“You know what pisses me off, Benny? These f*cking bitches look at me like I’m some goddamn piece of meat, you know? Like a f*cking sex toy. But I’m a human being, man! I’m a person, you know, with feelings and emotions… I’m sitting here, right? Yeah, I exist! They think I’m so tall, my feelings don’t get hurt.”

~George “Pornstache” Mendez, Orange is the New Black, “Tall Men with Feelings”

“I often cannot discern the humanity in a man.”

~Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value

There’s a very common reflex in contemporary moral discourse, evident both inside and outside philosophy. It shows up in numerous discussions of the moral psychology of racist brutality, as well as discussions of misogynist threats and violence. “The overall problem is one of a culture where instead of seeing women as, you know, people, protagonists of their own stories just like we are of ours, men are taught that women are things to ‘earn,’ to ‘win:’” trophies. So wrote cultural commentator Arthur Chu in the wake of the Isla Vista massacre, committed by Elliot Rodger in May 2014. Rodger had sought to wreak revenge on the “hot blonde sluts” who refused to have sex with him, or even to acknowledge his existence whatsoever.53 Describing her experiences confronting “her cruellest troll” on the internet, feminist writer Lindy West similarly wondered: “What made women easy targets? Why was it so satisfying to hurt us? Why didn’t he automatically see us as human beings?” (2015) West’s troll repented after she confronted him, and apologized for his misogynist behavior—much to her amazement. But this was the one question West reports asking him which he could not answer, despite his best efforts to.

In this chapter, I will argue that such questions—e.g., “Why didn’t he automatically see us as human beings?”—rest on a common mistake: reflexively attributing “man’s inhumanity to men”54 to some sort of dehumanizing psychological attitude. I’ll call this the ‘humanist’ explanation for interpersonal conduct of the kind that is naturally described as inhumane, in

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53 I discussed this case in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. See also Manne, ms.

54 This famous phrase was coined by the poet Robert Burns, who penned more than one Enlightenment anthem. Burns may in turn have adapted the expression from a line by Samuel von Pufendorf, an important forebear of Enlightenment thinking.
being not only morally objectionable, but also somehow cruel, brutal, humiliating, or degrading.\textsuperscript{55} And on the view in moral psychology I’ll subsequently call ‘humanism,’ such dehumanization is held to be the best explanation of such inhumane conduct relatively frequently (although not necessarily always). In other words, on the humanist view, such behavior often stems from people’s failure to recognize some of their fellows as fellow human beings. The former may instead see the latter as sub-human creatures, non-human animals, supernatural beings (e.g., demons, witches), or even as mere things (i.e., mindless objects). If people could only appreciate their shared or common humanity, then they would have a hard time mistreating other members of the species.

Humanism in the intended sense is a popular, familiar, and in many ways tempting view. In spite of this, however—or, perhaps, because of it—it is not always clearly formulated and defended against rival explanatory models. Nor has it been exposed to much in the way of extended critical scrutiny in contemporary analytic philosophy (though there are notable, if relatively brief, exceptions; see \textit{n. 75}).\textsuperscript{56} The aim of this chapter is hence to go some way towards correcting this omission. Ultimately, I will be mounting a critique of humanism, in terms of its explanatory ambitions, and some of what I take to be its failings and oversights. To be clear, I won’t argue, and indeed I don’t believe, that characteristically humanist explanations of inhumane interpersonal conduct are \textit{never} apropos. Rather, I think their scope and power has been considerably overestimated by some contemporary moral philosophers—Aristotelians, Kantians, and Wittgensteinians amongst them, as well as more general proponents of a rationalist, Enlightenment ethos.

But I anticipate. First to catch the flavor of humanist thought in some of its most interesting and fruitful philosophical applications, over the course of section 1. After that, I will clarify the humanist position (in section 2), criticize it (in section 3), present an alternative, ‘socially situated’ model for explaining the humanist’s target \textit{explananda} (in section 4), and argue that

\textsuperscript{55} Admittedly, the word ‘humanist’ and its cognates can mean different things to different people—but I can think of no better term that conveys something of its flavor.

\textsuperscript{56} The main set of extended critiques of broadly humanist thought in analytic philosophy comes from those who have argued that such views are objectionably ‘speciesist.’ I am increasingly sympathetic to the substance of these criticisms, although I have questions about how best to understand them in relation to other liberatory political movements. But in any event, criticisms of this kind are largely orthogonal to those I’ll be developing in this chapter, since humanism as I characterize it is not committed to (to my mind) dubious claims about the superior value or greater rights of human beings relative to other creatures.
these alternative explanations will often be superior to those offered by the humanist (in section 5, to close). In the end, I will tentatively moot a surprising conclusion: viz., it is not clear that the humanist line works in many of the cases for which it might seem tailor-made, where people participate in mass atrocities under the influence of dehumanizing propaganda. Their actions often betray the fact that their victims must seem human, all too human, to the perpetrators. We notice this when we remember to pay attention to man’s inhumanity to women, in particular—who are often brutally raped en masse during genocide.

1: Humanist Thought in Action

In Rae Langton’s treatment of women’s sexual oppression, a central role is played by the idea of “sexual solipsism.” Whereas solipsism in the classic sense consists in skepticism about (or perhaps the sheer denial of) the existence of other minds of any kind, sexual solipsism regards the only human minds as male ones. Women are viewed and treated as ‘mere things,’ or objects, in contrast. And in Langton’s view, this is closely connected with the moral ills of pornography. Here is Langton introducing her views, via her readings of Simone de Beauvoir and Catharine MacKinnon:

In the company of a creature stabilized ‘as an object,’ [Beauvoir] said, ‘man remains alone.’ Sexual oppression is a solipsism made real… [Beauvoir] thought it was, for many, “a more attractive experience than an authentic relationship with a human being.” A distinctive way of treating someone ‘as an object’ is to be found in pornography, so recent feminists have added, saying that in pornography ‘the human becomes thing.’ The ambiguity of [MacKinnon’s] striking phrase conveys the thought that through pornography human beings—women—are treated as things, and also that things—pornographic artifacts—are treated as human beings. (2009, p. 2)

Langton goes on to defend MacKinnon’s view that pornography (of the violent, degrading, heterosexual kind, at least57) silences and subordinates women by objectifying them in this way. This claim is meant to be not only a plausible causal (and hence empirical) claim; Langton’s central thesis is rather a constitutive one. (2009, Chapter 1)

57 MacKinnon gives a stipulative definition of pornography that centrally concerns violent, degrading, heteronormative material (although the exact scope of the definition is debatable). This was useful for MacKinnon’s intended purposes in drafting an anti-pornography civil rights ordinance (together with Andrea Dworkin). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to be more careful about MacKinnon’s views and aims here.
Racism often involves a similar obliviousness or imperviousness to the full inner lives of its victims or targets, according to Raimond Gaita. (1998, “Racism: The Denial of a Common Humanity”) Gaita offers us an autobiographical vignette by way of illustration, involving a bereaved mother, ‘M,’ who has recently lost a child and is still deep in the throes of grief. Gaita and M are watching a documentary about the Vietnam War on television. When the program turns to an interview with a grief-stricken Vietnamese woman who had also recently lost a child to the war, M initially leans forward, as if to catch every word of someone suffering the same kind of loss. But then she promptly leans back again, saying flatly: “But it is different for them. They can simply have more.” (1998, p. 57) Gaita makes it clear that M’s remark is not intended in a merely sociological vein, i.e., to mean that the Vietnamese have comparatively large families. Nor is it a remark to the effect that the Vietnamese were so devastated by war during this era that their usual capacity for grief may have been blunted by trauma. Rather, M’s remark expresses her sense that there is something about the Vietnamese as such which makes their emotional experiences incapable of “going as deep” as M’s own. Gaita:

In M’s eyes, the Vietnamese are not contingently unable to rise to the requirements that are inseparable from the possibility of a deepened inner life, as might happen to a people if they suffer great hardships. To her, that is how they essentially are. (1998, p. 59)

M hence “could not find it intelligible that she could converse with them and learn from them about what it means to be married, to love someone or to grieve for them.” (1998, p. xxxv) Gaita goes on to argue that M’s moral psychology, with her truncated sense of the human subjectivity of those who she harbors a racist prejudice against, is characteristic of many of those in the grip of racist ideology:

Victims of racism often say they are treated as ‘sub-human.’ In many cases—perhaps the majority—that is not even slightly an exaggeration. We can see from what I have been saying about M how radically demeaning her attitude is, how literally dehumanizing—because it denies its victims any possibility of responding with depth and lucidity to the defining features of the human condition. In a natural sense of the word ‘human’—when it is not used to refer simply to the species homo sapiens—those who are deemed

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58 Unfortunately, we are not told M’s own race or ethnicity, if I am not mistaken. But given that Whiteness is often treated as the default (again, unfortunately), it is natural to imagine her as being, like Gaita, a White Australian.
incapable of an inner life of any depth and complexity are rightly said to be treated as less than fully human, as sub-human. (1998, p. 60)

A similar line is taken by David Livingstone Smith, when it comes to the moral psychology of agents who participate in mass atrocities. Livingstone Smith takes a more political and historical line, in billing dehumanization—understood as the attribution of a non-human, animal ‘essence’ to the relevant class of people—as a solution to the problem, as it were, of empathy in politics. For:

To recognize someone as a person—a fellow human being—you need to have the concept of a human being. And once you categorize someone as human, this has an impact on how you respond to him… Thanks to our empathetic nature, most of us find it difficult to do violence to others. These inhibitions account for the powerful social bonds that unite human communities and explain the extraordinary success story of our species. But this generates a puzzle. From time immemorial men have banded together to kill and enslave their neighbors, rape their women, [etc.]… How do we manage to perform these acts of atrocity? An important piece of the answer is clear. It’s by recruiting the power of our conceptual imagination to picture ethnic groups as nonhuman animals. It’s by doing this that we’re able to release destructive forces that are normally kept in check by fellow feeling. (2011, p. 127)

In other words, when some people are tasked with brutalizing and persecuting others under a political regime, they will have a hard time of it unless their natural tendency to sympathize with these others is tempered. This is where dehumanization in general, and dehumanizing propaganda in particular, often proves invaluable.

If this is the moral psychology characteristic of racism and ethnic hatred, then we would expect that some kind of humanizing process would be required to overcome it. A nuanced treatment of such a process can be found in Nomy Arpaly’s discussion of the case of Huckleberry Finn, which is a classic in the literature on moral motivation, moral worth, and enkrasia (or ‘inverse akrasia’). (2003, pp. 75–78) As the story goes, Huck and Jim have been running away together, floating down the river together in a flimsy raft (a none-too-subtle metaphor, on Mark Twain’s part, for their being in ‘the same boat’). And despite Huck being a White boy, and Jim being a

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59 In describing the case, I draw on Manne, 2013, §2.
Black slave, the two have become companionable, and at ease with one another. When the slave hunters approach, and Jim is in danger of being captured, Huck cleverly heads them off, and thereby acts rightly. But there is a puzzle about whether and, if so, why Huck deserves moral praise for so doing, given that he acted contrary to his explicit, misguided moral belief that he should have handed Jim over. There is also a puzzle about why Huck did what he did at all. Arpaly argues that Huck’s deed is indeed morally praiseworthy, since it stems from Huck’s morally enlightened, increasingly humane view of Jim. Arpaly:

[D]uring the time he spends with Jim, Huckleberry undergoes a perceptual shift… Talking to Jim about his hopes and fears and interacting with him extensively, Huckleberry constantly perceives data (never deliberated upon) that amount to the message that Jim is a person, just like him. Twain makes it very easy for Huckleberry to perceive the similarity between himself and Jim: the two are equally ignorant, share the same language and superstitions, and all in all it does not take the genius of John Stuart Mill to see that there is no particular reason to think of one of them as inferior to the other. While Huckleberry never reflects on these facts, they do prompt him to act towards Jim, more and more, in the same way he would have acted toward any other friend. That Huckleberry begins to perceive Jim as a fellow human being becomes clear when Huckleberry finds himself, to his surprise, apologizing to Jim—an action unthinkable in a society that treats black men as something less than human… [W]hen the opportunity comes to turn Jim in and Huckleberry experiences a strong reluctance to do so, his reluctance is to a large extent the result of the fact that he has come to see Jim as a person. (2003, pp. 76–77)

That should suffice to give a preliminary taste of humanist thinking of the kind I have in mind here.60 What should we make of it? We can grant, I think, that it would be a serious problem to lose sight of the humanity of other human beings (at least with any consistency, or for no good reason).61 But is seeing people as people, or recognizing other human beings as such, really all it

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60 Aspects of the humanist view as I will understand it have also been defended by Christine Korsgaard, Martha Nussbaum, Stephen Darwall, and Julia Markovits, among others.

61 I say “with any consistency” because, following P.F. Strawson, I think room must be made for intermittent “relief” or “refuge” from the “strains of involvement” with other human beings. (1962/2008; 10, 13, 18) This may arguably involve a certain amount of detachment from these others’ very humanity. And I say “for no good reason” because there may be circumstances in which such detachment is vital in order to get a certain job done—e.g., as a surgeon who has to view her patients as mere bodies or complex systems when they are on the operating table.
is made out to be? To what extent does it dispose us to treat others decently? And to what extent is dehumanization responsible for the most brutal forms of treatment which people visit on each other? To what extent should we take it literally *qua* psychological phenomenon? These are the main questions I’ll be asking in this chapter. But first to clarify the key claims of humanism.

2: Clarifying Humanism

The term ‘humanism’ has meant many things to many people, historically, and it continues to do so today. I’ve already pointed in the direction of my stalking horse in giving the above examples, and in identifying some of the theorists whose views would (I take it) commit them to balking at some of my eventual conclusions. But rather than trying to pin down the specifics of their different positions, it will be helpful—both for the sake of clarity and brevity—to abstract away from any particular theorist’s views, and try to distil the humanist position into various key commitments. These comprise descriptive claims (conceptual-cum-perceptual, moral psychological, and historical), and also a normative claim (moral-cum-political). And their conjunction represents my attempt to put together various (it seems to me) complementary humanist thoughts, as gleaned in the previous section, into a natural, attractive package. (Each claim follows fairly naturally, but not deductively, from preceding ones, as we will see.) To be clear though, I don’t mean to imply that each of the aforementioned theorists is committed to each of the above claims, let alone to precisely these versions. With that caveat in hand, we can begin with the following

(1) **Conceptual-cum-perceptual claim:**

Human beings are capable of seeing or recognizing other human beings *as such*, in a way which goes beyond identifying them as other members of the species.\(^62\) This involves thinking about people in a way which has both perspectival and richer cognitive dimensions. It is to view them as a ‘*fellow* human being,’ as a member of one’s own kind, or (similarly) as a member of ‘our

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\(^62\) I mean ‘see’ somewhat metaphorically here, in that the distinctively visual aspect of this kind of recognition should not be overstated. On the other hand, something *perceptual* or quasi-perceptual in terms of its *holism* often seems to be at issue. Fortunately, I can remain neutral about the appropriate story about social (so-called) perception on behalf of the humanist for my purposes.
common humanity.’ Or, closely relatedly, it is to recognise them not merely as belonging to the species *homo sapiens* (if it in fact involves this at all), but rather, as a *person*.63

What does this come to? Recognizing someone as a fellow human being is generally supposed to comprise (*inter alia*) thinking of them as having, or at least as having had, the potential to:64

- Be *minded* in a similar way to oneself (cognitively, conatively, emotionally, phenomenologically, etc.);

- Develop and exercise various characteristically *human capacities*, including sophisticated forms of *rationality*, *agency*, *autonomy*, and so on, as well as a capacity to *value*, and to reflectively form and revise at least some of those values;

- Enter into and sustain various characteristically *human social relations*, including *marriage*, *parenthood*, *siblinghood*, *friendship*, *collegial relations*, etc.; and

- Be the intelligible intentional object of others’ *deep emotional attachments*, perhaps including one’s own, at least potentially.

With this conceptual-cum-perceptual claim in hand, the humanist can now make their second key claim, which presupposes the first (or something much like it):

(2)  *Moral psychological claim:*

When we recognize another human being as such, in the sense given by claim (1), then this is not only a *necessary* condition for treating her humanely, in interpersonal contexts, but also strongly *motivates* and *disposes* us to do so.65

Why should this be so though? What is the mechanism which connects the *recognition* of someone’s humanity with the *motivation* to (e.g.) be kind, and the aversion to being cruel to, her?

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63 Identifying someone as a fellow member of the species of course wouldn’t have been necessary before the concept of a species became salient, or in contexts in which it still isn’t.

64 The clause about ‘potential’ is included so as to allow the criteria below to encompass those human beings whose development has had, or will take, an atypical course, due to certain illnesses, injuries, disabilities, etc. Many humanists are keen not to exclude people who currently do not, and will likely never, fit the criteria below. To my mind, this is one of the most attractive (and humane) aspects of humanist thinking.

65 I’ll accept the necessity claim contained in (2) for the sake of argument. Given the deep human desire for interpersonal recognition, it is *prima facie* plausible, and nothing hangs on rejecting this claim for my purposes. However, I intend it to be fully compatible with holding that there is nothing *special* about being human, in the sense that non-human animals are just as valuable as human beings. (Although one may still hold that there are deep differences between different kinds of animals, including both human and other non-human species.)
This is an especially pressing question for those of us who subscribe to the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which beliefs and other ‘world-guided’ mental states don’t motivate by themselves. One also needs to posit a suitable desire or other ‘world-guiding’ mental state in order to explain someone’s disposition to take action.

A plausible account of the connection can be gleaned by considering an example from George Orwell, which more than one humanist has cited. (See Cora Diamond, 1978, p. 477; and also Gaita, 1998, p. 48.) Orwell recalls a morning in the trenches during the Spanish civil war, trying to snipe at the Fascists, when:

[A] man presumably carrying a message to an officer, jumped out of the trench and ran along the top of the parapet in full view. He was half-dressed and was holding up his trousers with both hands as he ran. I refrained from shooting at him. It is true that I am a poor shot and unlikely to hit a running man at a hundred yards, and also that I was thinking chiefly about getting back to our trench while the Fascists had their attention fixed on the aeroplanes. Still, I did not shoot partly because of that detail about the trousers. I had come here to shoot at ‘Fascists;’ but a man who is holding up his trousers isn’t a ‘Fascist’, he is visibly a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at him. (1981, p. 194)

Orwell speaks of the soldier as appearing on his radar as a ‘fellow-creature,’ rather than a ‘fellow human being,’ as Diamond acknowledges. But she nevertheless argues that a humanizing vision of a would-be target is especially prone to engender pity, and hence make the agent reluctant to pull the trigger.\textsuperscript{66}

We can generalize. The most promising route from claim (1) to claim (2) will invoke a concept like empathy, sympathy, compassion, or ‘fellow feeling.’ And the thought will be that, in view of our recognition of someone’s similarity to ourselves, we will be able and inclined to identify with her, or (somewhat more modestly) to take her perspective. We will subsequently often feel what we imagine she feels, or at least experience congruent or ‘helper’ emotions (pity being one

\textsuperscript{66} Orwell, for his own part, was more circumspect. Before recounting this incident, he warns the reader that it does “not prove anything in particular.” And immediately afterwards, he reiterates: “What does this incident demonstrate? Nothing very much, because it is the kind of thing that happens all the time in all wars.” (1981, p. 194)
such). This being the case, we will tend to want to be kind, rather than cruel, to her—or even to help, not to hurt, her more generally. The conclusion that we will be disposed to treat her in humane ways in interpersonal contexts is thereby significantly helped along. She will now be not only recognized but embraced as a member of our common humanity, an object of moral concern, reciprocity, or similar. Recognizing someone as a fellow human being can hence now be said to have a motivational upshot, at least in typical cases (e.g., absent certain psychological profiles).

So claim (2) follows naturally, if not inevitably, from claim (1), together with additional claims about a subsequent capacity for empathy or something like it, and the altruistic dispositions which characteristically follow.

A number of claims now become plausible on the basis of claim (2) without, again, following deductively.

(3) Quasi-contrapositive moral psychological claim: In order for people to mistreat others in the most morally egregious ways (e.g., to murder, rape, or torture them with relative impunity), a failure to see them as fellow human beings is a powerful, and perhaps even necessary, psychological lubricant.

(4) Historical claim: When a class of historically oppressed people comes to be seen as fellow human beings by members of dominant social groups, and in society as a whole, moral and social progress becomes much more likely, perhaps even virtually inevitable. Relatedly (or again, quasi-contrapositively), when people who belong to certain social groups are the targets of...
the most morally egregious forms of widespread mistreatment (e.g., genocide, massacre, mass rape, systematic torture), then this is typically due to their not being seen as full human beings in the first place, or dehumanized shortly thereafter, often due to the influence of dehumanizing propaganda.

(5) **Moral-cum-political claim:** when the members of certain social groups are mistreated in the above ways, then one of the most crucial immediate political goals should be to make their humanity visible to other people (whatever that involves, exactly). And this would also constitute a crucial form of individual moral progress for the people whose outlooks are transformed in the process.

3: The Trouble with Humanism

What should we make of humanism, understood as the conjunction of the preceding five claims? How well does the humanist diagnosis capture the moral-cum-social outlook of those in the grip of various oppressive ideologies (e.g., racist and misogynist ones)? In this section, I will consider some important potential objections to humanism, in light of which certain of its target explananda will tend to escape its clutches. In the section that follows, I will go on to consider a now-motivated alternative, which may be more appropriate in at least some of these.

We should start by considering claim (1) above—i.e., that there is a way of seeing people which goes beyond identifying them as another member of the species. It instead involves a sense of commonality with them sufficient to give rise to something like empathy (which, as we saw, is one concept of the kind which it would be natural to invoke to make the transition from claim (1) to claim (2)). I think that claim (1) is quite plausible in some version, and I’ll accept it for the sake of argument. The trouble is that it is radically incomplete. For, a fellow human being is not just an intelligible spouse, parent, child, sibling, friend, colleague, etc., in relation to you and yours. They are also an intelligible rival, enemy, usurper, insubordinate, betrayer, etc. Moreover, in being capable of rationality, agency, autonomy, and so on, they are also someone who could coerce, manipulate, humiliate, or undermine you. In being capable of abstract relational thought and congruent moral emotions, they are capable of thinking ill of you and regarding you contemptuously. In being capable of forming complex desires and intentions, they are capable of harbouring malice and plotting against you. In being capable of valuing, they may value what you abhor, and abhor what you value. They may hence be a threat to all that you cherish. And
you may be a threat to all that they cherish in turn—as you may realize. This provides all the more reason to worry about others’ capacity for cruelty, contempt, malice, and so forth.

The basic upshot is this: under even moderately non-ideal conditions, involving, e.g., exhaustible material resources, limited sought-after social positions, or clashing moral and social ideals, the humanity of some is likely to represent a double-edged sword to others. So, when it comes to recognizing someone as a fellow human being, the characteristic human capacities which you share don’t just make her relatable; they make her potentially dangerous and threatening in ways only a human being can be—at least relative to our own, distinctively human sensibilities.72

What follows from this? In view of the radical incompleteness of claim (1)—and thus, on the whole, the half-truth it represents—claim (2) can now be seen to be problematic. The capacity for empathy and the associated tendency to form altruistic dispositions can still be allowed to hold; but these dispositions will have to compete with, and may arguably be cancelled by, the dispositions associated with various hostile stances.73 E.g.: the stance towards one’s purported enemies which comes with a disposition to try to destroy them; the stance towards one’s purported rivals which comes with a disposition to try to defeat them; the stance towards one’s purported usurpers which comes with a disposition to try to turn the tables—i.e., to undermine and again surpass them; the stance towards those perceived as insubordinate which comes with a disposition to try to put them in their place again; and the stance towards someone perceived as a traitor which comes with a disposition to try to punish them for desertion.

Claim (3), in being close to the contra-positive of claim (2), will plausibly be impugned along with it. And the remaining claims, (4) and (5), now lack their hitherto justification. We will have

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72 See Lynne Tirrell (2012), for an illuminating account of the way the Tutsi were represented as threatening (among other things) by the Hutu in the lead-up to the Rwandan genocide, owing partly to new forms of dehumanizing hate speech. The Tutsi were called ‘inyenzi’ (‘cockroaches’) and ‘inzoka’ (‘snakes’) by the Hutu, terms which Tirrell plausibly argues had an action-engendering function, since there are characteristic actions one takes towards such creatures—namely, destructive ones. Tirrell also insightfully emphasizes the embeddedness in oppressive social contexts which make these deeply derogatory terms (as she calls them) much more pernicious than ad hoc terms like ‘sausage face’ (an example Tirrell gives of a term spontaneously made up by some children during a game they were playing).

73 If we allow for the latter possibility—which is something like John McDowell’s idea of motivating reasons being ‘silenced’ (1995)—then claim (1) will be positively false, in being subject to an important range of counter-examples. But even if not, i.e., if we insist on taking the former view, claim (1) will leave out half of the story—a half which the humanist would need in order to make the crucial transition from claim (1) to claim (2) plausible.
to see if these claims should be tempered or dropped, or whether they can be furnished with an independent warrant.

So far in this section, my criticisms of the key claims of humanism have been largely conceptual in nature. But a glance at recent history serves to underline their pertinence. Many of the nastiest things which people do to each other seem to proceed in full view of, and are in fact plausibly triggered by, these others’ manifestations of their shared or common humanity.74

Consider, for example, the aforementioned misogynist murderer, Elliot Rodger, who declared his intention to wreak vengeance on the “hot blonde sluts” of the Alpha Phi Sorority House at the University of California, Santa Barbara. These women had failed to give Rodger the love, sex, affection, and attention which he craved so sorely. Indeed, they had failed to notice him at all; so preoccupied were they, Rodger complained, with “throwing themselves” at the “obnoxious brutes” they preferred to him, “the supreme gentleman.” “What don’t they see in me?” Rodger wondered, self-pityingly, in a self-recorded video. But the mood then shifted, both emotionally and grammatically. “I will punish you all for it,” Rodger assured these women. He was now speaking to, not of, them, second-personally.

What is striking about these sentiments is that they not only presuppose but hinge on the women’s presumed humanity in the sense canvassed earlier (see claim (1), section (2)). Rodger ascribes to these women subjectivity, preferences, and a capacity to form deep emotional attachments (love, as well as affection). And he attributes to them agency, autonomy, and the capacity to be addressed by him. But far from being a panacea for his misogyny, such recognition in fact seems to have been its precondition.75 Rodger wanted what these women

74 In addition to the triggers being odd, the symptoms of a supposed failure to recognize others as fellow human beings often seem wrong as well. For, they often consist in the manifestations of characteristically interpersonal ‘reactive attitudes,’ in P.F. Strawson’s sense. (1962/2008) I made a similar point in Chapter 1. XXX It will also figure later on, in section 5.

75 Similar points have been made by Adam Gopnik (2006) and Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006; 2008), in relation to genocide. (Cf. Livingstone Smith, Forthcoming, who I thank for originally giving me these references.) Appiah writes: “At their worst [conflicts between groups] can lead to genocidal massacres. How? The familiar answer is: by persuading us that members of some outgroup aren’t really human at all. That’s not quite right: it doesn’t explain the immense cruelty—the abominable cruelty, I’m tempted to say—that are their characteristic feature. The persecutors may like the objects of their enmity to cockroaches or germs, but they acknowledge their victims’ humanity in the very act of humiliating, stigmatizing, reviling, and torturing them. Such treatments—and the voluble justifications the persecutors invariably offer for such treatment—is reserved for creatures we recognize to have intentions, and desires, and projects.” (2008, p. 144) In a subsequent footnote, Appiah also points out that génocidaires will often “tell you why their victims—Jews or Tutsi—deserve what’s being done to them.” (2008, p. 247n25) Elsewhere, Appiah offers a slightly different take on things. (2006, pp. 151–153) He writes there that the problem is not that
were not giving him; they subsequently had a ‘hold’ over him. He did not deny women’s power, independence, or the reality of their minds. Rather, he hated and sought to punish them for evincing these capacities in ways which frustrated him.\textsuperscript{76}

4: A Socially Situated Alternative

But if the humanist explanation does not work terribly well in some of the cases in which it tends to be invoked, what might we put in its place? What else could explain the inhumane forms of treatment which people visit on each other, in the cases which elude the humanist diagnosis?

We can make a start here by taking a closer look at the puzzle which the humanist takes himself to be addressing. If a human agent A understands that a human subject S is much like A, then how can A so mistreat S—or, alternatively, ignore or turn away from S in her suffering?

A’s lack of recognition of S’s common humanity is one potential explanation, which would negate the antecedent of the opening conditional. This would block the supposedly far-fetched possibility that someone could brutally mistreat another human being while representing them as being one. But another, equally sensible place to look, structurally speaking, for an explanation of people’s inhumanity to each other is for some additional representation—i.e., a way of envisaging people which gives rise to motivations which compete with or even cancel the incipient altruistic ones. This would open up the possibility that seeing someone as a fellow human being, while treating them abominably, is not in fact far-fetched; it is merely in need of some kind of backstory, without which the assertion of the conjunction would be pragmatically anomalous.

What could these additional ways of seeing people be? We have already encountered some of them. Seeing someone as one’s enemy engenders a motivation to try to destroy them, and seeing someone as one’s rival engenders a motivation to try to defeat them, for example.\textsuperscript{77} I’ll continue

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\textsuperscript{76} West’s ex-troll told her, similarly, that his misogynist hostility was due to the fact that she was so outspoken and secure in her opinions. “You almost have no fear when you write. You know, it’s like you stand on the desk and you say, “I’m Lindy West, and this is what I believe in. Fuck you if you don’t agree with me.” And even though you don’t say those words exactly, I’m like, “Who is this bitch who thinks she knows everything?”…It’s threatening at first.” See Manne, ms, §2, for a longer discussion of this fascinating interview.

\textsuperscript{77} What is the connection between the relevant representation and motivation here? This is an especially important question for me, given that I outed myself earlier as a proponent of the Humean Theory of Motivation, at least in some version. I think the crucial observation here is that the world-guided or ‘mind-to-world’ representations in
to focus on these categories in what follows, along with that of a usurper, an insubordinate, and a betrayer, to keep the discussion focused. But it would not be difficult to extend this list of (more or less covertly) hostile socially situated stances—i.e., stances which are taken towards people from somewhere specific in the social world—more or less indefinitely. Think of the terms ‘thug,’ ‘welfare queen,’ ‘urban youth,’ or even ‘looter,’ as they figure in political discourse in the US currently. These are all primarily terms which white people use to refer to Black citizens disparagingly. (This is why these terms can all serve as effective racist ‘dog-whistles;’ see Jason Stanley, 2015, pp. 158–160.) Yet none of the concepts these terms express seems, on the face of it, well-described as dehumanizing. True, they each reflect and help to shape a sort of ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality. But the ‘us’ in question need not be human beings writ large; it may be human beings in a particular social position, or who occupy a certain rank in one of many potential hierarchies (including moral hierarchies, crucially). I will leave the task of identifying the motivations these stances characteristically engender as an exercise for the reader.78

The motivations associated with hostile stances can result in some very ugly behaviour (although they certainly need not in every instance). They often bring with them a temptation to lash out, put people down, or otherwise try to (re)establish dominance. And these ways of envisaging people need not be blocked by a sense of the humanity one shares with them; indeed, they plausibly depend on that very recognition. For only another human being can sensibly be conceived as an enemy, a rival, a usurper, an insubordinate, a traitor, etc., at least in the fullest sense of these terms.79 The non-human animals to whom human beings do violence are rather

question aim to fit a state of the world which is itself world-guiding or ‘world-to-mind.’ For, your enemy is (among other things) a minded creature in the world in a world-to-mind state of mind, i.e., who wants to destroy you. Similarly, your rival is a minded creature in the world in a (different) world-to-mind state of mind, i.e., who wants to defeat you. Representing someone as your enemy or a rival hence has accuracy conditions about others’ desires where you are concerned. And this will naturally solicit a certain response from you. Namely, it is very natural to respond to these (purported) desires on the part of the other by responding in kind—at least, under the (typically safe) assumption that you do not want to be destroyed or bested by the agent in question. In other cases, the response called for is not symmetrical; but there is still a natural progression from representing someone as insubordinate (say) to being motivated to try to regain the upper hand over them. Again, this has to do with the fact that an insubordinate is represented as a minded creature with ‘ideas beyond her station,’ or as someone who wants to ‘get one over you.’ If you don’t want that to happen, then you will need to take action.

78 Like Strawsonian stances, these stances should be seen, I think, as a holistic, overall, ‘take’ one can have on a person, which encompass affective dimensions, and constrain and enable what one may do with, to, and for her, in addition to the aforementioned motivational upshots. Although the latter are most relevant for my purposes in this chapter, I don’t mean to suggest that this is their only extra-cognitive dimension.

79 ‘Sensibly’ might either be construed as ‘intelligibly’ or ‘reasonably’ here, depending on how one construes the folly of a Captain Ahab, vis-à-vis his white whale. But I don’t need to decide this issue for my purposes.
envisioned as *prey*, as *game*, as *menacing*, or as *dangerous*. Or, alternatively, they are viewed as *disobedient*, in the case of domesticated animals who can be taught to respond to complex commands. But wayward dogs and horses are not *insurgents*. The different terminology which we tend to reach for when it comes to human versus non-human animals is suggestive. Namely, it suggests that there are distinctively interpersonal, yet distinctly hostile, postures which we typically only take towards recognized human beings.

It is worth pausing over the notion of an *enemy* for a moment, since the claim that it is *sustained* by the recognition of shared humanity seems to have been rejected by some humanists. Cora Diamond writes, for example, that the notion of an enemy and the notion of a ‘fellow human being’ “are there in a kind of tension,” in connection with the Orwell passage quoted earlier. (1978, p. 477) But what kind of tension is this? And why think that it is operative, in this case or elsewhere? It is true that the latter *expression* has a friendly sound that the former manifestly lacks. But this may be just pragmatics. The task is to give some kind of determinate content to the thought that there is something in the similarity of others to ourselves the perception of which can make it hard to treat them as an enemy combatant. And this I do not see. If anything, the more similar these others are to ourselves, the more one may have to watch out for them, in the case of competing or warring interests.

I do not claim that this is the end of the argument, of course. Perhaps there is some meaning in the notion of a ‘fellow’ which I have not gleaned, and which could do the necessary work here,

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80 I owe this helpful way of putting my views to David Livingstone Smith. (Forthcoming)

81 In a previous draft of the paper which this chapter is based on, I mistakenly implied that Diamond holds that these concepts are inevitably in tension. I now take it that Diamond only means to be committed to the view that they “are there in a kind of tension” (my emphasis). It’s not obvious to me why these concepts would be in tension here and not elsewhere; but I leave further discussion of this nuance for a future occasion. Thanks to Professor Diamond for helpful correspondence about her views here.

82 A similar thought applies to the idea that there is a fundamental tension between seeing someone as a person and seeing them as a piece of property. *Pace* the remark of Arthur Chu’s which I quoted in opening, this can’t simply be assumed; it needs to be argued for. Admittedly, on some conceptions (e.g., some Kantian ones), seeing someone as a person encompasses seeing them as a morally autonomous being who cannot be bought, sold, or owned, is just as morally valuable as any other person, has equal rights to them, etc. But humanism as I understand it here needs to walk a certain tightrope in order to make good on its explanatory ambitions. If the idea of recognizing someone as a fellow human being packs in all this moral content, then it is hard to see how it could be the promised *explanans* in moral psychology. (Attributions of such recognition to an agent come precariously close to saying approvingly, “She gets it!” where the referent of “it” has been given a substantive characterization.) On the other hand, if the idea of recognizing someone as a fellow human being is thinned down to the point of being a suitable potential *explanans*, then it is not clear that it will provide the most plausible explanations of the target *explananda* all that frequently. Thanks to Nomy Arpaly for pushing me on this point, and valuable discussion and comments here generally.
without simply begging the question. But more would need to be said than I think has been said in the literature to date (at least to the best of my knowledge) in order to be convincing. And the argumentative burden falls on the humanist in the meantime.

To make matters worse for the humanist at this juncture, there is a competing explanation of what made the soldier’s enemy status fade from salience for Orwell. This has to do, again, with hierarchical relations. When Orwell saw the enemy soldier running across the battlefield holding up his trousers, it did not merely underline the soldier’s similarly human, or perhaps simply vulnerable, creaturely body. Rather, or in addition to this, Orwell caught a glimpse of the man at his most ridiculous. And this would plausibly have altered Orwell’s perception of their relative social positions for a moment. It became natural to view him, as Orwell did, with pity—a kindly attitude, but one which nevertheless involves stooping downwards, sometimes condescendingly. It is hard to see a ‘fellow-creature’ in such an abject position as fair game, or hence as an enemy at all, in the sense of the former which matters for the latter. For, although those engaged in battle may be confident of winning, the enemy is not typically conceived as so helpless and defenceless as to make it an ambush.

These socially situated ways of envisaging people—i.e., as enemies, rivals, usurpers, insubordinates, betayers, etc.—seem clearly ripe to do useful work in explaining inhumane behavior. Then why aren’t they called upon to do this work more often? One reason for this, I suspect, is that the position of the agent is often under-described in setting up the problem. For often, the agent is not depicted as firmly situated in the human world, embroiled in complex social practices, roles, institutions, and (in this context, crucially) oppressive hierarchical relations. The agent is rather depicted merely as trying to assess other people and evaluate their merits, rather as a god might. Whereas all of the stances mentioned above are essentially relational, and many of them hierarchical, in nature. They involve dispositions to try to protect, improve, or regain one’s social standing, relative to other people. They involve (in that useful phrase) ‘jostling for position.’

In addition to enmity, many of these forms of jostling involve some kind of rivalry. And one need not think poorly of one’s rival, in order to regard him as a rival, or even a nemesis. Indeed, quite the contrary—if one did not have some appreciation of his merits in the relevant domain, then competing with him would tend to lose much of its intrinsic (if not extrinsic) interest. And
while competition can be healthy, it can also be vicious. Rivalry can be friendly, but also, bitter. It can lead us to be resentful and hostile towards our rivals, to think of them uncharitably (due to the effects of motivated reasoning, among other things), and to subsequently treat them poorly. So the inference from an agent A’s thinking highly of a subject S’s abilities, at least deep down, to A’s being disposed to treat S kindly is simply not a good one (nor conversely, importantly; see n. 64).

But why was this inference thought to be plausible in the first place? In particular, why think that the recognition of the humanity of the members of subordinate social classes—in a sense which involves recognizing their equal capacity for human excellence—would come as uniformly good news to hitherto dominant group members? On reflection, this seems unlikely. The recent ingress of (e.g.) non-whites and white women to the most prestigious positions in contemporary Western societies has meant that white men now have serious competition. Add to this the fact that the competition will often result in these white men being surpassed by those who they tacitly expected to be in social positions beneath them, and you have a recipe for resentment and a sense of ‘aggrieved entitlement,’ to invoke sociologist Michael Kimmel’s notion (2013, pp. 18–25; Chapter 1).

This becomes clear when we are careful to picture the agent as embedded in the social world, rather than merely trying to form a ‘view from nowhere’ about other people’s merits. Even so, we will have to be careful to picture the social landscape properly. Another common way of (in my view) underdoing the set-up is to place comparatively privileged agents at the center of what Peter Singer calls “the circle of concern,” such that their main moral task in the struggle to end oppression is simply to open their arms and embrace the humanity, or perhaps just the sentience, of the rest of us. (2011) This picture situates the (supposedly relevant) agent in the world, but forgets all of the vertical structure which the world contains—i.e., the bastions of privilege which would need to be dismantled in order to achieve social justice. These bastions are often well-defended and difficult to challenge. For people are often, unsurprisingly, invested in them. To make matters worse, these structures are often quite invisible to the people whose privileged social positions they serve to buttress. So dismantling them will often feel not only like a

83 I draw in this paragraph on my 2014 piece.
comedown, but also an injustice, to the privileged. They will tend to feel flattened, rather than merely levelled, in the process.

I would hence suggest, on the strength of this, that the mistreatment of historically subordinated people who are perceived as threatening the status quo often needs no special psychological story, such as dehumanization. It can rather be explained in terms of current and historical social structures, hierarchical relations, and norms and expectations, together with the fact that they are widely internalized and difficult to eradicate. The dehumanization paradigm is, as we have seen, premised on the idea that it will typically be difficult for an agent to commit acts of violence or otherwise aggress against vulnerable and innocent parties. So something has to be done to alter the agent’s perception of his soon-to-be victim. But this misses the fact that agents in a dominant social position often don’t start out with such a neutral or salutary view of things. They are perpetually mired in certain kinds of delusions about their own social position relative to other people, and their respective obligations, permissions, and entitlements. So, from the perspective of the dominant, the people they mistreat are often far from innocent. On the contrary, they are often tacitly—and falsely—held to be deeply guilty. Specifically, non-whites and white women are often held to have committed acts of gross disrespect, intimidation, insubordination, negligence, etc., by the lights of patriarchal and white supremacist ideologies. And the mere presence of these historically subordinated people in prestigious social roles may constitute highway robbery, by the lights of these deeply unjust, but deeply internalized, social orders.84

5: Dominating People

Where does all this leave us, then? I’ve argued that an agent’s recognition of a human subject as such fail to dispose her strongly on balance—or, arguably, at all—to treat this subject humanely (i.e., with due consideration, respect, and care, in interpersonal contexts). This is not because I think the humanist is wrong that the recognition of someone’s humanity will tend to motivate humane conduct, all else being equal. It is rather that all else is often not equal, indeed as unequal as can be. Relatedly, I think the humanist has taken insufficient account of the fact that such recognition may be overlaid, and the altruistic disposition outweighed or even cancelled, by

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84 Michael Kimmel reports (on the basis of extensive interviews) that, when a historically subordinated person, e.g., a Black woman, is hired over a White man with similar qualifications, then the latter is prone to complain that the former took his job. Kimmel asks: why his job, not a job? (2013, Chapter 1) I think the answer is relatively straightforward. This woman has taken his job, relative to unjust patriarchal and white supremacist expectations.
competing representations and the dispositions they engender. For we may see others as rivals, insubordinates, usurpers, betrayers, and enemies (inter alia), without ever losing sight of these people’s full humanity. And we may subsequently be disposed to try to defeat, chastise, trounce, punish, and even destroy those who we know full well are human.

With that in mind, let us return to the opening examples, and see what might be made of them, now that the socially situated view is on the table alongside the humanist position. Which of these models, if any, is more explanatory in some of the main cases that humanists have leant on?

Arpaly interprets Huck’s morally good deed (and, in her view, his morally praiseworthy action) as the product of his burgeoning recognition of Jim’s fellow humanity. Elsewhere, I argue that what is crucial in bringing about Huck’s moral turnaround is something which Arpaly mentions only in passing: Huck’s having formed a genuine friendship with Jim. (Manne, 2013) This makes sense of the fact that, at this point in the story, Huck is actually seething with anger at Jim for having ideas beyond his station—his station as a slave, and hence as a piece of property. Huck fumes:

Jim talked out loud all the time while I was talking to myself. He was saying how the first thing he would do when he got to a free State he would go to saving up money and never spend a single cent, and when he got enough he would buy his wife, which was owned on a farm close to where Miss Watson lived; and then they would both work to buy the two children, and if their master wouldn’t sell them, they’d get an Ab’litionist to go and steal them. It most froze me to hear such talk. He wouldn’t ever dared to talk such talk in his life before. Just see what a difference it made in him the minute he judged he was about free. It was according to the old saying, ‘Give a n— an inch and he’ll take an ell.’ Thinks I, this is what comes of my not thinking. Here was this n— which I had as good as helped to run away, coming right out flat-footed and saying he would steal his children—children that belonged to a man I didn’t even know; a man that hadn’t done me no harm. I was sorry to hear Jim say that, it was such a lowering of him. (2010, pp. 99–100)

Huck subsequently decides to right these wrongs, as well as vent his spleen, by snitching:
My conscience got to stirring me up hotter than ever, until at last I says to it, “Let up on me—it ain’t too late, yet—I’ll paddle ashore at the first light, and tell.” I felt easy, and happy, and light as a feather, right off. All my troubles was gone. (2010, p. 100)

So Huck’s plan to turn Jim in isn’t simply borne of a genuine sense of duty, tempered by sympathy or conscience, which eventually wins out. It is at least as much an expression of Huck’s resentful, self-serving desire to teach Jim a lesson, and to put him in his place again. For, Jim had been getting ‘uppity.’

What happens in the story to change Huck’s mind, then? Just as Huck makes off in the direction of the slave hunters who have (coincidentally) turned up, Jim comes out with this:

“Pooty soon I’ll be a shout’n for joy, en I’ll say, it’s all on account o’ Huck; I’s a free man, en I couldn’t ever ben free ef it hadn’t been for Huck; Huck done it. Jim won’t ever forgit you, Huck; you’s de bes’ fren’ Jim’s ever had; en you’s de only fren’ ole Jim’s got now.” (2010, p. 100)

The next lines read:

I was paddling off, all in a sweat to tell on him; but when he says this, it seemed to kind of take the tuck all out of me… (2010, p. 100)

So I suggest it is primarily Huck’s recognition of his friendship with Jim, and his background awareness that one does not turn in one’s friends, which trumps his explicit belief that one ought to return stolen property, and bring runaway slaves to (supposed) justice. I am happy to agree with Arpaly that recognizing Jim’s humanity does play an important role here, in the sense that it is plausibly this recognition which allows Huck to enter into the friendship in the first place. But this just goes towards my point in this context (which matters less for the point which Arpaly is using the case to make). Recognizing Jim’s humanity does little to block Huck’s intention to cruelly betray him. Rather, this recognition conditions the sense of friendship which ultimately

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85 Pace Jonathan Bennett’s original discussion of the case. (1974) My reading of the case also runs counter to Arpaly’s claim that Huck initially “hopes against hope to find some excuse not to turn Jim in… [but] fails to find a loophole.” (2003, p. 75) However, Arpaly’s instructive account of the role of motivated reasoning in certain instances of racism and sexism means that she (unlike many other theorists) plausibly has the resources to accommodate my point here. (2003, pp. 98–114) And, as she points out, the correct interpretation of the episode in the novel isn’t terribly important for philosophical purposes. (2003, p. 76) An interesting remaining question is whether Huck’s volte-face is more or less morally admirable than Arpaly holds, given his spiteful self-righteousness leading up to it. But I won’t attempt to weigh in on this issue here.
does the conceptual-cum-psychological heavy lifting. Huck undergoes a kind of gestalt shift from representing Jim as an ‘insubordinate’ and as ‘uppity’ to a ‘friend’ at the crucial moment. And this is what seems to “take the tuck” out of the dispositions which flow from the former set of perceptions. Huck’s basic grasp of Jim’s humanity remains a constant throughout all of this.

What about the case of Gaita’s character, M? Suppose we accept Gaita’s view of M as ascribing only a truncated inner life to the Vietnamese woman in the documentary. This form of racism seems possible, indeed common. But Gaita seems to assume that this is M’s view of Vietnamese people quite generally—that she consistently attributes to them a certain nature or essence. This is one possibility, but it is surely not the only one. And it seems relevant in this context that the Vietnamese were considered the enemy by many Australians, for over a decade, in living memory. The fact that the documentary was about the Vietnam War would also presumably have served to buttress the association. So it seems like an open question, for all that has been said, whether M would have had the same reaction to a Vietnamese person in a very different context, where their nationality and ethnicity were known to M, but their erstwhile enemy status was rendered much less salient.

In order to tell whether this charitable thought has any plausibility in M’s case, we would need to know more. Did M have relatives who fought in the Vietnam War, for example? Might she hence be warding off the incipient recognition that her intimates visited much the same kind of intense suffering and grief on the Vietnamese people as she is currently experiencing? The capacity for empathy with fellow human beings can be confronting, even overwhelming, and dispose us to turn away from them.

This raises a possibility which Gaita dismisses rather summarily in developing his overall account of racism (1998, pp. 62–66)—viz., that a person like M’s tendency to minimize the subjectivity of outgroup members (at least in certain cases) is something like wishful thinking or, rather, willful denial. It is not a straightforward belief, nor even an implicit representation, of the relevant people’s nature, at least in the first instance. Whatever representations are in play may instead be the result of something like motivated reasoning, stemming from an inchoate desire to minimize these people’s subjectivity. And such a desire might in turn owe to the risk of guilt and shame otherwise, or the possibility of being flooded with debilitating compassion. Alternatively, and less flatteringly, it might owe to the (again, often inchoate) yen to hang onto the kind of
privilege that relies on taking outgroup members’ preferences and plans less seriously than ingroup members’.

The upshot is that there are possible ways of filling out M’s story which would make her denial of the full human subjectivity of the Vietnamese relatively superficial, and ultimately dependent on her uncomfortable awareness that they are of course equally capable of being wounded and grief-stricken. It would then be emotional strength, not a humanizing experience, standing between M and a less racist outlook.

What, now, of Langton’s views about the nature of pornography? This is obviously a large issue, and I can’t hope to defend my views about it properly in this chapter. (I endeavour to elsewhere, elsewhere in the manuscript.) Instead, let me just briefly sketch them. In some sense, Langton is clearly right that there is a genre of heterosexual pornography which depicts women as blank, staring, comparatively mindless creatures. (The female lead always wants what he has to give her, and breathy affirmations tend to exhaust her vocabulary.) But I think it is a mistake to suppose that such pornography engenders this literal view of women. I find it more plausible to think it is rather a marketable fantasy, in offering an escape from more painful and confronting realities. Women’s subjectivity and autonomous sexuality is increasingly difficult to deny, for anyone not utterly delusional, and endowed with an internet connection (ironically). For, women’s voices ring too loud and clear in cyberspace. Hence, from the perspective of patriarchal values, women are human, all too human, I would argue. Pornography may provide a welcome relief from these realities—which are difficult to bear, in being apprehended. It may soothe by imaginatively defusing the psychic threat which women’s humanity poses, rather than expressing or even shaping men’s literal view of women.

So far, the socially situated model has been proving rather fruitful. But it faces an obvious challenge to extending it much further. What should be said about the moral psychology of agents in the grip of explicitly dehumanizing ideologies, due to the influence of dehumanizing propaganda, in particular? If this cannot be explained on the situated approach, then this would serve to delineate an important arena in which the humanist model is clearly superior.

86 The obvious irony of this being that the rise of internet pornography seems not unconnected with the platform for the expression of women’s subjectivity which the internet has provided; see n. 24.
I am not convinced that the situated approach should be set aside so hastily even here though. This is another large issue, to say the very least, and there is a rich and growing literature which bears on it directly. (See, e.g., Tirrell, 2012, and Stanley, 2015, as well as David Livingstone Smith, Forthcoming.) So I will just try to say something preliminary about it in the remainder of this chapter, leaving a fuller discussion for a future occasion.

One simple point which I have made in another context is that dehumanizing speech can function to intimidate, insult, demean, belittle, etc. (Manne, 2014) For it helps itself to certain powerfully encoded social meanings. Given that human beings are widely held to be superior to non-human animals (rightly or, as I believe, typically wrongly), denying someone’s humanity can serve as a particularly humiliating kind of put-down. When a White police officer in Ferguson called a group of Black political protesters “fucking animals” three days after Michael Brown’s death, he was using this trope to demean and degrade Blacks, and to re-assert his own dominance. White supremacist ideology benefits from having a ready stock of put-downs of this kind to draw upon. Such put-downs would hardly be apropos when it comes to actual non-human animals, who could neither comprehend the insult, nor be successfully put down by having their non-human status correctly identified. This requires human comprehension, not to mention an incipient human status to be degraded from. There is no shame in being called a rat if, in fact, you are one.

The point can be extended some way towards meeting a challenge raised by Livingstone Smith. Since members of ingroups also speak of outgroup members in these ways amongst themselves, Livingstone Smith points out that dehumanizing speech cannot serve simply to dominate, intimidate, insult, etc. (Forthcoming) This is clearly right. However, there is also the simple point that ingroup members can egg each other on and sanction certain previously proscribed behaviours towards outgroup members by reiterating the terms in question, whose central purpose may still be to humiliate outgroup members in other contexts.87

One might retreat to the view that dehumanizing ideologies are best suited to explaining the moral outlook of agents who participate in mass atrocities, as per David Livingstone Smith’s

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87 See also Tirrell, for a discussion of a case in which the derogatory terms (as described in n. 20) were initially used primarily by in-group members amongst themselves in a similarly action-engendering way, and only later levelled derisively towards out-group members. (2012, p. 175) Tirrell also points to the ways in which derogatory terms can function to police out-group members, by threatening the ‘good ones’ who are privy to the insult (while the ‘bad ones’ being insulted are not) with being similarly disparaged if they do not toe the line. (2012, p. 192) These possibilities vis-à-vis dehumanizing speech are all fully compatible with the socially situated model.
focus. But even here, there are grounds to worry about reading the moral psychology off the literal content of dehumanizing propaganda (or people’s subsequent parroting of it).\textsuperscript{88} It remains possible that the uptake of dehumanizing propaganda amounts to false consciousness, at least in many instances. I suspect this is the case more often than is recognized.

Why think this? It is significant in this context that war, genocide, and so-called ethnic cleansing often encompass the mass rape of women. This seems to me to raise an important question for the humanist to answer. If the perpetrators of mass atrocities often dehumanize their victims, then why do the perpetrators so frequently rape the female ones? It is not just that sex between human beings and non-human animals is generally taboo, and relatively unusual, presumably partly because of this.\textsuperscript{89} It is also that the spirit in which mass rapes tend to be committed is typically vindictive, punitive, triumphalist, and domineering. These acts hence bear all of the hallmarks of interpersonal violence, which is expressive of and gives vent to paradigmatically interpersonal reactive attitudes—such as resentment, righteous anger, jealousy, and so on.\textsuperscript{90}

How might the humanist deal with this challenge? One interesting possibility, which Livingstone Smith pursues, is that the victims of dehumanization are represented as both human and sub-human. (Forthcoming) Specifically, they are held to have the outer appearance of a human being, but to share an essence with some kind of non-human animal that often represents a threat or hazard to humankind (e.g., snakes, cockroaches, rats). The victims of mass atrocities hence tend to be perceived as ‘uncanny’ and monstrous, he argues.

I think Livingstone Smith is onto something important here, when it comes to the gestalt shifts in perception and the subsequent ambivalence which often marks an agent’s stance towards those they are tasked with persecuting or destroying. But I worry that his specific story makes mass rape even harder to explain, if anything. Sexual liaisons with those who are perceived as

\textsuperscript{88} Compare Jason Stanley, 2015, Chapter 2, for an instructive discussion of what he calls ‘the sincerity condition,’ which can hold despite the fact that dehumanizing rhetoric is, in his view, often clearly metaphorical.

\textsuperscript{89} Compare Bernard Williams’ remark: “Take the case of the slave-owners who drafted the Bill of Rights. There was a great deal of false consciousness there, since when these slave owners took advantage of their women slaves, they didn’t actually think they were engaged in bestiality. They were well aware that they were fucking a human being!” (From the uncorrected proofs of an interview with Williams by Alex Voorhoeve; December 2002, released posthumously.)

\textsuperscript{90} As Livingstone Smith himself points out, when it comes to the humiliating nature of the rape of women during the Rwandan genocide. (Forthcoming)
uncanny, and subsequently inspire horror and revulsion, ought to be at least as aversive as any other interaction with them.

The notorious Soviet minister of propaganda during WWII, Ilya Ehrenburg, was confident of this himself. According to a recent account by historian Antony Beevor, the German propaganda ministry charged Ehrenburg with inciting the Red Army to rape German women when they occupied Berlin. (2003, p. 25) Ehrenburg, hardly one to shrink from charges of viciousness and ruthlessness, nevertheless held that the Soviet soldiers “were not interested in Gretchens but in those Fritzes who had insulted our women.” The Soviet political department echoed Ehrenburg’s sentiment, saying: “When we breed a true feeling of hatred in a soldier, the soldier will not try to have sex with a German woman, because he will be repulsed.”

Ehrenburg’s propaganda contained a classic mixture of dehumanizing tropes and the reiteration of enmity. The former aspect of it is particularly striking, in the context of this chapter. It features prominently in the pamphlet *Kill!* (1942), distributed to over a million Red Army soldiers, which opens with the statement: “The Germans are not human beings.” It is also central to the more searching, “The Justification of Hatred” (1942), in which Ehrenburg takes pains to emphasize the sympathetic nature of the Soviet people, as was supposedly evident from their conduct during WWI. This leaves him with the following puzzle, not to mention justificatory burden:

How did it come to happen, then, that the Soviet people came to abhor the Nazis with so implacable a hatred?

Hatred was never one of the traits of the Russians. It did not drop from the skies. No, this hatred our people now evince has been born of suffering. At first many of us thought that this war was like other wars, that pitted against us mere human beings dressed only in different uniforms. We were brought up on grand ideas of human fraternity and solidarity. We believed in the force of words, and many of us did not understand that opposing us were not human beings but frightful, loathsome monsters, and that the principles of human brotherhood imperatively demand that we deal ruthlessly with the Fascists…

The Russians have a song and in it the people have expressed their attitude towards just and unjust wars: “Wolfhounds are justified where cannibals are not.” It is one thing to
destroy a mad wolf; it is another thing to raise one’s hand against a human being. Now every Soviet man and woman knows that we have been attacked by a pack of wolves.

The rhetoric here is strikingly in line with Livingstone Smith’s claim that the dehumanized are represented as wolves in sheep’s clothing—or human clothing, rather. And the reference to “frightful, loathsome monsters” is equally grist for Livingstone Smith’s mill. Or at least, this would be so if we take this piece of propaganda to have succeeded in helping the 19th Army soldiers to see German people in the way that it depicted them.

But the Soviet soldiers’ mass rape of German women casts doubt on this hypothesis. So does the fact that they were not just following orders in doing so. Indeed, quite the contrary—there were widespread concerns, which came from as high up as Stalin himself, that the brutal behaviour of the soldiers (which included looting and extensive destruction in Berlin) would undermine their military efforts—not to mention destroy valuable resources, such as factories. So the Soviet soldiers were actually being disobedient. Despite that, the mass rape of German women continued over the course of several years. At least two million women were raped during this period—and many, if not a majority, were raped multiple times. Gang rapes were very common. There were documented rapes of girls as young as twelve and women as old as eighty. Nobody was exempt—not nuns, not women pregnant in hospital, nor even women currently in the process of giving birth there. And many of these women were raped in the most brutal ways imaginable. When certain of the soldiers were too inebriated to proceed as planned, they would violate women using bottles, sometimes broken ones. Needless to say, this caused horrific injuries. Many women died as a result; and many committed suicide. (Beevor, 2003, pp. 24–38)

The question I am left with, in trying to grapple with this, is the following: if the dehumanizing propaganda had seeped very deeply into the soldier’s moral outlooks, then how could their subsequent behaviour towards women be explained? But if it did not go deep in this instance, then does it usually? Does it ever?

This leaves us with an important, albeit confronting, possibility: people may know full well that those who they treat in inhumane ways are fellow human beings, underneath a more or less thin veneer of convenient false consciousness. And yet, under certain social conditions—the surface
of which I’ve just barely scratched in this chapter—they may massacre, torture, and rape them *en masse* anyway. 91

**A Conclusion and a Preview: Explaining Dehumanizing Attitudes and Motives**

So what makes many people—including, seemingly, many propagandists—believe that humanism is correct? Let me note two possibilities particularly relevant to my project. Both do little to undermine my suspicion that failing to recognize other people as human beings is rare, especially when it comes to women in America today (the primary focus of my book on misogyny, which the previous chapter is drawn from). On the contrary, each again presupposes it.

The first point concerns the sorts of perceptions which can result from other people’s anomalous behaviour, because it is viewed as anomalous *simpliciter*. The second involves giving a woman ‘a taste of her own medicine,’ undertaken as *vengeance*, on the part of those who feel *treated* by her or her ilk as *persona non grata*, and as if they’re entitled to better (often falsely). I’ll take these points in order.

1. Part of being recognized as human involves the potential to be cast in social scripts in specific roles and relations, in virtue (among other things) of one’s group memberships or identities. We’ve seen how this can give rise to brutal forms of (mis)treatment. But a *failure* to play one’s assigned part in the script, or to attempt some kind of role *reversal*, is prone to give rise to *startled* reactions—a sense of being “taken aback.” The person may then be perceived as hollow, empty, off-putting, or creepy. They may even be perceived as uncanny or robotic: as if they are an imposter in the role, merely ‘going through the motions.’ This doesn’t mean they are perceived as less than fully human, though. It means they are being viewed with the kind of *suspicion* that marks a divergence between (perceived) reality and normatively-laden expectations in general.

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91 Interestingly, Beevor emphasizes the envy the Soviet soldiers felt towards the people of Berlin; for the latter lived more comfortably than the former had ever dreamed of. He gives a striking example of the enraged Soviets destroying so many pillows and mattresses—paradigmatic creature comforts—that the streets of Berlin often resembled a snowstorm, so awash were they with feathers. (2003, p. 35) The envy of Jews is similarly an important theme in some recent historical explanations of the escalation of anti-Semitism in Germany prior to 1933. See, e.g., Amos Elon’s *The Pity of It All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743–1933* (2013), and Götz Aly’s *Why the Germans? Why the Jews?: Envy, Race Hatred, and the Prehistory of the Holocaust*. (2014)
Consider, for example, the “little robot woman” Meursault encounters in two different contexts in Albert Camus’s *The Stranger*. The first time he sees her, she is ordering a meal at a restaurant and paying for it. She acts very deliberately. Her agency is striking to him. And it may be striking to us too, as readers, that she is engaged in a very human act—and, a very social one. She is doing the same thing Meursault is, in having a meal out on her own. The woman is interacting with her waiter, and evincing myriad powers of mind: as she orders from a menu, reads her magazine (a radio schedule—circling programs she plans to listen to over the coming week). And then she asks for the check, calculates a tip, and leaves cash on the table.¹

So Meursault and this woman are playing essentially the same part in the same social script, in tandem. But on a woman, the behavior seems odd, even funny. She subsequently seems a fake in the role—somehow inauthentic or fraudulent. The same was said of Hillary Clinton, as we’ll see in Chapter 8, when I turn to her unsuccessful 2016 bid for the White House. Clinton was playing a role historically exclusively reserved for men—and asking for that which she might have been expected to give to him. To wit: support and attention, which many people refused her.

The next time Meursault encounters the “little robot woman” is in court. By that time, he has shot and killed “the Arab” who stared daggers in his direction—and who made him feel inhuman, like a mere object or impediment. Like a rock or a tree, specifically: that is, a movable object with no will of its own—the boulder, rather than Sisyphus pushing it.²

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¹ “The waiter brought the hors d’oeuvre, which she proceeded to wolf down voraciously. While waiting for the next course, she produced another pencil, this time a blue one, from her bag, and the radio magazine for the coming week, and started making ticks against almost all the items of the daily programs. There were a dozen pages in the magazine, and she continued studying them closely throughout the meal. When I’d finished mine she was still ticking off items with the same meticulous attention. Then she rose, put on her jacket again with the same abrupt, robot-like gestures, and walked briskly out of the restaurant. Having nothing better to do, I followed her for a short distance. Keeping on the curb of the pavement, she walked straight ahead, never swerving or looking back, and it was extraordinary how fast she covered the ground, considering her smallness. In fact, the pace was too much for me, and I soon lost sight of her and turned back homeward. For a moment the “little robot” (as I thought of her) had much impressed me, but I soon forgot about her.”

² “[The Arabs] stared at us silently, in the special way these people have—as if we were blocks of stone or dead trees. Raymond whispered that the second Arab from the left was “his man,” and I thought he looked rather worried. However, he assured me that all that was ancient history… There was no point in hanging about here. Halfway to the bus stop he glanced back over his shoulder and said the Arabs weren’t following. I, too, looked back. They were exactly as before, gazing in the same vague way at the spot where we had been.”

Later, on the beach, “Raymond’s man,” appears again, by himself this time. Meursault, who had considered the matter settled, is taken aback. The man’s face is shaded by a rock, and the haze of the heat renders him a blurry figure.
The “robot” woman is there at the trial to watch. She is described as wearing a “mannish” coat, and training her eyes upon him. Meursault feels aware of her judging him, though she is one among many. And when he feels judged, the effect is always disorientation. He loses his sense of agency—as in the ‘still face’ paradigm discussed in Chapter 4, and the behaviour known as ‘stonewalling.’ It may not be accidental that, prior to all this happening, Meursault had just lost his mother.³

(2) Then there are acts of revenge toward women who do not play their part in the social script which an agent has adopted, warping their sense of reality, as opposed to merely being a wish or a fantasy. Elliot Rodger did not receive the attention, affection, admiration, and sexual favours from a suitably ‘hot’ woman, in a suitably timely fashion. His social script was so rigid, and he so thoroughly ensconced in it, that he felt the women he stalked were ignoring him—even though he never introduced himself. Their story did not include him as a character, until he forced the issue.

But as I showed over the course of this chapter, it is not that Rodger held women to be mindless things, objects, non-human or sub-human creatures; nor is this true of women in general, under a patriarchal order. Rather, a woman is regarded as owing her human capacities to particular people, often men or his children within heterosexual relationships that also uphold white supremacy, and who are in turn deemed entitled to her services. This might be envisaged as the informal analogue of coverture law—a woman’s being ‘spoken for’ by her father, and afterward her husband, then son-in-law, and so on. It is what makes women more broadly somebody’s mother, sister, daughter, grandmother: always somebody’s someone, and seldom her own person. But this is not because she’s not a person, but rather because her personhood is held to be owed to other persons, in the form of service labor and loyalty.

Her personal services, moreover, have a humanizing quality on those in her care orbit, to whom her attention is owed. Or so it would seem. When she fails to give him what he’s held to be entitled to, by way of forms of nurturing, admiration, and attention, he may be left feeling less than human—like a “little nothing,” as Elliot Rodger described himself at one point. And his revenge may be to dehumanize her in turn: to give her a taste of her own medicine, when it

³ Her sympathetic gaze had always followed him around the room when they lived together, though they hardly ever talked, he adds. What she gave him, more than anything, was a sense of sympathetic oversight. She did what a mother is supposed to do: she looked after him.
comes to making her feel like a non-person. To wit, here’s how Rodger opens his so-called manifesto, *My Twisted World* (really more of a memoir, in which the character of the self is prescient, pitiable, and perpetually central):

   Humanity… All of my suffering on this world has been at the hands of humanity, particularly women. It has made me realize just how brutal and twisted humanity is as a species. All I ever wanted was to fit in and live a happy life amongst humanity, but I was cast out and rejected, forced to endure an existence of loneliness and insignificance, all because the females of the human species were incapable of seeing the value in me.

As *My Twisted World* unfolds, or rather, unravels, it becomes clear that this battle between the sexes is more than a metaphor. But the enmity is borne of need and dependency which sometimes provokes, and underlies many forms of, aggression. Rodger hates such women in much the way that an insecurely attached child (at least in popularized attachment theory) hates and rages at his mother (typically, and tellingly), when she leaves him with a stranger. He hates her for leaving him feeling helpless and lonely. He feels entitled to her time, focus, attention, and may love her intensely—but as a personal possession, who must be jealously guarded, and who must not betray him, break her promises, or disappoint him. Something similar applies to Rodger’s hatred of the women who sexually rejected him. They make him feel inhuman in the sense of profound social isolation and pariahdom. To wit, he concludes:

   I am not part of the human race. Humanity has rejected me. The females of the human species have never wanted to mate with me, so how could I possibly consider myself part of humanity? Humanity has never accepted me among them, and now I know why. I am more than human. I am superior to them all. I am Elliot Rodger… Magnificent, glorious, supreme, eminent… Divine! I am the closest thing there is to a living god. Humanity is a disgusting, depraved, and evil species. It is my purpose to punish them all. I will purify the world of everything that is wrong with it. On the Day of Retribution, I will truly be a powerful god, punishing everyone I deem to be impure and depraved. When I think about the amazing and blissful life I could have lived if only females were sexually attracted to me, my entire being burns with hatred. They denied me a happy life, and in return I will take away all of their lives. It is only fair.

Rodger continues, in an epilogue:
Women represent everything that is unfair with this world, and in order to make the world a fair place, they must all be eradicated. A few women would be spared, however, for the sake of reproduction. These women would be kept and bred in secret labs. There, they will be artificially inseminated with sperm samples in order to produce offspring. Their depraved nature will slowly be bred out of them in time.

This is but a minor variant on the ending of *Dr. Strangelove*. It would be hard not to laugh, but for the fact that Rodger obtained firearms—and he acted.

Rodger’s sense of fairness here is based on a delusion and narcissism which captures some of the madness of patriarchy. For many if not most women, there is a sense of their being ‘givers’ in the social sense that structures practices such as cat-calling, wolf whistling, ‘negging,’ and many of the behaviours endemic to sexual assault and harassment—even being bade to “smile,” or having one’s hair pulled by the proverbial schoolboy. These gestures are all supposed to either make her look, or else force her to stone-wall—a withholding, rather than sheer absence, of reactions. So her silence is icy; her neutral expression, sullen. Her not looking is snubbing; her passivity, aggression.

But an ice queen, a bitch, a temptress—or an angel, for that matter—all have something in common: they are human, all too human, female characters.

I hope too at this juncture to have made some sense of the common temptation to assimilate women to non-human animals—as in insults like ‘pig’ and ‘dog,’ recalling the discussion in Chapter 4—as well as sexual objects, glassy-eyed, perpetually orgasmic, and affirming the sex act constantly. In the former case, it is often a general subordinating move, made in response to someone getting ‘above herself:’ the insolence and subversion of a Rosie O’Donnell being very human qualities, and the epithets aiming to bring her down abruptly. In the latter case, it is often a way to imaginatively arrange women to be oriented in the direction of dominant men, and in the desired fashion. They serve to imaginatively extract and enact deference.

Let me summarize where we are now, with a view to previewing where we’re going. At this point in the book, I’ve offered an alternative to the commonly, if tacitly, assumed naïve conception of misogyny, according to which misogyny is primarily:

1. A *psychological* property of individual agents; namely,
A tendency to hate or be hostile towards women universally, or at least very generally. If we put these claims together with common claims about the nature of gendered prejudice, then such a psychological tendency would naturally be held to stem from, or at least be tied to:

(3) An essentialized view of women—as ‘the other,’ as sexual objects, or even as subhuman; and

(4) The explicit or implicit belief that women are inferior to men, or naturally rank beneath them, in various prestigious or masculine-coded arenas.

I’ve argued that this is not the most fruitful way of understanding misogyny, on both a descriptive and ameliorative approach to the question “What is misogyny?” I also invoked considerations about misogyny’s conceptual role or ‘job description,’ metaphorically, to show how this, naïve conception of misogyny threatens to turn a morally powerful term into a name for a rare phenomenon.

Instead, I argued that misogyny should be conceptualized as primarily:

(1′) A property of social systems or environments as a whole; in which

(2′) Women face hostility (e.g., aggression, resentment, threats, punishment, and similar) due to mechanisms which serve to enforce and police social norms and expectations of a patriarchal nature.

Misogynists can then be defined derivatively, I proposed, as agents who make comparatively strong and consistent contributions to misogynist social environments. On the strength of my argument in the past two chapters, I now want to suggest that these agents will often have:

(3′) A negative attitude not towards women as such, but hostility towards certain types of women (e.g., ‘bitches,’ ‘sluts,’ ‘feminazis,’ etc.), who may be represented by individual proxies who serve as outlets for aggression; and

(4′) An ideologically-driven and often unwitting desire or disposition to keep women down, or to put them in their place again (i.e., a subordinate one), if they challenge or violate patriarchal order.

I believe that this way of thinking about misogyny enables the corresponding term to do morally useful work, that it better reflects ordinary usage, and that it properly secures a necessary
connection between misogyny and patriarchal ideology. Misogyny does not arise in a political vacuum, and the account of misogyny which I develop reflects this.
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