

**Exhibit 1****Department of State Vaughn Index*****Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. DHS (Case No. 17-cv-07572)***

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Doc. Type</u>	<u>Page(s)</u>	<u>Date/ Date Range</u>	<u>Author(s)/Recipient(s)</u>	<u>Review Result</u>	<u>Exemptions</u>
<b>(1-8) Foreign Affairs Manual 9 FAM 302.6</b>						
C06533909	Manual	45	11/18/2015	Department of State (“DOS”) officials	Release in Part (“RIP”)	(b)(7)(E)
C06533920		48	10/20/2016			
C06533941		47	12/21/2015			
C06533947		46	3/1/2016			
C06533951		45	11/24/2015			
C06533970		46	2/23/2016			
C06534007		46	5/17/2016			
C06571131		48	11/21/2017			

**DESCRIPTION:** These records are multiple versions of Foreign Affairs Manual (“FAM”), Volume 9, Section 302.6, portions of which were withheld under FOIA Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E).

Volume 9 of the FAM establishes procedures for providing visa services to foreign nationals who wish to enter the United States. These processes involve interpretation and application of immigration laws and regulations, including the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), and also involve cooperation with other law enforcement agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Therefore Volume 9 meets the threshold requirement of FOIA Exemption 7 – that the record serve a law enforcement purpose.

In addition, the redacted portions specifically meet the requirements of Exemption 7(E) because they disclose law enforcement investigation techniques, procedures, and guidelines:

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(1)b. reveals interagency cooperation procedures during the process of checking for terrorism-related ineligibilities.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(3)b.(3) was redacted in subsections c.(2), d., e.(5)-(6), i.(1)(c)(i)-(ii), and (5)(b) because those sections identify the situations that trigger the process of checking for terrorism-related ineligibilities and reveal the techniques used during that process to determine whether an individual is ineligible to receive visas because of their involvement with terrorist activities.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(4)b. defines terrorist activity, adding specific details and clarifications about how they fit into the security investigation process.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(4)c.(4) provides details about the conditions under which to apply a presumption of inadmissibility due to involvement in terrorist activity, and how to account for that presumption when assessing a visa applicant.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(4)d.(3)-(5) provides information about the Palestine Liberation Organization that is used as a guideline for determining whether an applicant is associated with the organization and therefore inadmissible.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(4)e. (2) and (5) gives guidelines for when spouses and children trigger the requirement for further security investigation and how to conduct that process.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(5)c. (2)-(4) proves guidelines on how to identify individuals who qualify for the African National Congress ("ANC") exemption.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(5)e. (1)(a)-(e), (3), and (4) provides information about the listed groups that is used as a guideline for determining whether an applicant is associated with the organizations and therefore exempt.

9 FAM 302.6-2(B)(5)f. (1), (2) (portions), and (3) through (6) provides information about how to assess whether to exempt an applicant associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army.

9 FAM 302.6-2(C) provides guidelines for when further investigation is required and what procedures to follow.

9 FAM 302.6-2(E) provides procedures for flagging certain ineligibilities or potential ineligibilities in a database.

9 FAM 302.6-3(B)(2)b.(4) lists credible sources of evidence that may be used in recommending a finding, including sources that are not public knowledge.

9 FAM 302.6-3(B) describes guidelines for situations in which an individual may cease to be inadmissible.

9 FAM 302.6-3(C) provides guidelines for when a certain type of investigation is required.

9 FAM 302.6-3(E) provides procedures for flagging certain ineligibilities or potential ineligibilities in a database.

9 FAM 302.6-4(B) provides guidelines for how to vet applications when the applicant is from a state sponsor of terrorism.

9 FAM 302.6-4(C) provides guidelines for when a certain type of investigation is required.

9 FAM 302.6-4(E) provides procedures for flagging certain ineligibilities or potential ineligibilities in a database.

Disclosure of any of the above information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists and other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(9-11) Foreign Affairs Manual 9 FAM 40.32**

C06533937	Manual	20	1/2/2015	DOS officials	RIP	(b)(7)(E)
C06567707		22	5/3/2005			
C06567710		6	12/19/1994			

**DESCRIPTION:** These records are three versions of 9 FAM 40.32, earlier iterations of sections that are now incorporated into 9 FAM 302.6. As established above, Volume 9 of the FAM serves a law enforcement purpose, and therefore, these records meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7.

Furthermore, the redacted portions specifically meet the requirements of Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) because they disclose law enforcement investigation techniques, procedures, and guidelines about the following topics:

- guidelines for conducting the security investigation process, including whether certain procedures are mandatory, and what information to include in a request for those procedures (C06533937: N1.1.b, N2.8.a.(3)(a)-(b); C06567707: N3, N5.1.e; C06567710: N3, N11)
- interagency cooperation procedures during the process of checking for ineligibilities (C06533937: N1.1.c; C06567707: N2.1.c)
- guidelines for identifying material support (C06533937: N2.3)
- procedures for investigating whether an applicant is a member of a terrorist organization (C06533937: N2.4.e-f; C06567707: N5.4.c; C06567710: N6.2)
- procedures for finding and evaluating sources of information ( C06533937: N2.8.e-f)
- guidelines for identifying a specific type of terrorist action (C06533937: N3.2.d; C06567707: N4; C06567710: N4, N5, N7)

- provides information about the Palestine Liberation Organization that is used as a guideline for determining whether an applicant is associated with the organization and therefore inadmissible. (C06533937: N3.3.c; C06567707: N7.1, N7.2-2, N7.2-3; C06567710: N8.1, N8.2)
- guidelines for when spouses and children trigger the requirement for certain law enforcement procedures and how to conduct those procedures. (C06533937: N3.4.c, N3.4.e; C06567707:N8.b, N8.d)

Disclosure of any of the above information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists and other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(12) Foreign Affairs Manual 9 FAM 302.14**

C06571135	Manual	40	12/13/2017	-	RIP	(b)(7)(E)
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**DESCRIPTION:** This record is a version of 9 FAM 302.14. As established above, Volume 9 of the FAM serves a law enforcement purpose, and therefore, this record meets the threshold requirement of Exemption 7.

Furthermore, the redacted portions specifically meet the requirements of Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) because they disclose law enforcement investigation techniques, procedures, and guidelines about the following topics:

- guidelines for conducting the security investigation process, including whether certain procedures are mandatory, and what information to include in a request for those procedures (302.14-2(C); 302.14-3(B)(3)e; 302.14-3(B)(3)g; 302.14-3(C); 302.14-6(B)(2)c; 302.14-6(C); 302.14-7(C); 302.14-8(C))
- provides procedures for flagging certain ineligibilities or potential ineligibilities in a database or databases (302.14-2(E); 302.14-3(B)(2); 302.14-3(E); 302.14-4(E); 302.14-5(E); 302.14-6(B)(2)b; 302.14-6(B)(3)c; 302.14-6(E); 302.14-7(E); 302.14-8(E);302.14-9(E))
- procedures for investigating whether an applicant needs to be flagged in a database (302.14-3(B)(3)c; 302.14-6(B)(3)c)
- procedures for investigating a visa that is flagged and may need to be revoked (302.14-3(B)(3)f)
- guidelines for when spouses and children trigger the requirement for further investigation and how to conduct that process (302.14-3(B)(3)i)
- guidelines for when lawful permanent residents trigger the requirement for certain law enforcement procedures (302.14-3(B)(3)h)
- procedures for using certain sources of information (302.14-3(B)(3)j)
- guidelines for evaluating/investigating coursework and intent to return to Iran (302.14-7(B)(3)(1))

Disclosure of any of the above information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists and other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(13) Cable – Exemption Authority for Individuals Associated with the African National Congress**

C06568888	Cable	8	6/8/2011	DOS/U.S. Embassy Port Au Prince and All Diplomatic and Consular Posts	RIP	(b)(7)(E)
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**DESCRIPTION:** The Department sent this cable to all diplomatic and consular posts to notify them of a change in the FAM related to the African National Congress (9 FAM 40.32 N5.3).

The Department withheld some of the information under Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). As established above, Volume 9 of the FAM serves a law enforcement purpose, and therefore, this record meets the threshold requirement of Exemption 7.

Furthermore, the redacted portions specifically meet the requirements of Exemption 7(E) because they disclose law enforcement investigation techniques, procedures, and guidelines about the following topics:

- guidelines for conducting the security investigation process, including whether certain security procedures are mandatory in certain situations, and what information to include in a request for additional security procedures
- procedures for investigating whether an applicant is a member of the African National Congress
- procedures for finding and evaluating sources of information
- guidelines for identifying specific types of action that may trigger ineligibilities

Disclosure of any of the above information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists and other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

(14-38) Implementation Guidelines for Visa Restrictions						
				DOS officials	RIP	
C06567720	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06567737	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06567766	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06567796	Report	1	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06567839	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06567882	Report	3	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06567904	Report	3	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06567915	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06568365	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06568375	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06568456	Report	1	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06568890	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06568896	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06568902	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06568905	Report	2	May-14			(b)(7)(E)
C06568918	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06568937	Report	3	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06568940	Duplicate of C0659475	3	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06568948	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06569423	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06569454	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06569459	Report	2	Undated			(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06569478	Report	3	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06570384	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)
C06570543	Report	2	Undated			(b)(7)(E)

**DESCRIPTION:** These attachments provide implementation guidelines for the visa restrictions proposed in various Action Memoranda.

The Department withheld parts of these implementation guidelines under Exemption 7(E). As established above, visa processing is a law enforcement activity, and therefore, these records detailing how to process visa restrictions serve a law enforcement purpose and meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. Furthermore, the specific portions withheld contain techniques used to identify individuals whose names need to be added to the lookout system, procedures for adding those individuals to the system, procedures for performing security investigations into those individuals, and guidelines for how to apply the restrictions to a particular type of visa. Disclosure of any of the above

information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists and other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.

In addition, the Department withheld portions of some of the documents (C06567882, C06568890, C06568896, C06567737, C06567796, C06568365, C06568375, C06568456, C06569423, C06569454, C06569459) under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The fact that these specific individuals or countries were considered for sanctions, and the reason for those sanctions, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. Disclosure of the fact that these restrictions were being considered could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the countries most involved, but also in others that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

Finally, the Department withheld portions of certain documents (C06567882, C06568890, C06568896) under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b), which pertains to foreign government information. The withheld information contains foreign government information about the reason for the proposed visa restrictions that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. The disclosure of such information would weaken the relationship with the government that provided the information, as well as other countries considering sharing similar information with the United States in the future. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(39) Draft of Presidential Proclamation 8697**

C06569343	Draft	3	Undated	White House	Deny in full ("DIF")	(b)(5) (Deliberative Process Privilege ("DPP"), Presidential Communications Privilege ("PCP"))
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**DESCRIPTION:** This is a draft of Presidential Proclamation 8697 that was attached to an Action Memorandum about a waiver of possible visa ineligibility (C06569320).

The Department withheld the draft text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. The wording of this Proclamation differs from the final version, and in the place of dates in the last paragraph there are "XX" notations. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what information to include in the final exemption notice, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when Department officials are drafting visa and immigration policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action.

The Department also withheld the draft text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to the Presidential communications privilege. The withheld communication was authored by the White House and circulated to senior agency officials for their advice. Disclosure of the information withheld under the Presidential communications privilege would reveal the process by which the President receives national security advice from close advisors, and would reveal information about the advice itself. In order to protect communications between the President's close advisors and executive branch officials, the Department withheld the document in full.

This is an internal executive branch document that was not widely distributed, and was not disseminated outside of the executive branch.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(40-41) Memorandum for Philip A. McNamara: Request for State Views**

C06569220 C06569223	Cover Sheet Memorandum	1 1	10/17/2011	DOS DOS / DHS	RIP RIP	(b)(5) (DPP) (b)(5) (DPP)
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**DESCRIPTION:** These documents relate to DHS requests for State Department views on granting an exemption from INA terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds for certain groups.

In two documents (C06569220 and C06569223), the Department withheld the name of an organization under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. This organization was not granted the proposed exemption. This information is predecisional and deliberative, as it pre-dates DHS's ultimate decision. Release of the withheld information would impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. These are internal government documents that were not disseminated outside of the government.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(42) Inadmissibility Based on Endorsing or Espousing Terrorist Activity: First Amendment Concerns**

C06534021	Legal Memorandum	11	August 22, 2017	Office of the Legal Adviser	DIF	(b)(5) (Attorney-Client Privilege ("ACP"), Attorney Work Product ("AWP"), DPP, PCP)
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**DESCRIPTION:** This memorandum was solicited by senior Presidential advisors to use in the context of a high-level, inter-agency meeting involving lawyers, discussing visa policy. It contains a legal analysis of the First Amendment and some proposed courses of actions. This is an internal government document that has not been disseminated outside of the government.

The Department withheld the text under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what policy to pursue with respect to the "endorse or espouse" provision, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when interagency officials are drafting visa and immigration policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action.

The Department also withheld the text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to the Presidential communications privilege. The withheld communication was solicited and received by senior Presidential advisors and staff with broad and significant responsibility for gathering information in the course of preparing advice for potential presentation to the President in matters that implicate the President's decisions concerning foreign policy and national security concerns. Disclosure of the information withheld under the presidential communications privilege would reveal the process by which the President receives national security advice from close advisors, and would reveal information about the advice itself. In order to protect communications between the President's close advisors and executive branch officials, the Department withheld the document in full.

The Department also withheld the text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to attorney-client privilege and attorney work product privilege. The withheld communication is a confidential memorandum containing legal advice written by attorneys for their client, the U.S. executive branch. Furthermore, the document was prepared by those attorneys in anticipation of litigation as it specifically discusses both ongoing litigation and the likelihood of future litigation.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(43-45) Travel Sanctions Against Persons Who Participate in Serious Human Rights Violations and Other Abuses**

C06569352	Action Memorandum	2	February 22, 2011	DOS officials/Secretary of State	RIP	(b)(5) (ACP, DPP, PCP)
C06569349	Legal Memorandum	5	Undated		DIF	(b)(5) (ACP, DPP, PCP)
C06569347		3	Undated		DIF	(b)(5) (DPP, PCP); (b)(7)(E)

	Draft Procedures for Implementation					
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> Senior Presidential advisors solicited this memorandum to advise the President on whether to exercise authority to bar entry into the United States to aliens who participate in serious human rights violations. This memorandum and its attachments are internal government documents that were not disseminated widely, and have not been disseminated outside of the executive branch.						
<p>The Department withheld parts of the Action Memorandum (C06569352) and all of the Legal Memorandum (C06569349) and Draft Procedures (C06569347) under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege and the Presidential communications privilege. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what policy to pursue with respect to barring entry to the United States, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when interagency officials are drafting visa and immigration policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. Furthermore, the withheld communication was solicited and received by senior Presidential advisors and staff with broad and significant responsibility for gathering information in the course of preparing advice for potential presentation to the President in matters that implicate the President's decisions concerning foreign policy and national security concerns. Disclosure of the information withheld under the Presidential communications privilege would reveal the process by which the President receives national security advice from close advisors, and would reveal information about the advice itself. In order to protect communications between the President's close advisors and executive branch officials, the Department withheld one document in part and two documents in full.</p> <p>The Department also withheld the legal memorandum (C06569349) in full and the action memorandum (C06569352) in part, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. The withheld communication is a confidential memorandum containing legal advice written by attorneys for their clients, senior officials in the U.S. executive branch. The advice reflects the facts provided to those attorneys and disclosure would chill the attorney-client relationship, making clients less likely to provide full and detailed information to their counsel.</p> <p>The Department also withheld parts of the draft implementation guidelines (C06569347) and the action memorandum (C06569352) under Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). As established above, visa processing is a law enforcement activity, and therefore, these records detailing how to process visa restrictions serve a law enforcement purpose and meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. Furthermore, the specific portions withheld contain techniques used to identify individuals whose names need to be added to the lookout system, procedures for adding those individuals to the system, and procedures for performing security investigations into those individuals. Disclosure of any of the above information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists or other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.</p>						

<p>The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.</p>						
<b>(46-59) Action Memoranda Making Visa Policy With Regard to Syria</b>						
C06569424	Action Memorandum Duplicate of C06569424	3	7/8/2013	NEA, CA/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f)
C06595510	Action Memorandum Duplicate of C06569424	3				
C06567735	Action Memorandum Duplicate of C06567735	3	8/26/2005 (signed 9/7/2005)	NEA, CA/Secretary		(b)(7)(E)
C06568882	Duplicate of C06567735	3				
C06569457	Duplicate of C06567735	3				
C06569422	Near duplicate of C06567735 (missing clearance page)	2				
C06567734	Action Memorandum Duplicate of 7734	3	6/26/13	NEA, CA/Secretary		(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6) <sup>1</sup>
C06569455	Near Duplicate of 7734 (no clearance page)	3	6/26/13			
C06569419	Cover Sheet	2	6/26/13			
C06568355	Action Memorandum	1	12/12/2013	NEA, CA, H / Secretary		(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
C06569453		4	12/9/2013			

<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff is not challenging any of the Exemption 6 redactions. The Department has listed Exemption 6 for the sake of completeness, but does not include a further description of the information withheld on Exemption 6 grounds.

C06567730	Duplicate of 9453	4	12/9/2013			
C06595528	Action Memorandum	4	8/14/2014	NEA, H/Secretary		(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
C06595505	Action Memorandum	4	8/15/2016	NEA/Secretary		(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)

**DESCRIPTION:** These approved action memoranda concern visa decisions related to Syrian individuals, mostly named.

In most of the action memoranda (C06569424/C06595510/C06569453/C06567730/C06595528/C06595505), and the cover sheet (C06568355) the Department withheld information about individual visa decisions and individuals' visa statuses under Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") Section 222(f), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (hereinafter "INA 222f"). The Department had to withhold this information pursuant to INA 222f, because it is information pertaining directly to the issuance or refusal of a visa or permit to enter the United States.

In one action memorandum (C06569424/C06595510), the Department withheld the majority of one paragraph under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b), which pertains to foreign government information. This paragraph contains foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. Release of the foreign government information in this document, either voluntarily by the Department or by order of a court, would cause foreign officials to believe that U.S. officials are not able or willing to observe the confidentiality expected in such interchanges. The disclosure of such information would weaken the relationship with the government that provided the information, as well as other countries considering sharing similar information with the United States in the future.

Additionally, in many of the action memoranda (C06569424, C06595510, C06567734, C06569455, C06569419, C06569453, C06567730, C06595528, C06595505) and the one cover sheet (C06568355), the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of foreign policy considerations for these sanctions, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in Syria, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

In one of the action memoranda (C06567735, and the identical copies C06568882, C06569422, C06569457), the Department withheld one sentence under Exemption 7(E). As established above, visa processing is a law enforcement activity, and therefore, these records detailing how to process visa restrictions serve a law enforcement purpose and meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. Furthermore, the specific

portions withheld contain procedures for performing security investigations. Disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists and other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists and other bad actors cannot gain visas into the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(60-61) Syria Information Memorandum**

C06569415	Cover Sheet	1	7/22/2013	DOS	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(5) (DPP)
C06595525	Information Memorandum	4	7/18/2013	NEA/Secretary		(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(5) (DPP); (b)(6)

**DESCRIPTION:** This Information Memorandum for the Secretary relates to a policy that was considered with respect to Syria that relates to visa restrictions.

In the information memorandum (C06595525), the Department withheld three paragraphs under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b), which pertains to foreign government information. These paragraphs contain foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. The disclosure of such information would weaken the relationship with the government that provided the information, as well as other countries considering sharing similar information with the United States in the future.

Additionally, in both documents the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of the foreign policy options under consideration, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in Syria, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department also withheld parts of both documents under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. The proposed course of action was not adopted. Both this draft and the portion of the legal background that discusses the details of the proposal are pre-decisional and deliberative with respect to a final decision about this foreign policy choice having to do with Syria. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what to do and why, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when Department officials are formulating foreign policy. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. These are both internal Department documents that were not disseminated outside of the government.

<p>The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.</p>						
<b>(62-67) Action Memorandum on Proposed Legislative Policy for Group(s)</b>						
C06569231 C06569243	Cover Sheet Letter	1 1	1/12/2012 1/12/2012	DOS Secretary Clinton/Another Agency Head	RIP DIF	(b)(1) (1.4(d)), (b)(5) (DPP) (b)(1) (1.4(d)), (b)(5) (DPP)
C06569247	Action Memorandum	3	1/11/2012	Legal Adviser Harold Koh	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(5) (ACP, DPP); (b)(6)
C06569279	Background Memorandum	1			RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(5) (DPP)
C06569281	Legislative Options Memorandum	6			RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)), (b)(5) (ACP, DPP)
C06569277	Letter	2		Another Agency Head/ Secretary Clinton	DIF	(b)(1) (1.4(c) & (d)); (b)(3) (Nat'l Sec'y Act of 1947); (b)(5) (DPP)
<p><b>DESCRIPTION:</b> This package addresses an interagency proposal to exempt (from the INA's terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds) some groups that were and/or are considered Tier III undesignated terrorist organizations.</p> <p>In the action memorandum (C06569247), the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b), which pertains to foreign government information. These paragraphs contain foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. The disclosure of such information would weaken the relationship with the government that provided the information, as well as other countries considering sharing similar information with the United States in the future.</p> <p>In all of these documents, the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of the foreign policy considerations of these proposed exemptions to Tier III status, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the named countries, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.</p>						

The Department also withheld portions of all of these documents under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what policy to pursue with respect to this proposed exemption, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when interagency officials are drafting legislative and national security policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. These are internal government documents that were not disseminated outside of the executive branch.

The Department also withheld portions of two of the memoranda (C06569247/C06569281) under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to attorney-client privilege. The withheld communications are confidential memoranda containing legal advice written by attorneys for their client, the Secretary of State. The advice reflects the facts provided to those attorneys and disclosure would chill the attorney-client relationship, making clients less likely to provide full and detailed information to their counsel.

The Department withheld one document in full (C06569277) under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O 13526, section 1.4(c), which pertains to intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology. This exemption was asserted to protect classified intelligence methods and sources, and controlled access and dissemination control markings. The Department also withheld this document in full under Exemption 3, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. This exemption was asserted to protect intelligence sources and methods, including locations of sensitive facilities, intelligence targets and interests, and dissemination controls. This document is withheld in full because there is no meaningful non-exempt information that can be reasonably be segregated from any exempt information.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

#### (68-77) Action Memoranda Imposing or Lifting Visa Restrictions on Various Countries

C06595500	Action Memorandum	4	7/15/2015	NEA, CA/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
C06567810	Action Memorandum	4	12/21/2017	EUR/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(7)(E)
C06595498	Action Memorandum	4	3/6/2014	EUR, CA/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6)
C06567867	Action Memorandum	3	6/10/2011	WHA/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(6)
C06567859	Additional Background	2	Undated		RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d))
C06567793	Action Memorandum	5	1/23/2012	AF/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(6)
C06595539	Action Memorandum	4	3/24/2014	WHA, CA, DRL/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6)
C06595501	Duplicate of 5539	4	3/24/2014	WHA, CA, DRL/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6)
C06595494	Action Memorandum	3	1/7/2011	EAP, CA/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6)

C06568895	Action Memorandum	3	2/17/2011	EAP, CA/Secretary	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6); (b)(7)(E)
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**DESCRIPTION:** These action memoranda approved imposing or lifting visa restrictions on individuals from various countries.

In several of the action memoranda (C06567810, C06567867, C06567793) and in the additional background attachment (C06567859) the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b), which pertains to foreign government information. These paragraphs contain foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. The disclosure of such information would weaken the relationship with the government that provided the information, as well as other countries considering sharing similar information with the United States in the future.

In all of these documents, the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of the foreign policy considerations animating these proposed changes to visa policy, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. Release of the reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the named countries, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department withheld portions of one action memorandum (C06595500) under FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), pursuant to INA 222f. The withheld portions relate to the visa status of the individuals being considered, and therefore pertain directly to the issuance or refusal of a visa or permit to enter the United States, the decision to deny visas to the cited individuals.

In one of the action memoranda (C06567810), the Department also withheld information under Exemption 7(E). As established above, visa processing is a law enforcement process, and therefore, this record serves a law enforcement purpose and meets the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. Furthermore, the specific portions withheld contain procedures for processing specific types of visas. This document also contains information about criminal law information sharing and investigation techniques. Disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law because terrorists or other bad actors could use it to conceal derogatory information, provide fraudulent information, or otherwise circumvent the security checks put in place to ensure that terrorists cannot gain visas into the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(78-80) Inadmissibility Determination for Venezuelan Nationals**

C06595564	Memorandum	5	5/25/2016		RIP	
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C06595542	Memorandum	5	5/25/2016	WHA, H, DRL, CA/Under Secretary Shannon		(b)(1) (1.4(c), (d), & (e)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
C06595547	Memorandum	4	1/12/2016			(b)(1) (1.4(c), (d), & (e)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6) (b)(1) (1.4(c), (d), & (e)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)

**DESCRIPTION:** These action memoranda concern inadmissibility determinations for three Venezuelan nationals.

The Department withheld information in these documents about which individuals' visa statuses were affected, under Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), pursuant to INA 222f. The Department had to withhold this information pursuant to INA 222f, because it is information pertaining directly to the issuance or refusal of a visa or permit to enter the United States.

In all of the documents, the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of foreign policy considerations for these sanctions, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the named countries, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

In all of the documents, the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, sections 1.4(c) and (e), which pertain to intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; and to scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, including defense against transnational terrorism. These documents both involve a discussion of the acts of corruption allegedly committed by the individuals in question. Releasing this information would reveal the sources and methods by which the United States collects intelligence. Furthermore, the withheld description of corruption shows the methods by which certain types of sanctions are decided, which is an economic matter related to national security. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(81-83) Action Memo (Kosovo Liberation Army)**

C06569136	Action Memorandum	3	4/20/2011	EUR/Deputy Secretary Steinberg EUR	RIP	(b)(5) (DPP); (b)(6)
C06569118	Attachment: Report	3	4/18/2011		RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d))
C06569125	Attachment: Report	6	1/21/2010	-	DIF	(b)(1) (1.4(b), (c), & (d))

**DESCRIPTION:** This Action Memorandum (“AM”) approved the Department’s support for DHS granting an exemption to the Kosovo Liberation Army from the Immigration and Nationality Act’s terrorism-related provisions. The AM is accompanied by three attachments. The first attachment (C06569056) was a Memorandum for Christopher Button, Acting Executive Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) that was released in full. The second attachment (C06569118) is entitled “Policy Justification for Exemption of Certain Aliens Affiliated with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).” The third attachment (C06569125) provides background information about the KLA.

In the AM (C06569136), the Department withheld part of a paragraph under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. This section describes interagency deliberations about whether DHS should take the recommended action, and the factors DHS is considering. This information is predecisional, as it pre-dates DHS’s ultimate decision. Furthermore, release of this information would stifle the deliberative process in the future, making it less likely that drafters of future AMs will feel comfortable including a full description of other agencies’ deliberations in their written explanations to senior policy makers. Therefore, release of the withheld information would impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. These are internal government documents that were not disseminated outside of the executive branch.

The Department withheld information in the first attachment (C06569118) under FOIA Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The document is properly marked classified at the Secret level under Sections 1.4(b) and (d) of E.O 13526, which pertain to foreign government information and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The document contains foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. It also provides a frank assessment of the policies of this organization which, if revealed, would damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The fact that certain actions were being considered could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the countries most involved, but also in others that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department withheld the second attachment (C06569125) in full under FOIA Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), . The document is currently and properly classified at the Secret level under Sections 1.4(b), (c), and (d) of E.O 13526, which pertain to foreign government information; intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The document contains foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. It also contains classified intelligence methods and sources used to collect information about the KLA. Finally, it contains a frank assessment of the policies in regard to this organization and other countries which, if revealed, would damage or impair foreign relations and national security. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(84) Fiji Action Memorandum**

C06595502	Action Memorandum	3	1/7/2011 10/10/2014	EAP, CA/Under Secretary Sherman	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d)); (b)(6)
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**DESCRIPTION:** This action memorandum approved imposing and then lifting visa restrictions on individuals from Fiji.

In this document, the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of foreign policy considerations for these sanctions, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the named countries, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of these withholdings and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(85-88) Waiver of Possible Visa Ineligibility of [Redacted]**

C06569320	Action Memorandum	3	5/7/2012	SCA, EUR/Deputy Secretary Nides	RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
C06569414	Profile	2			DIF	(b)(1) (1.4(b), (c), & (d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
C06569321	Authority and Justification for Waiver of Visa Restrictions	2			RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(b) & (d))
C06569318	Cover Sheet	1	5/8/2012		RIP	(b)(1) (1.4(d))

**DESCRIPTION:** This action memorandum package approved waiver of a possible visa ineligibility for an individual.

The Department withheld information in these documents about which individuals' visa statuses were affected, under Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), pursuant to INA 222f. The Department had to withhold this information pursuant to INA 222f, because it is information pertaining directly to the issuance or refusal of a visa or permit to enter the United States.

In all of the documents, the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of foreign policy considerations for this waiver, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The reasoning could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the named countries, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

In three of the documents (C06569320, C06569414, and C06569321) the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b), which pertains to foreign government information. These paragraphs contain foreign government information that was provided to the United States in the expectation of confidence. The disclosure of such information would weaken the relationship with the government that provided the information, as well as other countries considering sharing similar information with the United States in the future.

In the profile (C06569414), the Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, sections 1.4(c), which pertains to intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology. This document involves a discussion of background information on the individual that would reveal the sources and methods by which the United States collects intelligence. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(89-95) Draft Notices from the Office of the Secretary: Exercise of Authority under INA Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i)**

C06569081	Memorandum	2	Undated	USCIS/DOS	DIF	(b)(5) (DPP); (b)(6)
C06569151		6				
C06569164		4				
C06569179		5				
C06569199		5				
C06569216		5				
C06569226		5				

**DESCRIPTION:** The Department of Homeland Security withheld the draft notices in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege.

The Department withheld these draft, unsigned notices in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. These draft notices are pre-decisional and deliberative with respect to a final decision on whether to issue a notice and what to include in the final notice. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what notices to issue and what information to include in the final exemption notice, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when Department officials are drafting visa and immigration policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. These are all internal Department documents that were not disseminated outside of the executive branch.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(96) Informal Legal Opinion on Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i)**

C06568577	Legal Memorandum			DOJ Office of Legal Counsel/ DOS	DIF	(b)(5) (ACP, DPP, PCP)
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**DESCRIPTION:** The Department of Justice (DOJ) withheld this document, under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process, the attorney-client, and Presidential communications privileges.

The Department withheld the text under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what policy to pursue with respect to a policy on waiving inadmissibilities in certain situations, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when interagency officials are drafting visa and immigration policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action.

The Department also withheld the text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to the Presidential communications privilege. The withheld communication was solicited and received by senior presidential advisors and staff with broad and significant responsibility for gathering information in the course of preparing advice for potential presentation to the President in matters that implicate the President's decisions concerning foreign policy and national security concerns. Disclosure of the information withheld under the presidential communications privilege would reveal the process by which the President receives national security advice from close advisors, and would reveal information about the advice itself. In order to protect communications between the President's close advisors and executive branch officials, the Department withheld the document in full. This document was not widely disseminated within the executive branch and was not disseminated outside of the executive branch.

The Department also withheld the text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to attorney-client privilege. The withheld communication is a confidential memorandum containing legal advice written by attorneys for their client, the U.S. executive branch. Releasing the legal advice that reflects facts provided by a client undermines the attorney-client relationship.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.

**(97) Memorandum for Acting Assistant Secretary**

C06570336	Memorandum	06/04/2015	1	DOJ National Security Division/DOS	DIF	(b)(5) (ACP, DPP)
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<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> DOJ withheld the draft text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege.						
The Department withheld the text under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what policy to pursue with respect to a proposed exemption from the INA terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when interagency officials are drafting visa and immigration policies. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. This document was not widely disseminated within the executive branch and was not disseminated outside of the executive branch.						
The Department also withheld the text in full, under FOIA Exemption 5, pursuant to attorney-client privilege. The withheld communication is a confidential memorandum containing legal advice written by attorneys for their client, the U.S. executive branch. Releasing the legal advice that reflects facts provided by a client undermines the attorney-client relationship.						
The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.						
<b>(98) Draft Press Guidance</b>						
C06567845	Draft	10/2009	1	DOS	RIP	(b)(5) (DPP)
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> This document contains draft press guidance relating to visa revocations for Guineans.						
The Department withheld the text under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), pursuant to the deliberative process privilege. Release of this information would reveal the authors' preliminary thoughts and ideas regarding what the final press guidance should be regarding a decision in the process of being made, and could reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the open and frank expression of ideas, recommendations, and opinions that occurs when interagency officials are making decisions that require drafting press guidance. Disclosure of this information would also impede the ability of responsible government officials to formulate and carry out executive branch programs by inhibiting candid internal discussion and the expression of recommendations and judgments regarding a preferred course of action. This document was not widely disseminated within the executive branch and was not disseminated outside of the executive branch.						
The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.						
<b>(99) List of Names Proposed for Visa Restrictions</b>						

C06567771	Name List		2	DOS	RIP	(b)(1)(1.4(d)); (b)(3) (INA 222f); (b)(6)
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**DESCRIPTION:** This document contains a list of names proposed for visa restrictions.

The Department withheld information under Exemption 1, pursuant to E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d), which pertains to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. The frank discussion of the details of the visa restrictions, if revealed, could damage or impair foreign relations and national security. The discussion could negatively affect the foreign policy environment, not only in the named countries, but also in other countries that consider themselves similarly placed. Therefore, the information remains properly classified.

Also, the Department withheld information about individuals holding valid or expired U.S. visas under Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) Section 222(f), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (hereinafter “INA 222f”). The Department had to withhold this information pursuant to INA 222f, because indications that individuals currently hold a visa, information about the type of visa, the visa number, and the visa’s expiration date is information pertaining directly to the issuance or refusal of a visa or permit to enter the United States.

The Department conducted a thorough, line-by-line review of this withholding and determined that there is no additional meaningful, non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and released.