

# **Engaging Cultural Differences**

**The Multicultural Challenge in  
Liberal Democracies**

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## Chapter 17

# Cultural Models of Diversity in America: The Psychology of Difference and Inclusion

Victoria C. Plaut

**H**ow are Americans thinking about the growing diversity of their workplaces? How are they grappling with issues of difference and inclusion in an increasingly diverse society? To find some answers to these questions, a series of interviews was conducted at the world headquarters of a large American commercial bank.<sup>1</sup> Of interest was the nature of intergroup relations among employees at this highly demographically diverse organization. The first interviews came from the international client services department, composed of about one hundred employees who represented twenty-five countries and who together spoke approximately forty languages. Dan—a white, middle-aged male—was the manager of this division.<sup>2</sup> In response to questions about diversity in his department, he quickly pointed out, “I agree that conflict may be a problem in some workplaces, but I have to tell you, we don’t have any conflict here.” Dan then proceeded to explain that the lack of tension was due to his own upbringing. “As a matter of fact, I was brought up in a very open-minded Italian American household in Brooklyn, and so I believe that people are all the same. After all, at the end of the day we all want the same thing.” He added, “People are people . . . we’re different but similar. I don’t see a person as being from this culture or that culture, instead I see them for who they really are.”

These words are strikingly familiar—the idea that people should be seen for who they are “deep down” and not for some group characteristic. Dan’s view of diversity seemed designed to counter any concern that he was prejudiced or made judgments about people based on their cultural or racial affiliation. The differences Dan did see were differences of language and food. His employees were able to speak different languages to carry out transactions with the bank’s diverse clients, and their diverse ethnic backgrounds ensured a variety of ethnic foods at social events. Dan believed the “solution” to the problems of diversity was “exposure to different people” and because diversity was relatively superficial, contact with other cultures was a sufficient condition for effective intergroup relations.

Notably, Dan’s subordinates—employees who had immigrated from Venezuela, the West Indies, and Taiwan—offered descriptions of intergroup relations

in their workplace that diverged considerably from the picture painted by their manager. Oscar, a midlevel manager from Venezuela, reported positive impressions of upper management's diversity—they were, he believed, becoming more diverse, although they still had a "lack of Asians." Moreover, Oscar asserted that because of the global nature of the business, the national and ethnic diversity reflected in the upper ranks "strengthens the organization." Early in the interview, he also declared, "It is the kind of organization I want to be in." Yet shortly into the discussion about diversity, Oscar admitted that because he was "Latin," he felt that he did not have certain characteristics, particularly "brashness and boldness," that were valued and viewed as reflecting leadership potential. Oscar thought this would keep him from advancing in the organization and that if he were more European (that is, Argentine or Chilean), he might be viewed as having more "promotion potential." Oscar's biggest complaint about his job, however, was the lack of connection fostered by the organization: "I want to be more connected with the people I work with . . . the workplace needs to be more meaningful and fulfilling." Oscar expressed his wish that his "Latin group" be permitted to play salsa music on the radio while they worked, and that there be more corporate social events to reflect cultural differences and bring people together. His interview reflected an interplay of independent and interdependent ideas and values. On one hand, Oscar recognized the necessity to be assertive and wished that he had more of those traits; on the other hand, he wished that the firm would take more of an interest in the interpersonal needs of employees. In addition, Oscar asserted that he valued respecting others and being respected.

Ann, an employee from Taiwan, argued that management should have different policies for different employees, suggesting, for example, that employees with a strong work ethic and self-direction should be "left alone," while others, such as the "complaining Americans," needed more rules. In addition, Ann recognized that some of her Asian colleagues were having problems they could not discuss with management, because they were used to a sharp distinction between management and subordinates and thus were fearful about expressing opinions and making suggestions. Ann felt that her manager should realize that different employees have different interactional styles and may require different management styles or relationships.

Carol, an employee from Jamaica who had worked for the bank for thirty years, was at first very reluctant to engage questions about diversity, and her responses for the most part were in sharp contrast with Ann's and Oscar's. Carol told us that she mostly wanted respect in her job and apart from that, she mostly "stayed away from hassles." She also revealed that her life outside of work revolved around her family, and she had tried to instill the same values in her children. "I go to work, do my job, I do a good job, and I go home." Any mention of race or culture was strikingly absent from the first part of the conversation with Carol. Later in the interview, however, Carol began to comment on her impressions of who got promoted within the department; she said she had noticed that "certain people get helped or moved along." According to Carol, it

was no accident that "proactive" and "aggressive" white males were the ones who got promoted to management positions.

Other interviews were conducted with people who had some say in creating, instituting, and overseeing policies surrounding diversity. This particular bank had a large human resources department, which housed an active diversity group charged with the duties of instituting and monitoring the bank's diversity programs and policies worldwide. Within this group we found, yet again, very different understandings of diversity and a wide array of opinions on which ideas and practices about diversity should be instituted. Christina, a Hispanic human resource officer in charge of diversity training (but a lower-ranking employee in her group), vehemently attested, "people are different and these differences can teach us something. . . . [Diversity] can be a strength because we don't necessarily know best. . . . Differences should be valued and utilized." Tori, an African American human resource officer and internal consultant who did employee advocacy and training, asserted, "Just have tolerance for difference . . . be able to handle my disagreement with you. Then what my physical image looks like becomes irrelevant, because all I have to do is be different. Be able to agree to disagree." She added, "because, at the end of the day we are a bank, so it is revenue production that matters most." With respect to formal diversity practices within the bank, Tori advocated the implementation of a set of organizationwide values that her group had developed and begun to disseminate. These values influenced every aspect of an employee's work life—from sick days to dress code to how he or she should interact with other employees. The purpose of this worldwide implementation was to foster a common set of values, norms, and goals in which employees across cultures could identify how to "be" an employee of that bank.

Elizabeth, an African American vice-president of human resources in diversity staffing and development, worked closely with upper management on issues such as the promotion and retention of high-level minority managers. Elizabeth saw her most important job within the company as persuading upper management to view diversity as a valuable resource—one that could have a direct impact on the profitability of their business. With this aim in mind, she had created four "business roundtables," or working groups, each consisting of middle- or senior-level managers and representing one minority population—women, African Americans, Asians, or Hispanics. Each group met once per month to develop their group project, which had been specifically designed to reflect the commonly held view of the strength of that particular minority group. The women's group worked on a work-life balance—dual career couples program; the African American group worked on marketing to the growing African American market segment; the Asian group worked on a technology program, and the Hispanic group worked on a mentorship program. This system had been instituted in order to show upper management how diversity in the workforce, particularly diversity at the top levels, can contribute to the bottom line.

These different ideas about diversity and practices surrounding diversity, and the fact that they seemed to be related in some way to the social and cultural

positioning of the informant, suggested that a number of models of diversity are currently being simultaneously entertained by Americans. What Americans make of the differences in their communities is currently under collective construction. While the notion that people are essentially all the same resonated with Dan (a white male manager), Oscar (his Hispanic subordinate) took comfort in a model that engaged and celebrated the notion of cultural difference. Whereas Ann (a Taiwanese woman) wanted her cultural background to be taken into account in her interactions with her boss, Carol (a West Indian woman) preferred to see race as irrelevant to her and her work life.

Each of these views reflects the employee's specific experience and positioning within the bank context. Dan's model of diversity, for instance, most likely has been shaped by his experience as a male majority group member in a high-status position within his company. Tori and Elizabeth's models of diversity likely have been contoured by their experiences as African American women engaging with European American mainstream culture, from fairly high policy-making positions within the organization. Christina, whose position allows her to institute programs but not organizationwide policies, engages a model of diversity that probably has been influenced by her position as well as her interaction with both Hispanic and European American cultures.

The accounts of diversity drawn out in these interviews present strikingly divergent perspectives on how people should think about, pay attention to, and incorporate difference in their work practices. While some employees' anxieties were raised by the suggestion that people are "different," others were disappointed by a system that failed to attend to cultural differences—in communication styles, work habits, and needs for connection. While some company policy makers touted incorporating difference in organizational practices, they diverged in their conceptions of the correct and effective way of doing so—and yet another policy maker avowed that differences should be tolerated but played down and replaced with an overarching value system. As America becomes increasingly diverse, there is, simultaneously, a growing diversity in how to think about difference and inclusion. Based on this set of interviews, subsequent studies (Plaut and Markus 2002), and a survey of the most influential psychological literature on intergroup relations, this chapter will document four models of diversity that currently appear to permeate both popular discourse and social science thinking. These models will be termed *Sameness*, *Common Identity Creation*, *Value-added*, and *Mutual Accommodation*.

Models of diversity can be defined as shared understandings and practices of how groups come together or should come together, relate to one another, and include and accommodate one another in light of the differences associated with group identity. These notions about diversity, which can take highly implicit or transparent forms, can be thought of as cultural models. Cultural models (see Shore 1996), which give form to individuals' engagement with the world and allow people to communicate with one another, are themselves shaped by individuals as they interact with the world and with each other and as they con-

struct meaning. Different cultural models are likely to evolve and influence individual thought and action depending on the sociocultural context with which the individual has engaged and is currently engaging. As the interviews herein suggest, people likely will engage different models based on their status or position, and they may engage different models in different situations. Drawing on a combination of interviews, surveys, a media content analysis, and a review of the intergroup relations literature, this chapter will explore the prevalence of different models and how their distribution might vary depending on social status and cultural context.

The models presented are not meant to be inclusive of all possible models of diversity. Fredrickson (1999), for example, describes two other models that also could be considered models of diversity. One is ethnic hierarchy, in which one powerful group—even a small group—controls the distribution of resources, and the other is group separatism, where groups have little or no interaction with each other. Under a related model, people may form voluntary associations with people of their “own kind” without interfering with each other, practicing a live-and-let-live philosophy. Further, the models depicted are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and sometimes the distinctions between models may be blurred. Yet for the most part these models represent four fairly cohesive sets of ideas and practices grounded in certain shared understandings of difference and inclusion. These models provide the foundation for the discourse of diversity in America, and they increasingly will be implicated in debates over how to combine diversity and democracy. The story of intergroup relations in America has been dominated by one model of diversity—the Sameness model—but there are other ways of thinking about groups getting together. The nondominant models (often, but not always, affiliated with the minority perspective) need to be attended to, because the most common model (reflecting the majority perspective) actually can work against incorporating difference.

An additional aim of this chapter is to fill a gap in the social psychological literature on intergroup relations. Social psychology has produced many powerful insights on stereotyping and prejudice, but it has not investigated the ideologies that frame attitudes about groups and practices of relations between groups. This chapter attempts to make explicit the cultural models that ground theories of intergroup relations. Given the ongoing dynamic between culture and science (Farr 1993; Kuhn 1962; Moscovici 1984), the review interweaves aspects of how models are represented by the public and by social psychology. Indeed, many of the psychological theories described herein have been used in legal cases (for example, Social Science Statement; see Allport et al. 1953) and to inform government policies (for example, Berry's work on multiculturalism) and organizational policies (see Thomas and Ely 1996).

There are many possible dimensions of difference: age, gender, sexual orientation, culture, race and ethnicity, nationality, social class, status, and so on. *Diversity* here refers to any way in which people differ because of their different positioning in the world. This chapter focuses on notions of cultural, racial, eth-

nic, and social status differences, because that is how diversity is most commonly interpreted by Americans (Plaut and Markus 2002) and in the social psychological literature.

## MEANING MAKING: CULTURAL MODELS AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Ideas and practices about diversity are developed by individuals in interaction with specific sociocultural and sociohistorical contexts. Models of diversity bundle a large set of culturally bound assumptions about the world and can operate implicitly, outside of conscious awareness. The literature on cultural models and social representations provides important insights into how thinking necessarily is linked with the social environment and how socially constructed knowledge can be deceptively invisible.

### Cultural Models: Culture Inside and Outside the Mind

The notion of culture as a necessary aspect of mind and mental functioning is reflected in the tradition of cultural models developed in cultural and cognitive anthropology and in cultural psychology (for example, D'Andrade 1990; Fiske et al. 1998; Quinn and Holland 1987; Shore 1996; Shweder 1990). Underscoring the notion of shared meaning, for instance, D'Andrade (1990, 809) describes a cultural model as "a cognitive schema that is intersubjectively shared by a cultural group." Quinn and Holland (1987, 4) argue that cultural schemas are "presupposed, taken for granted models of the world that are widely shared (though not to the exclusion of other alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of the world and their behavior in it."

But cultural models not only reside in the minds of people in a particular cultural context, they also inhabit the world itself. Shore (1996, 44) elaborates the definition of cultural model or schema by making it clear that models can exist "both as public artifacts 'in the world' and as cognitive constructs 'in the mind' of members of a community." In other words, models are externalized as shared, discernable institutions as well as internalized by individuals (see Berger and Luckmann 1966). The existence of these models is "contingent, negotiated through endless social exchanges" (Shore 1996, 47). Models constitute a community's conventional resources for meaning making—they constrain attention and guide what is perceived as salient through social norms and feedback.

In addition, because social institutions play a large role in meaning making, they necessarily shape cultural models (Shore 1996). People occupy and are very much materially involved with their place in the world, which includes cultural participation in the local economy, the legal system, schools, politics, and other institutions. Values and information depend heavily on particular practices and



institutions that are grounded in and make up material culture (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1990; Harris 1979). For example, cultural models of diversity are given form by the institutional life of a particular sociocultural context, and will be reflected by the people who interact with and make up those institutions.

### Social Representations: From Individual to Social

The theory of social representations has paralleled the cultural models tradition in its trajectory and contribution to our understanding of the socially constructed nature of human thought. Whereas the cultural models concept comes mostly from the tradition of cognitive anthropology, the notion of social representations comes from social psychology and is rooted in sociology (see, for example, Durkheim 1974 [1898]).

A social representation is, according to Moscovici (1973, xiii),

a system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.

Thus, the purpose of social representations is first to make the strange familiar and second to make communication relatively nonproblematic (Moscovici 1984, 1998). Social representations are formed through implicit negotiations in the course of conversations in which people are oriented toward particular symbolic models, images, and shared values. This process allows people to acquire a common repertoire of interpretations and explanations, rules, and procedures that they can apply to everyday life (Moscovici 1984). In many ways, social representations constitute a psychology of common sense or social sense. For example, social representations of diversity constitute what makes sense to people about how to perceive and label differences among people and how to act in light of these differences.

Social representations are transmitted and spread, and they change in the process of spreading (Sperber 1985). They also can be met with resistance. Individuals may resist or fail to incorporate public and mutually constructed ideas into their meaning-making systems (Oyserman and Markus 1998). In addition, social representations can be affected by life transitions as well as living in multiple cultural contexts, which can make competing claims on a person (Oyserman and Markus 1998).

Because of their similarity of function, *cultural models* and *social representations* will be used fairly interchangeably. Several important points may be gleaned from these various theoretical traditions. People behave and think within a semi-

otic—or meaning—space that is determined by their social and cultural positioning, or social vantage point. Within this space they socially construct models or representations, or cultural values, ideas, and practices, and they may institutionalize some of the models created in that space. This creative and dynamic meaning-making process ultimately serves to orient people with respect to one another, makes communication possible, and gives form to the relations between individuals and groups of people. Models, or representations, can be implicit or explicit and are both individually and collectively held and resisted.

Ideas about diversity that are permeating and guiding popular and social scientific thought can be better understood when viewed through the lens of cultural models or social representations. Accordingly, four models of diversity are portrayed in terms of their theoretical foundations as well as their prevalence in popular thought, with some attention to the problems or potential of the model for successful diversity. The description of the theoretical foundations of each model focuses mostly on social psychological approaches to intergroup relations as well as some important cultural ideals, both of which give some insight into and reflect the prevalent cultural models of diversity in a particular historical period. These approaches have also directly and indirectly shaped how people think about diversity, how they differ, and how those differences should be ignored, suppressed, or accommodated, and they have helped to create important policies that have been instituted in many domains of American life.

## THE SAMENESS MODEL: PEOPLE ARE PEOPLE

The Sameness model, epitomized by Dan's belief that "people are people," is characterized by the notion that differences among people are superficial and mostly irrelevant. This model is widely manifest in advertising campaigns and other public representations (Shweder 1991). For instance, a recent Merrill Lynch advertisement states, "the color of your skin is less important than the color of your imagination . . . you are larger, in the knowledge that the only race that really matters is the human one." And, when Supreme Court Justice Scalia declares, "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American," the Sameness model is instantiated in the legal system (*Adarand Contractors v. Pena*, 515 U.S. 200, 239 [1995]).

As suggested by Dan's response, America has an ideological struggle with the notion of difference. On one hand, America is a culture that prizes difference, uniqueness, and nonconformity. On the other hand, America is a culture that believes in individualism and equality, which necessitates treating everyone the same; it is a society that touts (even if it does not effectively practice) color blindness. Americans participate in a powerful legal and political culture that holds that "all men are created equal" and that one should treat people "as free and equal beings." Further, policy makers, social scientists, managers, and teachers work within a system that encourages people to believe that marking racial or ethnic difference is bad—a system that reflects the following sentiment

in Supreme Court Justice O'Connor's opinion in *Shaw v. Reno* (509 U.S. 630, 657 [1993]): "Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to much of our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin." To mark racial difference therefore is to court charges of racism. The solution has been to adopt an ideology of sameness with regard to diversity, championing such beliefs as "essentially we're all the same" and "at the end of the day we all want the same thing." According to this model, equality is understood as "similarity" (Shweder 1991), diversity is seen as just a matter of superficial differences, and many develop the presumption that once people are given "access" and treated with "respect and dignity" the rest is easy (see Thomas and Ely 1996, Fairness and Discrimination paradigm). In the past few decades, this model has become widespread in America's economic, educational, and legal institutions.

### Contact, Equality, and Individualism

Social psychologists have been not only descriptive in their theoretical investigation of intergroup relations but also prescriptive, and they have turned their attention to strategies for decreasing intergroup bias. Thirty-two social scientists, for instance, supplied evidence of the harmful effects of segregation (Allport et al. 1953) in the historic 1954 case *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, in which the Supreme Court overturned the 1896 decision of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, which permitted states to mandate "separate but equal facilities for blacks and whites." The *Brown* Court maintained that segregation generated feelings of inferiority among blacks and violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. Many social psychologists were optimistic that increased contact between blacks and whites would improve race relations. The "contact hypothesis," which holds that under certain conditions (for example, equal status, common goals, and egalitarian norms) direct contact between members of conflicting groups will reduce prejudice, was proffered as a means to achieve harmonious intergroup relations (Allport 1954; Amir 1969; Cook 1978). In this early theory and subsequent additions, we see the development of the Sameness model of diversity, one that is entrenched in a perceived need for color blindness based on equality.

This principle is itself intertwined with America's cultural ideal of individualism, where value is placed on independence, individual rights, and the tendency of people to see themselves as individuals rather than as members of a group (Hofstede 1980; Triandis 1995). This worldview is prevalent in North American and European societies—particularly among white middle-class people—and emphasizes the natural rights of the individual and personal achievement, which reinforce one another within the American cultural frame. The social representation of individualism in American society has been molded by the history of a war for independence and the belief in the right to individual freedom, epitomized in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, as well as by mainstream Protestant values such as hard work, self-reliance, achievement,

and discipline (Weber 1958 [1904]). These values of independence and achievement together have given force to the "American Dream," the mentality that claims that it is possible to get to the top and achieve almost anything if one works hard enough and with direction and perseverance (Spindler and Spindler 1990; Hochschild 1995). As a result, the American individualist stance highlights and rewards personal merit and success and promotes the judgment of others on the basis of personal success (Augoustinos 1998; Fiske 1991).

This cultural emphasis on achievement and locating its causes within the individual has played a large role in shaping American cultural models of diversity. According to Augoustinos (1998), liberal individualism, which abstracts and separates the individual from society and sees the individual as possessing inalienable rights, continues to "exercise ideological constraints on the way people think, live, and behave." Augoustinos (1998, 162-63) claims, "Individualism has been described as the most pervasive ethos characterizing liberal democracies because it has the ability to make sense of the social conditions of a capitalist society." The American economic system rests on a view of fair and equitable relations so that competition, the cornerstone of capitalism, can take place effectively and efficiently. This economic system then serves to legitimize and encourage views of the self that are grounded in equality and individualism. The Sameness model, which rests on these same principles, therefore can be seen as deriving from the free individual in the marketplace (Carr 1997).

In addition, in America, group life is seen largely as a matter of choice, and therefore, belonging to a group is not seen as natural; what is basic and natural is the individual. The United States is a nation of individuals seemingly bound together by a commitment to the protection of individual rights—not group rights. The 1954 decision to end segregation and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 fueled the process of dismantling differential treatment of groups. In essence, though, these legal decisions were meant to protect equal opportunity among individuals. Since group treatment heretofore had been associated with negative outcomes—and because the focus was on individual as opposed to group rights—a new ideology vaulted into America's racial discourse: color blindness. Liberals learned that they should not treat people based on their group membership or the color of their skin, but rather on the basis of sameness.

### Decategorization

Within the social sciences, elements of the Sameness model were developed further by proponents of decategorization. Insights from anthropology and social identity theory lured researchers toward a theory that attended specifically to the notion of group membership and categorization.<sup>3</sup> The anthropologists LeVine and Campbell (1972) suggested that the "crossing" of group memberships may help control the incidence of intergroup conflict by encouraging loyalties to more than one group. The social psychologists Deschamps and Doise (1978) found that "criss-cross" categorizations or multiple cross-cutting category distinctions

led to a decrease in intergroup discrimination. Worchel and colleagues (1978) suggested that cooperation would increase intergroup liking to the extent that it reduces the salience of the group boundaries or distinctions. These claims were based on the finding that in-group-out-group categorization was sufficient to lead to intergroup bias (Brewer 1979).

In light of these findings and in an effort to build on the conditions necessary for contact to have a positive influence on intergroup relations, Brewer and Miller (1984) developed the "decategorization" approach. This approach draws on the idea that with respect to category-based intergroup contact, categories can be based on differences in ethnicity, social class—even on single arbitrary distinctions (see Brewer 1979)—and that maintenance of category-based distinctions can undermine positive intergroup attitudes (Brewer 1988). According to Brewer and Miller (1984, 287), "an emphasis on intergroup distinctions introduces dysfunctional social competition and out-group rejection that interferes with collective action and interpersonal acceptance." The authors posit that intergroup interaction should be designed so as to eliminate the salience of social categories. Yet they argue that reduction of categorical responding does not "necessitate that real differences or perceived distinctions between groups be eliminated" (Brewer and Miller 1984, 289). Although Brewer and Miller argue that this is compatible with an integration approach, decategorization does not offer any indication of how differential group experience should be included, incorporated, or valued. In this sense, the decategorization approach is patterned by the tenets of the Sameness model in that it encourages people to decrease their perception of social categories, even if it does not suggest tuning them out altogether.

### Prevalence of the Sameness Model

Evidence from the diversity interviews, subsequent studies, and other practices shows that the first model of diversity is the most prevalent, at least among the European American majority. This "color-blind" perspective—characterized by Rist (1974) as a viewpoint that sees racial and ethnic group membership as irrelevant to how individuals are treated—is widely applied in education policy and pervasively instantiated in schooling practices. Schofield (1986a, 1986b) has studied the presence and effects of the color-blindness perspective in desegregated schools. She argues that this perspective is widespread in American schools, as part of official policy or as an informal but powerful social norm. Although the color-blind perspective is appealing because it coheres with American individualism, however, "it easily leads to a misrepresentation of reality in ways which allow, and sometimes even encourage discrimination against minority group members" (Schofield 1986b, 233). The idea that people should be judged by their behavior as individuals and not as members of particular social categories encourages institutions to try to ignore race completely. Yet the evidence that clues about race influence and guide people's perceptions and behavior, even as they

deny the influence of race, is voluminous. Schofield finds that although teachers claim not to notice race, it remains a factor in their perception and treatment of students, and racial categories still are salient to the students and continue to structure student interaction patterns (for example, with whom they sit during the lunch period).

The Sameness model is inherently tied to the concept of aversive racism, which focuses on the fact that although many whites are committed to a nonprejudiced self-image, they may have some degree of negative feelings toward minority groups such as blacks (Gaertner and Dovidio 1981, 1986, 1997). Aversive racism is a form of prejudice that surfaces in subtle ways—not as hostility or hate but rather as discomfort, uneasiness, or fear that motivates avoidance of race rather than intentionally destructive behaviors. This form of bias can lead to a failure in acknowledging one's negative racial sentiment, and it can be easily rationalized by principles such as fairness and equality. The availability of non-race-related rationales for behavior can help perpetuate negative outcomes for minority students (Schofield 1986b). To the extent that the color-blind perspective and its corollaries "help to remove awareness of race from conscious consideration, they make other explanations for one's behavior relatively more salient. Thus, they free the aversive racist to act in a discriminatory fashion" (Schofield 1986b, 247). Likewise, institutional racism (see Jones 1997 [1972]) is equally pernicious, because even though individual attitudes about race may have changed (through sets of policies, practices, and procedures), institutions continue to discriminate. Outcomes of aversive and institutional racism include discrimination by individuals who believe themselves to be unprejudiced when they can explain their behavior in ways that do not challenge their liberal self-concept when nonracial rationales are available to justify the action. Indeed, Schofield's (1986a, 92) findings suggest "to the extent individuals or institutions imagine that they are color-blind, they may well ignore social processes that perpetuate differential outcomes for members of majority and minority groups."

Another challenge posed by the Sameness model is how to come to terms with the fact that racial, ethnic, or cultural groups—who occupy a different position within the societal matrix—can have very different models of diversity. The assimilationist approach that results from the Sameness model starkly contrasts the pluralist approach advocated by members of minority groups: that is, to recognize cultural diversity and acknowledge the validity of "subcultural values" and "communal identities" (Schofield 1986a). For the European American majority, the Sameness model of diversity makes sense; it may even seem to work. Yet for others from different cultural contexts, and for those who operate from the vantage point of a different social position, people don't look the same. Nor do they necessarily aspire to be the same. Nor is "sameness based on fairness" really adequate.

According to our own studies, people who engage primarily in European American cultural contexts tend to hold the view that diversity among people is relatively superficial. In contrast, people who come from or who currently engage in some non-European American cultural contexts, or who occupy a lower


social position in a mainstream context, are more likely to be aware of significant differences between themselves and others. In one study (Plaut and Markus 2002), a questionnaire of attitudes toward and representations of diversity was administered to undergraduate students from different racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds that were associated with different social positioning on campus. Minority undergraduate students endorsed the following statements more strongly than did white students: I feel comfortable around others from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds; it's important to have multiple perspectives on campus; diversity is the fair thing to do; there is something special about diverse groups; differences among people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds are substantial. In contrast, white students endorsed the following statements more strongly: people are all the same; people are similar to me; too much diversity is harmful so we should emphasize the ways we are similar; diversity is irrelevant to me. These findings reflect an underlying tension between white and minority groups' responses. White students tend to focus on similarity and sameness, whereas minority students see differences between cultural and ethnic groups. Those who have been constituted as different or have learned through personal experience that color blindness does not really exist are more likely to endorse items supporting diversity and notice that people have different values and ways of thinking.

To document some current public understandings of diversity, we also are analyzing representations of diversity in a wide variety of magazines (Plaut and Markus 2002). This study looks at the prevalence of representations of diversity and draws on the fact that the media publishes advertisements with representations of diversity that advertisers think will resonate with the public. We have found the Sameness model widely represented in advertisements in a variety of publications. These advertisements explicitly tout a color-blind model and mention the lack of significance of group boundaries (such as the "color of your skin"). In advertising these messages and images, the media thus influences the public's conceptualizations of diversity.

### **THE COMMON IDENTITY CREATION MODEL: FROM DECATEGORIZATION TO RECATEGORIZATION**

The Common Identity Creation model holds that perceived differences among people and groups are substantial and should be minimized, and that a common, overarching identity should be created. This model is reflected in Tori's (the human resources consultant) efforts to implement an overarching, organizationwide set of values, norms, and goals that would reinforce employees' identification with the bank across cultural boundaries. One magazine advertisement (see figure 17.1) aptly characterizes the Common Identity Creation model: the ad proclaims, "This is our idea of teamwork." The caption then continues, "Zebras never wonder if they're white with black stripes. Or black with white stripes. They work together so they won't be lunch for a lion." Notice here that it does

FIGURE 17.1 / Ernst & Young Advertisement

An advertisement for Ernst & Young featuring a close-up, black and white image of a zebra's head and neck, showing its characteristic stripes. The stripes are thick and irregular, creating a strong visual pattern. The text is overlaid on the right side of the image.

**This is  
our idea of  
teamwork.**

Zebras never wonder if they're white with black stripes. Or black with white stripes. They work together so they won't be lunch for a lion. Join us and work side by side with seasoned professionals. Together, we can help you earn your stripes.  
[www.ey.com](http://www.ey.com)

CONSULTING TAX ASSURANCE

**ERNST & YOUNG**  
FROM THOUGHT TO FINISH.™

© 1999 Ernst & Young LLP



not matter if you are black or white—successful teamwork depends on the subordination of differences to a group identity or goal.

### Cooperation, Common Goals, and Similarity

One of the cornerstones of the contact hypothesis is the condition of cooperation between racial groups. Social scientists incorporated and developed this idea in later research on effective intergroup relations. For example, Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif 1966; Sherif et al. 1961) found that a series of "superordinate goals" are necessary for the reduction of intergroup hostility between two groups of boys in a summer camp. The "jigsaw" classroom technique developed by Aronson and colleagues (Aronson et al. 1978) also focuses on cooperative learning behavior. In this technique, each component of a lesson is mastered by one person in an interracial group of students, and cooperation with each person is necessary for the group to learn the lesson. Aronson's technique, developed in newly desegregated schools in Texas, focuses on equalizing student participation to enhance cooperation and on demonstrating a common purpose or goal.

The idea of demonstrating a shared purpose within an interracial group resonated with other social scientists as well. Some researchers (for example, Pettigrew 1969) argued that Allport's (1954) conditions reduce prejudice because they maximize the probability that shared values and beliefs will be demonstrated and perceived and therefore would provide the basis for interpersonal attraction between in-group and out-group members. This hope was reflected in the evolution of the "similarity-attraction model"—that people like others who are similar more than those who are dissimilar (Newcomb 1961; Byrne 1969, 1971). Byrne purported that a focus on similarity between groups rather than their differences may capitalize on this association between similarity and liking. In a series of studies, Byrne found that people who filled out an attitude survey and then were presented with the responses of other supposed participants liked this other person more when they perceive him or her to have similar attitudes. More recently, Grant (1993) found that perceived similarity led male and female groups to be more positive toward each other than did perceived dissimilarity.

### Common In-Group Identity Model

Some social psychological theories of intergroup bias and strategies for reducing it have recognized that people do not normally operate under a color-blind model. For instance, the social categorization perspective highlights the notion that people constantly perceive group boundaries. Turner (1981, 99), a proponent of this perspective, argues that the most effective way of resolving intergroup conflict is "through the creation of common or superordinate identifications." Gaertner and colleagues' common in-group identity model, firmly grounded in

these theoretical insights, reflects the principles of the Common Identity Creation model. Whereas Brewer and Miller (1984) stressed the importance of decategorization (the minimization of category-based interaction), Gaertner and colleagues (1993) have proposed that recategorization is necessary for the reduction of intergroup bias. They argue that intergroup bias can be reduced by changing categorization, or group boundaries, from *us* and *them* to *we*. In their study of a multicultural high school, for instance, reductions in bias were predicted by stronger common in-group representations and ethnic-racial identities that included a superordinate American identity (Gaertner et al. 1994). The common in-group identity model is based on principles of the social categorization perspective (Brewer 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1987)—that is, the idea that categorization of a person as an in-group member produces more positive evaluations (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1969) and perceptions of greater belief similarity (Brown and Abrams 1986; Byrne 1969). Gaertner and colleagues have claimed that common in-group identity is essential to group functioning (Gaertner et al. 1996).

### Prevalence of the Common Identity Creation Model

This perspective focuses on creating a single salient, inclusive category or identity with which many different people from different backgrounds, who would otherwise draw on different categories for self-categorization, can identify. The Common Identity Creation model bears some resemblance to the Sameness model; the idea of making people similar is linked to the idea of perceiving people as the same. However, while the Sameness model focuses on a broader identity (seeing people as "people," or as "all the same race"), the Common Identity Creation model works in a more confined way. This model does not require people to assume sameness on a large number of features or deny that differences exist. Just one group identity, at a level closer to the individual identity rather than as broad as all humanity, is sufficient. The Common Identity Creation model—the idea that if you make a diverse group of people focus on a common purpose, in some respects they can work together and like each other—is very appealing. This idea has come to life in many aspects of American culture, such as the military, which heralds the creation of one shared identity and institutes this model in such practices as dress and the perception of a common goal and enemy. The notion that "we are all playing on the same team" also is manifest in sports, where subgroup boundaries, such as race or ethnicity, often are minimized and replaced by a superordinate team identity. This model has appeared frequently in the social psychological literature as well, and although not one of the most prevalent themes in our media analysis, is not entirely absent from media representations of diversity.

Although an appealing conception of diversity, the model of creating a common identity has come under attack from a multiculturalist perspective. For instance, recent social psychological studies by Hornsey and Hogg (2000b) demonstrate that emphasizing a superordinate category actually could increase bias, while bias was lowest when subgroup categories were made salient.

## THE VALUE-ADDED MODEL: RECOGNITION AND INTEGRATION OF DIFFERENCES

According to the Value-added model, differences among people and groups are substantial, and some should be utilized because they add value. Christina (the human resources diversity manager) suggests that important differences exist among people from different groups, and these differences should be valued by the organization. This model also is promulgated in the following, from a Morgan Stanley Dean Witter advertisement:

Diversity: It's not an obligation—it's an opportunity. To make a difference, a company must keep its eyes open to different ways of thinking. That's why we take diversity seriously in all aspects of our business, including the way we select the companies that supply us with the goods and services that enable us to do business.

The Sameness model and the Common Identity Creation model are particularly attractive in a culture in which any mention of difference among people can inspire fear that one is alluding to genetic differences or essential differences in personality, motivations, goals, or values. Social psychology tells us, however, that while race and ethnicity do not create essential differences, people do differ owing to their different experiences and different positioning in society—because they are not treated the same. Indeed, the main contributions of social psychology have revolved around the lesson that people's psychological functioning (such as how they think, feel, act, and perceive themselves and others) varies because it is so profoundly influenced by different contexts and situations (see Ross and Nisbett 1991). Likewise, cultural psychology has deepened that tradition and has shown how psychological tendencies are shaped by people's engagement with the ideas, practices, and institutions that inhabit their cultural contexts and that guide and give meaning to their lives (see Fiske et al. 1998).

The Value-added model is rooted in this tradition of research that elaborates the dimensions along which people across cultures can be expected to differ. The Value-added model views differences among people as contributing value. Yet because notions about the values of particular differences are not highly elaborated or analyzed in the literature or popular discourse, the Value-added model encompasses a wide variety of perspectives on the incorporation of difference.

### Pluralism, Integration, and Multiculturalism

Pluralism refers to the "maintenance or development of separate cultures or distinctive ethnic identities in a given society" (Hewstone and Brown 1986, 21). While the conventional definition of pluralism calls to mind the notion of different cultures simply living side by side within a society, pluralist approaches can

differ from group to group. According to Pettigrew (1988), for instance, the image of the melting pot has long been a part of our national imagery, and reflects the Anglo-American concern with unity in the face of an enormously heterogeneous population. But the 1960s civil rights movement and demand for black inclusion caused an ideological shift, and the melting pot metaphor came under attack for obscuring "the cultural distinctiveness and contributions of ethnic groups" (Pettigrew 1988, 21). As a result, some groups have espoused a concept of pluralist integration that involves the maintenance of the "cultural integrity" of the group as well as the movement by the group to become an integral part of the larger societal framework (for example, the "mosaic" as opposed to the "melting pot"; Berry 1984). While pluralism had been based mostly on assimilation and seemed to reflect the needs of white minority groups (such as Catholics and Jews), a notion of pluralism tied to integration took ground that referred to the inclusion processes for a racial group (blacks, for instance) that had a "unique history of rigorous exclusion" (Pettigrew 1988, 20; see also Berry 1984 and Ogbu 1994 for a description of voluntary versus nonvoluntary minorities). Some scholars have argued, however, that integration was actually an idea about how blacks would become psychologically white (Triandis 1988; see Taylor 1974). Triandis and others propose a multiculturalist approach opposing current attempts at integration that disregard cultural differences. Multiculturalism, the way it has been referred to by cross-cultural psychologists in particular, grapples somewhat more directly with the notion of how differences should be recognized and included. According to Berry (1984), for a society to be multicultural requires the presence of both pluralism and a positive multicultural ideology in public attitudes and policy (that is, one that sees diversity as a resource rather than a problem). Most recently, Jones and his colleagues (2000) have proposed that positive consequences of diversity will occur if participation is reasonably representational and cultural identity is valued.

### Categorization Revisited

The multiculturalist perspective and the Value-added model also have been influenced by the social categorization tradition in social psychology. Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) dub social identity theory an "analogue to multiculturalism." Some researchers have suggested, however, that the conditions outlined by Brewer and Miller's (1984) formulation for positive intergroup contact (which also grew out of the social categorization approach and emphasizes decategorization) may not always lead to decreased bias. Hewstone and Brown (1986) suggest that contact should be "intergroup," not "interpersonal." In other words, individuals should be distinguished by the experience and expertise they bring to the situation. Their approach is aimed at the recognition and appreciation of both similarities and differences. Recent research by Wolsko and his colleagues (2000) also questions the assumption that social categories must be deemphasized for positive intergroup contact.

## Prevalence of the Value-Added Model

These perspectives all argue that differences between people are substantial and should be valued (or at least recognized), and the Value-added model is starting to seep into the diversity discourse. One of the most salient categories to emerge from the media analysis, for instance, has been the importance of different ideas, ways of thinking, and perspectives. We also have found many advertisements that represent a group of racially, ethnically, or culturally diverse people or simply present the term *diversity*. Yet the idea that differences in ways of thinking might in some meaningful way be tied to different group identities is absent from such advertisements, as is any concrete suggestion for what these different ways of thinking are or how they should be utilized. Moreover, in many organizational settings, even if different perspectives are recognized, they are not often integrated into the organization's practices.

Likewise absent from "diverse people" ads is any mention of how their differences are acknowledged or utilized. Indeed, notions about what kind of value people from diverse backgrounds bring are not highly elaborated or analyzed. Some organizations may emphasize cultural differences (for example, to gain access into different market segments) and place people in positions on the basis on culturally related characteristics, but fail to analyze how such differences function and are used within the organization (Thomas and Ely 1996). The Value-added model in practice therefore risks pigeonholing people into niches according to identity group membership. This practice is reflected in the interview of Elizabeth, whose business roundtable program assigned each minority group to a project based on its group identity and skills perceived to go with that identity. In her case, this strategy indeed is being used to legitimize the hiring and promotion of minorities explicitly based on their group-specific abilities. Closely linked to this approach to diversity is the widespread recognition of superficial group differences—that is, the practice of making sense of difference primarily in terms of ethnic "food and festivals." People are trying to celebrate and have some appreciation for some aspect of diversity—such as Dan, who reminded us of the importance of different backgrounds because of their link to various ethnic foods. Yet the question remains, how do we continue the intercultural conversation once we want to move past the international buffet?

## THE MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION MODEL

Ann's (the Taiwanese employee) desire to have her culturally based concerns heard and incorporated into management and work practices reflects a desire for mutual accommodation. Similarly, Oscar and Carol's concern that "certain" people get promoted points to their questioning of the inclusiveness of their workplace. These concerns reflect the Mutual Accommodation model, which focuses on the notion that differences among people and groups are substantial

and must be accommodated whether or not they are perceived to add value. This model calls for differences between groups to be perceived as contributive and nonlimiting. The Mutual Accommodation model does not deny that "people are people." Yet unlike the Sameness model, which implies that "we are all the same," mutual accommodation stresses the idea that seeing "people as people" requires recognizing that people have engaged with different sociocultural contexts and therefore have legitimately different perspectives and beliefs. Despite limited evidence for the Mutual Accommodation model in the interviews and in some recent social psychological research, it has not been represented—at least in a clearly elaborated way—in American society. It is missing, for example, in our magazine advertisements focusing on diversity.

To date, few social psychologists have adopted the premises of the Mutual Accommodation model directly, but this model can be gleaned from recent research. Investigators have begun to suggest that ethnicity should be taken into account, for example, in the process of organizational socialization (Brewer, von Hippel, and Gooden 1999), but apparently this research nevertheless advocates that organizational, or superordinate, identities should take priority over other social identities. Thus, accommodation seems for the most part to be a step on the way to common identity creation instead of a goal in itself. The Mutual Accommodation model also bears some resemblance to the Value-added model in that it recognizes the value of group differences in lived experience, but it goes further to argue for meaningful change in policies or institutions to accommodate such differences. The integration and multiculturalist perspectives described herein do not necessarily lead to accommodation and mostly take the viewpoint of the high-status group (the European American majority). In contrast, Mutual Accommodation in essence is a power-sharing model that calls for the expectation of change.

The Mutual Accommodation model begins with the assumption that individuals need to feel safe, valued, and respected in order to contribute to their full potential. Recall from the bank interviews that all of Dan's nonwhite subordinates asserted their desire for respect in the workplace, and at least two of these informants gave some indication of not feeling valued because of their lack of certain traits. Some recent research has begun to grapple with the complex task of creating environments and instituting practices that both acknowledge difference and allow differences to be respected and valued. The "Identity safety" approach, for instance, while recognizing group differences, accepts them as nonlimiting and contributive and attempts to reduce the threat that can be attached to a group's identity in critical settings (Markus, Steele, and Steele, ch. 21 herein). According to Markus and her colleagues, in this way the cross-group trust necessary for inclusion to occur can be built. Sending a message of identity safety, as opposed to one of color blindness, has been found to increase performance and trust and decrease stereotype activation among black college students (Purdie, Steele, and Crosby 2000).

The Mutual Accommodation model also involves a set of practices that require an institution to accept, adjust to, and incorporate group differences. Ac-

According to Schofield (1986a), schools should recognize the special values and behavior patterns of minority students and deal with them fairly, which emphasizes the responsibility of the school to adjust to its students rather than students' need to adjust to the school. Practices that involve only the one-way assimilation of minority groups ignore cultural differences that influence the way students operate in school and ignore the importance of using learning materials that reflect the interests and life experiences and identity of minority students (Schofield 1986b). This model is difficult to implement, however, in a system so firmly entrenched in a Sameness model, which demands one-way assimilation.

### Prevalence of the Mutual Accommodation Model

This tension between one-way assimilation and an accommodation approach is reflected in our own surveys of Stanford and San Jose State University students. As reported in the foregoing, variation was found between white and minority students on their perceptions of the amount and importance of difference as opposed to that of sameness or similarity. Minority undergraduate students also endorsed the following statements more strongly than did white students: to incorporate diverse perspectives, the university should change; government policy should ensure that organizations reflect the diversity of the population; immigrants should maintain and share their culture. In contrast, white students endorsed the following statements more strongly: people from minority groups must assimilate; having multiple perspectives does more harm than good; multicultural policy will cause conflict. So in addition to reflecting a discrepancy in the emphasis on similarity, these findings reflect another underlying tension between white and minority groups' responses. While white students support an "assimilation" model of diversity (where minorities should make adjustments to fit the majority culture), minority students seem to support the "accommodation" model of diversity (where the majority culture should change to accommodate minority perspectives). In an open-ended questionnaire, minority and white students also were distinguished by their reports of positive experiences with diversity. Minority students' responses were the only ones that contained any mention of learning, changing, or dispelling stereotypes. One African American female reported, for example, "You never know how sheltered you really are until you experience and learn from those different from you," and an African American male wrote, "Living in the Native American theme house last year I had to change my views of the stereotypical 'Indian' that I had."

Although espoused by several social scientists, the Mutual Accommodation model is relatively absent from mainstream discourse. The Mutual Accommodation model rests on the capacity to recognize group-based differences while ensuring that the salience of group categories does not intensify social competition and discrimination between groups (see Brewer and Miller 1984; Brewer, von Hippel, and Gooden 1999; Deschamps and Doise 1978; Turner 1981). Despite the

positive social science findings of adopting such an approach to diversity, our media analysis has found very little evidence of the Mutual Accommodation model and the message that diversity of experiences and perspectives can be recognized in a safe environment that respects and values difference.


One possible reason for the absence of the Mutual Accommodation model is that the pervasiveness of the Sameness model has introduced a sometimes seemingly insurmountable challenge to people's ability to grasp and practice mutual accommodation. The Sameness model is so deeply entrenched that institutions have come to see the necessity (legal, moral, economic) of "treating everyone the same." Indeed, one of the few advertisements to address the Mutual Accommodation model reflects this struggle between the Sameness and Value-added or Mutual Accommodation models. In a Dun and Bradstreet advertisement (see figure 17.2), a somewhat inconsistent or contradictory message unfolds as it grapples with how to hold both sameness and value-added or mutual accommodation notions at the same time. The advertisement starts with a clear color-blind message: it shows shadows of graduates (masking their group identities) and asks "Does it matter . . . ?" but then draws from a Value-added model when it states, "people's differences are our strengths." Finally, the message shifts to a Mutual Accommodation model, reflected in the phrase, "a company where people feel included and valued." So within one advertisement, three models of diversity are engaged, spanning the representational space from not dealing with difference (or the source of difference) to claiming the assets represented by different backgrounds, and finally to being concerned with valuing difference and being inclusive.

## TOWARD A MORE MULTIFACETED INDIVIDUALISM

After reviewing the concerns that arise in each of the four models, it seems that a sustainable model of diversity must be capable of valuing difference while: assuring that differences will be seen as contributive and nonlimiting, protecting the minority group against pigeonholing and negative views of difference, and assuaging the European American majority's fear of non-color-blind policies and practices. Given the problems posed by group membership, one may wonder why we cannot see people simply as individuals, as suggested by Brewer and Miller's (1984) model, which calls for purely "interpersonal" interaction in intergroup situations. Yet one of the main lessons of social and cultural psychology is that one cannot be a self by oneself. People cannot extract themselves from their historical, sociocultural, and situational grounding. A life without these three props is a life without meaning or basic orientation. The self is formed and reified by the cultural meanings and practices made available through group life. To think about oneself or others simply as individuals therefore is impossible. The opposite view—that people should be seen only as group members—is equally untenable. This approach certainly can lead to some of the concerns



FIGURE 17.2 / Dun & Bradstreet Corporation Advertisement



**Does it matter**

whether he's White?  
Or African American?

whether she's Asian?  
Or Hispanic?

whether he's Straight?  
Or Gay?

**Not at Dun & Bradstreet.**  
**We believe people's differences are**  
**our strengths, their ideas our assets.**

The infinite potential of the human being—we see it in everyone who works at Dun & Bradstreet and Moody's Investors Service. Because we've seen great ideas come from the most junior person on the team. From a telecommuting parent. From people of every religion, culture and background. It just makes good business sense: a company where people feel included and valued is a company that is ready to solve its customers' business challenges. We're always striving to be a better company to work for, and a better company to do business with. That's what matters at The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation.

Please e-mail your resume to:  
[www.dnbcorp.com](http://www.dnbcorp.com)  
or call 908-665-5854

**DB**  
**The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation**

presented by Brewer and Miller (1984) or expressed by Justice O'Connor (*Shaw v. Reno* 1993).

The question of individual versus group is not really a question of either-or but rather how. People can be viewed as individuals but risk misrepresenting, misunderstanding, or limiting others if they ignore the affordances of *multiple* group memberships, roles, and other socially meaningful associations. In other words, seeing people as individuals may require recognizing *multiple affiliations and identifications* (Hermans and Kempen 1998). Thus a possible solution that can be enacted within the framework of Mutual Accommodation is a *tacking back and forth between individual and group-based perspectives*. This approach requires seeing people as individuals within the context of a culturally and structurally patterned world.

As we intend to show in future research, the effectiveness of this practice rests on at least four conditions. First, people must recognize that culture and structure are not deterministic—racial categories or groups (and even group relations) are not fixed essences, but rather are very much social and cultural constructions that can change with time and use. A sense of the potential malleability of social categories could decrease concern with being seen as determined by one's culture or of making deterministic classifications of others, which in turn could decrease fear of difference. In addition, institutional practices should set up a norm of expecting differences, of assuming that these differences do not reflect "essential" differences, and of accepting that to notice them is okay. Second, people should recognize that they construct the world as much as it constructs them. Being labeled as a member of a group also is an opportunity to define what it means to be a member of that group. In a culture in which autonomy is such an important feature of our collective consciousness, this notion of agency in world construction could be crucial to the effectiveness of relations between groups. Third, flexibility, or having different sensibilities (which has been understudied and underappreciated), also should be recognized as a valuable skill. As cultural psychology has shown, people are different in meaningful ways and they inhabit and construct different worlds (Kim and Markus, ch. 20 herein; Shweder, ch. 11 herein); therefore they must learn to navigate in these different worlds and not take for granted that one's own way is always the right or only way. Lastly, the success of this model in practice rests on its acceptance by the dominant, majority group, which must recognize the importance of changing to accommodate different perspectives. Owing to its dual emphasis on the individual and that person's multiple group affiliations, the engagement of a Mutual Accommodation model used in this way could lead to the creation of settings in which individuals' anxiety about being negatively judged on the basis of group identities are minimized.

This chapter has aimed to document and make explicit a variety of models of diversity, characterized by different ideas and practices surrounding the notion of difference. The Sameness model, characterized by the idea that the differences among people are superficial and mostly irrelevant, is by far most prevalent.

This model is given force by American principles of equality and individualism. However, because of the Sameness model's explicit disavowal of differential treatment based on group identity, it paradoxically can lead to ignoring pervasive patterns of injustice and inequality. The Common Identity Creation model, somewhat prevalent in public discourse and organizational life, is based on the notion that groups will get along best if they can identify with a salient, overarching purpose and feel that they belong to the same "group" or "team." Some recent studies have shown, however, that such a strategy actually can lead to increases in intergroup bias. The Value-added model, which attempts to recognize and engage the increasingly diverse aspect of society, is slowly becoming more widespread. However, within this model, notions of difference are not well elaborated and organizations operating under this model may risk the negative consequence of pigeonholing people into niches that do not allow for the full development of their potential. In contrast, the Mutual Accommodation model, while recognizing differences, does not base its inclusion of difference on the perception of whether or not particular group-based differences add value. Rather, it seizes on the notion that different ways of being should be incorporated in an effort to create environments where people can feel respected and valued and also have some significant stake in important resources, decisions, and policies. This model is not at all prevalent, although of all the models considered here, it may have the most potential for appeasing the concerns of both minority and majority groups. For these reasons, while the other three models are not without merit and may even be preferable in certain situations, Mutual Accommodation may be the most sustainable model of diversity and the one with the most promise for building a successful diverse society.

Moscovici (1984, 33) claims that social psychologists have focused too much on the analytic operation of classification involving specific features (such as skin color) and on the judgments of similarity or difference according to one feature or another.

If my observations are correct, then all our "prejudices," whether national, racial, or generational or what have you, can only be overcome by altering our social representations of culture, of "human nature" and so on. If on the other hand, it is the prevailing view that is correct, then all we need to do is persuade antagonistic groups or individuals that they have a great many features in common, that they are, in fact, amazingly similar, and we will have done away with hard and fast classifications and mutual stereotypes. However, the very limited success of this project to date might suggest that the other is worth trying.

Models of diversity in essence are representations of culture and humanity—specifically, the important aspects of being human and the dimensions along which people differ, and how to come to terms with those differences. Although social psychology has given us many tools for dismantling intergroup bias, it has not looked carefully at the ideological assumptions that undergird its theories

and applications, and it has not taken stock of the heterogeneity of representations of diversity that can be engaged by different individuals and different groups in different contexts and situations. Perhaps it is time to heed Moscovici's advice and step back from the categorization and similarity perspective to gain a deeper appreciation of how people think human nature operates.

Although many Americans tend to believe in psychic unity—that deep down in the mind, we're really all the same—in reality, significant and fundamental differences exist in people's understandings of themselves and their social worlds (Shweder 1990, 1991; Markus, Mullally, and Kitayama 1997). The different life experiences of people from different cultures and social positioning necessarily produce important psychological diversity among them (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Markus, Kitayama, and Heiman 1986; Shweder 1990). As this chapter has aimed to illustrate, people who have experienced different sociocultural positioning bring with them basic differences in beliefs and practices that reflect their understanding of what difference means, how to relate to people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and how difference should be included. Future studies will examine more systematically how status and power scaffold models of diversity as well as how to develop individual and institutional practices that foster the inclusion and accommodation of difference.

These different models can have powerful and often subtle and unintended effects on the experiences of groups and on relations between groups. While once dominated by the melting pot ideology, as the interviews and studies suggest, American understandings of diversity are starting to reflect a variety of thinking about difference, what it means, and how it should be included. What form the ideological landscape of diversity will take remains to be seen, and working toward a more effective and inclusive diverse society will require careful attention to the content and functioning of cultural models.

## NOTES

1. These interviews were conducted with Hazel Markus as part of an ongoing project on models of diversity and inclusion in American life.
2. Names have been changed to preserve anonymity.
3. Social identity theory concerns the cognitive and motivational processes that underlie identity formation and lead to in-group bias, and is based on the notion of social categorization—that people categorize individuals into social groups (Tajfel 1969, 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) found that the mere fact of social categorization of self and others was enough to trigger in-group favoritism. To explain this finding, social identity theory was proposed. First, people categorize, then they compare (characterize on the basis of similarity or difference from self, and exaggerate in-group differences and in-group similarities), and finally, because they are motivated to enhance self-esteem, they confer positive distinctiveness on the in-group, which reflects well on the self. Self-categorization theory (Turner 1987) is a

more recent, exclusively cognitive extension of social identity theory, which focuses not on motivation but rather on the psychological basis of group formation and the process of self-categorization.

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