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**“General Duty to Obey the Law:
Perceptions of Chinese in Comparative Perspective”**

This draft paper forms part of the basis for the presentation. Apart from this dataset Professor Van Rooij will also draw from qualitative data from lawyers in China and the Netherlands as well as from farmers in China.

**The Exogenous Rule of Law:
Comparative Evidence about the General Duty to Obey the Law Amongst Law Students**

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Introduction

Rule of law is a central prerequisite for economic growth, human rights protection, law & order, efficient justice delivery, governmental accountability and transparency, and equality before the law (Kleinfeld 2006). Most approaches to rule of law emphasize elements endogenous to the legal system such as particular legal procedures, institutions, and/or legislative substance (i.e. Tamanaha 2004; Fuller 1976; Peerenboom 2002; Bedner 2010; Agrast, Botero, and Ponce 2011). A core element of the rule of law, however is exogenous and this is that the law must be implemented and “the gap between the law on the books and law in practice should be narrow” (Peerenboom 2002:65). Compliance with the law is thus a core element of the rule of law, without which, no matter what the procedures, rules and institutions are, a rule of law is most surely not to exist. Of course, the endogenous and exogenous aspects of rule of law are linked, as better laws, procedures and legal institutions enhance compliance (Fuller 1976). Vice versa,

voluntary compliance, compliance that exists without enforcement (Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl 2008), shows that the endogenous elements of a legal system are functioning well.

This paper looks more closely at the exogenous element of the rule of law, compliance with the law. It does so, not by studying whether there is actual compliance in a given situation, but rather by studying the General Duty to Obey the Law (GDOL) which indicates whether people perceive that one should obey the law simply because it is the law, regardless of circumstances. GDOL is a useful concept to study the exogenous rule of law, as it strips it bare of endogenous elements such as the content, procedures and operation of the legal system. It studies the perception people have of the intrinsic authority of the legal system. In legal philosophy there has been a debate about whether people actually have a general duty to obey the law (i.e. Durning 2003, Edmundson 2004, Greenawalt 1985, Wilkins 1996), with some, like for instance Raz arguing that no such duty exists and that people only need to respect the law (Raz 1979). For this paper, however, the focus is not on the normative question whether such duty exists, but rather, whether people perceive that it exists (cf. Geisinger 2002). The more they perceive such duty, the stronger the exogenous rule of law. Studying GDOL also has value for the study of compliance behavior. Some compliance scholars have posited that GDOL is a crucial variable explaining compliance behavior, with the higher GDOL the more compliance (Tyler 1990; Vandenberg 2003; Scholz and Pinney 1995).

Here, we develop a novel empirical approach to study GDOL, and thus the exogenous rule of law, which we validate in cross-national contexts with different legal, historical, cultural, and socio-economic settings. It uniquely operationalizes GDOL through a set of 12 questions measured in Law School populations across our sample of four highly diverse countries. It uses this measure to study GDOL perceptions through a survey of 808 law students in the US, China,

Israel and the Netherlands. On the one hand the study seeks to understand potential national differences in GDOL between these four countries. Second, it seeks to understand the relation between one's legal education and GDOL, both in terms of the total amount of legal education one has (i.e., number of years in Law School) had and what type of education it was (in terms of how formalistic, rule oriented it was). And third, the study seeks to understand individual differences amongst students, and the extent to which their different motivations to study law are associated with GDOL. Doing so the paper offers a new empirical test of GDOL and thus the exogenous rule of law at the micro-level (of citizens) that can be applied cross-nationally. It also offers insights in how national differences, as well as education and socialization and personal preferences affect GDOL and thus the exogenous rule of law. The study finally has value for those studying compliance behavior, offering an operationalized concept of GDOL to study cross nationally and insights about what explains its variation.

The paper has three core findings. First it finds that there is national variation in General Duty to Obey the law. Within our sample, China is not the outlier we expected and is not clearly different from the USA and the Netherlands. This shows that the perceived authority of law need not depend on the historical context, make-up and functioning of legal institutions, procedures or substance, in which China is so markedly different. Second, the study finds that the relation between the type of legal education in terms of formalism and GDOL reverses between first year and upper year students. In the first year, the more informal the education is, the higher the GDOL. In contrast, in upper years the more formal the education is the higher GDOL. Third, the paper finds that personal orientation to study law matters for GDOL. Altruistically oriented law students are less likely to see justifications for rule breaking of others than less altruistic students do. Similarly, but less clearly significant, instrumental students have see more justifications for

rule breaking than less instrumental students do. The implication is important, namely that general duty to obey the law and its related micro exogenous rule of law are a matter not just of culture, higher education and national differences, but also one of personality and personal motivations¹.

Approach

Presently no properly developed study to analyze the general duty to obey the law in cross-national settings exists. Our method is distinguished from other available measures in several key ways. Winter and May (2001) operationalize the duty to obey the law as on the one hand a moral civic duty, and on the other hand the moral appropriateness of the law itself (see also . While valuable, their approach does not fit our purposes here as it mixes endogenous elements such as the moral appropriateness of rules with GDOL. It thus does not study the perceived duty to obey the law regardless of what the law itself says. Moreover as we seek to study civic duty in cross-cultural settings, we developed a method which is more suited for that purpose compared to other available methods, such as Winter and May's. Another measure is Tyler's approach (1990) which measures GDOL through three kinds of questions: (1) measuring perceived duty to comply regardless of morals of the rules, (2) measuring generally whether there are justifications for non-compliance, and (3) measuring the importance of obedience and authority generally. We are inspired by Tyler's first two sets of questions, by asking questions about whether respondents find violations of the law acceptable under certain circumstances.

At its core, the General Duty to Obey the Law concerns the perception people have that one should follow the law regardless of circumstances. To measure GDOL we must thus first define what such circumstances are. As we saw, Tyler has done so, by looking at one such

¹ An interesting parallel in this context is the research on moral reasoning and legal compliance, where different stages of moral reasoning were argued to account for people's motivation to obey the law (see Feldman and MacCoun 2005, for a review)

circumstance, namely whether the law is in line with one's personal morals. Adopting a broader perspective, we do so here by looking at a wider set of circumstances under which it may be acceptable to break the law. If GDOL is strong, even such acceptable circumstances will matter less, and respondents will answer that even when such circumstances exist, breaking the law is not acceptable. We use the existing literature on compliance behavior to discern circumstances under which rule breaking usually occurs and may thus be more acceptable. This literature shows that there are five types of circumstances² that may make rule violation acceptable: (1) the **lack of capacity** to know and obey the law (i.e. Winter and May 2001; Vandenberg 2003; Nielsen and Parker 2012; May 2004, 2005a, b), (2) when the **amoral calculation** of benefits minus costs of violation are higher than those of compliance (i.e. Becker 1968; Ehrlich 1972; Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan 2005), (3) when there are **social norms** in terms of most others breaking the law or thinking it is acceptable to break the law (i.e. Cialdini and Trost 1998; Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg 2008; Tyran and Feld 2006, Feldman and Harel 2008), (4) when laws go against **personal morals** (i.e. Tyler 1990; Paternoster and Simpson 1993; Grasmick and Green 1980; Kornhauser 2003), and (5) when there is a lack in **procedural justice** in lawmaking and law enforcement (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Darley 1999; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). To measure GDOL we then developed 12 questions that let respondents indicate to what extent it was acceptable for people to break the law under these 5 different circumstances (for details see below under measures).

This paper seeks to understand variation in GDOL. It does so for three aspects: national differences, educational differences, and differences in personal orientation. National differences are analyzed by comparing the answers to GDOL questions by similar students (law students

² Compare with Feldman 2011, comparative analysis of the five models of compliance motivations.

from top law schools) in four diverse countries: the US, China (C), Israel (I), and the Netherlands (NL). These four countries were selected as they show great variation on many indicators, especially in terms of size (two small (I, NL), two large, US, C), political system (three democratic (US, I, NL) and one authoritarian (C)), legal history (two with over a century old continuing legal systems (US, NL), one with about sixty years of legal tradition (I), and one with a rebuilding legal system of 30 years (C)), in terms of cultural values (one with extreme individualistic values (I), two with moderate individual values (NL, US) and one with strong collective values (C)) (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 1991), income levels (three high income (NL, US, I) and one middle income (C)). Such geographic, economic, legal, historical, political and cultural differences are very likely to affect the way people perceive the authority of law as well as the general duty to obey the law. We especially expect that China scores different from the other countries in terms of GDOL as it is the clear outlier in our sample in terms of these broader differences. China has only has a short history of building contemporary legal institutions (cf. Peerenboom 2002). Its legal system is embedded and controlled in the confines of an authoritarian party state and thus is likely to have less overall legitimacy, being a rule by, rather than a rule of law. And China suffers from persistent problems with implementing its laws resulting in pervasive violations of legal rules, both by private and public actors (Van Rooij 2012). Meanwhile, Israel we expect may be different from the US and the Netherlands at least, as it has a shorter tradition of the rule of law (Sarat 1977) , a more pluralist attitude to the sources of norm-generating authorities, including religion, and military (Smith, Peterson, and Schwartz 2002, Brody, Coulter, and Lin 1999), and low deference to legal authority in Israel (Yagil and Rattner 2002). In addition, Feldman and Lobel (2008) find that relative to Americans, Israelis

were less concerned with violations of the law by others and were less likely to engage in social enforcement of such behaviors.

Clearly, any observed difference on GDOL between the counties can be attributed to any of the above factors, and more likely a combination of some of them. Our work does not aim to disentangle the specific cultural factor(s) influencing GDOL, but rather, assess several key factors related to it, and explore how those interplay with GDOL and differentially manifest themselves in the various cultural contexts.

Educational differences and their relation to GDOL are measured in two ways. First, we look at whether the type of legal education matters. We do so by looking at the extent of formalism in legal education. Formalism is measured by looking at the extent to which the study (1) includes interdisciplinary perspectives on law (Weinstein and Morton 2006; Priest 1983; Chemerinsky 2008), (2) involves experiential learning and education (Moliterno 1996), and (3) teaching methods inspire critical thinking and nuance (Pithers and Soden 2000). Lower levels on each of these three factors are associated with more formal education systems. Here we assess whether the more formal the education is, the higher students' GDOL will be. This possibility seems likely as the more students learn to study the law internally within the legal system, and the less they learn to think about the economic, moral, social or other reasons why there may be circumstances why disobedience with the law may be more acceptable.

The second aspect of legal education is the amount of legal education students have had. Thus we compare GDOL scores across different years of law students, most important comparing first year students with students who have had more than one year of studies. We do so realizing the immense changes that take place amongst law students going from the first to the upper years of law school (Sheldon and Krieger 2004). Comparing first year students to students

in later years is useful as the exposure to education and approaches is sharply distinct between the two. We assess if GDOL varies as a function of year in Law School, whether positively or perhaps negatively.

Finally, we look at the individual level of the respondents themselves. We are interested in how GDOL varies across different types of law students, and in particular how two different types of motivations to study law relate to GDOL variation. Here we draw on the work of Sheldon and Krieger, who distinguish generally between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to study law (2004). Extrinsic motivations in their study (which draws on the Aspirations Index, Kasser and Ryan 1993) include financial success, appealing appearance, and social popularity, while intrinsic motivations include emotional intimacy, community contribution, and personal growth. We draw on this broadly, but in a simplified form to keep the overall survey as short as possible, by summarizing two types of motivations: one is instrumental (to get a good job, make money, become famous etc.) and the other is altruistic (to enhance justice, to do right thing, to help the weak etc.). Of course there can be overlap between the two with students seeking fame through public interest lawyering for instance. We assess how that the motivations for studying law influence how one views the authority of law and thus when one should obey the law. Motivations that are more instrumental are likely to be associated with lower willingness to obey the law. In contrast, altruistic orientation is likely to overall be associated with higher willingness to obey the law, with the exception of breaking the law to help the weak and the needy (i.e., civil disobedience, and Robin Hood).

Methods

Participants

Participants were approached on campus or in class and were provided with a printed version of the questionnaire. They were asked to return the completed questionnaire within a week's time. In part of the Dutch sample, for practical reasons, we distributed the questionnaires by email. In total, we received questionnaires from 808 students, attending highly ranked law school from four different countries: Israel ($n = 277$), China ($n = 294$), The Netherlands ($n = 96$) and USA ($n = 141$). The sample included 51% (415) females and 34% (277) males, with the remaining 14% (116) not stating their gender. Out of all participants, 247 were in their first year of university, 166 in their second year, 136 in the third, 105 in fourth, 41 in fifth, 30 in sixth and 45 in seventh year. The students' age ranged between 15 and 56 ($M=22.7$, $SD=3.9$).

Procedure

Participants received the materials through three methods: (1) during class, (2) during a break, or (3) through email, and were asked to complete it unsupervised and return it either at the next class (delivery method 1), after the break (delivery method 2), or by return email (delivery method 3). Materials included 5 questionnaires related to the current project, as part of a larger battery of surveys. Out of the total 808 participants that returned their questionnaires, 88.7% ($n = 717$) returned it filled out. Completion rates varied across countries. The completion rate was highest in The Netherlands (100%), followed by China (97.6%), Israel (89.5%) and the USA (61%).

Measures

Participants completed the following questionnaires:

General Duty to Obey the Law. Based on the operationalization of GDOL, set out above, participants were asked to rank for 12 different situations whether they find it acceptable for people to disobey the law (1 = strongly disagree, up to 7 = strongly agree). Specifically, they

answered about the following situations: (1) the legal rule is clearly against my own moral principles; (2) I think the legal rule makes unreasonable demands of me; (3) obeying the legal rule is very expensive for me; (4) the legal rule is not enforced; (5) most of my direct colleagues and/or friends also break the legal rule; (6) I am in one way or another unable to do what the legal rule asks of me; (7) most of my direct colleagues and/or friends think breaking the legal rule is justified; (8) I do not know the legal rule; (9) I do not understand the legal rule; (10) the legal rule has not been published; (11) I feel that the legal rule was made without representing my interests; (12) I think the legal rule is enforced unfairly. We calculated General Duty to Obey the Law index to be the mean of the 12 items ($\alpha = .80$) after reversing their scale. A higher score on the GDOL index thus indicates a higher General Duty to Obey the Law.

Legal training. Participants were asked to rank 13 statements to measure the degree of formalism in their legal education, as operationalized above (each ranked on 1 = strongly disagree, up to 7 = strongly agree). Specifically, participants indicated the extent to which (1) I have already had one or more courses about professional ethics; (2) In class we often discuss the morality and justice of law; (3) I have learned practical skills of direct use for legal practice; (4) I have performed an internship in legal practice; (5) I have practiced in one or more moot courts or clinical legal education classes; (6) We are taught that law itself is of major value to society (reverse scored); (7) Students frequently challenge views expressed by their law professors; (8) In many classes law professors use insights from law and economics; (9) We learn to view the law as a matter of costs and benefits; (10) Many exams are based on multiple choice questions (reverse scored); (11) Law professors often teach law by asking students questions; (12) Law professors teach students the proper interpretation of the law (reverse scored); (13) Many exams are in the form of term papers requiring original research in which I am supposed to provide my

own point of view on the relevant topic. Three items (#6, #10 and #12) were reversed scored and showed very low reliability with all other items. We thus created a legal training index to be the mean of the 10 remaining non reversed-scored statement ($\alpha = .61$). A higher score on the index means that participant's legal education was more interdisciplinary, critical and practical and less formalist (a rule is a rule).

Legal training motivation. Participants were asked to rank 8 statements about the extent to which they agreed with each of the motivation provided as the reason they choose to attend Law School (all from 1 = strongly disagree, up to 7 = strongly agree). Specifically, they answered about the following statements: (1) I hope to earn a salary in the future that will allow me to live a comfortable life; (2) I hope to get a prestigious job; (3) I hope to find an intellectually stimulating job; (4) I hope to find a secure and stable job; (5) I hope help deal with injustice; (6) I hope to be able to help the weak; (7) I hope to strengthen people's respect for law (8) I hope to be able to hold people accountable for their misdeed. We computed the first 4 statements, which referred to instrumental motivation, into a new instrumental motivation index ($\alpha = .67$), with higher scores indicating higher instrumental motivation to study law. We computed the remaining statements 5-8, measuring participants' altruistic motivation, into an altruistic motivation index ($\alpha = .79$), with higher scores indicating an altruistic motivation to study law.


Demographic information. Participants further reported their age, gender, and year in law school.

Results

Legal training. A two-way ANOVA was used to assess whether teaching style varies as a function of country and years in Law School. The analysis revealed that teaching style varied

as a function of country (Israel: $M = 3.17$, $SD = .80$, China: $M = 3.87$, $SD = .99$, NL: $M = 3.25$, $SD = .80$, USA: $M = 3.96$, $SD = .83$), $F(3, 695) = 19.30$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .077$. Legal training also varied between the first year of Law School ($M = 3.23$, $SD = .77$) and later years ($M = 3.70$, $SD = .99$), $F(1, 695) = 19.47$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .027$. The ANOVA further revealed that legal training varied as a function of country (Israel vs. USA vs. NL vs. China) and year of study (1st year vs. rest), with a significant interaction effect, $F(3, 695) = 3.66$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .016$. As can be seen in Figure 1, legal training varied between first and later years, in the USA ($p < .001$), and China ($p < .001$), but not in Israel and NL (p 's $> .1$).

Figure 1. Formalism in legal training as a function of country and year in Law School.



Instrumental motivation. A Two-Way ANOVA was used to assess whether instrumental motivation varied as a function of country (Israel vs. USA vs. NL vs. China) and year of study (1st year vs. rest). Instrumental motivation did not vary as a function of country (Israel: $M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.25$, China: $M = 5.03$, $SD = 1.29$, NL: $M = 5.27$, $SD = 1.04$, USA: $M = 4.84$, $SD = .76$), $F(3, 689) = 3.59$, $p > .05$, nor did it vary as a function of years in Law School (1st year $M = 5.27$, $SD = 1.06$ vs. later years $M = 5.02$, $SD = 1.25$), $F(1, 689) = 3.59$, $p > .05$. The interaction was also not significant, $F(3, 689) = .79$, $p > .05$.

Altruistic motivation. A Two-Way ANOVA was used to assess whether Altruistic motivation varied as a function of country (Israel vs. USA vs. NL vs. China) and year of study (1st year vs. rest). Altruistic motivation varied between countries (Israel: $M = 5.06$, $SD = 1.21$, China: $M = 5.77$, $SD = 1.07$, NL: $M = 4.85$, $SD = 1.38$, USA: $M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.00$), $F(3, 689) = 16.19$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .066$. A post hoc Scheffe test showed that the difference between Israel and China ($p < .05$), as well as between NL and China ($p < .05$) and USA and China ($p < .05$) were significant, while all other differences were not (p 's $> .1$). Altruistic motivation also was varied between the first year of law school ($M = 5.38$, $SD = 1.17$) and later years ($M = 5.34$, $SD = 1.23$), $F(1, 689) = 14.06$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .020$. The interaction was not significant, $F(3, 689) = .47$, $p > .05$).


General Duty to Obey the Law. Most important for the current investigation, we assessed how GDOL varies as a function of the other demographic variables. A Two Way ANOVA with country and year in Law School predicting GDOL revealed a significant effect for country ($M_{\text{Israel}} = 4.71$, $SD = 1.11$, $M_{\text{China}} = 4.36$, $SD = .87$, $M_{\text{NL}} = 4.28$, $SD = .82$, $M_{\text{USA}} = 4.51$, $SD = .97$), $F(3, 697) = 6.96$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .029$. A post-hoc Scheffe test showed that the difference between Israel and China ($p < .05$) as well as between Israel and NL ($p < .05$), were significant, while all other differences were not (p 's $> .1$). The effect for years in Law School was not significant: students in their first year of law school did not score significantly different ($M = 4.51$, $SD = 1.07$) than student on later years ($M = 4.48$, $SD = .93$), $F(1, 697) = .43$, $p > .05$. The interaction between country and years in Law School was also not significant $F(3, 697) = 1.74$, $p > .05$.

We assessed how students' altruistic orientation and country of studies impacts their GDOL. An ANCOVA with altruistic orientation (as a continuous variable) and country was used

to predict GDOL revealing a main effect for altruistic orientation, $F(1, 694) = 5.73, p < .05, \eta^2 = .008$), specifically – the higher participants' altruistic orientation was the higher their GDOL was ($r = .08, p < .05$). The analysis further revealed a main effect for country was not significant, $F(1, 694) = .92, p > .05$, but the interaction between country and altruistic orientation was, $F(3, 694) = 2.80, p < .05, \eta^2 = .012$. The correlation between altruistic orientation and GDOL reached significance only in Israel ($r = .23, p < .05$), but not in China, NL or USA (p 's $> .30$). Similar analysis with participants' instrumental orientation, country predicting to GDOL only revealed a marginally significant negative effect of instrumental orientation on GDOL, $F(1, 694) = 2.87, p = .09, \eta^2 = .004$. That is, higher scores on instrumental scale were associated with lower scores on the GDOL (Pearson $r = -.074, p < .05$). Both main effect for country and the interaction between instrumental orientation and country were not significant, F 's < 1 .

When testing the effect of legal training and years in law school on GDOL, an ANOVA revealed a main effect of year in law school, $F(1, 698) = 8.67, p = .003, \eta^2 = .012$, with first year showing higher ($M = 4.50, SD = 1.08$) GDOL question scores than students in later years ($M = 4.48, SD = .93$), meaning that more legal study leads to lower GDOL. The main effect for legal training was not significant, $F(1, 698) = 1.69, p > .1$. The interaction between year in law school and formalistic legal training was significant, $F(1, 698) = 9.34, p = .002, \eta^2 = .013$. As can be seen in Figure 2, the correlation between GDOL and legal training was positive in student's first year in Law School ($r = .14, p < .05$) and negative in later years ($r = -.103, p < .05$), indicating that less formal legal training was related to a higher GDOL in the first year and to a lower GDOL in later years.

Figure 2. GDOL as a function of legal training and years in law school.



Then we assessed how students' altruistic orientation and year in law school (1st years vs. later) impacts their GDOL. An ANCOVA with altruistic orientation (as a continuous variable) and year in law school was used to predict GDOL revealing a main effect for altruistic orientation, $F(1, 692) = 8.30, p < .05, \eta^2 = .012$, a main effect for year in law school was not found, $F(1, 692) = 1.45, p > .05$, also an interaction between year in law school and altruistic orientation was not found, $F(1, 692) = 1.62, p > .05$.

Then, we assessed how students' instrumental orientation and year in law school (1st vs. later) studies impacts their GDOL. An ANCOVA with instrumental orientation (as a continuous variable) and year in law school was used to predict GDOL. Neither main effects nor the interaction were significant. There was no main effect for year in law school, $F(1, 692) = .00$,

$p > .05$, also the main effect for instrumental orientation, $F(1, 692) = 2.70$, $p > .05$ and the interaction $F(1, 692) = .00$, $p > .05$ were not significant.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of the study demonstrate the novel GDOL measurement is useful when applied across our cross-national sample. The internal reliability of the 12 questions is strong ($\alpha = .80$), which has important methodological implications, allowing studying GDOL cross-culturally. First, as we set out to do here, GDOL can be used to measure exogenous rule of law perceptions amongst different groups of a population. It thus adds an important and uniquely exogenous metric to the developing field of rule of law indicators (cf. Taylor 2007; Skaaning 2010; Agrast, Botero, and Ponce 2011). Second, GDOL can be used in compliance studies as an explanatory variable for compliance behavior. (cf. Vandenberg 2003). GDOL is more comprehensive, and also has uniquely been tested cross-nationally, compared to existing measures for the duty to obey the law (i.e. Winter and May 2001; Tyler 1990). Finally, the GDOL index can also be used in studies looking at ethical judgment, as it provides information about the flexibility and rigidity of law related ethical judgments of others (Shalvi and Leiser 2013; Shalvi et al. 2011; Shalvi, Feldman et al. 2014)

By studying GDOL in a first population of respondents, law students from the US, China, Israel, and the Netherlands, we now have new data and insights about GDOL variation. A first insight is that national variation on GDOL. Overall we find that there is a significant variation between countries, as we expected. Interestingly, we do not find that China is markedly different from all other three, as one may expect. This is quite remarkable given the national historical, legal, political, economic and cultural differences between China and the other countries. One

possible explanation may be that law students at the top schools we selected form an elite that have values that may be more alike than those of more average citizens. This does have some first implications for rule of law. It shows that at least within the restrictions of our limited sample of law students, differences in endogenous elements of the rule of law, so apparently existent between China and the other countries here included, need not affect the exogenous element of rule of law, in terms of whether people perceive a duty to obey the law simply because it is the law. In simpler terms, the perceived authority of law need not depend on the make-up of legal institutions, procedures or substance.

Legal education, both in terms of level of formalism and duration showed a complex linkage to GDOL. Amount of legal education and the level of formalism did not significantly relate to GDOL independently, but the interplay between them did. While first year students showed higher GDOL the lower their level of formalistic teaching was, students in later years showed the reverse pattern.. So in the first year, the more formal education students get the lower their GDOL, while in upper years, the more formal the higher their GDOL. This is somewhat different from what we had expected, as it shows that the type of legal education has a different effect earlier on than later on and that the effect of legal education is not linear, in terms of that duration strengthens the effects of formalistic education on GDOL. A possible explanation for this is that GDOL first year students that are confronted more with critical, interdisciplinary and experiential forms of legal education still do so in a context that is oriented on studying the basics of law, and thus early on are taught to think critically and thus will start asking questions beyond merely what is the law, but also about the authority of law itself, leading to a higher appreciation of the value of a general duty to obey. In this phase the broader and critical approach to law combined with basic legal training seems to have boosted the intrinsic value of

compliance with the law. In later years, the effects might reverse as there is less focus on just learning what the law is and interdisciplinary and critical approaches to law might come to dominate to the extent that students are led away from the intrinsic value of law. Important implications here are first that experiential, critical and interdisciplinary legal education have a different effect on first years than on higher years. A second important implication is that legal education can advance GDOL, but that its interaction with GDOL is complex and depends very much on the level of knowledge of the students and the amount of education they have had.

The study also reveals a linkage between personal motivation to study law and GDOL. Especially the altruistic orientation to study law has a significant correlation with GDOL, with altruistic students more likely to perceive a higher GDOL. Therefore, GDOL varies not so only because of national differences and legal education, but also in relation to personal orientation of students to study law in the first place. The implication is important, namely that general duty to obey the law and its related micro exogenous rule of law are a matter not just of culture, higher education and national differences, but also one of personality and personal motivations.

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