justice in Chinese Capital Cases, 41 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 273 (2018); Rachel Dioso-Villa, A Repository of Wrongful Convictions in Australia: First Steps Toward Estimating Prevalence and Causal Contributing Factors, 17 FLINDERS L.J. 163 (2015); Gwladys Gilliéron, Wrongful Convictions in Switzerland: A Problem of Summary Proceedings, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1145 (2012); Fredericke Leuschner, Martin Rettenberger & Axel Dessecker, Imprisoned but Innocent: Wrongful Convictions and Imprisonments in Germany, 1990-2016, 66 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 687 (2020). Many countries do not maintain accurate information on convictions reversed on innocence grounds. See, e.g., Luca Lupária & Chiara Greco, Unveiling Wrongful Convictions Between the U.S. and Italy: Cross-Learning from Each Other’s Mistakes, 1 WRONGFUL CONVICTION L. REV. 101, 118 (2020) (“[T]he Italian system does not provide accurate statistics or research concerning wrongful convictions . . . .”).


37. See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, supra note 6; INNOCENCE CANADA, supra note 6; RED INOCENTE, supra note 6; see also Godsey, supra note 9, at 1067.

38. For example, the Colorado Innocence Project was formed as a consortium of pro bono law firm lawyers. See Khorey Wise Innocence Project, COLO. L., https://www.colorado.edu/law/academics/public-service/khorey-wise-innocence-project [https://perma.cc/2LL9-CZXN].

39. For an overview of the role that different Conviction Integrity Units, centered in prosecutors’ offices, have played in exonerations in the United States, see National Registry, supra note 34.

and other new evidence of innocence, as well as relief based on that innocence. Various other countries have adopted similar reforms.

Despite these changes, finality still poses an obstacle to relief in many jurisdictions—sometimes just for certain cases, such as plea bargains, but also where procedural rules impose time limits, require diligence of counsel, impose restrictions on the types of new evidence that may be considered, or even bar consideration of new evidence altogether. These and other impediments reveal that an important innocence gap remains, notwithstanding the significant shifts in national law and policy.

C. National Models for Raising Innocence Claims

In most national jurisdictions, the concept of innocence traditionally did not have distinct legal significance; rather, a person was found guilty or not guilty at a trial, while clemency could be granted in the interests of justice based on a variety of concerns, including but not limited to innocence. In recent years, however, a wide range of countries with different legal systems and criminal procedures have modified their appeal and post-conviction review mechanisms to allow defendants to seek review and relief based on new evidence of innocence. These mechanisms, often adopted in response to efforts by the transnational advocacy network discussed supra, have led to a growing number of exonerations of individuals whose factual innocence

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43. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1177.


46. See, e.g., Huang Shiyuan, Chinese Wrongful Convictions: Discovery and Rectification, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1195, 1195–96 (2012) (describing the need for a “more effective mechanism in China to discover and rectify erroneous cases”).


48. See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 9, at 1067.
claims were upheld.

Drawing on existing scholarship, we describe three basic models for asserting these innocence claims: (1) a post-conviction model, in which a separate legal mechanism permits a challenge to a conviction after appeals are exhausted; (2) an appellate model, which broadly distinguishes between civil and common law approaches; and (3) an administrative model, in which a dedicated government agency reviews innocence claims. We also indicate where international human rights law has (or, more often, has not) meaningfully influenced these models.

1. The Post-Conviction Model

Numerous countries provide for a separate collateral procedure, unrelated to the trial and appeal, to a challenge to a criminal conviction. The common law writ of habeas corpus, which developed largely in the pre-trial context, has been repurposed as a post-conviction mechanism, mainly via statutes but also in constitutional provisions. Many states in Latin America recognize a separate judicial writ, the amparo de libertad, and other common law writs, such as coram nobis; and statutory mechanisms can be used to litigate new evidence after a conviction.

In the United States, post-conviction claims of innocence have been largely facilitated through state and federal post-conviction statutes unaided by the federal constitution or international law. In Herrera v. Collins, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to recognize a freestanding constitutional claim of actual innocence, noting that doing so would have a “disruptive effect . . . on the need for finality . . . .” At the time of that decision, in the early 1990s, only two states recognized a right of access to post-conviction DNA testing to prove factual innocence. In the decades since, finality rules have been relaxed significantly. In response to thousands of exonerations, over three hundred of which involved DNA testing, all fifty states and the federal government enacted post-conviction statutes permitting access to DNA and other evidence of innocence and creating procedures for seeking relief based on that evidence. Most states and the federal government have also adopted statutes that provide compensation to wrongly convicted persons. There is, however, no consistent national standard for making these

52. See Garrett, supra note 26, at 1631, 1646–50, 1673–75.
53. See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, supra note 41; GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 41.
54. See National Registry, supra note 34 (providing a primer on state and federal compensation
claims, nor for what type of or how much compensation is appropriate. These statutes have also arisen in isolation from international human rights law. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). As we explain infra, although the ICCPR does not require States parties to provide a mechanism for post-conviction review of innocence claims, it does recognize a right to compensation for miscarriages of justice. However, due to the treaty’s non-self-executing status in the U.S. legal system, no state or federal court has applied the ICCPR when reviewing wrongful convictions.55

2. The Appellate Model

In most countries, convictions may be challenged at one or more levels of an appeal, but there is no general mechanism for collateral post-conviction review. Instead, some jurisdictions have rules that permit the introduction of new evidence of innocence during appeals.

In many civil law countries, appeals have long been considered a fundamental right.56 The appellate process is typically, however, confined to questions of law and the factual record at trial.57 A distinct, and more limited, appellate process for reopening a case once ordinary remedies are concluded is termed a revision.58 Countries have expanded both types of appeals to include claims based on newly discovered evidence of innocence.59

France, for example, made significant changes to its revision statute in 1989 and 2014 in response to high-profile wrongful conviction cases and to facilitate claims based on new evidence of innocence.60 Judges had interpreted the prior standard to require “serious” doubt; lawmakers reinforced that even the “slightest” doubt sufficed.61 The People’s Republic of China also adopted sweeping changes in criminal procedure statutes and court rules statutes and linking to an Innocence Project spreadsheet surveying exoneration compensation statutes in fifty states).

56. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 1, 11, 15.
57. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 15.
58. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1202–03.
59. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1645–51. (providing overview of innocence claims and their evolution in civil law countries).
60. See, e.g., CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 622 (Fr.); see also Katrien Verhesschen & Cyrille Fijnaut, Correcting Wrongful Convictions in France: Has the Act of 2014 Opened the Door to Revision?, 4 ERASMUS L. REV. 22, 22 (2020).
over the past several decades, creating several appellate avenues for reopening convictions, including based on newly discovered evidence. Appeals or revision in both countries involve a proceeding before judges, who consider newly introduced facts as part of the record.

The greater burdens of trials in common law jurisdictions (including live witness testimony and determination of guilt by jurors) have long engendered resistance to reopening convictions based on new evidence of innocence. Yet the movement to develop modern systems of criminal appeals arose in common law countries out of the “concern over the incidence of wrongful convictions.” More recently, several jurisdictions have responded to wrongful convictions by altering their finality rules, in some instances reflecting the influence of international human rights law.

In the United Kingdom, for example, lawmakers adopted appellate reforms in response to prominent cases, including the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four. In 1995, the United Kingdom amended the standard for appeal to include “unsafe” convictions, permitting a claim based on evidence of innocence that is not conclusive or such that no reasonable juror could convict. Subsequently, international law influenced the adoption of a more flexible “unsafe” conviction standard. In Condon v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) as mandating appellate review of the overall fairness of criminal trials. In response, the UK Parliament adopted the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, opening additional avenues for retrials based on a broader category of “new and compelling evidence.”

In Australia, courts can overturn “unsafe” convictions not supported by the evidence, but their inquiry is confined to the facts available at the time of


63. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 10 (recounting finality concerns as objections to expanding appeals in common law countries).

64. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 3.


Appeals are only permitted on questions of law, and once a final decision is entered, the case cannot be reopened. While intermediate appellate courts can examine “fresh evidence,” that is, evidence not introduced at trial, the High Court has long been prohibited from such review. As a result, no recourse exists if the intermediate court denies relief. In academic writings, former High Court Judge Michael Kirby has argued that this gap impedes justice.

In 2013, responding to international human rights concerns regarding the right to appeal, lawmakers in the State of South Australia expanded the opportunities to introduce new evidence of innocence in second or subsequent appeals before the state’s supreme court. The basis for such an appeal is “fresh and compelling evidence” to be considered “in the interests of justice.” Similar appellate reforms were enacted in Tasmania and Victoria, and a number of exonerations resulted from the use of these statutes in high-profile cases. However, the Australian High Court has continued to interpret these new statutes narrowly and limit appeals raising innocence claims; and other state jurisdictions in Australia have not enacted similar laws.

3. The Administrative Model

Several common law and civil law countries have established

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71. AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 69, ¶ 20–21.


73. See Michael Kirby, Black and White Lessons for the Australian Judiciary, 23 ADEL. L. REV. 195, 206 (2002); AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 69, ¶ 22.

74. See Michael Kirby, A New Right of Appeal as a Response to Wrongful Convictions: Is It Enough?, 43 CRIM. L.J. 299, 302–03 (2019) (observing that the new amendment enacting a right to second or subsequent appeal responded to an Australian Human Rights Commission report finding that Australia’s system of criminal appeals did not comply with the ICCPR). The new provisions were enacted in 2013 in the Statutes Amendment Appeals Act 2013, which inserted Section 353A in the Criminal Consolidation Act of 1935. Id. at 299 n.1. The provisions were later repealed and reenacted as Section 159 in the Criminal Procedure Act 1921. For more information, see Robert N. Moles & Bibi Sangha, Australian New Right of Appeal Homepage, NETWORKED KNOWLEDGE, http://netk.net.au/AppealsHome.asp [https://perma.cc/ZS4C-XMGH].

75. Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (S. Austl.) s 159(1). These are defined as: “(6) For the purposes of subsection (1), evidence relating to an offence is—(a) fresh if—(i) it was not adduced at the trial of the offence; and (b) compelling if—(i) it is reliable; and (ii) it is substantial; and (ii) it is highly probative in the context of the issues in dispute at the trial of the offence.” Id. at s 159(6).

76. See Kirby, supra note 74, at 303–04.

77. See Kirby, supra note 74, at 305 (“To do nothing and to persist with the flawed facility of seeking Executive consideration of a complaint behind closed doors constitutes a breach of Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR.”).
administrative bodies to investigate potential wrongful convictions and request courts to reopen cases based on claims of factual innocence. The structure of these bodies varies. One example on the formal end of the spectrum is the United Kingdom’s Criminal Case Review Commission (“CCRC”), the first of its kind in the world. The CCRC was not explicitly informed by international human rights law.

Other countries use less formal bodies and methods to review convictions and secure judicial release for prisoners who raise new evidence of innocence. In China, for example, Politics and Law Committees and People’s Congresses can convene and refer concerns regarding criminal convictions to judges. In Canada, legislation enacted in 2002 authorizes a defendant whose appeals are exhausted to apply to the Minister of Justice to investigate a claim of innocence. Nonbinding guidelines—modeled on right to compensation for miscarriages of justice in the ICCPR, discussed in detail infra—establish criteria that a wrongfully convicted person must meet to be entitled to this remedy. In the Netherlands, a 2012 amendment to the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure permits the defense to request that the Attorney General investigate a case based on a “novum”—“a new fact not known to the judge at the time of trial.”

In Australia, a national administrative body, the Australian Human Rights Commission, was asked a decade ago to review a proposal to adopt a UK-style CCRC. Emphasizing that the overarching goals of the relevant provision of the ICCPR “operate[] to ensure that no individual is deprived, in procedural terms, of his or her right to claim justice,” the Commission concluded that “[t]he current system of criminal appeals in Australia for a person who has been wrongfully convicted or who has been subject to a gross miscarriage of justice to challenge their conviction may not be fully

78. See Royal Comm’n on Crim. Just., supra note 65, at i (recommending the creation of the CCRC to replace the Criminal Case Unit of the Home Office, under which the Home Secretary could order new investigations of criminal cases for referral to the Court of Appeal); Garrett, supra note 1, at 121213; Griffin, supra note 65, 118–21.
79. For the first substantial empirical study of the CCRC’s work, see generally Carolyn Hoyle & Mia Sato, Reasons to Doubt: Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Cases Review Commission (2019).
80. See Royal Comm’n on Crim. Just., supra note 65, at i (describing impetus for the creation of the CCRC).
82. See Hinse v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 2015 2 S.C.R. 621, 660. We discuss the guidelines in Section II(C)(4) infra.
83. Garrett, supra note 1, at 1208.
compatible with the right to a fair trial” in the ICCPR. Although the Commission identified a CCRC-type administrative body as one mechanism to comply with international human rights standards, no such body has been created in response to its recommendation.

D. THE LIMITED INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL MODELS

The three models discussed supra illustrate the wide range of institutions and procedures that countries use to review innocence claims. In some jurisdictions, such review is consolidated with the appellate process. In others, it is formally independent from that process, but the same judges adjudicate collateral proceedings. In still other countries, separate administrative bodies investigate and recommend relief based on claims of innocence, which are then typically referred back to national judges. In sum, there is no single way to adapt innocence claims to domestic criminal procedural rules.

This diversity reflects the fact that the national models developed organically in response to a common problem—wrongful convictions—that was, nonetheless, experienced quite differently due to variations in domestic criminal proceedings. Government officials, civil society groups, and scholars studied the approaches of other countries, learned from their successes and failures, and, in some instances, modified national models in light of the information they learned. However, these bottom-up and horizontal processes of law reform and policy diffusion occurred with limited input from international human rights law.

In other areas of the criminal process—such as fair trial guarantees—human rights treaties are specific and detailed, establishing an international baseline of protection that has influenced all national legal systems. In the absence of a bespoke right to claim innocence, however, international law has had less influence on national models for addressing wrongful convictions, especially regarding claims of factual innocence.

Human rights treaties have been invoked to justify some criminal law reforms in some common law countries, most notably in the United

88. Kirby, supra note 74, at 302.
89. See generally Wrongful Conviction: International Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008); see also Miranda Jolicoeur, Nat’l Inst. of Just., International Perspectives on Wrongful Convictions: Workshop Report 5 (2010), (examining “how other countries . . . are handling wrongful convictions . . . to determine possible best practices that could be adapted for the U.S. system to prevent and correct wrongful convictions”).
Kingdom, as well as Australia and Canada. Elsewhere, however, there is little evidence of international human rights law’s footprint; instead, domestic responses to exonerations and miscarriages of justice have largely driven reforms.91

Before setting forth our proposal to remedy this omission, we first explain how a right to claim innocence can be derived from existing international standards and can also satisfy the standard for recognition as a new, freestanding human right.

II. TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE

This section lays the foundation for protecting post-conviction innocence claims in international law. After reviewing the advantages that flow from identifying a legal claim as an internationally protected right, we consider where the right to claim innocence fits within typologies for recognizing “new” human rights. For example, can the right be derived from an interpretation of rights that already govern criminal trials, appeals, and compensation for miscarriages of justice?92 Does it constitute a new, stand-alone human right?93 Or can the right be recognized by drawing upon both perspectives? We conclude by discussing the implications of recognizing the right to claim innocence under each approach.

A. THE ADVANTAGES OF RECOGNIZING A RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The growing number of countries that allow defendants to raise post-conviction innocence claims reveals that national innocence organizations have been quite effective in convincing governments to recognize and expand such mechanisms. These developments have occurred, as we have shown, with only limited influence from international law. It is, thus, fair to ask whether the transnational innocence movement needs international human rights law. Or, to pose the question slightly less provocatively, what would defendants and innocence groups gain from the recognition of an express right to claim innocence in international law?

We answer these questions infra, drawing upon a rich literature that identifies the symbolic, strategic, normative, and enforcement benefits of explicitly recognizing a right in international law— for the individuals who

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91. See generally Garrett, supra note 1 (describing the role, across a range of jurisdictions, that wrongful convictions played in relaxing barriers to consideration of new evidence of innocence); see also Roach, supra note 33, at 381.
93. See id. at 25.
claim rights, for the civil society groups who advocate for recognition, and for society more broadly.94

1. Symbolic Benefits

Perhaps most basically, identifying something as an international human right acknowledges the need to prioritize its realization.95 It reframes a mere political aspiration as a mandatory entitlement that can be achieved, particularly via legal claims and accountability mechanisms.96 This reframing extends beyond the individuals and groups who benefit from the right. International laws and processes have expressive values that can influence state preferences, shaping normative beliefs about the nature of a problem and the need to address it.97

International recognition can also engender a range of “paradigm shift[s]” that enhance the legitimacy and power of rights-holders.98 These include changing discourse from “one of charity to one of entitlement”99 and enhancing expectations of compliance.100 In the context of wrongful convictions, these shifts can result in defendants being viewed not as passive recipients of government clemency or mercy, but as rights-holders who are entitled to present new evidence of innocence to appropriate decisionmakers.101

2. Strategic Benefits

Express recognition as an international human right also has numerous strategic advantages. These include serving as a tool for social

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100. See Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 128, 131 (2001); Leary, supra note 95, at 39; see also Kristen David Adams, Do We Need a Right to Housing?, 9 NEV. L.J. 275, 300–01 (2009) (“[H]uman rights . . . carry power and legitimacy that motivate governments to create and sustain programs to put those rights into action.”).
101. See Bluemel, supra note 99, at 973; Meier et al., supra note 96, at 117 (finding that the rights-language changes the conception of individuals as being “passive recipients of government benevolence”); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 341 (2005) (“Establishing water as a right puts people in the center of development as opposed to passive recipients.”).
movements;\textsuperscript{102} raising the visibility of individuals who have experienced injustice; increasing education and awareness;\textsuperscript{103} promoting the identification of shared goals; building broader alliances and more effective advocacy strategies, both within a single state and across borders;\textsuperscript{104} and enhancing the institutional, legal, financial, and other support needed to realize the relevant right. These advantages, both individually and in combination, have the potential to further strengthen the transnational innocence movement.

Recognition also locates the right within existing international legal frameworks that contain well-understood obligations for states, such as the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the right.\textsuperscript{105} These frameworks also identify specific duty-bearers—such as state agencies and officials—who become the focus of legal and political advocacy, alongside non-governmental actors who may also be amenable to rights-based claims. This identification enhances the ability of rights-holders and their supporters to hold these actors accountable for violations and pressure them to take proactive steps to realize the right and remedy violations.\textsuperscript{106}

3. Normative Benefits

Recognition of a right as protected by international law can also help to close domestic rights protection gaps. Although we have highlighted the transnational innocence movement’s successes, it is also worth underscoring that some countries continue to adhere to traditional finality rules that make it difficult or impossible to raise new evidence of factual innocence.\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, several states that have created procedures for introducing such evidence have, as previously explained, not done so comprehensively or sufficiently. As a result, the ability to raise innocence claims following a conviction—and the likelihood of exonerations—varies widely across national jurisdictions, even for similarly situated defendants.

\textsuperscript{102} Andrew Keane Woods, \textit{Discounting Rights}, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 509, 516 (2018) ("Rights can also be a language for articulating grievances, a tool for building a social movement, a specific aspirational goal for the country[,] . . . a general aspirational goal[,] . . . and more.").


\textsuperscript{104} See Meier et al., supra note 98, at 123.


\textsuperscript{107} See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 1, at 1187 ("[T]here is no established standard in India for reversing a conviction based on new evidence of innocence."); \textit{id.} at 1207 (noting that in Mexico “remedies involving newly discovered evidence of innocence remain extremely narrow.”).
International recognition of a right to claim innocence can help to remedy these deficiencies in several ways. It can identify minimum standards of protection that should apply regardless of which national model a state follows, such as ensuring recognition of factual innocence claims alongside legal ones. It can also facilitate consistent interpretations of similar legal standards and encourage the spread of policy innovation across borders.\(^\text{108}\) As legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies monitor and respond to developments elsewhere, these trends may, over time, generate an influential set of best practices for other states to follow.

4. Enforcement Benefits

Lastly, international recognition can encourage enforcement of a right.\(^\text{109}\) National courts in some countries give direct effect to international human rights standards; in others, courts interpret constitutions and statutes to avoid conflicts with those standards.\(^\text{110}\) This is true not only for treaties and customary law, but also for nonbinding international norms.\(^\text{111}\)

A related advantage concerns monitoring and enforcement before global and regional bodies. The system of international human rights protection encompasses multiple venues, including litigation before regional courts and commissions, review of complaints and State party reports by treaty bodies, fact-finding and reporting by the U.N. special procedures, and periodic review of all U.N. members before the U.N. Human Rights Council.\(^\text{112}\) Recognition of a right enables individuals and civil society groups to engage with this extensive network of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.\(^\text{113}\) Such engagement, in turn, can pressure governments to modify their laws and policies, incorporate rights protections into domestic legal systems, and provide meaningful redress for violations.\(^\text{114}\) Several recent studies have

\(^{108}\) See Bluemel, supra note 99, at 972 (finding that the recognition of a right can “provide greater clarity and consistency in interpretation, leading to greater State compliance and clearer complainant rights to remedies”); Halle, supra note 103, at 37 (observing that human rights can bring “clarity, coherence and standard” regarding the protection of rights).

\(^{109}\) Cassel, supra note 100, at 128–29.


\(^{112}\) See, e.g., Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 5–26 (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 2010).

\(^{113}\) See Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 301, 301 (1991); Cassel, supra note 100, at 129; Huang, supra note 106, at 359, 361; Margolin, supra note 105, at 80.

\(^{114}\) Halle, supra note 103, at 39; Fredvang & Biggs, supra note 98, at 18.
found international human rights laws and institutions to be effective in achieving these outcomes.  

As applied to the right to claim innocence, the combined effect of symbolic, strategic, normative, and enforcement benefits can create a positive feedback loop that, over time, leads to a reduction in the number of wrongful convictions globally. However, simply asserting the existence of an international right to claim innocence does not guarantee this result. To gain widespread acceptance, such a claim must be carefully grounded in existing frameworks for recognizing human rights. We describe infra the two leading frameworks for international recognition: the derivative rights and freestanding rights approaches. We then explain how global and regional treaties that mandate guarantees relating to criminal proceedings—the presumption of innocence, fair trials and appeals, and compensation for miscarriages of justice—provide a solid normative foundation for recognizing an international human right to claim innocence under either of these frameworks.

B. DERIVATIVE VS. FREESTANDING APPROACHES TO RECOGNIZING NEW HUMAN RIGHTS

Evolution and expansion are two hallmarks of international human rights law. The number and scope of protected rights and freedoms have enlarged over time through a range of processes, including the adoption of new treaties, the interpretation of existing international agreements, and the articulation of nonbinding human rights norms, or soft law. There are, nonetheless, ongoing debates over how to categorize these expansions, the degree to which they can accurately be labeled as novel, and whether they are

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115. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (finding that “treaties can affect domestic politics in ways that tend to exert important influence over how governments behave towards their own citizens”); Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, The Proof is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under International Human Rights Treaties, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2020) (documenting a positive relationship between states reporting to human rights treaty monitoring bodies and improvements in domestic human rights practices); Christopher J. Fariss, The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship Between Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 239 (2017) (relying on data to show “the ratification of human rights treaties is associated with higher levels of respect for human rights); KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 141 (2017) (analyzing evidence “suggest[ing] that overall there is less violence and fewer human rights violations in the world than there were in the past”).


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desirable or even permissible.\textsuperscript{118}

Within these debates, labeling an international right as “new” often refers to normative shifts that enable a claim or demand to gain the status of a separate or stand-alone human right.\textsuperscript{119} However, “newness” also encompasses processes that identify a right as novel in scope because it is newly implied or newly derived from existing guarantees.\textsuperscript{120} This section briefly outlines the two major processes for identifying “new” rights—derivation from existing rights, and freestanding rights\textsuperscript{121}—to set the stage for analyzing the right to claim innocence under both approaches.

The process of deriving a “new” right involves “identifying previously unarticulated aspects of old human rights”\textsuperscript{122} or articulating “newly recognized aspects of existing rights.”\textsuperscript{123} Also referred to as “auxiliary rights,”\textsuperscript{124} “implied rights,”\textsuperscript{125} or “intersectional rights,”\textsuperscript{126} derived rights are developed out of necessity—such as a need to ensure the realization of other rights or as a “necessary extension” of existing rights\textsuperscript{127}—and reinforced by the


\textsuperscript{119} See Susi, supra note 92, at 21 (“The claim of ‘novelty’ starts before and ends after the recognition of a new human right in the family of so-called stand-alone human rights.”).


\textsuperscript{121} See Danwood M. Chirwa, \textit{Access to Water as a New Right in International, Regional and Comparative Constitutional Law}, in \textit{THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC} 55–56 (Andreas von Arnauld & Kerstin von der Decken eds., 2020); see also Pierre Thielbörger, \textit{Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed and Something Blue: Lessons to Be Learned from the Oldest of the ’New’ Rights – the Human Right to Water}, in \textit{THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC} 74 (Andreas von Arnauld & Kerstin von der Decken eds., 2020) (“Thus, both the way in which the right to water was construed (namely through legal derivation) as well as the right’s normative content (being partially civil-political, partially socio-economic in nature) certainly deserve to be considered a novelty in international human rights law.”).


\textsuperscript{123} Holning Lau, \textit{Gender Recognition as a Human Right}, in \textit{THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC} 193, 193 (Andreas von Arnauld & Kerstin von der Decken eds., 2020) (“Sexual orientation and gender identity rights are only new in the sense that they are newly recognized aspects of existing rights.”).


\textsuperscript{125} See Çalı, supra note 120, at 277.


ambiguous scope of existing guarantees.\textsuperscript{128}

There are different means by which such derivative processes occur. Evolutive interpretation that recognizes human rights treaties as “living instrument[s]” is one of the most common methods.\textsuperscript{129} Irrespective of the technique used, however, the rights derivation approach focuses on the relationship between the “parent”\textsuperscript{130} right and the “offspring”\textsuperscript{131} right.\textsuperscript{132} This relationship can take a number of forms, including (as we later show for the right to claim innocence) through “combining different elements of several different parent rights.”\textsuperscript{133} In practice, claims of “newness” for derivative rights are often muted. Proponents of derivative rights often describe them in ways that acknowledge their novelty while emphasizing their close connections to established rights.\textsuperscript{134}

The path to recognizing a separate, freestanding right is more difficult, both as a conceptual and a practical matter.\textsuperscript{135} The relationship between stand-alone rights and existing guarantees can be quite attenuated. Stand-alone rights are often asserted precisely because established rights fall far short of the protections needed, such as by not extending to certain marginalized groups.\textsuperscript{136} To provide such protection, the new right “strengthens a specific aspect of the established human right to the degree that its separation . . . is justified.”\textsuperscript{137} Thus, a stand-alone right emerges because the need for “adequate protection” cannot be achieved through evolutionary interpretation or progressive implementation of existing rights.\textsuperscript{138}

There are no definitive criteria for recognizing new stand-alone human rights. However, the U.N. General Assembly and commentators have proposed various “quality control” standards to assess new rights claims. We

\begin{enumerate}
\item See \textit{PIERRE THIELBÖRGER, THE RIGHT(S) TO WATER: THE MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF A UNIQUE HUMAN RIGHT} 69 (2014).
\item \textit{See} von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 13.
\item \textit{See} Thielbörger, supra note 121, at 73.
\item \textit{Id.}
\item \textit{See}, e.g., Lau, supra note 123, at 193; Shaver, supra note 126, at 49.
\item \textit{See} Mart Susi, \textit{The Right to Be Forgotten}, in \textit{THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC}, supra note 92, at 287, 288 (arguing for a framework of novelty, recognition, and/or rhetoric in assessing whether a new stand-alone right exists).
\item Susi, supra note 92, at 26.
\item \textit{Id.} at 25.
\item \textit{Id.} at 26 (finding that a new “stand-alone” human right emerges because of the need for “adequate protection which is not achievable through broadening the scope of or simply interpreting the respective established right is justified”).
\end{enumerate}
analyze these standards *infra* and apply them to assess claims for a new, freestanding right to claim innocence.

**C. THE RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE AS A DERIVATIVE RIGHT**

This section applies the derivative rights approach to show that existing human rights treaties and international jurisprudence can be applied to protect a right to claim innocence. Since its inception, international human rights law has protected a wide range of fairness guarantees in criminal proceedings. These guarantees were first set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") and later defined and extended in the ICCPR and in regional human rights agreements, such as the ECHR. Several provisions of these international instruments—in particular, the rights to life, fair trial, appeal, a remedy, and compensation for miscarriages of justice—provide a solid normative foundation for recognizing a derivative right to assert a claim of factual innocence.

As currently interpreted, however, these rights, even when viewed cumulatively, do not adequately protect such a right. On the contrary, features that are central to raising factual innocence claims are strikingly absent from, or insufficiently developed through, this suite of existing protections. These gaps include the obligation of governments to establish a mechanism for defendants to introduce such evidence on direct appeal or in post-conviction judicial or administrative proceedings; the evidentiary standards applicable in such proceedings; and the types of remedies that must be provided to individuals whose innocence claims are upheld.139

1. **The Right to Life and Restrictions on Capital Punishment**

The right to life has long been recognized as inherent, non-derogable, and essential for the enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms. Numerous treaties require human life to be protected by law and prohibit states from arbitrary deprivations of life.140 Early civil and political rights treaties nevertheless recognized that capital punishment is not per se prohibited.141 However, as a growing number of countries have abolished the death penalty, human rights standards governing capital punishment have also evolved.

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139. We discuss how these gaps might be filled in Part III *infra*.
141. *See, e.g.,* ECHR, *supra* note 140, at art. 2(1) ("No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.").
This evolution is reflected in additional protocols and supplementary treaties that expressly abrogate capital punishment, as well as in capacious interpretations of the right to life by international tribunals and review bodies.

The latter development is particularly reflected in the jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”), a body of eighteen independent experts that monitors compliance with the ICCPR by evaluating reports from States parties, reviewing individual complaints, and issuing authoritative interpretations. In General Comment No. 36 on the right to life, adopted in 2018, the UNHRC explained that the ICCPR sets out “specific safeguards for ensuring that in States parties which have not yet abolished the death penalty, it must not be applied except for the most serious crimes, and then only in the most exceptional cases and under the strictest limits.” Those limits include violations of the ICCPR’s fair trial and due process guarantees, such as reliance on forced confessions, the inability of the accused to question relevant witnesses, disregard of the presumption of innocence, and restrictions on the right to appeal.

The UNHRC has long held that imposing a sentence of death following a criminal proceeding infected by such procedural flaws is an arbitrary deprivation of life. Burdyko v. Belarus, a 2015 decision, provides a representative example. The defendant in the case was subjected to physical and psychological pressure to confess to capital crimes, denied the assistance of a lawyer for pre-trial investigations, and shackled and kept in a metal cage during the subsequent criminal trial. In addition to finding violations of the ICCPR’s torture and fair trial provisions, the UNHRC held that Belarus had breached the right to life by sentencing the applicant to death after an unfair trial. The UNHRC reiterated its longstanding position that a sentence of death may be imposed only in accordance with “the procedural guarantees [protected by the ICCPR], including the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher tribunal.”

In General Comment No. 36, building on Burdyko and earlier decisions,
the UNHRC recognized for the first time an explicit link between wrongful convictions, post-conviction review, and the right to life:

The execution of sentenced persons whose guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt also constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life. States parties must therefore take all feasible measures in order to avoid wrongful convictions in death penalty cases, to review procedural barriers to reconsideration of convictions and to re-examine past convictions on the basis of new evidence, including new DNA evidence.148

This statement is noteworthy for moving beyond the procedural guarantees that support legal innocence claims to focus on how states should respond to defendants who allege factual innocence. The statement also lays a strong normative foundation for recognizing the right to claim innocence as part of the right to life. Further development of the content of this right would, for example, identify the processes that states should adopt to reconsider capital convictions obtained in violation of these procedural guarantees and challenged in light of post-conviction evidence of factual innocence.149

2. The Right to a Fair Trial and to Appeal

Numerous international instruments protect a range of guarantees relating to the criminal process. The UDHR recognizes a right to a “fair and public hearing” and a “right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty,” as well as a right not to be found guilty of “any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence . . . at the time when it was committed” or to receive a “heavier penalty” than that which applied at the time the offense was committed.150 The more detailed list of criminal procedure rights in Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR provide, inter alia, that everyone shall have the right “to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according

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148. See General Comment No. 36, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (footnote omitted). In support of this interpretation, the UNHRC cited to its 2014 Concluding Observations on the report of the United States, in which the Committee expressed concern at “the high number of persons wrongly sentenced to death, despite existing safeguards, and by the fact that 16 retentionist states do not provide for compensation for persons who are wrongfully convicted, while other states provide for insufficient compensation.” U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014).

149. See, e.g., Cornell Ctr. on the Death Penalty Worldwide, Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Regarding General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, on the Right to Life, 6–7 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/CornellCenterontheDeathPenaltyWorldwide.docx (urging the UNHRC to “consider adding cautionary statements with regard to other noted risk factors for wrongful convictions, including the use of torture or coercion to obtain confessions, faulty police investigation methods, and a lack of training and resources for defense counsel”).

to law,”¹⁵¹ “to a fair and public hearing,”¹⁵² and to receive “adequate . . . facilities”¹⁵³ for preparing a criminal defense, including access to “exculpatory material” and “material establishing innocence” in the prosecution’s possession.¹⁵⁴

However, while these fair trial rights mandate procedural equality and fairness, they do not guarantee that a domestic court “will actually reach the correct result in one’s case.”¹⁵⁵ It thus remains possible that an innocent person will be convicted of a criminal offense. What concrete protection does international human rights law offer if new evidence of innocence arises after a first-instance conviction? The answer is somewhat uncertain, as the discussion of the right to appeal reveals.

A “primary function of the modern right of appeal is to protect against miscarriages of justice.”¹⁵⁶ International human rights law emphasizes this function by requiring appellate review of the factual or legal bases of a conviction. For example, the UNHRC has explained that the right to appeal in ICCPR Article 14(5) is satisfied only if an appellate court can “review substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the law, the conviction and sentence, such that the procedure allows for due consideration of the nature of the case.”¹⁵⁷ In the European human rights system, “review by a higher court of a conviction or sentence may concern both points of fact and points of law or be confined solely to points of law,” provided that the appeals tribunal has “an effective role in reviewing the trial

¹⁵¹ ICCPR, supra note 140, art.14(2); ECHR, supra note 140, art. 6(2). “[T]he presumption of innocence is inherent in any proper conception of the relationship between the state and its citizens in an open and democratic society.” Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 123 S. Afr. L.J. 63, 73 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). The presumption “imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle.” U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007), [hereinafter General Comment No. 32]; see also Telfner v. Austria, App. No. 33501/96, ¶ 15 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 20, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59347 (finding a violation of Article 6(2) of the ECHR when a domestic court violated the presumption of innocence in that it wrongly placed the burden of proof on the defence”).

¹⁵² ICCPR, supra note 140, art.14(1); ECHR, supra note 140, art. 6(1).

¹⁵³ ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 14(3)(b).

¹⁵⁴ General Comment No. 32, supra note 151, ¶ 33; see also Papageorgiou v. Greece, App. No. 59506/00, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 9, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61091 (finding a violation of Article 6(2) of the ECHR when a domestic court violated the presumption of innocence in that it wrongfully placed the burden of proof on the defence”).


¹⁵⁶ Marshall, supra note 14, at 3.

¹⁵⁷ General Comment No. 32, supra note 151, ¶ 48. However, a “full retrial or a ‘hearing’ ” is not required, so long as the reviewing court “can examine the factual dimensions of the case,” including “evidence submitted at the trial and referred to in the appeal.” General Comment No. 32, supra note 151, ¶ 48.
procedures.” In countries “where an appellate court acts not merely as a court of revision but has to examine a case as to the facts and the law and make a fresh re-assessment of the issue of guilt or innocence,” the accused must be allowed to introduce evidence and testimony “for the purpose of proving that he did not commit the act allegedly constituting a criminal offence.”

However, the right to appeal, as presently interpreted, offers only partial protection when claims of factual innocence are raised after a conviction. This is shown by recent decisions of the ECtHR and the UNHRC which consider whether domestic courts must review evidence of factual innocence after an individual has been convicted and sentenced.

In the ECtHR judgment of *Lalmahomed v. Netherlands*, the applicant was charged with failing to present an identity document to the police. Lalmahomed contested the charge during an initial appearance, explaining that he had been acquitted of several previous offenses because someone else was misusing his identity. However, he did not show up at a subsequent hearing, and a Dutch trial court convicted him *in absentia*. Lalmahomed promptly challenged that conviction, but the Dutch Court of Appeal rejected the challenge, concluding that the case file did not support his claim “that his identity details [had been] systematically misused by someone else and that he [had] been acquitted by the courts several times already because of that.”

Lalmahomed then filed an application with the ECtHR, arguing that the denial of leave to appeal violated the right of access to a court protected by ECHR Article 6. He submitted copies of the previous acquittals that were part of the official record but were not, for unexplained reasons, included in the case file before the Court of Appeal. The ECtHR concluded that the Netherlands had violated Article 6 because the appellate tribunal had failed


161. *Id.* ¶ 8.

162. *Id.* ¶ 11.

163. *Id.* ¶ 13.

164. *Id.* ¶ 26.

165. *Id.* ¶ 29.
to consider the factual evidence supporting “the applicant’s claim that his identity had been misused.” According to the ECtHR, “the absence from the case file of [the record of acquittals] meant that the denial of leave to appeal . . . could not be based on a full and thorough evaluation of the relevant factors.”

The Lalmahomed decision applies the right to appeal to a factual innocence claim where the evidence in support of that claim appears in the trial record. However, other situations in which the right arises remain unresolved. For example, it is uncertain if the ECtHR would reach a similar result in cases in which a defendant seeks to introduce fresh evidence of innocence obtained after a first-instance conviction.

The uncertainty of whether the right to appeal automatically extends to separate collateral proceedings challenging a conviction on grounds of factual innocence is shown by a recent decision of the UNHRC. In Litvin v. Ukraine, the applicant’s son was convicted of murder and rape. The trial court and the Ukrainian Supreme Court dismissed the defendant’s allegations that he had been tortured into confessing and was deprived of the right to gather evidence to refute the prosecution’s case. After an appellate court affirmed the conviction, the defendant retained several forensic experts whose reports cast doubt on his identity as the assailant, questioned whether the victim had been raped, and supported his allegations of torture. The defendant then filed a petition with the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office, relying on provisions of the Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code which authorize the reopening of criminal cases based on “newly discovered facts.” The office refused to open an investigation, and the Supreme Court later rejected the defendant’s application to review his conviction, finding no grounds to reconsider the case.

In her petition to the UNHRC, the defendant’s mother raised numerous violations of the ICCPR. The UNHRC agreed with the complaints concerning her son’s interrogation and the procedural errors, but it dismissed the alleged violation of the right to appeal:

166. Id. ¶ 46.
167. Id. ¶ 47.
168. Such review is common in countries in which appellate courts reexamine both the facts and the legal issues relating to a prosecution and make de novo determinations of guilt or innocence. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 22–24 (summarizing de novo appellate review in France, Germany, and Italy).
170. Id. ¶ 2.7.
171. Id. ¶ 2.8–2.9.
172. Id. ¶ 2.192.20.
173. Id. ¶ 2.22.
174. Id. ¶ 2.22, 2.23.
As to the author’s claim that the refusal of the General Prosecutor to reconsider the criminal case of her son based on newly discovered facts after the Supreme Court decided the cassation appeal amounts to a violation of article 14, paragraph 5, of the [ICCPR], the Committee considers that the scope of article 14, paragraph 5 does not extend to a review of a conviction and sentence based on newly discovered facts once this sentence has become final.175

The Litvin decision has been cited for the proposition that the right to appeal “confers no right to a review of one’s conviction in the light of fresh evidence,”176 highlighting a key protection gap in the existing interpretation of the ICCPR. However, the persuasiveness of this interpretation of Article 14(5) is very much open to question, not least because it is in tension with the body’s own subsequent statement that governments—at least in capital cases—should “re-examine past convictions on the basis of new evidence, including new DNA evidence.”177

3. The Right to a Remedy

The right to appeal to correct errors of the criminal process is a specific application of a general international law principle: everyone whose rights have been violated is entitled to a remedy. In practice, the right to a remedy supports recognizing a derivative right of defendants to assert claims of factual innocence, although international law has yet to identify the full scope of protections associated with such a right.

The right to a remedy is expressly guaranteed by the UDHR178 and by most global and regional human rights treaties,179 and it has been reaffirmed and amplified in soft law, including a 2005 U.N. General Assembly Resolution.180 In general, a remedy should be “full and effective” and “proportional to the gravity of the violation” and of the injury suffered.181 Remedial

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175. Id. ¶ 9.4
176. See JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 155, at 515.
177. See General Comment No. 36, supra note 142, ¶ 43.
178. See UDHR, supra note 150, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”).
179. ICCPR Article 2.3(a) requires States parties “[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 2.3(a). ECHR Article 13 contains essentially identical language. See ECHR, supra note 140, art. 13. Article 2.3(b) of the ICCPR further specifies that remedies must be provided by the “competent judicial, administrative[,] legislative[,] or other competent authority” in the state’s legal system, with a preference for judicial remedies. ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 2.3(b).
181. Id. ¶ 18.
measures should include, whenever possible, restoring the situation that existed before the violation occurred.\(^{182}\)

In the criminal context, “often the most appropriate” remedy for a fair trial right violation not corrected on appeal is a retrial or reopening of the proceedings.\(^{183}\) Nearly all European countries, for example, have established mechanisms to reopen domestic criminal proceedings following an ECtHR judgment finding a prosecution or conviction in violation of the ECHR.\(^{184}\) However, states have also provided restitution in criminal cases by reducing or suspending enforcement of a sentence, unconditionally releasing a defendant, and providing compensation.\(^{185}\)

The right to remedy has been interpreted to require reopening of criminal proceedings in response to legal innocence claims. A recent UNHRC decision, \textit{Saidov v. Tajikistan},\(^{186}\) is illustrative. The case concerned a former government official (Saidov) convicted of illegally forming an opposition political party.\(^{187}\) The proceedings involved numerous violations of pre-trial and fair trial rights, including the courts’ refusal to consider evidence of Saidov’s innocence.\(^{188}\) The UNHRC concluded that the obligation to make “full reparation” for these violations required the state, “inter alia, a) [sic] to quash Mr. Saidov’s conviction, release him, and if necessary, conduct a new trial, in accordance with the principles of fair hearings, presumption of innocence and other procedural safeguards; (b) and provide Mr. Saidov with adequate compensation.”\(^{189}\)

Additional support for reopening criminal proceedings is found in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, which codifies the double jeopardy, or \textit{ne bis in idem}, principle.\(^{190}\) The first paragraph of Article 4 defines the

\(^{182}\) Id. ¶ 19.


\(^{184}\) See id. ¶¶ 34–39; see also Alice Donald & Anne-Katrin Speck, The European Court of Human Rights’ Remedial Practice and Its Impact on the Execution of Judgments, 19 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 83, 94 (2019) (discussing ECtHR jurisprudence “concerning the re-opening of criminal proceedings following an unfair trial”).


\(^{187}\) See id. ¶¶ 9.2–9.7.

\(^{188}\) See id. ¶ 2.72.8.


\(^{190}\) See Protocol No. 7, supra note 158, art. 4.
scope of the right not to be tried or punished twice. 191 The second paragraph provides an exception that permits the reopening of a case “if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.” 192 The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 clarifies that this exception “does not prevent a reopening of the proceedings in favour of the convicted person and any other changing of the judgment to the benefit of the convicted person.” 193

In Mihalache v. Romania, the ECtHR considered in dictum whether the exception applies to “situations where an accused has been found guilty and a reopening of proceedings might work to his advantage.” 194 Citing the Explanatory Report, the Court asserted that “the nature of the defect must be assessed primarily in order to ascertain whether there has been a violation of the defence rights and therefore an impediment to the proper administration of justice.” 195

Taken together, the Saidov and Mihalache decisions underscore international law’s focus on the procedural violations that provide the basis for legal innocence claims. While these cases do not explicitly address post-conviction claims of factual innocence, the core principles underlying the right to a remedy also provide a strong foundation for affording individuals who raise claims of factual innocence a meaningful opportunity to assert those claims in a domestic proceeding that can grant appropriate relief—including by re-opening criminal proceedings—if the claim is upheld.

4. The Right to Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice

International law provides another remedy for human rights violations in criminal proceedings: the right to compensation for miscarriages of justice. This provision appears in the ICCPR and in regional human rights treaties, which we analyze infra. Yet international law has lagged on specifying how this right applies to factual innocence claims—in particular, in not expressly requiring states to establish procedures for defendants to raise wrongful conviction claims and to determine whether miscarriages of justice have occurred. However, recent developments suggest a move toward recognizing a right to raise both legal and factual post-conviction innocence claims as

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191. See id. art. 4 § 1.
192. See id. art. 4 § 2.
195. Id.
part of the right to compensation.

The foundational provision recognizing a right to compensation appears in Article 14(6) of the ICCPR, which provides as follows:

When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.\(^{196}\)

Similar provisions appear in two regional human rights treaties. Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, adopted in 1984, follows the same wording of ICCPR Article 14(6), except that compensation shall be awarded either “according to the law or the practice of the State concerned.”\(^{197}\) Article 10 of the American Convention on Human Rights contains a more succinct articulation: “Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice.”\(^{198}\) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights lacks a corresponding provision. However, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights has adopted nonbinding principles and guidelines that closely track the right to compensation as set forth in the ICCPR.\(^{199}\)

The drafting history sheds some light on the scope of this compensation right. Article 14(6) has been labeled as “at the time of its drafting, the most controversial provision” among the ICCPR’s fair trial rights.\(^{200}\) Summing up the competing views, the U.N. Secretary-General noted: “It was argued . . . that the payment of compensation was a matter for the exclusive discretion of the executive and that national approaches varied considerably; [conversely,] that the right to compensation . . . was basic and should be made enforceable against the State . . . “\(^{201}\) One reason for this controversy

\(^{196}\) ICCPR, supra note 140, art.14(6). A few ICCPR state parties, mostly in the Global South, have filed reservations to Article 14(6). The reservations accept the right to compensation in principle but assert that it was not possible to implement the provision at the time of ratifying the ICCPR. See Mujuzi, supra note 14, at 216 n.2.

\(^{197}\) See Protocol No. 7, supra note 158, art. 3.


\(^{199}\) Principle 10(2)(b) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003) is “a verbatim reproduction of Article 14(6) of the ICCPR except that it is silent on the issue of whether such a person would also qualify for compensation even if ‘it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.’ ” Mujuzi, supra note 14, at 235.

\(^{200}\) MANFRED, NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY 269 (1993).

\(^{201}\) MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 311.
was a significant disagreement among states as to whether a “miscarriage of justice” requires a showing of factual innocence or can be demonstrated by other fair trial violations. 202

The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 is similarly ambiguous, underscoring the difficulty of protecting the right to claim factual innocence via the right to compensation for miscarriages of justice. The report initially describes a miscarriage of justice as “some serious failure in the judicial process involving grave prejudice to the convicted person.” 203 Even so, it later asserts that compensation is required “only in clear cases of miscarriage of justice, in the sense that there would be acknowledgement that the person concerned was clearly innocent,” in contrast to an “appellate[] court [that] had quashed a conviction because it had discovered some fact which introduced a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and which had been overlooked by the trial judge.” 204

The UNHRC and ECtHR have interpreted the meaning of “miscarriage of justice” in two decisions. In Dumont v. Canada, 205 the applicant was convicted of rape based primarily on the victim’s testimony. 206 The victim changed her statement after the trial, claiming that she had misidentified the perpetrator. 207 The revised statement was not considered on appeal, but a court later quashed the applicant’s conviction following a review by a board of inquiry. 208

Dumont then filed a petition pursuant to the Guidelines on Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons, which authorizes the Canadian government to award compensation to an exonerated defendant if “a new fact [has] come to light that shows that a miscarriage of justice has taken place.” 209 According to the Guidelines, “compensation should only be granted to those persons who did not commit the crime for which they were convicted.” 210 Applying this standard, the government denied the petition and Dumont challenged the denial in court. 211 After proceedings relating to the compensation claim remained unresolved for several years, Dumont filed

202. According to one recent study, the fact that delegates twice rejected proposals to condition compensation upon a finding of actual innocence indicates that the right extends to other types of miscarriages of justice. See Mujuzi, supra note 14, at 221. However, the basic normative disagreements among states over whether to include this right in the ICCPR makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions.
204. Explanatory Report, supra note 193, ¶ 25.
206. Id. ¶ 2.1.
207. Id.
208. Id. ¶ 13.2.
209. Id. ¶ 3.1.
210. Id. ¶ 16.1 n.10.
211. Id. ¶ 3.2.
a complaint with the UNHRC.\textsuperscript{212}

The UNHRC held that Canada had violated Article 14(6) together with Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy.\textsuperscript{213} The principal basis for this conclusion was the lack of a meaningful domestic mechanism for Dumont, following his acquittal, to “launch[] a new investigation in order to review the case and to possibly identify the real perpetrator.”\textsuperscript{214} As a result of this “gap” in the law—as well as the multi-year delay in the subsequent civil proceedings—Canada had deprived Dumont of “an effective remedy to enable him to establish his innocence . . . in order to obtain the compensation provided for in article 14, paragraph 6.”\textsuperscript{215}

The UNHRC also considered what qualifies as a “miscarriage of justice.”\textsuperscript{216} Canada argued that no miscarriage had occurred, because the victim’s revised statement merely cast doubt on Dumont’s conviction but did not prove that he was actually innocent.\textsuperscript{217} Since the government had not created an effective procedure for exonerated defendants to apply for compensation, the UNHRC did not take a “position on the accuracy of the State party’s interpretation.”\textsuperscript{218} One member of the Committee dissented on this point, concluding that Article 14(6) “does not require the convicted person to prove his or her innocence.”\textsuperscript{219} Consistent with that interpretation, the dissent would have required Canada to revise the Guidelines to “abolish the obligation for the convicted person to give proof of innocence in order to receive compensation for a miscarriage of justice.”\textsuperscript{220}

In the European human rights system, the meaning of “miscarriage of justice” has arisen in cases applying the presumption of innocence in ECHR Article 6(2). The ECtHR has held that the presumption, in addition to protecting individuals prior to and during criminal trials, continues after an acquittal.\textsuperscript{221} For example, government officials may not make public statements implying that an individual is guilty of the crime for which she was

\begin{revfootnotes}
\item[212] Id. ¶ 13.4.
\item[213] Id. ¶ 23.6. Article 2(3) requires states to provide a remedy for violations of the ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 2(3).
\item[215] Id. ¶ 23.6.
\item[216] Id. ¶ 23.4–23.6.
\item[217] Id. ¶ 23.4.
\item[218] Id. ¶ 23.5.
\item[219] Id. Appendix ¶ 4 (partly dissenting individual opinion by Mr. Fabián Omar Salvioli). Although Canada relied on the drafting history (discussed supra) to argue that “proof of factual innocence is a requirement” for compensation, the dissent reasoned that “such an interpretation is incompatible with both the letter and the spirit of” Article 14(6). Id. Appendix ¶¶ 7–8.
\item[220] Id. Appendix ¶ 12.
\item[221] See generally Orr v. Norway, App. No. 31283/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 15, 2008) (applying article 6(2) to victim’s claim against a defendant who had been acquitted of a rape charge).
\end{revfootnotes}
acquitted. This includes statements in judicial or administrative proceedings in which the individual seeks compensation for a miscarriage of justice.

The ECtHR Grand Chamber addressed the tension between the post-acquittal presumption of innocence and the right to compensation in Allen v. United Kingdom.\(^{222}\) The defendant in Allen was convicted of manslaughter of her four-year-old son based on medical evidence that the child had died of non-accidental shaking of the brain, known as Shaken Baby Syndrome.\(^{223}\) However, a post-conviction report revealed that the child’s death may have been due to other causes.\(^{224}\) The UK courts reversed Allen’s conviction but denied her application for compensation, holding that while the new medical evidence rendered her conviction “unsafe,” reasonable jurors could differ on whether she should have been convicted.\(^{225}\)

The Grand Chamber concluded that the decision to deny Allen’s compensation claim did not imply that she should have been convicted and, thus, did not violate the presumption of innocence.\(^{226}\) In reaching this result, the ECtHR briefly considered the right to compensation for miscarriages of justice.\(^{227}\) The United Kingdom has not ratified Protocol No. 7, and thus the Grand Chamber could not directly interpret the right to compensation protected by Article 3 of that Protocol. However, the Court made two statements relevant to that provision. The first recognized that domestic courts have discretion “to interpret the legislation [giving effect to the compensation right and] . . . to conclude that more than an acquittal was required in order for a ‘miscarriage of justice’ to be established.”\(^{228}\) Second, the Grand Chamber remarked that the narrow view of Article 3 suggested in the Protocol’s Explanatory Report—that proof of factual innocence is necessary to claim compensation—“must now be considered to have been overtaken by the Court’s intervening case-law on Article 6 § 2.”\(^{229}\) This dictum suggests that, in a future case, the ECtHR may adopt the view of the dissenting member of the UNHRC in Dumont—that the right to compensation for miscarriages of


\(^{224}\) Id. ¶ 13; see Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 5, 18 (2009).


\(^{226}\) Id. ¶ 134.

\(^{227}\) Id. ¶ 129–33.

\(^{228}\) Id. ¶ 129. The United Kingdom, which is a party to the ICCPR, has adopted legislation to implement Article 14(6) and provide a mechanism for compensating defendants who have been wrongfully convicted. See Criminal Justice Act 1988, c. 33, § 133 (UK).

justice applies to egregious violations of fair trial rights as well as to claims of factual innocence.

5. Summing Up the Derivative Rights Approach

International human rights law is deeply concerned with ensuring a fair criminal process, and it includes an extensive list of guarantees relating to that process. A clear, explicit, and comprehensive right to assert post-conviction claims of factual innocence is, however, missing from these guarantees. This section has shown, however, that the recent case law of international human rights bodies provides a strong basis for deriving such a right from closely related treaty provisions, including the rights to life, to a fair trial and appeal, to a remedy, and to compensation for miscarriages of justice. The UNHRC’s decision in Dumont v. Canada comes closest to recognizing the right to claim innocence through a purposive interpretation of the latter two treaty provisions.

The derivative rights approach is not, however, the only way to close international law’s innocence gap. As we now explain, a strong argument can also be made that the right to claim innocence satisfies the criteria for assessing whether to recognize a new, freestanding human right.

CLOSING INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INNOCENCE GAP

D. THE RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE AS A FREESTANDING RIGHT

Although there is no single standard for recognition of a new human right, several common elements can be identified. In brief, these criteria require that a new right be consistent with existing rights, fundamental, precise, and enforceable, and that it enjoy broad international support. We explore the contours of the right to claim innocence in light of these standards.

First, a new right should be “consistent with the existing body of international . . . law” and “compatible with the theoretical foundations of human rights.” However, it should also “not merely [be] repetitive of [] the existing body of international human rights law,” but instead be “independently justifiable” because it fills a gap in existing norms.

We have previously discussed how a new right to claim innocence aligns with existing criminal process guarantees. But such a right would extend beyond the currently identified scope of these guarantees. In particular, it would clarify (and, in some instances, require) the mechanisms needed to provide meaningful redress for legal innocence claims and extend those mechanisms to factual innocence claims in all cases—for example, not just when a factual innocence claim is part of the trial record. This close nexus satisfies the first criterion of consistency.

A second requirement is that a new stand-alone right must be “fundamental.” This has been variously described as requiring the right to be of


232. The U.N. General Assembly adopted a standard for recognizing new human rights in 1986. See G.A. Res. 41/120, ¶ 4 (Dec. 4, 1986) (stating that “international instruments in the field of human rights . . . should . . . (a) Be consistent with the existing body of international human rights law; (b) Be of fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person; (c) Be sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable rights and obligations; (d) Provide, where appropriate, realistic and effective implementation machinery, including reporting systems; [and] (e) Attract broad international support”). For other approaches to developing criteria for recognizing new rights, see Lewis, supra note 231, at 60–79; B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept of Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 1983 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 267; Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 607, 615 (1984); James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 281, 288 (1993); Bridget Lewis, Environmental Human Rights and Climate Change: Current Status and Future Prospects 95–148 (2018).

233. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 232, ¶ 4(a).

234. Lewis, supra note 231, at 60–71 (identifying this as one of five criteria for recognizing new rights, alongside the new right being “independently justifiable,” being precise, specifying rights-holders and duty-bearers, and being politically supported).

235. Alston, supra note 232, at 615.

236. Lewis, supra note 231, at 60–62; see also Çah, supra note 120, at 278 (warning that new rights may face skepticism if they “do[] not add any new value to already existing rights”).

237. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 232, ¶ 4(b).
“great importance for human beings,”238 to “demonstrate universal importance,”239 to “reflect a fundamentally important social value,”240 and to “be relevant, inevitably to varying degrees, throughout a world of diverse value systems.”241 An emphasis on the fundamental nature of the new right can also assuage concerns that a right is not sufficiently universal242 or that it “creates undue burdens” of implementation.243

As reviewed in Part I, remedies for wrongful convictions serve the most basic purpose of any criminal legal system: to ensure that individuals who have not committed an offense are not convicted and punished. The right to claim innocence has been recognized as an exception to finality at the national level precisely because it supports this fundamental principle.

A third substantive requirement is precision.244 This encompasses precision in normative content so that the right “give[s] rise to identifiable rights and obligations.”245 It also includes precision in “identifying rights-holders and duty-bearers.”246 To satisfy this criterion, in Part III we identify with granularity the core elements of an express right to claim innocence and discuss the different institutions and actors that can help to realize this right.

Precision is also linked to concerns about ensuring that a new right is feasible and enforceable,247 including “through realistic and effective implementation machinery.”248 With respect to the right to claim innocence, this fourth criterion can be satisfied by giving individuals access to treaty bodies, regional courts, and other institutions that already adjudicate claims alleging violations of the rights to life, fair trial, appeal, remedy, and compensation. In Part III, we further explain how the right can be tailored to the three national models for remedying wrongful convictions.

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239. Çali, supra note 120, at 278.
240. Alston, supra note 232, at 615.
241. Id.
242. See Brems, supra note 238, at 329 (“[I]t is widely understood that human rights should protect interests that are of great importance for human beings (threshold criterion) and that are universally valid (universality criterion).”).
243. See Çali, supra note 120, at 278.
244. See G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 232, ¶ 4(c).
245. See Alston, supra note 232, at 615; see also Lewis, supra note 231, at 71–75 (arguing that a right “must be capable of definition precise enough to enable it to be attainable and capable of enforcement”).
246. See Lewis, supra note 231, at 75–77.
247. See Çali, supra note 120, at 280; Lewis, supra note 231, at 71.
248. See G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 232, ¶ 4(d).
Finally, a new, freestanding right should have “support”—which has
been variously described as encompassing “[s]ufficient [p]olitical [s]up-
port,” “broad international support,” acceptance by “states and interna-
tional bodies,” and compatibility “with the general practice of states.”
Significantly, the right to claim innocence does not introduce a new protected
population, subject, or field to international law. Nor is it a right that is un-
protected at the national level; as we have shown, countries with very differ-
ent legal and political systems have adopted remedies in this area, albeit with
gaps that international human rights law can help to fill and harmonize.

Importantly, we do not argue that a stand-alone right to claim innocence
has been recognized by the United Nations or by other international bodies.
We have rather sought to identify concrete gaps that the new right would fill.
This approach is consistent with the view of scholars that a claim or demand
which has yet to receive formal legal recognition at the international level
can nevertheless be justified as a new, separate right.

E. PROS AND CONS OF DERIVATIVE VS. FREESTANDING APPROACHES

In practice, identifying—and garnering support for—a new human right
requires more than a mechanical application of substantive standards. Here,
we consider additional factors that may inform whether a right to claim in-
ocence should be recognized as a derivative or a stand-alone right in inter-
national law. In particular, we compare the advantages and disadvantages of
each pathway to recognition across three elements: feasibility, protection,
and resources. In Part III, we consider a related question—how a new right
to claim innocence fares under critiques sounding in so-called rights infla-
tion.

Deriving new rights, such as the right to claim innocence, from existing
ones is often a path of lesser resistance. It reflects a cautious and “[,]less am-
bitious[,] approach,” but one with an immediate payoff—namely, that the

249. See G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 232, ¶ 4(e).
250. See Lewis, supra note 231, 77–79.
251. See G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 232, ¶ 4(e).
252. See Bob, supra note 117, at 4.
253. See Alston, supra note 232, at 615.
254. See Susi, supra note 92, at 28 (“Even if it has not yet established itself as a self-standing right,
we can still speak of a new human right, and can add the qualification ‘under the process of contesta-
tion.’ ”); see also Alston, supra note 232, at 615 (noting that the right should “be eligible for recogni-
tion on the grounds that it is an interpretation of UN Charter obligations, a reflection of customary law rules
or a formulation that is declaratory of general principles of law”); von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122,
at 20 (noting that the desirability of new rights being necessary and being “firmly grounded in law”
should be constantly weighed against an understanding that human rights themselves require an “inherent
dynamism”).
255. See Thielbörger, supra note 121, at 73.
new right will be part of *lex lata* instantly,256 since there is no requirement for states to separately accept the norm.257 Conversely, insisting that a very new right exists may backfire and undermine progress toward recognizing the right.258 Acceptance under the derivative rights approach is also aided by the normative determinacy that often comes with relying on established legal guarantees.259

Derivative approaches can also enhance protection by emphasizing human rights as “indivisible and interdependent.”260 Extending existing rights to the wrongfully convicted through a derivative approach “is conceptually compatible with the idea that all persons are equal and have equal rights.”261 Deriving the right to claim innocence from existing rights also avoids wasted resources, since it can be difficult to justify expending political capital on developing a whole new framework when it is possible to interpret existing protections to secure the right.262

As for the stand-alone pathway, the feasibility concerns that often arise with new, freestanding rights are notably less pronounced for the right to claim innocence. Somewhat unusually, as shown in Part I, national practice on the right is more advanced than international recognition. As a result, barriers that might otherwise deter governments from accepting a new, freestanding right may be lower, since international law recognition can help clarify legal obligations263 and “enhance the profile of [a] right” that many states have actually already accepted.264

As for the protection element, the derivative approach, while useful for emphasizing interdependence of existing rights guarantees, may leave gaps and inconsistent approaches.265 A derived right to claim innocence is

256. See von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 19.
258. See Lau, supra note 123, at 206.
259. See Luis E. Rodríguez-Rivera, *The Right to Environment: A New, Internationally Recognised Human Right*, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC 153, 154 (Andreas von Arnauld & Kerstin von der Decken eds., 2020) (listing reasons that a stand-alone right might not be recognized, including that it has an “inherent indeterminacy,” has a “redundancy effect,” is “non-justiciable and non-enforceable,” or would “devalue or debase the human rights currency”).
261. See Pajuste, supra note 257, at 188.
262. See Rodríguez-Rivera, supra note 259, at 154.
263. See Pajuste, supra note 257, at 187.
264. Chirwa, supra note 121, at 59.
265. See Pajuste, supra note 257, at 186.
necessarily limited by the contours of the “parent” right(s),\(^{266}\) with the risk that it may be viewed as “ancillary” or subordinate to other criminal process guarantees, such as the right to an appeal.\(^{267}\) A stand-alone right, in contrast, “would prevent cases and situations falling through the cracks and holes”\(^{268}\) and underscore the right’s overall importance.

Lastly, using political and social resources to recognize a freestanding right to claim innocence may have the salutary effect of highlighting the achievements of the transnational innocence movement. Framing a new right in derivative terms risks obscuring these origin stories, including how civil society groups have pushed for recognition in diverse national and international settings.\(^{269}\) Seen from this perspective, framing the right to claim innocence as a separate right also has a strong communicative effect, signaling to rights-holders “that they can count on [the] protection”\(^{270}\) of international law.

III. CLOSING INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INNOCENCE GAP

We have thus far shown that international human rights law has an important, surprising, and remediable gap: the absence of an explicit and fully articulated right of defendants to raise wrongful conviction claims based on newly acquired evidence of factual innocence. This gap is important because an obligatory mechanism for raising innocence claims is closely linked to—and consistent with the values underlying—core human rights guarantees relating to the criminal process. The gap is surprising because a growing number of national jurisdictions have created such mechanisms, but in diverse ways and with only limited input from human rights treaties. The gap is also remediable, since recognizing such a right would be consistent with the two principal ways that other “new” human rights have been accepted in international law.

In this Part, we turn from analysis to prescription, exploring the substantive content of an international right to claim innocence. We argue that the right should be articulated in general terms that define its core elements while preserving sufficient flexibility for states to adapt it to their criminal laws and to the diverse national models for raising innocence claims described in Part I.

We begin by offering a draft text of the right to claim innocence and

\(^{266}\) See von der Deeken & Koch, supra note 122, at 13.
\(^{267}\) See Gilbert, supra note 260, at 101.
\(^{269}\) See Susi, supra note 92, at 23.
\(^{270}\) See Martini, supra note 268, at 132.
explain how the text is situated in relation to other criminal process guarantees. We then discuss several issues relating to the international definition of the right, as well as national-level considerations. We conclude by considering and rejecting a potential objection to our proposal—that human rights are overly inflated and should not be further expanded.

A. DRAFT TEXT OF A NEW RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE

The text of an international right to claim innocence could be drafted concisely as follows:

After a person has, by a final decision, been convicted of a criminal offense, the person shall have the right to seek relief from that conviction, including on the ground that newly discovered evidence of innocence shows that the conviction lacks factual support.

As articulated, the right complements and fits neatly alongside existing criminal process protections. Article 14 of the ICCPR provides a helpful illustration. As previously explained, Article 14(5) provides that a person “shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”; Article 14(6) requires that compensation be provided to an individual who has suffered “a miscarriage of justice”; and Article 14(7) prohibits a person who has been convicted or acquitted of a crime from being “tried or punished again” for the same offense.271 The text set forth supra would augment this list of key criminal justice guarantees. The text also leaves open the possibility of creating procedures to review post-conviction claims of legal innocence, such as violations of fair trial rights, as well as other procedural errors.

We emphasize, however, that we are not proposing an amendment to the ICCPR or any other human rights treaty. On the contrary, we expect that the right to claim innocence will appear, at least initially, in guidelines, declarations, and other soft law standards promulgated by treaty monitoring bodies, U.N. special procedures, and other international and regional institutions, with input from human rights NGOs, national innocence projects, and experts in international and criminal law.272 Nonetheless, these documents, no less than binding treaty provisions, must describe the content of the right with precision to encourage governments to implement it in domestic law.273

271. ICCPR, supra note 140, art.14(5)-(7).
B. DEFINING THE RIGHT

The core of the right is a legal entitlement to access, and to receive appropriate redress from, a domestic mechanism that reviews claims based on evidence of innocence obtained after a final conviction. Such a mechanism should satisfy the procedural and substantive components of the right to a remedy. In particular, the mechanism must have the capacity to review innocence claims on the merits and the authority to provide full and meaningful reparation, including compensation and the possibility of nullifying convictions. In addition, the mechanism must be non-discriminatory, both in terms of the procedures governing access and the substantive outcomes it produces.

These considerations inform our discussion of several definitional issues raised by the draft text we have proposed. A preliminary issue concerns the meaning of the phrase “final decision.” In many instances, such decisions will be made following a criminal trial. However, it is important that the right not be limited to trials. In the United States, for example, the bulk of criminal cases are plea bargained. For the right to be effective, all negotiated or summary determinations of guilt should be eligible for subsequent innocence review.

A second definitional question is when evidence is “newly discovered.” This term does not require that evidence be wholly different from that presented during the original criminal proceeding. It is not limited to a “new or newly discovered fact” and includes new technology, testing, or scientific research applied to evidence introduced at trial.

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274. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 180, ¶ 12 (“A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law . . . shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as provided for under international law.”); Pablo de Greiff (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur for the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/50 (Aug. 21, 2017) (emphasizing access “to a meaningful criminal justice system with the prompt exercise of judicial power within a reasonable amount of time”); see also CLOONEY & WEBB, supra note 14, at 831–900 (extensively reviewing the remedies that international law requires for violations of fair trial rights).


276. For a discussion of this issue in the United States, see Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 671, 727 (2020); Stephens, supra note 44, at 320–23.

277. In this respect, the proposed right to claim innocence goes beyond the right to compensation for a miscarriage of justice, which applies if a conviction has been overturned as a result of “a new or newly discovered fact.” See ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 14(6).

278. For example, in the prosecution discussed in Allen v. United Kingdom, newly contested medical evidence concerning shaken baby syndrome was found not to constitute new facts. Such evidence was nevertheless considered under the UK’s post-conviction review mechanism. Allen v. Kingdom, App. No.
The phrase “newly discovered” also raises the question of whether national jurisdictions can disregard post-conviction evidence of innocence whose non-discovery can be attributed to the defendant or to his or her counsel. The treaty-based right to compensation for miscarriages of justice includes such a limitation but places the burden of proof on the government.\(^{279}\) A similar requirement is appropriate for the proposed right to claim innocence. However, courts and other review bodies should be mindful of the fact that true “equality of arms”\(^{280}\) in domestic criminal law systems is often illusory and that attribution to a defendant should be proven, not inferred.

A third definitional issue concerns the term “innocence.” Our focus on factual innocence suggests that the right must apply, at a minimum, in two situations—when evidence is presented that the wrong person was convicted or that no crime occurred at all. The draft text we propose is more open-ended, however. It adds the word “including” to underscore that the right can also apply to violations of procedural and other fair trial guarantees that provide the basis for legal innocence claims.

Our proposed text intentionally eschews the phrase “miscarriage of justice.” Section II.C described the unsettled meaning of this phrase in international human rights law. National practice reveals a similar lack of clarity. “Miscarriage of justice” has been used to refer to incorrect criminal verdicts and to an array of grounds that permit plain error review or excuse other procedural barriers to an appeal or post-conviction relief.\(^{281}\) Scholars have similarly proposed a range of broad definitions of the phrase that include both procedural and innocence-related errors in criminal cases.\(^{282}\)

\(^{254}\) 24/09, ¶¶ 1517 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber July 12, 2013). Similarly, in the United States, six states have enacted new post-conviction statutes that expressly authorize relief based on new scientific developments. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-582 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 6.502(G)(2) (West 2021); NEV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.900–990 (West 019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(b) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-403 (West 2018).

\(^{279}\) See ICCPR, supra note 140, art.14(6) (denying compensation for miscarriages of justice where “it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to” the defendant).


\(^{281}\) For examples of U.S. courts using the phrase, largely in the plain error context, see, for example, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 393 (2013) (permitting petitioners who can make a “miscarriage of justice” showing to overcome the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations); United States v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501, 509 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that reversal based on a plain error is appropriate only if “jury instructions [are] so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice”); Commonwealth v. Curtis, 632 N.E.2d 821, 82527 (Mass. 1994) (holding that the standard for review for post-appeal motion for a new trial is “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice”).

\(^{282}\) An apt example appears in the following definition:

A miscarriage occurs as follows: whenever suspects or defendants or convicts are treated by the State in breach of their rights, whether because of, first, deficient processes or, second, the laws which are applied to them or, third, because there is no factual justification for the applied treatment or punishment; fourth, whenever suspects or defendants or convicts are treated adversely by the State to a disproportionate extent in comparison with the need to protect the
In the draft text supra, the word “innocence” is qualified by the phrase “shows that the conviction lacks support.” This recognizes that “innocence” does not have a legal meaning in most jurisdictions; instead, courts considering innocence claims assess whether a conviction cannot be sustained in light of the new evidence presented.\footnote{283} We anticipate that national judges will operationalize the “lacks support” standard in light of various factors, such as the elements of the crime in question, the evidence introduced at trial, the support offered for a post-conviction claim, and the standard for reviewing such claims.

Although the “lacks support” standard is flexible enough to allow for some variation across jurisdictions, the focus must remain on the present—whether a factfinder would now convict the person in light of the new evidence provided. This temporal requirement helps to overcome an undue focus on finality and guilt, in which courts conclude that sufficient evidence to convict in the past makes it unnecessary to consider any new evidence of innocence.\footnote{284}

Issues are also likely to arise regarding how persuasive new evidence of innocence must be to find that a conviction “lacks support.” For example, many states in the United States apply a “more likely than not” standard to determine whether a reasonable jury would convict with the benefit of the new evidence.\footnote{285} However, other states have adopted “would have changed the outcome” standards,\footnote{286} or “clearly convincing” standards that require extremely high levels of proof.\footnote{287} Outside of the United States, review standards range from an “unsafe” conviction standard, a “reasonable probability” standard, and a “more likely than not” standard to still higher standards.\footnote{288}

Our proposed text avoids prescribing a single standard of review. Given
the diversity of existing approaches, it is appropriate to allow countries some discretion to tailor the evaluation of innocence claims to familiar national practices. We anticipate that some countries may not adopt sufficiently robust standards and that some judges may interpret standards that are adequate on paper in ways that make it very difficult to obtain relief. We expect that these problems will be highlighted as national innocence projects publicize wrongful convictions and exonerations, creating pressure for additional reforms.

C. ADAPTING THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL MODELS

In addition to the definitional questions just discussed, recognition of an international right to claim innocence raises important institutional issues. These include, most notably, which national actors are authorized to review innocence claims and grant appropriate remedies. As Part I explains, countries have developed appellate, post-conviction, and administrative models to carry out such reviews. The right we propose is consistent with all three models and others that may be developed. In particular, states can designate courts, administrative bodies, executive branch officials, or some combination thereof to review innocence claims.

The choice of institution implicates a range of practical considerations. These include the existence and scope of hearings, whether the right is protected by due process or other procedural guarantees, whether claimants can obtain discovery (and from whom), whether claimants have a right to representation by counsel, and whether the state provides resources for investigations. We leave these issues to be developed in the future. For present purposes, we highlight several higher-level considerations relevant to each of the three national models.

If a country follows the post-conviction model, the right to claim innocence would be litigated in a collateral proceeding after direct appeals have been exhausted. One advantage of this approach, in terms of receptivity to innocence claims, is that the jurisdiction has already created procedures to assert new grounds for relief outside of the trial record after appeals are complete. Another is that claims can be addressed either to a new judicial body or to the same judge who presided over the trial. One potential challenge of the post-conviction model is that collateral proceedings are often narrow or discretionary. This need not be the case, however, and jurisdictions have broadened post-conviction rules to permit claims based on newly discovered

289. See supra Section I.B. (discussing examples in which countries modified judicial standards to make relief more robust or accessible).
290. In the United States, several states require post-conviction petitions to be heard by the judge who conducted the trial or accepted the guilty plea. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(f) (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14(e) (West 2019).
evidence of innocence. States may need to modify these procedures to ensure that the right satisfies the four overarching characteristics previously identified.

Countries that follow the appellate model place heavy reliance on rules of finality and often limit claims to evidence presented at trial. Nonetheless, many appellate model jurisdictions have modified these rules to permit new evidence to be considered. In civil law countries in particular, reopening a case to assess new facts does not pose onerous practical or logistical hurdles. It should thus be relatively straightforward to amend revision processes to facilitate consideration of new evidence of innocence. In contrast, common law countries in which there is a right to a jury trial (or hybrid judge and lay juries) may face greater resistance to allowing the adjudication of new proceedings.

Countries that adhere to an administrative model authorize a review commission or similar body to evaluate innocence claims. One advantage of this approach is that the commission, as an arm of the government, may have significantly broader ability to access evidence and investigate innocence claims, including from law enforcement files. These powers are especially important for pro se and indigent persons in custody, who face great obstacles in conducting their own investigations. However, in many countries the commission or administrative agency ultimately refers cases to court, with the result that judicial interpretation of the definitional issues discussed supra will remain essential to the meaningful protection of the right.

This Section has focused on institutional issues raised by the three principal national models for reviewing wrongful convictions. We expect, however, that closing international law’s innocence gap will help to promote convergence across these models and perhaps engender new types of review mechanisms. We also anticipate that countries which have not created any mechanism to remedy wrongful convictions will be more likely to do so once a right is recognized internationally. This provides another justification for initially articulating the right in soft law instruments, which can be quickly and easily adapted as countries interpret and apply the right to diverse national contexts.

D. A REJOINER TO THE “RIGHTS INFLATION” CRITIQUE

Our review of the two key pathways for recognizing an international right to claim innocence—and of the opportunities and limits of each 291. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-582 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 6.502(G)(2) (West 2021); NEV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.900–990 (West 2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(b) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-403 (West 2018) (recent state statutes permitting challenges based on new scientific evidence).
approach—also provides important insights into recent critiques based on so-called rights inflation. These critiques caution against too readily recognizing “new” human rights because of concerns variously described as the proliferation, “bloating,” “hypertrophy,” “inflation,” and “overproduction” of rights. In this section, we respond to this challenge by explaining why the right to claim innocence does not implicate these concerns. We also highlight how consideration of this new right shows that broader debates over the potential benefits and costs of recognizing “new” human rights are insufficiently precise.

Opponents of rights inflation raise a series of objections. These include concerns that expanding international norms undermines “core” human rights, delegitimizes existing guarantees, generates ambiguity in the normative content of rights, creates compliance problems by allowing states to selectively choose which rights to respect, and overloads international supervisory machinery. The proliferation of rights is also said to mask complex political questions in ways that generate “alienation or resentment,” and create inconsistencies and inconsistencies.
conflicts between rights. These arguments often focus on economic, social, and cultural rights, but they have been used to discredit the “positive” aspects of some civil and political rights as well.

Many of these critiques—such as the concern that international rights will run roughshod over local political processes—implicitly assume that domestic practices or rights protections lag behind international legal norms. For the right to claim innocence, in contrast, it is international law that is playing catch-up. Additionally, it is entirely possible to define this right in a way that draws inspiration from, and is compatible with, a range of national criminal process models.

Our review of the right to claim innocence also shows that rights inflation critiques often fail to meaningfully distinguish the types of processes that lead to “new” rights or how such processes can themselves mitigate concerns about rights inflation. For example, it is difficult to see how the international human rights enterprise will be “diminished by over-printing” in the context of derivative rights that, by definition, operate within the confines of existing rights guarantees and are limited by the parent right(s) from which they evolve. As we have shown, framing the right to claim innocence as a derived right helps to concretize several longstanding criminal process guarantees (such as the right to claim compensation for miscarriages of justice) that implicitly assume the existence of domestic mechanisms to adjudicate factual and legal innocence claims.

The processes of derivation that apply to the right to claim innocence also alleviate other inflation critiques. For example, reliance on existing guarantees minimizes concerns about circumventing political or social processes to push through new international norms. Derivation also enables a reading together of rights to clarify definitions and avoid normative inconsistencies that may exist within or across countries. The emphasis on indivisibility and interdependence that comes with derivative approaches, in

304. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 107 (2013) ("[A]s the [human rights] system has expanded its . . . obligations . . . many inconsistencies have emerged between provisions [which] . . . create problems for the interpretation of the law.").
305. See, e.g., Freedman & Mchangama, supra note 300, at 190–91 (arguing that states promote “new” economic, social, and cultural rights to “divert attention away from [their] gross and systemic violations” of civil and political rights).
306. See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 212–13 (2008) (arguing that the “ballooning” of the right to life to encompass a “basic welfare provision” and “a fully flourishing life” obscures what the right demands of states and what individuals can expect to be protected).
307. See Dudai, supra note 297, at 18.
308. See, e.g., von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 13 (noting that where rights are derived from existing rights, “the new right remains limited by the old right”); Gilbert, supra note 260, at 99 (stating that the limiting effect of parent rights can render new rights “invisible under human rights law”).
turn, reduces opportunities for governments to weaken compliance by picking and choosing among rights. Relying on existing guarantees also brings with it access to built-in monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that reduce the opportunities for noncompliance and weaken the international human rights system. Finally, grounding the right to claim innocence on foundational principles—such as the rights to a remedy and to a fair trial—makes it difficult to argue that recognizing such a right “ends up eroding the legitimacy” of these core guarantees.310

While rights derivation processes make it especially difficult to sustain most rights inflation critiques, recognition of the right to claim innocence as a stand-alone right provides additional nuance to the rights inflation debate. As previously explained, one justification for a freestanding right to claim innocence is the widespread national-level support for remediating wrongful convictions. The fact that domestic mechanisms are ahead of international recognition lowers barriers to acceptance by all governments and undermines rights inflation critiques that argue that rights are used to circumvent domestic preferences. Stand-alone recognition also achieves other salutary goals, such as signaling the normative importance of the new right, avoiding protection gaps that result from relying solely on existing guarantees, enhancing the clarity of state obligations, and highlighting the influence of a range of stakeholders.

In sum, recognizing a right to claim innocence showcases the legitimacy of an international legal system that appropriately evolves in response to new concerns and new types of violations. Seen from this perspective, “[t]he universality of human rights is characterised by a constant fixing and unfixing of what universal rights concepts are.”311 This evolution is central to the meaningful, continued protection of fundamental entitlements for all individuals.

Explicit recognition of an international right to claim innocence would close an important gap in existing human rights law, one that a wide range of countries are attempting to fill in response to a surge of wrongful convictions and advocacy efforts by the transnational innocence movement.

Post-conviction claims of factual innocence—allegations that the wrong person was convicted or that no crime occurred at all—are closely linked to several human rights that protect individuals charged with criminal offenses. Treaties and other international instruments have long recognized the violation of these guarantees as a basis for legal innocence claims—including assertions that unfair trials, insufficient evidence, or basic procedural errors require overturning a conviction. Nevertheless, international law has not developed a comprehensive or consistent set of protections for another foundational principle—that individuals who have been wrongfully convicted in a factual sense have a right to seek the same remedy.

This Article makes three contributions to support the full recognition of this right. First, we explain how innocence claims fit within, and have been adapted to, a range of civil and common law criminal systems, focusing on three national models—post-conviction, appellate, and administrative. Second, we develop the normative, analytical, and empirical case for an international right to claim innocence, explaining the benefits of doing so in light of the leading approaches for recognizing “new” human rights. Third, we offer a draft text of the new right, address key definitional issues, and respond to anticipated arguments against “rights inflation” in international law.

We conclude by emphasizing the broader implications of our proposal. Across the world, there is a convergence in thinking about criminal procedure issues in human rights terms. Despite nationalist and populist backlash, many governments and civil society groups are increasingly aware of the connections between racial and economic injustice and the criminal process. Safeguarding the accuracy of the criminal legal system is one way to help achieve these essential goals.

The universality of human rights must evolve to take account of new demands and new concerns. International law’s innocence gap is partly a historical byproduct of when leading human rights instruments were drafted. Such an instrument adopted today would likely not omit this right, given the growing recognition in many countries that wrongful convictions are an urgent yet inadequately addressed concern. The time has therefore come to close international law’s innocence gap and provide meaningful remedies for the wrongfully convicted.