THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT
FORMAL OPINION NO. 2020-204

ISSUE: What ethical obligations arise when a lawyer represents a client whose case is being funded by a third-party litigation funder?

DIGEST: Two types of third-party litigation funding have emerged over the last several years: consumer litigation funding, which provides funds to a plaintiff with personal injury claims, typically for personal use rather than to fund their case, and commercial litigation funding, which typically involves advancing funds to pay a plaintiff’s litigation expenses or otherwise. Both types of funding are non-recourse. This opinion addresses the ethical issues that arise from such funding arrangements. The principal ethical issues are maintaining independent professional judgment and complying with the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality. In commercial litigation funding arrangements, the funding agreement will likely be negotiated. If the client asks the lawyer to represent him or her in such negotiations, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer has the experience or learning required as well as whether the lawyer has any personal interest that creates a conflict. If so, the lawyer must address those by a written disclosure that describes the relevant circumstances and material risks and then obtain the client’s written consent. If the funder seeks client confidential information, the lawyer must advise the client of the risks of disclosure and obtain the client’s informed consent to disclose confidential information to the funder. The lawyer should also take appropriate steps to limit the risks to the client that the disclosure of such information will effect a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection which may include having the funder sign a non-disclosure agreement, appropriate labeling of shared materials as confidential or taking other steps to maintain the confidentiality of the shared materials.

\[1\] Within commercial litigation funding, there are also arrangements where the lawyer or law firm is funded rather than the client, often in the form of portfolio funding for a group of cases.
AUTHORITIES INTERPRETED: Rules 1.1, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7(b), and 1.8.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.2/

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Scenario 1: Lawyer represents Client with personal injury claim who is in need of money for living expenses. Lawyer advises Client that Client may qualify for litigation funding and provides Client with a list of funders that Lawyer’s clients have used. At Client’s request, Lawyer reviews the agreement and explains its terms carefully, emphasizing that the interest rate on the loan is high, there is also a large administrative fee, and Client might be able to get a bank loan at a lower rate. Despite this advice, Client enters into the funding agreement.

Scenario 2: Client, a company asserting a patent claim, is interested in litigation funding to avoid tying up its cash in legal fees. Lawyer has extensive experience with third-party funding and recommends a funder with which the firm has worked previously. Prior to agreeing to fund the case, Funder asks for a memo assessing the strengths of Client’s case. Lawyer tells Funder that Lawyer will seek Client’s consent to share this information. Lawyer advises Client there is some risk that sharing the memo could waive applicable privileges, that the risk is lessened if the information is communicated under a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”), and that Client must also consider that Funder will probably not fund the case without receiving Lawyer’s assessment of the strength of the claims. Client authorizes Lawyer to share the memo. Because of prior good experience with Lawyer, Funder agrees to fund Client’s case (the Client, in turn, is responsible for paying Lawyer’s legal fees). Lawyer is able to negotiate a better than standard deal for Client because of Lawyer’s relationship with Funder. Under the terms of the deal, Funder funds a portion of Lawyer’s fees (the Lawyer is on a partial contingency) and pays litigation expenses. Such funds are provided to Client, who in turn pays Lawyer. Funder has the right to cease funding if it disagrees with the direction of the litigation. The funding agreement also gives Funder the right to review and approve any change in counsel, which approval will not be unreasonably withheld. Over the course of the litigation, Funder’s employees communicate regularly with Lawyer.

Scenario 3: Same facts as Scenario 2, except under the funding agreement, Funder pays Lawyer’s legal fees directly for the representation of Client.

2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules in this opinion will be to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California in effect as of November 1, 2018.
INTRODUCTION: LITIGATION FUNDING AND ITS ANTECEDANTS

Litigation funding is the practice where a third-party unrelated to the lawsuit provides funds for litigation in return for a portion of any financial recovery. In this opinion, we consider the ethical issues an attorney may face in representing a client where litigation funding is involved.

The type of third-party litigation funding addressed by this opinion is a relatively recent development in the United States, although more common and accepted elsewhere. The ethics and social utility of this type of litigation funding are the subject of debate. Some have raised concerns that litigation funding will lead to frivolous lawsuits or that vulnerable clients may be forced to accept unfair deals. Others argue litigation funding in the United States promotes access to justice and/or diversifies thinking about litigation.

The purpose of this opinion is not to enter the normative debate about litigation funding but rather to provide guidance to attorneys as to the ethical issues that arise when dealing with a case that involves third-party funding.

DISCUSSION

A. Legality

In some states, agreements between a litigant and a stranger to the litigation by which the stranger pursues or assists in pursuing the litigant’s claim and in return receives part of any recovery are prohibited under laws against champerty and maintenance. These are legal doctrines dating from the Medieval England that developed to prevent feudal lords from financing other individuals’ legal claims against the financer’s political or personal enemies.

Courts in states with laws against champerty and maintenance have considered whether litigation funding arrangements violate those laws. See Charge Injection Technologies, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company (2016) 2016 WL 937400 (finding that litigation funding contract did not violate Delaware’s common law prohibition on champerty and maintenance because the funder did not exercise control over litigation); Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners LLC (2017) 890 N.W.2d 756 (finding that litigation funding agreement was unenforceable by Minnesota law against champerty).

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California has never recognized prohibitions against champerty or its variants. See In re Cohen’s Estate (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 450 [152 P.2d 485]. Such laws should not be a barrier to a litigation funder enforcing a litigation funding contract in California.6/ 

B. Duty of Competence and Duty to Communicate

A lawyer has a duty to provide competent representation, which includes applying the learning and skill reasonably necessary to perform legal services. Rule 1.1(b). A lawyer also has a duty to communicate with the client about the means by which to accomplish the client’s objectives in the representation. Rule 1.4(a). To the extent the client’s ability to accomplish its objectives depends on the client’s ability to fund the litigation or fund the client’s personal expenses while proceeding with the litigation, the lawyer’s representation of the client may involve advising the client as to whether litigation funding would assist in accomplishing the client’s goals. Such advice would likely need to include a discussion of the pros and cons of obtaining litigation funding and alternatives, if any.

Furthermore, a lawyer representing a client in a matter funded by a litigation funder has an obligation to understand how the funding agreement impacts the litigation. If the client asks the lawyer to advise on or negotiate a litigation funding contract, the lawyer must either have the expertise to do so, obtain such experience, or decline to provide the requested advice regarding litigation funding. See rule 1.1(c). But regardless of whether the attorney is advising a client on the funding contract, the lawyer must understand how the terms of the funding agreement impact decisions in the litigation.

C. Candid Advice and Independent Professional Judgment

Rule 2.1 provides that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice." This rule dovetails with a lawyer’s duty of loyalty to a client, which generally prohibits a lawyer from allowing obligations owed or potentially owed to a third-party to compromise the quality and soundness of advice offered to a client. See, e.g., Pollack v. Lytle (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 931, 946 [175 Cal. Rptr. 81] (explaining how the duty of loyalty to clients should not be diluted by obligations owed to third parties, as that would be inconsistent with an attorney’s duty to exercise independent professional judgment for the client). The lawyer must reasonably believe that the lawyer’s independent professional judgment will not be undermined, and that the lawyer can thus provide candid advice to the client regarding the subject matter of the representation.

Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s relationships with a third person or the

6/ See also, Los Angeles County Bar Assn. Formal Opinion No. 500 (1999) [explaining that doctrines of champerty and maintenance have not been recognized by California courts, and the concerns raised by those doctrines are addressed by other protections including sanctions for frivolous lawsuits and malicious prosecution actions].
lawyer’s own interest without the lawyer’s informed written consent. Rule 1.7(b). The lawyer must also reasonably believe that the lawyer can provide competent and diligent representation notwithstanding the potential conflict or relationship with a third person. Rule 1.7(d).

Rule 1.8.6 prohibits a lawyer from entering into an agreement for or accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless the client gives informed written consent, the lawyer complies with the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, and the payment arrangement will not interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship. The rule would apply in an arrangement where the funder pays the lawyer directly. The rule reflects the recognition that the source of the lawyer’s payment is likely to have influence over the lawyer. Litigation funding, like a third-party payor, introduces a third-party with its own interests into the lawyer-client relationship, posing risks to the lawyer’s independent professional judgment and the relationship of confidence between the lawyer and client. The duty of loyalty and independent professional judgment require the lawyer to act in the client’s interest at all times and particularly where the client’s interest might depart from the funder’s.

The lawyer’s independent professional judgment may also be impaired if the funding arrangement imposes limitations on the how the case is litigated. Some ethics committees have suggested that there could be circumstances in which a funding agreement imposes such limitations on the attorney’s judgment that the lawyer might not be able to competently represent the client. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates 23 (2012); Ohio Sup. Ct. Ethics Opn. No. 2012-3 (lawyer must ensure the alternative litigation funding company providing nonrecourse loan to client “does not attempt to dictate the lawyer’s representation of the client”). Others have suggested that such arrangements are permissible with client consent. Assn. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Com. on Prof. and Jud. Ethics, Formal Opn. No. 2011-02 (client may “agree to permit a financing company to direct strategy or other aspects of a lawsuit” and the lawyer is not prohibited from acceding to the funder’s direction as long as the client consents); cf. ABA Formal Opn. No. 01-421 (lawyer hired by insurer to represent insureds may not comply with insurer’s guidelines or directives relating to representation if these would “impair materially the lawyer’s independent professional judgment”).

The Committee does not reach a general conclusion that any particular degree of control is per se unethical. However, it is clear that where the funder has some degree of control of the litigation, the lawyer has an obligation to advise the client about the impact of such limitations on the lawyer’s representation. Rule 1.4; see also ABA Formal Opn. No. 01-421 (where lawyer represents insured and the insurer imposes limitations on the representation, lawyer must communicate limitations to the client early in the representation).

A lawyer’s duties are not dictated by the funding contract but by the lawyer’s ethical duties. ABA Formal Opn. No. 96-403 illustrates this principle in the context of an insurance agreement. The opinion considers the ethical obligations of an attorney retained by an insurer to represent
the insured pursuant to a contract that gave the insured control over settlement within policy limits where the client objects to the proposed settlement. The ABA opined that the lawyer could not settle against his client’s wishes. Instead, the lawyer was obligated to discuss with the client, the client’s legal rights, explain the consequences of rejecting the settlement and let the client decide.

This opinion stands for the proposition that a litigation funding agreement may be a fact that impacts the advice the lawyer gives a client, but it does not alter the lawyer’s ethical obligation to pursue the client’s best interest. Id. (“Whatever the rights and duties of the insurer and insured under the insurance contract, that contract does not define the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer to his client.”) See also, Md. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Ethics Opn. No. 00-45 (opining that where the client wishes to terminate a lawyer, the lawyer must abide by the client’s wishes regardless of whether the client’s terminating the lawyer is a breach of the funding agreement).

D. Protecting Confidential Information

In order to determine whether to invest in a case, funders will likely require information about the case at the outset. A prospective funder may ask for the attorney’s analysis of the merits of the case or other privileged materials. Once a funder has agreed to fund the case, that agreement will likely be memorialized in a contract which may reflect how the funder values the case which is likely to be based on the attorney’s analysis. As the case proceeds, there may continue to be communications between the funder and client or between the funder and the client’s counsel.

Rule 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from sharing confidential information without the client’s informed consent. In order for the client’s consent to be informed, the lawyer must inform the client about “the relevant circumstances and the material risks, including any actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences.” Such risks include the client’s adversary may seek to compel communications between the funder and the client or lawyer and a court may hold that the sharing effected a waiver of otherwise available evidentiary privileges.

E. Application to Hypothetical Scenarios

Scenario 1

In Scenario 1, Client with a personal injury claim entered into a funding agreement to pay his living expenses while his lawsuit is ongoing. Lawyer recommended that Client explore litigation funding, but also after reviewing the terms of the funding agreement, advises Client accurately about the downsides of the funding including that Client might be able to get a bank loan at a lower rate. Did Lawyer meet his ethical duties in each of these steps?

First, there is nothing unethical about a lawyer recommending a client consider litigation funding as long as there is no legal bar to the client entering into such a transaction. This Committee has previously opined that a lawyer may refer a client to a real estate broker to
obtain a loan to be used for legal fees. Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2002-159. Similarly, a lawyer may ethically provide information and introductions to a litigation funder.

In Scenario 1, the Client asked the Lawyer to review the terms of the funding agreement and the Lawyer gave Client an independent and objective assessment. The fact pattern is silent on the Lawyer's experience reviewing litigation funding agreements. The Lawyer must consider whether Lawyer has the skills necessary to advise the client and, if not, either tell Client it is outside the Lawyer's expertise, obtain the necessary understanding of litigation financing in order to adequately advise Client regarding the agreement proposed, or consult with another lawyer he reasonably believe has the requisite expertise. Rule 1.1.

Scenario 2

In Scenario 2, Lawyer advises Client on choice of funder and negotiates the funding contract on behalf of Client. Does Lawyer have a conflict in providing these services? The facts state that the Lawyer has a preexisting relationship with Funder, that Funder will be partially paying the law firm's fees and that certain terms of the funding agreement are advantageous to the law firm.

Under rule 1.7, if any of those circumstances or their combination creates a significant risk that Lawyer's advice on the choice of funder or funding contract terms is materially limited by Lawyer's own interests, Lawyer is required to advise Client of the facts and seek Client's informed written consent. Rule 1.7(b). See also, Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 546-47 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617] (lawyer must evaluate whether the relationship creates a "situation in which [he or she] might compromise his or her representation in order to advance the attorney's own financial or personal interests"). Indeed, Lawyer owes Client a duty to communicate material facts concerning the representation. Rule 1.4. Lawyer's existing relationship with Funder is a material fact. In addition to obtaining informed written consent, rule 1.7(d) requires that Lawyer reasonably believe that Lawyer can provide Client with diligent and competent representation notwithstanding the rule 1.7(b) conflict.

Rule 1.8.1 applies where a lawyer obtains a pecuniary (financial) interest adverse to the client. There is nothing adverse to a client about a lawyer getting paid for legal services. See Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2002-159, n.3 ("Although the lawyer does receive some benefit from the escrow arrangement—she is assured that there are funds available to pay her fees and costs—this is no different from the benefit the lawyer receives by requiring an advance fee and placing it in her trust account. The lawyer, by requiring an advanced fee, does not thereby come within rule 3-300."). Thus, the rule does not apply merely because the arrangement permits a lawyer to get paid its fees. On the other hand, if a lawyer owns a share in the litigation funding company, the funding arrangement would constitute a business transaction with the client and the lawyer would be obliged to comply with rule 1.8.1.
Scenario 3

This is the same as the prior scenario, except that Funder pays Lawyer’s legal fees directly for the representation of Client.

Lawyer must not enter into an agreement, charge, or accept compensation for representing Client in this scenario, unless Lawyer ensures that: (1) there is no interference with Lawyer’s independent professional judgment or relationship with Client, (2) the information is protected as required by Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)(1) and rule 1.6, and (3) Lawyer obtains Client’s informed written consent as set forth in rule 1.8.6(c). Rule 1.8.6(a)-(c).

Lawyer must also ensure that such a payment arrangement does not interfere with Lawyer’s obligation to render candid advice and exercise of independent professional judgment under rule 2.1. As for the informed written consent required in this scenario, Lawyer must communicate and explain (i) the relevant circumstances; and (ii) the material risks, including any actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of the proposed course of conduct. See rule 1.0.1(e) (defining informed consent).

Moreover, rule 1.8.6 does not alter or diminish a lawyer’s obligations under rule 5.4(c), which addresses financial arrangements with third parties. Rule 1.8.6, Comment [5]. In other words, in such a payment arrangement it remains paramount that Lawyer not permit the third-party payor to direct or regulate Lawyer’s independent professional judgment or interfere with the attorney-client relationship.

F. Impact on Attorney’s Duty of Confidentiality

According to the facts of Scenario 2, Lawyer shares a legal analysis memo with Funder after Funder signed an NDA. Lawyer also engages in communications with Funder about the progress of the case. These activities implicate Lawyer’s ethical obligation to maintain the confidentiality of information learned in the course of the representation and to apply diligence, learning and skill to avoid adverse consequences, such as a waiver of privileges and protections to which the clients is entitled.

Case law concerning whether funding agreements and communications with funders are privileged is still developing. Most but not all courts that have considered the question have held that work product does not lose its work product status because an attorney or client shares that work product with a funder either orally or in writing.77 That is because work-

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77 See, e.g., Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2014) 17 F.Supp.3d 711, 738 (holding that sharing with funder did not waive work product because disclosure did not substantially increase the likelihood that an adversary would obtain the materials where claimant had oral and written confidentiality agreements with prospective and actual funders); but see Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (D. Del. 2010) 719 F.Supp.2d 373, 376-77 (work product protection waived by sharing with funder). See also DeStefano, Claim Funders and Commercial Claim Holders: A Common Interest or a Common Problem? (2014) 63 DePaul L.Rev. 305 (favoring common interest attorney-client privilege and work product
product protection is only subject to waiver based on disclosure to a third-party where the disclosure “substantially increase[es] the possibility that an opposing party will obtain the information.” 2 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence (4th ed. 2016) § 5:38; see also Laguna Beach County Water Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1459 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 387] (disclosure operates as a waiver only where the otherwise protected information is divulged to someone with no interest in maintaining confidentiality). Taking steps to ensure that the funder will keep all information it receives confidential such as by entering into a confidentiality agreement and/or marking documents appropriately will decrease the risk that a court will find that work product is waived. Such steps are therefore consistent with Lawyer’s ethical duty to safeguard confidential information. However, particularly because case law is still developing, Lawyer should also inform Client of the risks of waiver and obtain the Client’s consent. See rule 1.6(a) (lawyer may not reveal client confidences without informed written consent in this context).

Under Scenario 2, Lawyer communicates frequently with the Funder about the case. Lawyer has an obligation to consider whether such communications may be discoverable, advise Client as to any risk of discoverability, take steps necessary to minimize the risk and ensure that the Client consents to disclosure. The few courts that have considered whether involving a funder in attorney-client privileged communications waives the privilege have split on the issue. Some courts, for example, have accepted the argument that such communications are protected from waiver by the common interest exception because the funder and client share a common legal goal.8/

Finally, throughout the litigation, Lawyer must not allow the relationship with Funder to impair Lawyer’s objectivity and loyalty to Client. Lawyer must remain cognizant that the company is the Client, not the Funder.

CONCLUSION

Opportunities exist to contract with litigation funders. Attorneys who represent clients that consider or take these opportunities must be cognizant of ethical considerations that are implicated. The lawyer is obliged to provide independent professional judgment not shaded by a third-party with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. The lawyer must ensure

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8/ Compare In re International Oil Trading Co., LLC (S.D. Fl. 2016) 548 B.R. 825 [62 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 145] (communications between funder, claimant and counsel protected by the attorney-client privilege and the common interest exception to waiver as well as agency exception) with Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2014) 17 F.Supp.3d 711, 738 (a client’s relationship to a litigation funder was merely “a shared rooting interest in the ‘successful outcome of a case’” and thus “not a common legal interest”).

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competence in advising on litigation funding including staying abreast of relevant law, such as whether disclosures to funders waive any evidentiary protections. The lawyer must obtain the client’s informed consent before providing any client confidential information.
Rule 1.1 Competence  
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective March 22, 2021)

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.

(b) For purposes of this rule, “competence” in any legal service shall mean to apply the (i) learning and skill, and (ii) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably* necessary for the performance of such service.

(c) If a lawyer does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal services are undertaken, the lawyer nonetheless may provide competent representation by (i) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes* to be competent, (ii) acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required, or (iii) referring the matter to another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes* to be competent.

(d) In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required if referral to, or association or consultation with, another lawyer would be impractical. Assistance in an emergency must be limited to that reasonably* necessary in the circumstances.

Comment

[1] The duties set forth in this rule include the duty to keep abreast of the changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.

[2] This rule addresses only a lawyer’s responsibility for his or her own professional competence. See rules 5.1 and 5.3 with respect to a lawyer’s disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

[3] See rule 1.3 with respect to a lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable* diligence.
Rule 1.4 Communication with Clients
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which disclosure or the client’s informed consent* is required by these rules or the State Bar Act;

(2) reasonably* consult with the client about the means by which to accomplish the client’s objectives in the representation;

(3) keep the client reasonably* informed about significant developments relating to the representation, including promptly complying with reasonable* requests for information and copies of significant documents when necessary to keep the client so informed; and

(4) advise the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows* that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably* necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c) A lawyer may delay transmission of information to a client if the lawyer reasonably believes* that the client would be likely to react in a way that may cause imminent harm to the client or others.

(d) A lawyer’s obligation under this rule to provide information and documents is subject to any applicable protective order, non-disclosure agreement, or limitation under statutory or decisional law.

Comment

[1] A lawyer will not be subject to discipline under paragraph (a)(3) of this rule for failing to communicate insignificant or irrelevant information. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m).) Whether a particular development is significant will generally depend on the surrounding facts and circumstances.

[2] A lawyer may comply with paragraph (a)(3) by providing to the client copies of significant documents by electronic or other means. This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking recovery of the lawyer’s expense in any subsequent legal proceeding.

[3] Paragraph (c) applies during a representation and does not alter the obligations applicable at termination of a representation. (See rule 1.16(e)(1).)
[4] This rule is not intended to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate any application of the work product rule. The obligation of the lawyer to provide work product to the client shall be governed by relevant statutory and decisional law.
Rule 1.6 Confidential Information of a Client
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) unless the client gives informed consent,* or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b) of this rule.

(b) A lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes* the disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes* is likely to result in death of, or substantial* bodily harm to, an individual, as provided in paragraph (c).

(c) Before revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) to prevent a criminal act as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall, if reasonable* under the circumstances:

(1) make a good faith effort to persuade the client: (i) not to commit or to continue the criminal act; or (ii) to pursue a course of conduct that will prevent the threatened death or substantial* bodily harm; or do both (i) and (ii); and

(2) inform the client, at an appropriate time, of the lawyer’s ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as provided in paragraph (b).

(d) In revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as provided in paragraph (b), the lawyer’s disclosure must be no more than is necessary to prevent the criminal act, given the information known* to the lawyer at the time of the disclosure.

(e) A lawyer who does not reveal information permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule.

Comment

Duty of confidentiality

[1] Paragraph (a) relates to a lawyer’s obligations under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), which provides it is a duty of a lawyer: “To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.” A lawyer’s duty to preserve the confidentiality of client information involves public policies of paramount importance. (In Re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 580 [116 Cal.Rptr. 371].) Preserving the confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the lawyer-client relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or detrimental subjects. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to
refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know* that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. Paragraph (a) thus recognizes a fundamental principle in the lawyer-client relationship, that, in the absence of the client's informed consent,* a lawyer must not reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). (See, e.g., Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 934, 945 [155 Cal.Rptr.393].)

Lawyer-client confidentiality encompasses the lawyer-client privilege, the work-product doctrine and ethical standards of confidentiality

[2] The principle of lawyer-client confidentiality applies to information a lawyer acquires by virtue of the representation, whatever its source, and encompasses matters communicated in confidence by the client, and therefore protected by the lawyer-client privilege, matters protected by the work product doctrine, and matters protected under ethical standards of confidentiality, all as established in law, rule and policy. (See In the Matter of Johnson (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621 [120 Cal.Rptr. 253].) The lawyer-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or be otherwise compelled to produce evidence concerning a client. A lawyer’s ethical duty of confidentiality is not so limited in its scope of protection for the lawyer-client relationship of trust and prevents a lawyer from revealing the client’s information even when not subjected to such compulsion. Thus, a lawyer may not reveal such information except with the informed consent* of the client or as authorized or required by the State Bar Act, these rules, or other law.

Narrow exception to duty of confidentiality under this rule

[3] Notwithstanding the important public policies promoted by lawyers adhering to the core duty of confidentiality, the overriding value of life permits disclosures otherwise prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). Paragraph (b) is based on Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(2), which narrowly permits a lawyer to disclose information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) even without client consent. Evidence Code section 956.5, which relates to the evidentiary lawyer-client privilege, sets forth a similar express exception. Although a lawyer is not permitted to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) concerning a client’s past, completed criminal acts, the policy favoring the preservation of human life that underlies this exception to the duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary privilege permits disclosure to prevent a future or ongoing criminal act.

Lawyer not subject to discipline for revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule

[4] Paragraph (b) reflects a balancing between the interests of preserving client confidentiality and of preventing a criminal act that a lawyer reasonably believes* is
likely to result in death or substantial* bodily harm to an individual. A lawyer who reveals information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule is not subject to discipline.

No duty to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)

[5] Neither Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(2) nor paragraph (b) imposes an affirmative obligation on a lawyer to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) in order to prevent harm. A lawyer may decide not to reveal such information. Whether a lawyer chooses to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule is a matter for the individual lawyer to decide, based on all the facts and circumstances, such as those discussed in Comment [6] of this rule.

Whether to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted under paragraph (b)

[6] Disclosure permitted under paragraph (b) is ordinarily a last resort, when no other available action is reasonably* likely to prevent the criminal act. Prior to revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted by paragraph (b), the lawyer must, if reasonable* under the circumstances, make a good faith effort to persuade the client to take steps to avoid the criminal act or threatened harm. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether to disclose information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) are the following:

(1) the amount of time that the lawyer has to make a decision about disclosure;

(2) whether the client or a third-party has made similar threats before and whether they have ever acted or attempted to act upon them;

(3) whether the lawyer believes* the lawyer’s efforts to persuade the client or a third person* not to engage in the criminal conduct have or have not been successful;

(4) the extent of adverse effect to the client’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and analogous rights and privacy rights under Article I of the Constitution of the State of California that may result from disclosure contemplated by the lawyer;

(5) the extent of other adverse effects to the client that may result from disclosure contemplated by the lawyer; and

(6) the nature and extent of information that must be disclosed to prevent the criminal act or threatened harm.
A lawyer may also consider whether the prospective harm to the victim or victims is imminent in deciding whether to disclose the information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). However, the imminence of the harm is not a prerequisite to disclosure and a lawyer may disclose the information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) without waiting until immediately before the harm is likely to occur.

Whether to counsel client or third person* not to commit a criminal act reasonably* likely to result in death or substantial* bodily harm

[7] Paragraph (c)(1) provides that before a lawyer may reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), the lawyer must, if reasonable* under the circumstances, make a good faith effort to persuade the client not to commit or to continue the criminal act, or to persuade the client to otherwise pursue a course of conduct that will prevent the threatened death or substantial* bodily harm, including persuading the client to take action to prevent a third person* from committing or continuing a criminal act. If necessary, the client may be persuaded to do both. The interests protected by such counseling are the client’s interests in limiting disclosure of information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e) and in taking responsible action to deal with situations attributable to the client. If a client, whether in response to the lawyer’s counseling or otherwise, takes corrective action — such as by ceasing the client’s own criminal act or by dissuading a third person* from committing or continuing a criminal act before harm is caused — the option for permissive disclosure by the lawyer would cease because the threat posed by the criminal act would no longer be present. When the actor is a nonclient or when the act is deliberate or malicious, the lawyer who contemplates making adverse disclosure of protected information may reasonably* conclude that the compelling interests of the lawyer or others in their own personal safety preclude personal contact with the actor. Before counseling an actor who is a nonclient, the lawyer should, if reasonable* under the circumstances, first advise the client of the lawyer’s intended course of action. If a client or another person* has already acted but the intended harm has not yet occurred, the lawyer should consider, if reasonable* under the circumstances, efforts to persuade the client or third person* to warn the victim or consider other appropriate action to prevent the harm. Even when the lawyer has concluded that paragraph (b) does not permit the lawyer to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), the lawyer nevertheless is permitted to counsel the client as to why it may be in the client’s best interest to consent to the attorney’s disclosure of that information.

Disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) must be no more than is reasonably* necessary to prevent the criminal act

[8] Paragraph (d) requires that disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted by paragraph (b), when made, must be no more extensive than is necessary to prevent the criminal act. Disclosure should allow access to the information to only those persons* who the lawyer reasonably believes* can act to prevent the harm. Under some circumstances, a lawyer may determine that the best course to pursue is to make an anonymous disclosure to
the potential victim or relevant law-enforcement authorities. What particular measures are reasonable* depends on the circumstances known* to the lawyer. Relevant circumstances include the time available, whether the victim might be unaware of the threat, the lawyer’s prior course of dealings with the client, and the extent of the adverse effect on the client that may result from the disclosure contemplated by the lawyer.

Informing client pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of lawyer’s ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)

[9] A lawyer is required to keep a client reasonably* informed about significant developments regarding the representation. (See rule 1.4; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m).) Paragraph (c)(2), however, recognizes that under certain circumstances, informing a client of the lawyer’s ability or decision to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted in paragraph (b) would likely increase the risk of death or substantial* bodily harm, not only to the originally-intended victims of the criminal act, but also to the client or members of the client’s family, or to the lawyer or the lawyer’s family or associates. Therefore, paragraph (c)(2) requires a lawyer to inform the client of the lawyer’s ability or decision to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted in paragraph (b) only if it is reasonable* to do so under the circumstances. Paragraph (c)(2) further recognizes that the appropriate time for the lawyer to inform the client may vary depending upon the circumstances. (See Comment [10] of this rule.) Among the factors to be considered in determining an appropriate time, if any, to inform a client are:

1. whether the client is an experienced user of legal services;
2. the frequency of the lawyer’s contact with the client;
3. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
4. whether the lawyer and client have discussed the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality or any exceptions to that duty;
5. the likelihood that the client’s matter will involve information within paragraph (b);
6. the lawyer’s belief,* if applicable, that so informing the client is likely to increase the likelihood that a criminal act likely to result in the death of, or substantial* bodily harm to, an individual; and
7. the lawyer’s belief,* if applicable, that good faith efforts to persuade a client not to act on a threat have failed.

Avoiding a chilling effect on the lawyer-client relationship

[10] The foregoing flexible approach to the lawyer’s informing a client of his or her ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code
section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) recognizes the concern that informing a client about limits on confidentiality may have a chilling effect on client communication. (See Comment [1].) To avoid that chilling effect, one lawyer may choose to inform the client of the lawyer's ability to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as early as the outset of the representation, while another lawyer may choose to inform a client only at a point when that client has imparted information that comes within paragraph (b), or even choose not to inform a client until such time as the lawyer attempts to counsel the client as contemplated in Comment [7]. In each situation, the lawyer will have satisfied the lawyer's obligation under paragraph (c)(2), and will not be subject to discipline.

**Informing client that disclosure has been made; termination of the lawyer-client relationship**

[11] When a lawyer has revealed information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted in paragraph (b), in all but extraordinary cases the relationship between lawyer and client that is based on trust and confidence will have deteriorated so as to make the lawyer's representation of the client impossible. Therefore, when the relationship has deteriorated because of the lawyer's disclosure, the lawyer is required to seek to withdraw from the representation, unless the client has given informed consent* to the lawyer's continued representation. The lawyer normally must inform the client of the fact of the lawyer's disclosure. If the lawyer has a compelling interest in not informing the client, such as to protect the lawyer, the lawyer's family or a third person* from the risk of death or substantial* bodily harm, the lawyer must withdraw from the representation. (See rule 1.16.)

**Other consequences of the lawyer's disclosure**

[12] Depending upon the circumstances of a lawyer's disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted by this rule, there may be other important issues that a lawyer must address. For example, a lawyer who is likely to testify as a witness in a matter involving a client must comply with rule 3.7. Similarly, the lawyer must also consider his or her duties of loyalty and competence. (See rules 1.7 and 1.1.)

**Other exceptions to confidentiality under California law**

[13] This rule is not intended to augment, diminish, or preclude any other exceptions to the duty to preserve information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) recognized under California law.
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each client and compliance with paragraph (d), represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter.

(b) A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent* from each affected client and compliance with paragraph (d), represent a client if there is a significant risk the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to or relationships with another client, a former client or a third person,* or by the lawyer’s own interests.

(c) Even when a significant risk requiring a lawyer to comply with paragraph (b) is not present, a lawyer shall not represent a client without written* disclosure of the relationship to the client and compliance with paragraph (d) where:

(1) the lawyer has, or knows* that another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm* has, a legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with or responsibility to a party or witness in the same matter; or

(2) the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that another party’s lawyer is a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the lawyer, lives with the lawyer, is a client of the lawyer or another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm,* or has an intimate personal relationship with the lawyer.

(d) Representation is permitted under this rule only if the lawyer complies with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), and:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes* that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; and

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal.

(e) For purposes of this rule, “matter” includes any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, transaction, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of specific persons,* or a discrete and identifiable class of persons.*

Comment

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client. The duty of undivided loyalty to a current client prohibits
undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed written consent.* Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person* the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. (See Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537].) A directly adverse conflict under paragraph (a) can arise in a number of ways, for example, when: (i) a lawyer accepts representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; (ii) a lawyer, while representing a client, accepts in another matter the representation of a person* who, in the first matter, is directly adverse to the lawyer's client; or (iii) a lawyer accepts representation of a person* in a matter in which an opposing party is a client of the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm.* Similarly, direct adversity can arise when a lawyer cross-examines a non-party witness who is the lawyer's client in another matter, if the examination is likely to harm or embarrass the witness. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require informed written consent* of the respective clients.

[2] Paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all types of legal representations, including the concurrent representation of multiple parties in litigation or in a single transaction or in some other common enterprise or legal relationship. Examples of the latter include the formation of a partnership for several partners* or a corporation for several shareholders, the preparation of a pre-nuptial agreement, or joint or reciprocal wills for a husband and wife, or the resolution of an “uncontested” marital dissolution. If a lawyer initially represents multiple clients with the informed written consent* as required under paragraph (a), and circumstances later develop indicating that direct adversity exists between the clients, the lawyer must obtain further informed written consent* of the clients under paragraph (a).

[3] In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Federal Insurance Company (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1422 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 20], the court held that paragraph (C)(3) of predecessor rule 3-310 was violated when a lawyer, retained by an insurer to defend one suit, and while that suit was still pending, filed a direct action against the same insurer in an unrelated action without securing the insurer's consent. Notwithstanding State Farm, paragraph (a) does not apply with respect to the relationship between an insurer and a lawyer when, in each matter, the insurer's interest is only as an indemnity provider and not as a direct party to the action.

[4] Even where there is no direct adversity, a conflict of interest requiring informed written consent* under paragraph (b) exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities, interests, or relationships, whether legal, business, financial, professional, or personal. For example, a lawyer's obligations to two or more clients in the same matter, such as several individuals seeking to form a joint venture, may materially limit the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the other clients. The risk is that the lawyer may not be
able to offer alternatives that would otherwise be available to each of the clients. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and informed written consent.* The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests exists or will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably* should be pursued on behalf of each client. The risk that the lawyer's representation may be materially limited may also arise from present or past relationships between the lawyer, or another member of the lawyer's firm*, with a party, a witness, or another person* who may be affected substantially by the resolution of the matter.

[5] Paragraph (c) requires written* disclosure of any of the specified relationships even if there is not a significant risk the relationship will materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. However, if the particular circumstances present a significant risk the relationship will materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client, informed written consent* is required under paragraph (b).

[6] Ordinarily paragraphs (a) and (b) will not require informed written consent* simply because a lawyer takes inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals* at different times on behalf of different clients. Advocating a legal position on behalf of a client that might create precedent adverse to the interests of another client represented by a lawyer in an unrelated matter is not sufficient, standing alone, to create a conflict of interest requiring informed written consent.* Informed written consent* may be required, however, if there is a significant risk that: (i) the lawyer may temper the lawyer's advocacy on behalf of one client out of concern about creating precedent adverse to the interest of another client; or (ii) the lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case, for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients' informed written consent* is required include: the courts and jurisdictions where the different cases are pending, whether a ruling in one case would have a precedential effect on the other case, whether the legal question is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the legal question to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved, and the clients' reasonable* expectations in retaining the lawyer.

[7] Other rules and laws may preclude the disclosures necessary to obtain the informed written consent* or provide the information required to permit representation under this rule. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e)(1) and rule 1.6.) If such disclosure is precluded, representation subject to paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this rule is likewise precluded.

[8] Paragraph (d) imposes conditions that must be satisfied even if informed written consent* is obtained as required by paragraphs (a) or (b) or the lawyer has informed the client in writing* as required by paragraph (c). There are some matters in which the conflicts are such that even informed written consent* may not suffice to permit representation. (See Woods v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 [197 Cal.Rptr.
[9] This rule does not preclude an informed written consent* to a future conflict in compliance with applicable case law. The effectiveness of an advance consent is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably* understands the material risks that the consent entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably* foreseeable adverse consequences to the client of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. The experience and sophistication of the client giving consent, as well as whether the client is independently represented in connection with giving consent, are also relevant in determining whether the client reasonably* understands the risks involved in giving consent. An advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (d). A lawyer who obtains from a client an advance consent that complies with this rule will have all the duties of a lawyer to that client except as expressly limited by the consent. A lawyer cannot obtain an advance consent to incompetent representation. (See rule 1.8.8.)

[10] A material change in circumstances relevant to application of this rule may trigger a requirement to make new disclosures and, where applicable, obtain new informed written consents.* In the absence of such consents, depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one or more of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the clients from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. (See rule 1.9(c).)

[11] For special rules governing membership in a legal service organization, see rule 6.3; and for work in conjunction with certain limited legal services programs, see rule 6.5.
Rule 1.8.6 Compensation from One Other than Client
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

(a) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship;

(b) information is protected as required by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) and rule 1.6; and

(c) the lawyer obtains the client’s informed written consent* at or before the time the lawyer has entered into the agreement for, charged, or accepted the compensation, or as soon thereafter as reasonably* practicable, provided that no disclosure or consent is required if:

(1) nondisclosure or the compensation is otherwise authorized by law or a court order; or

(2) the lawyer is rendering legal services on behalf of any public agency or nonprofit organization that provides legal services to other public agencies or the public.

Comment

[1] A lawyer’s responsibilities in a matter are owed only to the client except where the lawyer also represents the payor in the same matter. With respect to the lawyer’s additional duties when representing both the client and the payor in the same matter, see rule 1.7.

[2] A lawyer who is exempt from disclosure and consent requirements under paragraph (c) nevertheless must comply with paragraphs (a) and (b).

[3] This rule is not intended to abrogate existing relationships between insurers and insureds whereby the insurer has the contractual right to unilaterally select counsel for the insured, where there is no conflict of interest. (See San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358 [208 Cal.Rptr. 494].).

[4] In some limited circumstances, a lawyer might not be able to obtain client consent before the lawyer has entered into an agreement for, charged, or accepted compensation, as required by this rule. This might happen, for example, when a lawyer is retained or paid by a family member on behalf of an incarcerated client or in certain commercial settings, such as when a lawyer is retained by a creditors’ committee involved in a corporate debt restructuring and agrees to be compensated for any services to be provided to other similarly situated creditors who have not yet been identified. In such limited situations, paragraph (c) permits the lawyer to comply with this rule as soon thereafter as is reasonably* practicable.
This rule is not intended to alter or diminish a lawyer's obligations under rule 5.4(c).