THE COMPANY STORE AND THE LITERALLY CAPTIVE MARKET:
CONSUMER LAW IN PRISONS AND JAILS

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Abstract: The growth of public expense associated with mass incarceration has led many carceral systems to push certain costs onto the people who are under correctional supervision. In the case of prisons and jails, this frequently takes the form of charges and fees associated with telecommunications, food, basic supplies, and access to information. Operation of these fee-based businesses (referred to here as “prison retail”) is typically outsourced to a private firm. In recent years, the dominant prison retail companies have consolidated into a handful of companies, mostly owned by private equity firms.

This paper explores the practices of prison retailers, and discusses potential consumer-law implications. After an overview of the prison-retail industry and a detailed discussion of unfair practices, the paper looks at some potential legal protections that may apply under current law. These protections, however, prove to be scattered and often illusory due to mandatory arbitration provisions and prohibitions on class adjudication. The paper therefore concludes with recommendations on a variety of steps that state, local, and federal governments can take to address the problems inherent in the current model.

I. Background

Since the 1970s, the number of people incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails has skyrocketed. With approximately 2.3 million adults currently held in correctional facilities,1 mass incarceration is no longer a fringe issue—it impacts families in every community in the nation. Numerous constituencies, from prison guards to utility companies to construction firms, profit from the current system of incarceration;2 however, literature on profit-seeking in the carceral economy has disproportionately focused on companies that construct and manage correctional facilities.3 This preoccupation with facility operators ignores the explosion of smaller, privately held firms—such as telecommunications providers, technology companies, commissary operators, and money transmitters—that have sprung up to monetize basic every-day life in prisons and jails. These companies, which I refer to as “prison retailers,” extract money from incarcerated people and their families in numerous transactions. Despite the small dollar-amount of most purchases, prison-retail firms can command aggregate revenue comparable to private prison operators.4

3 This focus on for-profit facility operators (such as CoreCivic (f.k.a. Corrections Corporation of America) and the Geo Group (f.k.a. Wackenhut Corrections Corp.) has been rightly criticized for over-estimating the political strength of the private prison lobby (in terms of influencing substantive criminal justice policy), while ignoring the dominant position of publicly-run facilities, both in terms of fiscal outlays and number of people held. See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “The Worrying State of the Anti-Prison Movement,” Social Justice Blog (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/the-worrying-state-of-the-anti-prison-movement/ (“The longstanding campaign against private prisons is based on the fictitious claim that revenues raked in from outsourced contracts explain the origin and growth of mass incarceration.”).
4 Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration (Prison Policy Initiative 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html (“Private companies that
Prison retailing finds historical analogs in the commissaries and “company stores” that were a key component of the economic peonage found on post-bellum plantations and settlements organized around extractive industries. This prior generation of company stores met its demise when laborers became more mobile and were able to travel to other retailers with more competitive prices. In contrast, the modern prison retail industry has used the guise of security (unquestioned by legislators or courts) to insulate itself from competition which could threaten its profit margins.

The modern rise of prison retailing can also be situated within the historical evolution of the American carceral state. Penitentiaries began as nominally charitable institutions designed to isolate people and train them in preparation for an eventual return to the labor force. Prison-based labor was meant either to support the internal needs of a self-sufficient institution or to earn profits on the open market for the financial support of the institution.

While the idea of the self-sustaining penitentiary was always partially mythological, today’s correctional facilities have abandoned any pretense of paternalistic self-sufficiency, opting instead for a model of extreme austerity, supplemented by the sale of goods and services to those who can afford it.

Prisons represent an expansive use of state power, driven by policymakers of both major political parties who generally claim to support limited government. The contemporary prison thereby embodies the notion of the “antistate state,” developed by geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore, and

supply goods to the prison commissary or provide telephone service for correctional facilities bring in almost as much money ($2.9 billion) as governments pay private companies ($3.9 billion) to operate private prisons.


8 The model penitentiary’s progression from producing subsistence goods to outsourcing the manufacture of such goods to commissary vendors finds yet another parallel in historical practice—prior to the Civil War, plantation managers, mindful of the cost of providing a minimum level of “furnishings” for their enslaved workforce, tended to produce food on the plantation, a practice which ended after the Civil War, when landowners could focus on growing cash crops, while purchasing food from third-party producers, and passing the costs along to tenant customers. Forrest McDonald & Grady McWhiney, *The South from Self-Sufficiency to Peonage: An Interpretation*, 85 Am. Hist. Rev. 1095, 1116 (1980).

9 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* 245 (2007) (“The antistate state depends on ideological and rhetorical dismissal of any agency or capacity that ‘government’ might use to guarantee social well-being.”); see also Ruth
reflects the concept of “neoliberal penalty” promoted by legal theorist Bernard Harcourt.\textsuperscript{10} Regardless of the theoretical framework one uses to describe the prison, the ultimate dilemma is the same: the size and extent of the nation’s carceral infrastructure has grown dramatically at the same time policymakers have delegitimized policies and institutions that were designed to protect the health and welfare of the disadvantaged people who fill prisons and jails. As a result, a common mindset in contemporary correctional systems is to shift as many costs of basic subsistence as possible onto incarcerated people.

Prison retailing also changes the ways in which the state relates to incarcerated people. While American prisons historically strove to isolate people from the outside world and harness their labor for the benefit of the institution, by the late twentieth century incarcerated populations no longer represented a potentially valuable source of labor, but rather were surplus labor to be housed at the state’s expense.\textsuperscript{11} Seen through this lens, prison retailing is properly understood as a mechanism by which a state liability (i.e., the subsistence needs of incarcerated people) becomes a potential source of revenue for both public agencies and private firms.\textsuperscript{12} Despite the rhetorical support for free markets that is professed by many supporters of mass incarceration (particularly on the political right), prison retailing is anything but a functioning competitive market. The industry is comprised for the most part of monopoly providers who share financial interests with the same agencies that award the monopoly contracts in the first place.\textsuperscript{13}

No discussion of prison retailing would be complete without acknowledgment of the growing movement of incarcerated people and their families that has organized to bring public attention to the injustices of the industry and seek legislative and judicial relief. While organizations and individuals throughout the country have taken on this important work at varying levels of impact, special attention is due to Martha Wright and the other co-plaintiffs in the landmark class action \textit{Wright v. Corrections Corporation of America}.\textsuperscript{14} This lawsuit, filed in federal court in 2000, challenged the rates charged for phone calls from certain privately operated prisons. The plaintiffs

\textsuperscript{10} Bernard E. Harcourt, \textit{The Illusion of Free Markets} 41 (2011) (“The punitive society we now live in has been made possible by . . . [the] belief that there is a categorical difference between the free market, where intervention is inappropriate, and the penal sphere, where it is necessary and legitimate.”).

\textsuperscript{11} See Gilmore, \textit{Golden Gulag}, supra note 9 at 70-78.

\textsuperscript{12} See Lisa Guenther, \textit{Prison Beds and Compensated Man-Days: The Spatio-Temporal Order of Carceral Neoliberalism}, Social Justice, issue 148 (Spring 2017), 31, 42 (The logic of neoliberal penalty “does not primarily exploit the labor power of the prisoner, nor does it seek to discipline the subject or redeem their soul; rather, it targets criminalized populations for their potential to be warehoused.”).

\textsuperscript{13} In many ways, this seeming paradox is neither surprising nor unique, given that most American “free markets” are in actuality highly structured spaces that are governed by “intricate rules . . . all of which distribute wealth.” Harcourt, supra note 10 at 185.

consisted both of incarcerated customers and an array of family members. The choice of Martha Wright as lead plaintiff is notable in part because her situation was representative of the challenges facing countless families: her grandson was incarcerated in a distant prison, Wright could effectively communicate only by phone (glaucoma made reading letters difficult), and as a retired nurse she struggled to pay for phone calls that could cost $25-60 each.\footnote{Colin Lecher, “Criminal Charges,” The Verge (May 11, 2016), \url{https://www.theverge.com/a/prison-phone-call-cost-martha-wright-v-corrections-corporation-america}. While Wright and her co-plaintiffs were demographically representative of families throughout the country, they were unique in other respects: the non-incarcerated plaintiffs were residents of the District of Columbia whose relationships with incarcerated loved ones were thrown into turmoil in 1997 when Congress closed the D.C. prison system and scattered its residents throughout the federal prison system. The National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 not only transferred responsibility for the D.C. prison system to the federal Bureau of Prisons, but also required at least half of the D.C. prison population to be placed in privately-operated facilities. Stephen Raher, \textit{The Business of Punishing: Impediments to Accountability in the Private Corrections Industry}, 13 Richmond J.L. & Pub. Int. 209, 218, n.81 (2010). The privatization requirement was subsequently relaxed and only a few hundred people from the D.C. system were actually held in private facilities as of 2010. \textit{See} Nat’l Capital Revitalization & Self-Gov’t Improvement Act Status Report (Jun. 15, 2010) (on file with author).} The litigation spanned decades, ultimately resulting in a judicial referral to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which in turn took over ten years to issue rules capping prison and jail phone rates.\footnote{See infra, notes 208-210 and accompanying text. For a timeline of the \textit{Wright} litigation and resulting rulemaking, see Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, “Timeline: The 18-year battle for prison phone justice,” Prison Policy Initiative Blog (Dec. 17, 2018), \url{https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/12/17/phone_justice_timeline/}.} The experience of the Wright petitioners serves as both a model and a cautionary tale. The broad coalition of individuals and organizations that coalesced around the Wright petitioners provides a model that can be emulated by others. But the results are also cautionary: the Wright petitioners achieved a substantial victory in front of the FCC, only to have the most impactful parts reversed by a change in Commission members and a divided appellate court. Meanwhile, in the years that the Wright coalition battled telecommunications carriers, multiple other types of businesses arose to exploit incarcerated consumers in new ways.

This article seeks to provide a broad-based overview of the legal issues related to selling goods and services in prisons and jails. It begins with an exploration of the types of goods and services sold in prisons, and the companies that dominate the market. I then discuss specific unfair practices, followed by an analysis of existing laws that may provide relief to consumers. The article concludes with policy recommendations for addressing and ending the unfair business practices that are prevalent today. Readers should bear in mind that prison retailing is a close cousin to other financial aspects of neoliberal penalty that are beyond the scope of this article, such as the proliferation of fees and fines associated with judicial proceedings, bail, probation, or supervised release;\footnote{Neil L. Sobol, \textit{Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses}, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 841 (2017).} charging incarcerated people for medical...
care;\textsuperscript{18} or, making people pay for the basic costs of their own incarceration (so-called “pay to stay” laws).\textsuperscript{19}

II. Surveying the Landscape of Prison Retailing

The prison retail industry has grown in an unplanned, idiosyncratic manner. What started as a niche industry occupied by numerous narrowly-focused companies is now dominated by a handful of conglomerates owned by private equity firms. To better understand the players and products in this economic sector, it is helpful to analyze the four essential components that define any prison retail transaction: the end user, the payer, the facility, and the vendor.

A. End Users

Either incarcerated people or their friends and family can be end users, depending on the product or service being sold. Goods sold through a commissary are exclusively sold for use by people inside correctional facilities; whereas telecommunications services are sold for the benefit of the two parties communicating. Financial products can be targeted solely at an incarcerated person (release cards), or can be used to facilitate a two-party transaction (money transfers).

The “customer base” of end users is notable for several prominent demographic trends. People in prisons and jails are disproportionately likely to have low pre-incarceration incomes,\textsuperscript{20} low rates of formal education,\textsuperscript{21} high rates of unemployment,\textsuperscript{22} and high prevalence of mental illness.\textsuperscript{23} One might expect policymakers to be receptive to the idea of enhanced protections for a group of consumers with such pronounced disadvantages; however, this is not the case when it comes to incarcerated people. Although families and friends of the incarcerated have made substantial progress in the last two decades, policy debates on the rights of the incarcerated are still dominated by stereotypes and prejudices that stack the deck against the establishment of new


\textsuperscript{20} Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned (Jul. 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html (finding median incomes of incarcerated men and women to be 52% and 42% (respectively) lower than those of non-incarcerated people).

\textsuperscript{21} Becky Pettit, Invisible Men: Mass Incarceration and the Myth of Black Progress 15-16 (2012) (finding that 52.7% and 61.8% of white and black males, respectively, in prisons and jails did not complete high school).

\textsuperscript{22} See Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, “Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment among Formerly Incarcerated People,” (Jul. 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html (although data is lacking on pre-incarceration unemployment rates, people released from custody are five times more likely to be unemployed than the general U.S. population).

rights and safeguards. For example, introduction of computer-tablet programs in prison should raise questions about unfair pricing of digital products; but some legislators inevitably express “disgust” that people are “receiving gifts that will make their time served easier.”

In some ways, the political mischaracterization of prison retailing resembles a new manifestation of the zero-sum fallacy described by criminologist Frank Zimring: a belief that “[a]nything that hurts offenders by definition helps victims.” Not only is the zero-sum construct logically faulty, but it in the case of prison retailing, it is factually ill-conceived, since it is the family members of incarcerated people who often bear the financial punishment of paying for phone calls or commissary items, even though families have not been sentenced to any term of punishment.

B. Payers

Much of the money spent at prison retailers comes from families and friends of the incarcerated, either directly or indirectly. People typically enter prison with little or no money and earn shockingly low wages while incarcerated, to the extent they are employed at all. Historically, this meant limited opportunities to purchase goods or services inside correctional facilities, due to the lack of a viable customer base. But the rising prevalence and falling price of electronic payments have made it increasingly feasible to collect payments (even in small amounts) from non-incarcerated payers. Throughout this article, I use the phrase “family” or “family member” as shorthand for a non-incarcerated payer. In actuality, such payers can also be friends, attorneys, or anyone who wants to communicate with an incarcerated correspondent, although most commonly the payer is a spouse, parent, sibling, or child of an incarcerated loved one.

Direct payments can take several forms. In the case of telecommunications, the family member can be a party to the transaction being purchased—for example, as the recipient of a collect call. Families can also purchase some tangible goods through prison commissaries, although these purchases are sometimes limited to bundled “care packages.” Alternatively, family can pay for specific services by sending an advance payment that is held by the vendor.

24 See infra § II.D.4.
25 Company Giving Tablets to NY Prisoners Expects to Get $9M from Inmates over 5 years,” NYUp.com, Feb. 15, 2018, http://s.newyorkupstate.com/oIgNXak (quoting New York Assemblyman Clifford W. Crouch (R-Bainbridge)).
Indirect purchasing entails a family member transferring money to an incarcerated recipient who then uses the funds to make subsequent purchases. The funds are held by the correctional facility in a pooled deposit account, typically referred to as an “inmate trust account.” Once the money is in the trust account, the recipient can usually use it for any purpose not prohibited by prison regulations. Assuming that the transferor trusts the recipient to manage his or her own funds, transfers to trust accounts have the benefit of versatility—the money in a trust account can be used for a variety of purposes, and is not restricted to one specific service or vendor, in contrast to customer prepayments where money is locked into a specific vendor and/or service, and is usually nonrefundable and subject to arbitrary expiration provisions.

The benefit of trust-fund versatility is offset in many jurisdictions by mandatory deductions from trust accounts to cover fines, victim restitution, or costs of confinement. These deductions can have the effect of steering payers to economically inefficient transactions, such as prepaid phone accounts or care packages, in an effort to avoid loss of funds through mandatory deductions.

C. Facilities

Correctional facilities play two significant roles in prison retailing. First, and most obviously, the facility selects the vendors who sell goods and services, usually under a long-term contract that grants the vendor the exclusive right to sell certain items in the facility. Second, the facility may receive compensation under the contract, thus making correctional agencies financially interested in prison-retail revenues.

Any discussion of facilities must begin with an important distinction that is often overlooked in the popular press: prisons and jails are remarkably different in both their operations and demographics. Prison systems are limited in number (fifty state departments of corrections, plus the federal Bureau of Prisons) and are typically large enough to command certain economies of scale and employ experienced procurement staff. In contrast, the nation’s jails consist of a sprawling patchwork of facilities run by approximately 2,850 different jurisdictions. Many jails are small with limited resources—over one-third of people in jail are held in facilities with total populations of less

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29 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
than five hundred. In addition, the majority of people in jails (76%) have not been convicted of a crime.

The size of a correctional system is usually reported in terms of daily population—a snapshot of population on a given day. This metric disguises population turnover, most notably the significant amount of “jail churn.” State prison systems hold approximately 1.3 million people on any given day, compared to 612,000 people held in local jails; however, six to nine million individuals are sent to jail every year, compared to roughly 600,000 prison admissions. In the eyes of a prison-retail firm, the numerous people entering or leaving jails, and the family members with whom they communicate, add up to a broad and lucrative pool of captive customers.

Many facilities have a financial interest in prison retailing because they receive consideration from vendors. Such consideration can come in the form of a “site commission” (a predetermined percentage of sales revenue) or other types of monetary or in-kind payments. Defenders of the prison-retail sector often attempt to justify vendors’ monopolist privileges by arguing that prices are subject to market competition when facilities solicit and evaluate bids. Although this theory is becoming increasingly dubious in light of industry consolidation, it was never on strong ground to begin with, because a facility’s interest in increasing its commission revenue operates to drive end-user prices higher.

After conducting an extensive economic review of the inmate calling service (“ICS”) industry as part of the Wright rulemaking, the FCC found that competition in the procurement process did not result in competitive or fair rates for end users. Shortly before the Commission revived its previously moribund ICS rulemaking in 2012, a nationwide survey of prison phone contracts found commission rates of up to 60%, with an average nationwide rate of 42%. Based on a review of confidential carrier financial data, the FCC

33 Id.
34 Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 1. The 76% figure is calculated based on the number of people confined in jails on behalf of local jurisdictions (approximately 731,000), but excluding the roughly 120,000 people held in jails on behalf of federal agencies. If one were to include the latter category, then the percentage of non-convicted people in jails would drop to 63%.
35 Id.
36 Id. at n.2 and accompanying text (discussing jail churn); U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 31, tbl. 8.
38 See infra § IV.D
39 In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [hereinafter “First Report & Order”] ¶ 40, 28 FCC Rcd. 14107, 14128-14129 (Sept. 26, 2013) (“While the process of awarding contracts to provide ICS may include competitive bidding, such competition in many instances benefits correctional facilities, not necessarily ICS consumers—inmates and their family and friends who pay the ICS rates, who are not parties to the agreements, and whose interest in just and reasonable rates is not necessarily represented in bidding or negotiation.”).
determined that governments collected site-commission revenue of over $460 million in 2013.41 In 2015, after years of study, the FCC sought to rein in commissions by declaring that such payments to facilities were not recoverable costs for purposes of ICS rate setting.42 Although this regulation was eventually invalidated by an appellate court,43 in the interim, the industry quickly discovered new ways of providing valuable consideration to facilities without invoking the formal label of a site commission.44 One trend in new compensation structures is for a vendor to avoid commissions expressed as a percentage of sales, and instead negotiate a fixed lump-sum or recurring payment to the facility based on anticipated revenue.45 Securus’s 2016 financial statements indicate that the company was obligated to make over $84 million in such guaranteed payments to facilities over the following five years.46

As facilities explore new ways to profit from prison retailing, the number and type of potential conflicts-of-interest has dramatically increased. For example, when facilities receive commissions from an electronic messaging system,47 they may boost commission revenue by either banning postal mail48 or implementing policies that make mail cumbersome and impractical.49 Or if a

42Id. at ¶ 118, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12819 (“After carefully considering the evidence in the record, we affirm our previous finding that site commissions do not constitute a legitimate cost to the providers of providing ICS.”).
43See infra, text accompanying notes 219-228.
44Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, “On kickbacks and commissions in the prison and jail phone market,” Prison Policy Initiative Blog (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/02/11/kickbacks-and-commissions/ (sub rosa commissions can be labeled as a signing bonus, administrative fee, in-kind services rendered to the facility for no cost, equipment rent, or contributions to electoral campaigns or professional associations).
49Some facilities have striven to make mail slower and less personal by requiring all incoming mail to be scanned and either reprinted or distributed electronically through tablets, often citing dubious security concerns. See e.g., Samantha Melamed, “‘I Feel Hopeless’: Families Call New Pa. Prison Mail Policy Devastating,” Pittsburg Post-Gazette (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2018/10/17/sci-pennsylvania-prison-mail-policy-families-devastating/stories/201810170130 (new policy of scanning and reprinting incoming mail, based on allegations of drug smuggling, results in “missing pages, misdirected letters, weekslong delays, and copies so poor as to be illegible”); Katie Meyer, “Pennsylvania Prison Officials Change Mail Handling after Drug-Related Illnesses,” National Public Radio (Sep. 5, 2018),
facility receives a commission from a tablet-based e-book program, it might prohibit books from being sent to incarcerated people through the mail. Such conflicts will only become more pronounced as the prevalence of prison retailing grows.

D. Vendors

The final component of any prison retail transaction is the company that sells goods or services, and reaps the profits therefrom. Historically, these firms were niche companies that focused on a particular product, such as telephone service. These legacy companies have largely been absorbed by and consolidated into conglomerates that sell a variety of products pursuant to bundled contracts with facilities. Most of these new conglomerates (see Table 1) are owned by private equity firms. This ownership structure is not surprising given that prison-retail firms tend to have attributes that are highly prized in the private-equity world. Specifically, prison retailers enjoy high barriers to entry (long-term exclusive contracts with facilities, high capital requirements in the form of network build-outs, and increasing use of patents), dependable revenue streams (incarcerated customers and their families will prioritize paying for essential items like phone calls or basic hygiene items), and the potential for substantial revenue growth (as facilities become more receptive to allowing new fee-based services, like tablets). The following sections describe the basic contours of four major subsectors of prison retailing: telecommunications, commissary sales, financial services, and computer tablets.


51 As a rough indicator of company value, when Platinum Equity purchased Securus in 2017, it told regulators that it had arranged a loan of “up to an aggregate principal amount of $2.6 billion” to fund the transaction. See Letter to Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority from Raechel K. Kummer (counsel for Abry) and Catrina C. Kohn (counsel for Platinum Equity), Dkt. No. 00-12-20 (Jun. 15, 2017) (on file with author) (one of several identical disclosures filed with state public utility commissions concerning the Securus acquisition).
Table 1. Dominant Prison Retail Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Products/Services</th>
<th>Subsidiaries (not comprehensive)</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Tel/Link/GTL</td>
<td>Telecom, tablets, correctional banking</td>
<td>TouchPay Holdings (correctional banking)</td>
<td>American Securities (purchased GTL in 2011, from Veritas &amp; Goldman Sachs Direct, which jointly owned the company for two years).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securus Technologies</td>
<td>Telecom, tablets correctional banking</td>
<td>JPay (correctional banking)</td>
<td>Platinum Equity (purchased Securus in 2017 from Abry Partners, which acquired the company from Castle Partners in 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity Services Group</td>
<td>Commissary, telecom, correctional banking</td>
<td>Keefe Group (commissary) ICSolutions (ICS) Access Corrections (correctional banking)</td>
<td>H.I.G. Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Supply Group</td>
<td>Commissary unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Telecommunications

Any discussion of prison retailing must begin with telecommunications, given the comparatively long history of the ICS industry. Since the mid-twentieth century ascendance of the public switched telephone network, incarcerated people have typically had three options for communication: letters, in-person visitation, and telephone calls.52 These different channels have historically been insulated from naked rent-seeking. Postal rates are set to cover the broad costs of the postal network with its universal service mandate.53 In-person visiting often entails outlays of time and money on the part of the visitor, but does not produce significant revenue for facilities or private sector firms. Finally, telephone rates were, until comparatively recently, set by state and federal agencies who oversaw the highly regulated industry dominated by the Bell System and smaller independent operators.54 Phone pricing changed gradually but dramatically following the break-up of the Bell System and the subsequent passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which led to a proliferation of new companies in the ICS space, attracted by the prospects of high call volumes and unchecked rates.55

The contemporary ICS industry is dominated by two non-facilities-based telecommunications carriers that use VoIP-based platforms operating on lines leased from local exchange carriers. These companies—Securus and

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54 Raher, supra note 52, at 217-218.
55 Id. at 218.
GTL—have collectively absorbed dozens of competitors since the 1990s. The FCC determined that Securus, GTL, and a third company, Telmate, controlled 85% of the ICS telephone market (measured by revenue) in 2013. In 2017, GTL acquired Telmate.

Securus and GTL are aggressively pursuing new revenue sources, both in terms of emerging telecommunications technology and non-telecom businesses. As for the former category, so-called “video visitation” and electronic messaging are the latest newcomers. Video visitation allows incarcerated customers to communicate in real-time video with callers in the free world. Although this technology holds great promise, in that it allows for audio-visual communication across great distances, these benefits have been overshadowed by high rates and the efforts of some providers to couple video visitation with prohibitions on in-person visiting. Electronic messaging allows for the exchange of written messages (sometimes two-ways, other times only on an incoming basis) and sometimes photographs—a service somewhat like email, but without many of the technical features that free-world users have come to take for granted. Like video visitation, electronic messaging is potentially beneficial technology, but is known for high prices and unfair terms (such as stingy character limits on messages).

2. Commissary

Commissaries generally make money by acting as the only authorized vendor of items that are necessary for a minimally comfortable existence, but which are not provided by prison facilities. Commissary inventories are typically comprised of food (to supplement meager cafeteria meals), healthcare items, hygiene products, letter-writing supplies, religious items, and basic staples of everyday life like eating utensils, extension cords, and cleaning supplies.

The size of the prison commissary industry is difficult to estimate, but likely exceeds $1.6 billion in annual revenue. Average purchases per customer vary widely across correctional facilities (due to different regulations concerning allowable property and fluctuations in prices), but are often $600-900 annually. While there are likely more commissary operators in the field

57 Second Report & Order, supra note 41 at ¶ 76, 30 FCC Rcd. 12801.
60 See generally Raher, supra note 47.
62 Id.
than telecommunications firms, there has still been a wave of consolidation, with two companies dominating the commissary market—Union Supply Group, Inc. and private-equity owned Keefe Group. Unlike the ICS subsector, there seem to be a greater number of small fringe competitors in the commissary space, perhaps because of lower capital requirements.

3. Money Transmitters, Correctional Banking, and Release Cards

As previously discussed, incarcerated people rely largely on family members for the funds necessary to purchase goods and services inside. This structure has led to the proliferation of companies that profit from facilitating such transfers. Money transfers come in two varieties: transfers to inmate trust accounts, and direct payments for goods or services.

Inmate trust account is a term of art (specific terminology varies by jurisdiction) describing a deposit account held by a governmental entity for the benefit of an incarcerated person. Historically, inmate trust accounting has been a mundane subspecialty of government fiscal administration: agencies collected funds in the possession of people who come into custody, received deposits (i.e., wages earned during incarceration or money orders sent by families), issued checks or money orders for miscellaneous purchases, and ensured that account balances were disbursed to the accountholder upon his or her release from custody. Now, many agencies wish to outsource the management of such accounts, often bundling the straightforward tasks of trust fund accounting with other “correctional banking” services.

Traditionally, a family member would deposit funds to an trust account by sending a money order to the facility. While this funding method requires time for mailing, it has the benefit of allowing transferors to choose among a variety of money-order issuers operating in a competitive market. Contractors that hold correctional banking contracts tend to steer transferors

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64 According to Union Supply Group’s website (https://www.unionsupply.com/), the company was founded in 1991. The company thus appears to be unrelated to the similarly named Union Supply Company, which was (ironically), a large company-store operator that lasted well into the twentieth century, operating over 100 stores in the coal and coke industries in the eastern U.S. John A. Enman, Coal Company Store Prices Questioned: A Case Study of the Union Supply Company, 1905-1906, 41 Penn. Hist: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 52, 53-54 (1974).

65 See e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 5008 (Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation Secretary “shall deposit any funds of inmates in his or her possession in trust with the Treasurer”); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.014 (“The department shall take possession of all money that an inmate has on the inmate's person or that is received with the inmate when the inmate arrives at a facility to be admitted to the custody of the department and all money the inmate receives at the department during confinement and shall credit the money to an account created for the inmate.”); see also N.Y. Correct. Law § 187(3) (statute establishes trust accounting system, but only for wages earned).

away from low-cost money orders, in favor of an array of electronic or in-person payments, all of which carry high fees.67

As prison retailing opportunities grow, controlling access to the trust account begins to look more like an essential facility. Incarcerated people are increasingly expected to spend money on various goods and services. But to engage in such transactions incarcerated customers often rely on family members to transfer money into their trust account. Placing exclusive access to trust account deposits in the hands of one firm resembles a bottleneck monopoly,68 hurting both family members and prison retailers who are not affiliated with the bottleneck provider.

The other common type of money transfer is a payment directly to a vendor. These payments may be contemporaneous payments for goods or services; but, companies are increasingly encouraging customers to prepay, often subject to confusing and abusive terms of service. While prepayments are most common in the telecommunications subsector, commissary companies have also begun experimenting with prepayment options, possibly as a way to boost frequent small-dollar purchases of digital content. Although Keefe Group prominently states that its prepaid option is not the same as a trust-account deposit, Access Corrections does not (see Figure 1), leaving the possibility that some customers may use Access’s prepayment option under the mistaken assumption that they are sending money to a trust account.

The final financial transaction associated with a term of incarceration comes when a facility owes money to a person upon his or her release.

67 See infra Figure 3 for examples of fees. Oddly, automated clearing house (“ACH”) transfer is the one common payment channel that is hardly ever an option for trust-fund transfers. Given the strong security and low costs associated with ACH transfers, the lack of an ACH option is surprising, although it could be the result of vendors’ desire to avoid security-related investments that are required of online ACH originators. See Nat’l Automated Clearinghouse Ass’n, Operating Rule § 2.5.17.4 (2018) (additional warranties required for online ACH origination). While vendors that accept payment cards are likely expected, directly or indirectly, to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, these rules are largely focused on protecting confidential payment information in possession of a merchant, or during transmission. See Generally, “PCI Security Standards Council, Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures,” ver. 3.2.1 (May 2018), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf. In contrast, ACH security requirements are more focused on identity verification and fraud detection.

Typically this money consists of the final balance of an inmate trust account, although in the case of jails, it could simply be a refund of money that the releasee had in their possession at the time of arrest. The “release card” is a specialized payment product that has arisen to facilitate this type of disbursement. Release cards are open loop prepaid debit cards (typically branded as a MasterCard) which facilities use to make required payments to people upon their release. While there is nothing per se impermissible about making such payments via prepaid debit card, problems arise when facilities are unwilling to cover the costs of such a system. Under most release-card contracts, the correctional agency pays nothing and the card issuer makes money by charging cardholders a panoply of exorbitant fees. Making matters worse, most facilities that utilize release cards do not give people an option to receive release payments via a different method.

Correctional banking is big business. A rough extrapolation based on a small dataset (from four states) suggests that the principal amount of fund transfers to people in state prison systems could be around $1 billion a year. Another indicator of the profits that can be extracted from correctional banking comes from Securus’s 2015 acquisition of JPay. There is no public evidence of how much Securus paid, but a later transaction provides a clue. When private equity firm Platinum Equity acquired Securus in 2017, Securus disclosed its outstanding liability on an earnout provision related to its purchase of JPay. Specifically, the disclosure suggests that by 2017, Securus would likely owe JPay’s founder and other original owners about $20 million under the earnout clause (of course, this is on top of whatever money the founders received in 2015 when the sale actually closed).

4. Tablets: The New Frontier

The newest products to gain traction in the prison retail market are specialized computer tablets that provide communications, education, and entertainment functions, typically operating on a closed wireless network, but never with internet connectivity. Reviewers have found these tablets to be the technological equivalent of already-obsolete early-model handheld devices.
But tablets promise to help correctional staff by managing populations that suffer from chronic boredom.\textsuperscript{74} At the same time, the devices help prison retailers dramatically expand revenue opportunities. Some tablet programs, particularly in prison systems, provide tablets to users for free, but most features and content can only be accessed for a fee.\textsuperscript{75} Such fees tend to greatly exceed free-world prices, and there is no obvious cost-based reason for such pricing.\textsuperscript{76} In facilities where tablets are not provided for “free,” customers must either purchase a tablet (prices can range from $40-160) or pay a rental fee that can range anywhere from $5 to $150 per month.\textsuperscript{77}

Prison tablet programs are nearly universal in their offering of video games. No one has articulated the troublesome dynamic of encouraging videogame usage among incarcerated populations more persuasively than an unnamed resident of the Colorado Department of Corrections who told Denver’s Westword newspaper:

The average prisoner will play games and music 8-10 hours a day, just like any kid in America. Only they aren’t kids; they are men and women who need rehabilitation and education. This buys a lot of safety for prison staff, but what a waste of time for the prisoners. If they provided education, it would be marvelous. Prisoners might just learn something useful and not come back.\textsuperscript{78}

There is also something unsettling about promoting a product that could plausibly lead to addiction and dependency\textsuperscript{79} among a population with disproportionate rates of substance abuse.\textsuperscript{80}

Tablets do have potential to assist in educational programming, but

\textsuperscript{74} Without citing any evidence, GTL claims that its tablets produce “[s]ignificant decreases in inmate-on-inmate assaults, inmate-on-officer assaults, and rule and behavior code violations.” GTL, “Inspire Tablet Program Facility Benefits,” \url{http://www.gtl.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/GTL-Facility_Benefits.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{76} See infra, text accompanying notes 103-115.

\textsuperscript{77} Tablet pricing varies widely by facility and vendor. Some examples are: GTL’s $147 price tag for tablets in the Pennsylvania prison system. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. JPay’s tablet prices have been reported as ranging from $40 to $160. See infra note 146. Union Supply Group sells a tablet for $159. See infra note 148. As for rented tablets, Securus’s website lists eighteen county jails and one state prison system that allow month-to-month rentals, at prices ranging from $5 to $30 per month. Securus Technologies, Inc. “Order the SecureView Tablet for your loved one,” \url{https://www.securustablet.com/#/plans/start} (accessed Dec. 2, 2018). The jail in Knox County, Tennessee rents tablets for $4.99 per day, which can result in a monthly rate of approximately $150. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{80} U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, \textit{Drug Use, Dependence, and Abuse Among State Prisoners and Jail Inmates, 2017-2009}, NCJ Rpt. No. 250546 (Jun. 2017) (58% and 63% of residents of state prisons and jails, respectively, meet diagnostic criteria for drug dependence or abuse, compared to 5% of the general population).
only if adequate resources are invested in content and instruction. Technology by itself is not a solution. Although tablet providers are eager to hype educational uses, evidence of actual effective, salient, and high-quality content is lacking. To the extent that facilities are providing educational technology without also investing in instructors and curriculum, the educational potential will never be realized because unsupported technology cannot effectively substitute for socially-mediated pedagogy.

To illustrate the confusion about educational offerings, one need only visit JPay’s main webpage for family members, which includes a prominent banner ad touting the educational promise of its JP5 tablet (see Figure 5). Following the link, however, reveals that the tablet only provides access to an educational platform; content and instruction are apparently the responsibilities of others. Following yet another link brings the user to the webpage for JPay’s education program, which features stock images of graduation ceremonies, an emotionally manipulative video advertisement, vague statements about innovation and “leading-edge technology,” but absolutely no discussion of how facilities have obtained content and instruction, which facilities use the platform, or whether anyone has documented outcomes.

The versatility of tablets is both their major selling point and a wellspring of potential conflicts of interest. When a facility stands to financially profit from tablet usage, the opportunities for mischief are numerous: in-person visits can be prohibited in favor of video visitation; prison libraries or donated books can be cut off and replaced with e-books for purchase; postal mail can be restricted in order to increase electronic messaging usage; and educational programs can be curtailed to redirect students to online-only courses.

III. Unfair Industry Practices

Prison retailing is not only built on a generally inequitable business premise, but current industry leaders also use specific practices that are unfair, deceptive, or abusive. Some problems (such as price gouging) are a direct result of vendors’ unchecked monopoly powers, while other issues (such as oppressive contract terms) are similar to problems commonly confronted by

84 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
85 See supra, notes 48-49.
86 Although the author did not find any documented cases of online fee-based courses replacing in-person instruction, as a general matter, total prison spending on education decreased on a nationwide basis by 6% between 2009 and 2012. Lois M. Davis, et al., “Correctional Education in the United States: How Effective Is it, and How Can We Move the Field Forward,” RAND Corp. (2014), at 3.
consumers in other settings. Prison retailers employ some practices that are potentially unlawful, while others are unseemly but legal. It can sometimes be difficult, however, to pin down company practices due to the pervasive lack of transparency that characterizes the entire correctional sector. Bureaucratic hostility to transparency can result in information asymmetry that causes some consumers to spend money without fully understanding the terms of the transaction. Others who do understand the vendor’s terms are nonetheless unable to avoid them.

Of the unfair practices that are publicly known, most are highly structured and clearly intentional, bespeaking corporate cultures dominated by greed. When plaintiffs challenging ICS rates and practices in Illinois referenced the greed of the industry, Circuit Judge Richard Posner dismissed the characterization by remarking that the prison system is “said to be motivated by greed, but greed that is institutional rather than personal. Far from being mere agents of the phone companies, the prisons are in the driver’s seat, because it is they who control access to the literally captive market constituted by the inmates.” On the one hand, Posner is correct in pointing out the power exercised by correctional agencies, and his framing of the issue seems to be a defense of public budgeting decisions—a normative matter that many would agree is subject to judicial review only for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with applicable constitutional or statutory requirements. Nonetheless, this pat formulation ignores the very real greed on the part of private equity companies that have built a business model based on using the coercive power of the state to extract revenue from poor people in the form of exorbitant prices for phone calls or junk food. Of course, greed is not necessarily illegal. It can, however, motivate companies to use particular practices that are unlawful. This section discusses common types of unfair practices, while the subsequent section explores potential legal remedies.

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87 See Confronting Confinement: A Report of the Commission on Safety & Abuse in America’s Prisons 102 (John Gibbons & Nicholas Katzenbach, co-chairs) (Jun. 2006) (“The prevailing view of correctional facilities as shrouded and unknowable reflects the shortage of meaningful and reliable data about health and safety, violence and victimization; ignorance about what information is available; and the difficulty of accessing and interpreting much of the data that corrections departments collect but do not widely disseminate or explain.”).

88 Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2001).

89 It is difficult to overstate the disadvantage that the public has in not being able to gain a clear picture of vendor finances. Securus, for example, markets itself to facilities as a “partner” that puts facilities ahead of its own profits, as supposedly evidenced by Securus’s below-market EBITDA. Securus RFP Response, infra note 180, at 13. While Securus’s healthy EBITDA ratio of 27.9% may be lower than some publicly-traded telecommunications carriers, Securus’s audited financial statements provide no detail on how much the company pays to its parent, Platinum Equity, in monitoring fees. This is a critical piece of information, since monitoring fees can be substantial, and are arguably equity dividends disguised as expenses. See Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, “Fees, Fees, and More Fees: How Private Equity Abuses Its Limited Partners and U.S. Taxpayers,” Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research (May 2016), at 26-29.
A. **Masquerading as Cream: Inflated Prices and Inefficient Payment Systems**

*Things are seldom what they seem*

*Skim milk masquerades as cream*

—*H.M.S. Pinafore*, act II, scene 1

The leading complaints from prison-retail customers focus on high prices and payment mechanisms that are inefficient, confusing, or otherwise unfair. Although prison retailers are likely to make vague claims of security in response to such complaints, these arguments often do not hold up under scrutiny and it is difficult to see prison-retail prices as anything other than premium rates charged for inexpensive, run-of-the mill goods or services. Moreover, while vendors are quick to point out security features which add to their costs, they conveniently gloss over expenses incurred by free-world retailers that are inapplicable in a prison setting (such as advertising and operating a brick-and-mortar retail network).

The factual record concerning ICS prices is particularly robust thanks to the multi-year rulemaking conducted by the FCC. The Commission’s involvement with the industry dates back to 1993, when ICS carriers asked the FCC to deregulate payphone rates in correctional facilities. The FCC ultimately granted the request mere days before the entire telecommunications industry changed with the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. As part of Congress’s sweeping reorganization of wireline phone service, section 276 of the 1996 Act directed the FCC to ensure that payphone operators were “fairly compensated,” while also classifying all “inmate telephone service in correctional institutions” as *per se* “payphone service.” Armed with this provision, ICS carriers quickly took aim at a handful of states that had set caps on intrastate calling rates in prisons and jails. In 1996, a coalition of ICS carriers petitioned the FCC to preempt state regulation of intrastate ICS rates, citing the newly enacted § 276, but the FCC declined the request. The next major move regarding ICS regulation came when incarcerated people and their families went on the offensive, filing the landmark *Wright* class action. After months of motion practice, the district court referred the matter to the FCC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, but the Commission waited nearly ten years before commencing a rulemaking proceeding.

In 2015, when the FCC issued interim rate caps on ICS calls, it required carriers to submit detailed accounting data itemizing the functional

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92 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1) and (d).
94 See *supra*, notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
95 *Wright v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, No. 00-cv-293-GK (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2001), ECF No. 94 (order dismissing case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction); *id.*, ECF No. 105 (order modifying order of dismissal, and staying case pending FCC rulemaking); see also *infra* note 260 and accompanying text.
expenses of providing service to incarcerated customers. At the outset of the Wright rulemaking, the Commission had discovered rates ranging up to $1.15 per minute. Upon reviewing the expense data collected under the interim rule, the FCC concluded in 2015 that permanent rate caps of 11¢ per minute would allow ICS providers to cover their costs and be fairly compensated. The final 2015 rules also allowed carriers to charge some ancillary fees in addition to the per-minute rate, but the type and amount of such fees were strictly limited, in an effort to restrain the carriers’ “ability and incentive to continue to increase such charges unchecked by competitive forces.”

Importantly, even though the rate caps lowered the per-minute revenues collected by carriers, the new rates allowed customers to place more calls, thereby offsetting lower per-call profit margins. In mid-2015, Securus told potential investors in a private briefing that the interim caps had “neutral to . . . modestly positive EBITDA impact including some positive elasticity of demand,” and the company expected the same result under the yet-to-be-issued final rate caps.

Once the FCC signaled its intent to regulate calling rates, ICS carriers focused on identifying new unregulated sources of revenue. New communications channels and computer tablets offer carriers numerous opportunities to charge inflated prices and collect the resulting profits. Electronic messaging systems, for example, charge from 5¢ to $1.25 per message, with most facilities setting rates around 50¢. Messages sent on these systems are text-only, and are subject to character limits, ranging from 1,500 to 6,000 characters. Some systems allow family members to attach photos or videos, or send e-cards, but these features inevitably cost extra.

Why should a plain-text message

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98 Id. ¶ 35, 28 FCC Rec. at 14126.
99 Second Report & Order, supra note 41, at ¶ 58, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12792 (The FCC imposed an 11¢-per-minute rate cap on calls from prisons, while using a three-tiered system of higher per-minute rates for calls from jails (varying based on facility population). In justifying the rate caps, the FCC stated that even the lowest rate cap of 11¢ “is greater than the average per minute cost of each of the more efficient reporting providers.”).
100 Id. ¶¶ 144-147, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12838-40.
102 See infra text accompanying note 250.
103 Raher, supra note 47, at 13-14.
104 Id. at 20.
cost 50¢ per message when email is free to practically everyone outside of prison? Vendors typically argue that there are costs to running the system. Setting aside the question of whether these costs should be borne by correctional systems instead of families, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that end-user prices are reasonably related to vendor costs. Messaging prices typically hover around the cost of a first-class postage stamp (JPay even goes so far as to denominate its prices in numbers of “stamps” – see Figure 2), yet postal rates are set to cover the costs of a universal system of delivering mail to every address in the country—an expense structure totally unrelated to the cost of running a closed proprietary text messaging platform.\footnote{Raher, \textit{supra} note 47, at 14-15.}

Inflated prices are also evident in sales of electronic music and books. Under a 2016 contract with the Colorado Department of Corrections (since cancelled), GTL was allowed to charge up to $19.99 per month for a digital music subscription.\footnote{See generally, Stephen Raher, “The Wireless Prison: How Colorado’s Tablet Computer Program Misses Opportunities and Monetizes the Poor,” Prison Policy Initiative Blog (Jul. 6, 2017), \url{https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/07/06/tablets/}.} This price, which is twice the rate for free-world services like Spotify or Google Play, is difficult to justify when one considers that GTL’s music catalog appears to be about one-tenth the size of Spotify or Apple.\footnote{Id.} In 2014, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections awarded a contract to GTL to operate a tablet program, including an e-book feature. After the program started, the Department attempted to prohibit people from receiving purchased or donated books from any other source.\footnote{Wanda Bertram, “\textit{Philadelphia Inquirer} exposes Pennsylvania’s complicity in cutting off incarcerated people’s access to books,” Prison Policy Initiative Blog (Sept. 21, 2018), \url{https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/09/21/pennsylvania-ebooks/}.} Although the book ban was quickly repealed,\footnote{Samantha Malamed, “Under Pressure, Pa. Prisons Repeal Restrictive Book Policy,” \textit{Philadelphia Inquirer} (Nov. 2, 2018), \url{http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania-book-ban-doc-books-through-bars-wetzel-20181102.html}.} the e-book program is still in place, with prices that consistently exceed free-world prices by a wide margin. The Pennsylvania program does not provide free tablets, so a customer must first purchase a tablet for $147 plus tax.\footnote{Penn. Dept. of Corr., “Tablets,” \url{https://www.cor.pa.gov/Inmates/Pages/Tablets.aspx} (accessed Nov. 29, 2018).} After that substantial outlay, the customer must still purchase e-books from a list of roughly 8,800 titles.\footnote{“GTL E-book Availability List,” \url{https://www.cor.pa.gov/Inmates/Documents/master-ebook-list.pdf} (accessed Nov. 29, 2018).} An
analysis of fifty randomly selected titles indicates that GTL charges $3-6 for public-domain titles that are available for free as Kindle e-books on Amazon.com; remaining titles are priced at an average rate of 130% over the Kindle price.\footnote{Using a randomized process, the author selected fifty titles from the GTL e-book list and searched for Kindle versions on Amazon.com. Four titles were discarded from the sample because they were not available on Amazon, and an additional title was discarded because it existed in multiple editions. Of the forty-five titles that are available from both sources, eight are public domain works which are available for free on Amazon, but for which GTL charges $2.99 (three titles) or $5.99 (four titles). The remaining thirty-seven works were available for an average price of $9.40 from Amazon versus an average of $17.15 from GTL. GTL’s prices exceeded Amazon’s by an average of 130%, ranging from a low premium of 30% ($20.99 for a book sold on Amazon for $15.99) to a high of 808% ($8.99 for a book sold on Amazon for 99¢).}

Finally, fees charged for sending money to a trust account are reliably high, without any readily apparent cost-based justification. Neither Access Corrections nor TouchPay (owned by GTL) publish their fees, but JPay routinely charges fees that equate to 20-35% for smaller deposits (Figure 3). When a plaintiff incarcerated in Kansas challenged deposit fees, that state’s supreme court noted that the plaintiff’s mother incurred monthly fees of $11.40 to deposit $45 into his trust account (a 25% markup).\footnote{Matson v. Kan. Dept. of Corr., 301 Kan. 654, 659-660 (2015).}

Non-cost-based pricing also appears in the form of “premium” add-ons. For example, Securus charges one “stamp” to send a text-only electronic message.\footnote{Securus Technologies, “eMessaging,” \url{https://securustech.net/emessaging} (accessed Jan. 3, 2019).} Before sending a message, a family member must decide whether to prepay (one additional stamp) for their loved-one’s reply—if no reply is sent, then this additional amount is simply wasted. The family member may also attach up to five photographs, for an additional stamp.

Assuming Securus is economically rational, the typical 50¢ base price for a text-only message would be adequate to cover the overhead of operating the electronic messaging network. Thus, the marginal cost of adding photos to a message would consist of the additional storage capacity necessary to hold the additional files. Assuming that a customer attaches the maximum five photographs, at the maximum allowed size (3 megabytes per photo), this would require Securus to store 15 megabytes of data, which entails storage costs of less than one-tenth of a cent.\footnote{Pricing information was obtained from Andy Klein, “Hard Drive Cost Per Gigabyte,” \url{https://www.backblaze.com/blog/hard-drive-cost-per-gigabyte/} (Jul. 11, 2017), which quotes pricing from Seagate of $49.99 for a 1 terabyte drive, yielding a cost of $5 per gigabyte. Given the maximum attachment size of 15 MB (or 0.015 GB), Securus’s approximate marginal cost is calculated as follows: 5¢ \times 0.015GB = 0.075¢.} Even if one were to add some additional amount to allow Securus to recoup the cost of developing or licensing the software to receive and transmit such digital files, it is hard to imagine a situation where such recovery would
justify charging 50¢ to send five digital photos. But in facilities that have implemented mandatory mail-scanning policies, such electronic systems are the only practical way for family members to share pictures with their loved ones.

Sometimes vendors are able to charge customers premium prices for the privilege of avoiding problems that are created by the vendor itself. For example, Securus provides video visitation and electronic messaging in the Knox County, Tennessee jail, but customers often complain about having to wait in line for a fifteen minute session at a kiosk in a crowded unit. To avoid the hassle and lack of privacy that comes with using a shared kiosk, customers can access the same features on an individual tablet, for which they must pay $4.99 per day plus regular messaging fees.

In addition to prices that are unjustly high, consumers are also confronted by confusing or inefficient payment options which can hinder informed decision-making. To begin, the number of potential payment options can be bewildering, because vendors often encourage customers to make advance payments for specific types of services. But even if one vendor operates a facility’s phone system and electronic messaging system, prepayment for one type of communication often cannot be later redirected to a different service offered by the same vendor. For example, depending on the type of service someone is seeking to purchase, a relative of someone in the Colorado prison system must choose between five different payment options,

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116 See supra note 49.
117 Lakin, supra note 83.
which differ in terms of transaction fees and refund provisions (see Figure 4).

### Figure 4. Payment Options - Colorado DOC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance Pay Phone</td>
<td>Customer prepays for collect calls from incarcerated relative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN/Debit</td>
<td>Customer prepays for debit calls from incarcerated relative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messaging</td>
<td>Customer prepays for electronic messages to and from incarcerated relative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debit Link</td>
<td>Customer buys &quot;points&quot; that incarcerated relative can then spend on certain digital content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Fund</td>
<td>Customer transfers money to incarcerated person's trust account.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even if a consumer can decipher payment options, the associated terms can make it nearly impossible to determine what payment method is the most economically rational. To the extent that processing fees are high, one might assume that making fewer prepayments in larger amounts is the most rational course. But this type of prepayment can be disadvantageous when vendor terms and conditions provide for forfeiture of prepaid amounts in various situations. For example, Securus—like all electronic messaging providers—requires prepayment for messages. Not only are such prepayments non-refundable, but they also expire 180 days after the date of purchase.118 Given that people in prison can lose access to electronic messaging as a disciplinary measure, it is not hard to imagine situations where family members could prepay for a large quantity of electronic messages, only to lose the money when their relative is subject to disciplinary sanctions. Securus allows refunds for video visitation sessions in some limited circumstances,119 but the refund is only issued in the form of an account credit, which itself expires after 90 days.120 Anecdotal evidence also indicates that prepayment forfeiture can be a problem when a correctional facility changes ICS carriers without a provision for transfer of prepaid balances.


119 See infra, notes 139-141 and accompanying text.

120 Securus T&C, supra note 118, Secure Video Visitation Service Terms.
Prison-retail vendors price their products as if they are selling cream, when in fact they are trafficking in skim milk. In normal markets, such behavior is mitigated by competition and consumer choice, but not so inside prison walls.

B. What Law Applies?

When evaluating the rights and remedies of a party to a commercial transaction, the first task is to determine what law applies. In the case of prison retailing, this poses some unique challenges, beginning with incarcerated people’s pervasive lack of access to even basic transactional information. To the extent that a contract is exclusively available on the internet, an incarcerated customer is simply unable to access the document;\(^{121}\) on the other hand, if the customer agrees to “browser wrap” terms and conditions displayed on a kiosk or tablet, she may well be unable to save, study, or share this text with a friend or advisor, for lack of email or a printer. Prison-retail customers also face challenges that are common to many consumers in non-prison settings, such as dense terms written in impossibly small print. In fact, when formerly incarcerated people in Georgia filed a class action complaint challenging the legality of release cards, the court declined to rule on the enforceability of the cardholder agreement until the card-issuer filed a reformatted version in typeface that was large enough for the court to read.\(^{122}\)

Once a customer determines the terms of the contract governing a purchase, the next analytical step is to compare the provisions of the consumer-facing contract to the terms of the contract between the vendor and the correctional facility. The facility-vendor contract often contains more detail and is typically a negotiated agreement, in contrast to the adhesive terms presented to end users on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In a typical telecommunications contract, for example, Securus warrants to a county jail that its delivery of video visitation service will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner.\(^{123}\) In sharp contrast, family members signing up to use the same service are required to assent to terms and conditions that purport to disclaim all warranties, express, implied, or statutory.\(^{124}\) Because end-users are not parties to the facility-vendor contracts, these contracts cannot enlarge or

\(^{121}\) See supra note 72 and accompanying text.


\(^{123}\) E.g., Master Services Agreement between Securus Technologies, Inc. and Fort Bend County (Texas) (dated Feb. 6, 2018), Exh. C. at 16 (on file with author) (“[Securus] warrants that the services it provides as contemplated by this Schedule [including video visitation] will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner.”).

\(^{124}\) Securus T&C, supra note 118, General Terms § 8(A) (service “is provided on an ‘as is’ and ‘as available’ basis. Securus and its suppliers, licensors, and other related parties, and their respective officers, agents, representatives, and employees expressly disclaim all warranties of any kind, whether express, statutory or implied, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title, accuracy of data and non-infringement” (emphasis deleted)).
diminish consumers’ rights.\textsuperscript{125} There is a possibility that unreasonable discrepancies between a vendor-facility contract and an end-user contract could form the basis for a UDAP claim, to the extent that vendors have won monopoly contracts based on certain representations or warranties that are ultimately rendered illusory as far as the end-user is concerned, due to exculpatory provisions in consumer-facing contracts.\textsuperscript{126}

Finally, in the telecommunications context, it is important to determine whether a given service is covered by a publicly-filed tariff. Not only do tariffs provide important information about terms of service, but a true tariff may implicate the filed-rate doctrine. This doctrine “is a court-created rule to bar suits against regulated utilities involving allegations concerning the reasonableness” of rates contained in a filed tariff.\textsuperscript{127} Although some courts have dismissed ICS litigation under the filed-rate doctrine, it does not insulate carriers from every type of claim. For example, a retroactive claim for money damages is likely to fail, but a claim for injunctive relief may well survive a motion to dismiss.\textsuperscript{128} Even though the doctrine is usually invoked defensively by carriers, the possibility remains that ICS users may sometimes be able to use the doctrine offensively. Because website terms and conditions are so exculpatory,\textsuperscript{129} a tariff reviewed and approved by a regulatory may well provide greater customer relief by, for example, allowing claims based on the carrier’s gross negligence, willful neglect, or willful misconduct. Under the filed-rate doctrine, the terms in the tariff would be binding, because a carrier cannot “employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices . . . except as specified in [a filed tariff].”\textsuperscript{130}

The larger problem with application of the filed-rate doctrine to ICS litigation is that the basic rationale for the doctrine has largely disappeared, particularly at the federal level. The doctrine is grounded in judicial deference to the regulatory rate-setting process. But as jurisdictions increasingly deregulate telecommunications rates, tariffs are often not reviewed and approved by public utility commissions. On the federal level, tariffs for any

\textsuperscript{125} Not only do vendor-facility contracts invariably contain express disclaimers of third-party beneficiaries, but common law doctrine is particularly hostile to third-party beneficiary status in the context of government contracts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 313 (1981).

\textsuperscript{126} See infra § IV.C.

\textsuperscript{127} 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Utilities § 62 (2011).

\textsuperscript{128} The most informative judicial opinion on the filed-rate doctrine as applied to ICS carriers is Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001), in which plaintiffs brought claims under § 1983 and the Sherman Antitrust Act, concerning ICS rates and procurement. Citing the filed-rate doctrine, the district court dismissed all claims. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Posner found that the Sherman Act claims should not have been dismissed under the filed-rate doctrine, but that they were nonetheless properly dismissed on the merits. \textit{Id.} at 563 (“If the plaintiffs in this case wanted to get a rate change, the . . . [filed-rate] doctrine . . . would kick in; but they do not, so it does not. \textit{Eventually} they want a different rate, of course, but at present all they are seeking is to clear the decks—to dissolve an arrangement that is preventing the telephone company defendants from competing to file tariffs more advantageous to the inmates.”). See also, Daleure v. Kentucky 119 F.Supp.2d 683, 690 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (dismissing plaintiffs’ damages claims against ICS carriers under the filed-rate doctrine, but allowing claims for injunctive relief under the Sherman Act to proceed).

\textsuperscript{129} See infra § III.C.

\textsuperscript{130} Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Central Ofc. Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 221-222 (1998).
type of interstate phone service (in- or outside of prison) are no longer required under FCC rule. Instead, non-dominant carriers like ICS companies must publicly disclose rates and terms (confusingly, some providers comply with this obligation by posting a document that they refer to as a “tariff” even though it is governed by the FCC’s detariffing order). The posting of rates is meant to allow consumers to make informed choices—a concept that is has no relevance in the world of monopoly ICS contracts. When issuing its detariffing rule, the FCC concluded that elimination of tariffs would “eliminat[e] the ability of carriers to invoke the ‘filed-rate’ doctrine,” but some have argued that the FCC lacks the authority to abolish this judicially-created rule. The resulting confusion has led some courts to apply the doctrine to ICS rate challenges, even though such rates have long been detariffed at the federal level. At the state level, when the prospect of robust regulation threatens to erode profits, ICS carriers have been known to strategically detariff services in order to escape regulatory jurisdiction, although such efforts are not always successful. Accordingly, it is only fair to provide reciprocal treatment for ratepayers, by eliminating the filed-rate doctrine for detariffed services.

C. Terms of Service: Carrying a Bad Joke Too Far

As alluded to in the previous section, terms and conditions thrust onto prison-retail consumers are unfairly one-sided. While contracts of adhesion have become commonplace in all types of consumer transactions, the extremity of some prison-retail terms raise questions about what, if anything, a customer is actually purchasing. The terms for Securus’s video visitation product begin with a cheerful declaration that the service “allows users to avoid the time,

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132 Id. ¶ 84, 11 FCC Rcd. at 20776.
133 Id. ¶ 55, 11 FCC Rcd. at 20762.
135 E.g., Daleure v. Kentucky, 119 F.Supp.2d 683, 686 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (applying the filed-rate doctrine upon finding “State and federal regulatory agencies approved all of the . . . rates” challenged in the complaint (emphasis added)). In contrast, the correct result was reached in Antoon v. Securus Tech., No. 5:17-cv-5008, 2017 WL 2124466 (W.D. Ark. May 15, 2017), where the court denied a motion to dismiss under filed-rate doctrine because Securus utilizes VoIP technology and the Arkansas Public Service Commission lacks jurisdiction over VoIP services or provider.
137 See In re Securus Tech., Order Denying Withdrawal of Tariff, Dkt. No. TF-2017-0041 (Iowa Utils. Bd., Feb. 9, 2018) (denying Securus’s motion to withdraw its tariff because, even though the company was no longer a “telephone utility” under state law, it was still an “alternative operator service company,” which is required to file a tariff under state law (see Iowa Code Ann. § 476:91)).
138 The title of this section is admiringly borrowed from Peter Aleses and Jason Hopkins’ masterful analysis of U.C.C. § 4-103(a), Carrying A Good Joke Too Far, 83 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 879 (2008).
expense and hassle of travelling to and from a correctional facility,” but a
subsequent provision specifies that “Securus makes no representations or
guarantees about the ability of the service to work properly, completely, or at
all.”139 All fees are “pre-paid and non-refundable,” but Securus will, in “limited
situations,” consider issuing a discretionary refund, although it will not issue
refunds “for disconnects initiated by the correctional facility, or disconnects due
to Internet connection or hardware malfunctions.”140 Indeed, the same policy
states that discretionary refunds will only be issued in situations where
“Securus cancels a paid Video Visitation session before the session begins,”141
which indicates that the company’s policy is to never issue a refund for a
disconnected session, even if the disconnect was caused by a failure of
Securus’s own network.

Unsurprisingly, mandatory arbitration provisions and class-action
prohibitions are ubiquitous in prison retail terms. GTL includes a broad
arbitration and class-action ban in its terms, although it fails to identify an
arbitral forum,142 thus raising questions about enforceability. JPay publishes
separate terms and conditions for its various services and products, all of which
provide for mandatory arbitration before JAMS.143 Although prison retailers
are not always successful in enforcing arbitration agreements, the industry (like
others) presumably learns from its missteps and engages in ongoing efforts to
fashion more ironclad contractual provisions.144 The major failure in terms of
arbitration provisions has been release cards, because courts have largely found
that cardholders were given no other way to obtain their money, and therefore
any agreement to arbitrate was not voluntary.145

As computer tablets and their hefty price tags become more prevalent
inside correctional facilities, so too does the relevance of consumer warranty
law. Prison retailers’ end-user terms and conditions governing the sales of
goods are replete with questionable provisions. The most noticeable problem is
the appallingly short warranty periods covering expensive computer tablets.
JPay tablets can cost up to $160,146 but the devices are “not warranted to
operate without failure” and are covered only by a warranty against “material

139 Securus T&C, supra note 118, Prod. Terms & Conditions § 6 and Gen’l Terms & Conditions
§ 9.
141 Id.
142 Global Tel*Link Corp. Terms & Conditions (dated Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.gtl.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/GTL%20NET%20Terms%20of%20Use%203-30-2015.pdf (accessed
Dec. 3, 2018).§ R.
143 E.g., JPay, Inc., “Payments Terms of Service,”
144 For example, GTL lost a motion to compel arbitration as to most of the named plaintiffs in a
New Jersey class action because most of the plaintiffs had created their accounts through GTL’s
automated interactive voice recognition system, and had not taken any affirmative steps to
demonstrate acceptance of the arbitration provision. James v. Global Tel*Link Corp, et al., No.
145 See infra notes 314-315 and accompanying text.
146 Victoria Law, “Captive Audience: How Companies Make Millions Charging Prisoners to
Send an Email,” Wired (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/jpay-securus-prison-email-
charging-millions/ (citing prices ranging from $40 to $160, depending on the prison system).
defects in design and manufacture” lasting ninety days from the first time of use. Commissary company Union Supply sells tablets in the California state prison system. Although Union Supply’s warranty period is nominally 180 days, any warranty claims made after the ninetieth day require payment of a $50 “non-refundable administrative and processing fee” (an amount equal to nearly one-third of the device’s purchase price). The Union Supply contract further makes the dubious claim that tablets are “customized” goods and therefore buyers may not obtain a refund under any circumstances (even if a family member mistakenly purchases a tablet for a loved one housed in a facility that does not allow tablets)—a provision that is likely unenforceable as an unreasonable restriction on a buyer’s right to inspect and reject purchased goods.

In summary, the terms and conditions propagated by prison retailers serve as a concrete reminder that no one is protecting the interests of consumers in this sector. Correctional procurement staff appear to be entirely uninterested in what terms are imposed on consumers. Left to their own devices, vendors draft terms that are so one-sided it is difficult to call them contracts. While some onerous provisions may well be unenforceable under applicable consumer protection statutes, customers are left to figure out this legal puzzle on their own; and, of course, a customer’s ability to exercise their legal rights may be hindered or extinguished entirely given the frequent use of arbitration provisions and class adjudication prohibitions.

D. Advertising, Privacy, and Consumer Psychology

Incarceration, for many people, is a prolonged, slow-motion disruption of normal life, punctuated by periods of unpredictable violence. Certain aspects of incarceration can be analogized to being trapped in a natural disaster: you are cut off from loved ones, physical harm is a constant threat, and the future is full of unknowns. Many areas of the law provide special protection for people who must procure critical goods or services in stressful situations: price-gouging

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149 Id. The claim of custom-made status is based on the fact that Union Supply asks purchasers to select electronic content during the purchase process, and that content is then installed on the device that is shipped. The legal relevance of this so-called customization is unclear. As a practical matter, the content loading does not have any impact on the seller’s ability to re-sell the device, because—according to Union Supply’s own terms of service—content is loaded onto a removable SD card.
150 See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-513 (buyer’s right to inspect tendered goods) and 2-601 (buyer’s rights on improper delivery). See also U.C.C. § 2-719(1) and cmt. 1 (parties may contractually modify remedial provisions of U.C.C. Article 2, but “they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.”).
statutes prevent unfair fuel pricing in a natural disaster,\(^\text{151}\) the Federal Trade Commission prohibits exploitation of grieving relatives purchasing funeral services,\(^\text{152}\) and countless occupations (from hearing aid salespeople\(^\text{153}\) to pawnbrokers\(^\text{154}\)) are subject to wide-ranging regulatory systems designed to protect consumers whose ability to protect their interests may be impaired. In the case of prison retailing, however, there is a dramatic lack of structural safeguards against exploitation.

Meanwhile, prison retail companies (likely motivated by dual desires to increase sales and disguise the greed that shapes their business models) use advertising to portray themselves as caring providers who hold the precious keys to comfort (commissary items), normalcy (communication with family members), or post-incarceration survival (educational opportunities). The industry’s advertising practices raise questions about the unchecked power—both persuasive and coercive—of prison retail vendors.

The simplest type of misleading advertising is a mere promise of hope based on incomplete facts. For example, family members who want to send money or an electronic message through JPay must go to the company’s homepage, where a prominent banner ad cycles through various messages immediately next to the sign-up form. One such message (Figure 5) tells family members that “your loved one can access education platforms” via the JPay tablet. The reference to “educational platforms,” accompanied by images of the formal trappings of academia, evokes thoughts of intellectual engagement and increased earning potential. In actuality, the platforms referenced in the ad consist of “KA Lite” and “JPay’s Lantern.” The ad does not mention the limitations of the two platforms. KA Lite is a collection of open-source videos that JPay has acquired, presumably for free, and makes available for “self-guided learning.”\(^\text{155}\) Lantern, meanwhile, is not a universal education program, but is simply a platform that each facility can choose to

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\(^{152}\) 16 C.F.R., pt. 453.


utilize or not. While JPay has clearly invested in a slick marketing campaign, it does not appear to adequately disclose the limitations of its product.

A series of advertisements by Securus illustrate how marketing can raise concerns about consumer privacy. The campaign, which uses the tag-line “Connecting to what matters,” features extensive excerpts from what appear to be actual video visitation sessions with incarcerated fathers and their minor children. The videos use unsettling intimate footage, featuring men using video visitation to see their children engaged in normal childhood activity like homework or celebrating holidays (see Figure 6). It is not clear whether the people in the ads are actors or actual customers, but given the lack of a disclaimer, one would assume the footage depicts actual users. Even though

![Figure 6. Images from Securus’s advertisement “Be There,” available at](https://www.ispot.tv/ad/Axgw/securus-technologies-video-visitation-celebrating-christmas)

Author’s note: Using this ad image presents an ethical challenge. On the one hand, an image is worth the proverbial thousand words. On the other hand, it is awkward to criticize the exploitation of families and then use a screenshot of a child who may not have consented to the use of his likeness. In the end, I have erred on the side of transparency, but not without second thoughts.

156 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. JPay’s education page claims that “Tens of thousands of incarcerated students have earned college credits, studied for their GEDs, and participated in other educational activities through JPay’s Lantern.” JPay, supra note 81. The lack of details raises immediate questions about the meaning of this claim, along with the imprecise spectrum that encompasses everything from earning college credit to “participating in other educational activities.”


158 The FTC’s advertising endorsement rules require disclosure when actors are used to portray customers. 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(c) (“Advertisements presenting endorsements by what are
Securus’s privacy policy warns customers that they should have no expectation of privacy, the policy only speaks of call content being used for law enforcement purposes, with no mention of marketing activities. To the extent that the individuals in the videos are not actual customers, then the lack of a disclaimer likely constitutes a deceptive advertising practice, since their reactions do not accurately reflect those of real users. Alternatively, to the extent that the ads do depict actual customers, one wonders whether the customers were compensated for use of their images, and if so, what they received? Was separate compensation paid to the children in the ads, and were non-incarcerated parents consulted? Even if Securus complied with all applicable laws, the use of children in these ads evidences a disturbing willingness to disregard customer privacy and exploit the very personal pain that children of incarcerated parents frequently experience.

Apart from concerns about advertising, Securus’s use of video visitation footage of children as part of its Threads database appears to be a likely violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”). While the application of COPPA to VoIP calls is less than clear, the statute almost certainly applies to ICS video visitation services. As relevant in this context, COPPA (through its implementing regulations promulgated by the FTC) prohibits the “collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from children” without the verifiable consent of the child’s parent (“children” are defined as children under thirteen). “Personal information includes not just contact information but also “[a] photograph, video, or audio file where such file contains a child’s image or voice.” Securus’s description of its Threads product makes it clear that video recordings are shared with facilities and agencies throughout the country, which—when it comes to recordings of children—seems to be a rather clear-cut violation of COPPA. Notably, represented, directly or by implication, to be ‘actual consumers’ should utilize actual consumers . . . or clearly and conspicuously disclose that the persons in such advertisements are not actual consumers of the advertised product.”). Although the consumers in the Securus ads do not make any express statements concerning the video visitation product, their presence in the advertisements still constitutes an “endorsement” under the FTC’s expansive definition. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) and example 5.

159 See infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.

160 See Justice Strategies, Children on the Outside: Voicing the Pain and Human Costs of Parental Incarceration 5 (2011) (“Unlike children of the deceased or divorced who tend to benefit from society’s familiarity with and acceptance of their loss, children of the incarcerated too often grow up and grieve under a cloud of low expectations and amidst a swirling set of assumptions that they will fail, that they will themselves resort to a life of crime or that they too will succumb to a life of drug addiction.”).

161 See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.


163 COPPA applies to “operators of websites,” defined as “any person who operates a website on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains personal information from or about the users of . . . such website or online service . . . where such website or online service is operated for commercial purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2).

164 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1).

165 Id. § 6501(1).

166 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.

167 COPPA prohibits unauthorized “disclosure” of children’s information, with disclosure defined as “the release of personal information collected from a child in identifiable form by an operator
COPPA’s parental consent provisions highlight just how abusive Securus’s terms of service are. COPPA covers the “collection” of information, the “use” of information (by the website operator who collected the information), and the “distribution” of information (to third parties). The implementing rules expressly provide that parents be given “the option to consent to the collection and use of the child’s personal information without consenting to disclosure of his or her personal information to third parties.” Securus runs roughshod over this rule, by not offering such an option to parents, but rather announcing as a foregone conclusion that video contents will be shared with law enforcement. Violations of COPPA’s implementing regulations may form the basis for a private cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices under the FTC Act.

Finally, prison retailers are apt to steer vulnerable consumers into unneeded or inefficient transactions by leveraging the emotional impulses of concerned family members. For example, family members who use JPay may receive automated emails identified as coming from a specific incarcerated correspondent (Figure 7). The message, written in the first person, states “I wanted to let you know that my Media Account balance is running low. . . . Your support is appreciated, and it’s really easy to fund my Media Account.” Money transfer instructions then follow. Only at the end of the message is there a disclaimer (partially cut off on an iPhone 6, which has a healthy screen height of 5.43 inches) stating “This email was sent by JPay on behalf of your loved one.” In another example, ICS provider Telmate (which was acquired by GTL in 2017), used to allow callers from Alabama jails to speak to family members for less than a minute at the beginning of a call, after which time a

Figure 7. Automated JPay account funding message

for any purpose.” 15 U.S.C. § 6501(4)(A). While there is a law-enforcement exception under the FTC’s rules, that exception is quite narrow and doesn’t appear to cover Securus’s usage of children’s video footage. Specifically, 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(6)(iv) creates a law-enforcement exception that applies only to the disclosure of children’s name “name and online contact information” that is collected for “the purpose of . . . provid[ing] information to law enforcement agencies or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety; and where such information is not be used [sic] for any other purpose.” The category of “name and online contact information” does not include video or audio files containing children’s voices or images. See 16 C.F.R. § 612.2.

168 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(2).
169 See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
170 16 C.F.R. § 312.9.
recording interrupted to seek payment. The recipients of such calls are typically family members who are eager to help their loved ones and are therefore likely to hand over their payment information without a clear disclosure of costs; yet even those family members who took the time to navigate Telmate’s phone menu were given a misleading rate disclosure of $2.39 (flat rate for up to 15 minutes) plus “applicable taxes and fees,” where the unspecified “taxes and fees” apparently totaled $8.94 (or 374% of the base rate), yielding a total cost of $11.33 (or 76¢ per minute). Similar recordings used by Securus tend to steer distraught family members into accepting calling products that include a $3 per-call fee that can be avoided, but only by terminating the call (an emotionally difficult action) and setting up an account.

Communications tactics in the prison-retail setting illustrate how no one is monitoring the contents for accuracy and fairness. In many markets, deceptive advertising and product information can be identified and addressed by competitors. But in prison, vendors’ communications can mislead and manipulate family members unchecked by any countervailing market forces.

E. Data Insecurity

Given the large amounts of data that prison retailers (particularly ICS carriers) collect from customers, data privacy should be front and center in policy debates about the rights of the incarcerated and their families. Instead, such issues are rarely discussed and are governed by vague provisions buried in one-sided privacy policies. The reach of “big data” should be of particular concern to anyone with direct or even indirect involvement in the justice system, because of the numerous ways in which police, courts, probation systems, and correctional facilities are using data to make decisions about individuals’ lives. In the criminal justice system poorly-planned algorithms can shape policing strategies, investigative outcomes, and sentencing decisions in ways that too often penalize people either for being poor or for maintaining relationships with people who have criminal records. Moreover, expanding the scope and use of big data in criminal justice systems increases the chances of intentional or unintentional racial discrimination based on proxy data that correlates with race.


172 Id.

173 Wagner & Jones, supra note 56, appx. 11.

174 Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy 98 (2016) (Prison systems “[a]ll too often . . . use data to justify the workings of the system but not to question or improve the system.”).

175 Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 35) (“[T]he inevitable tendency of [artificial intelligence] to proxy for race when that characteristic is genuinely predictive of a facially neutral objective . . . can affirmatively reinforce past discrimination. Proxy discrimination can produce this result because it affirmatively harms those who it targets, subjecting them to increased police scrutiny or decreased chances of early release from prison. This, in turn, denies opportunities to and increases risk for this population.”)
ICS carriers collect a wealth of information about customers, which comes from at least four sources. First, companies hold payment data, both in the form of payment-card information and transaction histories. Second, some services require family members to verify their identity by uploading copies of government identification documents. Third, carriers record and store the actual content of communications (phone calls, written messages, or video chats) which are transmitted on their platforms. Finally, some carriers collect geolocation information from family members’ cell phones.

When family members receive calls or initiate electronic communications on ICS platforms, they are typically advised by an automated system that their communications will be monitored, yet the nature and extent of such monitoring is neither transparent nor intuitive. Take Securus’s privacy policy regarding its video visitation product, which states that family members must consent to call data being “accessed, reviewed, analyzed, searched, scrutinized, rendered searchable, compiled, assembled, accumulated, stored, used, licensed, sublicensed, assigned, sold transferred and distributed” by “Law Enforcement.” Someone communicating with a loved one in the California prison system may reasonably expect the reference to “law enforcement” to refer to the California state prison system and probably the state police. Instead, the defined term in Securus’s contract is much broader—law enforcement is defined as “personnel involved in the correctional industry (federal, state, county and local), investigative (public and private), penological or public safety purposes and specifically including the Department of Homeland Security and any other anti-terrorist agency (federal, state and local).” The reason for this broad (if grammatically fractured) definition is that Securus offers its law enforcement customers a product marketed under the name “Threads.” Securus markets Threads by proclaiming that “digital evidence is everywhere.”

176 Securus’s video visitation system, for example, directs users to upload “a copy of your government issued photo ID and a photo of yourself” when creating an account.
177 In addition to communications that are actually initiated on a specific network, vendors can also end up capturing and storing communications that were initially sent as private communications through the U.S. mail, when facilities hire contractors to scan and reprint incoming mail. See supra, note 49. Attorneys have expressed particular concern about such systems, which can effectively destroy a lawyer’s ability to securely and confidentially communicate with incarcerated clients. See Zuri Davis, “Pennsylvania’s New $4 Million Prison Mail System Brings Privacy Concerns,” Hit & Run Blog (Oct. 10, 2018), https://reason.com/blog/2018/10/10/pennsylvanias-4-million-prison-mail-scan.
178 Securus T&C, supra note 118, Privacy Policy § II(J).
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 Securus’s marketing materials and contracts actually refer to the product as “THREADSTM.” For ease of readability, and because the name does not appear to be an acronym, it is referred to here with the more reader-friendly capitalization “Threads.” Securus describes Threads as “[s]ystems that merge big data, voice biometrics, and pattern identification, providing early detection and alerts for investigators, attorneys, courts and criminal justice systems.” Securus Technologies, Inc., Response to Request for Proposals RFP 18-021 (Fort Bend County, Texas) (Oct. 17, 2017), at 261 (on file with author).
181 Master Services Agreement, supra note 123, at 5 (“THREADSTM offers an optional ‘community’ feature, which allows member correctional facilities to access and analyze
Securus’s unquenchable thirst for data does not seem to be accompanied by a commitment to protect customers’ privacy, as highlighted in two separate incidents from recent years. First, in 2014, hackers obtained call records and access to call recordings for over 70 million phone calls on the Securus system, including privileged calls between clients and attorneys. The details of the data breach were revealed in press reports in November 2015.\(^{182}\)

Second, following a 2016 federal indictment in Kansas (concerning illegal activity in a privately operated federal correctional facility) defense attorneys discovered that the U.S. Attorney had obtained recordings of privileged phone calls made by their clients.\(^{183}\) The district court appointed a special master to investigate the extent of the improper recordings, as well as the U.S. Attorney’s use of such evidence.\(^{184}\) In an interim report, the master reported that even when prison staff properly designated a phone number as belonging to an attorney, Securus’s system nonetheless recorded calls to such numbers on numerous occasions, and the recordings had been accessed by law enforcement dozens of times.\(^{185}\) After cooperating with the special master’s investigation for over a year, the U.S. Attorney’s Office reversed course in 2018, and began resisting discovery requests and challenging the court’s jurisdiction to appoint a special master.\(^{186}\) Once the early phases of the master’s investigation were completed, the litigation has focused primarily on the actions of the U.S. Attorney’s office, with little public mention of Securus’s role. This narrow focus is likely due to the odd procedural posture of the case: the investigation is being conducted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), and thus, the court’s inquiry is limited to addressing constitutional violations in current criminal proceedings.\(^{187}\) After conducting a seven-day evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that “the government purposely obtained and used attorney-client communications related to criminal defendants in this and other cases.”\(^{188}\) Although the court found that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had not discharged its obligations in discovery, it nonetheless closed the record noting that “compelling any further production from the


\(^{186}\) U.S. v. Carter, 2019 WL 329573, at *6-8 and *17.

\(^{187}\) Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) (“A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property . . . may move for the property’s return. . . . The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.”); see also Order, In re United States of America, No. 18-3007 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2018) (partially granting the U.S. Attorney’s petition for mandamus in the Black/Carter litigation, and restricting the scope of the District Court’s investigation to defendants before the court).

government is an exercise in futility.” The court took the matter under advisement, while also noting that the government may yet have to account for its activities in other proceedings, citing the large number of petitions for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, based on the facts that came to light in this case.

While the 2014 and 2016 incidents impact parties utilizing Securus’s calling products, other incidents have implicated the privacy rights of everyone with a cell phone, including people who have never placed or received a call involving Securus’s network. Securus offers (or at least, offered until recently) a free add-on product referred to as “location based services” (“LBS”), which allows law-enforcement staff to obtain “a mobile device user’s approximate geographical location.” Securus’s LBS uses data provided by the major wireless carriers, and can provide location information for virtually any U.S. cell phone. Although agencies using LBS are supposed to ensure that they have proper authorization (such as a warrant or court order) to obtain phone location information, Securus’s contract with facilities disclaims any responsibility on Securus’s part for ensuring compliance with applicable law.

In 2018, federal prosecutors accused Missouri Sheriff Cory Hutcheson of uploading defective or completely irrelevant documents (which were apparently not reviewed by a human being) to improperly obtain cell-phone information from Securus’s LBS platform. The indictment alleges that over an approximately three-year period, Hutcheson improperly obtained “thousands” of cell-phone locations, including for phones used by other law enforcement agents and a state judge. The indictment contained twenty-eight criminal counts, including wire fraud, identity theft, and violations of the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act. As part of a plea deal, Hutcheson pleaded guilty to two charges in April 2019; meanwhile, civil litigation against Hutcheson is pending in the Eastern District of Missouri, asserting claims under § 1983 and for common-law invasion of privacy. The plaintiffs in the civil case have only named the sheriff as a defendant, and it remains unclear whether

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189 Id. at *16.
190 Id. (noting 66 pending § 2255 motions and the potential for “more than 100 additional § 2255 petitions involving audio recordings”).
191 It is difficult to ascertain the current status of LBS services in general. After the original story broke, the large wireless carriers made claims of increased privacy protections that now look to have been false. See Joseph Cox, “Sprint to Stop Selling Location Data to Third Parties after Motherboard Investigation,” Motherboard (Jan. 16, 2019), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/qvqgnd/sprint-stop-selling-location-data-tmobile-att-microbilt-zumigo.
192 Master Services Agreement, supra note 123, at 6.
194 Master Services Agreement, supra note 123, at 6.
195 Superseding Indictment, U.S. v. Hutcheson, No. 18-cr-041-JAR (E.D. Mo., Aug. 17, 2018). Securus requires users to upload a legal authorization, but the indictment indicates that Hutcheson repeatedly uploaded sham documents “including his health insurance policy, his auto insurance policy and pages selected from Sheriff training materials.” Id. ¶ 22.
Securus could be subject to liability for mishandling private call information, but there is a suggestion that the FCC is conducting an enforcement investigation concerning Securus’s use of LBS.\(^\text{198}\)

In a new privacy policy published in January 2019, GTL reveals that it tracks the geographic location of any cell phone that receives a call on its ICS platform, both when the call is connected and for sixty minutes afterward. GTL’s privacy policy misleadingly states that customers can “opt out” of this location tracking, but actually the ability to opt out is limited to the sixty-minute trailing period. The only way to opt out of location tracking entirely is to not use GTL’s services.\(^\text{199}\)

Telecommunications companies are not the only prison retailers who compile customer data that could be put to other unexpected uses. Correctional banking firms amass substantial transactional data that can also serve as grist for law-enforcement datasets. The Federal Bureau of Prisons in 2015 proposed an amendment to its commissary regulations that would have required family members sending money to consent to the Bureau’s “collection, review, use, disclosure, and retention of, all related transactional data, including the sender’s personal identification information.”\(^\text{200}\) The rule would have also allowed the same use of data by “service providers.” After advocacy groups objected to the new rule as a violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”),\(^\text{201}\) the Bureau appears to have abandoned the proposal;\(^\text{202}\) however, the RFPA provides limited protections because it applies only to collection of transactional information by the federal government.\(^\text{203}\) The terms of correctional-banking privacy policies impart little information about how the vendor will use family members’ financial data. For example, TouchPay (a GTL subsidiary) states that it may share customer information with “third party . . . service[] providers who provide services . . . on our behalf, such as . . . analyzing data.”\(^\text{204}\) Such open-ended provisions provide no meaningful information on data usage, specifically any usage that may make the vendor a data furnisher for purposes of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.\(^\text{205}\)

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\(^\text{198}\) Wright Petitioners’ Reply to Joint Opposition to Petition to Deny, In the Matter of Joint Application of TKC Holdings, IC Solutions, and Securus Technologies for Grant of Authority, WC Dkt. No. 18-193, at 6 (July 30, 2018) (“It is understood that an enforcement inquiry is underway to determine whether Securus in fact violated Section 222 of the Act and the Commission’s rules related thereto.”).


\(^\text{201}\) 12 U.S.C. § 3401, et seq.

\(^\text{202}\) See Comments and Petition for Further Rulemaking, RIN 1120-AB56 (Sept. 1, 2015), \(\text{available at}\) \(\text{https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=BOP-2015-0004-0003&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf}\). Although the Bureau of Prisons has never formally rescinded the proposed rule, it is now listed as “inactive” on the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ Fall 2018 unified agenda of federal regulatory actions. See \(\text{https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaInactive}\).


Perhaps the most troublesome data-related practice by prison retailers is a seeming unwillingness to seriously comply with commonly accepted data-security frameworks. As Professor William McGeveran has shown in his analysis of fourteen leading systems of data security, a generally accepted legal duty of data security has begun to emerge from various sources of public and private law.\footnote{William McGeveran, \textit{The Duty of Data Security} 102 Minn. L.Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 42).} As companies become more attuned to data security, many of these accepted principles become enforceable duties through the force of contractual agreements.\footnote{\textit{Id.}, manuscript at 36-42.} But with correctional administrators apparently unconcerned about the security of consumers’ data, there does not appear to be growing use of contractual commitments to enforce security standards, thus leaving legislative action as the last apparent line of defense.

IV. \textbf{Potential Sources of Protection}

Most problems facing consumers in the prison retail-sector can be traced back to one fundamental shortcoming: on both the state and federal levels, no entity has been tasked with protecting the interests of incarcerated people or their families. Such protection could be provided either through the procurement process or through \textit{ex ante} regulation, but neither type of reform has happened, usually for lack of political will. As discussed in this section, some laws do provide protections to prison-retail customers, but these provisions tend to be piecemeal, outdated, and not created with incarcerated people in mind. Without a regulatory agency specifically focused on fairness and equity in the prison retailing sector, advocacy groups have been pursuing increasingly sophisticated strategies to fill in the gaps in consumer protection. While litigation and regulatory advocacy have produced victories, such efforts are unlikely to result in comprehensive protections without laws that are intentionally designed to provide \textit{ex ante} consumer protections to incarcerated people.

A. \textbf{Telecommunications Law}

As noted previously, the landmark \textit{Wright} rulemaking grew out of a 2000 lawsuit challenging ICS rates.\footnote{See \textit{supra} note 16 and accompanying text.} When referring the matter to the FCC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court specifically cited two statutory grants of jurisdiction that allowed the Commission to address the plaintiffs’ concerns. First, the court pointed to the FCC’s powers over common carriers, contained in title II of the Communications Act, specifically the mandate to ensure that carriers’ “charges, practices, classifications, and regulations” are “just and reasonable.”\footnote{\textit{Wright v. Corr. Corp. of Am.}, No. 00-cv-293-GK, slip op. at 6-7 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2001), ECF No. 94 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b))} In addition, the court cited the 1996 Act’s payphone provision, § 276, which directs the FCC to ensure competition...
and “fair compensation” in the payphone industry while also classifying all “inmate telephone service” as payphone service.\textsuperscript{210}

In 2015, when the FCC issued its final ICS rules, it relied on both title II and § 276 for jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{211} The final rule imposed rate caps on all ICS calls (both inter- and intrastate) and capped ancillary fees.\textsuperscript{212} Significantly, the FCC reaffirmed its earlier finding that, for purposes or regulatory accounting, site commissions were not a legitimate cost of providing communications services.\textsuperscript{213} Two commissioners dissented from the final rule. Commissioner Michael O’Rielly’s dissent appears to be motivated in part by antipathy toward incarcerated people,\textsuperscript{214} but then-Commissioner (now Chairman) Ajit Pai wrote a more analytical dissent that accurately presaged the outcome of the ICS industry’s petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Pai’s dissent criticized two aspects of the final rule. First, he expressed doubt that the FCC had jurisdiction to regulate intrastate rates and charges. In making this argument, Pai conceded that many of the protections in the rule could be validly enacted as to interstate calls under the commission’s title II authority, but he found the intrastate rate caps to be insufficiently authorized by title II or § 276.\textsuperscript{215} Pai’s second point of dissent addressed the Commission’s calculation of the rates caps, which he argued did not allow ICS carriers to recoup their costs.\textsuperscript{216}

The FCC issued its final rule in late 2015 and the ICS industry immediately petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit. On January 31, 2017, shortly before the court held oral arguments, the FCC General Counsel filed a notice with the court citing a change in the Commission’s membership, and stating that the new majority had directed counsel to no longer defend the Commission’s regulation of intrastate rates or the method for calculating the 2015 rate caps.\textsuperscript{217} Although the Wright Petitioners, along with numerous advocacy groups, had intervened in the litigation and continued to defend the final rule, the FCC’s partial withdrawal still held legal significance, because the majority of the appellate panel concluded that the regulatory provisions that the Commission no longer defended were not entitled to \textit{Chevron} deference.\textsuperscript{218}

\footnotetext[210]{210 Id. at 8.}
\footnotetext[211]{Second Report \& Order, supra note 41 at ¶ 3, n.12 and accompanying text, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12766.}
\footnotetext[212]{Id. ¶ 9, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12769.}
\footnotetext[213]{Id. ¶ 118, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12819.}
\footnotetext[214]{Id., Dissenting Stmt. of Comm’r Michael O’Rielly, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12971 (“Despite the intentions of supporters, it is highly probable that the end result of the changes in this item will lead to a worse situation for prisoners and convicts, to which I am only so sympathetic.”).}
\footnotetext[215]{Id., Dissenting Stmt. of Comm’r Ajit Pai, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12960-64.}
\footnotetext[216]{Id., 30 FCC Rcd. at 12965-69.}
\footnotetext[218]{\textit{Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n}, 866 F.3d 397, 407-408 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Although the court issued a subsequent clarifying statement (\textit{id}. at 416-419) claiming that the intrastate rate regulation and rate-cap methodology would have failed even under \textit{Chevron} review, Judge Pillard’s dissent deftly points out why these provisions can be justified as one of several plausible interpretations of the Telecommunications Act, which is precisely the type of situation that \textit{Chevron} is designed to address.}
A split panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated several parts of the FCC’s 2015 rules, in an opinion written by Judge Harry Edwards. The majority disagreed that the Commission had broad jurisdiction to regulate intrastate rates, and therefore vacated the rate caps and limits on ancillary fees, as applied to intrastate calls.\textsuperscript{219} While the Commission had cited 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 and 276 as jurisdictional bases for regulating intrastate rates, the majority focused on § 152(b)’s presumption against FCC regulation of intrastate communications. The Commission, of course, had addressed this and relied on § 276 when capping intrastate rates.\textsuperscript{220} The majority acknowledged, as it had to, that § 276 allowed the Commission to preempt state law; however, the court went on to find that § 276’s requirement that payphone providers be “fairly compensated” allowed the Commission to require minimal adequate compensation, but did not allow it to limit unfairly high compensation.\textsuperscript{221}

Dissenting, Judge Cornelia Pillard wrote that the meaning of the fair-compensation provision depended on “whether the word ‘fairly’ implies an ability to reduce excesses, as well as bolster deficiencies, in the compensation that payphone providers would otherwise receive.” Because the FCC had adopted the more expansive meaning after developing a thorough record as part of notice-and-comment rulemaking, Judge Pillard argued that the Commission’s interpretation was entitled to \textit{Chevron} deference and could be reversed only by the agency through a new rulemaking.\textsuperscript{222}

Although the court was hostile to the Commission’s regulation of intrastate matters, the majority echoed one of the more surprising aspects of Commissioner Pai’s dissent, finding that the limits on ancillary fees associated with interstate calls were proper under the Commission’s title II powers.\textsuperscript{223} The practical problem, however, is how to determine whether any given account fee (e.g., a fee for making a prepayment) is related to inter- or intrastate calls, if the account is used for both types of communications.\textsuperscript{224}

As for the Commission’s interstate rate caps, the ICS carriers challenged the FCC’s methodology, not jurisdiction. The court was largely sympathetic to the ICS industry, finding that the FCC’s exclusion of site commissions from recoverable costs was arbitrary and capricious, and further finding the use of industry-wide cost averages as a basis for rate caps was legally improper.\textsuperscript{225} Again parting ways with her colleagues, Judge Pillard criticized the majority’s finding that site commissions are “obviously” costs of

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Id.} at 402.


\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Global Tel*Link}, 866 F.3d at 408-412.

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Id.} at 420-421.

\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Id.} at 415 (“Contrary to Petitioners’ contentions, the \textit{Order}’s imposition of ancillary fee caps in connection with interstate calls is justified. The Commission has plenary authority to regulate interstate rates under § 201(b), including ‘practices . . . for and in connection with’ interstate calls.”).

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Id.} at 415 (upholding FCC’s jurisdiction to limit ancillary fees for interstate calls, but remanding because “we cannot discern from the record whether ancillary fees can be segregated between interstate and intrastate calls.”); \textit{see also Mojica v. Securus Tech.}, No. 14-cv-5258, 2018 WL 3212037, *5-6 (W.D. Ark. Jun. 29, 2018) (discussing methodological difficulties of allocating fees between inter- and intrastate calls).

\textsuperscript{225} \textit{GTL}, 866 F.3d at 412-415.
providing communications. She argued that a commission “might, in some sense, be ‘related’ to the provision of payphone services . . . but it is not ‘reasonably’ related because acceding to such preexisting contractual relationships is inconsistent with the statutory scheme [of ‘fair compensation’].”

One of the only substantive portions of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that received unanimous approval from the panel was the holding vacating the Commission’s rule requiring annual reporting of ICS carriers’ revenues and costs related to video visitation services. The court noted that the Commission had not explained how video visitation was a “communication by wire or radio,” as required for the exercise of title II jurisdiction.

The FCC has not taken steps to issue new rules in the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. The Wright class action lawsuit is still open, with the parties disagreeing on whether there is an ongoing role for the district court. As for call rates, the appellate court vacated the rate caps in the FCC’s 2015 order, which means interstate ICS rates are now subject to the higher rate caps contained in the FCC’s 2013 interim order, and intrastate rates are subject only to regulation by state public utilities commissions. In the meantime, ICS carriers have sought to escape intrastate regulation in some jurisdictions by citing their use of VoIP technology, which is sometimes exempt from state regulation. This leads to the possibility of wholly unregulated intrastate rates, which is of particular concern in jails, where incarcerated people are more likely to have ties to the local area and therefore are more likely to make intrastate calls.

Ironically, the Court of Appeals reinforced the jurisdictional importance of intra- and interstate calling at a time when even ICS carriers acknowledge that there is no material difference in cost based on the intra/interstate distinction. Moreover, ICS carriers have already lost their fight to prohibit families from using VoIP routing to engage in a type of pro-consumer regulatory arbitrage. In 2009, Securus challenged family members’ right to route ICS calls to a VoIP number assigned to the same local

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226 Id. at 413.
227 Id. at 424.
228 Id. at 415.
230 The 2013 order capped interstate rates at 21¢ per minute for prepaid calls and 25¢ for collect calls, and also created “safe harbor” rates of 12¢ and 14¢ (for prepaid and collect calls, respectively), which are presumed to be reasonable. First Report & Order, supra note 39 at ¶¶ 60 and 73, 28 FCC Rcd. at 14140, 14147.
231 See infra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
232 See Comments of Securus Technologies, Inc., In the Matter of the Amendment of ARM 38.5.3401, 38.5.3403, and 38.5.3405, the Adoption of New Rule 1 and the Repeal of ARM 38.5.3414 Pertaining to Operator Service Provider Rules, Montana Pub. Serv. Comm’r, at 5 (Sept. 19, 2017) (“[The VoIP technology] used by most ICS providers today means the ‘distance’ between the origination and termination points of an ICS call has little to no effect on the transport costs of an ICS call.”).
dialing area as a distant prison in order to take advantage of lower prices in jurisdictions that have capped intrastate rates. The FCC rejected Securus’s challenge and some consumers can now use this technology to take advantage of any favorable disparities in inter- and intrastate ICS rates. Once again, however, the potential salutary effects of VoIP routing illustrates the differences between customers in prisons and jails. The family of someone incarcerated for a prolonged period in a distant prison is likely to have the time and financial incentive to set up a local-dial VoIP number if it allows for significant savings over the long term. But the family of someone who unexpectedly lands in jail and must make an emergency call does not realistically have the ability to leverage such technology for their benefit.

Although the regulatory future of the ICS industry is unclear for a variety of reasons, there are three prominent trends that can be gleaned from recent experience: statutes that lag behind technology, the ascendancy of bundled services and cross-subsidies, and the importance of activism.

1. Technology Has Outpaced the Regulatory Framework

As is the case in many areas of telecommunications, the law governing ICS carriers has not kept pace with technology. This is most notable in the context of § 276, a statute of diminishing relevance outside of correctional facilities, as payphones disappear from the landscape. The disconnect between statutory language and technological reality becomes even more prominent as ICS carriers rely increasingly on emerging technologies like video visitation and electronic messaging to drive revenue. While legislation clarifying the FCC’s powers over these new services would be welcome, the Commission need not wait for congressional action, since existing law already provides sufficient regulatory jurisdiction. There are strong arguments in favor of regulating non-telephone communications services under either title II of the Communications Act or § 706 of the 1996 Act.

Section 706 of the 1996 Act expressly directs the FCC to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by utilizing . . . price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.” Electronic messaging and video conferencing are both classified as “advanced communications services” under the Act and thus fall within the scope of § 706. The D.C. Circuit has characterized § 706 as a grant of authority, and the FCC relied on this

234 Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 28 FCC Rcd. at 13914-95.
238 Verizon v. Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n, 740 F.3d 623, 637 (“The question, then, is this: Does the Commission’s current understanding of section 706(a) as a grant of regulatory authority represent a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute? We believe it does.”).
jurisdiction when issuing its 2015 Open Internet Order.\textsuperscript{239} Even during the brief period when the FCC reclassified internet service as a title II service, the Commission nonetheless eschewed rate regulation and other affirmative intervention in favor of substantial regulatory forbearance, consistent with the policy expressed in § 706.\textsuperscript{240} Unlike broadband internet access, for which there is a competitive (if highly concentrated) market, the FCC has already found that ICS markets are not competitive and therefore need regulation to correct market failures.\textsuperscript{241} Section 706’s reference to making advanced communications available to “all Americans” should be interpreted for the benefit of incarcerated people, since Congress clearly had incarcerated users in mind when drafting the inmate phone provision of § 276, which was part of the same legislation that enacted § 706. Accordingly, the FCC already has statutory authority to impose price caps on new ICS technologies like video visitation and electronic messaging.

Advanced technologies are also susceptible to regulation as a telecommunications service under title II of the Act. ICS carriers make the self-interested argument that ICS offerings are information services, because federal policy (both before and after enactment of the 1996 Act) has been to avoid regulation of such services.\textsuperscript{242} But the FCC already determined that ICS telephone service is not an information service, and the same reasoning should be applied to advanced technologies. The essential defining characteristic of telecommunications service is “the transmission of information between or among points with no ‘change in the form or content’.”\textsuperscript{243} The mutually-exclusive category of information service encompasses products that store, retrieve, and process information.\textsuperscript{244} Of course, ICS telephone service involves extensive computer storage, retrieval, and processing of information, but in denying the carriers’ requests to classify ICS as an information service, the FCC concluded that such features were merely used to support the provision of telecommunications service, and therefore should not be treated as information

\textsuperscript{239} In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 273-282 (Feb. 26, 2015), 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5721-5724; but see In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Dkt. No. 17-108, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order ¶¶ 267, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 470 (Jan. 4, 2018) (“We find that provisions in section 706 of the 1996 Act directing the Commission to encourage deployment of advanced telecommunications capability are better interpreted as hortatory rather than as independent grants of regulatory jurisdiction.”).

\textsuperscript{240} Open Internet, supra note 239, at ¶ 434-542, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5804-5867.

\textsuperscript{241} See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{242} The categories “communications service” and “information service” were first developed in the FCC’s Computer Inquiries, and subsequently enacted as statutory definitions as part of the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(24), (50), and (53) (definitions); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’ns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975-977 (2005) (legislative history). During the Wright rulemaking, GTL, Securus, and Telmate (an erstwhile competitor since acquired by GTL) all explicitly argued that emerging technologies are information services. See Comments of Prison Policy Initiative, In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375, at 4, n.19 (Feb. 8, 2016) (collecting citations), available at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/60001394099.


\textsuperscript{244} 47 U.S.C. § 153(24).
services. The same can be said for emerging technologies: the end-user pays to transmit an un-modified message (either text-based or video) from point to point. The carrier’s use of information services is incidental to the provision of telecommunications service, and the facility’s use of extensive computerized security features (which may qualify as information services) is an entirely separate product.

Although the FCC has assiduously avoided regulating new technologies under title II, market analysis should lead to a different result in the case of service in correctional facilities. Even Chairman Pai, who objected to the extent of the FCC’s new ICS rules, admitted that the ICS market is riddled with failure and cannot be left to the whims of monopoly carriers. Title II and § 706 allow the FCC to regulate wireline services regardless of the specific technology utilized, and the Commission can use these powers (informed by the court’s decision in the Global Tel*Link case) to craft a regulatory regime that is not artificially limited to only one technology.

2. The New Cross-Subsidies

Modern regulatory theory generally favors unbundling of services. Yet bundled contracts that combine regulated and unregulated services are common in the ICS sector, giving rise to a new twist on the longstanding problem of cross-subsidies. Historically, U.S. telecommunications law has focused on one type of cross-subsidy: an incumbent provider using revenues from regulated services to subsidize unregulated services and charge below-market rates, thereby undercutting competition. The probable cross-subsidies in the current ICS market are different: carriers are most likely using excess revenues from unregulated video and electronic messaging service to...

245 In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling by the Inmate Calling Services Providers Task Force, RM-8181, Declaratory Ruling at ¶¶ 28-32, 11 FCC Rcd. 7362, 7374-7377 (Feb. 20, 1996) (“Enhanced services do not include the functionality between the subscriber and the network for call set-up, routing, cessation, caller or calling party identification, or billing and accounting.”).

246 First Report & Order, supra note 39, Dissenting Stmt. of Comm’r Ajit Pai, 28 FCC Rcd. at 14217 (“I believe that the government should usually stay its hand in economic matters and allow the price of goods and services to respond to consumer choice and competition. But sometimes the market fails. And when it does, government intervention carefully tailored to address that market failure is appropriate. The provision of inmate calling services (ICS) is one such market. . . . [W]e cannot necessarily count on market competition to keep prices for inmate calling services just and reasonable.”).

247 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1340 (1998) (“Under the new paradigm, . . . carriers are required to unbundle . . . end-to-end service into constituent parts in order to allow end-users to mix and match different service elements to suit their own needs and tastes.”).


compensate for the rents they can no longer collect through telephone charges. This dynamic is not merely hypothetical—Securus has pitched potential investors by touting the fact that 65% of its 2015 corporate revenues came from unregulated business lines in 2015, up from 0% in 2007.  

The dynamics of the new cross-subsidies are novel, but they are not unheard of. In his comprehensive categorization of cross-subsidies, economist D.A. Heald acknowledged that regulated activities could be subsidized by competitive products, but he characterized such an arrangement as “uncommon.” This type of cross-subsidy cannot be sustained in the long term, to the extent that the “economy outside the regulated sector is competitive.” Of course, because unregulated prison communication services are offered on a monopoly basis, the unregulated market is not competitive, and this unusual breed of cross-subsidy can likely be perpetuated indefinitely.

When the FCC designed rules to prevent incumbent local exchange carriers from cross-subsidizing unregulated services, the Commission framed the issue as one of ensuring that regulated rates remained just and reasonable. The same concerns apply to the new type of ICS cross-subsidies, even though the flow of funds is inverted. The FCC set ICS rate caps in reference to carrier costs. Although the underlying cost data are confidential, the FCC calculated the 2015 rate caps with the goal of allowing carriers to operate profitably. Assuming this means net revenues roughly in line with the overall telecommunications industry, and using purely hypothetical numbers, a carrier’s profitability for a given contract could look something like the data.

Table 2. Hypothetical Revenues (Phone Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Fixed costs (network)</th>
<th>Marginal costs</th>
<th>Net revenue</th>
<th>Profit margin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>(700)</td>
<td>(140)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Messg</td>
<td>(300)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>(300)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Hypothetical Revenues (Bundled)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>E-Messg</th>
<th>Video</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>2,350</td>
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<tr>
<td>Network (redistributed)</td>
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<td>(100)</td>
<td>(300)</td>
<td>(700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product specific fixed costs</td>
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<td>(20)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal costs</td>
<td>(140)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net revenue</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit margin</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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250 Securus Lender Presentation, supra note 101, at 26 (“By investing in businesses that are not regulated by the FCC / PSC / PUCs, Securus has successfully decreased its exposure to potential rate of return regulation.”).


252 Id.

253 Joint Cost Order, supra note 249 at ¶ 37, 2 FCC Rcd. at 1303 (“We reaffirm that protecting ratepayers from unjust and unreasonable interstate rates is the primary purpose behind the accounting separation of regulated from nonregulated activities, just as it is the purpose behind all of our accounting and cost allocation rules. Our commitment to cost-based rates demands close attention to the manner in which the costs a company uses to support its [regulated offerings] are separated from the other costs of the company.”).

shown in Table 2, and the profit margin can be considered reasonable and just. But if that contract was actually awarded on a bundled basis for phone service, electronic messaging, and video visitation, then the carrier’s profit under the contract—including all revenue and redistributed fixed network costs—could resemble Table 3. Under this scenario, it is difficult to say that the telephone rates are just and reasonable when they are an integral, indispensable part of a contract that yields profits over three times the industry average.

The FCC can easily head off this problem by regulating rates charged for new technologies, as advocated in the previous section. In the absence of this preferable resolution, any attempts to regulate telephone rates will prove to be illusory unless accompanied by robust data collection that covers all bundled services. Although the D.C. Circuit invalidated the FCC’s attempts to collect data on video visitation revenue and costs, the court did so based on an inadequate record, not on an outright lack of jurisdiction, thus leaving the door open for a renewed attempt at comprehensive, technology-neutral regulation of communications service in correctional facilities.

3. Advocacy and Activism

The history of activism on behalf of families of incarcerated people in the United States is long and storied. The modern face of organizing against commercial exploitation of incarcerated people and their families is the coalition of individuals and organizations that initiated the Wright rulemaking and state-level campaigns throughout the country. One unintentionally positive byproduct of the FCC’s years of inaction is that by the time the Commission finally promulgated rules, a broad coalition of organizations had found common cause with the Wright petitioners and joined in the calls for reform. Consumer advocacy in the ICS realm has consisted of litigation, legislative campaigns, and participation in regulatory proceedings. This work has laid the foundation for the next round of the fight for fair telecom rates.

Title II of the Communications Act requires “just and reasonable” rates, and provides consumer with a private cause of action to sue for violations. But exercising this private right can be difficult. Many courts (including, most obviously, the district court that heard the Wright case) have invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction when faced with challenges to rates. While this doctrine does not necessarily bring about the conclusive end of a legal

255 See supra, text accompanying note 228.


257 Second Report & Order, supra note 41, appx B, 30 FCC Rcd. at 12926 (in addition to numerous advocates for the rights of incarcerated people, comments were submitted by religious communities, disability-rights activists, the American Bar Association, immigrant communities, the Minority Media and Telecommunications Counsel, and the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates).


259 See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.

challenge, it can result in decades of delay, as the Wright Petitioners can attest. Courts have also used the filed rate doctrine to dispose of consumer litigation, although that doctrine is increasingly inapplicable in deregulated markets.261

At least three class action suits regarding ICS rates have been certified in recent years. The district court in Fayetteville, Arkansas certified a class action against Secruus and GTL in 2017, when plaintiffs challenged the legality of site commissions under title II of the Communications Act and a claim for common-law unjust enrichment.262 But after the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC’s attempts to rein in site commissions, the court decertified the class and dismissed the named plaintiffs’ claims.263 A similar suit in New Jersey has fared better. Filed in 2013, plaintiffs challenged ICS rates under title II, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New Jersey’s consumer protection act, and a theory of unjust enrichment.264 Plaintiffs ultimately chose to seek class certification on only two of their claims: violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), and violations of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (actionable via § 1983). The court certified both claims over GTL’s objections.265 The New Jersey court granted class certification on August 6, 2018, and in early 2019 the parties commenced voluntary mediation. While the New Jersey case is arguably the most successful ICS litigation since the Wright lawsuit, it is entirely retrospective—in 2016, the New Jersey legislature prohibited site commissions, cracked down on ancillary fees, and capped call rates at 11¢ per minute.266 Accordingly, the class action only concerns rates charged prior to the 2016 legislative fix. Finally, a class action is currently pending in Massachusetts, alleging violations of that state’s consumer protection act based on Securus’s payments of site commissions to local jails.267

While litigation is an important tool for advocates, legislative reform has the potential for more widespread and proactive relief from excessive telecom rates. As the result of sustained public campaigns, several state and local governments have taken significant steps to curb abuses in the ICS industry. Such steps can take various forms, including legislatively-imposed rate caps.268 Alternatively, some states have passed more general mandates,

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261 See supra text accompanying notes 137-137.


265 James v. Global*Tel Link, No. 13-cv-4989, 2018 WL 3727371 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2018) (opinion re: motion to certify class). Among other things, the court distinguished the plaintiffs’ New Jersey CFA claims from the unjust enrichment claims in the Arkansas case, noting that the common law of unjust enrichment depends heavily on plaintiffs’ individualized circumstances, (contravening the commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2)), whereas a CFA claim was based on the overall reasonableness of GTL’s rates, and did not require adjudication of any facts specific to plaintiffs’ specific situations. Id. at *11


267 See infra note 342 and accompanying text.

268 Id. (New Jersey rate caps of 11¢ per minute); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-4-1(a-5) (7¢ per minute rate caps).
directing correctional facilities to bring ICS rates in line with non-prison phone services.\(^{269}\) Other jurisdictions have avoided direct rate regulation, but have eliminated site commissions in an effort to bring down costs.\(^{270}\) Most promising is the advent of jurisdictions that have committed to provide phone calls completely free of charge.\(^{271}\)

Over several decades, activists have gained enough experience in litigating ICS issues that this advocacy work is now paying dividends. While much work remains to be done in the telecommunications area, advocacy organizations should also prioritize litigation and regulatory advocacy in other legal fields, as discussed in the following sections.

**B. Financial Services Law, Money Transmitters, and Prepaid Accounts**

The phrase “correctional banking” is a bit of a legal misnomer, given that the actual law of banking is implicated only at the periphery of the industry. Although inmate trust funds are typically held in some kind of depository account, the incarcerated person with equitable title to the money has no direct customer relationship with the depository institution. The job of a correctional banking vendor is simple: receive deposits and facilitate payments on behalf of a customer population who are not allowed to use cash, checks, or payment cards. As a non-bank entity that uses technology to facilitate payments by or for the benefit of incarcerated people, correctional banking vendors are a niche type of financial technology (or “fintech”) firm.\(^{272}\) But even in an economic sector generally known for over-hyping its transformative nature,\(^{273}\) correctional banking fintechs do not provide any type of innovative or valuable service that justifies the high prices they charge.

One of the few issues in the correctional banking sector to have received extensive judicial attention provides an informative illustration of

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\(^{269}\) R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-38.1(b) (“No telephone service provider shall charge a customer rate for calls made from a prison in excess of rates charged for comparable calls made in non-prison settings. All rates shall reflect the lowest reasonable cost to inmates and call recipients.”); 2017 Mich. Pub. Act No. 107 (House Bill 4323) part 2, § 219 (provision in appropriations bill requiring that any new ICS contracts “shall include a condition that fee schedules for prisoner telephone calls . . . be the same as fee schedules for calls placed from outside of correctional facilities.”).

\(^{270}\) S.C. Code § 10-1-210 (“The State shall forego any commissions or revenues for the provision of pay telephones in institutions of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Juvenile Justice for use by inmates.”); Nebr. Dept. of Corr. Admin. Reg. 205.03 ¶¶ IX and XII (requiring “rates and surcharges that are commensurate with those charged to the general public for like services,” and foregoing commissions from ICS revenue).


\(^{272}\) See Adam J. Levitin, “Written Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on the Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions & Consumer Credit” at 4 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/2SHJ-966G (defining a fintech as a nonbank financial service company that uses “some sort of digital technology to provide financial services to consumers”).

\(^{273}\) Id. (“Despite the regular use of buzzwords like ‘transformative’ and ‘disruptive’ in discussions about fintechs, there really isn’t anything particularly transformative or disruptive about them.”).
current trends, although for reasons other than those discussed by the courts. Four circuit courts of appeals have addressed the question of whether incarcerated people are entitled to interest earned on their trust account balances, with only one court holding that the beneficiary has a property right to earned interest. Given the small balances in most incarcerated peoples’ trust accounts, and today’s low interest rates, this may seem like an academic debate. But the most recent appellate opinion to address the issue contains an important factual detail.

Young v. Wall involved a challenge to Rhode Island’s 2001 decision to stop paying interest on trust accounts, when the Department of Corrections “decided to outsource management of a wide swath of back-room systems.” According to the court, the repeal of the previous interest policy was the result of “[c]omments from prospective vendors” who sought the contract to manage Rhode Island’s correctional banking system. The plaintiff in Young did not prevail, and the opinion stands as an illustration of the prison-retail economy as applied to correctional banking: accounts that had previously been held and invested by the state treasurer (with earned interest remitted to beneficiaries) were now controlled by a vendor and interest income was retained for the benefit of the DOC. This fact pattern is echoed in many correctional-banking contracts, which seem to prioritize bureaucratic convenience over the best interests of the incarcerated accountholders.

This section examines the sources of law that can apply to common problems in the world of correctional banking, starting with prepayments and moving on to contemporaneous payments. The section concludes with a detailed consideration of prepaid debit cards issued to people upon their release from custody.

1. Categorizing Prepayments

As alluded to previously, prison retail payments can be sorted into two major types: prepayments for goods or services and contemporaneous payments or fund transfers. In the case of prepayment, an incarcerated person or a family member transfers funds to a vendor who agrees to apply the amount toward future purchase. Often the vendor will refer to such prepaid amounts as creating an “account” (see supra, Figure 1), but this terminology is misleading. Prepayments held by vendors are simply unsecured contractual obligations of the vendor, and should not be analogized to deposit accounts. Making matters even more confusing for consumers, many correctional banking

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275 Schneider v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
276 Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 2011).
277 Id.
279 See Eniola Akindemowo, Contract, Deposit or E-Value? Reconsidering Stored Value Products For a Modernized Payments Framework, 7 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 275, 278 (2009) (“[Stored value products] are technology-enabled contractual constructs rather than deposits, and . . . the use of deposit analogies to analyze them is generally inappropriate.”).
vendors collect trust account deposits and retail-transaction prepayments, which can cause some consumers to confuse the two types of transactions (see Figure 4).

Even though prepayments are often disadvantageous to consumers, they remain common in prison due to a combination of factors. First, facility instructions or vendor marketing materials may encourage customers to use prepayment options without fully explaining available alternatives. Second, incarcerated people may voluntarily prefer prepayments in an effort to avoid routing funds through trust accounts, where money can be subject to levies for fees, fines, restitution, or civil judgments.

Prison-retail prepayments raise the same concerns that are implicated in many types of consumer prepaid products, specifically merchant insolvency and loss of prepaid funds through forfeiture provisions. Merchant insolvency should be a major concern for customers because prison retailers tend to be closely-held firms whose financial health is difficult to gauge. In the event of an insolvency event, customers with prepaid accounts would hold (likely-worthless) unsecured claims.

Pernicious forfeiture provisions can result in substantial unfairness to customers, by eating away at prepaid balances through “service” or inactivity fees. Some vendors will refund prepaid amounts upon an incarcerated customer’s release from custody, while others do not. Some vendors have even advertised prepaid products as a way for correctional agencies to avoid unclaimed property laws. These provisions are entirely a creature of private contract and could easily be prohibited through the terms of the vendor-facility contract. Thus far, few facilities have shown any interest in protecting consumers by ending such confiscatory practices.

2. Financial Services Law and Prison-Related Transfers

Laws that can potentially apply to contemporaneous payments and transfers include the common-law of trusts, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”), state money-transmitter statutes, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”). To the extent a transaction involves an inmate trust account, the first step for consumer advocates should be to analyze whether the account is a bona fide trust, and if so, whether the trustee (most likely the correctional

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280 See supra note 30.
282 Outside of bankruptcy, the consumer holding a prepayment claim against an insolvent merchant is likely to receive nothing. In bankruptcy, the consumer may, as a best case scenario, receive a priority unsecured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7). See Justin R. Alberto & Gergory J. Flasser, “Solving the Gift Card Conundrum,” Am. Bankruptcy Institute Journal (Dec. 2016), at 32.
283 See supra note 139-139 and accompanying text.
284 See Prison Policy Initiative, supra note 69, at 5, n.22.
system or another government agency) has breached its fiduciary duty by, for example, allowing a vendor to diminish trust property by charging unreasonable fees. The trust classification will depend on the law or administrative policy that creates the inmate trust system. Although the name "inmate trust account" by itself is not dispositive, such accounts are often governed by generally applicable trust law.\footnote{E.g., Matson v. Kansas Dept. of Corr., 301 Kan. 654 (2015) ("[W]e have no difficulty finding the plain language of the applicable statutes establishes the inmate trust fund is, in fact, a trust subject to the [Kansas Uniform Trust Code]."); Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1101-1102 (6th Cir. 1994) (ruling that people incarcerated in Federal Bureau of Prisons could challenge the Bureau’s allegedly improper disbursements from the commissary trust fund, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 199-200 (1959)). The federal Bureau of Prisons maintains two trust funds (the Inmate Trust Fund and the Commissary Trust Fund). The Department of Justice has taken the position that the Bureau is subject to different fiduciary duties with respect to the two different funds. See Fiduciary Obligations Regarding Bureau of Prisons Commissary Fund, 19 Op. O.L.C. 127 (1995).} If the general law of trusts applies, beneficiaries may be able to challenge transaction fees to the extent the fees are not commercially reasonable.\footnote{E.g., Upp v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 799 F.Supp. 540, 544-545 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty by trustee who incurred bank fees not justified by cost or results), vacated for lack of diversity jurisdiction sub nom. Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993).} The determination of commercial reasonableness will be fact-specific and will likely involve a close examination of the purpose of the inmate trust fund, as defined by the enabling statute or other applicable authority.\footnote{See e.g., E. Armata, Inc. v. Korea Commercial Bank of NY, 367 F.3d 123, 133-134 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that trustee of statutory trust created by the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act did not breach fiduciary duties by holding trust funds in a bank account subject to fees because “maintaining a checking account with ‘commercially reasonable’ terms may facilitate, rather than impede, the fulfillment of a PACA trustee’s duty to maintain trust assets so that they are freely available to satisfy outstanding obligations to sellers of perishable commodities” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted))). In any event, even to the extent that EFTA applies to a particular party or transaction, the law is largely concerned with preventing unauthorized transactions, which does not appear to be a widespread problem in prison retailing. Rather, the primary

The EFTA, as implemented by Regulation E,\footnote{12 C.F.R. § 1005.3(b)(1)(v).} likely applies to many transfers of money by family members, particularly debit-card payments,\footnote{12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3) (Regulation E’s definition of “account” excludes “an account held by a financial institution under a bona fide trust agreement”); see also 12 C.F.R., pt. 1005, appx. B ¶ 2(b)(2), cmt. 1 (“The term ‘bona fide trust agreement’ is not defined by the Act or regulation; therefore, financial institutions must look to state or other applicable law for interpretation.”).} but its actual substantive protections are minimal. From the perspective of the incarcerated account holder, if an inmate trust account is a bona fide trust, then it is excluded from the EFTA’s definition of an “account.”\footnote{Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78(2) (2007) (“[T]he trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests.”).} In any event, even to the extent that EFTA applies to a particular party or transaction, the law is largely concerned with preventing unauthorized transactions, which does not appear to be a widespread problem in prison retailing. Rather, the primary
problem is exorbitant fees, but EFTA contains little direct regulation of fees, instead favoring disclosure of costs under the premise that consumers will make informed choices. In the context of correctional banking, the EFTA’s emphasis on disclosure is an ill fit, since consumers have no meaningful choice in financial companies.

If a contractor facilitates transfers into or out of an inmate trust account, the contractor is most likely governed by state-level money transmitter laws. These laws vary greatly by state. The Uniform Money Services Act (adopted by seven states and the Virgin Islands) covers businesses that “receive[e] money or monetary value for transmission,” but does not apply to a merchant that collects prepayments for future transactions. While the Uniform Act exempts state and local governments from its coverage, there is no exemption for an agent of a government—a feature that should be retained if calls for a federal money transmitter license are developed.

The GLBA likely applies to several aspects of correctional banking, although publicly available evidence suggests that correctional banking vendors give little thought to complying with the law. The provisions most relevant to correctional banking are the privacy provisions found in title V of the GLBA. These rules are applicable to entities that engage in “financial activities,” including transferring and safeguarding money. As a covered entity that is not overseen by a bank regulator, correctional banking vendors are covered by the GLBA implementing regulations issued by the FTC. The GLBA privacy

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294 One of the few provisions of the EFTA that regulates fees is an amendment added by the CARD Act of 2009, which prohibits dormancy and service fees in connection with gift cards and general-use prepaid cards. 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1. These rules do not apply to most prison-retail prepayments, because the statute excludes stored-value products that are “reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(D). Nor does this provision appear to apply to release cards. Humphrey v. Stored Value Cards, 355 F.Supp.3d 638, 643-644 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (holding that release cards are not general-use prepaid cards because they are not “marketed to the general public”).

295 But see Prison Policy Initiative, supra note 69, at 11, n.54 and accompanying text (discussing JPay’s unverified allegation that “few” correctional money services business comply with applicable state regulations).

296 Tu, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 86, n. 44.


298 Id. § 102(14).

299 Id. § 102, cmt. 12 (“O]nly stored value that consists of a medium of exchange evidence in electronic record would qualify as stored value for purposes of regulation. A medium of exchange needs to be something that is widely accepted. Closed-end systems, as mere bilateral units of account, therefore would be excluded from regulation.”).

300 Id. § 103(3); see also id. § 201(a)(2) (licenses are not required for an agent of a licensee, but the Act contains no comparable provision for an agent of an exempt entity).

301 E.g., Levitin, supra note 272 at 16 (“A federal money transmitter license, coupled with some sort of federal insurance for funds held by money transmitters . . . would be a simple move that would help reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens.”).

302 The one exception is JPay, which briefly mentions GLBA’s data protection provisions in its privacy policy. Despite this terse reference to the law, JPay does not appear to address GLBA compliance in its bid proposals, nor is there any mention of the consumer disclosure and opt-out procedures.


304 16 C.F.R. § 313.1(b).
provisions that can potentially benefit incarcerated consumers include notification of privacy practices and the ability to opt out of certain information sharing. Covered entities must also develop a data security plan, which must include certain elements designated by the FTC. Although noncompliance cannot be addressed through private litigation (GLBA does not include a private cause of action), a consumer who can show injury resulting from a covered entity’s failure to comply with the GLBA standards, may be able to bring a UDAP claim on that basis.

3. Legal Issues Related to Release Cards

The area of correctional banking that is most clearly covered by the EFTA is the use of prepaid debit cards ("release cards") to pay amounts due to incarcerated people upon their release from custody. The cards are open-loop stored value cards that can be used on the MasterCard payment network. Although EFTA’s general applicability to release cards has been unclear in the past, the CFPB clarified matters in its latest amendments to Regulation E. Effective April 1, 2018, Regulation E’s definition of “account” includes prepaid accounts, and the CFPB’s commentary explaining the amended rule specifically cites release cards as a type of prepaid product that is covered by the new definition. While the CFPB’s decision to expressly include release cards within the scope of Regulation E is an improvement, more work remains to determine the precise extent of the rights conferred by this change in regulation.

Regulation E prohibits payers from requiring a consumer to use a certain financial institution (including a specific prepaid card) for receipt of wages or government benefits. During the CFPB’s last EFTA rulemaking, several advocacy groups requested that the Bureau extend the compulsory-use prohibition to release cards. Although the Bureau declined to adopt these requested changes, it did note that “to the extent that . . . prison release cards are used to disburse consumers’ salaries or government benefits . . . such accounts are already covered by § 1005.10(e)(2) and will continue to be so under this final rule.” This “clarification” actually creates some uncertainty, because it does not specify whether a payroll disbursement must be contemporaneous with the employee’s earning of the underlying compensation. When someone is released from prison, they might receive disbursement of accumulated wages earned during the term of their incarceration. To the extent

305 Id. §§ 313.5 (annual privacy notices), 313.7 (opt-out procedure).
306 Id. § 314.4.
308 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
311 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10(e)(2).
312 See Prison Policy Initiative, supra note 69, at 8-9.
313 Regulation E Amendments, supra note 310, 81 Fed. Reg. at 83985.
that the compulsory-use prohibition applies to delayed disbursements of wages, then Regulation E would prohibit mandatory use of release cards to make such payments.

Consumer litigation concerning release cards holds promise. Encouragingly, most courts have held that arbitration provisions in release-card contracts are unenforceable, given the inability of consumers to realistically withhold their consent. The outlier case, where an arbitration agreement was held enforceable, is a case from Florida where the district court found the plaintiff had been given a clear choice of receiving his funds via debit card or check. Claims under the EFTA have met with mixed success: one court has dismissed a class-action claim alleging that release cards charge fees in violation of the EFTA’s stored-value card provisions. Another court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs who allege that compulsory issuance of release cards violates EFTA’s prohibition on unauthorized issuance of access devices. Finally, the district court for the Western District of Washington has certified a class of Washington residents asserting violations of both the stored-value card fee provision and the compulsory-issuance provision (the same court deferred deferring ruling on a motion to certify a national class pursuing the same claims). Most release-card class-actions have also included general claims such as Fifth Amendment takings, unjust enrichment, conversion, or violations of UDAP statutes. These types of claims have frequently survived a motion to dismiss or led to an advantageous settlement.

314 Reichert v. Keefe Commissary Network, No. 17-cv-5848-RBL, 2018 WL 2018452, at *2 (order denying motions to compel arbitration) (W.D. Wash. May 1, 2018) (“All contracts, including those to arbitrate disputes, must have mutual assent, and Defendants’ ‘contract’ to arbitrate is unenforceable and unconscionable under Washington law.”); Brown v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., No. 15-cv-01370-MO, 2016 WL 755625, at *4 (order denying motion to compel arbitration) (D. Or. Feb. 25, 2016) (“[Plaintiff] had to take the card and had to work through the Defendants’ system in order to get her money back. . . . It is not clear that Plaintiff was presented with a meaningful choice, as such I DENY the Motion to Compel.”); see also Regan v. Stored Value Cards, Inc., 85 F.Supp.3d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2015), aff’d 608 Fed. Appx. 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (defendants argued that plaintiff had impliedly accepted or ratified the cardholder agreement through his use of the release card; court denied motion to compel arbitration and ordered an evidentiary hearing on whether a contract had been formed; case settled before evidentiary hearing).


319 See Reichert, 2018 WL 2018452, at *3 (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s conversion and unjust enrichment claims, as well as claims under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (actionable through § 1983) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act); Humphrey v. Stored Value Cards, No. 18-cv-1050, 2018 WL 6011052 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 2018) (certifying class
C.  **UDAP Statutes**

Statutes in every state prohibit the use of unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) in consumer transactions. In the past, UDAP laws have been of limited relevance in prison because incarcerated people engaged in relatively few commercial transactions. With the rise of prison retailing, however, these laws are becoming increasingly salient. Prison-retail vendors often employ tactics that are deceptive, unfair, or unconscionable for purposes of consumer protection law. Notably, UDAP statutes not only allow enforcement by state attorneys general, but frequently provide a private cause of action as well. The private enforcement option is critically important because attorneys general are unlikely to aggressively promote the rights of incarcerated people, since doing so would typically be met with consternation by agencies that are either clients of the attorney general (in the case of state prison systems) or at the very least are ideologically aligned with the state’s chief law enforcement officer (in the case of county jails).

As defined by the FTC, a deceptive practice requires a false or misleading material claim or omission that is likely to mislead a consumer. Although deception is prohibited under the UDAP statutes in most states, not all jurisdictions follow the FTC’s definition. In most states deception is akin to common-law fraud, but with more flexibility (for example, most states do not require proof of reliance to prove deception). Advertisements, promotional materials, and product descriptions published by prison retailer vendors frequently contain deceptive claims. For example, the suggestion that a computer tablet has functions that it lacks in reality could be deceptive. As
could advertised phone rates that do not adequately disclose or explain fees.326

Not all states recognize claims for unfair or unconscionable practices, and of the states that do, not all provide consumers with a private cause of action.327 Under the FTC Act, a practice is unfair if it is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”328 Other jurisdictions have employed even more expansive definitions of unfairness which seek to root out all manner of inequitable conduct.329 Unconscionability is typically defined by reference to various non-exclusive factors that focus on whether a merchant took advantage of consumer’s vulnerability or knowingly structured a transaction in a particularly egregious manner.330 Prison-retail customers often have actionable claims for unfair or unconscionable practices because of their inability to avoid injury: prison retailers sell essential goods (food, clothing) or services (communication with family) through state-created monopolies, and if these vendors employ unfair tactics, customers have no alternative. As one court found, families who pay exorbitant phone rates do so “out of sheer desperation for contact with their loved ones.”331

Different types of consumer injuries are discussed in the following subsections. It is first necessary to acknowledge that prison-retail customers are often severely impaired in their ability to vindicate their legal rights, due to contractual prohibitions on class adjudication. In many ways, the enforcement of arbitration provisions and class-adjudication bans in the prison-retail realm stretches the legal justification of “consent” to its limits.332 Without diminishing the impact of arbitration provisions, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge and explore the frequent facial violations of UDAP statutes, in the form of unreasonable prices, oppressive contract terms, and efforts to evade sellers’ duties under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

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326 Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1163-1164 (2000) (company’s imposition of lawful fees was nonetheless actionable as deceptive practice because company failed “to make it clear to customers that an avoidable charge is considerably higher than the retail rate for an item or service, which in the absence of contrary information many would expect to apply”).

327 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 322, at 15 (44 states plus D.C. broadly prohibit unfairness and/or unconscionability, although 5 of these do not always provide a private cause of action).


329 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 151, § 4.3.3.1.

330 Id. § 4.4.2; see also Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act § 4 (factors determining unconscionable practices).


332 See Reichert v. Keefe Commissary Network, No. 17-cv-5848-RBL, 2019 WL 2022678, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2019) (“According to Defendants [correctional banking vendors], voluntary deposits necessarily subject the inmate to the facility’s terms and conditions for distribution of the funds [including arbitration provision]. But Defendants gloss over the fact that inmates have no other means of using funds while in prison, making the ‘voluntariness’ of a deposit not so different from when cash is confiscated.”).
1. Prices

Consumers who challenge prices should take care to highlight the ways in which prison-retail pricing resembles practices that have previously formed the basis for valid UDAP claims. Specifically, practices such as use of monopoly power to extract excessive fees, or paying kickbacks to the issuer of a government contract. Some jurisdictions may recognize unreasonably high prices as unconscionable in and of themselves. Other jurisdictions may require some type of independent wrongdoing in addition to unreasonably high prices. In a class action, a finding of unconscionable prices need not be made customer-by-customer, but rather can be based on judicial comparison of end-user prices to the seller’s average costs. In addition to base prices, transaction fees may be unfair or deceptive, depending on how they are portrayed and what (if anything) the consumer receives in return for payment of the fee.

In the context of prison-retailing, consumers have used UDAP statutes to challenge inflated monopoly prices charged by ICS carriers. For example, plaintiffs in Arkansas challenged Securus’s intrastate rates under that state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The district court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations that Securus “improperly exploit[ed] economic leverage resulting from exclusive-provider contracts” formed the basis for an actionable claim of unconscionability. In a still-pending New Jersey class action, the district court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations that Securus “improperly exploit[ed] economic leverage resulting from exclusive-provider contracts” formed the basis for an actionable claim of unconscionability.

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333 E.g. Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72 (D.C. App. 2006) (consumer pleaded a valid claim for unconscionably high prices under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, where plaintiff’s only way to obtain copies of his own medical records was to pay $6.36 per page to contractor selected by the medical provider).


335 Via Christi Regional Med. Ctr. v. Reed, 298 Kan. 503, 527-528 (2013) (hospital’s use of superior bargaining power to charge inflated prices was actionable; the fact that such pricing was common in the industry held not to be a defense); Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 545-547 (1971) (defendant’s targeting low-income consumers with sales of “practically worthless” educational materials for two-and-a-half times a reasonable market price was unconscionable).


337 ChartOne, 908 A.2d at 90-92.

338 Byler v. Deluxe Corp., 222 F.Supp.2d 885 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (plaintiffs adequately pled deceptive trade practice under California, Illinois, Missouri, and Massachusetts law, based on company’s shipping fees (ranging from $8 to $49.60 per order), which bore no reasonable relationship to company’s actual shipping costs); Martin v. Heinold Commodities, 163 Ill.2d 33, 50-52 (broker’s imposition of a “foreign service fee” was deceptive because it inaccurately implied that the fee was charged to recover costs, when in fact it was simply an additional sales commission).


340 Id. at *6.
court denied GTL’s motion to dismiss claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim of unconscionability based on the anti-competitive way in which rates were imposed upon a vulnerable population (further holding that a separate act of deception was not required).341 Most recently, the district court for Massachusetts denied Securus’s attempt to dismiss a class action claim under Massachusetts consumer protection law, finding that the plaintiffs were families of limited means who had no reasonable alternative but to pay prices that Securus had inflated in order to pay commissions to the sheriff.342

2. **Terms and Conditions**

Adhesive contracts with oppressive terms are often actionable for either of two interrelated reasons: complex contract language can deceive consumers into misunderstanding the terms of a bargain, and an inability to negotiate terms leaves consumers with no meaningful choice.343 These dual concerns are particularly acute in the prison-retail setting, where terms and conditions are unusually oppressive and merchants enjoy a legal monopoly. Terms and conditions that are difficult to understand may be deceptive, while terms that are overwhelmingly exculpatory may be actionable as unfair or unconscionable.344

Deceptive practices in prison-retailing can include advertising services as achieving a specific purpose (e.g., communicating with a loved one) but forcing consumers to assent to contract terms that excuse the vendor from actually providing the advertised service.345 The same goes for goods that are advertised as fulfilling specific functions, but which come with terms stating that the product is not warranted to operate without failure.346 Other problematic terms and conditions include purported waivers of duties imposed by law. For example, JPay’s terms of service for money transfers state that

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341 *James v. Global*Tel Link*, No. 13-cv-4989, 2018 WL 3736478, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2018) (Unconscionability claim is “not solely about excessive rates, but also about the manner in which those rates were established—through site commissions and ancillary fees. From the end user’s perspective, there was no marketplace. GTL enjoyed a monopoly over individuals held captive by a government agency.” (citation and internal quotation mark omitted; emphasis in original)).

342 *Pearson v. Hodgson*, No. 18-cv-11130-IT, 2018 WL 6697682, *8-9 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2018). The plaintiffs’ theory in this case relies on an earlier state-court ruling, *Souza v. Sheriff of Bristol County*, 455 Mass. 573 (2010), which held sheriffs may only impose and collect fees that are specifically authorized by statute. The *Pearson* plaintiffs argue that the sheriff has violated *Souza* by collecting fees (site commissions) that are not authorized by statute, and that Securus has violated Massachusetts’ UDAP statute by assisting the sheriff in this unlawful activity.

343 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., *supra* note 151 § 4.3.2.3.4.


345 See *supra* note 139-141 and accompanying text.

346 See *supra* note 147 and accompanying text.
JPay “will not be liable for a Payment sent to the incorrect inmate account.” This blanket exculpatory term ignores the numerous situations in which JPay could be liable for an erroneous transfer due to its own negligence. JPay also claims (perhaps as part of its efforts to redirect customers to high-fee electronic payment channels) that it is “not responsible” for money orders that it receives at its designated mailing address, but which do not reach the intended recipient of funds. This provision is not only unfair, but is likely unenforceable as an attempt to evade the common-law duties of a bailee.

Vendors’ privacy policies also contain troublesome provisions, especially when it comes to law-enforcement use of customer data. Securus’s Threads product collects data from numerous sources for distribution to anyone “connected to” a public law enforcement agency or private investigative firm. Securus apparently has some awareness that such data sharing implicates privacy laws, because law enforcement customers that subscribe to Threads must sign a form contract promising to “comply with all [applicable] privacy, consumer protection, marketing, and data security laws and government guidelines.” Yet Securus’s customer-facing terms of service require customers to “agree that [communications data] will be . . . assigned, sold, transferred and distributed by [law enforcement]” and customers must further “agree that Securus assumes no responsibility for the activities, omissions or other conduct of any member of Law Enforcement.” In other words, Securus uses form contracts to require law-enforcement to observe to certain laws, while simultaneously requiring the effected consumers to waive the protections of those same laws. Because the agency-facing contract evidences Securus’s knowledge of applicable privacy laws, the company’s consumer-facing terms seem particularly vulnerable to a challenge as unfair or unconscionable.


348 Most obviously, a customer paying by credit card could have valid grounds to initiate a chargeback if JPay negligently misdirected deposited funds. See MasterCard, Chargeback Guide 47, 222 (May 1, 2018) (description of chargeback message reason codes 4853, 53, and 79).

349 JPay, supra note 347 at ¶ 7.

350 JPay’s terms and conditions state that this disclaimer is designed for situations where “there is a problem with the deposit.” Id. Although a money transfer is not a bailment, in the case of an attempted payment by negotiable instrument that cannot be consummated, the recipient most likely holds the instrument as a constructive bailee. See Bayview Loan Servicing v. CWCapital Asset Management (In re Silver Sands R.V. Resort), 636 Fed. Appx. 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2016) (recipient of overpayment held excess funds as constructive bailee); see also 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 12 (2009) (“A ‘constructive bailment’ or ‘involuntary bailment’ arises where . . . a person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby he or she should, on principles of justice, keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner.”). Although parties to a bailment may alter their respective rights and obligations by contract, attempts to eliminate a bailee’s liability for loss arising from its own misconduct are typically held void as against public policy. Id. § 86 (2009).

351 See supra, notes 178-181.

352 Master Services Agreement, supra note 123, at 5, ¶ 1. The contract also requires agencies to agree to implement eight specific practices, including restricting access to properly authorized employees, using personal information only for lawful purposes, and limiting the further dissemination of personal information. Id. ¶ 2.

353 Securus T&C, supra note 118, Privacy Policy §§ II(J) & (K).
Finally, although it would be novel, a UDAP claim could be brought in cases where vendors have made materially different representations and warranties to facilities versus consumers. As an example, in a typical contract for video visitation, Securus agrees to provide functioning video service, with specified features, and subject to detailed technical specifications. Yet, the customer-facing terms and conditions for the same service provide that Securus does not warrant that the system will work “properly, completely, or at all.” Such a stark disparity could form the basis for a claim of unfairness in that the disparity between the vendor-facility contract and the vendor-customer contract reflects the extent to which vendors use their disproportionate power to craft one-sided consumer-facing contracts.

3. **Sales of Goods**

Sales of goods such as food, toiletries, clothing, and electronic hardware (including tablets) implicate both UDAP statutes and consumers’ rights under article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). The rights of buyers regarding defective goods is likely to become more relevant to the extent that computer tablets of questionable quality become more common. Because prison retailers tend to offer the most parsimonious express warranties imaginable, consumers will often have to rely on the implied warranty of merchantability available under UCC article 2. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may also arise in situations where a seller encourages consumer misconceptions, such as leading customers to believe that a tablet performs a specific function, (e.g., accessing educational content), when in fact it does not.

Prison retailers routinely impose terms and conditions that misleadingly purport to “disclaim” all implied warranties. The enforceability of such a provision is questionable. About one-third of the states restrict the ability of sellers to disclaim implied warranties. In addition, if a merchant does use a broad disclaimer, they are required to advise consumers that they may have greater rights under state law—a requirement that is routinely ignored by prison

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355 See *supra* note 139 and accompanying text.
356 Although not a consumer-law issue, one tablet user in South Dakota has raised the ongoing malfunctioning of computer tablets as a Sixth Amendment issue, since that state removed prison law libraries and replaced it with a tablet-based Lexis Nexis app. See *Motion for Appointment of Counsel*, *Gard v. Fluke*, No. 18-cv-5040-JLV (D.S.D. Jun. 19, 2018), ECF No. 3 (“The tablet program is defective and prone to lockouts and other network and system failures. For a year, promised repairs and updated have not provided petitioner with meaningful access to any legal materials.”).
357 U.C.C. § 2-314.
358 U.C.C. § 2-315.
359 See *supra* notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
retailers. Even if a disclaimer of implied warranty is allowed under state law, it may be unenforceable under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which prohibits a supplier from disclaiming an implied warranty if it “makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer product.” Given the FTC’s broad definition of a “written warranty,” many goods sold in a commissary will fall under this provision.

Although merchants are generally able to limit the duration of warranties, prison retailers frequently use warranty periods that are so short or otherwise burdensome that they may be actionable either under either the Magnuson-Moss Act or the UCC’s “manifestly unreasonable” standard. For example, Union Supply Company sells computer tablets that are covered by a three-month warranty. The procedure for invoking one’s warranty rights under the Union Supply policy is also troublesome. If a defective item is returned for a warranty claim, it must be accompanied by an original receipt and all of the original accessories and packaging. This could be a consumer trap even in a regular free-world transaction, but is particularly onerous for someone in prison, where customers may not even be allowed to keep the packaging. After imposing intricate and burdensome rules for warranty claims, Union Supply claims to reserve to itself the sole discretion to determine whether a returned item is eligible for warranty service. If it determines a return is ineligibile, the company has the sole discretion to decide whether or not

362 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(7), (8), and (9).
365 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(c)(1) (written warranty includes “[a]ny written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time.”)
366 15 U.S.C. §§ 2308(b) (seller may limit an implied warranty only if the duration is reasonable and the limitation itself is conscionable) and 2310(d) (private cause of action).
367 U.C.C. § 1-302(b); Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 361 at § 7.7.4.6 (parties may vary terms such as a warranty duration, by contract, but such variations may not be manifestly unreasonable).
368 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. The warranty period is technically 180 days, but after 60 days, a repair fee is imposed that may prevent many customers from effectively making warranty claims. Notably, although the company’s website terms include a description of the warranty coverage, it also states that complete warranty terms are available only in the tablet package, a practice that likely violates the Magnuson-Moss Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (requiring warranty terms to be “made available to the consumer (or prospective consumer) prior to the sale of the product to him.”).
369 Union Supply Group, supra note 148.
370 The Union Supply tablets are specifically marketed for people incarcerated in the California prison system, which limits personal property to items on a preapproved list (a list that does not include used packaging) and caps the volume of allowable possessions at six cubic feet per person. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3190(e); Calif. Dept. of Corr. and Rehabilitation, “Inmate Property Matrix” (rev. Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.cdc.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/docs/DOM/DOM%202018/APPS-Rev-4-1-14.pdf.
to return the item to its owner.\textsuperscript{371}

The use of oppressive warranty terms is not unique to Union Supply. The warranty for GTL’s tablets lasts twelve months, but repairs can take up to one month to complete (or “21 working days”), and GTL has the sole discretion to determine whether “conditions of the warranty are met.”\textsuperscript{372} If GTL determines the product is not eligible, the customer has no appeal rights, does not receive the original device back, and his only recourse is “to purchase a new tablet.”\textsuperscript{373}

Tactics that render warranty coverage illusory can be actionable as either a deceptive or an unfair practice.\textsuperscript{374} In addition, the Magnuson-Moss Act allows the FTC or the Attorney General to sue when “the terms and conditions of [a written warranty] so limit its scope and application as to deceive a reasonable individual;”\textsuperscript{375} there is not, however, a private cause of action under this provision.

\textbf{D. Antitrust}

Because prison retailers are able to use their market power to inflict harm on consumers, many industry trade practices are potentially subject to a private action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.\textsuperscript{376} Specific aspects of prison-retailing that are relevant to such claims include vendor exercise of monopoly power, the oligopoly in the correctional telecommunications market, and collusion between vendors and facilities in setting prices. Due to the specialized nature of antitrust litigation, this article does not explore such actions in greater depth; however, recent developments in public enforcement do warrant a brief mention.

ICS carrier Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC (doing business as ICSolutions) is a wholly owned subsidiary of commissary company Access Corrections. ICSolutions is the third largest ICS carrier in the market,\textsuperscript{377} and claims to have a captive customer base of approximately 268,000 incarcerated

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{371} Union Supply Group, supra note 148.
\textsuperscript{372} Pennsylvania-GTL Contract, supra note 50, appx. G at Requirement #103. Even though the tablets are warranted for twelve months, the batteries (which are presumably a critical component) are only warranted to last three months. \textit{Id.} at p. 415 (GTL Genesis 116-PA spec sheet).
\textsuperscript{373} \textit{Id.} appx. G at Requirement #103.
\textsuperscript{374} See \textit{Roelle v. Orkin Exterminating Co.}, No. 00AP-14, 2000 WL 1664865, *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2000) (guarantee that promises effective services but is negated by other components of the same contract is a deceptive practice under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act).
\textsuperscript{375} 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c).
\textsuperscript{377} Wagner, supra note 58, lists ICSolutions’ market share as fourth, behind CenturyLink. But CenturyLink is likely not a true independent competitor in the ICS marketplace. CenturyLink, an incumbent local exchange carrier with operations concentrated in western and midwestern states, is a nominal holder of many ICS contracts, but its bid proposals indicate that CenturyLink simply provides transmission lines, while ICS carriers such as Securus or GTL are responsible for all operational details, such as software, billing functions, and customer support. See e.g., CenturyLink, Response to Georgia Dept. of Corrections Solicitation No. 46700-GDC0000669, attch. K (Jun. 9, 2015) (on file with author).
\end{footnotesize}
people in over 400 facilities. In June 2018, Securus filed an application under § 214 of the Communications Act, seeking FCC permission to acquire ICSolutions. Moody’s Investors Service noted that the acquisition was “costly” for Securus, but it would “eliminate[] an aggressive competitor in the smaller facility space comprised of local and county jails.” For this reason, Moody’s reaffirmed Securus’s bond rating, citing the company’s “small scale, niche industry focus, aggressive financial policy, and strong competitive pressures in a largely duopolistic and mature end market.”

The acquisition was challenged by the Wright petitioners and others. After an extended review by the FCC and the U.S. Department of Justice, Securus and ICS terminated the transaction. Although the abandonment of the merger was announced as a voluntary action by the parties, the public statement of FCC Chairman Pai indicates that the Commission was genuinely skeptical about the deal.

The demise of the ICSolutions acquisition indicates that regulators are aware of the acute consolidation within the ICS marketplace and the resulting lack of competition. Yet even with this positive development, it may not be realistic to expect a resurgence of competition in a market that has become consistently less robust over the span of several decades.

V. Policy Recommendations

Although prison-retail customers have some protections, as discussed in the previous section, these scattered ex post remedies are inefficient and less-than-comprehensive. Meaningful protection must come through a deliberately designed system of ex ante regulation that respects legitimate security needs while vigorously protecting the interests of incarcerated people as consumers.

Central to the current lack of consumer protections is the failure of any government agency to take responsibility for broadly protecting the rights of incarcerated people and their families as captive customers. Time and time

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378 ICSolutions, Response to Request for Proposals for Providing Inmate Communication Services for the Harrison County Jail Facilities, Gulfport, Mississippi, at 1 (Jul. 28, 2017) (on file with author).
379 Joint Application, In the Matter of Joint Application of TKC Holdings, ICSolutions, and Securus Technologies for Grant of Authority, WC Dkt. No. 18-193 (Jun. 12, 2018).
381 Id.
384 Press Release, Fed. Comm’ns Comm., Chairman Pai Statement on Decision by Inmate Calling Services Providers to Withdraw Merger Application (Apr. 2, 2019) (“FCC staff concluded that this deal posed significant competitive concerns and would not be in the public interest. I agree.”).
again, concerns about abusive monopolist business practices are dismissed by policymakers who claim that correctional agencies take these matters into account when awarding exclusive vendor contracts. This is not a sufficient answer, given the agencies’ divided loyalties.

This section explores proactive actions that legislatures, regulatory agencies, and correctional facilities can take. Because the majority of incarcerated people are held in state or local facilities, this section begins with state- and local-level policy proposals and then considers potential federal action.

A. State and Local Governments

The basic problem of prison retailing can be summarized as follows: growing prison populations have led to unsustainable correctional budgets, which has led agencies to seek out so-called “no cost” contracts (in reality, this simply means shifting costs from the public sector to incarcerated people). The ultimate solution to this quandary is for states to reduce the use of incarceration and acknowledge that the state must assume the financial costs when it chooses to incarcerate people. In the absence of this large-scale normative change, consumer rights can be protected through reforms that are more incremental, but which nonetheless creatively change the ways in which society addresses the burdens of incarceration.

1. Reimagine Procurement Practices

Opening up aspects of the procurement process to oversight is one part of a multi-layered approach to addressing the problematic aspects of prison retailing. This can be accomplished through numerous changes, ranging from major overhauls to minor tweaks. To begin, families and representatives of incarcerated people must have a meaningful role in the procurement process. Incarcerated people and their families are increasingly well organized, and as the experience of the Wright petitioners teaches, this is a constituency that is entirely qualified to bring valuable insights to complex regulatory matters. Accordingly, legislatures should require that any panel of reviewers evaluating bids for prison-retail contracts must include a qualified delegate from an organization that represents the interests of people incarcerated by the agency that has solicited bids.

Corrections agencies should also take the lead by reforming procurement practices to address the unnecessarily abusive practices that are common in the industry. There are numerous targeted reforms that agencies

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385 See Confronting Confinement, supra note 87, at 78 (The key, many people told the Commission [on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons], is never to rely on any single mechanism of oversight and accountability, but rather to take what Professor Michele Deitch calls a “layered approach.”).

386 Allowing advocates to sit on procurement committees is no more revolutionary than the numerous insurance regulatory systems that allow intervention of consumer advocates in ratemaking proceedings. See Daniel Schwarz, “Preventing Capture through Consumer Empowerment Programs; Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It 365 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds., 2014).
could achieve simply by modifying contracts or the terms of requests for proposals. For example, agencies should:

- Protect consumers from the potentially disastrous effects of a money-transmitter insolvency by requiring vendors to post a surety bond or hold prepaid revenue in a segregated account that cannot be pledged as collateral.
- Refuse to consider or enter into bundled contracts.
- Allow all incarcerated customers to designate a third party representative (e.g., a trusted family member) for purposes of accessing account data and interacting with vendor customer-service staff.
- Require all vendors providing financial services to formulate a data protection plan and comply with the consumer data provisions of the GLBA.
- Prohibit vendors from disclaiming the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
- Require public posting (accessible both in- and outside of prison) of all vendor policies and fees, as well as disclosure of any compensation received by the correctional agency.
- Prohibit forfeiture of prepayments and require that all unused prepayments be refunded upon a customer’s release from custody. If any refund cannot be completed, the credit balance should be administered under the state’s unclaimed property law.

2. Foster Competition

Part of the reason why retail offerings like commissary and telephone service are delivered through monopoly contracts is that correctional facilities want tight control over the security practices of vendors. In the case of digital content delivered via tablets, the security-related justification for a monopoly provider is not particularly compelling. Companies like Apple and Spotify have spent considerable resources amassing enormous catalogs of music, and developing sophisticated content-delivery platforms. Moreover, these companies have invested substantial money (almost assuredly more than has been invested by prison-retail firms) in designing a secure network that can prevent malicious misuse. Any computer network used by incarcerated people must be established by the facility, subject to necessary security features. The costs of establishing that network can be funded through correctional budgets or (if necessary) through reasonable user fees. But providing software and content that operates on this closed network need not be the exclusive province of a monopoly provider. Free-world platforms can be modified and offered in prisons, allowing customers to select providers in a truly competitive market. There are two reasonable security concerns about allowing such free-world

387 This third-party authorization system can be modeled after the CFPB’s “Consumer Protection Principles: Consumer-Authorized Financial Data Sharing and Aggregation” (Oct. 18, 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-protection-principles_data-aggregation.pdf (“Consumers are generally able to authorize trusted third parties to obtain [account-related] information from account providers to use on behalf of consumers, for consumer benefit, and in a safe manner.”).
digital platforms in a correctional facility: (1) potentially objectionable content in books, music, or other digital material, and (2) certain features like user reviews, which could be used to facilitate unauthorized communications. Correctional administrators who are truly committed to innovation could work with technical experts on modifying existing platforms to address these concerns. For example, if facilities want to control the types of songs available (due to violent or sexual content), then how could various corrections departments collaboratively curate and share a database of acceptable songs, while simultaneously providing users explanations of why certain music has been censored? Or if prison administrators balk at iTunes because user reviews allow communication with the outside world, could the software be modified to disable the review feature for incarcerated users?

In the case of tangible goods, security concerns are more understandable, but some level of competition is nonetheless possible. In fact, the ability to introduce competition comes from an unlikely source. There is a robust national network of independent community organizations that send free books to incarcerated people. Prison systems sometimes attempt to squelch these sources of donated books by prohibiting incarcerated people from receiving mailed books unless they come from one of a small number of approved vendors. While approved-vendor policies have rightly been criticized (in the context of book shipments) as needless censorship, such policies serve as a key piece of evidence when it comes to confronting the monopoly of prison commissaries. Prison administrators, when it suits their purpose, admit that the supply chain of a national company like Amazon or Barnes and Noble is secure enough to serve incarcerated people (supplemented, of course, by screening in the facility mail room). If the supply chain is secure enough in the case of books, then family members should be allowed to use the same vendors to purchase toothpaste, batteries, or socks for incarcerated loved ones. Such an arrangement would require some kind of coordination between facilities and approved vendors (most notably to determine what inventory items are allowed under facility rules), but the logistics should not be insurmountably difficult.

3. **Conduct Rulemaking Proceedings to Protect Consumers**

Absent congressional action, some subset of telecommunications services will remain under the supervision of state public utilities commissions (“PUCs”). So long as this regulatory dichotomy continues, it is critical for

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388 Even though it is generally obvious that prisons should have the power to screen out objectionable content, prison officials have repeatedly proven themselves unreasonably overzealous in exercising this power. Perhaps the most notorious example are the numerous books which have been prohibited in prisons for implausible, nonsensical, or obviously pretextual grounds. See Books to Prisoners, “Banned Books List,” [http://www.bookstoprisoners.net/banned-book-lists/](http://www.bookstoprisoners.net/banned-book-lists/) (accessed Jan. 6, 2019) (collecting examples). This is a real problem, but one that is simply beyond the scope of this paper.


PUCs to ensure reasonable ICS rates. Intrastate rate regulation is particularly important for people incarcerated in local jails, because they are generally more likely to make local calls (to family or counsel in the vicinity who can provide immediate help) and do not have the ability to use VoIP routing to obtain the most favorable rates. When setting rates, PUCs must obtain carriers’ comprehensive financial information in order to prevent carrier manipulation of cost data.

UDAP statutes are another critical protection that can extend to all types of prison retailing, not just telecommunications. Because these statutes prohibit very broad categories of behavior, many states allow attorneys general or consumer-protection agencies to promulgate rules defining certain unfair or deceptive practices in greater detail. UDAP regulations could provide greater clarity by addressing issues specific to prison retailing. The first issue to address is arbitration provisions. Because prison-retail consumers have no ability to choose sellers, their consent to an arbitration clause is not truly voluntary. To mitigate this situation, states should issue regulations making it an unfair trade practice for any prison retailer doing business in that state to impose mandatory arbitration or prohibit class adjudication. States should also conduct other UDAP rulemakings after surveying incarcerated people and their families and identifying the problems most in need of remediation.

4. Provide Protection for Trust Account Balances

As discussed previously, families will sometimes utilize prepayment options with unfair terms in an effort to avoid depositing funds into a trust account where they can be subject to mandatory deductions. Some of these deductions can take the form of irregular seizures, such as a writ of garnishment. Other jurisdictions have made mandatory deductions more systematic. For example, a 2017 Oregon law directs the Department of Corrections to deduct 15% of all incoming funds (including wages or gifts), to pay any outstanding compensatory finds, restitution, court-appointed attorney fees, child support, or civil judgments. To illustrate the impacts of this law, consider a hypothetical mother who wishes to support her son in the Oregon prison system. If, every month, the mother wants her son to have enough money to purchase five prepaid mailing envelopes, a months’ supply of dental floss, deodorant, a bar of soap, and enough to pay for two 20-minute phone calls, she would need to send $17.65 per month. The impact of the new law is that she now needs to send $20.30 per month for her son to have the same buying power. The increased monthly deposit also increases the applicable transaction fee (charged by Access Corrections) by $3 per month (or $4 in the

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391 See supra notes 233-234 and accompanying text.
392 Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr, supra note 151 at § 3.4.4.2.
394 The cost of the phone call and postage are based on current rates; all other items are based on a likely outdated 2014 commissary price list available at https://www.oregon.gov/doc/docs/pdf/Commissary%20List.pdf.
case of a phone payment).395 Between increased transfer amounts and applicable fees, the total impact on the mother would be $67-79 per year.

Defenders of such mandatory deductions are quick to emphasize the importance of paying court-ordered financial obligations. But these arguments miss the fact that all states have enacted statutory exemptions for judgment debtors based on the realization that everyone needs minimal financial resources to live, and federal law generally limits the maximum wage garnishments to the lesser of 25% of disposable earnings or the amount by which disposable wages exceed thirty-times the federal minimum wage.396

One simple way that states could protect incarcerated people and their families from predatory prepayment schemes would be to exempt a reasonable amount of monthly trust account deposits from seizure under mandatory deduction laws. Despite the predictable counter-arguments that would come from proponents of zero-sum criminal justice, such a policy need not diminish the importance of repaying court-ordered debts. Rather, just like a wage-garnishment exemption, it is an acknowledgment that people in prison are expected to pay for basic necessities, and to do so, they must have some degree of protection from involuntary payments.

5. Develop Independent ADR Systems

Another important issue that should be seriously addressed in prison-retail systems is the existence and structure of customer dispute resolution processes. A creative form of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) in prison retailing is sorely needed. Vendors do not operate in a competitive market and therefore have little incentive to seriously respond to consumer complaints. Meanwhile, disputes in prisons are typically funneled to grievance systems which are notoriously biased, unfair, and ineffective.397

Often the problems with internal grievance systems can be traced to staff skepticism regarding the validity of complaints coming from incarcerated people. In some ways, this is the correctional system’s version of Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants (the “McDonald’s hot coffee case”), a highly publicized case that has led to many strongly-held opinions based on misinformation.398 The equivalent case in the correctional sector was a real lawsuit (many details of which have been lost to the sands of time) involving a purchase of peanut butter from a prison commissary. Senator Bob Dole described it as a suit over “being served chunky peanut butter instead of the

396 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)
397 See e.g., Prison Justice League, A “Rigged System”: How the Texas Grievance System Fails Prisoners and the Public at 5 (Jun. 2017) (54% of survey respondents reported never having a grievance satisfactorily resolved during their time in Texas prison, 91% reported that the system was not effective); Confronting Confinement, supra note 87 at 93 (“Nearly every prison and most jails have a procedure for receiving prisoners’ grievances. However, the Commission heard that many are ineffective.”).
creamy variety” during Senate debate of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.399 The case became a widely-cited example of frivolous prison litigation, and has become a shorthand method of dismissing the complaints of incarcerated people. Yet when Chief Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman unearthed the original complaint from the case, he discovered that Senator Dole’s characterization was not entirely accurate: yes, the plaintiff had received the incorrect type of peanut butter, but he filed the suit because he returned the incorrect jar and never received the refund he was promised.400 As Judge Newman remarked, the $2.50 cost of the peanut butter may seem trivial to some, “but out of a prisoner’s commissary account, it is not a trivial loss, and it was for loss of those funds that the prisoner sued.”401

The mythology of the peanut butter case is representative of many correctional administrators’ hostility toward grievances. Accordingly, the best way to ensure an effective and innovative ADR mechanism for prison retail transactions is to remove it from the correctional system entirely. To accomplish this, legislatures should consider creative ways of requiring prison retailers to utilize outside ADR mechanisms. The details of such systems will vary, but should be commensurate with the needs of any given prison-retail operation and should leave litigation as an option. The most critical component is an independent evaluator such as an ombudsperson who works outside of the correctional agency, 402 or a contractor who is tasked with adjudicating disputes. A new ADR system could utilize technology to obtain necessary information from the consumer, analyze vendor data to identify problematic products or practices, and provide performance data to the correctional agency for use when deciding whether to renew a contract. Such novel solutions will likely require legislative action, because they will be effective only to the extent the ADR neutral has access to transactional details and vendor records—something to which that vendors will not likely acquiesce unless required by law.

B. Federal

1. CFPB Regulation of Correctional Banking

Under title X of the Dodd-Frank Act,403 the CFPB is authorized to prohibit unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices (“UDAAP”). The CFPB should use these powers to comprehensively regulate the entire field of correctional banking. Title X grants the CFPB the authority to prohibit UDAAP by “covered persons,” which are defined as persons or entities “engage[d] in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service.” 404 Correctional banking vendors transmit funds, provide payment services, accept

401 Id.
deposits for the purpose of facilitating transfers, and act as custodians of stored value, all of which are statutorily defined as consumer financial products or services for purposes of title X.\footnote{Id. §§ 5481(5), (8)(C), and (15)(A)(iv), (v) & (vii).}

The UDAAP provision in § 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes statutory definitions of the terms “unfair” and “abusive.” Unfair practices are defined using the same definition as the FTC Act, requiring a likelihood of substantial injury, unavoidable by the consumer, which is not outweighed by countervailing benefits.\footnote{Id. § 5531(c)(1) (defining unfairness as an act or practice that is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers,” and such injury is not “outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”).} Trust fund transfers, prepayment products, and release cards routinely injure consumers by imposing supra-competitive fees and unfair terms and conditions. The customers in these transactions receive no corresponding benefit as a result of these practices, nor do consumers have access to a competitive market.

Section 1031 contains several definitions of abusive practices, one of which is an act or practice that “takes unreasonable advantage of . . . the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service.”\footnote{Id. § 5531(d)(2)(B); see also Adam Levitin, “CFPB ‘Abusive’ Rulemaking?” Credit Slips Blog (Oct. 17, 2018), \url{https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/10/cfpb-abusive-rulemaking.html} (arguing that the abusive prong under the CFPB’s enabling statute is basically duplicative of unfairness and deception).} Again, correctional banking products easily fit this definition because of the complete lack of consumer choice and the exploitative fees that are levied on vulnerable consumers.

Using its § 1031 powers, the CFPB should conduct an open-ended rulemaking to address common practices in the correctional banking industry. Such a rulemaking should include fee regulation and extension of Regulation E’s compulsory-use prohibition to release cards. The Bureau should also directly regulate correctional banking fees. While this level of intervention would be somewhat unusual, even those who lean toward market-oriented methods of fee regulation acknowledge that context matters.\footnote{Liran Haim & Ronald Mann, \textit{Putting Stored-Value Cards in Their Place}, 18 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 989, 1016 (2014) (“In our view, the question of fee regulation [for prepaid cards] should be largely contextual.”).} In the case of correctional banking, the facility is the party that evaluates bids and awards exclusive contracts. Transaction costs should therefore be internalized and borne by the facility, which is in the best position to minimize such costs.

2. **Congressional Action**

The most important step that Congress can take is to clarify FCC jurisdiction over emerging technology. This issue is already on the legislative radar screen. In 2017, Senator Tammy Duckworth introduced legislation to clarify the FCC’s jurisdiction over ICS telephone service and video visitation, regardless of whether such communications are inter- or intrastate.\footnote{Video Visitation and Inmate Calling in Prisons Act of 2017, S. 1614, 115th Cong. (2017).} The bill was assigned to committee and languished without any further action. Due to
technological changes in telecommunications, the traditional dichotomy between intra- and interstate communications makes little sense. The Duckworth bill should be reintroduced in the current congress and advocacy organizations should make passage a priority.

3. Wright Petition, Post-Remand

After the FCC took up the matter of ICS rate regulation, the Commissioners fractured on the appropriate regulatory fix. But even Chairman Pai, who led the dissent, admitted that government intervention in the ICS market is appropriate given the documented market failure.410 Now that the D.C. Circuit has vacated portions of the FCC’s 2015 rule, the ball is once again in the FCC’s court. Recall, however, that title II’s requirement of just and reasonable rates can be enforced via private litigation. The matter ended up before the FCC because courts were receptive to ICS carriers’ citation to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. That rule is a prudential doctrine, which some courts have declined to apply in situations where “the agency is aware of but has expressed no interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”411 If the FCC does not promptly take up the Wright rulemaking now that it has been remanded, then courts should interpret this as a lack of agency interest, and decline to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine in future cases.

As for the substance of the rulemaking, the FCC should promulgate new price caps for interstate ICS rates using a methodology that will satisfy judicial review. The Commission should also reissue the same restrictions on ancillary fees that were contained in the 2015 rules, but this time specifically invoke § 152(b)’s “impossibility exception” as grounds to apply the rules to intrastate calling.412

The Commission must also address ICS carriers that invoke their use of VoIP technology to evade state regulation. When vacating the FCC’s caps on intrastate rates, the D.C. Circuit relied on § 152 of the Communications Act, which creates a presumption that states will regulate intrastate communications.413 The purpose of § 152 is to respect the dual sovereignty of federal and state regulators. To the extent that the industry is successful in evading state regulation, then § 152 is no longer in play.

The Commission should also regulate emerging technologies such as video visitation and electronic messaging. This may seem infeasible given the current political makeup of the FCC, but it should not be. The Commission can maintain a general agenda of deregulation and still recognize the sui generis market failure that has occurred in prison telecommunications. The novelty of the products should not obscure the fact that customers are purchasing “mere

410 See supra note 246.
411 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, 783 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2015).
412 See e.g., Minn Pub. Utils Comm’n v. Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n, 483 F.3d 570, 577 (8th Cir. 2007) (impossibility exception “allows the FCC to preempt state regulation of a service which would otherwise be subject to dual federal and state regulation where it is impossible or impractical to separate the service's intrastate and interstate components”); see also supra note 224 (describing impossibility of segregating ancillary fees by call type).
413 Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n, 866 F.3d 397, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“§ 152(b) of the 1934 Act erects a presumption against the Commission’s assertion of regulatory authority over intrastate communications.”).
transmission” of text, voice, or video messages, the hallmark of communications services subject to regulation under title II.\textsuperscript{414} Those services suffer from the same market failures that the FCC identified in connection with telephone service in correctional facilities, and basic rate caps and restrictions on abusive fees would benefit consumers.

VI. Conclusion

Prison retailing is a predictable result of an age of runaway carceral growth coupled with legislative demands for fiscal austerity. While common business practices in the industry regularly run afoul of existing laws, substantial roadblocks make it difficult for injured customers to exercise what rights they may have. Meanwhile, correctional administrators, who are in the best position to guard against industry abuses, have largely indicated a lack of interest in consumer protection.

As discussed in the previous section, legislative and administrative bodies have numerous tools at their disposal to address the problems of prison retailing. A world without the parasitic companies that dominate the industry is achievable, but given the profitability of current business practices, pushback will be intense as companies defend their ability to extract profits from captive customers. Accomplishing meaningful change will thus require concerted effort by advocates and a willingness on the part of policymakers to see incarcerated people and their families as consumers entitled to the same protections that are enjoyed by most people every day.

\textsuperscript{414} See Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 239, at ¶ 6, 33 FCC Rcd. at 313 (describing information services as those that “offer more than mere transmission”).