Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs

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Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses to take is preordained. Questions of foreign policy and national security engage diverse components of the executive branch bureaucracy, which have overlapping jurisdictions and often conflicting biases and priorities. And yet they must arrive at one executive branch position. Thus the process of decisionmaking, the weight accorded the position of any given decisionmaker, the context in which the decision is made—together these shape the ultimate position the President takes.

This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress can—and does—play in structuring and rearranging the relative powers of those internal actors, and the processes they take to reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President’s ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance, Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may influence the policy directions of the presidency by manipulating its internal workings. There are risks to deploying “process controls,” as I term these measures, in lieu of direct substantive engagement, but I argue that Congress can and should use these tools more instrumentally to influence the course of foreign policy in areas where it is otherwise unlikely to assert itself as a coequal branch and necessary check on presidential power.

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INTRODUCTION

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

But presidential primacy is not the end of the story. While the President might wield far-reaching control over the nation’s foreign affairs and national security policies, Congress can shape the President’s position, and thus the foreign policy of the United States, without necessarily mandating the substance of that policy itself.

This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress can—and does—play through structuring and rearranging the relative powers of internal executive branch actors, and the processes they take to reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President’s ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance, Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may
influence the policy directions of the presidency simply by manipulating its internal workings.

A recent example illustrates the point. In 2017, the newly-elected President threatened a trade war with China, Mexico, Canada and other longtime allies and competitors around the globe, proposing high tariffs on imports of steel, and specific products such as foreign-made vehicles. His own political party controlled the House and Senate, but there was little appetite in Congress for raising tariffs. So he turned inward, looking to his own cabinet to effectuate his plans. Government lawyers dusted off a rarely-used delegation from Congress, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which permits the President to adjust restrictions on imports when the Secretary of Commerce finds that they impose a threat to national security.

With his statutory authority contingent upon meeting this procedural requirement, the President demanded that the Commerce Secretary consider the effects on national security of steel and aluminum imports, asserting meanwhile, in an expansive interpretation of this statutory exception, that the nation’s economic welfare is itself a matter of national security. The Secretary of Commerce, following the statute’s requirements, consulted with the Secretary of Defense, who told him, in a diplomatically-worded missive, that the adjustments proposed by Commerce were in fact unnecessary for national security, and could have negative consequences for U.S. relationships with important allies. Those steps taken, and despite the Defense Secretary’s warning, the President moved ahead on the Commerce

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Secretary’s report, imposing additional tariffs on both steel and aluminum imports.\(^5\)

Members of the President’s own party in Congress issued unusual rebukes of the President’s action, denouncing the measures as a “tax hike on American manufacturers, workers and consumers,”\(^6\) and asked the President to dial back the global tariffs.\(^7\) They did not, however, exercise their power to withdraw the President’s authority to adjust imports, an authority that Congress itself had given to the President through increasingly expansive delegations since the 1930s.\(^8\)

Yet congressional reticence to reassert dominance over trade policy is not the end of the story. There is another tool of control that members of Congress yet seek to deploy and which, despite increasingly relinquishing power to the President, Congress has used several times before in order to influence the direction of U.S. trade policy. And that is to restructure the decisionmaking process inside the executive branch in order to preference decisionmakers and processes more likely to favor their preferred outcomes.

Indeed, members of Congress have introduced several bills seeking to do just that. In 2018 and 2019, several bipartisan groups of lawmakers introduced bills in both the House and Senate to retract from the Secretary of Commerce the power to invoke a national security justification for raising tariffs on foreign imports.\(^9\) The bills would grant that power instead to the Secretary of Defense—the very cabinet secretary who had, the bill proponents surely noticed, criticized the Commerce Secretary’s proposed indiscriminate tariffs.\(^10\) Such micro-management over the executive branch decisionmaker is not an untested tool for Congress. In fact, the bills would

\(^{5}\) Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (November 21, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/ctrs/misc/R45249.pdf. The President also negotiated exceptions on a country-by-country basis. *Id.*


\(^{8}\) See *infra* II.C.2 (detailing historical development of the national security justification for imposing tariffs).


\(^{10}\) See *infra* note 4. Former Defense Secretary Mattis resigned between the 2018 and 2019 bill proposals, but press releases accompanying the 2019 proposals, such as one stating the purpose was to counter “misuse” of the national security justification and “to ensure that the statute is used for genuine national security purposes,” suggest that bill proponents view the Defense Department’s constraining effect on the use of the national security justification as departmental, rather than unique to Mattis. *See* Press Release, Portman, Jones, Ernst, Alexander, Feinstein, Fischer, Sinema & Young Introduce Trade Security Act to Reform National Security Tariff Process (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-jones-ernst-alexander-feinstein-fischer-sinema-young-introduce
make the Office of the Defense Secretary at least the sixth distinct congressionally-designated executive branch office to wield that authority since Congress began delegating away its power over the nation’s trade policy.11

Why might members of Congress who want to challenge the President’s trade policies deploy an indirect tool of micro-management over the executive branch’s decisionmaking process, rather than simply direct the policy themselves through substantive legislation? And could such an indirect tool have any real effect?

In fact, indirect tools such as the choice of executive branch decisionmaker or the restructuring of internal decisionmaking processes can entirely redirect the President’s policy outcomes, and members of Congress often have reason to prefer these mechanisms to more direct legislation. Thus, while Congress may defer or even delegate to the President on matters of substantive foreign policy—and while members of Congress may not rest assured that the President will implement their will even when they do mandate substance—Congress may nevertheless shape the nation’s foreign policy through what I term “congressional administration.”12

Congressional administration, as I define it here, is the management and manipulation of internal executive branch decisionmaking processes for the purpose of advancing a substantive agenda. Congress has an array of measures that it may deploy to influence the nation’s foreign policy, short of mandating the substance itself. These “process controls” include familiar tools such as agency design and procedural requirements, but they also include the designation and reassignment of decisionmaker within the executive branch. Each of these may be deployed for different purposes, with different effects and risks, and each has significant effects on the ultimate policy direction the United States takes.

This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature, one on congressional-executive turf wars over foreign affairs and national security, and one on agency design and political control over the

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12 I use this term as a congressional corollary to then-Professor Elena Kagan’s “presidential administration,” which she identified as presidential control of the bureaucracy as a means to advance “the President’s own policy and political agenda,” particularly in the face of political obstacles to doing so through other means. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2011). Jack Beermann uses this term directly, to describe Congress’s ongoing involvement in the “day-to-day administration of the law.” See Jack Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006).
bureaucracy. Scholars have long debated the proper constitutional allocation of power between the President and Congress over the direction of the nation’s foreign policy. As a practical matter, however, the conventional wisdom holds that “the President (almost) always wins in foreign affairs.” 13 The reasons for presidential primacy are legion: institutional competence; asymmetrical expertise and information; more costs than benefits to Congress in engaging. Moreover, many argue that even when Congress does engage directly and substantively on a matter, the President often manages to assert authority to act, either by interpreting his statutory authorities broadly, 14 or by establishing his constitutional prerogative to act unilaterally, 15 or even by skirting the legal constraints altogether. 16

But the fact that the President usually “wins” vis-à-vis Congress does not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses to take is preordained. Nor does it mean that the policy the President ultimately adopts at the end of a long winding process is the one he would have chosen if all of the options were simply laid out before him at the outset. In fact, presidential primacy does not even mean that the policy the President ultimately adopts has actually received the personal sign-off of the President.

Indeed there is another dynamic beyond that of the President-Congress relationship that is essential to understanding foreign policy positioning and is as much of a hotbed for diversity of opinion. This is the multi-faceted, many-headed organism that is the executive branch bureaucracy. That there is a diversity of opinion within the executive branch, especially on matters of foreign policy and national security, should be clear these days to anyone who picks up a newspaper. 17 That the process for decisionmaking inside the executive branch influences the resulting policies is perhaps less intuitive, particularly to those who envision a unitary executive headed by a willful President with his fingers in every pot. And yet it is so. Furthermore, there exist opportunities for influencing these processes, and

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16 For a bit of all three, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), (available at: https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download).

17 Or, if this is anachronistic, then to anyone who is on Twitter.
thus the resulting policy, from the outside. Of specific relevance here, Congress has robust means at its disposal to shape these processes and thus the resulting decision.

I have written previously about the multiplicity of decisionmakers, processes, overlapping interests, and conflicting proclivities inside the executive branch, and the potential for external actors to shape the President’s positions by triggering different decisionmaking pathways.\(^\text{18}\) I focused in prior work on the role of litigants, NGOs, and international treaty bodies in prompting different processes and the potential for achieving different outcomes.\(^\text{19}\) But members of Congress have far greater opportunities than most for triggering and even for restructuring different decisionmaking pathways, including for designating their preferred internal official as the decider over a given matter.

While executive branch decisionmaking may at times appear opaque from the outside—particularly in the realm of foreign policy and national security—savvy government watchers, scholars, and even members of Congress can often glean a sense of its inner workings: which matters are subject to internal debate, who within the administration may be inclined toward particular policies, and where the pressure points lie for decisionmaking.\(^\text{20}\) Actors inclined to lean into these pressure points may therefore find they can influence policy outcomes simply by exerting influence on the shape of executive branch decisionmaking.

Members of Congress have especially potent tools for shaping the process of decisionmaking, through legislation directly creating procedural requirements or designating decisionmakers, as well as through “soft” mechanisms such as requests for testimony from particular executive branch officials,\(^\text{21}\) all of which can shape and shift presidential priorities, force to a head executive branch decisions, exacerbate internal tensions, or place a thumb on the scale in favor of a particular set of actors engaged in intra-executive branch conflict. Through the use of these process controls, Congress can and does shape the process of executive branch decisionmaking and influence policy without necessarily mandating a particular substantive outcome.

\(^{18}\text{Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1531 (2017).}\)

\(^{19}\text{Id.}\)

\(^{20}\text{In fact, members of Congress often have significant ties to the executive branch both through their own personal relationship to members of the political class within the administration, and through staffers’ often deep connections to agencies, through prior positions, former colleagues, and the fact that they are repeat players on specific issues. See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 263, 296-297 (2018).}\)

\(^{21}\text{See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017) (arguing that Congress has many tools both “hard” like appropriations and “soft” like speech, which it underutilizes).}\)
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I first considers scholarly debates over the legal and practical allocation of the foreign affairs power, including the extent to which Congress is able effectively to constrain the President in this sphere. Acknowledging the practical reality of presidential primacy in matters of foreign affairs, it turns to scholarship considering the interaction of Congress with the internal workings of the executive branch bureaucracy. This scholarship largely brackets off the fields of foreign policy and national security; thus bringing insights from administrative law and political science scholarship on political control of the bureaucracy to bear on debates about the allocation of foreign policy power is one contribution of this Article.

Part II introduces and classifies what I term “process controls,” the mechanisms that Congress may deploy to influence the executive branch decisionmaking process, and through it, the shape of foreign policy. Two types of measures that I include within the term process controls—agency design and the imposition of administrative procedures—have been the subject of significant scholarship in both administrative law and political science. I therefore consider these each in turn here in order to examine their relevance and influence on questions of foreign policy and national security, which are generally excluded from scholarship over agency design and administrative procedure.

I devote the majority of this Part, and of the Article, to identifying and analyzing a specific type of process control that has not been the focus of scholarship: the designation of executive branch decisionmaker. Among the controls I discuss in this Article, Congress wields significant, targeted control over decisionmaking inside the executive branch simply through its choice of intra-executive decider. This is not a one-off decision; Congress may—and does—reassign the decisionmaker as new events arise or policy preferences shift. Members of Congress thus may seek to shift a delegation of authority horizontally, from one executive branch official or office to another who may espouse policy preferences more in sync with their own. Or they may allocate power vertically, such as upward toward a high-level official, if they are looking to increase political accountability for a decision, or downward to professionals and technocrats, when seeking to buffer an issue from partisan politics. Or they may try to diffuse power, perhaps as a means of constraining government action, for example by requiring consultation among or even certification by several different officials.

Part III considers the implications of Congress turning to process controls to shape foreign policy. It considers when and why Congress might turn to process controls over more direct efforts to mandate substance, and which particular process controls are likely to be effective at

\[22\text{ See infra Part I.}\]
implementing particular purposes. This Part also probes the unique constitutional questions raised by congressional administration of foreign policy, as well as the risks at stake—risks to good government and to accountability for decisionmaking.

In considering the influence of internal decisionmakers and processes on executive branch policy, and Congress’s ability to influence its direction through these processes, this Article also adds texture to debates about a “unitary executive” model of executive branch decisionmaking. I discuss the implications of process controls for formal doctrine and the potential for judicial review in Part III. But the influence of process controls on policy I discuss in this paper more broadly provides a functional critique of unitary executive theory. Wherever the line ultimately falls on the formal powers of the President over those within the executive branch, the multiplicity of decisionmakers and processes will always provide practical opportunities for influencing and even manipulating executive branch policies, from within the executive branch and without.

Congress has ceded significant ground to the President on matters of foreign policy and national security, and continues to do so, often abdicating its responsibility to craft policy or to provide substantive, rigorous oversight. Moreover, Congress has at times lost ground to the President even when it has attempted to assert its prerogative. But this Article nevertheless challenges views of the presidency as completely untethered to law or to congressional constraint. Congress may be overly timid in this space, and it may at times be ineffective, but it can and does exercise its power to shape foreign policy short of mandating substance, and it could deploy these process controls even more instrumentally to impel decisionmaking in its preferred direction.

I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER AND BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS

This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature, one on congressional-executive power struggles over foreign affairs and national security, and one on agency design and political control over the bureaucracy.

A. Congressional-Executive Allocations of Foreign Affairs Power

It has long been conventional wisdom that the President exercises significantly more control over foreign affairs than does Congress. As a matter of constitutional authority, scholars continue to debate the proper

23 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076.
allocation of foreign affairs power between the President and Congress. And yet as a practical matter, the question quite rarely comes to a head. This is not for lack of possible flashpoints, but rather because Congress rarely deploys all the power it clearly holds, let alone tries to push the envelope. In fact, Congress has a wide range of methods at its disposal for exercising direct authority over foreign affairs well within its explicitly allocated authority—from committee oversight to appropriations to declarations of war. Yet members of Congress have often been reticent to use this power, for reasons both practical and political, and Congress’s formal authority generally well exceeds its functional willingness to deploy it. To the extent that longstanding practice affects the balance of powers among the branches, this acquiescence by Congress in the executive’s stranglehold on foreign affairs may even result in a formal shift in power over time to the executive.

The reasons for congressional reticence to get involved in foreign policy are overdetermined. Some are based in rational justifications like institutional competence and good government. Much of the foreign affairs and national security expertise is now housed in the executive branch, and thus some level of deference to their more granular knowledge may be justified. Exponential increases in complexity and classification lead to significant information asymmetries between the branches. And to the extent it is advantageous that the state speak with “one voice” on the international plane, the President is the likeliest option for holding that mantle. Some reasons are practical: collective action takes time, and the

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25 A recent notable exception is the case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in which the State Department refused to implement a statutory requirement that passports for individuals born in Jerusalem list the place of birth as “Israel.” The Supreme Court heard the case and held that the statutory requirement impermissibly infringed on the President’s plenary power over recognition of foreign governments. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076.

26 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.


28 See, e.g., Wildavsky, supra note 13 (arguing that, among other reasons, foreign policy engages fewer clear partisan preferences than domestic matters, requires expertise the public does not tend to have, and thus Congress tends to cede to the President a freer hand on such matters).


31 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 42 (1996) (“That the President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.”); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1258 (2018). But see Kristen Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 CHI. L. REV. 609 (discussing the under-theorized reality of congressional communication with foreign nations).
President is considered to be at least relatively “unitary” and thus can act with dispatch that the other branches do not enjoy.\(^{32}\) Moreover, while members of Congress have many tools at their disposal, including the power of the purse, they do not themselves command militaries.\(^{33}\) But, Congress being Congress, the most significant reason for congressional listlessness in foreign affairs is likely the political one. Most members of Congress have likely determined that the political costs to engaging in foreign policy are not worth the political benefits, and tend to engage in this arena only when they are.\(^{34}\)

All of this is, of course, a matter of intense scholarly discussion and disagreement. In addition to disagreement over whether Congress has abdicated its authority over foreign affairs, and whether the President has wrongfully aggrandized his power, scholars have also questioned the extent to which Congress even can rein in the President when it tries to.\(^{35}\) Many scholars have rightly noted the difficulties Congress faces in changing the President's course of action in the foreign affairs and national security space even when it chooses to legislate constraints.\(^{36}\) These concerns are compounded by other public law scholarship questioning the extent to which the President is bound by law generally.\(^{37}\)

Debates over the foreign affairs power focus primarily on questions of authority over substance: which body is charged with making major policy decisions about a given question of foreign relations or national security? On that metric, the President does “win” most (even almost all) of the time, at least as a functional matter, even when the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the authority in question.\(^{38}\) This is so for many reasons—among them information asymmetries; the ability to act with dispatch; the ability to act at all; Congress’s cost-benefit analysis about the political value of intervening in foreign affairs.\(^ {39}\)

\(^{32}\) See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 27, at 438-44 (discussing structural and political impediments to congressional action).

\(^{33}\) See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1818 (1996) (discussing the President’s longstanding unilateralism in entering war as one reason for presidential dominance).

\(^{34}\) For an account of when Congress is more likely to engage, specifically on war powers, see William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers, 33-49 (2007).

\(^{35}\) Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, supra note 14.


\(^{38}\) See Koh, supra note 13. Authorities the Constitution delegates directly to Congress, which Congress has then either handed over to the President or largely acquiesced in his encroachment, include the power to declare war and the power to regulate international commerce.

\(^{39}\) See, e.g., id.; Wildavsky, supra note 13.
Yet presidential primacy is not the end of the story. That the President can ultimately act does not tell us what the President’s course of action will be. Particularly in the foreign affairs realm where novel questions often arise and policy preferences do not necessarily divide neatly along partisan lines, there is often significant room for disagreement even inside the executive branch over what action or policy the President should adopt. And to bring this full circle, Congress has means at its disposal to pressure and shape the nature of those internal debates and decisionmaking processes.

This is where the foreign affairs debate could benefit from the literature on congressional control over the bureaucracy, which I explore in the section that follows. Both together inform deeper consideration of the multiplicity of ways actors outside the executive branch, including Congress, shape Presidents’ actions and policies, as I explore in this Article.

B. Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy

There are extensive literatures in both political science and public law scholarship on Congress’s interest and efficacy in reining in and otherwise controlling the federal bureaucracy. Much of this literature focuses on domestic matters and often even explicitly brackets off the foreign affairs or national security bureaucracy. Yet despite the possibly exceptionalist nature of foreign affairs and national security, many of the dynamics that scholarship on bureaucracy considers have relevance for these fields as well. As I explain below, these literatures provide an important jumping off point for considering Congress’s role in influencing executive branch foreign affairs process and policy.

As in the foreign policy space, scholars of congressional-executive relations generally have long reckoned with, bemoaned, or defended what has appeared to be congressional abdication to the President of greater and greater power. With the rise of the administrative state and the concomitant complexity of modern governance, Congress has increasingly moved from narrow delegations of power to the President to broad delegations that created a significant sphere of discretion within which bureaucrats could act. One debate in modern scholarship considers the extent to which the result of these broad delegations is an entirely unconstrained, all-powerful President; among those who push this

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40 Wildavsky, supra note 13.
42 Kagan, supra note 12, at 2253-54.
“executive unbound” version of the presidency, there are many who warn of its dangers, and others who view it as essentially a good state of affairs.43

Others argue that the presidency is not, as an empirical matter, entirely unconstrained. Scholars have pointed to legislative attempts to rein in the President with substantive law, and the effectiveness of those efforts, even in areas like national security and war where the conventional wisdom says the President has enormous leeway.44 They have noted that even when Congress fails to legislate, there are a number of other tools it has at its disposal for making its interests known and influential.45 And there is a significant body of scholarship examining the extent to which Congress influences bureaucratic choices through its control over the design of agencies structure of decisionmaking, rather than through substantive legislation.46

Scholars have considered the extent to which Congress engages in “ex ante” controls, like agency design, and “ongoing” controls, like oversight, as a means of managing the bureaucracy, though they debate the purpose of these controls.47 Some propose that Congress chooses agency design to ensure that agencies hue to their statutory mandate, to, in effect, “hardwire” them in order reduce “bureaucratic drift.”48 Others maintain that politicians design agencies primarily with policy preferences and political purposes in mind, which may connect indirectly to efficiency and good governance to the extent voters are informed on these matters.49 This literature intersects with debates on the extent to which congressional

43 Compare, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006), with POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 37.
45 See CHAFETZ, supra note 21.
47 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999).
48 Jonathan Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 671-72 (“The goal of Congress is to ensure that administrative agencies generate outcomes that are consistent with the original understanding that existed between Congress and the various interest groups that were parties to the initial political compromise”); Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 92 J.L. ECON. & ORG., at 93 (“politicians who establish administrative agencies can manipulate the structure and design of those agencies in ways that reduce the chance that future changes in the political landscape will upset the terms of the original understanding among the relevant political actors”).
49 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES BUREAUCRACY, 3, 161-162 (1997) (“calculations about the ‘proper’ design of administrative agencies are shaped less by concerns for efficiency or effectiveness than by concerns about reelection, political control, and ultimately, policy outcomes”); Terry Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (“American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. [It] arises out of politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power.”).
attempts at control have any real effect on bureaucratic outcomes, whatever their purpose.\textsuperscript{50}

Even scholars who do not necessarily see Congress as providing significant constraints on the executive have pointed to other constraints that rein in Presidential prerogative. A burgeoning literature has developed exploring the role of bureaucratic, or administrative, constraints, reining in the President from inside the executive branch.\textsuperscript{51} But there is work yet to be done in considering the extent to which congressional process controls on agency structure and design interact with these constraints on the President from inside the executive branch.\textsuperscript{52}

As I have explored in prior work, bureaucratic constraints on the President can play a significant role in shaping the process and outcome of executive branch decisionmaking,\textsuperscript{53} but they are created, bolstered—and can ultimately be undermined by—political sources like Congress and the President himself. Beyond agency design, Congress has numerous “hard” and “soft” tools at its disposal for structuring and restructuring the process of decisionmaking inside the executive.\textsuperscript{54} And it deploys these tools for

\textsuperscript{50}Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, \textit{Agency Design and Political Control}, 126 YALE L.J. 1002 (2017).


\textsuperscript{52}Political scientist James Lindsay, who has written extensively on congressional involvement in foreign policymaking, is one of the rare scholars to consider the role of congressional influence on process in the executive branch’s foreign policy decision-making space. In his view, scholarship has “underestimated” congressional influence on foreign policy in part because “[p]olitical scientists [were] slow to recognize how process shapes policy.” See James M. Lindsay, \textit{Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters}, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4, 607-628 (1992-1993) (discussing the influence of “[s]tructural and procedural innovations” on policy, but noting that the efficacy of these innovations is difficult to answer due to the “understudied” and “slippery” nature of the subject, which involves “anticipated reactions and counterfactuals.”). See also James M. Lindsay and Randall B. Ripley, \textit{How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy}, in JAMES M. LINDSAY AND RANDALL B. RIPLEY, \textit{CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL} (1993). Lindsay and Ripley catalog five different types of what they call “procedural legislation,” including variations of agency design, reporting and certification requirements, and “enfranchising new groups in the decision-making process.” Id. at 28-30. Lindsay and Ripley do not examine the designation of or shift in executive branch decisionmaker as a targeted tool of congressional control, but much of these statutory mechanisms they discuss might be deployed as a means of designating or changing the decision over a particular policy matter, as I explore in Part II.


\textsuperscript{54}I borrow here the terms “hard” and “soft” as applied to congressional power from Josh Chafetz, who in turn borrowed them from international relations theory. See CHAFETZ, supra note 45 (describing two forms of congressional power: hard power to “coerce,” such as the power of the purse, and other “soft” tools such as internal rules of discipline and proceedings.)
purposes in addition to, and beyond that of, bureaucratic responsiveness to political pressure alone, as I explore in this Article.

The foreign policy and national security spaces provide an especially valuable lens for considering this interaction between Congress and bureaucratic constraints, as there are numerous conflicting interests inside the executive branch foreign policy and national security infrastructure, with overlapping jurisdictions, and thus many levers to push and pull to influence decisionmaking. Moreover, novel issues arise or boil over at a higher rate than in the purely domestic policy realm, providing new “opportunity windows” for Congress and the President to consider matters with fresh eyes.55

Drawing on these literatures, this Article considers a range of mechanisms through which Congress shapes executive branch decisionmaking and thus the path of U.S. foreign policy. I focus in particular on a set of process controls that are not theorized in scholarship on the administrative state—the choice of internal executive branch decisionmaker—and consider the purposes, efficacy, and risks of this tool of congressional administration over the nation’s foreign policy. Though the focus here is on foreign policy and national security decisionmaking, this consideration of process controls has relevance beyond these spheres, to still-nascent questions of how Congress interacts with the levers and pulleys effectuating decisions inside the executive branch.

II. PROCESS CONTROLS AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY

As I describe in Part I, Congress has, for a range of reasons, fallen short in the foreign affairs arena. Whether it holds a significant body of formal power that it refuses to use, or is in fact formally impotent in this sphere, there is general agreement on this: Congress does not aggressively legislate a substantive foreign policy agenda, and it certainly does not do so at the expense of its domestic interests. This Part demonstrates, however, that even as Congress often declines to pursue a substantive foreign policy agenda directly, it can and does pursue an array of “process controls” to influence the conduct of foreign affairs short of directing which positions the President should adopt.

I use the term “process controls” here to encompass a range of mechanisms Congress might deploy to manage executive branch decisionmaking. These include agency design and administrative procedure requirements, as well as less familiar mechanisms like switching the

55 JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2003); RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-Congressional Relations (James A. Thurber & Jordan Tama eds., 6th ed. 2017) (noting the differences between foreign and domestic policy as a matter of partisan divide); Wildavsky, supra note 13.
decisionmaker inside the executive branch. Process controls permit members of Congress to influence the process and direction of executive branch decisionmaking indirectly, often with a light touch, avoiding many of the pitfalls and political costs members may fear would arise from more direct engagement in foreign policymaking. Moreover, process controls may even at times be more effective than direct substantive legislation; while executive branch officials might seek to interpret their way out of more substantive legislative constraints in order to protect presidential power, process controls commandeer executive branch officials and processes themselves to serve as internal constraints on the President.  

Scholarship on the effects of agency design and administrative procedure tends to focus on “political control” over the bureaucracy, a term used to refer to the responsiveness and accountability of bureaucratic actors to politicians, be they in Congress or the Oval Office. Does the bureaucracy, in so many words, continue to make decisions that those political actors who empowered them would want them to take? Yet process controls can be animated by multiple purposes, beyond policy preference. At times, in fact, the precise purpose for which members of Congress may propose or support a particular mechanism is to remove decisions from political control, and specifically from the intransigence of partisan politics.

The choice of process control often connects to the reason members of Congress may have for choosing this tool over another, more direct form of policy engagement. Measures aimed at removing decisions from partisan politics, for example, may be deployed if members of Congress believe it is important to act on a particular matter, but that political sensitivities stand in the way of action unless they give the matter to technocrats. Creating decisionmaking pathways inside the executive branch allows members to shift the political burden off of their shoulders and on to technocrats who are free of such constraints. At other times, by contrast, members may have specific policy preferences, but be reticent to act because of high political costs; they may see deploying process controls as a way to effectuate or at least approximate their preferences while shifting the cost burden. Even when their goal is a preferred policy objective, members may believe they can more effectively implement that policy through the use of these measures. They may even choose these tools over more direct substantive legislation mandating a particular policy for reasons of good

56 See Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51.
58 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 47 (discussion of base closures).
59 Id.
government, because they actually believe that the executive branch holds the upper hand on questions of expertise, or information, or ability, and yet nevertheless have views on improving the process to effectuate better policies. And of course, as Congress is itself anything but a monolith, any given measure that Congress implements may be driven forward by multiple motivations, varying among the members who propose and support it. 60

This Part seeks to classify these different process controls according to their form and function. I first address two forms of congressional control over the bureaucracy that have been the subject of significant political science and administrative law scholarship—agency design and administrative procedure requirements—to consider how these measures are and can be deployed as tools of foreign policy. But the focus of this Part is the dissection of what I term “designated deciders”: measures that shift the decisionmaker horizontally, such as from one agency head to another; or vertically, upward toward a cabinet official, or downward toward a technocrat; measures that excise responsibility and place it in a new body, at a distance removed from existing decisionmakers; and measures that diffuse responsibility among several decisionmakers inside the executive branch. I classify these process controls here, and consider their purposes, efficacy, and risks in Part III.

A. Foreign Policy through Institutional Design

A great deal of political science and administrative law scholarship has been devoted to considering agency design as a tool for political control of the bureaucracy. 61 Much of this literature is devoted to specific ex ante creation decisions, such as agency independence from the President as measured by a single vector, control over appointment and removal of the agency’s leadership. 62 This focus has less salience in the foreign policy and national security arenas, where presidential power over the bureaucracy is arguably at its peak. Informal norms of independence for some specific areas


61 Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 100 (1992) (“the politicians who create administrative agencies can limit future agency costs not only by establishing procedural and substantive rules under which such agencies must operate, but also through the initial organizational design of the agency itself”); Moe, supra note 49; EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 47; LEWIS, supra note 57; Berry & Gerson, supra note 50.

62 See, e.g., Berry & Gerson, supra note 50, at 1012 (“The President’s ability to influence the bureaucracy … depends on a range of institutional features, including whether the agency’s leadership is insulated from presidential removal, the location of the agency inside or outside the cabinet hierarchy, and the extent of presidential appointments in the agency, subject (or not) to Senate approval.”); Lewis, supra note 57, at 28 (“Congress, at times, tries to circumscribe the president’s influence with commissions instead of administrations, fixed terms for appointees, qualifications for appointees, and location outside the cabinet.”).
such as intelligence and law enforcement do exist, as well as occasional, narrowly-tailored attempts at congressionally-mandated independence in this sphere, though the constitutionality of removing these powers from presidential control remains a matter of hot debate. But agency independence is not the primary vector along which Congress exerts influence in the foreign policy and national security arena. It is thus worth considering the foreign policy implications of other aspects of agency design.

Congress is involved in the institutional design of the foreign policy and national security infrastructure from top to bottom. Most of the agencies and offices are, of course, created by legislation, and Congress has thus been the critical player in creating most of the structures that engage our foreign policy since the founding. That Congress chose to lodge so much power in the Presidency through the establishment of, for example, a Secretary of State and executive agency engaged in foreign affairs—the Department of State—wholly subordinate to the President right from the beginning might suggest congressional acquiescence in the executive’s foreign affairs predominance. But Congress’s role in the institutional design of foreign policy does not begin and end with that initial creation of a federal agency. Rather, Congress continues to remain involved through both the regular creation—or termination—of offices within these agencies, through the designation of personnel, including their employment status and relationship to the President, and through the earmarking of appropriations to agencies and offices.

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65 The State Department was the first executive branch agency, created as the Department of Foreign Affairs, in 1789. John Jay had been appointed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under the Articles of Confederation, 1784-89, and Thomas Jefferson became the first Secretary of State in 1790, under the new legislation. Administrative Timeline of the Department of State, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/timeline/1789-1899 (last visited Aug. 17, 2018).

66 Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 300 (2001) (arguing that in creating this new Department that was entirely beholden to the President, “Congress had cut itself out of the picture.”).

At times of great upheaval or controversy, Congress has engaged this particular tool aggressively to restructure the foreign policy or national security institutions of the U.S. government. After World War II, Congress reorganized the bureaucracy of warfighting and intelligence through the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent statutes, creating the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other offices responsible for intelligence sprinkled throughout the executive branch national security establishment, as well as consolidating the armed services and civilian components of war under one department, the Department of Defense (DOD).68 And Congress has re-engaged in ways both small and big, including in response to the Church and Pike Committees, and again after 9/11, to restructure the intelligence community to rein in perceived excesses or resolve perceived deficiencies.69

Often, Congress acts in conjunction with the President to engage in shared foreign policy goals. Even within that context, negotiations over precisely how to structure an agency or which programs to fund provide members of Congress—and especially members of the relevant committees—with a means to influence executive policy-making, including by narrowing executive requests even while agreeing to delegate power.70

But at times, Congress engages its design tools in ways that directly oppose the sitting President’s prerogatives, sometimes favoring specific bureaucrats within the rest of the executive branch. This takes many forms, including refusals to fund a Presidential priority, which would have a direct effect on the President’s policy-making by entirely or partially impeding it. It also includes the opposite: refusals to cut funding to agencies or offices that Congress deems important, thus privileging the bureaucrats within those agencies in disregard of the President’s preferred approach. One prominent recent example from the past few years has been Congress’s repeated pushback against the Trump administration’s aggressive proposal

68 National Security Act of 1947. Amy Zegart has critiqued Congress’s design of these agencies, arguing that poor design has led to major substantive policy failures. See Zegart, supra note 41.

69 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975-76 (Church Committee), available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions (recommending structural changes to the intelligence community in the wake of abuses during the Watergate era). The House undertook its own investigation, through the Pike Committee, though its final report was released only through subsequent leaks. See Gerald Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA, CIA.Gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98-99/art07.html#rf0; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee the executive branch Intelligence Community).

to cut the State Department budget, initially by 28%.\textsuperscript{71} During budget hearings in front of the House and Senate Committees in 2017, members of Congress excoriated then-Secretary Rex Tillerson’s proposed cuts as exhibiting poor foreign policy judgment and potentially endangering national security.\textsuperscript{72} More important than the rhetoric, Congress ultimately passed a spending bill that refused the proposed budget cuts, instead making only modest cuts from 2017 levels.\textsuperscript{73}

General appropriations and the creation of executive offices can be both blunt and sharp instruments. In the broadest sense, Congress is creating the fora in which foreign policy decisionmaking occurs, and by insisting on funding the State Department, for example, at levels similar to recent history, Congress makes clear that it intends the executive branch to continue to use the “soft” power of diplomacy alongside the “hard” power of military force. But such appropriations themselves can also include more directed tools—for example, the 2018 fiscal bill included foreign assistance for HIV programs that the Trump administration had wanted to cut, specifically ensuring the continuation of an office devoted to policy objectives contrary to the President’s.\textsuperscript{74}

The existence of a building and offices with funding alone does not direct policy outcomes, of course; but members of Congress are well aware that individual agencies have distinct mandates and that personnel tend to gravitate toward offices and agencies that match their priorities. Thus, privileging funding for, say, the State Department will prioritize a different set of policy goals—specifically diplomacy, soft power, foreign aid—than would funding for the Department of Defense. Creating the fora for particular types of decisionmaking and ensuring that they remain populated with personnel devoted to a particular mandate creates path dependencies and presumptions that favor continuity of particular policy objectives, and


hurdles to significant change. And at the other extreme, the defunding or closure of particular offices can have a significant impact on the executive branch’s ability to engage a particular area or policy objective. When Congress allocates funding to or away from particular agencies and offices, it privileges certain personnel and certain kinds of decisionmaking over others, and that this will shape policy outcomes.

B. Foreign Policy through Administrative Procedure

Scholars of administrative law and political science have considered Congress’s ability to control the executive branch through the imposition of administrative procedures, in particular the Administrative Procedures Act, which mandates procedures by which executive branch agencies must make decisions. The Administrative Procedures Act itself largely exempts from its application the executive branch’s foreign policy and national security decisionmaking. But Congress imposes a variety of procedural requirements outside of the APA on the foreign policy and national security decisionmaking of the executive branch—such as requirements that the executive branch certify that specific criteria are met before it can act to, say, provide aid to a foreign nation; or that it making a finding in writing before it may take covert action; or that the President make regular reports on his activities to Congress.

Scholars of political science and economics McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast suggest that Congress turns to administrative procedures as a means of ensuring congressional control over the bureaucracy because of the sheer impossibility of controlling every decision that the bureaucracy makes. In other words, administrative procedures are a second-best alternative for members of Congress who would otherwise seek to control the substance of decisionmaking directly. As I explore in this article, however, there are multiple reasons—beyond the sheer scale of decisions that must be made—that Congress might turn to process over substance as a means of influencing policy, and this may be exacerbated in the foreign policy context where Congress is even less inclined to legislate substance than it is in the domestic sphere.

75 See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46.
76 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2018) (exempting “military or foreign affairs function of the United States”). And the Supreme Court has held that the President is not covered by the APA. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 US 788 (1992).
80 McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46.
Scholars have considered the extent to which specific procedures have a real effect on government outcomes. Many have argued that certification requirements, for example, are not effective in constraining presidential decisionmaking. As I discuss in Part III, however, the efficacy of any given process control depends on a variety of factors including context and the relevant actors, and must be weighed against the likelihood of the alternatives, respectively, inaction or substantive congressional legislation.

A significant body of work applying principles of administrative law to foreign policy and national security focuses not on the efficacy of specific administrative procedure requirements, but on the extent to which the executive branch should be afforded deference on matters of war and national security. A thorough discussion of the role of courts in influencing policy through their allocation of power inside the executive branch is outside the scope of this article, but it is the subject of a forthcoming project. Suffice it to say here that statutory process requirements are interwoven with judicial review—they are a means by which Congress can more effectively commandeer the courts to help influence executive branch policymaking, and to do so without necessarily seeking direct responsibility over the policy itself.

C. Foreign Policy through Designated Deciders

The primary focus of this Part is a third category of process control that has received little attention in scholarship: the designation or modification of executive branch decisionmaker as a means of influencing policy.

The choice of decider is a process control connected to, and at times deployed through the use of, agency design and administrative procedures. It is a highly-tailored tool, and can have a significant, targeted effect on the policy positions of the U.S. government. Members of Congress may seek to deploy this measure for multiple purposes: to advance a particular policy objective, to depoliticize particular decisions or prioritize expertise, or to constrain the President. They may seek to institutionalize a particular decisionmaking process long term, perhaps for purposes of more efficient governance, or they may seek to advance specific short-terms goals, by for example designating a particular decisionmaker inside the executive branch who they believe holds views more in line with their policy preferences than

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81 Chinen, supra note 77.
83 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the use of process controls as a means of effectuating military base closures).
the alternative deciders. These purposes may and do overlap; moreover different members of Congress may be compelled by different motivations in supporting the same control measure.

The choice of decisionmaker may take different functional forms, each of which may be usefully deployed for different specific purposes, and hold different advantages and risks—to transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in meeting a particular purpose. Some process controls shift decisionmaking authority up, to a high-level official, which may increase transparency but may also politicize. Other process controls shift deciders horizontally, which could result in a major policy change if the change occurs between decisionmakers who hold opposing views. And still others diffuse decisionmaking among different deciders, or allocate it downward to technocrats and career officials. This Section dissects and classifies this form of process control according to function. I then consider in Part III the advantages, efficacy, and risks involved in deploying these different forms of process controls.

1. Vertical Shift in Decider

One process control that Congress deploys is to shift decisionmaking authority up or down the hierarchy within the executive branch. This designation may take the form of a delegation of authority to a particular agency head, but other procedural tools—such as a certification requirement, waiver authority, or reporting obligation—may each be deployed as a means of channeling decision-making authority in a particular office, or of shifting decision-making authority further down the chain of command. This category of process control may be deployed for the purpose of promoting a particular policy objective by advantaging a favored agency or official, of constraining presidential prerogative, or of ensuring that a particular agency’s expertise is deployed in a decisionmaking process. It could also be motivated by an interest in increasing accountability for a particular type of decision. Shifting decisionmaking authority up, to, say, the head of an agency or even to the President, might be done for the purpose of increasing accountability or transparency for a matter, or raising the profile of a matter in the public eye. Shifting authority down, by contrast, might be done for the purpose of taking a matter out of the hands of the President, and, if shifted to career bureaucrats, of setting a decision at a remove from partisan politics, or of ensuring expertise is prioritized in the process.

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84 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (detailing the Trump administration’s use of Section 232 as a justification for imposing tariffs).
85 See infra Part III.A (discussing purposes for congressional use of process controls).
Congressional responses to then-President Barack Obama’s pledge to shutter the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay provide an example of both types of vertical shifts—a shift away from Presidential control as well as away from anonymous bureaucratic decisionmaking, and toward a particular executive branch official, here the Secretary of Defense.

A brief history is necessary for background: Obama’s predecessor, President George Bush, who first turned to the naval base at Guantanamo as a location for military detention facilities in the conflict with al Qaeda, himself ultimately asserted a policy of closing the detention facilities. Nevertheless, Obama became inextricably linked with the argument for closure, as he made it a campaign pledge while running for President, and as one of his very first actions in office issued an Executive Order commanding its closure within a year. To do so, he established working groups that would review the case for detention and recommend disposition (transfer, release, continued detention) for each detainee at Guantanamo.

Opposition to this plan soon grew in Congress, with many members calling for the facility to remain open. Instead of passing a statute mandating that the detention facilities remain open, however, Congress passed stringent process controls, year after year, which constricted the Administration’s efforts to transfer detainees off the base and ultimately posed a significant hurdle to closing the facility. Beginning in 2010, members of Congress attached to the defense appropriations bill onerous restrictions on the President’s ability to transfer detainees from the facilities abroad. Rather than simply mandate that Guantanamo remain open, either by prohibiting the use of funds to close it (as Congress ultimately did), or by denying funds for transfers full stop (as Congress also ultimately did for several countries), Congress enacted requirements that the Secretary of Defense make rigid certifications about the security threat.

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86 See Jack Goldsmith, The Bush Administration Wanted to Close GTMO Because (in Part) of its Propaganda Value to Jihadists, LAWFARE (February 5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bush-administration-wanted-close-gtmo-because-part-its-propaganda-value-jihadists (citing President George Bush as stating that the detention facility had become a recruiting tool for al Qaeda, and thus that he had “worked to find a way to close the prison without compromising security.”)
87 Executive Order 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (2009)
88 Id.
of any transfer 30 days before it could occur.\textsuperscript{92} Among the requirements, these provisions mandated that before a detainee could be transferred to a foreign country, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, must certify that the government in question “has agreed to take effective steps to ensure that the individual cannot take action to threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future; [and] has taken such steps as the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage or reengage in any terrorist activity.”\textsuperscript{93} The result of this designation was that Congress took functional decisionmaking authority out of the hands of a panel of career executive branch officials from national security offices throughout the executive branch, as dictated by Executive Order, and funneled it more squarely and transparently into the (reluctant) hands of the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{94}

There may have been multiple purposes animating Congress’s deployment of this process control: certainly some members held strong policy preferences in favor of keeping the detention facilities at Guantanamo open, and placing constraints on transfers was a means to that end.\textsuperscript{95} These preferences may have been motivated by, or simply coincided with, the views of some within the national security bureaucracy inside the government, who reportedly opposed closure of the facilities and made those views known—including through regular reports on detainee recidivism—to members of Congress.\textsuperscript{96} Other members may have held less strongly-formed views on keeping Guantanamo open, and might not have supported a substantive bill to that effect, but were either willing to


\textsuperscript{94} Exec. Order 13567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011) (designating a “Periodic Review Board” of senior officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, the Offices of the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review the continued detention of Guantanamo detainees.) The Secretary of Defense was charged with coordinating the review, and along with the Secretary of State responsible for the safe transfer of detainees who did not meet the standard for continued detention. \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{96} See Aziz Z. Huq, \textit{The President and the Detainees}, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 544-54 (2017) (positing that bureaucratic resistance to Obama may have been a driving force behind legislative efforts to halt transfers); Ingber, \textit{The Obama War Powers}, supra note 53; Connie Bruck, \textit{Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantanamo}, \textit{NEW YORKER} (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-close-guantanamo (discussing opposition to closing Guantanamo within the Department of Defense).
support—or felt they could not oppose—provisions requiring that the Defense Secretary certify transfers out of the prison were not a threat. 97

Whatever the motivations of various members of Congress in deploying this process control, it appears to have had a significant effect on the substantive policy of Guantanamo closure. By designating the Secretary of Defense as the decider in this context, and not just the decider but the public face of the determination, Congress harnessed the reticence of the Secretary of Defense to make such certifications, and placed its thumb on the scale on the side of those within the Department of Defense and elsewhere in the executive branch who were reticent to close the facility in internal conflict over Guantanamo transfers. 98 With the certification requirements in place, the flow of detainees from Guantanamo slowed to a near halt. 99

2. Horizontal Shift in Decider

Congress may at times seek to shift decisionmaking authority from one official inside the administration to another at the same rank, such as from one head of an agency to another. This process control may be motivated by a policy agenda, if for example, there is a belief that one individual’s policy views may be preferable to another’s. Or the implementation of such a control may simply reflect a view that a particular office is better suited for such decisions, or that the public may perceive that to be the case.

An example of a horizontal shift is the changing placement of decisionmaking authority over tariffs, and specifically the national security justification for imposing tariffs, that I discuss in the introduction. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, currently authorizes the President to impose restrictions on imports if the Commerce Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, finds them necessary to mitigate a threat to national security. 100 Recent communications between the Commerce and Defense Secretaries in accordance with this legislative requirement unearthed concerns by the then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis that tariffs proposed by the President and supported by the

97 See, e.g., infra note 156 and accompanying text.
98 Bruck, supra note 96 (quoting a senior defense official as stating that the certification requirements changed the internal debate. Whereas previously, due to the Administration’s “focus on closing Guantánamo—you risked your job if you weren’t on board,” the statutory requirements gave officials “the ability to be openly in favor of transferring people but unable to do it, because of the law.”)
Commerce Secretary would exacerbate, rather than resolve, national security concerns.\textsuperscript{101} Perhaps hoping to leverage the Pentagon’s reticence in this area, several bipartisan groups in Congress have proposed bills that would amend Section 232 to place more direct authority squarely in the hands of the Defense Secretary to constrain the President from imposing tariffs under this provision.\textsuperscript{102}

Congress does not turn to process controls to influence trade policy and constrain the President out of a want of formal authority to direct United States trade policy itself. The Constitution gives to Congress, not the President, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.\textsuperscript{103} That the President today holds significant power to impose tariffs is the result of a series of expanding congressional delegations, delegations that Congress could, but thus far does not, roll back.\textsuperscript{104}

And yet, Congress has repeatedly deployed process controls as a means of influencing trade policy instead of dialing back delegations of authority, even at times deploying these controls alongside expansions of such delegations.\textsuperscript{105} In fact, the horizontal shift contemplated by these recent bills is a frequently deployed move for Congress as a means of influencing U.S. trade policy. Congress has already shifted the decisionmaker for this particular tariff justification about four times, give or take, since it began delegating control over tariffs to the executive branch in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930—from a series of offices within the White House, to the

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\textsuperscript{101} See Memorandum from Def. Sec’y James Mattis to Commerce Sec’y Wilbur Ross (on file with author), available at https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf (expressing skepticism that the tariffs at issue were necessary to national security, and concerns that they could instead strain relationships with allies).


\textsuperscript{103} U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

\textsuperscript{104} See infra notes 105-106.

\textsuperscript{105} As an example, in 1934 Congress expanded the President’s power to enter into trade agreements and adjust tariffs in conjunction with those agreements. An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). The stated intention of the Act at the time was to empower the President to reduce tariffs quickly in the midst the Great Depression, in accordance with powers held by executive’s in other states. House Rep. No. 1000, at 5 (1934). Twenty years later, while continuing to extend this authorization, Congress enacted the first version of the national security justifications with the intention of providing industries an opportunity to petition for tariff protection. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (1955); 101 Cong. Rec. 5298 (1955) (noting benefits associated with having single director in charge who would be responsive to industry).

The history of Congress’s horizontal shifts in decisionmaker aligns with—and can be partially explained by—an evolution in Congress’s policy preferences on trade vis-à-vis the President throughout this period. Interestingly, the relative positions of the President and Congress have shifted dramatically in the Trump administration from previous political contexts when Congress deployed these controls. At the time of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, it was Congress looking to restrict imports as a means of protecting domestic industry, and the President seeking flexibility to reduce tariffs.\footnote{Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 330(a), 46 Stat. 590, 696-697.} Smoot-Hawley established a series of tariffs, and empowered a body called the Tariff Commission, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,\footnote{The Commission itself was created in a separate earlier act. Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795 (1916). At the time, however, the Commission filled an investigatory and advisory role, with little power to alter existing tariff rates. Id. § 706, 39 Stat. at 796.} to report to the President on the need to adjust them, giving the President the authority to approve those recommended changes as necessary.\footnote{Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 330(a), 46 Stat. 590, 696-697.} Subsequent statutes expanded the President’s authority to adjust tariffs, and the 1955 Extension of Trade Agreement Authority first codified the national security justification, requiring the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (an office within the White House)\footnote{The Office of Defense Mobilization was created during the Truman administration. Exec. Order No. 10193 (1950) (creating office and designating the appointment procedure of advice and consent by the Senate).} to investigate national security concerns with imports, and report to the President, who was then permitted to adjust imports in accordance with the report after the President conducted his own independent investigation.\footnote{Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (1955).} After additional extensions,\footnote{Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, § 8(b), 72 Stat. 673, 678-79 (1958) (extending temporary authorization).} Congress codified the national security exception in the 1962
Trade Act, and changed the title of the responsible office to the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning to align with the name change within the White House.\footnote{Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877. The name change was effectuated in response to a request from President Kennedy, who had transferred much of the authority of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Department of Defense. See Office of Emergency Planning Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 87-296, 75 Stat. 630 (1961) (codifying change of name to the Office of Emergency Planning). This name was again altered in 1968 to the Office of Emergency Preparedness. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 90-608, § 402, 82 Stat. 1190, 1194 (1968).}

The legislative history provides some context for the decision to deploy these controls to place some decision-making authority over the national security justification in the hands of this White House office. In particular, there was a sense among members of Congress and industry lobbyists that obligating this office to issue a report would be more, not less, likely to result in a decision to impose tariffs than placing the power with the President directly, either because the President might himself be opposed, or because taking the explicit authority away from this office would empower other stakeholders inside the executive branch—namely the State Department—who might have reasons, such as diplomatic concerns, to oppose tariffs.\footnote{See, e.g., Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 9900 Part 5, 87 Cong. 3063 (1962) (Statement of Eugene Stewart, Counsel, Man-Made Fiber Products); Id. at 2715-16 (Statement of Harry B. Purcell, Vice President, the Torrington Co.) (“To leave to the sole determination the person who occupies the White House which tariff cuts would or would not ‘threaten to impair the national security’ would be sheer folly.”).}

In fact, representatives from affected industries hoping to convince the President to levy tariffs testified before Congress to this effect, arguing in favor of keeping the reporting requirement with the Office of Emergency Planning.\footnote{Id.; see also Id. at 1460 (statement of Donald J. Hawthorne) (arguing in favor on behalf of the watch industry); Id. at 1579 (statement of Ralph Frey) (arguing in favor on behalf of the precision ball bearing industry); Id. at 1723 (statement of John H. Lichtblau) (arguing to keep the procedure and limit the time permitted for reports). But see Id. at 1820 (statement of Otis H. Ellis, General Counsel, National Oil Jobbers Council, Inc.) (arguing against the national security justification); Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means on H.R. 9900 Part 3, 87 Cong. 1380-81 (1962) (statement of Charles W. Engelhard) (arguing that the defense provision is a “cloak for the narrowest protectionist pressures”).}

A representative of the textile industries testified that the State Department was in fact “resisting a finding by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, now called the Office of Emergency Planning, that imports of textiles are threatening to impair the national security.”\footnote{Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong. 3063 (1962) (statement of Eugene Stewart, Counsel, Man-Made Fiber Producers).}

Were Congress to remove that office from the language of the statute, the representative worried, the President might not choose to request their advice, out of concern that “a favorable finding in the national security case by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization … would cause some inconvenience so far as diplomatic relations with foreign countries.”\footnote{Id.}
Instead, such a statute “would facilitate the ease with which the State Department can subvert and oppose and prevent favorable findings in these national security cases.”\(^{118}\) In other words, industry professionals believed that despite the Office of Emergency Planning’s placement inside the White House, a reporting requirement placed on that office would be more likely to compel the President to levy tariffs than were the same substantive delegation made to him directly, because he might in that case prioritize the views of different actors inside the executive branch, namely the State Department.\(^{119}\)

Over subsequent amendments, Congress continued to shift the decider over the national security justification, changing the designation first to the Secretary of the Treasury,\(^{120}\) when the Office of Emergency Planning was abolished,\(^{121}\) and then to Commerce.\(^{122}\) At one point, industry representatives, particularly the precision ball bearing industry, lobbied Congress to shift the authority to the Defense Department, based on suggestions that Defense officials would have been more favorable to industry interests in promoting tariffs.\(^{123}\) One member of Congress vociferously argued in favor of shifting the authority to DOD, and suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other executive branch officials believed shared this belief.\(^{124}\) Ultimately, Congress landed on a compromise solution, and amended Section 232 to require that the Treasure Secretary, and then the Secretary of Commerce, consult with and receive an assessment from the Secretary of Defense.\(^{125}\)

Many of these shifts appear to have been prompted at least in part by an interest in meeting the concerns of industry officials who hoped to prompt the President to levy, rather than constrain, tariffs on particular

\(^{118}\) Id.

\(^{119}\) Id.


\(^{121}\) Reorganization Plan No. 1, § 3, 38 Fed. Reg. 9579 (1973) (dissbanding the office and transferring powers held by the office to the Treasury Department).


\(^{124}\) Id. at 3345-49.

\(^{125}\) Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94. The requirement of consultation with the Department of Defense continued into the next iteration of the national security justification. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1501, 102 Stat. 1107, 1257-1260 (1988). The decision to lodge the power exclusively in the Secretary of Treasury and then the Commerce, rather than the Department of Defense, appears to be due to concerns about access to necessary economic data. Hearings Before the Comm. on Finance United States Senate, Threat to Certain Imports to National Security, 99th Cong. 24-26 (1986) (Statement of Senator Byrd) (“The Commerce Department has much of the economic data on American industries and the scope of foreign imports; but this is not a conventional trade question. The language of the statute makes it clear that the threat of injury to national security must be assessed after weighing many factors, many of them within the expertise of the Department of Defense.”).
industries, in a context where he was deemed unlikely to do so were he granted the authority unilaterally. Today we find the policy preferences reversed: the President is inclined to use his delegated authorities to impose tariffs, and Congress appears to be seeking ways to constrain him. In both of these contexts, however, members of Congress have turned to process controls rather than changes to substantive delegations of power in order to effectuate their preferences.

3. Excise Decisionmaking Responsibility and Power

At times Congress may seek to create new entities as a means of placing decision-making at a remove from existing options. Congress’s handling of the impasse over military base closures in the late 1980s by creating a new commission to make the necessary decisions is a prime example of congressional excision of decisionmaking.

In the wake of the Vietnam war, after the Department of Defense under President Kennedy closed over 60 military bases, decisions to close military bases became politically fraught. The Department of Defense was determined to cut costs by eliminating “underutilized” bases, and yet closing any given military base entailed a sure loss of jobs, raising the profile of base closures on the domestic policy agenda for Congress. Congress passed legislation increasingly involving itself in base closure decisions, ultimately in 1977 mandating that they approve all large base closures. Yet voting for base closure was a political hot potato; no politician could support closing a military base in his or her own district. As a result, it became nearly impossible for the Department of Defense to close military bases, at significant cost.

Ultimately, in response in part to changing politics, budgetary concerns, and lobbying efforts by the Department of Defense, the concept of closing military bases gained support in Congress, at least in theory. But the question remained how to make that happen considering the domestic

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126 Nevertheless, concerns regarding the potential abuse of Section 232 were voiced by Congressmembers at the time of the passage of these various amendments, but they were largely overridden by a belief in the prudent nature of the executive office. See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 93-571, at 199 (1973) (minority views) ("There is no question that this bill would make the President of the United States the foreign trade czar of this nation.").
128 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2018) (requiring congressional approval for “the closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed”).
130 1988 BRAC Report, supra note 127, at 8-9 (noting that “Since passage of this legislation over a decade ago, there has not been a single major base closure.”).
131 EPSTEIN AND O’HALLORAN, supra note 47, at 2.
political costs. Delegating the decision directly to DOD did not resolve the political question, as the Secretary of Defense was himself a political appointee.\textsuperscript{132} The solution—proposed by DOD and adopted by Congress—was to delegate decisions about base closures to a bipartisan commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and reporting both to him and to Congress.\textsuperscript{133} The Secretary of Defense and Congress retained a veto over the ultimate proposal—each could take action to reject the Commission’s list in its entirety—but the process allowed them to shift the political costs of choosing a base onto the independent commission, an entity less inclined to feel such costs.\textsuperscript{134}

4. Diffuse Decisionmaking Responsibility and Power

At other times members of Congress may seek to diffuse decisionmaking responsibility and power, rather than channel it to a decisionmaking body. This may be done through a variety of measures, including concurrent delegations to multiple agencies, requirements of coordination, or mandatory consultation provisions.\textsuperscript{135} Such requirements are fairly common, particularly in the domestic regulatory space, and may be motivated by various purposes. Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi identify several different rationales for overlapping control in their article, \textit{Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space}, including: turf wars among members of congressional committees; an interest in removing decisionmaking from the President; desire to include multiple spheres of expertise in decisionmaking; compromise; and accident.\textsuperscript{136} To this list I would add an interest in constraining or slowing down presidential action, which is evident in the recent Syria and Republic of Korea bills I discuss in the end of this section.\textsuperscript{137}

Since 2017, Congress has used the National Defense Authorization Act to limit the President’s ability to conduct bilateral military operations with Russia, through fact-finding conditions placed jointly on the Secretaries of Defense and State. Specifically, the statute conditions funding for such bilateral operations on a certification by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State that “(1) the Russian Federation has ceased its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive activities

\textsuperscript{132} Id., at 3.
\textsuperscript{134} Id.
\textsuperscript{135} Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, \textit{Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space}, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (2012).
\textsuperscript{136} Id. at 1138-43.
\textsuperscript{137} Bijal Shah considers and classifies congressional mechanisms to force interagency coordination for a range of purposes including constraint of the President in an excellent forthcoming article, \textit{Congress’s Agency Coordination}. See 103 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (2) the Russian Federation is abiding by the terms of and taking steps in support of the Minsk Protocols regarding a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine.\footnote{National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1232(a), 130 Stat. 2488 (2017) (amended 2018, 2019). The NDAA 2019 includes a carve-out for “bilateral military-to-military dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation for the purpose of reducing the risk of conflict.” Id. at § 1247.}

Similarly, Congress recently added to the defense appropriations act a delegation to the United States Cyber Command of the power to undertake proportionate defensive cyber operations against Russia, contingent on the “the National Command Authority determin[ing] that the Russian Federation is conducting an active, systematic, and ongoing campaign of attacks against the government or people of the United States in cyberspace.”\footnote{John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. § 1623 (2018).} The National Command Authority is comprised of the President and the Secretary of Defense, and thus a delegation contingent on its determination appears to dilute the delegation of power, at least as compared to a delegation to the President alone.\footnote{See also Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE (July 26, 2018, 2:07 P.M.), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa (taking note of this designation to the “NCA as opposed to just the president” as “[v]ery interesting.”).} The ostensible purpose here is to facilitate the Defense Department’s ability to undertake these kinds of defensive cyber operations, and the inclusion of the Secretary of Defense as a necessary component of the determination of Russian activity would seem designed to assist in that endeavor. This may well operate to facilitate action in practice, depending on the process the Secretary of Defense and the President have for making National Command Authority decisions. But as a general matter, a mechanism of joint control such as this one likely would be more effective as a means of constraining the President—as it positions the Secretary of Defense as a statutory hurdle to action.

Recently, a spate of proposed bills have sought to engage this process tool as a means of effectuating a particular policy. In 2018 and 2019, several senators introduced bills to engage several national security agencies in the decisionmaking process over new sanctions on Russian over election interference. Senators Marco Rubio and Chris Van Hollen twice proposed a bill—titled the DETER Act—that would place the critical trigger over foreign state sanctions in the hands of the director of national intelligence and other intelligence officials—and quite pointedly not the President.\footnote{Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2018, S. 2313, 115th Cong. § 201 (2018); Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter DETER Act].}
The proposed bill would trigger a requirement that the President—through
the Treasury Secretary—impose sanctions on Russia or any other state
should the Director of National Intelligence (“in consultation with the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the
National Security Agency, and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency”) make a finding that the state has interfered in American
elections. Unlike the cyber operations provisions of the NDAA, which
simply grant authority, conditioned on the finding of the National
Command Authority, the DETER act would require action, conditioned on
the Director of National Intelligence’s finding of fact.

And in January 2019, a bipartisan group in the House introduced two
bills aimed—at preventing the President from
withdrawing troops from the Republic of Korea and Syria through funding
limitations. Neither bill would require that the President keep troops in
either Syria or on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, each would make
funding contingent on specific executive branch officials meeting certain
procedural obligations. The Syria bill would prohibit the use of funds to
withdraw troops from Syria unless Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, and the Director of National Intelligence submit a report to Congress
answering fifteen (15) onerous questions about the state of affairs in
Syria. The Republic of Korea bill is far more aggressive: it prohibits the
use of funds to withdraw troops from the Korean peninsula unless the
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify, inter
alia, that “the Republic of Korea would be fully capable of defending itself
and deterring a conflict on the Korean Peninsula that would threaten
United States interests following such a reduction; [and] that North Korea
has completed verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarments.” Should
they pass, these would undoubtedly face some pushback from the President
as infringing on his commander-in-chief authority, which I discuss further
below. But historically, Presidents have often chosen to comply with
procedural requirements despite raising separation-of-powers concerns, and
despite the clear hurdle they may pose to their policy agenda.

142 DETER Act, supra note 141.
143 Responsible Withdrawal From Syria Act, H.R.934, 116th Congress; United States and
Republic of Korea Alliance Support Act, H.R.889, 116th Congress.
144 Id.
145 Syria Act, supra.
146 Republic of Korea Act, supra.
147 See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text (discussing President Obama’s nearly perfect
compliance with the Guantanamo certification requirements, which he had critiqued in a signing
statement as potentially raising separation-of-powers concerns.)
5. Implicit Allocations of Decisionmaking Power

In addition to direct, targeted designations of specific deciders, Congress also allocates decisionmaking authority inside the executive branch implicitly, to unnamed administrators whose work product is required by the terms of the statute. When Congress premises a statutory delegation of power to the President or head of an agency on the condition that certain proceduralis be followed, facts found, or reports provided to Congress, this necessitates the involvement of certain types of actors within the executive branch, namely: “experts,” “professionals,” “technocrats,” lawyers. The expert class of officials within the executive branch is typically made up of non-politically-appointed civil servants, operating around the middle tiers of the executive branch bureaucracy. Their role is essential to adequately carrying out process requirements like fact-finding or reporting to Congress. Thus, even without explicitly naming an office or official in its delegation of power, Congress can influence the organization of decisionmaking inside the executive branch by legislating process requirements.

Statutory requirements that executive branch officials engage in particular processes, or find specific facts, or explain their actions before acting fall within the “administrative procedures” category I discuss above. But they are also a vehicle through which Congress can designate deciders by steering power away from the President and toward lower level officials, even while delegating it to, or accepting its use by, the executive branch as a whole.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Congressional influence on foreign affairs through the administration of executive branch decisionmaking has numerous implications—for Congress’s ability to influence foreign policy, for transparency and accountability of foreign policy decisions, for the extent to which the President is in fact bound by law—and it can be judged according to each of these criteria

148 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46, at 244 (“procedures can be used to enfranchise important constituents in agency decision-making processes, thereby assuring that agencies are responsive to their interests”). Adrian Vermeule and Elizabeth Magill have written about a similar effect on executive branch decisionmaking of judicial doctrines and process requirements, although their focus was on these doctrines’ “upward” allocation of power within agencies. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1061 (2011).

When considering these implications and the value of process controls, one must weigh them against the actual alternatives, taking into account the potential for their realization. These alternatives include on the one hand more direct involvement of Congress, such as through direct substantive efforts to legislate policy, or, on the other hand, an even starker abdication of influence to the President. Congressional administration can be weighed against those alternatives on two levels: as a descriptive matter (why might members of Congress prefer these forms of engagement to the alternatives) and as a more normative one (whether these forms are advantageous as a matter of policy, and whether they raise different or fewer constitutional issues).

A. Why Deploy Process Controls to Influence Foreign Policy

There are many reasons members of Congress might turn to process controls to influence policy short of mandating its substance. Targeted process controls may permit members of Congress to push past hurdles that would otherwise impede action. They may provide a means of resolving conflicts or promoting a policy that could not be addressed or passed through substantive legislation. At times process controls may even be more efficacious in influencing policy than would be substantive legislation seeking to mandate it directly. I explore these reasons in further detail in this section.

1. Why do Process Controls Surmount Congressional Reticence?

There are numerous reasons Congress does not take full advantage of its foreign affairs power. Some may be based in genuine concern about the relative institutional competence of Congress in this realm as against the executive branch—whether these concerns are based in a belief that the United States should speak with one voice, and that voice should be the President’s, or out of a sense of deference to the executive branch’s relative expertise, access to information, and dispatch. For reasons of expediency and good government, including the interest in presenting a unified United States foreign policy to the world, members of Congress might reasonably take the view that the President and the executive branch are best placed to control foreign policy decisionmaking.

Of course, history suggests that these concerns are not sufficient to compel Congress to sit out entirely. There have been multiple occasions when members of Congress—both through duly-enacted legislation and through separate unilateral action—have sought to press their own foreign policy objectives. Moreover, they have done so not only when the President has hesitated to act itself, but even in the face of the President’s clear, contrary foreign policy goals. Congress’s attempt to legislate U.S.
recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is one such example.\footnote{See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084-85.} For a non-legislative attempt to interfere with the President's foreign policy agenda, consider the “open letter to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” signed by 47 Republican Senators, opposing President Obama’s Iran nuclear deal.\footnote{An Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/middleeast/document-the-letter-senate-republicans-addressed-to-the-leaders-of-iran.html?_r=1&module=inline.}

I see no separation-of-powers rationale for distinguishing between these and other foreign policy decisions in which Congress chooses not to challenge the President’s agenda. Rather the distinction is likely to be a political one. In these limited examples, members of Congress found a political advantage to a foreign policy showdown with the President, and little disadvantage. More often, however, there are significant political reasons that Congress declines to take a strong stand in the foreign policy arena. When one or both houses of Congress are held by the same political party as the President, members may find it politically unsavory or inopportune to challenge him generally, especially on foreign policy.\footnote{See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313-15 (2006).} And even when opposing parties control both the House or Senate, members may find it more politically useful to be able to criticize the President’s choices than having to own a particular foreign policy themselves. They may find that their constituents are not as interested in questions of foreign policy as in domestic, and therefore there is little to be gained politically by engaging directly in this space.\footnote{See, e.g., HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER, supra note 34, at 193 (“most citizens, most of the time, come to foreign policy discussions with fewer well-defined and independently formulated prior beliefs than they do to domestic policy debates.”)} Congressional abdication on foreign policy matters may also have a self-fulfilling, snowballing effect that connects back up to institutional reasons for abdication: as members of Congress sit out major debates on war and foreign policy, they lose (or fail to gain) expertise in these realms. And as Congress has fallen back on foreign policy, the executive branch has been more than willing to fill the void.

Whatever the reason for congressional timidity in the foreign policy realm, congressional administration through process controls provides an alternate vehicle to facilitate congressional influence in this realm that may avoid some of the stumbling blocks that otherwise hold Congress back.

First, unlike mandating substance directly, shaping foreign policy through the use of process controls enables Congress to exploit, rather than undermine, the advantages in the foreign policy realm that the executive holds over Congress, such as expertise, or access to information. As with
other areas of policymaking, Congress may quite reasonably acknowledge that it is not—at least as it has evolved—capable of tackling the enormity and complexity of all decisions that the executive branch bureaucracy undertakes.\footnote{154} Process controls thus permit Congress to influence the shape of decisions while benefiting from the vastness and complexity of the bureaucracy, and with it executive branch expertise, information, expediency, and flexibility.

Second, congressional use of process controls may permit members of Congress to influence policy without necessarily damaging the state’s ability to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs. While that “one voice” may presumptively be the President’s, in practice, it has always been the result of executive branch deliberation more broadly. That Congress may influence the internal dynamics that result in that position does not necessarily undercut the President’s stature abroad as the expected mouthpiece for the U.S. government.

Third, it may be easier for proponents of a measure to obtain votes on a bill including a process control than on one compelling a particular substantive policy. Process controls are often attached to broader legislation packages on which members are voting, potentially creating an opt-out versus an opt-in scenario for choosing whether to support the bill. Moreover, process controls may appear more “neutral” than substantive legislation.\footnote{155} Whereas a substantive provision may engender sufficient support to compel members to vote against it, a process control will be less likely to be a make-or-break component of the bill.\footnote{156}

Finally, process controls give members of Congress a means of pushing back against a President even when it could be politically costly to do so more directly.\footnote{157} Adding process requirements to a statutory grant of power, or designating a particularly trusted executive branch official as the decisionmaker on a specific grant of authority, is hardly as headline-grabbing or as conflict-creating as would be openly legislating a policy

\footnote{154} McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, \textit{supra} note 46, at 254 (“an important function of administrative procedures is to provide a means of inducing bureaucratic compliance that does not require the time, effort, and resources of political actors.”).
\footnote{155} See Lindsay and Ripley, \textit{supra} note 52, at 28 (“the ‘ostensibly neutral’ character of procedure makes it easier to build a winning coalition around procedural changes than around substantive policy changes.”)
\footnote{156} See, e.g., David Manners-Webber, Comment, \textit{Certification as Sabotage: Lessons from Guantanamo Bay}, 127 \textit{Yale L. J.} 1416, 1442-44 (2018) (discussing interviews with several members of Congress that suggest they voted for process controls that would effectuate a policy that they would not have supported); Dara Lind, \textit{Republicans have Obama in a Corner on Syrian Refugees}, Vox (Nov. 19, 2015, 2:06 PM) https://www.vox.com/2015/11/19/9762054/congress-obama-refugees-syria (calling a bill that would slow the process of accepting refugees by requiring certifications by high-level administration officials “anodyne enough that it’s attracted broad support from congressional Democrats as well as Republicans”).
\footnote{157} See, e.g., DETER Act, \textit{supra} note 141.
contrary to the President’s. Moreover, process controls typically leave the politically sensitive decisions in the hands of bureaucrats—whether lower-level technocrats or high-level heads of agencies, permitting members of Congress to avoid or even deny responsibility for the resulting policy should it fail or prove unpopular. Whether the process control delegates to technocrats or to the head of an agency, it permits members of Congress to shift the political costs of decisionmaking to the executive branch, while still retaining some influence over the policy.

2. Process Controls and Purpose

Congressional deployment of process controls to influence foreign policy may be motivated by diverse purposes. In fact, any given mechanism of control may be driven by multiple, varied motivations among the members of Congress who supported it. These motivations may include mistrust of the President, conflicting views over the preferred policy objective, or an interest in avoiding political costs for a necessary action.

Process control measures deployed for the purpose of promoting a preferred policy objective may involve a shift of decisionmaker to an agency or office likely to press policy objectives in line with those of members of Congress, such as the statutory mandate that the Secretary of Defense certify the lack of threat for all transfers out of Guantanamo. Similarly, recent interest in transferring to the Secretary of Defense authority over the Section 232 national security justification for tariffs appears to be motivated by a desire to minimize the use of that exception.

Measures intended to depoliticize decisionmaking, or to advance particular expertise, will typically allocate power downward, toward career officials and “technocrats” within the agency, or an appointed bi-partisan commission, rather than toward the President or his direct appointees. Congress’s creation of a nonpartisan commission to issue military base closure recommendations fulfilled this purpose, by taking the political heat off of members of Congress, who found that votes to close military bases

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158 Of course, it is not always clear the extent to which members of Congress support particular process controls for a given purpose. See, e.g., Abbe R. Glück & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (revealing the breadth of motivations and procedural causes behind statutory drafting and the delta between knowledge among the drafters of statutes and assumptions about congressional intent). See also, Shepsle, supra note 60.
159 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Guantanamo transfer restrictions).
160 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the multiple historical shifts in authority over the Section 232 justification, and recent attempts to shift it again).
161 See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the creation of an executive branch-based commission to issue recommendations on military base closures).
highly unpopular among constituents who would be affected by the loss of jobs and resources. 162

And measures to combat a lack of trust of the President—whether based on suspicion of corruption or doubts about his judgment in a given area—may deploy any of the above, depending on the extent to which other actors within the executive branch inspire greater confidence. The DETER Act bill, discussed above, is a prime example; if passed, it would make the Director of National Intelligence (not the President) the arbiter of whether Russia were interfering in U.S. elections, thus triggering the sanctions in the bill.163 This would permit Congress and the country to benefit from the expertise and access to information of the executive branch intelligence agencies, while simultaneously taking some decisionmaking power away from a President whose motivations in this realm many have come to suspect. And it would do so without implicating concerns of a so-called “deep state” seeking power at the expense of elected leadership, because the policy objective would come from Congress itself.

B. Efficacy of Congressional Administration

So does congressional administration in fact influence the shape of foreign policy decisionmaking, or is Congress just rearranging deck chairs on a ship the president will sail in whichever direction he likes? While administrative procedures and agency design are often held out as tools of bureaucratic control, clear accounts of the extent to which these controls are effective, and at producing what particular purpose, are rare.164 The few scholars who have considered the role of specific administrative procedures in influencing foreign policy have taken opposing views on their efficacy.165

This section considers the efficacy of process controls—and specifically the choice of decider measures that I discuss in Section II(C)—in light of the various purposes for which they might be deployed. This is not an extensive survey of results. Such a study would be worthwhile though complicated; while numerous examples exist in which process controls correlate with a result that accords with purposes I describe above, the reasons for a particular outcome may be overdetermined. There is the

162 Id.
163 See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing the DETER Act).
164 See, e.g., Berry & Gersen, supra note 50, (using bureaucratic decisions to allocate appropriated funds to measure the political responsiveness of agencies based on design, and finding the common belief—that deploying political appointments throughout an agency makes them more politically responsive—to be consistent with their results).
165 See, e.g., Mark Chinen, supra note 77, at 235 (arguing that “certification requirements are not particularly effective in controlling executive behavior.”) But see Manners-Weber, supra note 156 (arguing that certification requirements can be effective, and that specifically, the Guantanamo certification requirements created an obstacle to Obama closing the detention facility).
problem of “observational equivalence” akin to that faced by scholars seeking to demonstrate that the President makes decisions constrained by law and not policy preferences that happen to accord with law.166

Furthermore any given process control itself may be motivated by multiple purposes. Nevertheless, it is possible to deduce from understandings of the inner workings of executive branch bureaucracy how the various process controls I describe above may interact with internal levers of decisionmaking, and thus the types of influence they are likely to exert, and why, if not whether they will in each event result in a change of outcome. I thus examine here the features of congressional administration and contextual factors that are relevant to the inquiry.

1. The state of play inside the executive branch

The state of agreement or conflict inside the executive branch on a particular matter of foreign policy or national security affects the extent to which congressional administration can influence executive decisionmaking. Foreign policy and national security are fields that engage many different agencies and executive branch offices, with overlapping jurisdictions and often conflicting mandates and biases.167 These complexities provide opportunities for influencing outcomes by changing decisionmaking processes, responsibilities, and authority.

To the extent key actors on the inside are all on one page, and that page is the President’s, there are few pressure points for members of Congress to manipulate to do their bidding. Happily for Congress, such extreme agreement among all components of the executive branch is rare. Often on matters of foreign policy and national security there exist serious policy differences, either between different agencies or personalities—or both—and the process of decisionmaking inside the executive branch can have a considerable effect on the outcome, in large part because that process affects the weight afforded particular decisionmakers, and who will be the ultimate “decider.”168 In prior work, I have discussed how triggers outside of the executive branch can influence that process, the authority of particular internal “deciders,” and thus help shape the ultimate outcomes.169 Congress has more power than most to influence that process, and thus, congressional engagement to place a thumb on the scale of one side can have a significant effect on the resulting outcome.

167 See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN L. REV. 194 (2011); See also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 135.
168 See, e.g., Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts, supra note 18.
169 Id.
For example, in the case of the Guantanamo transfer restrictions, members of Congress had reason to believe that the Department of Defense, and specifically the Secretary of Defense, would be more reluctant to approve transfers than, say, the Secretary of State. The reasons for that belief were plentiful: the Defense Secretary was the lone member of the opposing party in the President’s national security cabinet; and the Department of Defense was understood to harbor a significant amount of dissent inside the building (though not universal dissent) regarding the President’s plan to shutter the Guantanamo detention facilities.\footnote{See, e.g., Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51 (discussing resistance within the Department of Defense to the President’s plan to shutter the detention facilities at Guantanamo).} Members of Congress also hoping to slow Guantanamo closure had their own channels to actors within the Defense Department, and thus were surely aware of internal executive branch conflict over detention questions.

Delegating the requirement to the Secretary of Defense to certify transfers privileged the position of the Department of Defense in those internal debates with the rest of the executive branch. And even though President Obama signed the Act containing the certification requirements with an accompanying signing statement questioning their constitutionality,\footnote{See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1568 (Dec. 23, 2011).} he nevertheless continued to comply—through the Secretary of Defense—with the reporting and certification requirements.\footnote{The only exception was the transfer of five Guantanamo detainees in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl. See The May 31, 2014, Transfer of Five Senior Taliban Detainees: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 6-12 (2011) (statement of Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def.) (acknowledging that the transfer occurred without the 30-day notice required by the statute, but stating that “[t]he President has constitutional responsibilities and constitutional authorities to protect American citizens and members of our armed forces.”).} The result of the certification requirement was that transfers out of Guantanamo ground almost to a halt in the aftermath of the legislation.\footnote{See Manners-Webber, supra note 156, at 1424.}

There appear to be similar dynamics at play in the context of the Section 232 exceptions to tariff rules. Here, again, the President and some members of his cabinet seem inclined toward action—in this case the imposition of significant tariffs on foreign imports across the board—and the former Defense Secretary, James Mattis, was believed to hold views closer to that of many members of Congress, who did not want to see such extreme tariffs imposed broadly.\footnote{Letter from Mattis to Ross, supra note 4.} Members of Congress have had reason to believe, in part due to his own memorandum to this effect, that the former Secretary of Defense and later after his departure, the Department generally, would be less inclined to certify a national security justification for imposing tariffs than was the Secretary of Commerce, and thus they
have made a number of attempts to move the authority from the latter to the former.

Congressional reliance on internal tensions may take a short or long-view. While any given statutory designation is likely to outlast particular appointees, who come and go quite regularly, interagency tensions are often longstanding and survive administration to administration, and thus specific designations may continue to operate as intended beyond the lifespan of a particular appointee. Nevertheless, priorities and preferences do shift over time, agency mandates are reorganized, and offices are brought closer to or further from the White House from administration to administration; thus, as with the shifting designations over Section 232 justifications for tariffs, members of Congress may find it useful to shift agency deciders when the current structure no longer comports with their intentions in deploying it.

2. Process Controls: Formal or Functional Barriers?

A potential challenge to my account of process controls as an effective means of constraining or compelling Presidential action is the argument that executive branch actors report to the President and must do his bidding. Designating a decider within the executive may create some paperwork requirements, but should not—under this view—affect the actual policy result, because that is the President’s to decide. Whether or not this reflects the formal breakdown of power within the executive branch (and I do not accept that it does, certainly not for all exercises of power), it does not describe the functional reality, in which decisionmaking power and process have a significant if not always dispositive role in the path of policymaking.

Most of the examples of congressional administration I discuss in this paper involve allocations of power to officials over which the President exercises direct removal authority. Scholars differ on the extent to which the removal power is a sufficient political control over bureaucratic autonomy. Under Elena Kagan’s view of “Presidential Administration,” the President’s authority implicitly extends to directing these officials to take a particular action even if it does not accord with their own views. Their delegated authority is, in other words, really the President’s. Gary Lawson goes several steps further, arguing that the President should have

175 Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51. See supra note 10.
176 See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2326-31 (arguing that while the Constitution does not require that the President be able to direct all authority delegated to administrative officials, statutory delegations to such officials, outside of independent agencies, should generally be interpreted as “subject to the ultimate control of the President.”
177 Id.
the power to nullify the acts of subordinates. Kevin Stack takes an opposing view, arguing that the President does not have authority to direct subordinates in cases where statutes delegate executive power to them specifically.

Yet even accepting arguendo the most aggressive view of Presidential power over subordinates’ decisions as a matter of formal authority, as a functional matter, process and structure shapes decisionmaking and adds hurdles, if not barriers, to the President’s ability to effectuate his preferred policies. Consider one glaring example: the President’s oft-stated desire during the first half of the Trump administration to end the Russia investigation run first by the FBI under Jim Comey, and then by the Special Counsel, Robert Mueller. If the investigation were under his direct, immediate control, it is probably fair to say there can be no doubt that he would have ended or severely compromised it. But this was not within his direct power, because the investigation was designed to be situated several steps removed from the President by personnel if not formal authorities. In his efforts to end the investigation, he removed some officials, such as FBI director James Comey, and—ultimately (though slowly)—his Attorney General Jeff Sessions, and failed to remove others, such as the Deputy

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180 Kagan herself acknowledges this practical reality. See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2298 (“Their resistance to or mere criticism of a directive may inflict political costs on the President as heavy as any that would result from an exercise of the removal power. This fact of political life accounts in part for the consultations and compromises that prefaced many of the Clinton White House’s use of directive authority. In this context, to put the matter simply, persuasion may be more than persuasion and command may be less than command – making the line between the two sometimes hard to discover.”).
181 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 15, 2018), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1029731513573822464 (“The Rigged Russian Witch Hunt goes on and on as the “originators and founders” of this scam continue to be fired and demoted for their corrupt and illegal activity. All credibility is gone from this terrible Hoax, and much more will be lost as it proceeds. No Collusion!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2018), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1068116413498429445 (“When will this illegal Joseph McCarthy style Witch Hunt, one that has shattered so many innocent lives, ever end-or will it just go on forever? After wasting more than $40,000,000 (is that possible), it has proven only one thing-there was NO Collusion with Russia. So Ridiculous!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 11, 2018), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1024646945640525826 (“This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now, before it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted, and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!”).
182 The regulations governing the special counsel do set the investigation at some remove from the President, but as they are created by executive order and not statute, the President holds formal authority to change them. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2018).
183 This entire paragraph will obviously need some reworking in light of recent events, but my claim stands.
AG, Rod Rosenstein, and Robert Mueller himself. Each removal had, or was delayed by, political repercussions, despite the fact that each removal was within his formal authority to effectuate. And yet he was stymied in his efforts to end the investigation, not primarily by formal legal constraints, though in this case there may also exist some, but by the political hurdles of what ending the investigation would entail and require—likely firing each official who refused to end the investigation until he were to find someone who would. Thus some officials left, but Rosenstein remained, along with his decisions to commence and to protect the inquiry, despite the fact that the President would not have made those decisions himself. Wherever the formal line is drawn with respect to presidential control over executive branch personnel, Presidential control through appointment and removal is hardly equivalent as a functional matter to Presidential control over the decision itself.

3. Harnessing of accountability mechanisms

One of the more effective uses of process controls is the placement of public responsibility for a decision directly in the hands of a particular official, who will thus understand herself to be accountable for whichever decision she chooses going forward. When this mechanism is combined with a legal requirement—for example to find facts, or to certify that certain factors are met—this accountability feature raises the stakes for the designated individual choosing whether or not to comply with the substantive legal requirements.

Moreover, a procedural requirement is often less open to interpretation than, say, whether a particular strike qualifies as “war,” and whether the President can undertake it without congressional authorization. Presidents tend to avoid actively asserting non-compliance with law, but they may

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184 Mueller Report (discussing the President’s attempts to have the White House Counsel, Don McGahn, fire Robert Mueller and thus terminate the investigation)

185 This is not to say there are no formal constraints on removal; for example, the President may be subject to constraints on his ability to obstruct justice as a matter of law (if not one addressable by courts at this time), which could constrain his formal authority to fire law enforcement officials for particular purposes. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Eric Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2018) (arguing that the President may be held criminally liable for obstructing justice through the corrupt exercise of constitutional powers); Mueller Report (stating that the investigation was constrained by the [year] OLC memorandum that state the President cannot be prosecuted for criminal offenses while in office).

assert an interpretation that some find far-fetched. And the extent to which a presidential claim is simply a different interpretation or beyond the pale can be particularly hard to police in areas where the law is ambiguous, fraught, or evolving. By contrast, a requirement that the Secretary of Defense sign a piece of paper with specific language, or produce a report to Congress, provides a much simpler metric by which to judge compliance or non-compliance with law.

By engaging with foreign policy through process controls, Congress enlists these internal actors themselves in its cause. It places the onus on these individuals to decide for themselves whether to comply with or disregard particular statutory obligations, removing their ability to hide behind the President or behind collective action in determining whether a statutory requirement must be followed, or whether it is a plausible justification to dismiss the requirement as an unconstitutional encroachment on the President. And while Presidents may be protected to some degree from certain kinds of accountability, such as prosecution while in office, lower-level officials have fewer protections. Executive branch officials may face both hard and soft forms of personal liability for law-breaking: from criminal prosecution in some cases, to inspector general or GAO investigations to congressional requests and even subpoenas to testify and explain actions taken, to disbarment or other professional censure to public and professional embarrassment. As former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta dramatically explained his record of not approving a single transfer out of Guantanamo under the congressional certification requirements, “that provision required that I sign my life away.”

For these reasons and others, executive branch officials who are designated deciders may be more inclined than the President or unnamed groups of advisers or officials to comply carefully with the letter of statutory requirements.

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187 See Bradley and Morrison, Presidential Power, at 1114, supra note 166 (“It is rare for Presidents to acknowledge that they are acting inconsistently with the law. Instead, they typically argue that the law does not require what critics are contending.”)

188 Federal government officials do enjoy some immunity for decisions they make in their personal capacity, but their are not protected from liability for unambiguous law-breaking.

189 Soldiers, for example, must be prosecuted and punished for violating the laws of war. Federal officials face criminal sanction for violating the anti-deficiency act. Agency Inspectors General Offices investigate misconduct by federal employees. The GAO is an independent agency that investigates wrongdoing on behalf of Congress. See https://www.gao.gov/about/. Congress also frequently calls executive branch officials to testify in order to explain how their actions comport with statutory requirements. And professional associations are often called upon to censure the actions of professionals accused of acting unethically or otherwise outside the norms of the profession.

190 Bruck, supra note 96.
C. Risks in Congressional Administration

Congressional administration does not put to bed all debates about the allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches of the federal government. In fact, precisely because congressional administration may facilitate congressional involvement in areas where members might otherwise choose to sit out, congressional influence over foreign policy through process controls may provide the flashpoint for thorny constitutional questions over the line between the President’s and Congress’s authorities. Beyond these constitutional risks, there are potential disadvantages to engaging foreign policy through congressional administration. For example, deploying process controls may give members of Congress a false sense of action, mollifying concerns about the President’s policy direction or judgment and thus keeping Congress from engaging in substantive policy debates more directly. And process controls might at times undermine, rather than promote, accountability for decisionmaking.

1. Constitutional Risks in Congressional Administration

Congressional administration of foreign policy and national security raise distinct constitutional issues from the rest of the administrative state, depending on the extent to which a given exercise of control approaches the debated zone between the President’s delegated statutory authority and constitutional Article II power. While some level of congressional involvement in the design and ongoing process of executive branch decisionmaking has a long, and executive branch-accepted, pedigree, the executive branch has long bristled at, and often pushed back against, any congressional engagement that interferes with, let alone “prevents,” a “constitutionally assigned function[].”\(^{191}\) While “constitutionally assigned” may be too low a bar for precluding congressional involvement, as there are areas where the President and Congress hold concurrent power, the extent to which the President may trump Congress in this space is a matter of hot debate.\(^{192}\) And congressional attempts to control policy through the bureaucracy itself may raise similar constitutional dilemmas to attempts to dictate that policy directly. Thus congressional involvement in the foreign affairs and national security realms raises significantly thornier questions.


\(^{192}\) See supra, note 24.
than similar engagement with other parts of the administrative state, which rely more exclusively on delegated authority.\footnote{See id., at 133 n.27 (“Legislation impinging on the President’s responsibilities in the areas of foreign affairs and national defense poses unique issues in the application of the general principle of separation of powers, requiring a more searching examination of the validity of congressional action.”).}

Some examples may help set the lay of the land. Certainly a congressional attempt to constrain the President’s use of his pardon power through, say, a requirement that the Attorney General certify that every pardoned individual is sufficiently contrite, would be impermissible.\footnote{See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) (The pardon “power flows from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”). In fact the federal regulations regulating the pardon process for the executive branch themselves explicitly state that they are “advisory only” and do not “restrict the authority granted to the President under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.” 28 CFR § 1.11} The executive branch will likewise resist process controls that executive branch officials perceive to be interfering with the President’s ability to exercise his commander-in-chief authority.\footnote{U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.} Yet the extent to which that clause gives the President plenary constitutional authority over war, concurrent authority with Congress, or in fact very little non-delegated authority at all, is controversial.\footnote{U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.} While the Constitution makes the President the “Commander-in-Chief,” it gives to Congress not only the power to declare war but also the power to make rules governing the armed forces.\footnote{Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process, 97 FOR. AFF. 119 (2018).} A recent proposal by Richard Betts and Matthew Waxman to mandate certification by specific internal actors, including a legal review by the Attorney General, before the President may order the launch of a nuclear weapon raises precisely these questions.\footnote{See supra Part I.A.} So too it is far from clear whether the congressional requirements that the Secretary of Defense certify Guantanamo transfers, for example, present a constitutional conflict. President Obama suggested as much in signing statements, and even at one point violated the statutory prohibition, but otherwise complied.\footnote{See Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 2013 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 876, at 1 (Dec. 26, 2013) (stating that “in certain circumstances, [the transfer restrictions] would violate constitutional separation of powers principles.”); Statement from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the return of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl (May 31, 2014), at https://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16737; Jack Goldsmith, The President Pretty Clearly Disregarded a Congressional Statute in Swapping GTMO Detainees for Bergdahl, LAWFARE (June 2, 2014), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-pretty-clearly-disregarded-congressional-statute-swapping-gtmo-detainees-bergdahl (discussing the exchange of an American soldier for GTMO detainees, in which the Secretary of Defense did not meet the 30-day notification requirement in the statute).} Neither matter would likely come before the courts, and because of the executive branch’s general track record of compliance with such requirements, both

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are examples of areas where Congress might effectively rein in the President even without necessarily running to ground the scope of their authority to do so.

Outside of the commander-in-chief clause and the authority to appoint and receive ambassadors, the President’s foreign policy dominance has less clear sourcing, but the executive branch has long sought to claim and protect it, often, though not always, successfully. Yet some areas—such as international commerce—quite clearly lie within congressional control, and have been ceded to the executive only through progressive statutory delegations. Congress could dial back the President’s authority in these areas entirely, and thus the fact that it intervenes through process controls rather than through substance should not create any greater constitutional problems than engagement with other areas of the administrative state.

It is also worth at least briefly noting here ongoing debates in scholarship over the extent to which Congress may direct how the executive branch executes the law, in particular debates over the concept of a “unitary executive.” In broad brushstrokes, unitary executive theory holds that the President must wield all power vested in the executive branch. What that means in practice, however, varies across different versions of the theory. Congressional administration of the President’s decisionmaking processes, and in particular the use of process controls to designate and change deciders inside the executive, is in tension with more aggressive variants. Thus far, the courts have broadly accepted congressional structuring of the executive branch, but I discuss these debates here to explain how they would engage with congressional administration of foreign policy.

200 See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 1 PUB. PAPERS 807, 808 (Apr. 30, 1994) (noting that the President’s plenary power “includes special authority in the area of foreign affairs,” and that the President will “construe” any provisions in the legislation that would interfere with those prerogatives as “precatory.”)


202 See supra notes 105-106.


In its most aggressive form, a unitary executive theory might hold that any constraints on a President’s ability to exercise executive power—including through delegating that power to an official other than the President—would pose an unconstitutional constraint. 206 Of course, that would mean the dismantling of most delegations of power to the agencies making up the administrative state. The more widely held view of the unitary executive, however, accepts the general structure of administrative delegations to agency officials rather than to the President. 207 Most adherents of unitary executive theory accept such delegations because they hold the view that the way Presidential control of executive power is effectuated is through the vesting of final decisionmaking authority in the President or officials under his or her control by way of removal. In effect, the argument goes, the President must hold unfettered discretion to appoint and remove officials who wield executive power. Yet the Courts have to date upheld Congress’s power to insulate certain agencies and officials from presidential control. In any event, Congress has virtually never sought to insulate the foreign policy or national security administration through such restrictions on appointment or removal power. 208

Here is where unitary executive theory could intersect with debates about the proper allocation of foreign affairs and national security power between the President and Congress. Might there be some distinction between the kinds of agencies or powers Congress can insulate from Presidential control? Could Congress insulate executive branch actors in their exercise of powers where the President holds some concurrent authority with Congress, such as at least some foreign policy or national security powers? Were Congress to seek to insulate certain actors or decisionmaking processes from presidential control in areas where the President has traditionally asserted Article II authority, such measures could bring questions over both the viability of unitary executive theory and the allocation of foreign affairs power to a head.

Congressional attempts to manage the President’s foreign affairs and national security decisionmaking therefore could provide the next flashpoint at which each of these constitutional questions arise in the courts. This will likely turn on how aggressively Congress seeks to deploy process controls to establish formal buffers between the President and executive branch decisionmakers in areas where the President has traditionally asserted independent or even plenary authority to act.

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206 Tushnet, supra at 319. Gary Lawson has argued further that the President should have the power to nullify the acts of subordinates. See Lawson, supra note 178.
207 Id. at 315 (describing “weak” version of the unitary executive).
208 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). One potential, though narrow, exception could involve efforts by some in Congress to protect the Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential campaign. See, e.g., Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act, S.2644, 115th Cong.
2. Mollification of Congress

One risk of deploying process controls is that—by giving members of Congress a sense that they are controlling the decisionmaking process—this may keep them from engaging further in the substance of policymaking. And on some matters there is no substitute for direct Congressional—and through it public—engagement with the substance of policymaking.

This phenomenon may be particularly prevalent when Congress allocates power vertically down the hierarchy within the executive branch, to career professionals who are expected to deploy expertise at a remove from partisan interference. In fact, members of Congress might be more reticent to endorse grants of power to the President—in particular to Presidents of the opposing party—were they not assured this power would be partly wielded (and perhaps tempered) by non-partisan professionals within the government. And thus congressional delegations of this sort should be understood as made in reliance upon existing bureaucratic constraints. I have previously referred to this phenomenon as congressional “bargain[ing] in the shadow of the bureaucracy.”

Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey nodded toward such a phenomenon in their discussion of the reauthorization of FISA 702. In response to criticism of Democratic lawmakers who voted to reauthorize broad surveillance powers to the President while Trump held the office, Goldsmith and Hennessey suggest that these members of Congress did so only because of their understanding that the powers would be employed largely by “career public servants” within agencies that “are remarkably immune from inappropriate presidential meddling.” But while deference to expertise may be reassuring, particularly in highly technical areas or in times of high political drama, this ability to push hard decisions to apolitical actors may also give Congress a means of abdicating its own responsibility to promote informed and public debate.

Of course, none of this necessarily means that bureaucratic actors can easily thwart the will of political leadership. A President or other political

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209 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 178, at 1245 (“Judging from the political conflict that is often generated by disputes between Congress and the President, it is at least arguable that Congress would never have granted agencies their current, almost-limitless powers if Congress recognized that such power had to be directly under the control of the President.”).


212 Id.

213 See, e.g., Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 51, at 214.
actor determined to act will often manage to do so if willing to accept the political consequences. And congressional administration of decisionmaking inside the executive branch is not a holistic solution to Presidential mismanaging of foreign relations. A President who is willing to face the consequences of doing so can generally force the executive branch to bend to his will. With respect to those officials who hold high-level positions in the executive branch, like heads of departments and White House staffers, the President may appoint whom he chooses, and he may order officials beneath him to take, or not take, certain actions.\textsuperscript{214} As I discuss above, those who decide they cannot follow his orders typically resign.\textsuperscript{215} Or the President may remove recalcitrant officials who refuse his directions.\textsuperscript{216}

There are some process answers to the above problems. If political actors interfere with decisionmaking in a way that upends congressional faith in the internal processes they created, members of Congress may turn to different process controls, for example by directly requiring the involvement of very specific actors—such as with the proposed DETER Act.\textsuperscript{217}

Ultimately, the final constraints on the President’s abuse of congressional controls lie outside the executive branch. They are political—such as in response to the firing of officials who insist on following congressional requirements against the President’s will, and, to a lesser extent, judicial—to the extent the administration refuses to engage a reviewable statutory requirement. Both of these remedies require the other branches to step up and engage more directly. Thus, to the extent congressional administration pacifies Congress’s need to act and keeps it from engaging further, this is a real threat to oversight of the executive branch.

\textbf{3. Overeager and Unwilling Deciders}

Much thought about how to structure government rests on assumptions that the players are power \textit{seeking}.\textsuperscript{218} And Congress’s ability to

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\item \textsuperscript{214} U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{215} See Resignation letter from James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, to President Donald Trump (Dec. 20, 2018), (available at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5656065-Resignation-Letter-From-Defense-Secretary-James.html).
\item \textsuperscript{217} DETER Act, \textit{supra} note 141.
\item \textsuperscript{218} See, e.g., William Niskanen, Jr., \textit{Bureaucracy and Representative Government} (1971)(arguing that bureaucrats seek to maximize their power, e.g. through their budgets).
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shift power dynamics inside the executive branch creates avenues for internal actors to, in effect, lobby Congress to give them greater decisionmaking authority. Executive officials working with Congress to push a legislative agenda is itself normal process; much legislation is the result of congressional-executive wrangling, and executive branch officials regularly seek legislation and work with counterparts in congress to accomplish it.219 A request for changes in decision-making authority – versus substantive policy – may be based in genuine consideration of the best allocation of expertise and resources. It may also, however, be deployed by internal actors who simply want greater power to gain a leg up in interagency-conflicts through outside assistance from Congress.

But not all designations of deciders are the result of requests for more power; and not all power is desired. Many executive officials may not always appreciate an allocation of power in their direction.220 A designation of decisionmaking authority, even if crafted as one of simple “fact-finding” may put the designee in quite an awkward position vis-à-vis her boss, the President, or other officials.221 Particularly for executive branch actors who view their roles as engaging in fact-finding and analysis, rather than policymaking, they may view a designation as a policymaker as forcing them to act outside of their ordinary mandate.

That executive branch officials may not always seek or want policymaking authority runs counter to the orthodoxy that government officials seek to aggrandize power; yet so too does Congress’s slow abdication of power over time to the executive branch, contrary to the Madisonian ideal of the separate branches as checking one another through their clashing

219 See, e.g., 1988 BRAC report, supra note 127 (discussing efforts by executive branch officials to seek legislative relief from the base closure stalemate); The President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (The Grace: Commission)(1983) (proposing a nonpartisan commission to address base closures).

220 See, e.g., James Wilson, Bureaucracy (countering the theory that agencies are “imperialistic” with evidence that often they do not seek or even seek to avoid increases in budget or power).

221 Several Defense Secretaries responsible for certifying the Guantanamo transfers have discussed the awkward position this placed them in, required by law to make a public certification for which they would bear responsibility, and yet facing a President who had made Guantanamo closure a signature promise. See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearings on S. 1253 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th Cong. 49 (2011) (statement of Robert Gates, Sec’y of Def.) (testifying that the Congressional certification requirements had put him in an “uncomfortable position of having to certify people who get returned”); Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed To Close Guantanamo, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-close-guantanamo (quoting former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel discussing the “immense pressure” he felt from the President, as against the sentiment in DOD that there should be an extremely high bar to release).

222 Intelligence analysts, in particular, view the role of their offices as providing information and analysis, and often seek to avoid a suggestion that they might be crafting policy. This makes the proposal in the DETER Act, which would make a major policy decision—here a sanctions regime—turn on the word of an intelligence agency—here ODNI—unusual.
hunger for power.223 And yet here we are. Government actors do not always find that more responsibility, or more power, is necessarily in their self interest.224 Whether imposing on these officials despite their reticence is in the public interest, however, is another question. In at least some of these cases, it is worth considering that officials given roles that they deem to fall outside of their mandate, expertise, or competence may actually be right about their mandate, expertise, or competence (or at least the latter two, as the first will inevitably shift with the new responsibility). Designations of such officials under such circumstances would seem to follow from a breakdown in process or a lack of viable alternatives—such as a widespread mistrust of the other available officials or the President—in which case Congress might be better suited to making the decision itself than delegating it to the executive branch at all.

4. *Surreptitious Interference with Political Will*

Presidents, much more so than members of Congress, campaign on foreign policy promises. And there is an expectation on the part of the public that they will seek to carry out these promises. Congressional administration may at times permit Congress to stymie presidential prerogatives without necessarily doing so openly and entailing the political cost of directly challenging the President’s stated policies through substantive legislation. For example, President Obama campaigned on closing the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.225 Once he began the process of doing so in office, congressional opposition to the plan swelled.226 Yet rather than directly legislate that Guantanamo be kept open, or prohibit transfers entirely, Congress chose to influence the course of Guantanamo closure through less transparent means, by altering the transfer decisionmaking process. By so doing, Congress was able to play a large role in upending the President’s closure agenda, for which he might have reasonably argued he had a public mandate to accomplish.227 Because he, and not Congress, bore the brunt of that failed campaign promise, members of Congress who opposed the President politically had political incentives to upset his policies generally, regardless of their belief in the ideal policy outcome, and particularly so if they could do so with few costs. In the case of Guantanamo, it is possible that members of Congress who
supported the process controls would have supported more significant substantive measures as well, but it is impossible to know whether there would have been any political costs borne in that alternative universe. And because the costs to supporting process controls are so low, congressional administration could potentially lead to substantive results that neither the President nor members of Congress who vote for the control measures would support—or would want to be seen supporting—if required to do so directly.

5. Risks to Accountability and Transparency

Finally, and to my view most significantly, congressional influence through process controls in lieu of direct substantive engagement with policy can at times weaken, rather than augment, accountability and transparency in foreign policy decisionmaking. In fact, the very same political advantages that members of Congress may seek in deploying indirect mechanisms of influence rather than more direct forms of policymaking come hand and hand with concomitant disadvantages to transparency and accountability. The extent to which a given control weakens or strengthens accountability and transparency of decisionmaking depends on the particular control at issue, how it functions, and the plausible alternatives against which it might be measured.

Arguably, the Constitution allocates to Congress certain powers, such as the power to declare war, or to regulate international commerce, at least in part because the framers wanted certain types of decisions to be made within the context of heavy public debate, by the branch most closely accountable to the public. Yet in contrast to the substantive control by Congress of the merits of a particular policy objective, congressional attempts to influence policy by manipulating the inner workings of the executive branch, and specifically by designating as the decisionmakers its politically-insulated bureaucrats, entail significantly less transparency or direct accountability for the substantive positions taken. This is not to say that Congress itself is somehow legislating in secret; its enactment of legislative process controls itself is as transparent as would be substantive legislation. But it is the subsequent process of substantive decisionmaking by actors inside the executive branch that is more shielded from public view or voters’ control. In fact, that lack of political accountability is often the point: whether out of a belief that the decision is better made by technocrats without partisan political influence, or because members of Congress want to shield themselves from political costs, or both, Congress

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228 U.S. CONST. art I, § 6.
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often deploys process controls in lieu of substance specifically because it sets the substantive decision apart from political accountability.229

The extent to which a given process control engages more or less accountability, however, depends on the nature of the control itself, and on the baseline against which it is judged. Process controls may be deployed specifically to raise a decision from the ranks of unknown bureaucratic actors to a designated high-level official. Such was the case with the Guantanamo certification requirements, in which case Congress’s choice of process control took the decision-making authority over transfers from an unnamed panel of bureaucrats who issued determinations as a group, and handed it to a not overjoyed Secretary of Defense for his personal signoff.230 In comparison to members of Congress, or the President, the unelected Secretary of Defense is less accountable, and certainly does not face the voters’ wrath directly unless he later decides to run for elected office. But as compared to decisionmaking by a group of faceless bureaucrats, there is more transparency in the decision when made by a named high-level official such as the Secretary of Defense. The many accounts by former Secretaries of Defense who reported finding these requirements to be a significant, painful burden supports the intuition that the direct designation of a decisionmaker does create a sense of accountability for one’s decisions.231 As this example demonstrates, the specific function the process control implements, and the baseline against which it operates, are both critical factors in determine the extent to which a given process control aids or weakens accountability.

Moreover, weighing congressional administration against more direct substantive congressional engagement is not necessarily a fair comparison. An alternative universe in which Congress legislates substance up to the extent of its formal authorities might be one in which foreign policy is more accountable to public opinion (putting aside for the moment whether that would be a normatively desirable outcome). But considering Congress’s historical trajectory at this point, it is not a realistic one.232 Therefore, while it is wise to compare the accountability effect of different types of process controls as against one another, it is not typically realistic to compare them to direct substantive congressional engagement.

229 See e.g., infra Part II.C.1 (discussing military base closures).
230 See infra Part III.C.1.
231 See, e.g., Manners-Weber, infra note 156 (arguing that “[b]y localizing accountability in a single person, certification requirements concentrate risk in that person. Personal responsibility brings personal vulnerability. Moreover, these certifications must be memorialized in writing, heightening the vulnerability: should things go wrong, there is a clear record both of the certifier’s responsibility and of her poor judgment. This vulnerability changes the certifier’s overall decision-making calculus; under the right set of factors, the decisionmaker may become unwilling to make a decision that she would have made otherwise.”).
232 See infra Part I.
Counter-intuitively, the duly elected President is not necessarily a more accountable “designated decider” than would be a specific named official in his cabinet. While designating the President as decider might formally appear to place the reins in more publicly-accountable hands, the functional reality is that President-as-designee does not effectuate the same personal accountability features that would any-other-named-official-as-designee. This is so for several reasons, among them the fact that the President will be held vaguely accountable for all decisions emanating from his term in office, whether within or not within his control, and the sheer enormity may tend to swallow up any given decision.233 But more importantly for our purposes, presidential decisions and pronouncements are often the result of processes that take place far below his radar, via group decisionmaking by unnamed officials, whom the President and her subordinates will often designate and task secretly.234 Thus, neither direct congressional engagement with substance nor direct decisions by the President are, as a realistic matter, necessarily more “accountable” options against which to measure congressional administration. Instead, specific process controls, decisionmaking processes, and their distinct implications must be weighed against each other, and against a realistic assessment of the plausible alternatives.

CONCLUSION

Congressional administration of executive branch decisionmaking provides a means for Congress to move past the impasses that often hinder direct congressional action in the foreign affairs and national security space. The process controls I discuss in this Article permit members of Congress to advance policy preferences, push back against a President whose policies they mistrust, or resolve politically fraught quandaries by placing them in the hands of experts, without many of the policy and political risks that often get in the way of substantive legislation. And yet, despite their salience, the influence of process controls on the foreign policy and national security decisionmaking process is often absent from debates about the allocation of these powers between the President and Congress.

233 See “The Buck Stops Here” Desk Sign, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum (available at: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm) (discussing Truman’s oft-stated motto, “the buck stops here,” meaning “the President—whoever he is—has to decide. He can’t pass the buck to anybody.”). But cf. Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, White House (Jan. 10, 2019) (available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-30/) (In which President Trump states, “the buck stops with everybody” in response to the question, “does the buck stop with you over this shutdown?”).

234 Even when the President creates processes publicly, through, e.g., Executive Order, the specific officials are often unnamed. See Exec. Order 13567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011).
The use of process controls to designate deciders within the executive branch is particularly effective when it exploits known tensions, which provides opportunities for Congress to influence policies through strategic use of pressure points on the internal decisional process. Congress—and the Courts, as I will discuss in a future paper—might employ this mechanism of oversight even more instrumentally as a means of playing a more significant role in national security and foreign relations without necessarily infringing on the executive’s comparative advantages of speed, expertise, and knowledge, or undermining the United States’ “one voice” in foreign affairs.

Process controls are not a panacea, and they are not without risk. Indirect legislation of process is not always superior to direct substantive legislation, and the existence of this half measure may at times prevent Congress from taking more direct action. Moreover, process controls entail certain risks—to efficient decisionmaking, to accountability, and to public engagement with foreign affairs and national security decisions. Choosing the proper control requires consideration of context, purpose, and the state of play inside the executive branch.

Nevertheless, process controls offer three critical advantages to direct substantive legislation. First, they provide a means for members of Congress to influence policy without necessarily incurring the political costs that often keep them from engaging. Thus, to the extent congressional involvement is important, process controls may often be the only game in town. Second, process controls may be more effective than direct mandating of policy, as they act through the commandeering of officials inside the executive branch, often before decisions even reach the President, rather than through direct interbranch conflict, which the President may be more inclined to thwart. And finally, process controls provide a means of Congressional influence on policy while still benefiting from the executive branch advantages of information, expertise, and dispatch. Ultimately, process controls can be an important tool Congress may and should deploy to push back against the President, giving that branch some concrete means to complement the President’s creeping claims to unilateral power in the foreign affairs and national security spheres.