DESIGN PATENT LAW’S IDENTITY CRISIS

Peter S. Menell† & Ella Corren††

ABSTRACT

Since its emergence during the industrial revolution nearly two centuries ago, U.S. design patent law has suffered from a profound identity crisis. U.S. copyright law did not yet extend to the shape or ornamentation of three-dimensional works. The drafters of the first U.S. design protection regime modeled the law on the British copyright regime for surface ornamentation and sculptural features of three-dimensional articles but confusingly labeled the regime “design patent.” Courts and the Patent Office struggled to interpret protection for “useful” designs against the backdrop of a utility patent regime focused on technological inventions. Further complicating design patent’s role, manufacturers used design patents as a nascent form of trademark protection until federal trademark protection emerged. And in 1870, Congress expanded copyright law to protect sculptural works. In 1902, after a persistent split in the courts and the Patent Office over design patent eligibility for functional designs, Congress clarified that design patents were limited to “ornamental” attributes of articles of manufacture and did not extend to functional attributes. Regional federal circuit courts faithfully limited the design patent regime’s reach, but the tests that they enunciated were cautious and incomplete.

In 1982, appellate jurisdiction over design patents shifted to the newly established U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Later that decade, the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of design patent protection, paving the way for design patent law protection for minimalist and functional features of articles of manufacture. This shift helped to fuel the “smartphone wars” of the past decade. Apple’s design patent claims to rounded rectangles proved to be the most valuable (and profitable) weapon in its seven-year battle with Samsung.

This article traces the origins of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine and shows how several early cases using the “dictated solely by utilitarian considerations” phrasing to deny design patent protection were misinterpreted to be the standard for determining whether a design was eligible for design patent protection. These decisions merely explained that designs “dictated solely by utilitarian considerations” were clearly outside of design patent eligibility. They did not mean that designs that only partially affected functionality qualified for design patents. Unfortunately, inattentive and protectionist judicial opinions caused the standard to drift far from these holdings and into direct conflict with the clear language and intent of the 1902 design patent amendments and fundamental, overarching intellectual property law principles reflected in the Supreme Court’s seminal Baker v. Selden decision.

This article aims to correct this fundamental misinterpretation of intellectual property law. Part II tells the remarkable story of how the effort to transplant England’s design copyright regime to the United States spawned a confusingly labeled “design patent” regime and examines the confusion wrought by this mislabeled law during the mid to late 19th century. It also reveals a period in which design patent law served as a proto-federal trademark
registration system before Congress established federal trademark protection in the late 19th century. Remnants of that dalliance still confusingly resonate in the design patent system today. Part III explores the 1902 amendments, which unequivocally limited design patents to the ornamental features of articles of manufacture and made clear that they did not extend design patent protection to functional elements. Part IV traces the emergence and distortion of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine. The early decisions clearly grasped the need to exclude functionality from design patents. Unfortunately, later cases misapplied some of the language of those cases, resulting in standards that contradict the 1902 (and 1952) Acts as well as the logic reflected in Baker v. Selden and other Supreme Court cases dealing with the structure of the intellectual property system. Part V traces the Federal Circuit’s tilting of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine toward overbroad protection of functionality within the design patent regime. Part VI explores the forces that have led the design patent regime astray. Part VII proposes ways of rectifying design patent law’s wayward drift to restore fidelity to the statutory language and the overarching logic of the intellectual property system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 105

II. ORIGINS OF THE DESIGN PATENT LAW'S IDENTITY CRISIS .................... 108
   A. SWITCHED AT BIRTH: DESIGN PATENT'S MISBEGOTTEN COPYRIGHT ORIGIN ................................................................. 108
   B. DESIGN PATENTS AS PROTO-FEDERAL TRADEMARKS ......................... 112
   C. DESIGN/UTILITY PATENT CONFUSION ........................................... 114
   D. SUPREME COURT CONFUSION ....................................................... 122

III. THE 1902 DESIGN PATENT ACT: LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW'S FUNCTIONALITY CHANNELING PRINCIPLE ................ 124

IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1902 ACT'S FUNCTIONALITY CHANNELING PRINCIPLE: WAYWARD DRIFT BACK INTO CONFUSION .................................... 129
   A. THE ORNAMENTALITY STANDARD ................................................ 133
   B. ORIGINS OF THE “DICTATED BY” “UTILITARIAN,” “MECHANICAL,” OR “FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS” PHRASEOLOGY .............. 141
   C. THE CCPA'S ADOPTION OF A “DICTATED SOLELY BY” STANDARD ................................................................. 153
   D. OTHER FORMULATIONS ................................................................. 156
      1. “Primarily Ornamental” ................................................................. 156
      2. “Primarily Functional” ................................................................. 158
      3. “Availability of Alternative Designs” ................................................ 164

V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S FUNCTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE: EXPANDING DESIGN PATENT ELIGIBILITY ................................................................. 166
   A. A CAUTIOUS BEGINNING .................................................................. 169
   B. EXPANDING ELIGIBILITY THROUGH THE “AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS” TEST AND VIEWING DESIGNS AS A WHOLE ....................................................... 173
   C. PARTIAL REBALANCING THROUGH INFRINGEMENT FILTRATION ANALYSIS ................................................................. 190
   D. THE APPLE v. SAMSUNG FUNCTIONALITY SHOWDOWN: DESIGN PATENTS RUN AMOK ................................................................. 199
      1. The 2011 District Court Preliminary Injunction Decision .............. 199
         a) The Smartphone Design Patents ............................................. 200
b) The Tablet Design Patent .................................................... 203
2. The 2012 Federal Circuit Appeal of the Preliminary Injunction Decisions and Remand .................................................... 205
3. The 2012 Trial ......................................................................... 206
4. Post-Trial Motions .................................................................. 211
5. The 2015 Federal Circuit Appeal ............................................ 214
6. The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity ............................... 216
7. The 2017 Remand Trial: Samsung’s Pyrrhic Victory .................. 218
8. Denouement ........................................................................... 219
E. The Post-Apple Trajectory: Further Erosion of the Ornamentality/Non-Functionality Limitation .......... 224
VI. THE ROLE OF ADVOCATES AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN DESIGN PATENT LAW’S WAYWARD COURSE ........................................... 229
A. Design Protection Advocacy .................................................. 229
B. The Federal Circuit .................................................................. 232
VII. RECTIFYING DESIGN PATENT LAW’S ORNAMENTALITY/NON-FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE ...... 234
A. Restoring the Fundamental Intellectual Property Channeling Principle .................................................. 235
1. Guiding the Federal Circuit’s Ornamentality/Non-Functionality Jurisprudence Back to the Proper Course ........................................................................ 236
2. Jettison Consumer Deception as Part of the Design Patent Infringement Standard .......................................................... 242
B. Substantive Legislative Reform .................................................. 245
C. Responding to the Apple Revival Counterargument ................. 247
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE VERY UNEASY CASE FOR DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION FOR FUNCTIONAL FEATURES ....... 253
I. INTRODUCTION

In one of the most significant and astounding intellectual property decisions of the early 21st century, the Federal Circuit upheld rulings that Apple's design patents for the rounded rectangular faces for a mobile phone and an electronic tablet were valid because those elements are “ornamental” and not functional.1 The products at issue—Apple's iPhone and iPad—are notable for their lack of surface or shape ornamentation. The surfaces are smooth and black. Rounded corners provide shock resistance should the user drop the device on a corner. The size and proportions of the iPhone easily fit in the user's hand and pocket. The iPad size and shape mimic a standard sheet of paper.

The Federal Circuit's decisions upholding the validity of Apple's design patents for the minimalist shape and appearance of the iPhone and iPad illustrate how far the design patent regime has strayed from the fundamental logic and structure of the intellectual property system. Those decisions, in conjunction with Apple's recovery of more than half a billion dollars from Samsung for infringing Apple's design patents, has fueled a surge in design patent applications.2

Soon after his departure from the helm of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office where he oversaw examination (and granting) of Apple’s design patents, David Kappos explained that:

The ever increasing functionality of the man-made devices in our lives—from our automobiles to our mobile phones to our clocks—has brought with it increasing complexity. . . .

Enter design. The discipline of design—the “form” that makes “function” accessible—has never been more in demand. Design enables us to simply, intuitively, use all these wonderful product capabilities that otherwise might as well not exist for the vast majority of us.

That is the story of design—in innovators blurring the lines of the traditional intellectual property realms of patents, trademarks and copyrights to deliver not just new products, but entirely new markets by matching form with function and making “complicated” “simple.” For these innovators, the new frontier for IP now and

---


tomorrow is in the increasing convergence of IP embodied in
design.

But for the breakthrough innovators of the 21st century, design
has moved onto a much larger stage. It is where high function meets high
style. And the traditional disciplines of IP—patents, trademarks and
copyrights—are no longer ends unto themselves but are now viewed
as component parts of a larger whole.

This is not to say that the traditional disciplines are becoming
unimportant. They will remain critical as the building blocks of
design in the large. But innovative 21st century companies
understand that design is larger than these individual components—
much larger. Consider the ecosystem that Apple Inc., the standard
bearer of design in the large, has created around mobile devices. The
magic of the iPhone and iPad is not just in the content that can be
accessed on the devices, or in their format, or the software that
makes them work. The magic is the overall design—Apple’s ability
to manage the convergence of the brand, the inventions and the
content to revolutionize a market. And this focus on design as a
nexus for IP, with all of its constituent parts, will only continue to
grow.

But this explanation contradicts the fundamental structure of the
intellectual property system. The system requires that functional advances
meet the higher thresholds of the utility patent system. Affording protection
for functional advances short of applying the utility patent law’s more exacting
novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure requirements would be, as the
Supreme Court observed in denying copyright protection for a system of
accounting (and the associated lined forms), “a surprise and a fraud upon the
public” and undermine free competition.

As this article shows, the validation of Apple’s iPhone and iPad design
patents resulted from the Federal Circuit’s misreading of the design patent
regime and the larger structure of intellectual property law. Through a series
of decisions beginning in 1988, the Federal Circuit turned the
ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine, which is intended to prevent design
patent protection from encroaching on the utility patent regime, on its head.
According to the Federal Circuit, a design is ornamental and not functional so
long as it not is “dictated solely” by functional considerations or alternative
designs could not achieve the article of manufacture’s function. How this

22, 2013) (emphasis added).
5. See id.
standard could be consistent with the overall intellectual property landscape—reserving to the utility patent system exclusive authority over functional advances—boggles the mind.

This article traces the origins of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine and shows how several early cases using the “dictated solely by utilitarian considerations” phrasing to deny design patent protection in easy cases were later misinterpreted by the Federal Circuit to be the standard for determining whether a design was eligible for design patent protection. These decisions merely explained that designs “dictated solely by utilitarian considerations” were clearly outside of design patent eligibility. They did not mean that designs that only partially affected functionality or where alternative designs were available qualified for design patents. Unfortunately, inattentive or protectionist judicial decision-making caused the standard to drift far from the holdings of those early cases into direct conflict with the clear language and intent of the 1902 design patent amendments and fundamental, overarching intellectual property law principles reflected in the Supreme Court’s seminal Baker v. Selden decision.

Part II tells the remarkable story of how the effort to transplant England’s design copyright regime to the United States spawned a confusingly labeled “design patent” regime and examines the confusion wrought by this mislabeled law during the mid to late 19th century. It also reveals a period in which design patent law served as a proto-federal trademark registration system before Congress established federal trademark protection in the late 19th century. Remnants of that dalliance still confusingly resonate in the design patent system today. Part III explores the 1902 amendments, which unequivocally limited design patents to the ornamental features of articles of manufacture and made clear that design patent protection did not extend to functional elements. Part IV traces the emergence and distortion of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine. The early decisions clearly grasped the need to exclude functionality from design patent. Unfortunately, later cases misapplied some of the language of those cases, resulting in standards that contradict the 1902 (and 1952) Acts as well as the logic reflected in Baker v. Selden and other Supreme Court cases dealing with the structure of the intellectual property system. Part V traces the Federal Circuit’s tilting of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine toward overbroad protection of functionality within the design patent regime. It also explores the nearly decade-long Apple v. Samsung decision, which play a significant role in the evolution of design patent law. Part VI explores the forces that have led the

6. See infra, Sections IV and V.
7. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
design patent regime astray. Part VII proposes ways of rectifying design patent law's wayward drift to restore fidelity to the statutory language and the overarching logic of the intellectual property system.

II. ORIGINS OF THE DESIGN PATENT LAW'S IDENTITY CRISIS

The emergence and evolution of U.S. design patent law is shrouded in a mist of industrial history, bureaucratic opportunism and amnesia, and political economy distortions. The result is an oxymoronic modern regime that confusingly and inefficiently overlaps with utility patent, copyright, and trade dress protection. This section traces the roots of the design patent law's identity crisis.

A. SWITCHED AT BIRTH: DESIGN PATENT'S MISBEGOTTEN COPYRIGHT ORIGIN

As the industrial revolution unfolded in the early 19th century, advances in iron casting processes paved the way for mass producing decorative stoves, radiators, and other cast-iron consumer goods. These advances shifted competition toward the decorative elements for cast-iron goods. Such ornamentation of useful articles did not, however, fit easily within utility patent or copyright protection. Although advances in the production processes and casting machinery were eligible for utility patents, the particular designs resulting from such processes and machinery did not qualify for utility patent protection. And copyright protection extended only to books, maps, charts, and prints, not to three-dimensional works.

Relatedly, the growth of the textile industries during the industrial revolution spawned piracy of popular and attractive rug designs, clothing, and other imprinted goods. England's more developed manufacturing economy


9. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171 (extending copyright protection to "who[ever] shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work, or from his own works and inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched or worked, any historical or other print or prints.

had already confronted these issues through the enactment of copyright-based design protection regimes.\textsuperscript{11}

Drawing on England’s precedent, Jordan L. Mott, a successful American stove manufacturer, along with other industrialists and designers, petitioned Congress to enact design protection.\textsuperscript{12} Senator John Ruggles of Maine, former chair of the Senate’s Committee on Patents and the Patent Office,\textsuperscript{13} presented Mott’s petition. The bill proposed a “sole and exclusive copyright”\textsuperscript{14} for the proprietor of any “new and original design” for specified articles of manufacture, including iron products and textiles.\textsuperscript{15} The copyright protection was for one year for articles other than metals and three years for metal designs.

Senator Ruggles’s bill passed the Senate Committee but was not enacted during that legislative session. Following Ruggles’ failed reelection bid, the design protection mantle was taken up by Patent Commissioner Henry Ellsworth, which resulted in an unfortunate drafting twist. In his 1841 Commissioner’s Report to Congress, referred to the Senate Committee on Patents and the Patent Office on March 8, 1842, Commissioner Ellsworth called upon Congress to establish a design protection regime under his authority at the Patent Office:

The justice and expediency of securing the exclusive benefit of new and original designs for articles of manufacture, both in the fine and useful arts, to the authors and proprietors thereof, for a limited time are . . . presented for consideration.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} See An Act to secure to Proprietors of Designs for Articles of Manufacture the Copyright of such Designs for a limited Time, 2 Vict., c. 17 (1839) (Eng.); An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing and printing Linens, Cottons, Callicoes, and Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, Printers, and Proprietors, for a limited Time, 27 Geo. 3, c. 38, § 1 (1787) (Eng.) (providing protection for “any new and original pattern . . . for printing linens, cottons, callicoes, or muslins”); see generally BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, at 63–76 (1999).
\item \textsuperscript{12} See Origins of Design Patent Protection, supra note 8, at 854-59.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Senator Ruggles had led the effort to pass the significant Patent Act of 1836 re-instituting patent examination. See John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338 (1836); Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 28, 1836). His brother Draper Ruggles was a partner in Ruggles, Nourse & Mason, the largest cast-iron plow and agricultural implement company in the U.S. See CHARLES G. WASHBURN, INDUSTRIAL WORCESTER 132–33 (1917); see generally Origins of Design Patent Protection, supra note 8, at 858, n.139 (discussing other connections between Draper Ruggles and patent law).
\item \textsuperscript{14} See Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841) (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{15} See id.
\end{itemize}
Other nations have granted this privilege, and it has afforded mutual satisfaction alike to the public and to individual applicants. Many who visit the Patent Office learn with astonishment that no protection is given in this country to this class of persons. Competition among manufacturers for the latest patterns prompts to the highest effort to secure improvements, and calls out the inventive genius of our citizens. Such patterns are immediately pirated, at home and abroad. A pattern introduced at Lowell, for instance, with however great labor or cost, may be taken to England in 12 or 14 days, and copied and returned in 20 days more. If protection is given to designers, better patterns will, it is believed, be obtained, since the impossibility of concealment at present forbids all expense that can be avoided. It may well be asked if authors can so readily find protection in their labors, and inventors of the mechanical arts so easily secure a patent to reward their efforts, why should not discoverers of designs, the labor and expenditure of which may be far greater, have equal privileges afforded them?

The law, if extended, should embrace alike the protection of new and original designs for a manufacture of metal or other material, or any new and useful design for the printing of woolens, silk, cotton, or other fabric, or for a bust, statue, or bas-relief, or composition in alto or basso-relievo. All this could be effected by simply authorizing the Commissioner to issue patents for these objects, under the same limitations and on the same conditions as govern present action in other cases. The duration of the patent might be seven years, and the fee might be one-half of the present fee charged to citizens and foreigners, respectively.16

Although largely tracking Senator Ruggles’s copyright bill, Commissioner Ellsworth’s proposal shifted to a patent rubric while retaining copyright language lifted from the British copyright law.17 He proposed a design patent term of seven years, half of the fourteen year term for utility patents, and charging half of the application fee for utility patents. Shifting this new regime to the Patent Office expanded Commissioner Ellsworth’s portfolio and, importantly, increased funding for the Patent Office, which was struggling to

---


17. See An Act for Encouraging the Art of Making New Models and Casts of Busts, 1798,38 Geo. 3, c. 71, § 1 (Eng.) (protecting any “new Model, Copy, or Cast, or any such new Model, Copy or Cast in Alto or Basso Relievo” of human or animal figures).
cover a large cost overrun in the construction of its new building following a devastating fire in 1836.\textsuperscript{18}

Congress heeded this recommendation and passed design patent legislation covering any new and original design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other materials, or any new and original design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any new and original design for a bust, statue, bas-relief, composition in alto or basso-relievo, or any new and original impression or ornament to be placed on any article of manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other material, or any new and useful pattern, print, or picture to be either worked into or worked on, or printed, painted, cast or otherwise fixed on any article of manufacture, or any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture not known or used by others before his invention or production thereof, and prior to the time of his application . . . .\textsuperscript{19}

There is no statutory text or legislative history to suggest that Congress intended any more than copyright protection for the ornamental aspects of useful articles.\textsuperscript{20} While the text refers to “new and useful pattern, print, or picture,”\textsuperscript{21} there is no reason to believe that Congress meant to extend protection to functional features. A pattern, print, or picture can be “useful” in an informative and decorative sense and yet not be technologically functional. Congress clearly limited this new regime to the decorative elements of various manufactures. Nor is there any question that Congress intended to exclude protection for functional features, which could only be obtained by satisfying the standards for utility patents. In 1861, Congress replaced the Design Patent Act’s fixed seven-year term with a choice of three and a half-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 (1842).
  \item \textsuperscript{20} See Origins of Design Patent Protection, supra note 8, at 856 (concluding that the 1842 design patent Act “likely sprang from considerations of bureaucratic self-interest, not from any perceived distinction between the relative merits of copyright and patent protection for designs”); id. at 868 (observing that “the proposals that ultimately resulted in the first American design patent statute veered from a quasi-copyright proposal to a patent proposal for extrinsic reasons. Our research uncovered no evidence of any debate over the wisdom of the core idea that substantive utility patent law rules should govern a new design protection regime and no indication that drafters of the design patent statute were sufficiently prescient to foresee that copyright and utility patent jurisprudence would evolve along divergent paths in the decades to come.”).
\end{itemize}
seven-, or fourteen-year term (and the ability to extend the term under specified circumstances). The 1861 Act referred to five classes of works:

1. any new and original design, or a manufacture, whether of metal or other material or materials,
2. original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief, or composition in alto or basso relievo,
3. any new and original impression or ornament, or to be placed on any article of manufacture, the same being formed in marble or other material,
4. any new and useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed, or painted, or cast, or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture,
5. any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture.

The 1861 Act omitted the specific protection for designs for woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics from eligibility for design patents, retaining a broad language of any “material.”

B. DESIGN PATENTS AS PROTO-FEDERAL TRADEMARKS

Beyond affording copyright-type protection for ornamental features of useful articles, design patents also became a form of protection for graphic trademarks. By the mid-19th century, commerce was rapidly expanding in the United States and Congress had not yet enacted federal trademark protection. Enterprising businesses began to use design patents as a means to obtain exclusive rights for distinctive labels for their products. Figure 1 illustrates a “Design Patent for a Trade Mark” issued in 1859.

24. See id. at § 11.
The design patent states:

Be it known, that We Thos & Sam Hardgrove, . . have invented or produced a new and useful Design of Picture to be affixed to our wares and manufactures . . . .

Our invention or protection consists in the ornamental design for a trade mark as shown by the accompanying representations.

What we claim and desire to secure by Letters Patent is the within described design of picture to affixes to our wares and manufactures and to be designated as the Peach brand. 26

---

26. See id., at 2.
Between 1842 and 1870, the Patent Office granted more than 200 graphic trademark design patents. In 1865, the Patent Office issued the following guidelines for procuring design patents for the graphic elements of trademarks:

§ 76. Names, titles, bill-heads, and other matters intended for use as circulars or trade-marks, if printed in the ordinary movable types, are not held to be patentable as designs.

§ 77. When any such matter is the special work of an artist for a specified purpose, as when engraved, it may be patented as a design. Hence when a patent is desired for a design to be used as a trademark, it is recommended that the same be engraved.

The following year, the share of design patents granted for graphic “Trade-Marks” reached 11 percent of all design patents. That number of trademark-type design patents rapidly declined with the passage of federal trademark protection in 1870.

C. DESIGN/UTILITY PATENT CONFUSION

The 1842 Act extended protection to “any citizen . . . who by his, her, or their own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have invented or produced . . . any new and useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture . . .” The 1842 Act also authorized the granting of design patents for “any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture . . .”

The inclusion of the term “useful” and recognition of protection for “shape or configuration” of an article of manufacture led to confusion as to whether the 1842 Act protected functional elements of useful articles. The Patent Office initially took a parsimonious approach, recognizing that the

---


30. See id.


design statute covered artistic designs as distinguished from functional elements.\textsuperscript{33}

The first judicial construction of the 1842 Act, rejecting the Patent Office’s narrow interpretation, illustrates the confusion.\textsuperscript{34} Jason Crane, the patentee, sought patent protection for a paper box with compartments arranged for holding a set of ladies’ furs.\textsuperscript{35} After the Patent Office rejected Crane’s utility patent application, he sought a design patent on the same subject matter. The Patent Office rejected his design patent on the ground that

\[
[\text{the construction which has been given to that [design patent] act by the office, ever since its passage in 1842, is that it relates to designs for ornament merely; something of an artistic character as contradistinguished to those of convenience or utility. It was upon this view of the statute that the application was rejected by the examiner in charge, and, on appeal, by the board of examiners in chief. No judicial construction has as yet been given to this part of the act.}\textsuperscript{35}
\]

On appeal to the Patent Commissioner, Commissioner Elisha Foote took a more expansive view of the scope of design patent eligibility:

Considerable reflection upon the subject has satisfied me that the objects and intent of the statute extend beyond the limit assigned to it by the office.

... It does not say “ornamental” design, or “artistic” shape or configuration, and I am unable to perceive any good reasons why designs for utility are not fairly and properly embraced within the statute as well as those relating to ornamentation merely.

The line of distinction between what is useful and what is merely ornamental is, in some cases, very indefinite. By some it is said that any form or design that is most useful, is also most pleasing. It would be impossible, in the view of such persons, to make any improvement in utility that did not at the same time add to the ornamental and artistic.

I can perceive no necessity for the distinction. There is a large class of improvements in manufactured articles that are not regarded as new inventions, or as coming within the scope of general patent laws. They add to the market value and salability of such articles, and

\textsuperscript{34} See id.
\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
often result from the exercise of much labor, genius, and expense. They promote the best interests of the country, as well as the creations of inventive talent. It seems to me to have been the intent of Congress to extend to all such cases a limited protection and encouragement.

Whenever there shall be produced by the exercise of industry, genius, effort and expense, any new and original design, form, configuration or arrangement of a manufactured article, it comes within the provisions and objects of the act creating design patents, whatever be its nature, and whether made for ornament merely, or intended to promote convenience and utility.

The construction given to the statute by the board of appeals seems to me to be erroneous, and I accordingly over rule their decision.36

Notably, Commissioner Foote did not assess the circumstances surrounding the passage of the design patent statute nor the ramifications of its interpretation for the efficacy of the utility patent regime.

In *Ex parte Solomon*37 decided later that year, Acting Commissioner Hodges expanded on *Crane*’s recognition that design patents could extend to functional features of articles of manufacture:

The patent under consideration covers, under this rule, not only the beauty of the inkstand in point of form, but also all those advantages in point of utility and convenience, which result from its configuration, by which, in this connection, must be intended its construction. Some of these are old, it is true, but the combination of the whole is new.38

Whereas *Crane* recognized that an article of manufacture could have functional qualities, *Solomon* expressly extended the design patent’s scope to functional features.39

36. *Id.* at 60-61. See also WILLIAM D. SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 133-34 (1929).
38. *Id.* at 228.
39. See Du Mont, *supra* note 22, at 555-56 (noting that “[a]lthough *Crane* properly taught that the article could have (*i.e., de facto*) functionality, it did not explicitly extend the design patent’s scope of protection to those functional features. Rather, Hodge’s decision in *Solomon* was the first opinion to indicate this natural progression.”)
Following this line of reasoning, Commissioner Samuel Fisher adopted a broad reading of *Crane* in *Ex parte Bartholomew*. The Commissioner first noted that the 1861 Act covered five separate subject matter classes for designs,

and

\[
\text{[t]he first three of these classes —[(1)] any new and original design, or a manufacture, . . . [(2) an] original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief, . . . [(3)] any new and original impression or ornament, or to be placed on any article of manufacture”—] seem[ed] to refer to ornament only; the fourth —"any new and useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed, or painted, or cast, or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture”—], to ornament combined with utility, as in the case of trade-marks; and the fifth —"any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture”—], to new shapes or forms of manufactured articles, which, for some reasons, were preferable to those previously adopted.}

The language of the 1861 Act—similar to the language of the 1842 Act—included the word “useful” only with regard to the class of “pattern, print, or picture.”

As in *Crane* and *Solomon*, the Board of Examiners-in-Chief rejected the applicant’s design application (for a rubber eraser) because “[t]he general understanding has always been that the Acts of 1842 and 1861 were intended to cover articles making pretentions to artistic excellence, exclusively.” Commissioner Fisher rejected this reasoning: “In thus denying that a new ‘shape or configuration’ of an article, whereby utility or convenience is promoted, is the proper subject of a patent . . . the office would seem to have involved itself in the absurdity that if a design is useless it may be patented, whereas if it be useful it is entitled to no protection.” Further, Commissioner Fisher commented that “[a]rticles have been, and are being constantly, patented as designs which possess no element of the artistic or ornamental, but are valuable solely because, by a new shape or configuration, they possess

---

40. See *Ex parte Bartholomew*, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 103 (1869), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 37, at 229-37.
41. Id. at 230-31.
42. Id. at 231 (bracketed quotations from Section 11 of the 1861 Act).
43. See Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 11, 12 Stat. 246, 248 (1861); Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543-44 (1842). The 1861 Act did not use the term “useful” with regard to the “shape or configuration” class. The 1870 Act added “useful” to that class as well.
44. See *Ex parte Bartholomew*, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 103 (1869), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 37, at 234.
45. Id.
more utility than the prior forms of like articles.” Finally, Commissioner Fisher expressed the

opinion that the class of cases named in the act arising from “new shape or configuration,” includes within it all those new changes of form which involve increase of utility.

... [W] ... here the sole utility of the new device arises from its new shape or configuration, I think it may fairly be included among the subjects which the act of 1842 was designed to protect.47

Thus, after initially questioning the availability of design patent protection for functional features of articles of manufacture, the Patent Office reversed course. By 1869, the Patent Office extended design patent protection to functional features of articles of manufacture.

Congress revised the intellectual property statutes in 1870. The 1870 Act’s most relevant design patent amendment deleted the word “useful” from the class of “pattern, print, or picture” and added it to the class of “shape or configuration” of an article.48 The result was that a law aimed at protecting appearance and not function now confusingly conjoined “utility” with “shape or configuration.”

46. Id. at 235

Of this character are designs for axe-heads, for reflectors, for lamp shades, for the soles of boots and shoes, which have been heretofore patented as designs; and to this class might be added with great propriety that class of so-called ‘mechanical’ patents granted for mere changes of form, such as plowshares, fan blowers, propeller blades, and others of like character. When, therefore, my learned predecessor in Crane’s case added to this number a box so designed as to hold, with convenience, a set of furs, he did but confirm, and not alter, the practice of the office, so far as it can be gleaned from the patented cases.

See also SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 134 (noting that, in Ex parte Bartholomew, Commissioner Fisher questioned whether the office had a practice of granting patents based solely on ornamentality).

47. Id. at 235-36.

48. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 71-76, 16 Stat. 198, 209-10 (1870) (“[A]ny new, useful, and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture . . . . . . .” (emphasis added)). Du Mont suggests that it is likely that the term “useful” was purposely added to the “shape or configuration” class based on the reasoning in Bartholomew, while omitted from the other class by mistake. See Du Mont, supra note 22, at 565 & n.203.
The Patent Office continued to struggle with the interplay of design and utility patent protection. In *Ex Parte Fenno*, an applicant sought a design patent for a damper of stove-pipes after his utility patent application was rejected in light of prior art. The examiner rejected the design patent application based on lack of ornamentality:

[the] mere shape is but a fractional part of the end desired to be covered by the case . . . [and] the claim for a patent is inadmissible, inasmuch as the device is to perform its function inside a stove-pipe, where, from the nature of things, mere beauty of form or ornamental configuration can play no part.

While acknowledging that the “applicant is now endeavoring to obtain covertly what he failed to accomplish by direct method upon the former application,” Acting Commissioner Duncan remanded the case to the examiner for reconsideration with the following instructions:

There is [under the 1870 Act] . . . no suggestion that mere beauty of form or ornamental configuration are the ends sought. In fact, the language quoted [from the act of 1870] expressly implies that utility may be the sole object had in view, in the invention or selection of the particular form to be impressed upon the manufacture; and I am of the opinion that under the present statute, if a new, and at the same time useful shape be devised for a particular article of manufacture, even though no ornamental effect be produced thereby, the inventor of the same is entitled to protection for it under the design section of the patent law.

Referencing the new language of the 1870 Act, Acting Commissioner Duncan required the design to positively exhibit utility.

With the appointment of Commissioner Mortimer Leggett in 1871, the Patent Office shifted its position back to limiting design patents to ornamentality and away from backdoor protection for functional features.
Ex parte Parkinson, Commissioner Leggett criticized the Patent Office’s previous approach to granting design patents as “not only liberal but lax.” He forthrightly explained the need to limit design patents to their original purpose and safeguard the utility patent system as the exclusive means of protecting technological advances:

The Legislature never intended by this section (Act of July 8, 1870, Sect. 2) to let down the standard for patents. It was never contemplated to grant a design patent for every possible change of form that might be given to a machine or article of manufacture. By “article of manufacture,” as used in this section, the legislature evidently meant only ornamental articles, articles used simply for decoration.

. . . .

This class of patents has been to some extent subversive of the fundamental object of the patent law. Very many design patents which cannot, under the law, be denied, are a fraud upon the public. A man applies for a patent on a cultivator, or hammer, or any other useful tool or device, and finding himself fully anticipated in every principle and useful feature of his application, at once applies for a design patent for the same thing. This application he bases upon some peculiarities of form or color, having nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of the article itself, and not being anticipated in these respects, a patent is granted for the new design. The patent gives him no protection whatever, except as to the form or color upon which it is based. He, however, obtains from the Office the right to stamp the word “Patented” upon the article he is manufacturing and thereby deceives the public, wrongs inventors, and brings patented articles into disrepute.

C. C. Reif, Mortimer D. Leggett, 2 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 534, 540 (1920). Commission Leggett’s suggestion that design patents “deceive the public” anticipates the Supreme Court’s similar statement regarding a copyright on bookkeeping methods seven years later:

To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the government.

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). This further supports the inference that design patents are analogous to copyrights and not to utility patents in the channeling of intellectual property protection.

55. Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Comm’r Pat 251 (1871), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 37, at 259; see also SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 135 (noting that, in Ex parte Parkinson, Commissioner Leggett voiced his disagreement with his predecessors).
The idea of stretching the section in question to cover slight changes in the form of crow-bars, spades, plows, scrapers, &c., is simply ridiculous, and tends to bring the whole system into disrepute.

The man who comes to the office with a machine or article of manufacture and seeks a design patent simply for some slight and unimportant change of form or color, requiring neither inventive nor creative genius, and producing no new or esthetic effect, deserves but little favor or consideration. In general, such men are impostors, and desire a design patent merely to obtain the right to put the word “patented” upon their manufacture, and thereby deceive the public and wrong real inventors.

The interests of real inventors, and a proper regard for the public good, demand that design patents be limited exclusively to the field herein suggested, and it is clear to my mind that a proper construction of the law fully warrants such limitation.\footnote{Id. at 258-59.}

Accordingly, Commissioner Leggett clarified the new interpretation for the term “useful” in the context of a design patent:

The term ‘useful,’ in connection with machine patents, relates to the office the thing patented fills in producing a desired effect . . . [or] to its adaptation to serve some practical purpose in supplying some physical or tangible want. But the law authorizing design patents was intended to provide for an entirely different class of inventions, inventions in the field of esthetics, taste, beauty, ornament. The question an examiner asks himself while investigating a device for a design patent is not ‘What will it do?’ but ‘How does it look?’ ‘What new effect does it produce upon the eye?’ The term ‘useful’ in relation to designs means adaptation to producing pleasant emotions.\footnote{Id. at 258. \textit{See also} Du Mont, \textit{supra} note 22, at 571-72.}

Essentially, Commissioner Leggett set a requirement that the design be only ornamental.\footnote{See Du Mont, \textit{supra} note 22, at 572 and n. 244; \textit{see also} Fenton, \textit{supra} note 37, at 8.}

\textit{Much difference of opinion has existed as to whether or not design patents were confined to ornamentation only, as defined in the Acts of 1842 and 1861, and as these statutes were construed by the Supreme Court in Gorham Co. v. White, since, in the subsequent Act of July, 1870, and the Revised Statutes, the word \textit{useful} appears for the first time in conjunction with the words \textit{new and original} in including form or configuration of an article as}
D. **SUPREME COURT CONFUSION**

Courts and Patent Commissioners continued to shift on the appropriate subject matter and scope of design patents. The Supreme Court entered the fray in a series of opinions but failed to resolve the ornamentality/non-functionality controversy.

Patentable subject-matter under the design section. Diametrically opposite opinions on this point are to be found in the earlier decisions of the Patent Office, but better opinion at this time seems to be that useful, in the statute, means ornamental utility, and not functional utility. Since the Act of 1870, the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey, in a well considered case [Theberath v. Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co., 15 F. 246] decided in 1883, held that design patents differ from patents for inventions or discoveries in that they have reference to appearance rather than utility; that their object is to encourage the arts of decoration rather than the invention of useful products; and that a picture or design which merely pleases the eye is a proper subject for such a patent, without regard to the question of utility. (emphasis in original).

59. See Du Mont, supra note 22, at 572 and n. 245; see also Ex parte Schulze-Berge, 42 O.G. 293 (1888), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 37, at 327-28 (observing that the decisions... have given too great importance to the word ‘useful,’ employed in this connection. I cannot avoid the conclusion, from an examination of later authorities, that the subject of design patents was intended by Congress to relate to matters of decoration, of esthetic art, which reach the senses through the eye. There can be no doubt that an invention to be the subject of a mechanical patent must possess utility or usefulness; but it is a usefulness which relates to mechanics, the modification or control of physical forces. On the other hand, the subject of a design patent may also be useful in an entirely different sense or direction, and I think the word ‘useful’ in the statute... is employed in a different sense. The subject of invention, so far as form, or shape, or configuration is concerned, must be useful in the sense that it tends to promote pleasure, refinement, comfort, depending upon the sense of the beautiful; it must be useful in the sense that it must not be mischievous, obscene, or tending to produce evil or wicked reflections. ... Congress, by its legislation upon the subject of mechanical and design patents, had clearly marked out two separate and distinct fields of invention, which were purposely made separate and distinct from each other...]; SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 132 (observing that some courts have declared that the word ‘useful’ in the patent law, is in contradistinction to ‘mischievous.’ The invention should be of some benefit. A design, if not ‘mischievous’ is useful if it attracts persons to it or to articles made like it. It may not be of great artistic excellence, but if it be attractive it is useful); William Symons, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 18-19, n. 1 on 19, 20-21 (1914).
In *Gorham Co. v. White*, the Supreme Court stated that:

> [t]he acts of Congress which authorize the grant of patents for designs were plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts. They contemplate not so much utility as appearance, and that, not an abstract impression, or picture, but an aspect given to those objects mentioned in the acts . . . And the thing invented or produced, for which a patent is given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form . . . It is the appearance itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense. The appearance may be the result of peculiarity of configuration, or of ornament alone, or of both conjointly, but, in whatever way produced, it is the new thing, or product, which the patent law regards.

*Gorham*, therefore, held that design patents cover ornamentality, not functionality.

A decade later in *Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus*, however, the Supreme Court downplayed considerations of aesthetics and ornamentality and instead emphasized utility. In assessing the validity of the design patent at issue, the Court concluded that:

> [t]he design patented by the complainants differs essentially from any other which has been called to our attention . . . Whether it is more graceful or beautiful than older designs is not for us to decide. It is sufficient if it is new and useful. The patent is prima facie evidence of both novelty and utility.

Similarly, in *Smith v. Whitman Saddle*, the Supreme Court reiterated that utility could be a consideration in design patentability. The Court explained that “[t]he first three of [the 1870 Act] classes [eligible for design patent protection] plainly refer to ornament, or to ornament and utility, and the last to new shapes or forms of manufactured articles . . .” While noting *Gorham’s* observation that Congress authorized the granting of patents for designs for

---

60. 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
61. *Id*. at 524-25.
62. *Gorham*, although decided in 1871, applied the 1842 and 1861 Acts and did not refer to the 1870 Act.
63. 105 U.S. 94 (1882).
64. *Id*. at 96.
65. 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
66. *Id*. at 678.
the purpose of enhancing the appearances of articles, rather than their utility or the manner they were produced, the Court nonetheless explained that:

This language [cited from Gorham] was used in reference to ornamentation merely, and moreover the word ‘useful,’ which is in section 4929, was not contained in the act of 1842, under which the patent in Gorham Co. v. White, was granted; so that now where a new and original shape or configuration of an article of manufacture is claimed, its utility may be also an element for consideration.

The Court further confused the issue by quoting Northrup v. Adam, which held that:

the law applicable to design patents ‘does not materially differ from that in cases of mechanical patents . . . To entitle a party to the benefit of the act, in either case, there must be originality, and the exercise of the inventive faculty. In the one, there must be novelty and utility, in the other, originality and beauty . . .

III. THE 1902 DESIGN PATENT ACT: LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW’S FUNCTIONALITY CHANNELING PRINCIPLE

Lacking clear resolution of the scope of design patent protection, the Patent Office eventually pushed Congress to restore design patent law to its original limited purpose of protecting ornamental features of articles of manufacture. In a letter to the Senate Committee on Patents commenting on draft design patent legislation, PTO Commissioner Frederick Allen advocated reform:

... In the proposed section the word ‘useful’ has been eliminated, and the word ‘artistic’ has been inserted as qualifying.
the designs covered by the statute. The reason for this change is, that at the present time the construction given to this statute by the courts has reached this position. After the insertion of the word ‘useful’ by the act of July 8, 1870, the Supreme Court of the United States passed upon this question in Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus (105 U. S., 94), and said, speaking of the design in this case: ‘It is sufficient if it is new and useful. The patent is prima facie evidence of both novelty and utility.’ It is perfectly apparent that any other ruling would have been to remove by construction the word ‘useful’ from the statute, which was beyond the province of judicial construction.

In Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., decided at the October term, 1892 (148 U. S., 674), Chief Justice Fuller said: ‘... the word ‘useful,’ which is in section 4929, was not contained in the act of 1842, under which the patent in Gorham Co. v. White was granted. So that now where a new and original shape or configuration of an article of manufacture is claimed, its utility may be also an element for consideration.’ (Citing Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U. S., 94.)

Although the Supreme Court has thus indicated, in effect, this, that since the word ‘useful’ is in the statute it must be an element for consideration, it has never been stated what the consideration is which can be given to utility in respect to a design, and the same court stated with approval in the same opinion the language used by Mr. Justice Brown when district judge for the eastern district of Michigan (148 U. S., p. 679): ‘To entitle a party to the benefit of the act in either case (mechanical inventions or designs) there must be originality and the exercise of the inventive faculty. In the one there must be novelty and utility; in the other, originality and beauty.’

The court of appeals of the District of Columbia, in re Tournier (94 O. G., 2166), speaking of these two Supreme Court decisions, said: ‘We do not, however, understand the court as intending to go further than this, and to hold that functional utility is to be regarded as a controlling or even an essential element in a patent for a design. For if so the design patents would virtually be placed upon the same footing and with the same requirements of patents for mechanical inventions.’

The trouble of late years under this statute has been that inventors who have been unable to show any novel function arising from change of form in their mechanical cases, have sought to obtain design patents for the very same subject-matter that had failed to show any mechanical utility. Things had passed finally to this point, that design patents were asked for to cover a lot of things for which

---

72. [Ed. Note: It is unclear why Commissioner Allen wrote that the word “useful” was inserted only in 1870, when it was included in the original 1842 Act and the 1861 Act albeit in a different class of eligible subject matter.]
it was perfectly evident that the design-patent act was never intended at the time of its passage.

Recently the United States circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, in the case of Rowe v. Blodgett (112 Fed. Rep., 61), affirming the decision of the circuit court, quoted and adopted the language which had been used in the court below, as follows: ‘I decide this case upon the broader ground that patents for designs are intended to apply to matters of ornament, in which the utility depends upon the pleasing effect imparted to the eye, and not upon any new function . . . Design patents refer to appearance, not utility. Their object is to encourage works of art and decoration, which appeal to the eye, to the aesthetic emotions, to the beautiful. A horseshoe calk is a mere bit of iron or steel, not intended for display, but for an obscure use, and adapted to be applied to the show of a horse for use in snow, ice, and mud. The question an examiner asks himself while investigating a device for a design patent is not ‘What will it do?’ but ‘How does it look?’ ‘What new effect does it produce upon the eye?’ The term ‘useful’ in relation to designs means adaptation to producing pleasant emotions. ‘There must be originality and beauty. Mere mechanical skill is not sufficient.’”

The present situation, then, is this: We have the word ‘useful’ in the statute. The Supreme Court says consideration must be given to it, and now the court says as to the nature of the consideration to be given to it that the term ‘useful’ is ‘adaptation to producing pleasant emotions.’ This is something very different from mechanical utility. This is best set forth in the statute if we erase the word ‘useful’ and insert the word ‘artistic,’ which is done in the proposed statute.

It is thought that if the present bill shall become a law the subject of design patents will occupy its proper philosophical position in the field of intellectual production, having upon the one side of it the statute providing protection to mechanical constructions possessing utility of mechanical function, and upon the other side the copyright law, whereby objects of art are protected, reserving to itself the position of protecting objects of new and artistic quality pertaining, however, to commerce, but not justifying their existence upon functional utility. If the design patent does not occupy this position there is no other well-defined position for it to take. It has been treated of late years as an annex to the statute covering mechanical cases, since the introduction of the word ‘useful’ into it. It is thought that this practice should no longer continue.73

Against this backdrop of confusion and disarray,\textsuperscript{74} Congress passed legislation deleting the word “useful” from the design patent statute and replacing it with “ornamental.”\textsuperscript{75} Congress also consolidated the several classes of eligible works into a design for an “article of manufacture.”\textsuperscript{76} Under the new Act, “Any person who has invented any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture” could apply for a design patent.\textsuperscript{77} These and additional changes in the Act\textsuperscript{78} aimed to shift the focus of design patents to appearances and ornamentality.\textsuperscript{79} The bill passed both the Senate and the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{74} See also Du Mont, \textit{ supra } note 22, at 588-89.
\item \textsuperscript{76} The consolidating term “article of manufacture” for the several alternative classes of protection was adopted based on an amendment from 1887 to Section 289 of the act in relation to infringement remedies. See Hudson, \textit{ supra } note 16, at 389; Sarah Burstein, \textit{The Article of Manufacture in 1887,} 32 \textit{BERKELEY TECH. L.J.}, 1, 3 (2017).
\item \textsuperscript{77} Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, 32 Stat. 193 (1902).
\item \textsuperscript{78} See Du Mont, \textit{ supra } note 22, at 589-90.
\item \textsuperscript{79} See Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the year 1902, at viii (stating the intent of the 1902 Act was to make clear the fact that mechanical devices of little importance unaccompanied by the development of new mechanical functions were not to be protected by design patents. These patents are now restricted to those ornamental characteristics of manufactured articles which were intended primarily to be the subject for the application of this law before its employment had been widened beyond its originally-intended scope.
\end{thebibliography}
House unanimously without substantive discussion or input from the professional community.\(^80\) The 1902 Act’s essential language still holds today.\(^81\)

The Senate Report explains the rationale for the reforms—to delineate a clear boundary between design and utility patents and to defuse the confusion caused by the word “useful”:

The object sought by the proposed amendment is to conform the existing law to the manifest requirements of design patent law as distinguished from the law governing the subject of mechanical patents. Under existing law the courts have been compelled to strain the meaning of the word ‘useful’ to its utmost limit in order not to do injustice to design patentees, and in some instances the purpose of Congress in enacting design patent legislation has been conspicuously evaded and aborted because of the inappropriate language found in the Revised Statutes bearing on the subject of design patents.\(^82\)

\(^80\) See Harold Binney, Present Status of the Law Relating to Designs, 25 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 662, 662 (1902); see also Du Mont, supra note 22, at n. 350

The chairman of the House Committee had asked for the Patent Law Association’s input on the bill. However, the local patent bars never had an opportunity to submit their findings to Congress because the bill was inadvertently allowed to move forward. Indeed, the bill was passed unanimously in the Senate and House without any substantive discussion at all. After the Patent Law Association contacted the House Committee chairman, he apologized for the oversight and contacted the Secretary of the Interior. A brief was submitted by the members of the House Committee and the Patent Law Association to the Secretary of the Interior prior to the bill’s signature by the President. As one might guess, over 90% of the Patent Law Association’s members were opposed to the bill because of the perceived subject matter change. The day after the brief was submitted to the Assistant Attorney General—to whom the matter was referred by the Secretary of the Interior—the bill was signed by the President. (internal citations omitted).

\(^81\) Compare 35 U.S.C § 171(a) “Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” with Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, 32 Stat. 193 (1902) “Sec. 4929. Any person who has invented any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. . . may, . . . obtain a patent therefor.” It should be noted, however, that during those years between 1842 to 1902, the act went through several amendments, and while the requirement that a design be “useful” remained in the act throughout, in the 1870 amendment it changed its location from one class of protection to another. See infra note 138 and related discussion.

\(^82\) S. Rep No. 57-1139, at 1 (1902).
The Senate Report reproduced PTO Commissioner Allen’s letter supporting the reforms and explaining the underlying rationale.\(^{83}\) Along similar lines, the House Report explained that

> Under the existing statute the United States Supreme Court has said that consideration may be given to the word ‘useful’ in the granting of a patent. Other courts in attempting to define what consideration shall be given to the word ‘useful’, define it as ‘adaptation to producing pleasant emotions’. This has nothing whatever to do with mechanical utility. This state of affairs has brought into the Patent Office much contention and some confusion. To avoid these difficulties and to make plain the distinction between mechanical patents, where ‘utility’ is an essential element, and design patents, where ‘utility’ has nothing to do with it, but where ornamentation is the proper element of consideration, the amendment offered by this bill is proposed.\(^{84}\)

A contemporary practitioner and commentator viewed the 1902 Act as significantly narrowing the scope of design patent protections as regards minimalist designs:

> It would seem then that certainly wherever the aesthetic sense is involved in a design either in respect to ornament, or in respect to the beauty that flows from the mere neatness and fitness of shapes, the statute before amendment certainly afforded protection; whereas, now the requirement ‘ornamental’ would seem incapable of so broad a meaning. There is certainly a class of designs wherein neatness or fitness of shape is evolved solely for the purpose of improved appearance or attractiveness, and yet where ornamentation is neither sought for nor present. This field of effort the amended statute leaves unprotected. Secondly, while it is debatable whether merely useful shapes where utility and not appearance is the sole object, were or were not protected under the statute, it is quite certain now that neither the saddle of the Whitman case nor the showcase of Lehnbeuter vs. Holthaus would be protected under the amended statute.\(^{85}\)

### IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1902 ACT’S CHANNELING PRINCIPLE: WAYWARD DRIFT BACK INTO CONFUSION

The 1902 legislation clarified Congress’s intent to reinforce the channeling principle as between design and utility patents through replacement of the word

---

83. Id. at 1-3.
84. H.R. Rep No. 57-1661 (1902) (emphasis added).
85. Binney, supra note 80, at 669 (emphasis added).
“useful” with “ornamental.” This change sought to limit design patents to original ornamental features and channel functional advances to the utility patent regime. The 1952 Patent Act retained the 1902 Act approach. Yet as reflected in the Apple v. Samsung controversy and countless other cases, modern courts allow design patent protection to cover functional features of articles of manufacture.

In modern jurisprudence, a design is ornamental and not functional so long as it is not “dictated solely” or “primarily” by functional considerations, thereby affording design patent protection for functional features that meet this ambiguous bar. Such standards directly contradict the unmistakable intent of Congress.

86. See also Functionality in Design Protection Systems, supra note 71, at 265 (“Commissioner Allen seemed to view the ornamentality criterion as an important channeling device, ensuring that design patent law would occupy ‘its proper philosophical position in the field of intellectual production . . .’”) (citing S. Rep. No. 57-1139, at 3 (1902)); In re Sherman, 35 App. D.C. 100, 101 (1910)

The right to a design patent . . . depends upon whether the person applying ‘has invented any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture, not known or used by others in this country before his invention thereof,’ etc. Prior to May 9th, 1902, when said section was amended, the invention must have comprised a ‘new, useful, and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture.’ . . . It will be observed that in the statute as amended the word ‘useful’ is omitted and the word ‘ornamental’ is inserted. It would seem that the purpose of this change was to more carefully differentiate design patents from mechanical patents.

87. But it seems that in the early years after 1902 there was some ambiguity as to whether cases decided prior to the 1902 Act, which allowed utility considerations in questions of design patentability, continued to apply after the 1902 amendment. See, e.g., In re Sherman, 35 App. D.C. 100, 101 (1910) (“. . . It would seem that the purpose of this change was to more carefully differentiate design patents from mechanical patents. While in a close case utility may be given some consideration, the real question is whether there is such originality shown as to call for the exercise of the inventive faculty.” (citing Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893) (emphasis added); In re Tourrier, 17 App. D.C. 481 (1901))); Shoemaker, supra note 36, at 130 (“The consensus of legal opinion, however, is that while utility may be considered, it is not an important factor in the determination of design patentability, but is reserved for consideration in a close case.”); SYMONS, supra note 59, at 21-22.

88. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (providing “Patents for designs. (a) In General.— Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).

89. See infra, Part V(D).

90. See infra, Parts V(B), V(C), and V(E).

91. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“the design of a useful article is deemed to be functional when the appearance of the claimed design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article. . . [P]atented design must be primarily ornamental . . .”) (internal citations omitted) (emphases added); Best Lock Corp. v. Iko Unican Corp.,
How did courts veer so badly off-course? This section explains the inadvertent and inattentive drift that underlies the problem. Rather than referring back to the 1902 legislation, courts gradually lost their compass and, through a flawed common law evolution, developed standards that not only diverged from Congress’s clear intent but also contradicted the Supreme Court’s seminal intellectual property channeling principle enunciated in *Baker v. Selden.*

In the first few decades following the 1902 Act, courts sought to evaluate the question of ornamentality directly, focusing on either the manifestation of artistic beauty and aesthetic appeal or by addressing the question of visibility.

---

92. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
93. See J.H. Carnes, *Rules 79 to 84*, 2 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 204, 205 (1919) (defining “ornamental” as used in the design patent statute:

   The word ornamental as used in connection with articles of manufacture indicates an article which produces a pleasing appearance on the eye of the observer. It is sometimes stated that if the article of manufacture is beautiful it is also ornamental within the meaning of the statute. The appearance may be grotesque, bizarre, or even ludicrous, and yet be ornamental within the meaning of the statute. Such effects have to the beautiful a relation similar to what in music discords have to concords. They both form part of a larger whole that may be properly comprehended under the terms beauty or harmony, respectively. The pleasing effect produced on the eye must involve invention in order to be patentable.

   (citing cases)); SYMONS, *supra* note 59, at 14 (“If the object produced is beautiful, it is ‘ornamental’ within the meaning of the statute. A thing may also be beautiful and therefore ornamental in the sense here used if it is grotesque, bizarre, or ludicrous. The design is ‘ornamental’ if it appeals to the esthetic emotions. But although it must be ‘a thing of beauty’ it is not necessary that it show any high degree of esthetic excellence.”); see generally *Functionality in Design Protection Systems, supra* note 71, at 264. Later cases shifted away from this approach and focused on conventional aesthetic beauty. See e.g., *In re Stimpson*, 24 F.2d 1012, 1012 (C.A.D.C. 1928) (invalidating a design patent because it was “lacking in symmetry, wanting in grace, and destitute of any appeal to the senses or emotions”); *In re Koebring*, 37 F.2d 421, 422
namely, the “matter of concern” test. This approach, however, put judges in the uncomfortable role of art critic.

As an alternative, courts shifted their focus to the question of functionality—which became the prevalent test. Early cases correctly invalidated design patents that were solely dictated by functionality, but

(C.C.P.A. 1930) (“[T]he beauty and ornamentation requisite in design patents is not confined to such as may be found in the ‘aesthetic or fine arts.’”); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 696 (C.A.N.Y. 1961) (denying a design patent for a plastic pitcher for lacking a “dominant artistic motif” and for failing to be “the product of aesthetic skill and artistic conception.”); see Perry J. Saidman & John M. Hintz, The Doctrine of Functionality in Design Patent Cases, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 352, 352-53 (1989); William T. Fryer III, Industrial Design Protection in the United States of America - Present Situation and Plans for Revision, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 820, 831-33 (1988).


95. See H.C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Sons Co., 20 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir. 1927) (Hand, J.) (after recognizing that “in aesthetics there are no standards” and “that the design need not please such sensibilities as we may personally chance to possess,” nonetheless invalidating a design patent on a tricycle on the grounds that the design “has neither proportion, ornament, nor style, which could in our judgment make remotest appeal to the eye.”); E. S. Allen, Design Patentability, 9 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 298, 299, 302 (1927) (lamenting that “[n]o branch of the Patent Office service is there more opportunity for arbitrary judgment on the part of administrative officials, and in no branch is there a more hazy and indefinite line of decisions from which to endeavor to extract principles and rules which should lead to the establishing of definite standards of what is, and what is not, patentable in the way of a design”; and observing that “[a] model for a very thin watch might be particularly suited for its purpose because everyone knows that a watch is carried in the pocket. The same design might not be beautiful for a clock, because the clock is made to stand up, and a very thin clock might fall over. The thought of the comparison of the very thin watch and a very thin clock model is illustrative of the fact that what might be inventive for one class of articles would not be invention for another.”); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company, 188 U.S. 239 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (warning in a copyright case that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).

96. See Functionality in Design Protection Systems, supra note 71, at 271; SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at Chapter VII; see also, e.g., Best Lock Corp. v. Iko Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Recognizing that ornamentation is in the eye of the beholder, the courts have sought a more objective standard in the general rule that a design is ‘ornamental’ for purposes of 35 U.S.C. 171 when it is not primarily functional.”); Christopher J. Gaspar, The Federal Circuit Locks Down the Ornamentality Requirement: Best Lock v. Iko Unican, 23 J. Corp. L. 179, 182 (1997) (“According to the most recent pronouncements by the Federal Circuit, ‘ornamental’ means ‘not primarily functional.’ The court now defines the ornamentality of a claimed design solely in terms of its functionality or lack thereof. To put it another way, the Federal Circuit views functionality and ornamentality as mutually exclusive characteristics.”).
unfortunately later decisions misinterpreted these decisions to hold that design patents are available *so long as* articles of manufacture are not “solely” or “primarily” dictated by functionality. Some later courts lost the compass that Congress provided and set upon a treacherous course that undermined the coherence of the intellectual property system. As Part V explains, the Federal Circuit ultimately went down this mistaken path.

A. **THE ORNAMENTALITY STANDARD**

Early cases indeed contradistinguished the two design qualities—ornamental and useful. In *Ex parte Hartshorn*, Commissioner Allen rejected an application for a design of a wooden-shaped roller, observing that:

> there does not appear to be in this case anything present created by invention and placed upon this article of manufacture for the purpose of ornamentation. The subject-matter of a design patent is wholly wanting from this case. The construction shown is created for the accomplishment of a mechanical result, and while it would have been possible to place upon this article some ornamental design for its embellishment the construction presented here seems void of any such design... 98

In *Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co.*, an earlier case cited in the legislative history of the 1902 Act, the court denied a design patent for a horseshoe calk on similar grounds:

> I decide this case upon the broader ground that patents for designs are intended to apply to matters of ornament, in which the utility depends upon the pleasing effect imparted to the eye, and not upon any new function... It is significant, in this connection, that the patentee first applied for this essential feature... as a mechanical invention, which application was rejected, and that he then attempted to cover the same feature by a design patent. Design patents refer to appearance, not utility. Their object is to encourage

---

97. Such interpretation seems a return to the Act’s origins. See, e.g., in *Ex parte Crane*, supra note 33 (explaining that “[t]he construction which has been given to that act by the office, ever since its passage in 1842, is that it relates to designs for ornament merely; something of an *artistic* character as contradistinguished to those of convenience or utility”).


99. 112 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1901).

100. See S. Rep No. 57-1139, at 2-3 (1902).

101. A horseshoe calk (or caulkin) is a blunt projection on a horseshoe that is often forged, welded, or brazed onto the shoe to improve a horse’s balance and grip over uneven surfaces. See Caulkin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caulkin.
works of art and decoration which appeal to the eye, to the aesthetic emotions, to the beautiful. A horseshoe calk is a mere bit of iron or steel, not intended for display, but for an obscure use, and adapted to be applied to the shoe of a horse for use in snow, ice, and mud.\textsuperscript{102}

In \textit{Weisgerber v. Clowney},\textsuperscript{103} two patents relating to a rolling chair, a utility patent and a design patent, were asserted in an infringement action. The court noted that “\textbf{t}he attempt to patent a mechanical function, under cover of a design, is a perversion of the privilege given by the statute.”\textsuperscript{104} In overturning the validity of the design patent, the court explained that among other reasons: “\textbf{t}he extension of the back and sides of the chair, by which screens for the wheels are formed, is functional rather than ornamental. . .”\textsuperscript{105}

Other early cases explicitly pronounced the supremacy of utility patents and recognized that functionality is a channeling principle for distinguishing between utility and design patents. In \textit{Royal Metal Mfg. Co. v. Art Metal Works},\textsuperscript{106} for example, when discussing an infringement claim relating to the design of a belt, the court found that:

[\textit{t}he principal things [of the design in question] are the downward dip in front, which appears to have been old, and the shape of the triangular front pieces to produce it by the angular attachments to the bands. \textit{T}his effect is mechanical. Design patents cover appearances only. \textit{A} monopoly of operating devices can be secured only by a mechanical patent.\textsuperscript{107}]

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{102} Rowe, 112 F. 61 at 62. For similar decisions, \textit{see Marvel Co. v. Pearl}, 114 F. 946 (1902); \textit{Eaton v. Lewis}, 115 F. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); \textit{Bradley v. Eccles}, 126 F. 945 (2d Cir. 1903); \textit{Williams Calk Co. v. Neverslip Mfg. Co.}, 136 F. 210, 215 (1905); \textit{Williams Calk Co. v. Kemmerer}, 145 F. 928 (3d Cir. 1906); \textit{see also SYMONS, supra note 59, at 15-16 (collecting cases).}
\bibitem{103} 131 F. 477 (1904).
\bibitem{104} \textit{Id.} at 480. For similar language, \textit{see Marvel}, 114 F. 946 at 946 (explaining that “\textit{t}he design patent sued on in this cause is another instance of a perversion of the statute. Patents for designs are intended to apply to matters of ornament, in which the utility depends upon the pleasing effect imparted to the eye, and not upon any new function. Syringes . . . are not bought because of their artistic beauty, but because they are mechanically useful.” (internal citations omitted)); \textit{Williams Calk Co. v. Neverslip Mfg. Co.}, 136 F. 210, 215 (1905) (citing \textit{Weisgerber}); \textit{Star Bucket Pump Co. v. Butler Mfg. Co.}, 198 F. 857, 863 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (citing \textit{Weisgerber}).
\bibitem{105} \textit{Weisgerber}, 131 F. 477 at 480-81. \textit{See also SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 136-37 (explaining that “[a]ny peculiarity of appearance due to configuration designed and employed for the performance of the mechanical result must be eliminated from consideration in determining design patentability” (citing \textit{ex parte Kern}, 105 O. G. 2061 (1903))).}
\bibitem{106} 121 F. 128, 129 (1903).
\bibitem{107} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added); \textit{see also Roberts v. Bennett}, 136 F. 193, 194-95 (2d Cir. 1905) (finding that the design patent for a basket with handles was almost identical in shape to the claimant’s prior utility patent, noting that “\textit{f}unctional utility entitled the patentee to the
Similarly, the Patent Commissioner in *Ex parte Nickel* and *Crane*\(^{108}\) noted that:

> Since the differences from the prior devices do not add to the beauty of the device, but merely adapt it to perform new functions, *they do not patentably distinguish them as designs*. If they involve novelty and the exercise of the inventive faculty, *they must be placed in the class of mechanical inventions, which must be protected under section 4886 of the Revised Statutes, and not in the class of designs*.\(^{109}\)

Around the same time, the district court in *Rose Mfg. Co. v. E. A. Whitehouse Mfg. Co.*\(^{110}\) recognized the potential for abuse of the design patent regime to protect mechanical inventions resulting from the advent of photography. In invalidating a design patent for a lamp bracket that was the subject of a utility patent, the court derisively explained that

> [a] valid design patent does not necessarily result from photographing a manufactured article and filing a reproduction of such photograph properly certified in the patent office . . . . Indeed, every feature of these patents is mechanical and functional, and not ornamental. Even ordinary rivet heads are made to appear as beautiful circles in this scheme of ornamentation. If, moreover, the braces or supports of patent No. 41,389 were intended for ornamentation, they apparently failed in their mission, but, if otherwise, then every piece of mechanism can, with the aid of photography and the machinery of the Patent Office, be readily crystallized into a design patent.\(^{111}\)

mechanical patent already discussed, but mere functional utility did not entitle him to a design patent for the same article” and “*The term “useful” in relation to designs means adaptation to producing pleasant emotions. There must be “originality and beauty” mere mechanical skill is not sufficient,*’ *Rowe v. Blodgett & Clapp Co.* (C.C.) 103 Fed. 873, 874 [(2d Cir. 1901)].” (some citations omitted)).


109. *Id.* (emphases added); *see Ex parte Knauth*, 102 O. G., 1294 (1903) (“*Forms modeled only to develop function may receive protection under section 4886, Revised Statutes, if they are functionally distinguishable from other existing forms, and when they cannot stand this test they are not worthy of the protection of the patent law, but are mere changed forms changed for no useful purpose . . . . Changed forms which do not produce ornamental effects and which develop no new functions do not promote the progress of the useful arts and are outside of the constitutional power of congress to afford protection to them.*)” *cited in W. L. Pollard, DIGEST OF DECISIONS OF LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE PATENT OFFICE AND THE UNITED STATES AND STATES COURTS IN PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS, COPYRIGHTS AND LABELS 1897-1912 103* (1912).

110. 201 F. 926 (D.N.J. 1913).

111. *Id.* at 929-30.
In 1920, the Second Circuit in *Baker v. Hughes-Evans Co.* also confronted the interplay of the utility and design patent regimes and offered a succinct and insightful resolution. The patentee sought to enforce both a utility and a design patent for an inset soap dish wall receptacle with a protruding lip that could be used as a handle.
In ruling that the design was ineligible for a design patent, the court explained that

the lip receptacle is open to the criticism that its desirable features are functional rather than ornamental. *Weisgerber v. Clowney* (C.C.) 131 Fed. 477. It is true, as pointed out in *Bayley, etc., Co. v. Standart, etc., Co.*, 249 Fed. 478, 161 C.C.A. 436, that the same device or article may exhibit patentable mechanical invention and a patentable design; but it is not true that the design can ever be used to appropriate (per se) the mechanical function. The two inventions must be separable; otherwise, it would be a contradiction in terms to grant two patents for them.\(^{114}\)

\(^{114}\) *Baker*, 270 F. at 99 (citation omitted and emphasis added); *see Work of the Education Committee*, 5 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 396, 403 (1921) (explaining that “[i]f the feature in which the
The court’s recognition that a design patent can never be used to appropriate a mechanical function aligns with the Supreme Court’s fundamental insight in *Baker v. Selden*\(^\text{115}\) that it would be a “surprise and fraud upon the public” to grant the author of a book “an exclusive property in the art described.”\(^\text{116}\) Such is the exclusive province of the utility patent regime. Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s recognition in *Baker v. Hughes-Evans Co.* that the functional and ornamental features must be separable parallels the separability limitation on the scope of copyright protection for useful articles.\(^\text{117}\)

Some cases ruled that various categories of articles of manufacture were categorically excluded from design patent protection. The First Circuit reasoned in *Theodore W. Foster & Bro. Co. v. Tilden-Thurber Co.*\(^\text{118}\) that although the 1902 Act did not bar design patents “if the ornamental character consists merely in a new and original shape or configuration given to the article,”\(^\text{119}\) it nonetheless noted that “design patents refer to appearance, not utility,”\(^\text{120}\) and that

\[
\begin{align*}
novel esthetic effect resides is the identical feature which produces the novel function, so that a structure embodying the mechanical invention would, of necessity, embody the design, and vice versa, it is questionable whether two separate patents, one for a design, the other for a mechanical patent, should issue; for neither patent could be practised without infringing the other. In such a situation one patent would necessarily afford complete protection against all infringers,” (citing *Bayley & Sons, Inc. v. Standard Art Glass Co.*, 249 F. 478 (2d Cir. 1918)).
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{115}\) 101 U.S. 99 (1879)

\(^{116}\) Id. at 102 (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the government.”). Letters-patent refers to the utility patent regime.

\(^{117}\) See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (limiting protection of “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” to “artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article. . . shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” (emphasis added)). We explore this doctrine in Part VII(A)(1), infra.

\(^{118}\) 200 F. 54 (1st Cir. 1912).

\(^{119}\) Id. at 56.

\(^{120}\) Id. at 56 (quoting *Rawe v. Blodgett* (C.C.) 103 Fed. 873); see also *Pashek v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co.*, 8 F.2d 640, 640-41 (N.D. Ohio 1925) (holding that “an automobile tire tread is not a proper subject for a design patent. . . The tread surface is broken up and given certain characteristics for reasons of function and utility. . . Ornamentation and decoration have little if any relation thereto. . . In use the tire tread is not intended to be ornamental or decorative.
among articles of manufacture there are some incapable of being the subjects of design patents, for want of reason to suppose that their appearance can ever really matter to anybody. Examples of this class are, besides horseshoe calks, syringes, plates joining the ends of machine belts, and thill couplings; also ribbon spools for typewriting machines, and insulating plugs. The shape or configuration of such articles can have value only in so far as it may make them more useful.121

The court allowed that a “design for an article of manufacture not belonging to this class” was eligible for a design patent if it was novel, original, and ornamental.122 Somewhat confusingly, however, the court commented that such a design patent could “give the manufactured article . . . greater utility than any previously used.”123 Importantly, the court then qualified that statement by noting that “[s]uch a patent, indeed, would cover the new shape or configuration only in its ornamental and not in its merely useful aspect, nor would it be infringed by an article securing the same merely useful result through shape or configuration, unless so nearly the same in appearance as to come within Gorham Co. v. White.”124 This significant caveat presaged Judge Learned Hand’s seminal copyright decision in Nichols v. Universal Studios,125 which emphasized the need to filter out unprotectable features of copyrighted works in conducting infringement analysis.126

Other early cases considered whether the commercial success of an article of manufacture could be attributed to ornamentality or utility.127 In Ex parte

121. Theodore W. Foster & Bro. Co., 200 F. at 56 (citations omitted) (citing Rowe v. Bledgett & Clapp Co., 112 F. 61 (2d Cir. 1901); Williams Calk Co. v. Neverslip Mfg. Co., 136 F. 210 (1905); Williams Calk Co. v. Kemmerer, 145 F. 928 (3d Cir. 1906); Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F. S. Webster Co., 144 F. 405 (1906); Williams v. Syracuse & S. R. Co., 161 F. 571 (1908)); see also Bradley v. Eccles, 126 F. 945 (2d Cir. 1903) (discussing the inherent lack of design patentability of a design for a washer for thill-couplers).
123. Id.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930).
Marsh, for example, the Patent Commissioner held that the commercial success of a device used in the kitchen to extract grease from waste water was not sufficient evidence that its value lies in its appearance, as such success depends more upon its functional characteristics. Similarly, in Follen v. Lambert Tire & Rubber Co., where the design patent claimed a tire tread surface, the district court concluded that prospective purchasers were motivated principally by the tire’s mechanical advantages, rejecting the assertion that the tire appearance accounted for fifty percent of the sales.

In other contexts, however, courts found that the ornamental features drove the sales of useful articles and accorded design patent protection. In General Gaslight Co. v. Matchless Mfg. Co., the court determined that “[t]he evidence establishes beyond doubt that the lamp under consideration met with immediate favor from the public on account of its artistic construction. . . . [T]he design’s ornate appearance and novel shape quickly achieved popularity.” Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Boyle v. Rousso concluded that “[t]he evidence . . . successfully established that [the article of manufacture] proved pleasing and attractive to the eyes of the purchasers of the towel cabinet it described, for they were many and its manufacture and sale was a remarkable commercial success.

The design patent regime applied with relative ease to surface ornamentation of articles of manufacture or decorative items. The
application of the ornamentality doctrine to the shape of useful articles presented greater difficulty, but even here there was relatively wide agreement that industrial tools and mechanical articles were outside of design patent subject matter. Nonetheless, it was “well-established” by the mid-1920s that a design patent on an article could not be denied simply because that article had a mechanical or functionality utility.

B. ORIGINS OF THE “DICTATED BY” “UTILITARIAN,” “MECHANICAL,” OR “FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS” PHRASEOLOGY

The standard for assessing whether a design is within the scope of design patent subject matter evolved over the course of the mid-20th century. As this section traces, the Second Circuit observed in a relatively straightforward case function. A badge would fall under this class, also a chain, a necklace, a comb for the hair, a picture frame, etc.”; SYMONS, supra note 59, at 14-15 (commenting that “[t]here are many articles which all agree are ornamental objects clearly entitled to protection under the design law, such as watch cases, spoons, medals, vases, various kinds of glassware, and many other articles”).

135. See SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 126-17 (observing that “[t]here are many structures which are so purely and entirely utilitarian that their ornamentation is a matter of such inconceivable importance that design patents cannot properly be granted for them. Possibly a frame for a combination lathe, drilling and milling machine is such a device. The United States courts in a number of instances have found design patents invalid because they were based substantially entirely upon a functional feature of a structure.” (citations omitted)); SYMONS, supra note 59, at 14-15 (commenting that “[t]here are other articles in regard to which there may be strong doubt whether they are proper subject for protection.”).

136. See SHOEMAKER, supra note 36, at 128 (citations omitted); N. British Rubber Co. v. Racine Rubber Tire Co., 271 F. 936, 938 (2d Cir. 1921) (observing that “it is not necessarily a fatal objection to a patent of this class that the design itself is exhibited upon a mechanical product devoted to utilitarian purposes, provided that the design per se is (inter alia) the result of invention. But the invention must relate to the design and be distinguishable from that which contrived the mechanical product for commercial purposes.”) (citation omitted); R. E. Dietz Co. v. Barr & Starkweather Co., 243 F. 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1917) (observing that “[w]hile design patents are not intended to protect a mechanical function, or to secure to the patentee monopoly in any given mechanism or manufacture as such, it is immaterial that the subject of the design may embody a mechanical function, provided that the design per se is pleasing, attractive, novel, useful and the result of invention. But it is the design that is patented, not the mechanism dressed in the design.”) (citation omitted); Ashley v. Weeks-Numan Co., 220 F. 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1915) (declaring that “the subject-matter of a patent is not rendered unfit as a design patent by the mere fact that it is possible somewhere in its construction to discover a mechanical function. .. The design law was intended to encourage the decorative arts, and therefore deals with the appearance, rather than the structure, uses, or functions, of the article. In a design patent the appearance is the subject-matter of the patent, and the appearance is none the less patentable because a mechanical function is involved. The patentability of a design is determined by its appeal to the eyes, and not by the presence or absence of a mechanical function.” (quotations omitted)).
invalidating a design patent that the design “does not seem to us to have been dictated by other than utilitarian considerations.” The Seventh Circuit used this formulation in two other straightforward cases. Other courts picked up on this language as well. None of these cases, however, state or even imply that a design that is partially based on functional considerations or in which ornamental elements are inextricably intertwined with functional features are eligible for protection. As Section C explains, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) deployed the “dictated solely” formulation in the 1960s in two cases that created ambiguity as to the standard for design patent eligibility. These decisions and lax pronouncements from some other courts laid the groundwork for the Federal Circuit to eviscerate the intent behind the 1902 and 1952 Acts, as will be explored in Part V.

The Second Circuit first used the “dictated by” terminology in the 1916 decision in *Strause Gas Iron Co. v. William M. Crane Co.* In this litigation, Strause Gas Iron Co. (“Strause”) asserted both a utility patent and a design patent against its competitor. The utility patent claimed a “sad iron,” a clothes iron constructed of solid heavy iron, having mechanical means for supplying air and gas for heating the iron efficiently and without the smell of unconsumed gas. The design patent application, filed two years after utility patent application, claimed the outer shape of a sad iron.

---

139. 235 F. 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1916). The opinion was written by then-District Judge Learned Hand, sitting with the appellate court.
141. *See U.S. Patent No. 948,773 (Feb. 8, 1910).*
In affirming invalidation of the design patent, Judge Learned Hand explained:

If there be any room at all in the subject-matter for a design patent, the patentees have not found it. [The court described several similar prior art design patents.] The modification of these forms into the design patent does not seem to us to have been dictated by other than utilitarian considerations. To suppose that any inventive effort was necessarily addressed towards pleasing even a most rudimentary aesthetic susceptibility appears to us far-fetched. . . . We believe that any one starting to design sad irons with the art before him, and governed only by considerations of proportion and plan, would have had no difficulty in making the plaintiff’s iron.  

143. 235 F. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
Other courts also found the “dictated by” functionality principle useful as a way of resolving design patent cases. In *Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp.*, the Sixth Circuit overturned a ruling that a design patent on a combination of ash receiver and electric lighter for use in an automobile was infringed. Although sidestepping the patent validity issue because of an assignor estoppel bar, the court nonetheless used the functional nature of the design in narrowing the infringement determination.

The patented design is comparatively simple, and without ornamentation. In the main its configuration is made imperative by the elements which it combines and by the utilitarian purpose of the device. It was certainly not the intent of the law to grant monopoly to purely conventional design which is in itself little more than a necessary response to the purpose of the article designed. The scope of a design patent, as well as its originality, must depend on something more than this.

Thus, the court engaged in the sort of abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis reflected in Judge Learned Hand’s *Nichols* decision.

The Seventh Circuit in *Circle S Products Co. v. Powell Products, Inc.* used the “dictated by” formulation to invalidate a minimalist rectangular design for a photographic lamp holder.

---

144. 67 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1933).
146. See 67 F.2d 429 (discussing *Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.*, 266 U.S. 342 (1924)).
147. 67 F.2d at 430 (emphasis added).
148. See supra text accompanying note 126, where we discuss copyright law’s abstraction-filtration-comparison framework.
149. 174 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1949).
The district court invalidated the design patent on the ground that

‘[t]he photographic lamp holder ... is a mechanical device for providing illumination for photography and its shape and configuration are dictated by mechanical and functional requirements rather than those of design.’

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, explaining that

This finding, if accepted, as we think it must be, negatives any basis for a patentable invention. It has been held that the design patent cannot properly be obtained on the shape of a device which necessarily results from its mechanical parts. In the instant case, the [patentee’s] device consists of a number of mechanical parts for operating light bulbs. The shape of the device is that resulting from the assembly of those component mechanical parts. A statement pertinent to the instant situation was made in Applied Arts Corporation v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corporation, 6 Cir., 67 F.2d 428, at page 430, wherein the court in discussing the design before it stated:

‘In the main its configuration is made imperative by the elements which it combines and by the utilitarian purpose of the device. It was certainly not the intent of the law to grant monopoly to purely conventional design which is in itself little more than a necessary response to the purpose of the article designed.’

150. *Id.* at 564 (quoting the district court decision).
Nor do we find any reason to disagree with the lower court in its view that the design is not ornamental, as that term is used in the patent law... It has no unusual shape or configuration. It is without decoration and its shape results from its mechanical construction.¹⁵¹

Less than a year later in *Hueter v. Compco Corp.*,¹⁵² the Seventh Circuit invalidated yet another minimalist design patent. Hueter claimed an incredibly simple “Article Holding Guard or the Like.”

Figure 5: Hueter Article Holding Guard

The Seventh Circuit noted that:

The drawing of the patented design was a straight, plain and unadorned front bar, the length of which is approximately seven times its width, with straight wings of the same width at each end.

¹⁵¹ Id. (emphasis added).
¹⁵² 179 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1950).
which were a little less than one-fourth the length of the front bar at an angle of about 45 degrees. No ornamentation of any kind is shown on either the front bar or on the wings. The only possible claim for the design being considered as ornamental must be found in the proportion of the length and width of the front bar and wings and in the angle at which the wings extend backward from the front bar.\footnote{153}

The district court found that

the shape and configuration of the structure shown in the patent drawing are not ornamental but are \textit{dictated by functional requirements} rather than by those of design. Such shape and configuration fail to exhibit creative artistry and show nothing suggesting the exercise of invention in the creation of a design.\footnote{154}

The Seventh Circuit had no difficulty affirming the invalidation of this rudimentary minimalist design, reiterating

that the shape and configuration of the structure of the plaintiff’s design were not ornamental but were \textit{dictated by functional requirements} rather than by those of design; and that such shape and configuration failed to exhibit creative artistry and show nothing suggesting the exercise of invention. Consideration of the use for which plaintiff’s device was designed dictated a front bar for the holder in order to keep articles from falling off the front side of the dashboard, and the wings were likewise necessary to prevent the articles from sliding sidewise and falling to the floor. The purpose and available space for placing the device \textit{necessarily dictated} the approximate length and width of the front bar and of the wings. It would seem that even a child, building a fence on a dashboard to contain articles, would have arrived at approximately the same result.\footnote{155}

\footnotetext{153}{\textit{Id.} at 417.}
\footnotetext{154}{\textit{Id.} (quoting district court) (emphasis added).}
\footnotetext{155}{\textit{Id.} at 417-18 (emphasis added). The court noted that although “in a close case evidence of the commercial success may tip the scales in determining whether an improvement amounts to an invention, . . . it cannot be used to create a doubt where there is lack of invention.” \textit{Id.} at 418. The court was using “invention” here to reference ornamental creativity, not technological advance. The Seventh Circuit concluded that “even if the evidence had shown that the patented design of plaintiff, instead of the utility of the device, had a strong public appeal, and had met with commercial success, such evidence could not have made plaintiff’s patent valid.” \textit{Id.}}
Drawing on these Seventh Circuit cases, the District Court in *Tupper Corp. v. Tilton & Cook Co.*\(^\text{156}\) addressed the validity of a design patent on a combined cigarette and match case.\(^\text{157}\)

**Figure 6: Tupper Design Patent – Des. 144,528 (Jan. 9, 1945)**

![Diagram of Tupper Design Patent](image)

As the court explained, the design was composed of two parts, a lower member into which can be placed a package of cigarettes and a book of matches, and a cover member which telescopes over the lower member. In general configuration the lower member is a hollow rectangular container of a size to fit a regular size package of cigarettes with the front wall bulging or protruding sufficiently to form a substantially rectangular compartment for the book of matches. The cover is of the same general shape, being slightly larger so that it will slide down outside the wall of the lower part.\(^\text{158}\)

Tupper Corp. executed a minimalist design that was contoured to a standard-sized cigarette box and a standard sized match book.


\(^{158}\) *Tupper*, 113 F.Supp. at 805.
Tupper defended the validity of the design patent on the ground that the design “produces a new and pleasing impression on the aesthetic sense; namely, a symmetrical twin-formed case . . .”\(^{159}\)

The court framed the case as follows:

The essential question is whether the particular combination of elements used by Tupper produced a new and ornamental design which showed invention over the prior art, *S. Dresner & Son, Inc. v. Doppelt*, 7 Cir., 120 F.2d 50, 51, and also one which was primarily ornamental, rather than a design dictated by the functional and mechanical requirements of the subject matter. *Hueter v. Compco Corp.*, 7 Cir., 179 F.2d 416, 417.\(^{160}\)

Therefore, either ground—anticipation or ineligible subject matter—would have invalidated Tupper's design patent.

In invalidating Tupper's design patent, the court noted that the “idea of a case with a telescoping cover is not new” and had “long been made . . . to hold cigars and cigarettes as well as many other products.”\(^{161}\) The court cited two utility patents—one for a cigarette case holding a matchbook and another holding a toothbrush and dentifrice—reflecting similar designs involving functional elements.\(^{162}\) After explaining these bases for invalidating Tupper's design patent, the court then observed:

The general shape and configuration of the Tupper case is clearly one dictated by functional requirements. Given the problem of designing a container for a pack of cigarettes and a book of matches, the obvious and natural result would be a case following the general configuration of the cigarette package with a bulge on one side of the size and shape necessary to allow the book of matches to be placed therein. . . . Thus the essential features on which plaintiff relies as producing the new and pleasing aesthetic impression are merely the natural results of the functional elements of the Tupper case. . . .

The conclusion must be that the Tupper design patent in suit is invalid because it fails to show invention over the prior art and because the essential features of the design disclosed are dictated by the functional requirements of the object designed rather than by ornamental or decorative inventiveness.\(^{163}\)

---

159. *Id.* at 806 (quoting Plaintiff's proposed findings of fact).
160. *Id.* (emphasis added).
161. *Id.*
162. *See Id.*
163. *Id.* at 806-07 (emphasis added).
Thus, the discussion of eligibility is largely if not entirely dicta. The court was gilding the lily and not setting forth a definitive test for design patent eligibility. It was merely pointing out that Tupper's minimalist design claim was untenable. The First Circuit affirmed the district court in a per curiam opinion.164

Five years later, the District of Rhode Island in *Jones v. Progress Indus.*165 confronted the familiar pattern of an inventor asserting utility and design patents covering the same functional, unadorned, minimalist article of manufacture. Jones filed his application for industrial goggles, "which will be sufficiently strong and durable to be suitable for industrial protection of the eyes," on November 18, 1950.166 Fourteen months later, he filed a design patent application on "Goggle Front."167 As an indication of the Patent Office's lax examination, the design patent issued on March 25, 1952, two months after filing and two months before issuance of the utility patent.

Figure 7: Jones Goggle Patents

---

164. 209 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1954).
Jones sued Progress Industries for infringement of both patents. As regards the design patent claim, the court quoted from the statement from Tupper that designs must be “primarily ornamental, rather than a design dictated by functional and mechanical requirements of the subject matter” to obtain design patent protection. The court easily concluded that

The general shape and configuration of the plaintiff’s design is obviously one dictated by functional requirements. Considering all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the shape, size, and contour of the visor and lens section, the recess for the nose, the curved lens, the ventilation ports and holes, the molded lip overhanging the lens at the front of the visor, the loops for receiving the head strap, the acute angle between the head and visor section, the heads of the detachable bolts and all of the essential features of plaintiff’s design are functional rather than ornamental. Moreover, having in mind the prior art, much evidence of which was presented by the defendant and not cited by the examiner, I am of the opinion that plaintiff’s design exhibited no more creative artistic ability than that of which a routine designer in this field would be capable and did not amount to invention. Accordingly I find that said design patent No. 166,257 is invalid because its essential features are dictated by functional requirements rather than by ornamental or decorative inventiveness and because it fails to show invention over the prior art.

Drawing in part on the language from Hueter, the Southern District of New York in Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastic Co. invalidated a design patent on a pitcher on the dual grounds that the design lacks invention over the prior art and that it was “dictated solely by functional and mechanical requirements.” As Figure 8 illustrates, the design patent at issue in Blisscraft, unlike the patents discussed above, possessed decorative elements, such as the scalloped rim surrounding the lid.

169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. 189 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affirming design patent ruling and reversing the trademark ruling, 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961).
171. See id., at 337 (citing Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871), Hueter v. Compco Corp., 179 F.2d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 1950), and Jones v. Progress Industries, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.R.I. 1958)). This is the first case that uses “dictated solely by functional and mechanical requirements” (emphasis added).
173. The finger indentations on the handle are clearly functional. The circular ridges provide a gauge for measuring the amount of liquid in the pitcher.
Figure 8: Bliss Design Patent

The court’s analysis focuses first on the lack of creative advance over the prior art, noting that “plaintiff’s design exhibited no more creative artistic ability than that of a routine designer in the field and does not amount to invention.”

As regards functionality, the court states:

The patent is also invalid on the ground that the novelty, if any, is functional rather than ornamental. The spout cover serves to close the spout opening; the handle and the tapered body make for ease in molding. The finger indentations on the ‘pistol grip’ prevent the pitcher from slipping out of one’s hand. The horizontal lines around the body permit measuring and also strengthen the body. The scalloped lower edge of the lid serves to keep the lid on more tightly and to prevent leakage; and the flange or base prevents tipping. Each of these features is basically functional.

The new and pleasing aesthetic impression required to sustain a design patent cannot be merely the natural result of a combination of functional arrangements. Here, the design is clearly dictated by functional or mechanical requirements, and the so-called pleasing effect is merely a by-product. It is therefore invalid.175

In view of the court’s determination on creativity, the court’s analysis of functionality is dicta. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the design patent based on the lack of creativity in combining prior art elements and lack of ornamentation, making it “unnecessary” for the court to determine “whether the utilitarian or mechanical features of the pitcher were so dominant in the design conception as to prevent patentability.”176

None of these cases in which the “dictated by functional considerations” or “functional requirements” language was used state or even imply that a design that is partially based on functional considerations or in which ornamental elements are inextricably intertwined with functional features are eligible for protection. These were all easy cases in which the courts could resolve the controversy by observing that design patents cannot be granted where a design is dictated by functional considerations. In some cases, the observation that the design is “dictated by functional considerations” was secondary as the court had an independent ground (anticipation or obviousness) for its decision.

C. THE CCPA’S ADOPTION OF A “DICTATED SOLELY BY” STANDARD

The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office applications, placed its imprint on design patent eligibility in two decisions in the 1960s.177 Although these decisions affirming rejections of design patents did not reach erroneous results per se, they introduced ambiguity as to the proper standard for assessing design patent eligibility.

175. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See In re Garbo, 287 F.2d 192 (C.C.P.A. 1961); In re Caretti, 328 F.2d 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
In *In re Garbo*, the CCPA reviewed an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office which rejected an application for a design patent on obviousness grounds. The CCPA noted that

*a design may embody functional features and still be patentable, but in order to attain this legal status under these circumstances, the design must have an unobvious appearance distinct from that dictated solely by functional considerations. We do not find this situation here.***

The CCPA’s terse statement left room for doubt as to the scope of design patent eligibility. What did it mean to say that a design patent “may embody functional features”? Did the CCPA imply that a design patent could extend to functional features so long as they were not “dictated solely by functional considerations”? Could a design that inextricably intertwined aesthetic and functional elements be eligible for a design patent? The regional appellate courts decisions were far more circumspect in communicating that design patents could not monopolize functional elements.

Judge Giles Rich, whose protectionist predilection defined his long career, wrote the CCPA’s opinion in *In re Carletti*. The decision affirmed the Patent Office’s determination that a design for a gasket for the threaded bunghole of a fifty-five gallon drum made in compliance with a regulatory specification was not eligible for a design patent. The CCPA reiterated its terse statement regarding design patent eligibility from *In re Garbo* and further explained that:

> It is clear that appellants never invented an ‘ornamental design.’ The appearance of appellants’ gasket seems as much dictated by functional considerations as is the appearance of a piece of rope,

---

178. *In re Garbo*, 287 F.2d 192 at 848 (emphases added).

179. See, e.g., *Strause Gas Iron Co.*, 235 F. at 130-31; *Applied Arts Corp.*, 67 F.2d at 430 (expressing concern about monopolizing conventional designs through design patent protection); *Circle S Products Co.*, 174 F.2d at 564.


Judge Rich was advocating for broad protection for industrial designs at the time that he was sitting on the *In re Garbo* and *In re Carletti* cases. See *Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1888, 87th CONG., 1st SESS. 27-36, 83-86 (1961) (testimony of Judge Rich).

181. *See In re Carletti*, 328 F.2d at 1020-22.
which, too, has ribs and grooves nicely arranged. The fact that it is attractive or pleasant to behold is not enough. Many well-constructed articles of manufacture whose configurations are dictated solely by function are pleasing to look upon. . . But it has long been settled that when a configuration is the result of functional considerations only, the resulting design is not patentable as an ornamental design for the simple reason that it is not ‘ornamental’—was not created for the purpose of ornamenting.182

As in In re Garbo, the CCPA failed to clarify whether an article of manufacture that inextricably intermingled ornamental and functional considerations could garner design patent protection as a whole, namely, including the functional elements. Unlike some of the early ornamentality cases,183 the CCPA did not address whether separability of ornamental and functional features would be necessary.

Thus, these two cases can be read broadly or narrowly. If read broadly, any design for an article of manufacture that is not “solely” dictated by functional considerations is eligible for design patent protection.184 Under this interpretation, designs that are somewhat dictated by functional considerations could garner design patent protection. If read more narrowly, they address only the ineligibility of designs that are clearly dictated solely by functional considerations and which do not include even an iota of ornamentality. Notably, neither decision explores the 1902 Act, the legislative history, or the late 19th century controversy that led to the 1902 reforms.

The scope of design patent eligibility would continue to reverberate across the regional circuits until the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. As explored in Part V, the Federal Circuit would ultimately interpret the doctrine in favor of broad design patent subject matter. Although it was heavily influenced by the CCPA’s jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit also considered other formulations percolating around the country, which we will explore next.

---

182. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added) (citing WALKER ON PATENTS, Deller Ed., Sec. 138, p. 434; Conn. Paper Prods. v. N.Y. Paper Co., 127 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1942), Hueter v. Compco Corp., 179 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1950); Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1933), In re Garbo, 287 F2d 192, 193 (C.C.PA. 1961)).

183. See Baker v. Hughes-Evans Co., 270 F. 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1920) (requiring that the ornamental features be “separable” from the functional features); Theodore W. Foster & Bro. Co. v. Tilden-Thurber Co., 200 F. 54, 56 (1st Cir. 1912) (qualifying that a design patent “would cover the new shape or configuration only in its ornamental and not in its merely useful aspect, nor would it be infringed by an article securing the same merely useful result through shape or configuration, unless so nearly the same in appearance as to come within Gorham Co. v. White”).

184. See Saidman & Hintz, supra note 93, 355-56.
D. OTHER FORMULATIONS

The standard for design patent eligibility continued to mutate as other circuit courts of appeals improvised new language and approaches in defining the line between ornamental and functional. None of these decisions went back to the critical source material: the 1902 Act, the Act’s legislative history, or the Supreme Court’s seminal *Baker v. Selden* logic. Courts increasingly focused on whether a design is “primarily ornamental” or “primarily functional.” We also see the District of Minnesota taking the doctrine in a radical ungrounded direction: assessing whether there are “alternative available designs” as a measure not of functionality but of market preemption. While several of these decisions reached the correct conclusion—invalidating design patents on minimalist and highly functional designs—they unfortunately left in their wake misleading dicta as to the proper standard. As this dicta and variations on this language expanded, the standard drifted ever further from the logic and intent of the 1902 (and 1952) Act.

1. **“Primarily Ornamental”**

We see the use of the “primarily” language take off in the 1962 *Fendall Co. v. Welsh Mfg. Co.* decision where Judge Day confronted a minimalist design for an “Eye Protective Industrial Spectacle Frame.”

---

The defendant contended that the design patent was invalid because the design is “primarily functional.” In assessing this defense, the court highlighted the patentee’s emphasis on the functional advantages of its design in its marketing brochure: accommodating a wide range of users; reducing the size and cost of goggle inventory; lessening fitting time; affording greater comfort; and providing high strength.

Drawing on his decision in Jones, which built on the decision in Tupper, Judge Day proclaimed that “[i]t is well settled that for a design to be patentable it must be primarily ornamental; a design dictated by functional or mechanical requirements is not patentable.” The court concluded without further elaboration that “the shape and configuration of the plaintiff’s design is obviously one dictated by functional requirements of the object designed rather than by ornamental or decorative inventiveness.”

188. See id. at 46-47.
191. Fendall, 203 F. Supp. at 47 (emphasis added). Fendall was not the first design patent case to use the “primarily ornamental” terminology. The District of Massachusetts referred to “primarily ornamental” in Tupper, 113 F. Supp. at 806 (stating that design patents must be “primarily ornamental, rather than a design dictated by the functional and mechanical requirements of the subject matter”). Judge Day used that same language in Jones, 163 F. Supp. at 826.
2. “Primarily Functional”

Beginning with its 1963 decision in *Bliss v. Gotham Industries, Inc.*, a case involving the same design patent on a pitcher invalidated in *Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastic Co.*, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “primarily functional” standard, holding that a design patent must not be “dictated primarily by functional or mechanical requirements and any ornamental or so-called pleasing effect was merely a byproduct thereof.” Three years later, another Ninth Circuit panel followed this standard in *Bentley v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp.*, a case invalidating both a utility patent and a design patent covering the same minimalist, functional scissor-shaped meatball mold.

Figure 10: Bentley Food Ball Mold Patents

---

designs dictated by functional considerations are not primarily ornamental and, therefore, are not patentable” (emphasis added)).

193. 316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963).
194. 189 F.Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affirming invalidation of design patent, 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961); see supra text accompanying notes 170-176.
196. 359 F.2d 140, 145 (9th Cir. 1966).
199. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict invalidating the utility patent on obviousness grounds. See *Bentley*, 359 F.2d at 143-45.
The Ninth Circuit based its invalidation of the design patent on the following standard: “[w]here the ‘design’ of a design patent is dictated primarily by functional or mechanical requirements and any pleasing aesthetic effect is only an inadvertent by-product, the design patent is invalid.”200 The court reasoned that:

the device itself ‘is not ornamental and does not appeal to the eye as a thing of beauty; does not relate more to appearance and to matters of ornament than to utility and does not appeal to the aesthetic emotion.’ The law does not require that the device be attractive to us; judges are part of the laity insofar as artistic judgment is concerned. But we must be able to find the design to be the result of invention, not modification, and to be ornamental, ‘the product of aesthetic skill and artistic conception.’ Here we find only modification; two molds in the prior art had finger-loop scissor handles, three had spherical molds, and at least five had a rather circular thickening of the handles where they were joined together. Almost all had horizontal lines, when closed and lying flat, of the degree of straightness which Bentley says is attractive. The ‘balance’ between handle and mold or tongs on many is roughly the same as that of the Bentley mold. Alone, then, or in the aggregate, the features of this tool show no invention. Nor do they show ornamentation; as indicated above, each feature was designed to be and is unabashedly and purely functional.201

Other Ninth Circuit cases followed the primarily functional standard, also in cases invalidating design patents.202

Similarly, the Third Circuit applied a primarily functional standard to invalidate a design patent claiming a minimalist functional design for an electrical conductor.203 The plaintiff, Methode Electronics, brought a
declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate Elco Corporation’s utility patent 204 and design patent 205 relating to quick detachable electrical connectors.

---

The Third Circuit based its decision invalidating the design patent on the Ninth Circuit’s “dictated primarily by functional[ity]” standard: “If the design of the patent is dictated primarily by functional needs the patent is invalid.”

Thus, the regional circuit courts developed and applied a relatively strict functionality test and generally invalidated design patents that reflected functional design elements. In rare cases, however, courts twisted the standard to uphold the validity of design patents that involved utilitarian features. Two district court decisions that did not receive appellate scrutiny stand out. The second case, *Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, would later make its way into Federal Circuit jurisprudence.

In *L. F. Strassheim Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co.*, the Eastern District of Wisconsin rejected the argument that a highly functional design for

---

206. *Methode Elecs.*, 385 F.2d at 141 (citing *Bently v. Sunset House Distributing Corp.*, 359 F.2d 140, 145 (9th Cir. 1966)).
207. 496 F. Supp. 476 (D. Minn. 1980).
208. *See, infra*, Part V(B).
an arm-rest assembly for a classic Director’s chair is primarily functional rather than primarily ornamental.
Although the basic contours of the Director’s chair traces back to the 15th century, the patentee contended that the design “eliminated the square, boxy appearance found in prior art chairs, and resulted in a definite and salutary distinctiveness and freshness of appearance.” In upholding the validity of the design patent, the court noted that “the patented feature need not be primarily ornamental, as the plaintiff suggests; it suffices that the patented configuration does not involve its utility alone.” It is difficult to see how the standard minimalist arm assembly is not inextricably intertwined with function. Note that the design patent claims only the solid lines: a flat, modestly contoured piece of wood and standard dowel connecting the arm to the seat section of the chair.

---

210. See Director’s chair, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director%27s_chair ; The History of Director’s Chair, YOUTUBE (Jun. 26, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTENg4t7AKM.
212. Id. (citing Spandling v. Guardian Light Co., 267 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1959)).
213. Design patent applicants limit the scope of their design patent drawings through the use of broken or phantom lines to illustrate the environment, but not claimed aspects, of the design. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 1504.04. Only the solid lines constitute the claimed design.
3. “Availability of Alternative Designs”

In 1980, the District of Minnesota in *Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.* applied a lax new test of design patent eligibility: whether “there are numerous possible design solutions” for the article of manufacture. The design patent at issue claimed a series of side-by-side C-shaped tubes that function as both a fireplace grate and a heater. The design heats the ambient air by drawing cool air from the room into the tubes, which is then heated by the fire and then propelling the warm air from the top of the tubes.

Based on the legal standard applied in *Barofsky v. General Electric Corp.* and *Methode Electronics*, the defendants argued that the design was “solely or primarily dictated by functional considerations.” They contended that the diameter and circular nature of the tubes, the use and size of the legs, the

215. Id. at 489.
217. 396 F.2d 340, 342-45 (9th Cir. 1968).
218. See *Bergstrom*, 496 F. Supp. at 488. [[explain case facts above the line because cited extensively in following paragraph]].
spacing between the tubes, the positioning of the top strap, the angle of incline with respect to the back tube which parallels the slanting back wall of the fireplace, and the upturned lower portion of the air intake tubes were dictated by the performance of the grate and the capability of the grate to fit into a fireplace.\textsuperscript{219} While acknowledging that functional considerations might well dictate the “C” shape of the tubes, the court sidestepped directly addressing the functional considerations by finding that “there are numerous possible design solutions for tubular fireplace grates which operate on convective heat principles” based on prior art patents.\textsuperscript{220}

* * *

Thus by 1980, the standard for assessing design patent eligibility of functional shapes was badly splintered. The use of the “dictated by functional considerations” as a judicial shortcut for disposing of easy cases involving clearly functional designs had opened the door to more lax and subjective standards. The “primarily ornamental” and “primarily functional” standards introduced significant subjectivity and caused the standards to drift farther from the 1902 Act’s text and underlying rationale. As Judge Ely noted in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in \textit{Barofsky},\textsuperscript{221} the “primarily functional” standard is a factual question that arguably should have been tried to a jury.\textsuperscript{222} The \textit{Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co.} decision went even further, allowing design patents on a functional feature so long as the feature “does not involve its utility alone.”\textsuperscript{223} The \textit{Bergstrom} decision provided a way of sidestepping the critical separability inquiry by merely asking whether the function could be accomplished through alternative designs. If the design patentee claimed the optimal design, so be it. Note that there were arguably multiple alternative designs for many, if not all, of the designs held to be “dictated by functional considerations” and “primarily functional”—from the sad iron to the protective goggles and scissor food baller. The District of Minnesota’s \textit{Bergstrom} standard threatened to undermine fundamental design patent eligibility restrictions.

None of these decisions referred back to the clear purpose of the 1902 Act to exclude functional features from design patent protection. Inventors and designers increasingly sought to use design patents to protect minimal

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{219} See id. at 488-89.
  \item \textsuperscript{220} See id. at 489.
  \item \textsuperscript{221} \textit{Barofsky v. General Electric Corp.}, 396 F.2d 340, 345 (9th Cir. 1968).
  \item \textsuperscript{222} As explored in Part VII, \textit{infra}, we believe that the ornamentality/functional question is more properly resolved through a strict separability standard that in most cases would avoid subjectivity.
  \item \textsuperscript{223} \textit{L. F. Strassheim Co.}, 294 F. Supp. at 714 (citing \textit{Spaulding v. Guardian Light Co.}, 267 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1959)).
\end{itemize}
functional features. The advent of plastics industries and shifts in the industrial design field from surface ornamentation to the merger of form and function revived the tensions that led to the 1902 Act. The soon to be established Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would determine the future of design patent eligibility.

V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S FUNCTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE: EXPANDING DESIGN PATENT ELIGIBILITY

With the passage of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981,224 Congress transferred exclusive appellate jurisdiction over utility and design patent cases to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress’s principal motivation for establishing the Federal Circuit was to improve the functioning of the federal appellate system by eliminating regional forum shopping that had become severe in the utility patent field.225 A national patent appellate court would unify patent law interpretation. Advocates of the legislation also believed that the consolidation of patent appeals in a specialized tribunal would strengthen patent law.226 Policy analysts, legal scholars, and jurists worried that the Federal Circuit would be more prone to political

---

influences and tunnel vision than general jurisdiction appellate courts. More recent studies suggest that these concerns have come to pass.

Congress initially filled the Federal Circuit judgeships by merging the Court of Claims and CCPA judges into a single Article III appellate court. Thus,

---

227. See Hearing on S. 21 and S. 537 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 211 (1981) (commenting that “[t]he quality of decision-making would suffer as specialized judges become subject to ‘tunnel vision’ seeing the cases in a narrow perspective without the insights stemming from broad exposure to legal problems in a variety of fields”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 31 (1981) (noting that “[s]everal witnesses . . . expressed fears that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would be unduly specialized or would soon be captured by specialized interests”); see also Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 823, 845-46 (1977) (arguing that court specialization enhances the likelihood of litigant interest groups affecting substantive policy); LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 181, 204 (2011) (noting that corporate support played a key role in creation of the Federal Circuit); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1458 (2012) (discussing strong industrial support for creating the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 190 (2009) (noting the strong support from corporate patent counsel); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation?, The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 35 A.B.A. J. 425, 425 (1951) (predicting that “[o]nce you segregate the patent law from the natural environment in which it now has its being, you contract the area of its exposure to the self-correcting forces of the law”).


229. See Menell, supra note 229.
the CCPA judges, who had already resolved patent appeals from the Patent Office, would continue on in an expanded role. In essence, the Federal Circuit inherited the CCPA’s jurisprudence and personnel.

The Federal Circuit took charge of the nation’s appellate patent docket in 1982. From the beginning, appeals of utility and design patent cases from the Patent Office and district courts took up a substantial part of its caseload. In one of its first decisions, the Federal Circuit adopted the decisions of the CCPA as binding precedent. As a result, the CCPA’s jurisprudence in cases such as *In re Garbo* and *In re Carletti* remained especially authoritative because the judges who participated on those decisions would lead the Federal Circuit.

Design patents did not, however, play a substantial role in the Federal Circuit’s early caseload. Its first design patent cases involving functional features reflected a cautious approach, using various formulations of the “primarily ornamental”/“primarily functional” test. In a series of cases beginning in the late 1980s, the Federal Circuit increasingly embraced the “alternative design” test as a way of addressing the ornamentality/non-functionality inquiry. This shift, in conjunction with an emphasis on viewing designs as a whole, greatly expanded eligibility of designs with functional attributes. In the late 1990s, the Federal Circuit tempered its broad eligibility standard by discounting or filtering out functional elements in conducting its infringement inquiry. This partial rebalancing, however, conflicted with its emphasis on viewing design patents as a whole. As a result, the court pulled back, resulting in a wayward, incoherent framework that validated Apple’s iPhone and iPad design patents and other functional and minimalist designs.

What stands out in the nearly four decades during which the Federal Circuit has developed the modern design patent eligibility landscape is that the court has never once examined the text or legislative history of the 1902 Act that established the design patent ornamentality/non-functionality regime. The Federal Circuit has yet to recognize the copyright origins of the design patent system and the applicability of the channeling principle reflected in *Baker v. Selden* and design patent legislation. We turn to those sources in Part

---

230. *See South Corp. v. United States*, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (“As a foundation for decision in this and subsequent cases in this court, we deem it fitting, necessary, and proper to adopt an established body of law as precedent. That body of law represented by the holdings of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals announced before the close of business on September 30, 1982 is most applicable to the areas of law within the substantive jurisdiction of this new court. It is also most familiar to members of the bar. Accordingly, that body of law is herewith adopted by this court sitting in banc.”).
VII in an effort to rectify the design patent ornamentality/non-functionality morass.

A. A CAUTIOUS BEGINNING

The Federal Circuit first confronted the ornamentality/non-functionality question in *Feuling v. Wood*, a case involving two fan housing designs for an air-cooled engine and a design for a mounting stand for attaching an accessory to an engine for modifying Volkswagen engines. None of the designs featured surface ornamentation or decorative three-dimensional elements.

231. 758 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (unpublished/non-precedential; text can be found at 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 15512). The Federal Circuit first discussed the distinction between utility and design patents in *Carman Indus. v. Wahl*, 724 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1983), noting that “[u]tility patents afford protection for the mechanical structure and function of an invention whereas design patent protection concerns the ornamental or aesthetic features of a design.” *Id.* at 939, n.13. In applying the double patenting doctrine, the case tangentially touched on ornamentality/non-functionality in holding that design patent on the exterior of a storage bin flow promoter did not render obvious the internal mechanical features of a utility patent. See *id.* at 941.


The patentee contended that the designs were ornamental because they “are symmetrical when mounted in the engine, and because they are bright and shiny.” 234 Relying on In re Carletti’s statement that “[a] design resulting only from functional considerations is not patentable as an ornamental design,” the Federal Circuit had little difficulty finding these designs ineligible.235 Much like Carletti and prior regional court decisions, the Federal Circuit applied the “dictated by functional considerations” standard as a shortcut for rejecting minimal, clearly functional designs.

Later that year, the Federal Circuit sidestepped the ornamentality/non-functionality issue in Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc.,236 a case involving a design patent on a needle-nosed wrench.237

---

234. 758 F.2d at *5.
235. Id.
236. See 740 F.2d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Central Purchasing moved for summary judgment on the grounds that patent was invalid because the design was not ornamental, being dictated by functional considerations; and obvious in view of Petersen’s own earlier tool design and another prior art tool. The district court found that the design patent was invalid and unenforceable.\textsuperscript{238} The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that “the jaws structure—even assuming it embodies some details which are not dictated solely by function—does not create a non-obvious modification of the appearance of prior art tools.”\textsuperscript{239} In so doing, however, the court implied that the standard for assessing ornamentality is whether the design is “not dictated solely by function.”

In its first precedential decision squarely addressing the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine, the Federal Circuit in \textit{Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc.}\textsuperscript{240} overturned a preliminary injunction on the ground that a rectangular packaging container for electrical switches\textsuperscript{241} was invalid.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{packaging_container.png}
\caption{Packaging Container for Electrical Switches}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{238} 740 F.2d at 1545. \\
\textsuperscript{239} 740 F.2d at 1549. \\
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc.}, 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986). \\
\end{flushright}
The court declared that “[i]f the patented design is primarily functional rather than ornamental, the patent is invalid.”\(^{242}\) The court based its standard on *In re Carletti*:

> Many well-constructed articles of manufacture whose configurations are dictated solely by function are pleasing to look upon. ... But it has long been settled that when a configuration is a result of functional considerations only, the resulting design is not patentable as an ornamental design for the simple reason that it is not “ornamental”—was not created for the purpose of ornamenting. [Citations omitted.]\(^{243}\)

The court did not offer any insight into how to deal with functional elements that are intertwined with ornamental features. In applying the standard, the court emphasized that the inventor acknowledged that:

1. The package was made clear so that the product could be viewed by the consumer and so that a paper insert card could be protectively placed inside the plastic package and still be read;
2. The recesses in the front and back of the package were designed to fit snugly around the rotary dimmer switch and were placed as they were to balance the package;

\(^{242}\) 806 F.2d at 238.
\(^{243}\) *Id.* (quoting *In re Carletti*, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (CCPA 1964)).
3. The rounded corners and edges, and the angled surfaces were necessary for the production of a workable mold;

4. The rim along the periphery of the package was designed to hold the package rigid and to lock the package together; and

5. The hole for hanging the package on a peg was designed to extend only through the back of the package to obviate the need for precise package alignment during molding and assembly.244

The patentee responded by noting in a conclusory fashion that the design was ornamental in nature and aesthetically pleasing, and contending that the court must view the design as a whole, citing *Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White*,245 and not by its particular features.246

The Federal Circuit distinguished *Gorham*, noting that the design must be analyzed as a whole only in determining infringement, not invalidity.247 The court further explained that the purposes of the particular elements of the design must be considered in determining whether a design is primarily functional. Based on this “strong and clear showing of functionality” and the lack of persuasive countervailing evidence, the court concluded that the design patent was functional and hence invalid.248

These early cases involved clearly functional designs without any discernable surface or shape ornamentation. The Federal Circuit was not challenged to go beyond the shortcuts that prior decisions had devised.

B. EXPANDING ELIGIBILITY THROUGH THE “AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS” TEST AND VIEWING DESIGNS AS A WHOLE

In the late 1980s, the Federal Circuit confronted more challenging design patent functionality cases and began to blaze a new trail. Two 1988 cases suggested different paths: a parsimonious approach that filtered out functional elements as part of infringement analysis and a more permissive approach based on the availability of alternative designs. The latter approach would come to dominate Federal Circuit jurisprudence over the next two decades, but the former approach occasionally resurfaced and eventually gained a stronger foothold in a 2010 case. Section C explores that reemergence.

244. *Id.* at 239.
245. 81 U.S. 511 (1871) (holding that a patent is infringed when an entire design has an overall effect of resembling the patented design enough to deceive a purchaser).
246. See 806 F.2d at 239.
247. See *id.* at 239-240.
248. See *id.*
The design patent in *Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.*[^249] claimed the “massage implement”[^250] depicted in Figure 17. The device features two opposing balls at one end.

Figure 17: Massage Implement

Based on the principle that only the “non-functional, design aspects . . . are pertinent to determinations of infringement,”[^251] the court integrated the functionality inquiry into the infringement analysis. The Federal Circuit upheld the finding of non-infringement, explaining that the district court correctly viewed the design aspects of the accused devices: the wooden balls, their polished finish and appearance, the proportions, the carving on the handle, and all other ornamental

[^249]: 838 F.2d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1988).


[^251]: 838 F.2d at 1188. In an accompanying footnote, the court observed:

> The legal protection of industrial designs was the subject of recent congressional hearings. *See Industrial Innovation and Technology Act: Hearings on S. 791 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8–9 (1987) (statement of Hon. Giles S. Rich): “[T]here is definitely no Federal statute today suited to the needs of designers and design owners. . . . [T]he great bulk of industrial design is simply not protectable by design patents.”*
characteristics, considered to the extent that they would be considered by “the eye of an ordinary observer.”

The Federal Circuit noted that “a design patent is not a substitute for a utility patent. A device that copies the utilitarian or functional features of a patented design is not an infringement unless the ornamental aspects are also copied, such that the overall ‘resemblance is such as to deceive.” Thus, the court followed a parsimonious approach that avoided protecting the functional aspects of the design.

Later that year, another Federal Circuit panel took a far more permissive approach to functionality in *Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.* The case involved design patents claiming the sole and upper for an athletic shoe depicted in Figure 18.

---

252. Id. (citing *Gorham Co. v. White*, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)).
253. Id. at 1189 (citing *Gorham Co. v. White*, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)).
254. 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
257. We note that both of these patents were prosecuted by the law firm of Saidman, Sterne, Kessler & Goldstein. Perry Saidman emerged as a leading advocate for broad eligibility. We discuss Mr. Saidman’s influence on design patent law in Part VI(A).
In affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff on validity and infringement, the Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s approach of identifying numerous functional elements of the design as a way of assessing whether the design patent was invalid. In ruling that the defendant had “not persuasively” shown the design to be functional, the court quoted a portion of the district court’s analysis:

But every function which [defendant] says is achieved by one of the component aspects of the sole in this case could be and has been achieved by different components. And that is a very persuasive rationale for the holding that the design overall is not primarily functional. Moreover, there is no function which even defendant assigns to the swirl effect around the pivot point, which swirl effect is a very important aspect of the design.
In so doing, the court implicitly approved an alternative design standard for upholding design patents against functionality challenges. 259

The following year, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in passing in *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, a case involving federal preemption of state intellectual property legislation, that “[t]o qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance *that is not dictated by function alone*, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability.” 260 The Court provided no citation for this statement and it is clear from the context that the statement was pure, and inadequately informed, obiter dicta. No brief filed in the case cited or discussed the “dictated” jurisprudence. 261 The case did not address the

259. Although the district court and the Federal Circuit did not cite any authority for the alternative design rationale, it appears to be following the District of Minnesota decision in *Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 496 F. Supp. 476 (D. Minn. 1980).


The patent laws also provide for the issuance of patents on new and ornamental designs for articles of manufacture. 35 U.S.C. § 171. Dozens of examples of so-called “design patents” on the appearance of boat hulls could be cited, and an illustrative example (U.S. Design Patent No. 235,753, issued to Bremer) is reproduced in the Appendix for the convenience of the court (A-25). 5

---

5 While “utility” patents issued under 35 U.S.C. ... § 101 protect the novel and nonobvious utilitarian features of boat hull designs or boat hull manufacturing processes, design patents issued under 35 U.S.C. § 171 protect the non-utilitarian ornamental aspects of the boat's appearance. As can be seen from inspection of the design and utility patents issued to
standards for design patent eligibility. It is clear from the context of this statement that the Court was viewing the federal utility and design patent regimes monolithically.\(^{262}\)

The “dictated by function alone” language appears to have been dropped into the opinion uncritically. Much of the discussion of intellectual property policy in the case supports a higher standard for finding that a design with functional attributes would qualify for design patent protection. The Court explains that

The Patent Clause [of the U.S. Constitution] . . . reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ . . .

Bremer reproduced in the Appendix (A-4, 25), it is not uncommon for both design and utility patents to issue on different aspects of the same product. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment below, *Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats*, No. 87-1346 (filed Sep. 15, 1988); *See, e.g., Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl*, 724 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment below at 5, 5 n.5, *Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats*, No. 87-1346 (filed Sep. 15, 1988). The “Respondent’s” brief is filed as an amicus brief because the Supreme Court appointed amicus curiae to brief and argue the case in support of the judgment below. See id. at 30. The “Respondent’s Brief closed by arguing that any reevaluation of the balance between competition and incentive for innovation by the patent laws should be to Congress and citing to proposed legislation that would “confer a short-term, copyright-like protection on industrial designs..”). See id. at 29; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Xenetics Biomedical, Inc., *Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats*, No. 87-1346 (filed Sep. 15, 1988) at 23-28 (arguing that Congress did not intend for copyright law’s design separability condition to override preemption of state design protection regimes and ongoing federal legislative consideration of design protection). The only and fleeting mention of functionality comes in a brief filed by repair part manufacturers:

A manufacturer who produces a boat hull with new features that improve its performance can obtain a utility patent which accords the manufacturer 17 years of exclusivity in the manufacture, use, or sale of that product. . . .

The inventor of a new boat hull with an aesthetically pleasing and ornamental design can similarly obtain a design patent which would provide the inventor with up to 14 years of exclusivity, even if the design has no improved functional features. . . .


262. See 489 U.S. at 148 (observing that “[t]oday’s patent statute is remarkably similar to the law as known to Jefferson in 1793”); *See generally id. at 148-52* (summarizing the federal patent system with examples and cases drawn exclusively from the utility patent regime).
From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.263 Although the Court does not explicitly explain that it refers to utility patents, the policy reasons it uses are those underlying utility patents, not design patents. The Court was clearly focused on the utility patent system as the engine of promoting technological innovation. The 1902 Act makes clear that the design patent system does not cover technological innovations but rather original ornamental designs. The Court concluded Bonito Boats by noting that:

Congress has considered extending various forms of limited protection to industrial design either through the copyright laws or by relaxing the restrictions on the availability of design patents. See generally Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1987). Congress explicitly refused to take this step in the copyright laws, see 17 U.S.C. § 101; H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 55 (1976), U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1976, pp. 5659, 5668, and despite sustained criticism for a number of years, it has declined to alter the patent protections presently available for industrial design. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S.Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20–21 (1967); Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?, 10 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 195 (1985). It is for Congress to determine if the present system of design and utility patents is ineffectual in promoting the useful arts in the context of industrial design. By offering patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the present federal scheme, the Florida statute conflicts with the “strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969). We therefore agree with the majority of the Florida Supreme Court that the Florida statute is preempted by the Supremacy Clause, and the judgment of that court is hereby affirmed.264

Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court’s comment regarding the test for ornamentality/non-functionality was ill-conceived dicta, zealous lawyers, inattentive courts, and some scholars have treated this questionable interpretation of design patent law as authoritative.265

263. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 167–68.
265. See, e.g., Static Media LLC v. Leader Associates LLC, 395 F.Supp.3d 982 (W.D. Wisc. 2019) (stating that “[t]o be ‘ornamental,’ and thus qualify for protection, ‘a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the
Over the next several years, the Federal Circuit vacillated on the proper standard for assessing whether a design patent was invalid on functionality grounds. In *Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc.*,266 a major automobile company sought to use a design patent on its fender design,267 depicted in Figure 19, to enjoin an aftermarket fender manufacturer from selling compatible replacement parts.

other criteria of patentability.’ *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)’); Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, *The Law of Look and Feel*, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 561 (2017) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has ruled that ‘[t]o qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone.’ Because it is relatively easy to find some nonfunctional motivation for a design (even a design that incorporates functional elements), it is relatively easy to avoid the functionality bar in the design patent context”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, *Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.*, 2009-1354 (filed Apr. 22, 2010), at 2 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court set forth the test for design patent functionality: ‘To qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone.’ *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)’); Christopher J. Gaspar, *The Federal Circuit Locks Down the Ornamentality Requirement: Best Lock v. Ilco Unican*, 23 J. CORP. L. 179, 181-82 (1997) (stating that “*Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.* is the starting point for defining ornamental”); *Hupp v. Siroflex of America, Inc.*, 122 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating “[a]s explained in *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989), to qualify for design patent protection, a design must have an ornamental appearance that is not dictated by function alone”); *Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp.*, 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating “if the design claimed in a design patent is dictated solely by the function of the article of manufacture, the patent is invalid because the design is not ornamental. See *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (‘To qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability.’)”). These references do not mention that the Supreme Court’s reference was unsupported dicta; some incorrectly state that the Supreme Court “ruled” on the issue. Unfortunately, scholars have reinforced the ill-considered dicta by arguing to the Supreme Court that design patents cover functional features as part of their argument interpreting copyright protection for useful articles narrowly. See Peter S. Menell & Daniel Yablon, *Star Athletica’s Fissure in the Intellectual Property Functionality Landscape*, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137 (2017). Their analysis regrettably failed to explain that the 1902 Act does not support such a reading and that the Federal Circuit’s misreading of regional circuit law and blindness to *Baker v. Selden* explain the “dictated by functionality” anomaly. Hopefully this article’s comprehensive examination of the issue will steer the doctrine back on course. It does not help, however, that Justice Breyer took the bait in his *Star Athletica* dissent. See *Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1002. 1034 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). On the bright side, like the Court’s design patent comment in *Bonito Boats*, Justice Breyer’s statement was dicta.

266. 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

267. 908 F.2d at 953-54 (“The district court found the ’019 fender to have been ‘designed according to functional and performance considerations as opposed to aesthetic or ornamental considerations . . . ’ and, therefore, that the validity of the ’019 patent was called into ‘serious question.’”).
In affirming denial of a preliminary injunction for this truck fender design,\textsuperscript{268} the Federal Circuit observed that “[t]he question of when the functionality of a design so permeates an article of manufacture that design patent protection is not available under the law is a complex issue and one that continues to be the subject of considerable judicial attention.”\textsuperscript{269} In \textit{Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.},\textsuperscript{270} the Federal Circuit followed the parsimonious approach in \textit{Lee v. Dayton–Hudson Corp.},\textsuperscript{271} which filters out unprotected elements prior to the infringement comparison, to overturn an infringement ruling: “where . . . a design is composed of functional as well as ornamental features, to prove infringement a patent owner must establish that an ordinary person would be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{268} See U.S. Design Patent No. 299,019 (Dec. 20, 1988).
\item \textsuperscript{269} 908 F.2d at 954 (citing \textit{Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.}, 853 F.2d 1557, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1988); \textit{Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc.}, 806 F.2d 234, 238–40 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
\item \textsuperscript{270} 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
\item \textsuperscript{271} 838 F.2d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
\end{itemize}
deceived by reason of the common features in the claimed and accused designs which are ornamental.\textsuperscript{272}

In 1993, the Federal Circuit returned to the alternative design standard for assessing functionality in \textit{L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.},\textsuperscript{273} another athletic shoe design case. Learning from its defeat in \textit{Avia} a few years earlier, L.A. Gear obtained a design patent on the upper features of an athletic shoe\textsuperscript{274} depicted in Figure 20.

\textbf{Figure 20: Shoe Upper}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{shoe_upper.png}
\caption{Shoe Upper}
\end{figure}

After the district court found infringement, the defendants argued on appeal that each element comprising the design has a utilitarian purpose: the delta wing provides support for the foot and reinforces the shoelace eyelets; the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} 970 F.2d at 825 (citing \textit{Lee v. Dayton–Hudson Corp.}, 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Read Corp. had obtained a design patent on drawings from a nearly contemporaneously filed utility patent. \textit{See} U.S. Utility Patent No. 4,197,194 (Apr. 8, 1970 (Loam Screening Apparatus); U.S. Design Patent No. 263,836 (Apr. 13, 1982) (Portable Screening Plant). The court found that Read “failed to submit any evidence directed to either element of infringement” “(1) the similarity of the ornamental features of the Portec device and the patented design, and (2) the likelihood that an ordinary person would be confused because of such ornamental similarity.” 970 F.2d at 826.
\item \textsuperscript{273} \textit{L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.}, 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
\item \textsuperscript{274} \textit{See} U.S. Design Patent No. 299,081 (Dec. 27, 1988).
\end{itemize}
mesh on the side of the shoe also provides support; the moustache at the back of the shoe provides cushioning for the Achilles tendon and reinforcement for the rear of the shoe; and the position of each of these elements on the shoe is due to its function. In rejecting an element-by-element analysis of functionality, the Federal Circuit emphasized the need to view the design as a whole in assessing “whether the claimed design is dictated by the utilitarian purpose of the article.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision based on the existence of a myriad of athletic shoe designs in which each of the functions identified by [defendant] as performed by the ’081 design elements was achieved in a way other than by the design of the ’081 patent. When there are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.

Building on Avia, the court’s decision in L.A. Gear reinforced a permissive approach to the functionality inquiry. The court uncritically adopted the “dictated by” standard for finding functionality without addressing its origin as a shortcut for addressing easy cases. In effect, the Federal Circuit converted a sufficient condition for finding a design patent ineligible into a necessary condition. Under this standard, only designs dictated by functionality are ineligible for design patent protection. Hence functional features that are inextricably intertwined with ornamental elements are granted design patent protection without meeting utility patent law’s exacting conditions. The Federal Circuit also gave its imprimatur to the alternative design framework without explaining how a defendant could prove that a combination of functional elements resulted in a composite functional design. Moreover, despite Lee v. Dayton–Hudson and Read v. Portec, the Federal Circuit did not call for filtering out of the functional elements in the infringement inquiry.

Over the next seventeen years, the alternative design standard emerged as the principal framework for assessing ornamentality/non-functionality.

275. See 988 F.2d at 1123.
276. 988 F.2d 1123 (citing Lee v. Dayton–Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 530 (1872)).
277. Id. (citing Avia Group International, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
278. See supra Sections IV(B)-(C).
Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (same); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kate Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (same); Hupp v. Simflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (same); Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (same). Best Lock is the rare case where there truly were no alternative designs that could achieve the function of the key blade design: opening a lock designed to be opened by that particular key blade. See id. at 1566 (explaining that:

The parties do not dispute that the key blade must be designed as shown in order to perform its intended function—to fit into its corresponding lock’s keyway. An attempt to create a key blade with a different design would necessarily fail because no alternative blank key blade would fit the corresponding lock. In fact, Best Lock admitted that no other shaped key blade would fit into the corresponding keyway, and it presented no evidence to the contrary.

). Best Lock is the proverbial exception that proves the rule that there is almost always an alternative design. But even in this extreme circumstance, one member of the Federal Circuit panel dissented, see id. at 1567-69 (Newman, J., dissenting) (contending that “the fact that the key blade is the mate of a keyway does not convert the arbitrary key profile into a primarily functional design”), and advocates for broad and strong design patent protection argued that this decision would eviscerate design patent protection, see Perry J. Saidman, Functionality and Design Patent Validity and Infringement, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 313, 318-21 (2009); Perry J. Saidman, The Demise of the Functionality Doctrine in Design Patent Law, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1471, 1488 (2017) (criticizing Best Lock and explaining that “if the function of a claimed design is defined in general, broad terms, there will always be alternatives that can perform substantially the same function and not look like the patented design”); Christopher J. Gaspar, The Federal Circuit Locks Down the Ornamentality Requirement: Best Lock v. Ilco Unican, 23 J. CORP. L. 179 (Fall, 1997). By contrast, regional circuit courts and Congress appreciated that interoperability is a form of functionality that should not be monopolized short of a utility patent. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534-37 (6th Cir. 2004); Sony Comput. Entertainment v. Connectix, 203 F.3d 596, 599-608 (9th Cir. 2000); Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 700, 707-10 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-28 (9th Cir. 1992); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (providing that “a person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs”); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 13 (1998); see generally, Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 218 (2019) (tracing the evolution of intellectual property protection for network features of systems and platforms and showing the many ways in which courts and Congress have recognized interoperability as functional); P. Anthony Sammi, Christopher A. Lisy & Andrew Gish, Good Clean Fun: Using Clean Room Procedures in Intellectual Property Litigation, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2013) (describing clean procedures for learning the interoperable features of computer software); Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Features of Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651 (1998) (showing how courts have interpreted copyright law to avoid encroaching on functional features of computer software).
although the Federal Circuit occasionally invoked the *Dayton-Hudson* filtering approach.\(^{280}\)

The court tempered the alternative design standard in the 1997 case of *Berry Sterling Corp. v. Prescor Plastics, Inc.*\(^{281}\) The design patentee there claimed a cylindrical container designed to fit a vehicle cup receptacle along with a spill-proof lid.\(^{282}\) The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s invalidation of the design patent on the grounds that the lower court had inappropriately focused its functionality analysis on the limitations of the commercial embodiment of the underlying article of manufacture, failing to view the minimalist design as a whole or consider alternative designs.\(^{283}\) In remanding the case, the Federal Circuit noted that presence of alternative designs was just one factor to be considered. It stated that

> The presence of alternative designs may or may not assist in determining whether the challenged design can overcome a functionality challenge. Consideration of alternative designs, if present, is a useful tool that may allow a court to conclude that a challenged design is not invalid for functionality. As such, alternative designs join the list of other appropriate considerations for assessing whether the patented design as a whole—its overall appearance—was dictated by functional considerations. Other appropriate considerations might include: whether the protected design represents the best design; whether alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are any concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function.\(^{284}\)

---

\(^{280}\) See *OddzOn Prods. v. Just Toys*, 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reasoning that “[t]he non-functional, design aspects that are pertinent to determinations of infringement” and that “[w]here a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent,” citing *Lee v. Dayton-Hudson*; see also *Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l*, 157 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (focusing the infringement analysis on the point of novelty, which the Federal Circuit rejected in *Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.*, 543 F.3d 665, 672-79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

\(^{281}\) 122 F.3d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997).


\(^{283}\) See 122 F.3d at 1455-56.

\(^{284}\) Id. at 1456.
The court cited no authority for these factors, but they appear to be derived from *In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.*,285 a CCPA trade dress functionality case.286

Notwithstanding *OddzOn* and *Berry Sterling*, the Federal Circuit quickly shifted back to simply asking whether alternative designs are available.287 *Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co.*288 illustrates the Federal Circuit’s lax approach to design patent eligibility. As depicted in Figure 21, Rosco claimed a highly convex, curved-surface, three-dimensional, oval, aerodynamic, cross-view mirror with a black, flat metal backing.289

![Figure 21: Automotive Mirror](image-url)
In assessing whether the design was functional, the district court observed that the oval shape produces angles and images not similarly discernible in convex cross-view mirrors of different shapes. When compared with the Bus Boy mirror, another cross-view mirror, the Rosco mirror provides a more expansive field of view and produces a slightly different distortion of images in the mirror, depending on positioning. Specifically, the Rosco mirror, when mounted perpendicularly to the ground, allows the viewer to view images from above the mirror that the Bus Boy does not when mounted in the same position. Depending on where the school bus on which the mirror is mounted is operating, for example, in an urban area or in a rural area, the ability to see alongside and above the bus may or may not be important to a customer. In short, the oval design has functional capacities that a Bus Boy style mirror does not. The oval design is sufficiently central to the Rosco mirror’s use as to render it functional.290

For added measure, Judge Sifton noted that

Rosco represented to the patent office that its oval cross-view mirror provided a superb field of view by virtue of its shape. Rosco also advertised that its mirror would offer a more thorough field of view due to its oval shape than other cross-view mirrors, such as Mirror

Lite’s Bus Boy. ‘Why settle for half a mirror when you can have it all. Our new Eagle Eye mirror gives you the big picture.’ Rosco also marketed its mirror as more aerodynamic than other cross-view mirrors of different shape. Advertising that highlights features of the product’s design as offering a specific utility is a factor that influences the determination of the functionality of a design patent.\(^{291}\)

In reversing the district court’s decision, the Federal Circuit noted that “[w]e apply a stringent standard for invalidating a design patent on grounds of functionality: the design of a useful article is deemed functional where ‘the appearance of the claimed design is “dictated by” the use or purpose of the article.’”\(^{292}\) Without appreciating the origins of the “dictated by” terminology in pre-Federal Circuit jurisprudence, Judge Dyk chose the narrowest standard for invalidating a design patent on functionality grounds:

‘[T]he design must not be governed solely by function, i.e., that this is not the only possible form of the article that could perform its function.” Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu–Kote Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed.Cir.1999). ‘When there are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.’ L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123 (citations omitted). That is, if other designs could produce the same or similar functional capabilities, the design of the article in question is likely ornamental, not functional. Invalidity of a design patent claim must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id.\(^{293}\)

The Federal Circuit created a nearly impossible burden for showing functionality:

Mirror Lite has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that there are no designs, other than the one shown in Rosco’s ‘357 patent, that have the same functional capabilities as Rosco’s oval mirror. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the claimed design of the ‘357 patent was dictated by functional considerations.\(^{294}\)

The court’s analysis ignores the possibility that some shapes are better than others. So long as there are alternative designs that serve the same functions—even if less well—the design patent is not invalid.

---

291. Id. (citing Berry Sterling Corp. v. Prescor Plastics, Inc., 122 F.3d 1452, 1456 (Fed.Cir.1997)).
292. 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1378-79.
In 2007, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review in *Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.* to assess whether the “point of novelty” should be used in assessing design patent infringement. The Federal Circuit’s decision rejecting the “point of novelty” test further narrowed the grounds for invalidating design patents on functionality grounds by commanding that design patents be viewed as a whole. The court’s discussion of claim construction in design patent cases, however, breathed new life into the *Dayton-Hudson* filtration approach:

Apart from attempting to provide a verbal description of the design, a trial court can usefully guide the finder of fact by addressing a number of other issues that bear on the scope of the claim. Those include such matters as describing the role of particular conventions in design patent drafting, such as the role of broken lines, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.152; assessing and describing the effect of any representations that may have been made in the course of the prosecution history, and distinguishing between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely functional, see *OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.*, 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“Where a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.”).

C. PARTIAL REBALANCING THROUGH INFRINGEMENT FILTRATION ANALYSIS

In the first design patent functionality case following its en banc decision in *Egyptian Goddess*, the Federal Circuit took a more measured approach to the functionality issue in *Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.*, a case involving a quintessential functional product: a multi-function carpentry tool combining a hammer, a stud climbing tool, and a crowbar depicted in Figure 22.

![Figure 22: Multi-Function Tool](image_url)

---

296. 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
297. Id. at 680. *OddzOn* applied the *Dayton-Hudson* filtration approach. See supra text accompanying note 280.
298. 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Richardson brought suit against Stanley Works alleging that its multi-function tool—sold under the FUBAR \textsuperscript{300} trademark—infringed the ’167 design patent. The FUBAR contained the same tools but in a sleeker design, depicted in Figure 23.\textsuperscript{301}

\footnotesize{Figure 23: Demolition Tool}

The district court drew heavily upon \textit{Dayton-Hudson}: “If a given ‘configuration is made imperative by the elements which it combines and by the utilitarian purpose of the device,’ that configuration is functional and not

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{300} Stanley Works used FUBAR as an abbreviation for functional utility bar. The term is also recognized as a military slang acronym. \textit{See infra} note 444.
  \item \textsuperscript{301} See U.S. Design Patent No. 562,101 (Feb. 19, 2008).
\end{itemize}
protected by a design patent. Judge Wake also referenced the alternative design framework, but tempered it by a range of additional considerations:

Other appropriate considerations might include: whether the protected design represents the best design; whether alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are any concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function.

Judge Wake observed that the overall configuration of the four elements [the handle, the hammer-head, the jaw, and the crow-bar] is dictated by the functional purpose of the tool and therefore is not protected by his design patent. A designer seeking to incorporate a hammer-head, jaw, and crow-bar on a single handle will naturally and inevitably place the jaw and hammer-head together on one end and the crow-bar on the other end. To place the jaw and hammer-head on opposite ends of the handle would distribute the tool’s mass, decreasing the striking force and interfering with the user’s swing. It would also adversely encumber the crow-bar, which would have to be placed together with one of the other elements and thus would no longer fit into narrow spaces.

As a result, Judge Wake concluded that although the configuration of a multi-tool product like that reflected in the ’167 patent can take many forms as reflected in the prior art, the ’167 patent does not protect the configuration of the handle, hammer-head, jaw, and crow-bar. The design protection only extends to ornamental elements, such “the standard shape of the hammer-head, the diamond-shaped flare of the crow-bar and the top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the orientation of the crow-bar relative to the head of the tool, and the plain, undecorated handle.”

303. Id. (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
304. Id. at 1049-50 (quoting Berry Sterling Corp. v. Pescor Plastics Inc., 122 F.3d 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
305. Id. at 1050.
306. Id.
307. Id.
With these limitations in mind, Judge Wake focused on whether the FUBAR’s sleek design infringed the '167 patent. Drawing further from Dayton-Hudson, the court filtered out the unprotectable elements of the '167 patent—the overall configuration of the handle, the hammer-head, the jaw, and the crow-bar—from the infringement comparison. With these elements eliminated, Judge Wake concluded that the FUBAR did not infringe the '167 patent because “[t]here is little similarity between the ornamental features of Richardson’s and Stanley’s designs.”

Richardson appealed to the Federal Circuit, contending that the district court erred by not viewing his patented design as a whole as required by L.A. Gear and Egyptian Goddess. The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion that relied heavily on OddzOn and Dayton-Hudson. Writing for the court, Judge Lourie observed that

In OddzOn, we affirmed a district court’s claim construction wherein the court had carefully distinguished the ornamental features of the patented design from the overall ‘rocket-like’ appearance of the design of a football-shaped foam ball with a tail and fin structure. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed.Cir.1997). We held that ‘[w]here a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.’

The court concluded that

'the district court here properly factored out the functional aspects of Richardson’s design as part of its claim construction. By definition, the patented design is for a multi-function tool that has several functional components, and we have made clear that a design patent, unlike a utility patent, limits protection to the ornamental design of the article. Lee v. Dayton–Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 171). If the patented design is
primarily functional rather than ornamental, the patent is invalid. \( Id. \)

The \textit{Richardson} decision signaled a shift toward ensuring that design patent protection would not monopolize functional product features or encroach upon the utility patent regime. But even before the \textit{Richardson} decision was final, a campaign was already in motion to limit its influence.

More than a decade before \textit{Richardson}, Steve Jobs began one of the most audacious technology revivals in corporate history. When Jobs returned to Apple in 1997, eight years after his unceremonious departure, the company was near bankruptcy. Combining collateral advances in computing technology with his flair for elegant simplicity, Jobs launched an ambitious research and development effort to revolutionize consumer electronic products. Beginning with the iPod, Apple introduced a stream of new products that seamlessly combined minimalist design with user-friendly features and dazzling electronics. The iPod, iPad, and iPhone blended form and function to captivate the world and bring the digital revolution to billions of fingertips.

As part of his plan to lead the consumer electronics revolution, Jobs took an aggressive approach to securing intellectual property protection. At the splashy product introduction for the iPhone in January 2007, Jobs proudly announced five key characteristics and a clear warning to potential imitators.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1293-94.}

\footnote{313. \textit{Id.} at 1293-94.}
\footnote{314. See \textit{WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 305-425, 444-51, 465-75, 490-510 (2011).}}
\footnote{315. This had long been a part of Jobs' playbook. Apple jealously guarded its intellectual property, see \textit{FRED VOGELSTEIN, DOGFIGHT: HOW APPLE AND GOOGLE WENT TO WAR AND STARTED A REVOLUTION 172-74 (2013)}, as reflected in its aggressive and ultimately unsuccessful effort to assert copyright protection for the Macintosh graphical user interface, much of which was derived from Xerox's Star interface. \textit{See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.}, 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).}
\footnote{317. See \textit{VOGELSTEIN, supra} note 316, at 172-74.}
As it developed the iPhone and the iPad, Apple filed rafts of utility and design patent applications. It also acquired utility patents from others. On the utility patent side, for example, Apple obtained a patent on the slide-to-unlock feature for touchscreens. Figures 25 and 26 illustrate four of Apple’s touchscreen design patents.

---

Figure 25: Electronic Devices

Design Patent No. 504,889
Issued May 10, 2005

Design Patent No. 593,087
Issued May 29, 2009

Design Patent No. 618,677
Issued Dec. 23, 2010

Figure 26: Graphical User Interface for Display Screen or Portion thereof

Design Patent No. 604,305
Issued Nov. 17, 2009
These design patents were premised on a low threshold for ornamentality and a high threshold for functionality. Apple hoped to ride the Avia/L.A. Gear jurisprudence to exclusive control of the mobile phone and tablet touchscreen marketplaces.

The Richardson decision, however, potentially stood in the way of Apple’s design patent enforcement strategy. Application of a filtration approach exposed Apple’s design patents to the risk that there would be nothing left of its rounded rectangular design after discounting the functional elements. By early 2010, smartphones featuring the Android operating system had overtaken Apple iPhone sales. Apple was gearing up to launch a multi-front patent battle against the growing tide of Android products inundating the smartphone marketplace.

Jobs was livid that Google’s founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page, whom he had mentored, and Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt, whom he had welcomed onto Apple’s Board, betrayed him. Apple sued HTC (and, by extension, Android) in June 2010 for infringement of five of its utility patents. Apple was gearing up to sue Samsung for infringement of Apple’s utility and design patents, as well as its trade dress. Jobs characterized its campaign against the Android iPhone clones as saying:

‘Google, you fucking ripped off the iPhone, wholesale ripped us off.’ Grand theft. I will spend my last dying breath if I need to, and I will spend every penny of Apple’s $40 billion in the bank, to right this wrong. I’m going to destroy Android, because it’s a stolen product. I’m willing to go thermonuclear war on this. They are scared to death, because they know they are guilty. Outside of Search, Google’s products—Android, Google Docs—are shit.

As insurance to protect its design patent investments and enforcement strategy, Apple enlisted Perry Saidman, the design patent attorney behind the

---


321. See VOGELSTEIN, supra note 316, at 172-74.


323. See infra Section V(D).

324. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 512 (2011).
Avia case and a prominent advocate for robust design protection,\(^{325}\) to overturn the panel’s filtration approach and restore the broad standard for design patent eligibility reflected in Avia, L.A. Gear, Rosco, and Egyptian Goddess. Apple’s amicus brief supporting Richardson’s en banc petition laid bare the strategy to eviscerate the functionality limitation on design patent protection:

> It is exceptionally important for the Court to reconsider en banc the panel’s finding that it is proper to factor out functional aspects of a claimed design prior to determining infringement.

> The parsing of ornamental and functional features should be abolished. Whether an individual feature of an overall design performs a function is simply not relevant to design patent infringement.

> Functional features that make up an overall design are nearly always themselves ornamental, and those functional features are no more or less relevant to design patent infringement than any other feature, all contributing to the overall appearance of the claimed design.

> The proper place in design patent law to consider functionality is when evaluating the validity of a design patent, i.e., whether the overall claimed design is dictated solely by function. This use of functionality in the validity inquiry is supported by the Supreme Court’s Bonito Boats decision.

> This Court’s Egyptian Goddess decision, in rejecting the old deconstructionist analysis of novelty, also changed the underpinning of older case law that similarly dissected functionality element-by-element—a flawed analysis with the same infirmities that led this Court to abolish the point of novelty test in Egyptian Goddess.\(^{326}\)

Although the Federal Circuit declined en banc review of Richardson,\(^{327}\) this decision merely postponed the inevitable functionality showdown. Apple

---


could still contend its touchscreen designs, viewed as a whole, were not functional and were infringed by Samsung’s touchscreen smartphones.

D. THE APPLE V. SAMSUNG FUNCTIONALITY SHOWDOWN: DESIGN PATENTS RUN AMOK

On April 15, 2011, Apple filed a broad complaint alleging that Samsung’s Galaxy phones and tablets infringed numerous utility and design patents, as well as the iPhone and iPad trade dress. This litigation would run for seven years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars, with several appeals to the Federal Circuit, a Supreme Court decision on a question of far less significance than design patent functionality, and ultimately a jury damages award of over a half billion dollars against Samsung based principally on the design patent infringement allegations. At the end of this Dickensian saga, the courts passively reinforced the permissive view of design patent ornamentality/non-functionality.

1. The 2011 District Court Preliminary Injunction Decision

On July 1, 2011 Apple moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Samsung sales of smartphones and tablet computers arguing among other things that these products infringe upon Apple’s design patents. Samsung opposed the motion, arguing that Apple had not met the high threshold for this “extraordinary remedy.” To prevail on its motion, Apple had to establish: “(1) some likelihood of success on the merits of the

---


329. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).


331. See id. at *5. Under 35 U.S.C. § 283, the decision to grant a preliminary injunction “in accordance with the principles of equity” is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
underlying litigation; (2) immediate irreparable harm will result if the relief is not granted; (3) the balance of the hardships to the parties weighs in its favor; and (4) the public interest is best served by granting the injunctive relief.”

a) The Smartphone Design Patents

With regard to success on the merits of the smartphone design patents, Samsung focused its opposition on their evident minimalism (non-ornamentality) and functionality:

the core of Apple’s D’677 and D’087 patents is ‘minimalistic.’ Under this theory of design, ornamentation is stripped down to pure functionality, and therefore, Samsung argues, the D’677 and D’087 patents are invalid based on functionality. Samsung offers a list of design features found in the D’677 and D’087 patents, which also have functional benefits for the user of the patented article. These design features include the design patents’ (1) rectangular shape; (2) rounded corners; (3) placement of the rounded speaker on the upper portion of the front surface above the display screen; (4) horizontal slot shape of speaker; (5) black color and borders around the screen; (6) bezel; and (7) lack of significant ornamentation. Samsung argues that all of the major elements in the D’677 and D’087 patents are “primarily functional,” and therefore the patents themselves are invalid.

Samsung also pointed to anticipation and obviousness based on a Japanese smartphone patent published more than one year before the D’677 and D’087 filing dates:

Figure 27: Smartphone Prior Art References and Comparison

332. See id.
333. 2011 WL 7036077 at *7 (citations to brief and footnote omitted).
Samsung further contended that Apple would fail to succeed in proving infringement after filtering out the functional design elements under the Richardson framework.

In rejecting Samsung’s ornamentality/non-functionality arguments, Judge Koh explained that

> the standard employed to invalidate a design patent based upon functionality requires that the design itself be dictated by the functionality of the item. Just because various elements of Apple’s D'677 and D'087 patents enhance the user experience does not necessarily mean that the patented design is dictated by functionality. The Federal Circuit has previously rejected precisely the type of argument advanced by Samsung. In L.A. Gear, the party seeking to invalidate a shoe design patent based on functionality argued that various design elements had utilitarian purposes, increasing the benefit to the wearer of the shoe. 988 F.2d at 1123. The Federal Circuit refused to find that a design patent was invalid as functional because “the utility of each of the various elements that comprise the design is not the relevant inquiry with respect to a design patent.” Id. Viewing the patents at issue here as a whole, the Court cannot say that the designs are purely functional.

Moreover, Apple has identified numerous alternative smartphone designs in which the functions identified by Samsung as performed by the design elements in the D’677 and D’087 patents were achieved in another way. Evidence of alternative designs may support a finding that the patented design is more likely to serve an ornamental function. See L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123.334

Judge Koh also found that:

334. Id. at *8 (emphasis in original).
the alternative smartphone designs identified by Apple—both other smartphones within the industry, and alternative designs considered and discarded by Apple in the process of designing the D'087 and D'677 patents—establish that there are alternative designs that do not adversely affect the utility of the design. For example, Apple identified alternative designs that had different characteristics that were neither more nor less utilitarian than the design used in the D'677 and D'087 patents. These included alternative designs that contained: more deeply rounded corners that gave an overall less rectangular visual impression; sharper corners; differently shaped speakers; differently sized and placed screens; and alternative designs with additional buttons. Indeed, several of these phone designs had additional buttons on the body of the phone, which are arguably more functional than the one button designs found in the D'087 and D'677 patents. Accordingly, Samsung has failed to meet its burden of raising substantial questions as to the validity of the D'087 and D'677 patents based on functionality.335

The court nonetheless acknowledged that “certain aspects of the design patents that are dictated by function may limit the claim scope of both the D'087 and D'677 patents.”336 Applying Richardson, Judge Koh found that “a size that can be handheld, a screen that encompasses a large portion of the front face of the smartphone, and a speaker on the upper portion of the front face of the product are non-ornamental.” 337

As regards invalidity based on anticipation and obviousness, Judge Koh found that Samsung had met its burden and raised substantial questions regarding the validity of the D'087 patent in light of the Sharp Japanese patent.338 She reached the opposite conclusion regarding the D'677 patent because the Sharp patent did not feature a black transparent and glass-like front surface.339

On the infringement question, Judge Koh acknowledged in a nod to Richardson that it was a close call “in light of the claim limitations and other considerations,” but that Apple had met its burden.340 She did not, however, explain the filtration analysis and offered only a conclusory judgment.

Weighing these considerations in conjunction with Apple’s allegation of irreparable harm from erosion of design distinctiveness and loss of market

335.  Id. at *9 (citations to declarations omitted).
336.  Id.
337.  Id.
338.  See id. at *13.
339.  See id. at *14-15.
340.  See id. at *17.
share, hardship to the parties, and the public interest, Judge Koh ultimately denied Apple’s preliminary injunction request. She emphasized the closeness of the infringement question and that “the design (as opposed to the touch screen technology) of the front view of the smartphone—is but one of many features of the Samsung accused devices. Issuing an injunction on both of these products based on one aspect of the overall product does not advance equitable principles.”

b) The Tablet Design Patent

Samsung focused its opposition to the grant of a preliminary injunction with regard to the tablet design patent (D’889) on its minimalism and functionality as well as its obviousness in light of two prior art references: a 1994 tablet intended to be used as a newspaper reader and Compaq’s 2002 TC1000 tablet.

Figure 28: Tablet Prior Art References

---

341. See id. at *23-*24.
342. See id. at *23.
343. See id. at *24-*27.
Samsung also challenged Apple’s likelihood of success on proving infringement based on the Richardson filtration framework.344

Judge Koh rejected Samsung’s functionality contentions on the same grounds that she applied to the smartphone design patents, emphasizing the narrow “dictated by” standard.345 Regarding obviousness, Judge Koh reasoned that:

Apple’s D’889 patent is a broad, simple design that gives the overall visual impression of a rectangular shape with four evenly rounded corners, a flat glass-like surface without any ornamentation and a rim surrounding the front surface. The back is a flat panel that rounds up near the edges. The overall design creates a thin form factor. The screen takes up most of the space on the front of the design.

The Court finds that the 1994 Fidler/Knight Ridder tablet creates ‘basically the same visual impression’ as the D’889 patent. The 1994 Fidler/Knight Ridder tablet is also a simple rectangular tablet with four evenly rounded corners. The front screen is a flat reflective surface surrounded by a rim on all four sides. The back-side, though it apparently has four screws, is essentially flat. The area surrounding the screen is admittedly not entirely symmetrical on all four sides, but none of these minor differences distracts from the overall visual appearance of the 1994 Fidler/Knight Ridder tablet as a simple and portable rectangular tablet with the same overall visual impression as the D’889 patent. See Durling, 101 F.3d at 103 (‘In comparing the patented design to a prior art reference, the trial court judge may determine almost instinctively whether the two designs create basically the same visual impression.’) (emphasis added).

Once a primary reference has been identified, ‘secondary references may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are so related to the primary reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other,’ Burling, 101 F.3d at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). Samsung has identified several prior art references, including the 2002 Hewlett-Packard Compaq Tablet PC TC 1000 (“the HP Tablet”), which disclose additional features of the tablet that are related to the primary reference. The HP Tablet may serve as a secondary reference because it is related both in design and in use to the 1994 Fidler/Knight Ridder Tablet. The HP Tablet

344. See id. at *27-*28.
345. See id. at *24.
contains a flat glass screen that covers the top surface of the tablet and a thin rim that surrounds the front face of the device. Thus, the main element that Apple argued was not present in the 1994 Fidler/Knight Ridder Tablet existed in the HP Tablet.346

Consequently, the court determined that Samsung had raised substantial questions as to the validity of the D'889 patent.

As regards infringement, Judge Koh again nodded to Richardson and noted that the infringement analysis must be limited to those aspects of the design that are ornamental and do not extend to any functional elements of the claimed design.347 She noted that in the functionality analysis that “the tablet computer must be a size that allows portability” but that is relatively large to allow users to make effective use of the touchscreen.348 And in view of these constraints, the “screen necessarily must encompass a large portion of the front face of the product.”349 Notwithstanding these limitations, Judge Koh concluded that the design of the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 “is substantially similar to the D′889 patent in the eyes of an ordinary observer.”350 As with the smartphone infringement analysis, she offered little explanation of how she conducted the filtration analysis.

Judge Koh concluded that Apple had shown a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction351 but that substantial questions regarding the D′889 patent—principally the obviousness issue—led her to deny issuing a preliminary injunction with regard to Samsung’s tablet product.352

2. The 2012 Federal Circuit Appeal of the Preliminary Injunction Decisions and Remand

On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of Apple’s request for a preliminary injunction largely on Judge Koh’s findings with regard to irreparable harm,353 but rejected her rulings that the D′087 smartphone design patent is likely anticipated by the Sharp’s Japanese patent354 and that Samsung had raised substantial questions as to the obviousness of the

346. See id. at *26-*27.
347. See id. at *27.
348. See id. at *25 (citation to declaration omitted).
349. See id. (citation to declaration omitted).
350. See id. at *28.
351. See id. at *28-*29.
352. See id. at *29.
354. See id. at 1326-27.
The D’889 patent. The court vacated the order denying an injunction with respect to the D’889 patent and remanded the case for further proceedings on that portion of Apple’s motion for preliminary relief.

Although Samsung devoted much of its appellate brief to the ornamentality/non-functionality issue, the Federal Circuit sidestepped the question even as it acknowledged the highly functional character of these designs in its background summary of the design patents at issue.

On remand, Judge Koh preliminarily enjoined Samsung from “making, using, offering to sell, or selling within the United States, or importing into the United States, Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet computer, and any product that is no more than colorably different from this specified product and embodies any design contained in U.S. Design Patent No. D504,889.”

3. The 2012 Trial

The district court commenced a jury trial in August 2012 to much fanfare. Apple alleged infringement of four design patents, three user-
interface software utility patents,\textsuperscript{362} and the iPhone and iPad trade dress.\textsuperscript{363} Samsung defended the design patent allegations by arguing invalidity based on functionality, anticipation, and obviousness, and non-infringement based in part on the Richardson filtration framework. Samsung also counterclaimed that Apple products infringed several of its utility patents.\textsuperscript{364}

Prior to trial, Judge Koh construed the design patents as follows:

1. The D’087 Patent

The D’087 Patent claims the ornamental design of an electronic device as shown in Figures 1-48. The broken lines in the D’087 Patent constitute unclaimed subject matter. Thus, the D’087 Patent claims the front face, a ‘bezel encircling the front face of the patented design [that] extends from the front of the phone to its sides,’ and a flat contour of the front face, but does not claim the rest of the article of manufacture.

2. The D’677 Patent

The D’677 Patent claims the ornamental design of an electronic device as shown in Figures 1-8. The broken lines in the D’677 Patent constitute unclaimed subject matter. The use of “solid black surface shading” on the D’677 Patent represents the color black. The use of oblique line shading on the D’677 Patent is used to show a transparent, translucent, or highly polished or reflective surface.

3. The D’889 Patent

The D’889 Patent claims the ornamental design of an electronic device as shown in Figures 1-9. The broken lines depicting the human figure in figure 9 do not form a part of the claimed design. The other broken lines in the other figures are part of the claimed design. The D’889 also includes oblique line shading on several of


\textsuperscript{363} U.S Trademark Reg. No. 3,470,983 (SMS-trade dress for iPhone screen with app icons), unregistered iPhone 3G trade dress, unregistered combination iPhone trade dress, and unregistered iPad/iPad 2 trade dress.

the figures. The oblique line shading in Figures 1-3 and Figure 9 depicts a transparent, translucent, or highly polished or reflective surface from the top perspective view of the claimed design, the top view of the claimed design, and the bottom perspective view of the claimed design.

4. The D’305 Patent

The D’305 Patent claims the ornamental design for a graphical user interface for a display screen or portion thereof, as shown in Figures 1-2. The broken line showing of a display screen in both views forms no part of the claimed design.365

The claim construction, which would be read to the jury as an instruction,366 makes no mention of functional elements that are outside of the scope of design patent protection, despite the fact that Judge Koh recognized many functional elements in Apple’s design patents in her 2011 preliminary injunction decision.367

Following the close of evidence, Judge Koh read the jury the following instruction to guide them in assessing direct infringement of the design patents:

**FINAL JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 46**

**DESIGN PATENTS—DIRECT INFRINGEMENT**

To determine direct infringement of a design patent, you must compare the overall appearances of the accused design and the claimed design.

If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the overall appearance of an accused Samsung design is substantially the same as the overall appearance of the claimed Apple design patent, and that the accused design was made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported within the United States, you must find that the accused design infringed the claimed design.

Two designs are substantially the same if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, the resemblance between the two designs is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other. You do not need, however, to find that any purchasers actually


367. See supra notes 329-353 and accompanying text.
were deceived or confused by the appearance of the accused Samsung products. You should consider any perceived similarities or differences between the patented and accused designs. Minor differences should not prevent a finding of infringement.

This determination of whether two designs are substantially the same will benefit from comparing the two designs with prior art. You must familiarize yourself with the prior art admitted at trial in making your determination of whether there has been direct infringement.

You may find the following guidelines helpful to your analysis:

1. The placement and ornamentation of a logo may alter the overall design. However, the use of a mark or logo to identify the source of an otherwise infringing design will not avoid infringement.

2. When the claimed design is visually close to prior art designs, small differences between the accused design and the claimed design may be important in analyzing whether the overall appearances of the accused and claimed designs are substantially the same.

3. If the accused design includes a feature of the claimed design that departs conspicuously from the prior art, you may find that feature important in analyzing whether the overall appearance of the accused and claimed designs are substantially the same.

4. If the accused design is visually closer to the claimed design than it is to the closest prior art, you may find this comparison important in analyzing whether the overall appearances of the accused and claimed designs are substantially the same.

5. You should not consider the size of the accused products if the asserted design patent does not specify the size of the design.

While these guidelines may be helpful, the test for infringement is whether the overall appearances of the accused design and the claimed design are substantially the same.

Whether Samsung knew its products infringed or even knew of Apple design patents does not matter in determining infringement.368 Samsung objected that this instruction failed to explain to the jury the need to filter out the functional features.369

368. See id. at 63.
As regards the ornamentality/non-functionality invalidity defense, Judge Koh provided the following jury instruction:

**FINAL JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 52**

**DESIGN PATENTS—INVALIDITY—LACK OF ORNAMENTALITY**

Design patents protect the ornamental appearance, including shape or configuration, of an article of manufacture. If Samsung proves by clear and convincing evidence that the overall appearance of an Apple patented design is *dictated by* how the article claimed in the patent works, the patent is invalid because the design is not "ornamental." In other words, the inventor did not "design" anything because in order to achieve the function of the design, it had to be designed that way.

When deciding this, you should keep in mind that design patents must be for articles of manufacture, which by definition have inherent functional characteristics. It is normal that claimed designs perform some function—that does not disqualify them from patent protection.

In determining whether a design is dictated by functionality, you may consider whether the protected design represents the best design; whether alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are any concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function.

When there are several other designs that achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose. However, this may not be true if the other designs adversely affect the utility of the article.370

---

370. See Final Jury Instructions, *supra* note 367, at 70 (emphasis added).
Samsung objected to such narrow framing of the functionality question. Samsung contended that jurors should be instructed to “ignore any features that are functional and compare only the ornamental features” and that “[i]n determining whether the overall design is functional, the functionality of each of the various elements that comprise the patented design may be relevant.”

After thirteen days of trial and three days of deliberation, the jury found that twenty-six of Samsung’s mobile devices infringed three of Apple’s design patents (although not the tablet design), three of Apple’s utility patents, Apple’s registered trade dress, and Apple’s unregistered trade dress for the iPhone 3G. The jury rejected Samsung’s utility and design patent invalidity defenses and its utility patent counterclaims. The jury awarded approximately $1.049 billion to Apple, the majority of which was attributable to infringement of the design patents.

4. Post-Trial Motions

Following the trial, Samsung moved for judgment as a matter of law on multiple grounds, including that no reasonable jury could find that Apple’s...
design patents were valid or infringed by Samsung’s products. Samsung argued that Judge Koh erred in failing to give the jury a Richardson filtering instruction advising jurors to filter out functional design elements in assessing infringement. Samsung also contended that the weight of the evidence established that Apple’s designs were functional and hence the design patents were invalid.

Although Judge Koh repeatedly referred to the Richardson filtering standard in grounding her denial of Apple’s preliminary injunction motions, she shifted course and ruled that

a “filtering” instruction of the type Samsung requested is not required. The Federal Circuit has explained that a court may aid a jury in determining design patent infringement by construing the claims, see Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679–80 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), and that claim construction may, but need not, include listing functional elements that should be factored out of the claimed design. See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (construing a design patent by factoring out functional elements in the context of a bench trial). However, claim construction is a matter of law for the Court. The cases do not suggest that this type of claim construction is appropriate when instructing a jury. The cases engaging in such explicit filtering analysis generally do so in contexts in which a court then rules directly on infringement, such as summary judgment or a bench trial. See, e.g., Richardson, 597 F.3d 1288 (bench trial). Indeed, Egyptian Goddess warns of the risks of providing an element-by-element construction to a jury, as such instruction could divert the jury’s attention from “the design as a whole.” Id.; see also 543 F.3d at 680. Moreover, the Court determined in considering Samsung’s request for a jury instruction that Samsung had not shown that the allegedly functional design elements were actually functional under the Federal Circuit’s “dictated by function” standard, particularly in light of Apple’s evidence that alternative designs existed. See Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1294 (applying the “dictated by function” standard during design patent claim construction).

It is unclear how a jury would understand the need to filter out functional elements without such an instruction. The fact that Richardson was a bench trial hardly supports omitting such an instruction in a jury trial. If anything, such

378. See infra Part V(D)(1).
an instruction is especially important in enabling a lay jury to apply the infringement standard with due care in cases involving functional designs. Both Judge Koh and the Federal Circuit had previously emphasized the minimalist, functional aspects of Apple’s design patents. In her preliminary injunction ruling, Judge Koh emphasized that aspects of Apple’s design patents that are dictated by function limit the claim scope of the patents “to those aspects alone that are ornamental and do not extend to any functional elements of the claimed design,” and that “Richardson instructs the district court to identify the aspects of the design that are ‘dictated by’ function and to consider only the remaining aspects of the design in the infringement and anticipation analysis of the design patent.”

Samsung also argued that no reasonable jury could have found Apple’s design patents valid on the basis of functionality. Judge Koh was not persuaded:

Samsung points to expert testimony identifying some allegedly functional elements of the designs. However, invalidity requires not just some functional elements, but that the overall design is “primarily functional.” See PHG Techs. v. St. John Companies, Inc., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A design is primarily functional if “the appearance of the claimed design is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the article.” Id. (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Expert testimony of the type Samsung identifies, stating that individual design elements confer specific functional benefits (e.g., that round corners “help you move things in and out of your pocket,” Tr. 680:9–15), does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the overall patented designs are dictated by function. Samsung has not identified any other evidence of functionality directed at the designs as a whole.

Judge Koh’s comment that Samsung identifies some “allegedly functional elements of the designs” is inconsistent with her earlier ruling. Judge Koh’s detailed ruling denying Apple’s preliminary injunction motion discussed many functional elements of Apple’s design patents, as did the Federal Circuit’s opinion reviewing the preliminary injunction ruling.

381. Id. at *9 (citing Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1404–05 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
382. See 920 F.Supp.2d at 1091-92.
383. See supra notes 329--353 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 354-359 and accompanying text.
Moreover, Judge Koh’s reasoning illustrates how looking at minimalist designs “as a whole” without filtering out the functional features eviscerates the ornamentality/non-functionality limitation on design patents. Apple’s smartphone design patents claimed rounded rectangles without surface ornamentation. There has to be some ornamental aspects in the design to justify finding the design ornamental. The assertion that the mere combination of rounded corners and flat surfaces somehow becomes ornamental is conclusory. It is not surprising that a jury would be misled if not instructed on the need to filter out the functional features.

5. The 2015 Federal Circuit Appeal

On appeal, the Federal Circuit resoundingly affirmed Judge Koh’s design patent rulings. Samsung argued that it should not have been found liable for infringement of the asserted design patents because any similarity was limited to the basic or functional elements in the design patents. Citing Richardson and OddzOn, Samsung contended that the district court erred in failing to exclude functional aspects of the design patents either in the claim construction or elsewhere in the jury instructions. In rejecting Samsung’s position, the Federal Court confusingly limited Richardson to its facts:

In Richardson, the design patent at issue depicted a multifunction tool with numerous components that were ‘dictated by their functional purpose.’ 597 F.3d at 1294. But the claim construction in Richardson did not exclude those components in their entirety. Rather, the claim construction included the ornamental aspects of those components: ‘the standard shape of the hammer-head, the diamond-shaped flare of the crow-bar and the top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the orientation of the crow-bar relative to the head of the tool, and the plain, undecorated handle.’ Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 610 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1050 (D.Ariz. 2009). That construction was affirmed on appeal. Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1294. As such, the language ‘dictated by their functional purpose’ in Richardson was only a description of the facts there; it did not establish a rule to eliminate entire elements from the claim scope as Samsung argues.

This explanation makes no sense. Unlike the design patent at issue in Richardson—which had ornamental qualities—the Apple designs were truly minimalist, as the Federal Circuit acknowledged in its 2012 opinion.

386. See id. at 998.
387. Id.
Furthermore, prior art, such as the Sharp Japanese patent, disclosed rounded rectangles and flat surfaces for smartphones. The fact that Apple’s actual product was sleeker should not have mattered. Apple expressly disclaimed those (and all other) aspects of the iPhone design through its use of dotted lines on its design patent drawings. Ultimately, we are left with the unavoidable conclusion that the Federal Circuit’s reasoning cannot be reconciled with the court’s precedent and the minimalist, functional character of Apple’s design patent claims.

While narrowing the meaning of functional for purposes of design patent validity and infringement to nonexistence, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the lower court’s trade dress infringement ruling on functionality grounds makes the opinion read like a chapter from *Alice in Wonderland.* Applying Ninth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit waxes eloquently about the robust functionality of the iPhone trade dress (which parallel Apple’s design patents): improving the quality of the iPhone, having utilitarian advantage, the failure of alternative designs to offer the same features, and the substance of Apple’s advertisements emphasizing the functionality of multi-touch features on flat screens. All of this led the Federal Circuit to conclude that Apple “failed to show that there was substantial evidence in the record to support a jury finding in favor of non-functionality for the … registered and unregistered trade dress.”

In partial defense of the Federal Circuit’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit (and other circuits) have set a high bar for non-functionality. But that only begs
the question of why the Federal Circuit has not come to the same conclusion regarding design patents. We return to that conundrum in Parts VI and VII.

6. The Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity

After failing to obtain en banc review at the Federal Circuit, Samsung filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Its petition led with the fundamental question of “where a design patent includes unprotected non-ornamental features, should a district court be required to limit that patent to its protected ornamental scope?” The petition also posed the question of whether the Federal Circuit properly allowed Apple to recover Samsung’s “entire profit” from the sale of products of the infringing devices, as the clear text of Section 289 of Patent Act appeared to require.

Samsung’s petition concisely explained that unrebutted evidence at trial showed:

that rounded corners improve a phone’s ‘pocketability’ and ‘durability,’ that a non-rectangular display element would be difficult and ‘expensive’ to manufacture and ‘completely rare’, that the rectangular shape of the device maximizes the size of the rectangular display it can hold, that a clear flat front surface facilitates finger-touch operation over the entire display, and that the borders surrounding the display efficiently accommodate and hide under-lying components.

Moreover, Apple’s witnesses admitted that ‘having a clear cover over the display element’ was ‘absolutely functional,’ that ‘you need a speaker at the top to hear,’ that the bezel keeps the glass from hitting the ground if the phone is dropped, that ‘rounded corners certainly help you move things in and out of your pocket,’ and that

this shape”); *Disc Golf Ass’n v. Champion Discs, Inc.*, 158 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “[a] product feature need only have some utilitarian advantage to be considered functional”); *see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.*, 532 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001) (explaining that trade dress does “not bar competitors from copying functional product design features” and that there is “no need” “to engage . . . in speculation about other design possibilities”).


396. *See Samsung Certiorari Petition, supra* note 377, at i.

397. *See 35 U.S.C. § 289* (providing that “[w]henever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties”).
Apple may not own ‘a colorful matrix of icons’ or ‘icons arranged in rows and columns in a grid,’ which inform the user that the phone will perform particular functions when specific icons are selected.398

The petition noted the 1902 Act and its purpose of replacing the “useful” rubric with that of “ornamental”399 but did not explain the critical historical background of the design patent regime before and after 1902. This was particularly unfortunate because the Supreme Court had not heard a design patent case since the late 19th century, before the foundational 1902 Act clarified Congress’s intent to reinforce the channeling principle between design and utility.400 The petition made no reference to the many regional circuit cases, preceding the establishment of the Federal Circuit, that interpreted the design patent regime narrowly and faithfully to the text and language of the 1902 Act.401

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the damages question: “Where a design patent includes unprotected non-ornamental features, should a district court be required to limit that patent to its protected ornamental scope?”402 The Supreme Court’s resolution of that question did nothing to address the critical ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine and did little to clarify design patent damages law.

Samsung prevailed in persuading the Supreme Court to overturn the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Section 289. The Court held that determining profits under Section 289 of the Act involves two steps: “First, identify the ‘article of manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate the infringer’s total profit made on that article of manufacture.”403 On the first step, the Supreme Court held that the “article of manufacture” for which total profits are awarded was not limited to the product sold to consumers, but may be either “a product sold to a consumer [or] a component of that product.”404 But the Court “decline[d] to lay out a test for the first step of the § 289 damages inquiry in the absence of adequate

399. See id. at 5 (“Although design patents were once available for “useful” product configurations, see Smith, 148 U.S. at 677, in 1902 Congress eliminated “the word ‘useful’ as applied to design patents … and substitut[ed] the word ‘ornamental’ “).
400. See supra Part III.
401. See supra Part IV(A)-(B).
404. Id.
briefing by the parties.” 405 The case was therefore remanded back to the Federal Circuit which in turn remanded the case back to the district court. 406

7. The 2017 Remand Trial: Samsung’s Pyrrhic Victory

The district court ordered a new damages trial and set forth a four-factor test for determining the relevant article of manufacture for the purpose of § 289. 407 Judge Koh instructed the jury to identify the articles of manufacture to which Samsung applied Apple’s patented designs based on the following factors:

(1) The scope of the design claimed in Apple’s patent, including the drawing and written description; (2) The relative prominence of the design within the product as a whole; (3) Whether the design is conceptually distinct from the product as a whole; and (4) The physical relationship between the patented design and the rest of the product, including whether the design pertains to a component that a user or seller can physically separate from the product as a whole, and whether the design is embodied in a component that is manufactured separately from the rest of the product, or if the component can be sold separately. 408

Apple argued that the articles of manufacture to which Samsung applied Apple’s patented designs were the whole phones. Samsung countered that the articles of manufacture are a component or collection of components of each phone. Specifically, for the D’677 patent, Samsung contended that the article of manufacture was a phone’s round-cornered, black glass front face. For the D’087 patent, Samsung contended that the article of manufacture was a phone’s round-cornered, glass front face and surrounding rim or bezel. For the D’305 patent, Samsung contended that the article of manufacture was a phone’s display screen.

405. Id. at 436.

406. The Federal Circuit held that “the trial court should consider the parties’ arguments in light of the trial record and determine what additional proceedings, if any, are needed. If the court determines that a new damages trial is necessary, it will have the opportunity to set forth a test for identifying the relevant article of manufacture for purpose of § 289, and to apply that test to this case.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 Fed. Appx. 1012, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished).


The jury ultimately awarded Apple $533 million for infringement of the design patents and $5.3 million for infringement of the utility patents, approximately 20% more than the verdict that Samsung appealed to the Supreme Court. A short time later, the parties settled their seven-year smartphone patent battle.

8. Denouement

This seven-year saga reinforced the Federal Circuit’s lax interpretation of the critical intellectual property channeling doctrine aimed at balancing innovation and competition. Apple v. Samsung elevated the broad and lax L.A. Gear framework for assessing ornamentality/non-functionality while relegating Richardson to a narrow fact-specific decision.

In contrast with Apple’s design patent enforcement efforts in the United States, Apple’s international enforcement campaign against Samsung’s devices was far less successful. After Apple sued Samsung in the United States in April 2011, Samsung retaliated by filing lawsuits in Europe, Asia, and Australia, and the battle quickly expanded to more than fifty lawsuits covering various intellectual property claims around the world. Notably, Apple got modest traction with design claims in Europe, but not in Asia. The utility patent battle

---


410. See supra note 377.


largely fizzled.\footnote{See Dordick, supra note 412, at 245-46 (“Samsung filed a complaint in the Tokyo District Court of Japan… [and] alleged that Apple infringed its patents relating to mobile-communications technologies. Predictably, Apple countersued seeking 100 million yen, or about $1.2 million in damages, but this time over a patent that involved the synchronization of media content between a computer and a mobile device. Samsung scored a complete defense victory and was awarded various costs, most notably the stamp fee. The Intellectual Property High Court (IP High Court) upheld this decision, and Apple did not appeal to the Supreme Court. The judgment then became final and binding.”); Leon B. Greenfield, Hartmut Schneider & Joseph J. Mueller, SEP Enforcement Disputes beyond the Water’s Edge: A Survey of Recent Non-U.S. Decisions, 27 ANTITRUST 50 (2013) (describing, among others, Apple and Samsung’s FRAND disputes in Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, France and Italy); Dordick, supra note 412, at 246 (“in response to Apple’s initial complaint in April of 2011, Samsung filed claims against Apple in the Seoul Central District Court of South Korea, claiming infringement on its telecommunication standards patents. Only a few months later, in June, Apple also filed a suit in the Seoul Central District Court alleging infringement on their trade dress, design, and utility patents. The Seoul Central District Court handed down its decision in both lawsuits on August 24, 2012—the same day that the jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California returned a verdict in Apple’s favor for $1.05 billion in damages. The South Korean court concluded that Apple infringed on two of Samsung’s five disputed patents and that Samsung had infringed on Apple’s “bounce-back” patent. The decision that Apple infringed on Samsung’s patents forced Apple to remove the iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad 1 and iPad 2 from store shelves in South Korea. Both Apple and Samsung were ordered to pay limited damages, and Samsung was enjoined from selling infringing products, including the Galaxy S2, in South Korea. Apple was awarded a mere $22,000 in damages.”); Dordick, supra note 412, at 243-44 (In Germany, both parties filed lawsuits in several regions of Germany seeking injunctions, “but by the end of 2012, each party’s patent infringement claims had either been rejected or stayed until Germany’s Federal Patent Court could rule on patent validity. Finally, on April 4, 2013, Germany’s Federal Patent Court invalidated Apple’s “slide to unlock” patent on the grounds that it failed to meet the technicity requirement under European patent law,” and in Australia after Apple also sought to obtain a preliminary injunction against Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 10.1, “an Australian Federal Court Justice determined that “Apple had a prima facie case that Samsung had infringed two of its patents relating to touchscreens and the gestures that control them. Samsung agreed to suspend the sale and distribution of its tablet in the Australian market until the dispute was resolved. However, on appeal, the Federal Court of Australia unanimously overturned the ban on the Samsung device.”); Duncan, supra note 413; Bajwa, supra note 413, at 95.} The battle outside of the United States produced mixed results and the parties settled all of the non-U.S. litigation in August 2014.\footnote{See infra note 428.}

In Germany, after Samsung filed suit against Apple,\footnote{Claiming that Apple infringed on a number of its 3G technology utility patents. See Dordick, supra note 412, at 243.} Apple countersued over its own European patents, including its European Community Design registration.\footnote{A European Community Design is somewhat similar to a design patent in the United States. See Dennis Crouch, UK Appellate Court Confirms Pan-European Win for Samsung on iPad Community Design Charges, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 18, 2012),} On August 2011, the Landgericht court in Düsseldorf granted
Apple a preliminary injunction across the European Union against Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 10.1 for allegedly violating a Community Design registration for the iPad. While the injunction was eventually affirmed by the appellate court of Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court on January 2012, it was restricted to Germany, and was affirmed on different grounds—a violation of German unfair competition law418—rather than a violation of Apple’s Community Design.419

https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/apple-samsung-european-community-design.html (explaining that “[a] registered European Community Design is roughly equivalent to a US Design Patent. However, the Europeans have done away with the examination process and replaced it with registration without considering whether the design is actually novel. Thus, while the European law requires that a registered community design be novel (a lower standard than nonobvious), that issue is not raised in the initial registration process. . . Because of the in-expense and ease of registration, Community Designs have been quite popular.”). In Europe, designs may be registered or unregistered, provided they meet certain eligibility conditions. A design is eligible for protection if it meets three requirements: (1) be new; (2) has “individual character”; and (3) not be composed of features solely dictated by their function. A Community design shall also have a “unitary character,” i.e., it shall have an equal effect throughout the Community and shall not be registered, transferred or surrendered or be the subject of a decision declaring it invalid, save in respect of the whole Community. See Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 1-8, 2001 O.J. (L 3) 1 EC.

418. See Marc D. Mimler, The Aspects of Unfair Competition Within the Apple v. Samsung Litigation in Germany, 3(2) QUEEN MARY JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 176 (describing that after the German ruling on unfair competition Samsung modified its tablet design and intended to market a 10.1N version of the Galaxy tablet, Apple again took action but the German courts did not find the redesigned version to violate unfair competition rules).


Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the main action [in Germany concerning alleged infringement of the Apple registered design], and then HHJ Birss’s final decision [in the English High Court of Justice’s Chancery Division] on the merits on 9th July 2012, Apple persisted [in Germany] in its appeal from the refusal on 24th October 2011 to grant a pan-European injunction against SEC in respect of the 7.7 [Samsung’s tablet]. On 24th July 2012 the German Court of Appeal, the Oberlandesgericht, allowed the appeal and granted a pan-European interim injunction in respect of the 7.7 against SEC, and its German subsidiary. In the course of argument before us, as I shall recount later, Apple undertook to apply forthwith to the German court for that injunction to be completely withdrawn so far as it related to infringement of the registered design. . . . The upshot of all this is that there is now no injunction anywhere based on the registered design or its equivalent.
In the United Kingdom, after Samsung sought a declaration that three of its Galaxy tablet computers (Tab 10.1, Tab 8.9, and Tab 7.7) did not infringe Apple’s Community Design, Apple counterclaimed for infringement. In July 2012, the High Court of Justice’s Chancery Division ruled that Samsung’s Galaxy Tab did not infringe the design of Apple’s iPad because the Samsung devices were not as “cool” as Apple’s products.\textsuperscript{420} The judge also issued an order forcing Apple to publish its loss in order to correct the commercial harm done to Samsung.\textsuperscript{421} In October 2012, the English and Wales court of appeals affirmed the ruling that Samsung’s devices did not infringe Apple’s Community Design for the iPad as a pan-European decision.\textsuperscript{422}

In the Netherlands, during August 2011, the first instance tribunal in the Hague (Rechtbank’s- Gravenhage) held that Apple’s registered Community Design was not infringed.\textsuperscript{423}

\textsuperscript{420} [2012] EWHC 1882 (Pat), can be found at: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2012/1882.html. The Judge held that:

The informed user’s overall impression of each of the Samsung Galaxy Tablets is the following. From the front they belong to the family which includes the Apple design; but the Samsung products are very thin, almost insubstantial members of that family with unusual details on the back. They do not have the same understated and extreme simplicity which is possessed by the Apple design. They are not as cool. The overall impression produced is different. . . The Samsung tablets do not infringe Apple’s registered design No. 000181607-0001.

\textsuperscript{421} Samsung Elecs. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., [2012] EWHC 2049 (Pat), can be found at: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2012/2049.html. The judge stayed the publishing order until Apple’s appeal was heard in October 2012, yet when the case reached the court of appeal, the previous ruling was supported. Charles Arthur, Samsung Galaxy Tab ‘does not copy Apple’s iPad designs’, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2012) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/oct/18/samsung-galaxy-tab-apple-ipad


Firstly it is common ground that no German court was “first seized” of the claim for a declaration of non-infringement. Indeed given that Apple withdrew its claim for infringement in Germany, no German court appears even now to be seized of a claim for infringement. It is true that Samsung applied for declarations of non-infringement on the same day, 8th September 2011 in Spain, the Netherlands and England and Wales and there could be (but I think rather overtaken by events given that the trial and appeal are over here) a dispute about which case started first in point of time. After all there is now a Community-wide decision on the point, now affirmed on appeal. One would think that ought to put an end to all other litigation about it.
design, albeit valid, was not infringed by Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 10.1. On January 2012, the Hague Court of Appeal (Gerechtshofte’s-Gravenhage) confirmed the first instance decision. On 31 May 2013, the Hoge Raad, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, dismissed Apple’s appeal from the decision to reject Apple’s claim regarding the infringement of its registered Community design by Samsung’s tablet Galaxy Tab 10.1.

In parallel with the various European court cases, Samsung requested that OHIM (the European Community Designs registry) would invalidate several of Apple’s registered Community Designs. The Community Design that was the subject of the European iPad design litigation was found by OHIM to be valid.

All of the actions between Apple and Samsung outside of the United States came to an end in August 2014. The parties dropped all non-U.S. claims without any licensing arrangements but continued their battle in the United States through the post-Supreme Court remand process and eventually settling the U.S. litigation in 2018.

---


424. See Mueller, supra note 4.

425. Formerly known as the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), and currently known as the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

426. See Registered Community Design No. 000181607-0001.


E. **The Post-Apple Trajectory: Further Erosion of the Ornamentality/Non-Functionality Limitation**

Following *Apple v. Samsung*, the Federal Circuit reinforced the *L.A. Gear* framework narrowly interpreting the ornamentality/non-functionality limitation while further marginalizing the *Richardson, OddzOn, and Dayton-Hudson* line of cases that provided a filtration approach to safeguard against design patents protecting functional features. In *Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc.*, the Federal Circuit endorsed the district court’s construing design patents to identify the non-functional aspects and even agreed that elements of the designs were functional. Nonetheless, the court held that a minimalist inverted U-shaped design contoured to fit a human hand and a conventional fluted torque knob for a surgical instrument had “some scope,” noting that “the trigger has a particular curved design, the torque knob has a particular flat-front shape, and the activation button has a particular rounded appearance.” As reflected in Figure 27, it is difficult to ascertain what aspects of those appearances for a surgical instrument are not functional.

![Figure 29: Handle and Torque Knob for Surgical Device](image)

---

430. *Id.* at 1329-32.
The decision reinforced the “dictated by” standard and the availability of alternative designs as a basis for finding a design patent valid. Although overturning the district court’s ruling that the design patent was functional, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the accused device was not infringing.431 In doing so, the court specifically referenced the Apple v. Samsung narrowing of Richardson.432 While recognizing that both designs include an open trigger, a small activation button, and a fluted torque knob in relatively similar positions, the court excluded these features from consideration at a general conceptual level because of their functional character and focused on the contours of the components. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that these elements were “plainly dissimilar.”433

In 2016, the Federal Circuit in Sports Dimension, Inv. v. Coleman Co. overturned a district court decision finding that a design patent for a personal floatation device was functional and therefore invalid.434 As depicted in the left panel of Figure 30, Coleman’s design patent claimed a wide, form-fitting torso strap with two arm bands that serve as buoyant floatation devices.435 The torso strap is connected using a conventional clip.

Figure 30: Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co.

431. See id. at 1334-37.
432. See id. at 1333.
433. See id. at 1337.
Sport Dimension filed a declaratory relief action seeking declarations that that Coleman’s design patent was invalid and not infringed. Following a claim construction hearing, the district court concluded that “the armbands, the armband attachments, the shape of the armbands, the tapering of the armbands, and the tapering of the side torso are all elements that serve a functional rather than ornamental role in the D’714 patent.”436 Accordingly, the court construed the claimed design to be:

The ornamental design for a personal flotation device, as shown and described in Figures 1–8, except the left and right armband, and the side torso tapering, which are functional and not ornamental.437

Based on this claim construction, Judge O’Connell entered a stipulated judgment of non-infringement and the appeal followed.

While acknowledging that a district court may use claim construction to help guide the fact finder through issues that bear on a claim’s scope, the

437. Id.
Federal Circuit faulted the district court’s construction for excluding structural elements from the claim.\textsuperscript{438} While agreeing with Coleman that the claim construction was improper, the panel recognized that the armbands and tapered side torso designs serve a functional purpose. The court further noted that “Coleman filed a co-pending utility patent disclosing the design patent’s armbands and torso tapering and touting the utility of those features. And it found Coleman to have promoted the particular utility of the armbands and tapered torso in its advertisements.”\textsuperscript{439} Nonetheless, the court overturned the claimed construction “completely removing the armbands and side torso tapering from its construction.”\textsuperscript{440} The court’s insistence that claim construction must include all of the structural elements is difficult to understand considering that it characterized the elements as “minimalist, with little ornamentation” and “serving a functional purpose.”. The court did, however, comment that “[b]ecause of the design’s many functional elements and its minimal ornamentation, the overall claim scope of the claim is accordingly narrow.”\textsuperscript{441} The court remanded the case for “consideration of infringement and, if necessary, validity consistent with the proper claim construction.”\textsuperscript{442}

\textbf{F. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE DESIGN PATENT
ORNAMENTALITY/NON-FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE: A WAYWARD,
INCOHERENT FRAMEWORK}

The foregoing demonstrates that on the Federal Circuit’s watch, the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine has veered far from the 1842 and 1902 Acts and much of the jurisprudence that preceded the Federal Circuit’s formation. Between 1988 and 2008, the Federal Circuit eviscerated the non-functionality limitation of design patents through its uncritical adoption of the “dictated by” short cut for dealing with easy cases as the test for assessing ornamentality/non-functionality, treating designs for which there are alternatives as non-functional, viewing even simple designs comprising functional elements “as a whole,” and categorically rejecting the point of novelty viewpoint. After some apparent moderation of these questionable standards through a filtration infringement test in the 2010 \textit{Richardson} decision, the court marginalized the filtration approach in \textit{Apple v. Samsung} and has since further eroded the ornamentality/non-functionality limitation. Many of these decisions, including \textit{Apple vs. Samsung} and \textit{Rosco}, reveal the absurdity of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{438} \textit{See Sports Dimension}, 820 F.3d at 1320-23.
\item \textsuperscript{439} \textit{Id}. at 1322.
\item \textsuperscript{440} \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{441} \textit{Id}. at 1323.
\item \textsuperscript{442} \textit{Id}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Federal Circuit’s approach. What is especially disconcerting is that to this day the Federal Circuit has never once examined the 1902 legislation that established the critical ornamentality/non-functionality limitation on design patent protection. Patent Commissioner Allen, the principal author and advocate for the 1902 Act, could not have been clearer about the meaning and purpose of the design patent amendment: to preserve the utility patent system’s exclusive role in protecting functional advances.

It is thought that if the present bill shall become a law the subject of design patents will occupy its proper philosophical position in the field of intellectual production, having upon the one side of it the statute providing protection to mechanical constructions possessing utility of mechanical function, and upon the other side the copyright law, whereby objects of art are protected, reserving to itself the position of protecting objects of new and artistic quality pertaining, however, to commerce, but not justifying their existence upon functional utility. If the design patent does not occupy this position there is no other well-defined position for it to take. It has been treated of late years as an annex to the statute covering mechanical cases, since the introduction of the word ‘useful’ into it. It is thought that this practice should no longer continue.443

The fact that copyright law later expanded to provide parallel coverage of ornamental aspects of useful articles in no way suggests that design patent protection should be shoehorned into protecting functional elements as a way to differentiate its role from copyright’s expanded scope. To the contrary, copyright law provides a model for how to ensure that the utility patent regime remains the exclusive means for protecting functional elements. And it further demonstrates that Baker v. Selden should apply with equal force to design patent protection.

As one commentator observed: “Design patent law in the USA is what’s FUBARed.”444 Frankenstein445 provides another apt metaphor for contemporary design patent law: a hideous creature comprised of different parts. The Federal Circuit’s articulation of the design patent infringement standard reveals the incongruous combination: “whether an ordinary observer,

---

445. See MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1818).
familiar with the prior art [] designs, would be deceived into believing the [accused device] is the same as the patented [design].”446 This test confusingly intermingles copyright, trademark, and utility patent protection standards. Add in the skewed ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine and we have both incoherence and complete undermining of Congress’s intent in clarifying the design patent regime in 1902. Whereas regional circuit law generally applied standards that invalidated design patents embodying functional features, the Federal Circuit switched the polarity of those standards to validate design patents so long as there were alternative ways of achieving similar functionality.

VI. THE ROLE OF ADVOCATES AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IN DESIGN PATENT LAW’S WAYWARD COURSE

The incoherence of the design patent ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine, as well as the general confusion over the role of the design patent regime within the larger intellectual property landscape, begs the question of how design patent law diverged from what Congress intended.

A. DESIGN PROTECTION ADVOCACY

Since the turn of the 20th century, design industry advocates have sought to expand design protection.447 Several of these efforts came close to fruition,448 but ultimately fell short. As of the mid-1980s, most intellectual property practitioners viewed design patent protection for functional features as unenforceable:

[I]n substantially all [design patent infringement cases], the trial court will rule that the design patent is invalid. Where the trial court determines that a design patent is valid, such determinations are usually overturned upon appeal. Or should the trial court determine

---

448. See generally, David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road: A History of the Fight over Industrial Design Protection in the United States, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 21 (1997) (cataloging dozens of failed design protection bills dating the beginning of the 20th century and concluding that “given this long history of failure, it is not difficult to predict the future of design legislation”).
that the design patent is valid, no infringement of the design patent will be found by the trier of fact.\footnote{449. Thomas B. Lindgren, \textit{The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? 20 Years of Design Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.}, 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 195, 198 (1985).}

In his 1987 overview of the state of design protection in the United States,\footnote{450. See Ralph S. Brown, \textit{Design Protection: An Overview}, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1987).} Professor Ralph Brown characterized the design patent regime as “a Cinderella who never goes to the ball”:

There are several reasons why design patents are held in low esteem. First, the process that certifies their worth is expensive and time-consuming. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) fees come to $300. It is essential to hire a patent solicitor to draft the claims and specifications. And when, after waiting up to two years, you get a design patent, detect an infringer, and bring suit, seven times out of ten your patent will be held invalid, if validity is an issue. In the three out of ten that are held valid, only half will be found to have been infringed. That at least was the situation for the period 1964-83. Now that all patent appeals go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, patentees may fare better.\footnote{451. Id. at 1356 (citing Lindgren, supra note 449, at 261 (app. II)); see also J. H. Reichman, \textit{Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms}, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2460 (1994) (commenting that “[i]n practice, . . . the patent process has proved too rigid, slow, and costly for the fastmoving, short-lived products of mass consumption, and too strict in excluding the bulk of all commercial designs on grounds of obviousness” (citations omitted)).}

Professor Brown’s rumination about the Federal Circuit proved prescient. The year after his article was published, attorney Perry Saidman escorted design patents to the intellectual property ball, although not with a glass slipper but with a sleek and functional athletic shoe.\footnote{452. See Perry J. Saidman, \textit{The Glass Slipper Approach to Protecting Industrial Designs or When the Shoe Fits, Wear It}, 19 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 167 (1989).} After winning summary judgment, enhanced damages, and attorney fees in the \textit{Avia} athletic shoe case in the lower court,\footnote{453. See Pensa Inc. v. L.A. Gear California Inc., 1987 WL 125071 (C.D. Cal. 1987).} Saidman persuaded the Federal Circuit to consider the availability of alternative designs as part of the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine.\footnote{454. See \textit{Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.}, 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 254-259.} This victory changed his own view about design patents: they were no longer a “booby prize” for inventors who failed to surmount the utility patent hurdles. Instead, under the lax ornamentality/non-functionality standard adopted in \textit{Avia}, design patents could be a lower cost
path to protecting functional features and opening the door to robust remedies. Over the next three decades, Saidman spread the design patent gospel. He authored numerous articles in design trade journals praising the cost-effectiveness of design patents. He also penned a stream of articles in practitioner intellectual property journals advocating lax design patent protection standards and reforms to expand industrial design protection outside of the utility patent system.

The relaxation of the design patent law’s ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine attracted more industrial designers in search of a backdoor for functional design protection. Even the PTO Director joined the campaign. This success of this campaign, of course, turned on the Federal Circuit’s support.

---


458. See supra note 2 (showing a steep rise in design patent applications).

B. **THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT**

As Professor Ralph Brown intimated in his 1987 overview of design protection, the Federal Circuit’s approach to design patent protection would play a significant role in how that regime developed. As noted earlier, legislators, judges, and scholars raised concerns that a national appellate patent tribunal could lead to overly protectionist interpretations of patent law. They warned that such a specialty court, would be less sympathetic to competition policy concerns and less sensitive to the intellectual property policy balances reflected in the copyright and trademark arenas. As a result, Congress stopped short of entrusting those regimes to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit would only adjudicate such matters if they were part of a patent case, and the Federal Circuit would be required to apply the regional circuit law of the district in which the case arose.

None of these safeguards, however, would apply to design patent law. Although design patent protection is more properly viewed as a close cousin of copyright law than utility patent law, the Federal Courts Improvement Act included design patents within the same exclusive appellate jurisdiction provision as the utility patent regime. The Federal Circuit immediately jettisoned regional circuit law in favor of the CCPA soon after it commenced operations.

To the extent that the interpretation of design patent protection served as a test of the warnings about a specialty patent court, the post-1988 case law validates those concerns. Long before design patent protection gained salience, Giles Rich, a storied and revered patent attorney, CCPA judge, and Federal Circuit judge, had taken up the cause of design protection. In addition to...
his role on the Federal Circuit, Judge Rich frequently testified before Congress on intellectual property policy and developed a reputation for promoting robust utility patent protection. He was also one of the main proponents of expanding design protection throughout the mid to late 20th century. Although he did not write any of the key Federal Circuit design patent decisions, his In re Carletti decision at the CCPA played a significant role in the Federal Circuit’s design patent jurisprudence. Although that decision was ambiguous regarding whether the “dictated by” inquiry is the exclusive test of whether a design is eligible for protection under the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine, the Federal Circuit eventually embraced “dictated by” as the test.

As Part V chronicled, the Federal Circuit has pursued an especially protectionist path in its interpretation of design patent law. From Avia through L.A. Gear, Egyptian Goddess, and Apple v. Samsung, there is a clear blindness to concerns about encroachment on the utility patent regime and free competition in functional elements that are not protected by utility patents. The Federal Circuit has proven far less sensitive to these concerns than regional circuit courts.


VII. RECTIFYING DESIGN PATENT LAW’S ORNAMENTALITY/NON-FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE

The design patent saga reveals a distressing level of administrative and judicial amnesia. The Patent Office overcame repeated bouts of amnesia in the mid to late 19th century. It was eventually led out of the fog by Commissioner Frederick Allen at the turn of the 20th century.471 Following legislative clarification in 1902, the judiciary made a conscientious and largely successful effort to effectuate Congress’s intentions, but common law drift shifted the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine away from the legislative mooring. The Federal Circuit misinterpreted linguistic shortcuts used to dispose of easy cases, causing the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine to veer away from Congress’s intent to ensure that design patent law did not protect functional features. The resulting jurisprudence twisted the case law so that designs were eligible for design patents so long as they were not solely dictated by functionality or if alternative designs to achieve a particular function were not available—a nearly 180-degree shift from the 1902 Act.

The shift can be seen by reviewing the ten circuit court decisions invalidating designs in Part IV472 and asking whether they would be upheld under the Federal Circuit’s “dictated by functionality”/view designs as a whole/availability of alternative designs approach. The functions of each of these designs could be achieved by alternative designs, which is nearly all that the federal circuit requires. Furthermore, these designs are more original and ornamental than the iPhone and iPad rounded rectangles. Yet the regional circuit courts found all of the designs in Figures 2 – 11 to be invalid. It is only the happenstance of the enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act establishing the Federal Circuit that has obscured a profound circuit split.

Beyond contradicting Congress’s intent to keep design patent protection from encroaching the utility patent’s exclusive domain of protecting functional advances,473 the Federal Circuit’s expansive standard for design patent eligibility conflicts with the critical channeling principle set forth in the Supreme Court’s seminal Baker v. Selden decision.474 At a minimum, the Federal Circuit should steer the design patent ship back on course. If not, the Supreme Court should correct this wayward shift. Samsung v. Apple provided a prime opportunity, but unfortunately the opportunity was missed. Samsung did not explain the rationale behind the 1902 Act legislation or the Federal Circuit’s misreading of regional circuit law that used the “dictated by functionality”
language. We hope that our jurisprudential archeology provides a beacon for returning design patent law to the course that Congress intended.

We do not question the proposition that designs that are dictated by functionality are ineligible for design patent protection, but this proposition is merely one part of a faithful ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine. What is lacking from the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is that even if a design in its entirety is not dictated by functional considerations, the design or features thereof may embody functional elements that should remain free for others to use and build upon. The proper ornamentality/non-functionality test—as recognized by reasoned regional circuit jurisprudence, reflected in Congress’s crafting of the analogous copyright originality, compilation, and useful article doctrines, developed in regional circuit law, and stated in the Supreme Court’s trade dress functionality jurisprudence—should have several components.

First, minimal designs do not rise to the modicum of creativity necessary to meet the originality requirement for design patent protection. Minimal or simple combinations of shapes do not merit protection. Second, design patent protection extends only to ornamental design elements or original compilations of ornamental elements that are separable from functional features. Any lesser test would allow designers to obtain exclusive rights to functional elements without meeting the more exacting utility patent law standards. Furthermore, application of these standards must include a filtration infringement test that ensures that competitors and other inventors can use the unprotectable functional features.

Section A explains how these principles can be restored into the design patent regime to return to the legislative design. Section B goes further and suggests that the time is ripe for Congress to reopen the policy debate over design protection. Section C responds to the counterargument that Apple’s rebirth supports the notion that design patent protection should extend to functional features of articles of manufacture.

A. RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHANNELING PRINCIPLE

The Supreme Court’s Baker v. Selden decision channels functional features to the utility patent regime so as to ensure that only those technological

475. See supra Part IV.
476. See infra Part VII(A)(1)
477. See id.
479. See infra Part VII(A)(1).
advances meeting the utility patent regime’s high requirements are protected and other inventors and competitors are free to imitate and build on technology, methods, and designs that do not meet these standards. In this way, the intellectual property system promotes progress through a balance of time-limited rewards for innovation and robust competition. As a copyright-based regime, design patent law should be cabined in much the same way that copyright and trademark law have been barred from extending to functional features. That was indeed the purpose of the 1902 design patent amendments. However, the Federal Circuit’s failure to grasp this fundamental legislative purpose has created an imbalance within the intellectual property system. This imbalance can be corrected by looking to the ways in which copyright and trademark law have dovetailed with the utility patent regime. Beyond these substantive limitations on design patent eligibility, Congress could protect against wayward drift by bringing regional circuit percolation back into the development of design patent jurisprudence.

1. Guiding the Federal Circuit’s Ornamentality/Non-Functionality Jurisprudence Back to the Proper Course

The Federal Circuit can restore design patent law to its appropriate role first and foremost by reviewing the 1902 Act legislation that established the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine and the regional circuit jurisprudence that developed in the early 20th century. As those cases make clear, the “dictated by functionality” jurisprudence was never intended to be the exclusive test for ornamentality/non-functionality, it was merely a shortcut for disposing of easy cases—often where the patentee had sought both utility and design patents on the same features. These decisions recognized the need for separating protectable ornamental elements from functional features, a principle that Congress incorporated into the Copyright Act's useful article doctrine. As reflected in the 1902 Act’s legislative history, channeling, and thus separability, was the purpose in the 1902 Act’s “ornamentality” requirement.

In drafting the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress incorporated separability into the definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works:

‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ . . . shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.480

With regard to copyright protection for computer software, a highly functional type of work, Congress explained that

Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the “writing” expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.481

The Copyright Act’s definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and the treatment of computer software parallel the rationale for the 1902 design patent act amendments.482

Second, the Federal Circuit should give meaning to the design patent act’s “originality” requirement.483 It is not merely a novelty standard but serves to exclude designs that are derived from prior art or that are so minimal or simple as to not merit protection.

Third, along similar lines, the Federal Circuit should restore use of the point of novelty,484 or more precisely the point of non-obviousness, to better focus the invalidity inquiry. If the point of novelty of a claimed design is functional, then the design is not eligible for a design patent.

Fourth, the Federal Circuit should abandon the rule that designs are not functional merely because there are alternative designs available.485 The design


481. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976). Reflecting the Supreme Court’s Baker v. Selden decision, Section 102(b) provides that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).

482. See supra Part III; see also Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293, 1375 (2017).


484. See supra text accompanying note 296; Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2015).

485. Cf. TrafficFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001) (explaining that “There is no need . . . to engage . . . in speculation about other design possibilities, such as using three or four springs which might serve the same purpose. Here, the functionality of the spring design means that competitors need not explore whether other spring juxtapositions might be used. The dual-spring design is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI’s
patent rule apparently derives from a Minnesota district court decision that lacks support in prior authority.\footnote{See supra Part IV(D)(3) (discussing Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 476 (D. Minn. 1980)).} It also confusingly overlaps with trade dress law, which imposes a stricter standard.\footnote{See supra note 394.} As applied in design patent law, the availability of alternative design rule validates almost any design since there are almost always alternative ways of achieving function. Yet, the intellectual property system seeks to preserve the freedom to use functional designs unless an inventor comes up with a novel, nonobvious design that meets the utility patent standards.

At a minimum, the Federal Circuit should clarify that designs that offer functional advantages are outside of the design protection regime. The Federal Circuit decision in \textit{Berry Sterling Corp. v. Pescor Plastics, Inc.},\footnote{122 F.3d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997).} recognized this idea by suggesting that district courts consider a range of factors—including “whether the protected design represents the best design” and “whether alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article”—in assessing the availability of alternative designs,\footnote{See id. at 1456 (stating that the presence of alternative designs may or may not assist in determining whether the challenged design can overcome a functionality challenge. Consideration of alternative designs, if present, is a useful tool that may allow a court to conclude that a challenged design is not invalid for functionality. As such, alternative designs join the list of other appropriate considerations for assessing whether the patented design as a whole—its overall appearance—was dictated by functional considerations. Other appropriate considerations might include: whether the protected design represents the best design; whether alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the specified article; whether there are any concomitant utility patents; whether the advertising touts particular features of the design as having specific utility; and whether there are any elements in the design or an overall appearance clearly not dictated by function. (emphasis added)).} but subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have ignored this important caveat.\footnote{See, e.g., Ross v. Sonax Furniture Mfg., Ltd., 217 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Intl', Inc., 190 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 256 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).}

Beyond invalidity analysis, the Federal Circuit should restore and invigorate the filtration analysis. The Second Circuit in \textit{Computer Associates product; it is the reason the device works. Other designs need not be attempted.” (citation to lower court decision omitted))}
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.\textsuperscript{491} provides a sound analytical framework for determining copyright infringement of computer code:

In ascertaining substantial similarity . . . a court would first break down the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public domain, a court would then be able to sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel, or perhaps kernels, of creative expression after following this process of elimination, the court’s last step would be to compare this material with the structure of an allegedly infringing program.\textsuperscript{492}

The court’s abstraction-filtration-comparison (“AFC”) test framed the ultimate comparison not between the programs as a whole, but between the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s program and the allegedly infringing program. The way in which the court addressed interoperability, a key functionality consideration for computer software, illustrates how design patent law could systematically ensure that functional elements remain unprotectable. The court held that copyright protection did not extend to those program elements where the programmer’s “freedom to choose” is:

circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry.\textsuperscript{493}

The court observed that “[w]hile, hypothetically, there might be a myriad [sic] ways in which a programmer may effectuate certain functions within a program—i.e., express the idea embodied in a given subroutine—efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice as to make only one or two forms of expression workable operations.”\textsuperscript{494}

The Federal Circuit recognized the role of filtration analysis in its 1988 Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. decision, and later picked up on this precedent in OddzOn and Richardson. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit tacked away from these decisions in Avia, L.A. Gear, Rosco, Egyptian Goddess, and Apple v. Samsung.

\textsuperscript{491} 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
\textsuperscript{492} Id. at 706; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “the unprotectable elements have to be identified, or filtered, before the works can be considered as a whole”).
\textsuperscript{493} Id. at 709-10.
\textsuperscript{494} Id. at 708.
The filtration step is vital to ensuring that design patent protection does not encroach on the utility patent’s domain and that competitors and subsequent inventors can imitate and build on non-utility patented functional features.

Such filtration requires that a district court construe design claims and instruct the jury as to those aspects of the claimed designs that are not protectable and hence excluded from consideration in assessing infringement. Although Judge Koh identified functional elements of Apple’s design patents in declining to issue a preliminary injunction, she declined to instruct the jury about those elements in the trial. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit should accord deference to the district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual issues involved in patent claim construction.

Courts should also apply a sliding similarity scale in assessing whether the accused device infringes the appropriately filtered design claim. Where the protection is thin, the standard for similarity should be elevated as a safeguard against overprotection.

Relatedly, copyright law’s compilation doctrine is analogous and instructive for assessing the scope of design patents. The Copyright Act defines a “compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work.”

495. See supra text accompanying notes 330-352.
496. See supra text accompanying note 366-372.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 330-352.
498. Cf. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[i]f there’s only a narrow range of expression (for example, there are only so many ways to paint a red bouncy ball on blank canvas), then copyright protection is ‘thin’ and a work must be ‘virtually identical’ to infringe.”); Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the video display is afforded protection only from virtually identical copying”); Satava v. Lawry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that “there can be no infringement of thinly protected works] unless the works are virtually identical”); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “copyright infringement of compilations consisting largely of uncopyrightable elements should not be found in the absence of ‘bodily appropriation of expression’” (quoting Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 573 (9th Cir.1985)); East USA, Inc. v. Eggs, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying a heightened infringement standard for evaluating thinly protected works, such as the audiovisual elements for a videogame).
of authorship.” The Federal Circuit’s emphasis on viewing design patents “as a whole” assumes that the elements of the design are selected and arranged in an original and ornamental/non-functional way. Such an assumption should be scrutinized. Many articles of manufacture combine elements in non-original and functional ways. Take, for example, the surgical device depicted in Figure 29. The form-fitting handle and the tightening knob are likely derived from prior art devices and assembled in a functional configuration. Hence, viewing this design “as a whole” does not comport with the originality and ornamentality/non-functionality limitations on design patents. As with copyright law, competitors should be able to copy unoriginal or functional compilations of elements.

That said, protection can subsist in a compilation of unprotectable elements if there is originality in the selection and arrangements of the constituent elements. As a result, courts must assess both the copyrightability of elements and the way those elements are compiled. As noted above, where the originality is thin—as is true in some categories of compilations—the standard for similarity should be elevated as a safeguard against overprotection.

An industrial design for an article of manufacture might be a single element or a compilation of elements. The Federal Circuit should limit its focus to design as a whole only to the extent that it embodies originality in the compilation of features. And it should also ensure that any functional feature embodied in the design is not monopolized simply because the design as a whole has original features.

Applying this framework to the Apple v. Samsung design patents, the Federal Circuit should have questioned whether a rounded rectangle is original. Even apart from the fact that the Sharp Japanese patent anticipated this claimed design, the Apple claim should have been held to fall below the modicum of creativity required for originality. Furthermore, the rounded rectangle design element should have been filtered out or discounted in the infringement analysis. These limitations would have left nothing to protect because Apple

---

500. See supra text accompanying note 498; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347-49 (1991) (noting that factual compilations only attract protection to the extent that the facts, which are unprotected, are arranged in an original way; and “[t]his inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin”); Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enter., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir.1991) (observing that substantial similarity inquiry is “narrowed” when dealing with compilations).
disclaimed the other aspects of the iPhone shape in its design claim through its use of dotted lines on the drawing.

Finally, the Federal Circuit should instruct district courts (and itself) to apply the presumption of validity accorded to issued patents with due regard for the fact that the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine drifted from the 1902 standards long ago.\textsuperscript{501} Therefore, courts should be appropriately skeptical of the eligibility of design patents containing functional features.

2. *Jettison Consumer Deception as Part of the Design Patent Infringement Standard*

The Federal Circuit should further clarify design patent protection by abandoning the long-standing reference to consumer deception in the infringement standard.\textsuperscript{502} That language dates back to a time when design patent law served as a proto-trademark law.\textsuperscript{503} Yet that era ended well over a century ago and the reference to this factor mischaracterizes the essential copyright nature of design patent protection. Design patent law, like copyright law's useful article protection, is about similarity of original, non-functional design. It should not depend on whether consumers would be confused as to the source of a useful article.

\textsuperscript{501} Following Federal Circuit case law, the Patent Office applies an overly broad standard for design patent eligibility. See U.S. PTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 1504.01(e) (“Lack of Ornamentality”) (stating that “[t]o be patentable, a design must be ‘primarily ornamental.’ ‘In determining whether a design is primarily functional or primarily ornamental the claimed design is viewed in its entirety, for the ultimate question is not the functional or decorative aspect of each separate feature, but the overall appearance of the article, in determining whether the claimed design is dictated by the utilitarian purpose of the article.’ See *L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.*, 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . The design for the article cannot be assumed to lack ornamentality merely because the article of manufacture would seem to be primarily functional.” (emphasis in original)).

\textsuperscript{502} See *Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.*, 543 F.3d 665, 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (characterizing the infringement standard as “whether an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art [designs], would be deceived into believing the [accused device] is the same as the patented [design]” (emphasis added)); *Garham Co. v. White*, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) (stating the design infringement standard as “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other” (emphasis added); and concluding that “whatever differences there may be between the plaintiffs' design and those of the defendant in details of ornament, they are still the same in general appearance and effect, so much alike that in the market and with purchasers they would pass for the same thing—so much alike that even persons in the trade would be in danger of being deceived.” (emphasis added)).

\textsuperscript{503} See supra Part II(B).

Another reform that could alleviate the encroachment of design patents into the utility patent regime would be for Congress to reform the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to allow design patent appeals to be heard by regional circuit courts. Such courts have historically been more sensitive to limiting incursions of copyright, trademark, and, prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit, design patents into utility patent law’s exclusive role in protecting functional features.

There is good reason to believe that Congress would have narrowed the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction in this way if it had been aware of the copyright nature of design patents. Congress voiced concern about the Federal Circuit expanding its exclusive patent jurisdiction to other areas, such as antitrust law. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted the risk and specifically warned against the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims being manipulated or extended. The Senate Report explained that the establishment of the Federal Circuit:

> is intended to alleviate the serious problems of forum shopping among the regional courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of appeals. It is not intended to create forum shopping opportunities between the Federal Circuit and the regional courts of appeals on other claims.\(^505\)

Senator Leahy specifically warned that “[n]early all . . . litigation [other than patent cases], science and technology, when relevant, are related to other human or social issues, and only a generalist court should ever hear such matters.”\(^506\) The House Report stated that “jurisdiction of an appeal in a case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights or trademarks . . . will continue to go to the regional appellate courts, pursuant to section 1294 of title 28.”\(^507\)

When the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981 was passed, the design patent regime was a sleepy area. And even many patent practitioners had little appreciation of its copyright origins. It is unlikely that generalist legislators or their staffs were aware of the copyright nature of design patents. The focus of that legislation was on the regional circuit court forum shopping plaguing the utility patent regime. Such technologically complex cases presented special

---

504. See Menell, supra note 228, at 1578-81.
problems for generalist regional circuit jurists. Furthermore, regional circuit courts had been sensitive to the need to prevent design patents from encroaching on utility patent turf.

Congress could bring a wider range of perspectives to the design patent law regime by restoring appellate jurisdiction over design patent cases to the regional circuit courts. The problem of design patents cases brought in conjunction with utility patent infringement claims could be addressed through various approaches. Although the utility patent and design patent issues may share a common nucleus of operative facts, the disputed issues may be sufficiently distinct that it makes sense for the district court to phase or bifurcate trial of the causes of action. To the extent that the district court keeps the trial and post–trial rulings separate, it is as if separate cases have been adjudicated.

If exclusively utility patent or design issues are appealed, jurisdictional integrity and federalism considerations favor having those issues resolved by the appellate tribunal with primary authority: the Federal Circuit for utility patent issues and the regional circuit court for the design patent issues. Thus, since there is no loss in administrative efficiency for cases in which utility patent issues are not appealed, the most obvious solution would be to vest jurisdiction over the appeal of the design patent issues with the regional appellate court. This could be accomplished by amending § 1295(a)(1) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code to exclude from the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction cases that do not appeal issues arising under the utility patent provisions of the Patent Act or the Plant Variety Protection Act.

If both utility patent and design issues are appealed, the case would be effectively divided into separate causes of action and the timing of appeals and remands could affect case management. But since the case was already phased or bifurcated, appellate bifurcation would be straightforward and not add significant additional administrative cost. The district court would retain jurisdiction and could adapt any further proceedings based on the outcome and timing of the parallel appellate processes. Section 1295(a) could be amended to provide for cases in which the design issues have been tried separately—whether through phasing or bifurcation—to fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the regional circuit court of appeals.

That leaves cases in which the patent and nonpatent issues are litigated in a combined proceeding and are intertwined. Even in such scenarios, the appeal could be best handled by the regional circuit court if no utility patent issues are

508. This proposal parallels a proposal to alter appellate jurisdiction over copyright cases that plead patent infringement allegations in the complaint. See Menell, supra note 228, at 1591-95.
appealed. If utility patent issues or utility patent and design patent issues are appealed, then the Federal Circuit has primacy in adjudicating the appeal. But even in this situation, Congress could maintain regional circuit courts in the loop to the extent that distinct design patent issues arise by: (1) providing for certification of design patent questions to regional circuit courts; or (2) providing for review of Federal Circuit interpretations of regional circuit design decisions by a regional circuit panel and/or at the en banc level.

B. SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATIVE REFORM

A lot has happened since 1902. Copyright has emerged as a significant form of protection not just for “fine arts” but for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works generally, including useful articles. Moreover, the design field has shifted from decorative ornamentation to industrial design that integrates form and function. As an astute observer recognized half a century ago:

The distinction between ornamental and functional qualities, which the courts have long sought to establish, takes on an almost humorous aspect when its premise is contrasted with the theories underlying modern design. The elaboration of the ornamental standard is based on the notion that design and function are easily separable. Of course, this is not the case, at least not without a more detailed articulation of the reasons for the rule. Even if it were an easy distinction to make, it does not reckon with modern design, which is heavily influenced by Louis Sullivan’s dictum ‘Form follows function.’ Contemporary design avoids decoration: ‘The stark simplicity of much modern design, both industrial and architectural, is a violent reaction against the ginger-bread of the nineteenth century.’ Yet the law in this area is built upon a gingerbread conception of design; it sees design as something added to a product, an ornamentation, an embellishment, not as an integral part of the product itself. The contemporary designer does not take a finished good and decorate it; he helps to create it as much as does the production engineer. The designer does not seek to add something special to the product; rather he seeks, if he is in the vanguard of artistic innovators, to strip away and reveal basic forms. The design patent, in particular its requirement of ornamentation, is not only difficult to apply through the establishment of legally respectable standards; it is also grounded conceptually in an aesthetic outlook inconsistent with the art it seeks to encourage.509

Although we still believe that the fundamental channeling principle reflected in Baker v. Selden—reserving protection for technological advances to the utility

patent system—should be preserved and reinforced, there could be significant benefits from clarifying, harmonizing, and unifying design protection in light of the shifts in industrial design theory and practice that have taken place over the past century.

It is important to recognize, however, that advances in industrial design can qualify for utility patent protection. And although design protection advocates emphasize gaps in protection, industrial design is not rocket science or biomedical research. Advocates would need to make a much stronger case that industrial design falling short of the utility patent thresholds faces the technological risk, research and development expenditure, and appropriability problems necessary to justify new or expanded protections.

We are certainly not the first to recommend reexamining the need for design patent protection. There have been nearly perpetual efforts to reform design protection for more than a century.\(^{510}\) But as one scholar intimately familiar with such efforts recognized, “[g]iven this long history of failure, it is not difficult to predict the future of design legislation.”\(^{511}\) We note, however, that Congress passed sui generis design legislation for vessel boat hull designs the year after that prediction.\(^{512}\)

The time may be ripe for considering ways of updating design protection. Now that the dust has settled from the *Apple v. Samsung* litigation and the Federal Circuit has doubled down on eviscerating the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine, it is clearer than ever that the design patent regime has drifted far from what Congress intended more than a century ago. Apple’s legal victory, however, has escalated efforts by other electronic device

\(^{510}\) See Goldenberg, *supra* note 448; Brown, *supra* note 450, at 1395-1403 (discussing prior reform efforts); see, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT 12-13 (1966) (concluding that another form of design protection should be devised and design patents abandoned); Daniel H. Brean, *Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product Designs*, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 379–81 (2008) (arguing that the design patent system should either be abolished or should be phased out and replaced with a system more akin to community design protection); Note, *Design Protection—Time to Replace the Design Patent*, 51 MINN. L. REV. 942, 959–61 (1967); Roy V. Jackson, *A New Approach to Protection for the Designs of New Products*, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 448, 449 (1956) (arguing that design patent protection should be converted to a system of “engineering copyright” or “copyright-design”).

\(^{511}\) See Goldenberg, *supra* note 448, at 21.

manufacturers, as well as many design industries, to gamble on design patent lottery tickets. The aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Samsung ruling did little to quell the concern about design patent windfalls. As with the business method gold rush following the Federal Circuit’s State Street Bank decision upholding business method utility patents,\(^{513}\) the Federal Circuit’s lax standard for assessing ornamentality/non-functionality in conjunction with the outsize Apple v. Samsung damages award has produced a surge in offensive and defensive design patenting.\(^{514}\)

This vesting of interests, however, further complicates the political economy of design protection reform.\(^{515}\) Prior to the smartphone wars, many of the competitors might well have supported a ceasefire so as to reduce the risk of mutually assured destruction resulting from drawn out unpredictable battles over subjective intellectual property claims. But now many of these companies have armed themselves with design patents. And that is in addition to the traditional opposing forces in the design reform arena—such as fashion designers, manufacturing industries, replacement part manufacturers, and insurance companies. That said, hope springs eternal that a grand compromise can be achieved.

C. RESPONDING TO THE APPLE REVIVAL COUNTERARGUMENT

Prior to the Apple v. Samsung litigation, design patent law was a sleepy intellectual property niche that did not have a large impact on commerce or the digital technology industries. The publicity surrounding the smartphone wars and Apple’s massive damages award attributable to its design patent claims for rounded rectangles catapulted design patents to prominence in intellectual property law and business strategy. The design patent Cinderella is

---


514. See supra note 2.

now a celebrity, leading electronic device manufacturers and a growing range of other industries to pursue design patent applications. Applying the Federal Circuit’s lax design patent functionality standards, the Patent Office has been issuing a growing number of design patents embodying clearly functional features.

Defenders of design patent law’s emergence point to how the design system fostered Steve Jobs’s visionary focus on the integration of form and function in electronic products, reviving a once great but near-bankrupt company to historic financial success, transforming the consumer marketplace, and contributing to the reemergence of American industry.516 But is this story more mythology than truth? Would Apple have failed without lax design patent eligibility? Are the Federal Circuit’s lax standards for ornamentality/non-functionality promoting or impeding “progress”?

While we do not question Apple’s contributions to product design, we don’t think that it should override the limits that Congress wisely included within the design patent regime nor the fundamental logic of the Baker v. Selden channeling principle. Apple’s re-emergence is inspiring, but the role of design patents is at least partly mythology spun by one of the most charismatic business leaders in history. Furthermore, the expansion of design patent eligibility is likely to undermine technological progress by cluttering the electronic device and other design markets with minefields of dubious intellectual property rights that threaten cumulative innovation and competition.

We focus first on the role of design patents in Apple’s rebirth. The product that revitalized Apple was not the iPhone or the iPad, but the iPod.517 While this charismatic device also embodied seamless minimalist design for which it (belatedly) obtained design patents,518 the key to its success was its ingenious solution to an intractable clash between the content industries (record labels, music publishers, recording artists, and composers) and the digital technology industries. Neither Steve Jobs nor Apple invented file compression, faster and more compact electronics, enhanced battery life, more advanced programming languages, and other technologies that drove the emergence of a new generation of digital music devices. And while Jobs and Apple deserve credit

516. See Kappos, supra note 3; Saidman, supra note __.
517. See Levy, supra note __.
for integrating these technological advances into a highly successful user-friendly device, the iPod’s success turned significantly on Jobs’s loosening of the recording industry’s controlling licensing practices and creation of a legitimate marketplace (the iTunes store) for acquiring digital downloads of popular music. And even here, we should not overestimate Jobs’s role. More than anything else, the emergence of Napster and file-sharing technology drove the recording industry to the negotiating table. And the failure of the recording industry’s efforts to develop their own online music stores also played a role. Steve Jobs and Apple deserve tremendous credit for pulling off the iTunes deal quickly. But the context is critically important to assessing their role: they accelerated what was already in motion.

The iPod and the iTunes Store played critical roles in Apple’s revival and provided the platform for the expansion of Apple’s consumer electronics product catalog. The “iPod-iTunes symbiosis” was a “self-reinforcing” “unassailable fortress” that gave Apple a 70 percent share of the music player marketplace. Like Microsoft Windows in the 1990s, the iPod platform created the potential for tremendous network effects. It also provided a pathway for Apple to enter and dominate the mobile phone marketplace, a far larger business. And with the iPod’s synergy of technology and content, Apple could expand its empire into many other markets.

Although Apple acquired design patents on its iPod products, its success in building this marketplace turned significantly on Apple’s business acumen and advances in collateral technologies. Apple was not the first company to develop a portable electronic music device or a music download service. Apple brilliantly integrated various technologies, broke the logjam with the major music industry content owners, and adeptly marketed the iPod.

The utility patent system provided Apple with the means to protect novel and nonobvious technological advances in its electronic devices, including the integration of components. We don’t see why the design patent system should afford Apple additional protection for the functional features of its devices that do not meet the novelty and non-obviousness thresholds of the utility patent system. Apple’s first mover advantage, utility patents, integration with its other computers, high manufacturing standards, strong brand loyalty, and adroit marketing afforded Apple ample motivation to pursue research and development of media devices. Vague design patents on minimalist designs may have reinforced these motivations, but it is not at all clear that they were needed.

519. See VOGELSTEIN, supra note 315, at 140-45.
520. See Menell, supra note 279.
521. Apple acquired various utility patents associated with the iPod. See, e.g.,
Which brings us to whether the iPhone and iPad design patents were worth both the economic and legal costs that they imposed on competitors and consumers and the larger effects that they continue to have on many consumer industries as companies accumulate arsenals of design patents of uncertain scope with regard to minimalist and functional features. There is no doubt that the design patents on rounded rectangles created a minefield for competitors and slowed cumulative innovation. The notion that Apple needed such patents to pursue its iPhone and iPad product lines has more to do with Steve Jobs’s humorous presentation of the iPhone than economic reality.522 In discussing Apple’s approach to intellectual property, Nancy Heinen, Apple’s General Counsel and Senior Vice President from 1997 through 2006,523 explained,

Remember, [Jobs] was the best marketer on the planet. So he was sending a message . . . I’ve got a sledgehammer, and I am going to use it anytime [cell phone manufacturers] come too close. It’s a business strategy. There were true innovations in the iPhone, but we were not the first by a long shot into this area. So if you’re not the first in, you have to be robust in covering every possible invention or feature or little thing because it’s a crowded environment. You don’t know what is going to survive [the patent-office and legal challenges], and don’t know what other things are going to be coming out from competitors in the space.524

Apple’s aggressive intellectual property enforcement campaign was also fueled by Steve Jobs’s perception that he had been betrayed by Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Google’s co-founders whom he had befriended and mentored, and Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO who served on Apple’s Board of Directors.525

Thus, the narrative surrounding design patents is more hype than substance. Jobs had already revived Apple and paved the way for its entry into the smartphone and tablet markets before embarking on the iPhone and iPad projects. Furthermore, Apple’s iPhone and iPad products were less

522. See supra text accompanying Figure 24; Vogelstein, supra note 315, at 172-74 (emphasizing that “[n]othing illustrates Jobs’s obsession with patents as weapons better than his comments about them during the first iPhone launch in 2007 and the private meetings he had surrounding them in 2006. In the fall of 2006, as Apple’s engineers were scrambling to ready the iPhone for its January unveiling, the topic of what technologies Apple should patent in the iPhone came up . . . It was a short discussion . . . Jobs answers it completely and definitively: ‘We are going to patent it all.’”; noting that “Jobs knew that defending patents is as much about bluster as about the law). 523. See Nancy R. Heinen, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nancy_R._Heinen. 524. See Vogelstein, supra note 315, at 174 (quoting Nancy Heinen). 525. See id. at 83-145.
breakthroughs than the next stage in the maturation of various collateral technologies. Apple did not invent smartphones, multitouch gestures, or tablet devices.\textsuperscript{526}

These ideas had been floating around Silicon Valley for decades. Alan Kay,\textsuperscript{527} a noted software engineer at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC),\textsuperscript{528} came up with plans for Dynabook, a progenitor of laptop and tablet computers and the e-book, in 1968.\textsuperscript{529} In the early 1990s, James Gosling, a legendary software engineer credited with developing the Java programming language, built the Star7, a prototype for a handheld device that combined a Sun SPARCStation motherboard, radio, a four-inch LCD touchscreen, and speakers from the Nintendo Game Boy.\textsuperscript{530}

GO Corporation envisioned a touchscreen device that integrated a cell phone, fax machine, modem, microphone, calendar, and word processor in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{531} Apple introduced the Newton, a handheld personal digital assistant (PDA), in 1994. Although the Newton was initially successful, the PalmPilot’s sleeker size and longer battery life won the PDA market.\textsuperscript{532} Microsoft and Compaq introduced tablet devices in the early 2000 period.

Apple’s success with the iPhone and iPad was built on a vast body of prior art, the emergence of the Internet, and plummeting prices on ever more powerful microprocessors, batteries, and touchscreens resulting from robust innovation and competition. There is no doubt that Apple brought many valuable insights and incremental innovations to its iPhone and iPad products. But it would be a mistake to view Jobs or Apple as a modern-day Prometheus, the Greek mythological hero credited with the creation of humanity from clay and defying the gods by stealing fire and giving it to humanity as civilization.\textsuperscript{533}

And that is why it is ironic that Apple’s most powerful weapon in its smartphone intellectual property arsenal turned out to be design patents on rounded rectangles. Without the Federal Circuit’s failure to appreciate the

\textsuperscript{526} See \textit{Vogelstein, supra} note 315, at 101-05
\textsuperscript{528} Xerox PARC is where a young Steve Jobs, along with Steve Wozniak, his Apple co-founder, got some of the ideas for the desktop graphical user interface that contributed the success of the Apple Macintosh line of computers. See Jeremy Reimer, \textit{A History of the GUI}, \textit{Ars Technica} (May 4, 2005), https://arstechnica.com/features/2005/05/gui/4/
\textsuperscript{530} See Star7 Demo, \textit{YouTube}, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GsTH9S79qI. The Star7 was developed as part of Sun Microsystems’s Green Project. See Menell, \textit{supra} note 126, at ___.
\textsuperscript{531} See Jerry Kaplan, \textit{Adventures of a Silicon Valley Startup} (1999) (chronicling GO’s journey from promising start-up to business failure).
\textsuperscript{532} See \textit{Vogelstein, supra} note 315, at 150.
limited, copyright-based nature of design patent protection, and its unwarranted expansion of design patent protection into the exclusive domain of utility patents, the digital technology industry would have been spared tremendous wasteful litigation that hindered cumulative innovation and competition.

It is doubtful that Apple needed its design patents, and their collateral effects on progress and the intellectual property system are regrettable. While appropriately tailored intellectual property can promote progress, overbroad and vague intellectual property protection undermines progress by imposing costs on follow-on inventors through needless due diligence and the costs of defending against unwarranted protections. We have learned these lessons through the painful experience of utility patents on business methods and efforts to use copyrights on computer software to protect functional features.

Despite their great technology leadership, neither Steve Jobs nor Apple has served the intellectual property system well through their cynical assertion of dubious intellectual property claims. Apple’s smartphone war against Android devices was not its first cavalier effort to use dubious intellectual property assets to wreak havoc across the digital computing ecosystem. Recall that Apple pursued a vigorous campaign against Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and other computer companies in the late 1980s and early 1990s over the graphical user interface for desktop computers. It took several years to sort out that mess, but Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit ultimately resolved that controversy in a way that blocked Apple’s monopolistic impulses and promoted both innovation and competition.534

Unfortunately, Apple’s design patent campaign has, thus far, had the opposite effect. The Federal Circuit has opened the backdoor to protecting functional features without requiring that the claims meet the utility patent’s more exacting requirements. This shift in the law, without due attention to Congress’s intention in amending the design patent regime or the wise channeling doctrine reflected in Baker vs. Selden, threatens to undermine progress. It remains to be seen how far this wayward drift will go, although the buildup of design patent arsenals is an ominous sign.535

VIII. CONCLUSION: THE VERY UNEASY CASE FOR DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION FOR FUNCTIONAL FEATURES

The U.S. design patent regime began as a mislabeled copyright regime, which has continued to plague its efficacy since the mid-19th century. The regime served for a brief period as proto-trademark law until the U.S. Congress established a true federal trademark regime. The early dalliance with trademark law, however, caused lasting confusion as courts continue to apply a trademark-like standard for assessing infringement more than a century and a half later.

During the mid-to-late 19th century, some patent commissioners and courts, confused by the inclusion of the term “useful” in some classes of design patent subject matter, caused design patent law to encroach on utility patent protection for technological inventions. At the turn of the 20th century, Commissioner Allen righted the ship, persuading Congress to excise the word “useful” from the design patent law and insert an express “ornamentality” requirement so as to properly channel protection between the utility and design patent regimes.

While struggling to assess aesthetics directly, early 20th century courts appreciated that Congress intended the ornamentality requirement to serve as a channeling doctrine to bar design patents from protecting functional features. Without any intention of allowing design patent protection to extend to functional features of articles of manufacture that are intertwined with ornamental elements, several regional circuit courts stated that designs that are “dictated by functionality” are ineligible. This was merely a shortcut to dispose of easy cases. The regional circuit courts generally adhered to the channeling principle.

The establishment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the early 1980s led to a pronounced shift in design patent eligibility. After a cautious start, the Federal Circuit produced two 1988 decisions pointing in different directions. *Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.* respected the channeling principle by holding that “a design patent is not a substitute for a utility patent. A device that copies the utilitarian or functional features of a patented design is not an infringement unless the ornamental aspects are also copied, such that the overall ‘resemblance is such as to deceive.’” *Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.* took a far more permissive approach to design patent

536. 838 F.2d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
537. Id. (citing Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872)).
538. 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
eligibility, rejecting dissection of function elements of patented designs and suggesting that a design is ornamental and not functional so long as there are alternative designs available.

The Federal Circuit reinforced the alternative design standard a few years later in *L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.*[^539^] Without exploring the 1902 Act or the context in which the “dictated by functionality” formulation emerged—i.e., regional circuit decisions employed this test as a shortcut for invalidating straightforward functional design patents—the Federal Circuit adopted the “dictated by” formulation as the test for ornamentality/non-functionality. The Federal Circuit reinforced this interpretation in the en banc *Egyptian Goddess* case[^540^] which overturned the use of a point of novelty focus. Although the Federal Circuit tempered the ornamentality/non-functionality doctrine in a 2010 decision that filtered out functional features in the infringement assessment[^541^], it largely repudiated that approach in its handling of the blockbuster *Apple v. Samsung* case[^542^]. Its subsequent decisions reinforced the permissive approach.

It is disconcerting that throughout nearly four decades of struggling to make sense of the design patent regime, and particularly its role within the larger intellectual property system, the Federal Circuit has never once referred to the 1902 Act and its rationale. Nor has it seriously examined the rich body of regional circuit authority that sheds light on the key legislation.

Apart from this wayward drift, the design patent regime is an anachronism. Passed as a mislabeled form of copyright protection for useful articles before copyright had expanded to encompass useful articles, design patent protection served a narrow but worthwhile purpose for a century. As copyright law expanded, however, the need for design patent protection has faded. Congress provided clearer language in the Copyright Act to ensure that it did not encroach on the utility patent domain. And the Supreme Court has similarly guarded against trade dress law affording backdoor protection for functional features of product design. Yet the Federal Circuit has allowed the design patent regime to drift into a troubling collision with the utility patent regime. Product designers can now gain protection for functional features without meeting the higher requirements of the utility patent system.

[^539^]: *L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.*, 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
[^542^]: *See supra Part V(D).*
In 1969, then Professor Stephen Breyer wrote a provocative article entitled “The Uneasy Case for Copyright.” While his questioning of the need for copyright for some categories of books may have overshot the mark, his parsimonious intellectual property framework captured the importance of balancing innovation and competition in pursuing the constitutional aim of promoting progress of expressive and inventive works. This perspective is especially valuable for protecting forms of expression that combine expressive and functional attributes.

Like computer software, designs are an ideal candidate for the parsimonious framework. Design patents should never have been interpreted so broadly as to protect functional features. We have suggested ways to restore the fundamental channeling principle that undergirds the intellectual property system. We have also explained why the time is ripe for Congress to address the overlap of design and utility patent protection so as to promote design creativity without inhibiting competition in functional features. Designers should not be offered a backdoor for protecting functionality.


544. See BARBARA A. RINGER, THE DEMONOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT 14-15 (Second of the R.R. Bowler Memorial Lectures 1974) (“While mostly disagreeing with his conclusions, I admire Professor Breyer’s courage and skill in saying what he thinks, but I must say that at this point he scared me); Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1970); cf Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 80 (1972) (conceding that the claim for abolishing copyright protection for important categories of books is not convincing while defending his methodology and refocusing the discussion on reforming copyright protection).

545. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, Cl.8.