LENIENCY IN CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW? EVERYDAY JUSTICE IN HENAN

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1 Robert L. Lieff Professor of Law and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. BLiebm@law.columbia.edu
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Abstract

This article examines one-year of publicly available criminal judgments from one basic-level rural county court and one intermediate court in Henan Province in order to better understand trends in routine criminal adjudication in China. I present an account of ordinary criminal justice in China that is both familiar and striking: a system that treats serious crimes, in particular those affecting state interests, harshly while at the same time acting leniently in routine cases. Most significantly, examination of more than five hundred court decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in criminal cases in China today. Defendants who agree to compensate their victims receive strikingly lighter sentences than those who do not. Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even serious crimes, at times appearing to make the difference between life and death for criminal defendants. My account of ordinary cases in China contrasts with most western accounts of the Chinese criminal justice system, which focus on sensational cases of injustice and the prevalence of harsh punishments.

The evidence I present provides insight into the roles being played by the Chinese criminal justice system and the functions of courts in that system. This article also provides empirical evidence that contributes to debates on a range of other issues, including the relationship of formal law to community norms in Chinese criminal justice, the roles of witnesses and lawyers, the function of appellate review, and how system confronts and handles a range of high profile topics. My findings also contribute to literature on courts in authoritarian regimes and the evolution of authoritarian transparency. This article provides a base for discussing the future of empirical research on Chinese court judgments, demonstrating that there is much to learn from the vast volume of cases that have in recent years become publicly available in China.
English-language scholarship on the Chinese criminal justice system largely focuses on major cases and harsh punishments: “strike hard” campaigns, capital cases, torture, and sensational cases of wrongful convictions. With few exceptions, the term “leniency” rarely factors into western accounts of criminal justice in China. When it does, it is principally in the discussion of national policies embracing the combination of leniency and harsh punishment, kuanyan xiangji, or leniency for those who confess rather than empirical study of court practices. In contrast, this article shows that leniency is a key characteristic of everyday Chinese criminal justice, in particular in rural areas.

This article examines one-year of publicly available criminal judgments from one basic-level county court and one intermediate court in Henan Province in order to better understand criminal justice in rural China and in small towns and mid-sized cities. I supplement my analysis of cases with interviews with judges, academics, and lawyers in Henan. I have two primary goals. The first is to develop an understanding of trends in basic-level criminal adjudication in China. I aim to paint a picture of what ordinary crime and criminal justice looks like in one county and one municipality in China. What emerges is an account of ordinary criminal justice in China that is both familiar and striking: a system that treats serious crimes, in particular those affecting state interests, harshly while at the same time practicing leniency in more routine cases. Most significantly, examination of more than five hundred court decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in criminal cases in China today. Defendants who agree to compensate their victims receive strikingly lighter sentences than those who do not. Whether or not a settlement has been agreed is far more important to the resolution of a case than more traditional legal factors, including legal arguments and evidence presented. Although the importance of settlement has been noted in prior Chinese language scholarship, no prior work has examined the practice through the study of court dockets or a large volume of case

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3 In China the municipality, or shi, is the primary sub-provincial governance unit. A municipality generally includes both extensive rural areas and county towns, administered by county governments, and urban areas, administered by district governments.
decisions. My dataset also allows me to examine the role of intermediate courts in trying major crimes and in reviewing appeals from lower courts. Again, the findings are surprising. Appellate courts are far more aggressive in policing lower court judgments than is commonly assumed. Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even serious crimes, at times appearing to make the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.

My second goal is methodological. Until very recently, Chinese criminal judgments were either difficult or impossible to obtain, in particular for non-Chinese researchers. Those who did obtain such opinions largely relied on friends and colleagues with connections to local courts. Within the span of just a few years this situation has changed dramatically: in Henan Province alone tens of thousands of criminal judgments are now available online. In 2013 China’s Supreme People’s Court called on courts nationwide to follow the Henan example and place most judgments online. The reasons behind this sudden embrace of transparency are complex (and certainly do not include facilitating research by scholars, Chinese or foreign). Nevertheless, the widespread availability of large volumes of criminal judgments raises the question of what can actually be learned from reading court opinions in China. Scholars in China and in the West have generally assumed that court

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4 The most detailed and important prior work in English on the Chinese criminal justice system looks at a selection of cases from a range of different courts but does not examine every case from any individual jurisdiction. See Mike McConville et al., Criminal Justice in China: An Empirical Inquiry 40 (2011).

5 China’s court system is divided into four tiers: basic courts at the county (in rural areas) or district (in urban areas) level; intermediate courts at the municipality level; provincial high courts; and the Supreme People’s Court. The vast majority of cases are tried in basic level courts, with a right to a single appeal to an intermediate court. But serious cases, including criminal cases in which a defendant faces a potential death sentence or life imprisonment, are tried in intermediate courts with a single appeal to the provincial high court. The state is represented by the procuratorate in criminal cases. The procuratorate may appeal verdicts in criminal cases regardless of the outcome in the first instance court: there is no bar to the procuratorate appealing non-guilty verdicts or to arguing that a lower court was too lenient toward a defendant.

Decisions become final after a decision on appeal is issued (or after the time for an appeal has expired). But courts may also decide to retry cases at a later date through retrial (zaishen) procedures. Courts also must retry a case if requested to do so by the procuratorate. Litigants may request a rehearing within two years of a final decision. There is no time limit on rehearings initiated by the courts or procuratorates. In practice this means that after the two year period has run litigants seeking to reopen cases protest or petition to courts or procuratorates in an attempt to convince them to initiate rehearings.

judgments in criminal cases in China tell us very little about either the facts or reasoning behind a case. To be sure, much is missing from these decisions. The task of reading contemporary criminal judgments at times is akin to that of reading Qing Dynasty cases: readers are left to speculate both about the facts of the case and behind the scenes interactions among the courts, the procuratorate, and the police. Cases are written in a standard format and generally emphasize outcomes, not analysis. Certain cases, most notably death sentences, remain unavailable and we know little about those that are not made public. Nevertheless, this article demonstrates that there is much to learn from publicly available cases, including about the role of settlement, the types of sentences imposed, the legal arguments made, and the roles of lawyers. Even relatively minor and simple case decisions generally provide information about the defendant, the crime charged, alleged facts, evidence, lawyer and procuratorate attendance and arguments, and outcome, including fines and sentences. This article is a first step toward exploring what scholars can learn from the huge volume of material now publicly available.

The evidence I present provides insight into the roles being played by the Chinese criminal justice system, the functions courts play in that system, and the meaning of leniency in Chinese criminal practice. My findings also offer a baseline for evaluating future changes to the Chinese criminal justice system, in particular the effect of the 2012 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law, the most important development in Chinese criminal justice in two decades, as well as the effect of major personnel shifts in the wake of the 2012 leadership transition. The evidence I present also adds to debates on a range of other issues including the relationship of formal law to community norms in Chinese criminal justice, the role of witnesses and lawyers, and how the criminal justice system confronts and handles a range of controversial topics, including land disputes, corruption, protests, and disputes within families.

This article also contributes to literature on the evolution of China’s courts and courts in authoritarian regimes. The emphasis that courts, procuratorates, and the police place on settling cases reflects trends in the Chinese legal system away from formal adjudication in favor of mediated outcomes. Carl Minzner has described such trends as a “turn against law.” I have written of China’s “return to populist legality.”

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8 The leadership transition included the installation of new leaders of the courts, procuratorates, and the Communist Party’s Political Legal Committee, which oversees the entire legal system.
9 Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 935, 937 (2011).
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criminal cases concerns about stability often lead to surprisingly lenient outcomes, at least in routine cases. As in high profile civil disputes, most notably medical, labor, and land cases, extreme state emphasis on social stability is leading courts to innovate in routine cases. Although judges generally claim that they are lenient only where formally permitted by law, some cases represent quite flexible interpretations of existing law. Courts are most concerned with defending themselves from criticism, minimizing conflicts with other state actors, and reducing the risk of petitions and protest. Such concerns explain both emphasis on settlements and deference to procuratorates. Evidence from Henan also contributes to literature on the role of transparency in the Chinese legal and political system and in authoritarian systems more generally. Henan’s experiment with judicial transparency is an example of the ways in which increased public exposure may be used primarily to serve the interests of centralized state oversight and control.

In Part I of this article I discuss Henan’s efforts to make court decisions publicly available. In Part II I present my empirical findings based on examination of one year of publicly-available criminal division decisions from one county court and one intermediate court. In Part III I discuss the methodological significance of the large amount of data only recently made available in China and the implications of my empirical findings for literature on the Chinese criminal justice system and on courts and transparency in authoritarian regimes.

I. BACKGROUND: HENAN’S PUSH TOWARD “JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY”

Henan Province is home to roughly 100 million people. Located in central China and regarded as the historical birthplace of Chinese civilization, Henan has lagged behind many eastern and central provinces economically: its per capital GDP ranks 22nd out of 31 provincial units in China. Henan is divided into seventeen municipalities, each administering populations that range from 1.5 to 8.5 million people.

11 For a general discussion of the impact of petitioning and protest on China’s courts, see Benjamin Liebman, A Populist Threat to China’s Courts? in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Margaret Y. K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).
Sixty-one million of Henan’s population are classified as rural, making the province home to the largest rural population in China.\textsuperscript{13}

Beginning in mid-2009, the Henan High People’s Court ordered all courts in the province to begin putting most decisions online.\textsuperscript{14} Although Chinese law provides for most court decisions to be made publicly available, in general court decisions are not readily available to non-litigants. Although the Henan High Court rule came in the wake of Supreme People’s Court (SPC) statements that courts should embrace transparency and place cases online,\textsuperscript{15} Henan’s efforts to post cases went beyond what had been done in other provinces and regions up to that


\textsuperscript{15} The SPC’s regulation was permissive, not mandatory. It stated in relevant part that “the people’s courts may, according to the needs of legal advocacy, law research, case guidance and unification of standards for judgment, compile, print and publish various judgment documents in a centralized way.” See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingfa Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding He Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Xinwen Meiti Yulun Jiandu De Ruogan Guiding de Tongzhi (最高人民法院印发《关于司法公开的六项规定》和《关于人民法院接受新闻媒体舆论监督的若干规定》的通知) [Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on the Publication of Six Measures on Judicial Openness and Certain Provisions on People’s Court Accepting News Media Supervision] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2009), \textit{available} at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=305059.
point. Other courts that had placed cases online had done so selectively, or in a few cases had placed all cases from a specific court division (such as intellectual property in the case of Beijing) online. In contrast, the presumption in Henan is that all cases are to be posted online unless they fall within certain specified exceptions.

Official policy in Henan, set forth in implementing rules adopted by the provincial high court, is that all court decisions formally classified as judgments or verdicts (panjue shu) are to be posted online. Documents classified as rulings (caiding shu), which generally are very brief decisions, are required to be posted online only if they fit into one of eight categories, generally those involving substantive rulings. Exceptions to the general rule include cases involving state secrets, personal privacy issues, business secrets, juveniles and other cases not publicly tried, capital cases, state compensation cases, mediated cases, and withdrawn cases. Litigants may also request that cases not be posted online or be removed after posting. The rules state that a court may grant such a request only after “strict review” by a supervising judge and only if the case falls into categories of cases likely to cause emotional distress to a litigant or third party. In practice this is most often done in a broad range of family law disputes.

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16 Some other provinces and municipalities subsequently began to emulate the Henan example.
17 In 2013 the SPC issued new rules calling for courts nationwide to place more opinions online. See Zuigao Fa Shouci Shangwang “Shai” Caipan Wenshu (最高法首次上网“晒”裁判文书) [Supreme Law for the First Time Puts Judgment Documents Online], RENMIN RIBAO ( 人民日报 ) [People] (Jul. 3, 2013), http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c42510-22054836.html. I discuss the new rules and their effect on Henan’s practice of putting cases online below. See infra.
18 Implementing Rules, supra note, arts. 3, 5, 6. The implementing rules state that “all first instance, appeal, and rehearing case opinions shall be posted online” with the exception of specific listed categories of cases.
19 The implementing rules list eight categories of such rulings that must be posted online: rulings affirming decisions in criminal cases, rulings refusing to accept a case, rulings reflecting differing opinions on jurisdiction, rulings directly rejecting suits or rehearing decisions, rulings remanding a case for retrial, rulings in cases involving disputes concerning enforcement, rulings regarding appeals of enforcement decisions, and rulings correcting typographical errors in opinions. Implementing Rules, supra. More routine and non-substantive court notices and decisions are excluded. Interview 2012-24.
20 Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note , art. 5.
21 Interview 2012-24. Implementing Rules, supra note , art 16. The Rules state that cases may be removed if a party makes a valid request or a serious error is discovered, but only after formal review by senior officials at the court that posted the decision. The rules appear designed to prevent individual judges from removing cases that they do not want made public.
22 Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note , arts. 6, 7. The regulations state that legitimate reasons for granting such a request include cases in which “there is strong antagonism” among the parties or between one party and the court or the contents of an
criminal cases; a defendant has no right to request that a case not be made public or be removed after it is posted online.23 Certain information is redacted: victim and witness names are removed prior to publication, as are parties’ phone numbers and addresses.24

The exceptions leave significant room for local court interpretation. Nevertheless, the policy is designed to require that most cases be put online. Provincial high court rules state that judges who believe that a case should not be placed online must seek approval from a court vice-president; otherwise all cases must be submitted for online posting within three days of the judgment being submitted to the parties. Cases submitted for online posting are reviewed by a court official responsible for the website, who has an additional three days to decide whether or not to make the case publicly available.25

As of early 2013 the Henan High Court reported that more than 440,000 cases had been posted to court websites since the policy was adopted in 2009.26 By early 2014 that number had increased to more than 600,000 cases posted online.27 Although official reports claim that courts

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23 Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note , arts. 6, 7.
24 Interview 2012-24; Implementing Rules, supra note , art. 22. The Implementing Rules state that victims’ names are to be excluded only in cases involving violent crimes. In practice it appears that victims’ names are redacted in all cases. The Rules state that full names, gender, and age of parties is to be included, but all other information is to be redacted. See also art. 21 (stating that witnesses, juveniles, and those performing meritorious conduct such as helping to arrest a defendant shall be listed only by last name).
25 Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, arts. 10, 11. The rules state that the presiding judge has three days from receiving confirmation that the decision has been delivered to the parties or from the end of the stipulated time for delivery to submit the judgment for posting. If the judge responsible for posting cases decides not to place a decision online she or he must provide a specific reason for such a decision.
26 Henan Sanji Fayuan Shangwang Gongkai Caipan Wenshu Yu 44 Wan Jian (河南三级法院上网公开裁判文书逾 44 万件) [Henan Three Levels of Courts Have Published More than 440,000 Cases Online], RENMIN FAYUAN PINDAO (人民法院频道) (People’s Court Channel) (Jan. 25, 2013), http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201301/25/117953.shtml. The figure was 280,000 as of early 2012; Interview 2012-24; see also Henan Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang 28 Wan Yu Fen (河南法院裁判文书上网 28 万余份) [More Than 280,000 Henan Court Judgment Are Available Online], CAIXIN WANG (财新网) [Economic News Net] (Jan 31, 2012), http://china.caixin.com/2012-01-31/100352036.html.
27 Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (河南省高级人民法院工作报告) [Henan High People’s Court Work Report], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) (China Court Web) (Jan. 22, 2014),
in Henan are now putting 99 percent of their cases online, this figure refers to cases not falling within the exceptions. In practice a significant percentage of court rulings are not posted online: for example, court-approved mediation agreements, which represent a large portion of all first instance civil cases.

Initially cases posted online were not made public permanently. Court rules stated that cases should be public for one year, and in the initial years of the policy courts generally removed cases from their websites at the end of the calendar year. As judges explained, the primary goals of making cases publicly available are “to make courts transparent,” to increase public confidence in the courts, and to increase pressure on judges to decide cases correctly. These goals are achieved with a one year publication of cases. In practice, however, many such cases remain available at commercial case databases even after they have been removed from the court websites. The policy also appears to be evolving toward permanent publication of cases. In 2012 the Henan High Court began aggregating all cases province-wide onto its own website, with cases no longer being removed after one year.

The decision to place cases online came in the wake of a number of high profile wrongful convictions in Henan. Zhang Liyong, the president of the Henan High People’s Court, stated that the policy of placing opinions online was “compelled” by illegal conduct by some judges. Zhang stated that with online publication errors by judges will be “immediately discovered and criticized online.” Judges now know that

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29 Interview 2012-24; Henan Provincial High Court’s Notice on Printing and Distributing Court Judgment Publication Online Measures, supra note , art. 4.
30 Interview 2012-13.
31 Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet, supra note .
32 Henan Kaitong Caipan Wenshu Wang He Tingshen Zhibo Wang (河南开通裁判文书网和庭审直播网) [Henan Launches Case Website and Trial Live-streaming Website], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [China Court Web] (May 17, 2012), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/05/id/517955.shtml.
33 See Henan Fayuan Jiang Caipan Wenshu Shangwang “Daobi” Faguan Jinze (河南法院将裁判文书上网“倒逼”法官尽责) [Online Publication of Judgments Forces Judges to be Responsible], ZHONGGUO WANG ( 中国网 ) [China Net] (Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.china.com.cn/law/txt/2009-01/25/content_17185088.htm; see also Henan Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Qingkuang Tongbao, supra (commenting that online publications of judgments have offered judges an opportunity to study precedents and narrow the discrepancy and randomness among judgments). Implicit in Zhang’s comment was the argument that erroneous outcomes in criminal cases are the fault of the
any errors will directly affect their chances of promotion. Placing cases online is not intended to facilitate use of the decisions in future cases or to serve as precedent. Nevertheless, judges acknowledge that lawyers often use prior cases in legal arguments.

Local courts in Henan vary in their implementation of the policy. Some courts have taken more restrictive approaches than suggested by the provincial high court, for example by not posting cases that have been appealed. Some jurisdictions appear to have liberal definitions of privacy interests, thus keeping a larger percentage of cases from being posted. Yet a number of courts also report “100 percent compliance” with the high court’s rules – meaning that they have posted all cases that do not come within a listed exception. The provincial high court has criticized courts
that have lagged in compliance. High court officials report that in general most courts have complied with the policy.

The policy of putting cases online initially encountered resistance from judges who feared increased workloads and scrutiny. Judges and courts are now evaluated based on the percentage of cases they put online. Judges describe such efforts as resulting in “tremendous pressure” on them as they handle cases. Lawyers concur, noting that judges are under pressure to avoid mistakes and as a result are far more careful than in the past.

The policy of making cases public has generally been praised by officials, lawyers and academics. For example, lawyers who handle 


Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet, supra note. In 2009, 15 basic level courts that “lagged behind” in implementing the policy were exposed and the presidents of such courts were required to come to the provincial high court to explain why they had not complied. The high court stated that such actions were highly effective in promoting compliance. The Implementing Rules call for the Provincial High Court to engage in regular review of implementation of the policy by each division in the high court and by all lower courts, including issuing a ranking of courts based on their level of compliance. Courts that lag in implementing the policy “are to have points deducted” when they are evaluated. Implementing Rules, supra note, Art. 36.

Interview 2012-24.

Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet, supra note (acknowledging and critiquing resistance to the policy among some judges who were concerned either at the workload or the effect of publishing cases online).

Interview 2012-3; Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note, art. 18. The implementing rules state that judges who fail to comply with the policy, or who delay in making cases public, shall be subject to administrative sanctions. Implementing Rules, Art. 18.

Interview 2012-11; Interview 2012-19; Henan Gaoyuan Jiang Panjueshu Shangwang Gong Shimin Chaxun (河南高院将判决书上网供市民查询) [Henan Provincial High Court Uploaded Court Opinions Online for Citizens to Examine], DAHE WANG (大河网) (Dahe Net) (Dec. 31, 2008), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-31/072216954042.shtml (quoting a judge stating that even a small error may be reported by parties); Zhang Liyong Daibiao Yu Wangyou Zaixian Jiaoliu: Zhengyi Buneng Guanzai Wuzi Li (张立勇 代表与网友在线交流: 正义不能关在屋子里) [Representative Zhang Liyong Communicates with Netizens Online: Justice Should Not be Locked in a Room], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [China Legal Info Net] (Mar. 5, 2009), http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=347301 (stating that judges know that their decisions will be posted online and examined by ordinary people, and thus will be careful to follow the law from the beginning).

Interview 2012-7.

Zhang Liyong, Shehui Fating: Tiaochu Fayuan Zhiwai de Shijian Yu Sikao (社会法庭：跳出法院之外的实践与思考) [Society Courts: Practice and Thoughts Outside the
criminal cases praised the policy, arguing that judges need to be controlled – and that greater oversight and transparency are effective routes for doing so. Yet the policy has also received criticism. A number of lawyers and academics in Henan expressed concern in discussions that the push to place all decisions online is resulting in court judgments that are increasingly simple in their reasoning, the result of judges’ trying to avoid any possible errors. As one lawyer noted, in Henan any error becomes a “big error” when it is posted online. This alleged trend toward simplified reasoning is in tension with the SPC’s efforts to encourage courts to provide more detailed explanations of their reasoning in opinions. High court officials, in contrast, argue that the policy has
forced judges to pay more attention to legal analysis and thus has improved the overall quality of court opinions.\textsuperscript{49}

I selected for study one rural county court in Henan that appeared to be putting the large majority of cases of all types online in 2010.\textsuperscript{50} The court is situated in the county seat, an average-sized county town in China. I do not claim that this county is representative either of basic courts in Henan or of courts across China more generally. It is one of thousands of such courts in China.\textsuperscript{51} I also do not claim that my study is comprehensive: in 2010 the court placed 171 cases online. I supplemented the cases found online with an additional six cases from the county court that were located on commercial websites,\textsuperscript{52} making a total of 177 cases. The highest reported case number was number 221, suggesting that the court placed roughly 80 percent of cases on its website.\textsuperscript{53} Most omitted cases involve juveniles or rape.\textsuperscript{54} Judges state that it is rare for a party to a criminal case to object to the decision being placed online.\textsuperscript{55}

I also examined the publicly available annual criminal docket for 2010 of the intermediate court in the same jurisdiction (the court directly above the county court). The intermediate court is located in a third-tier Chinese city, with a combined rural and urban population of approximately six million. The county is home to roughly half a million people.\textsuperscript{56} The intermediate court has jurisdiction over a total of twelve county or district courts.\textsuperscript{57} The cases on review in the intermediate court

\textsuperscript{49} Interview 2012-25.
\textsuperscript{50} This was done after surveying a range of Henan courts in 2010 to ascertain the volume of cases being put online. Judges and lawyers in the jurisdiction agreed to speak with me on the understanding that their names and the name of their courts would not be identified.
\textsuperscript{51} The county court has 45 persons classified as judges, thirty of whom hear cases. Interview 2013-9.
\textsuperscript{52} It is unclear why those six cases were not posted to the court website. They do not appear particularly sensitive or noteworthy. The cases may have been cases originally posted online and then removed, as they are also available on the provincial high court website, which collects cases posted to lower court websites.
\textsuperscript{53} Court officials confirmed this rough calculation and stated that in 2012 the figure was closer to 90 percent. Interview 2013-8.
\textsuperscript{54} Interview 2013-8; 2013-9
\textsuperscript{55} Interview 2013-8
\textsuperscript{57} Eight lower courts were county courts and thus primarily rural. Four were district courts, meaning they were in towns or urban areas.
thus came from a broader geographic area than those in the county court. The intermediate court posted 276 opinions in criminal cases from 2010 to its website. I located an additional sixteen on commercial websites, making a total of 292 judgments.\(^{58}\) Of these 37 were first instance trials, 239 were decisions in appeals, and 16 were decisions in rehearing procedures. Intermediate court decisions were divided across three court divisions. Calculating the percentage of cases posted is thus more difficult than for the county court. Nevertheless, using the highest case number as a guide and excluding decisions from the court’s third criminal division, which handles juvenile cases, it appears that the court posted just under half of its first instance decisions not involving juveniles, just over three-quarters of its appellate decisions, and just over two-thirds of its rehearing cases.\(^{59}\) According to intermediate court officials, as of early 2012 the court had placed nearly 7,000 decisions on its website since the online policy began in the second half of 2009.\(^ {60}\) This was roughly half of the total number of decisional documents issued by the intermediate court during the same period. The vast majority of excluded documents were mediation agreements or decisional documents that do not discuss the merits of a case.\(^ {61}\) The court reported just 37 instances during the same period when a case of any type was not posted online due to a request from one of the parties.\(^ {62}\) In addition to reviewing the cases, I conducted interviews with approximately forty judges and lawyers in three cities in Henan.

The push to place court decisions online is one of a number of innovations adopted under the leadership of Henan High People’s Court President Zhang Liyong. Zhang, who came to the court with no legal background, has promoted new policies that he has said are designed to increase the quality of and public confidence in Henan’s courts.\(^ {63}\) These

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\(^{58}\) As with the county cases, the additional cases do not appear to be particularly sensitive or noteworthy, and it is unclear why they were not available on the intermediate court website.

\(^{59}\) I calculated this approximate figure by dividing the total number of cases available by the combination of the highest case numbers for each criminal division.

\(^{60}\) Interview 2012-13.

\(^{61}\) Interview 2012-13.

\(^{62}\) Interview 2012-13.

\(^{63}\) Da Faguan Zhang Liyong Wuni Kao (大法官张立勇五年考) [Grand Judge Zhang Liyong’s Exam in the Fifth Year], MINZHU YU FAZHI WANG (民主与法制网) [Democracy and Legal System Net] (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/minzhuyufazhishibao/fanfu/html/1248/2012-11-12/content-568478.html (discussing Henan efforts to make courts more welcoming to ordinary people and requiring judges to be more like ordinary people, strengthening courts’ obedience to Party leadership and their rejection of concepts of separation of powers, and making courts more open to comments from ordinary people). The moves were controversial, with some complaining that judges were being forced to take on inappropriate roles and would be overwhelmed by their new workload.
have included live broadcasts of court cases, requiring court leaders to meet directly with aggrieved litigants, experimentation with a form of jury system, requiring courts to hold hearings in villages, the creation of “society courts” (社会法庭) staffed by laypeople to mediate cases, the establishment of an annual “wrongful conviction day” on which courts examine their files for any incorrectly decided cases, and the creation of a “life responsibility system” for judges, under which judges are responsible “until the end of their lives” for any errors made in handling cases. Zhang has also welcomed increased supervision of the courts from people’s congress representatives. Some such policies have drawn...

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64 For live broadcast of court cases of Henan Courts, see http://ts.hncourt.org/. As of early 2012 the High Court reported that more than 1,500 cases had been broadcast online.


67 See “Shehui Fating”: Huajie Maodun De Henan Chuangzao (“社会法庭”:化解矛盾的河南创造) (“Society Courts”: A Henan Innovation That Resolves Contradictions), HENAN PINGAN WANG (河南平安网) [Henan Pingan Net] (Jun. 3, 2011), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/jujiaosanxiangzhongdiangongcheng/shehuiguanlichuangxin/shehuibaozhang/html/1037/2011-06-03/content-76470.html; see also Zhao Gang et al, Xuchang Fayuan: Dakai Shehui Fating Shenshang De Wenhao (许昌法院：打开社会法庭身上的问号) [Xuchang Court: Unfold the Question Mark on Society Courts], LUOYANG SHI XIGONG QU RENMIN FAYUAN WANG (洛阳市西工区人民法院网) [People’s Court] (May. 17, 2011), http://xgqfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=78. Society courts, made up of ordinary people selected from the local community, are designed to further mediation in routine cases. They appear largely to be the repackaging of traditional mediation authorities under the direct supervision of the courts.

68 See Ji Tianfu, Henan Fayuan Yanjiu Jianli Cuoan Zeren Zhongshen Zhuijiu Zhidu (河南法院将研究建立错案责任终身追究制度) [Henan Courts Will Research and Establish Lifelong Responsibility for Wrongly-Decided Cases], RENMIN FAYUAN WANG (人民法院网) [People’s Court Net] (Jan. 11, 2012), http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201201/11/83609.shtml. It appears that the lifetime responsibility system is targeted at the most egregious forms of judicial misconduct, primarily corruption.

69 Henan: Fayuan Ban’an Yao Zhudong Jieshou Renda Daibiao Jiandu (河南：法院办案要主动接受人大代表监督) [Henan: Courts Should Take Initiative To Accept People’s Congress’s Supervision over their Handling of Cases], FAZHI WANG (法制网) [Legal Daily] (Sep. 15, 2011), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2011-09/15/content_2956921.htm?node=20908 (detailing requirements that each court report
extensive criticism from legal academics, who warn of a return to populist justice and who argue that many of these reforms lack a legal basis. In one prominent early account of Zhang’s reforms, *Southern Weekend* described him as a “judge who does not play according to legal principles.” Yet others in the legal community have come to his defense, noting that he has significantly increased judicial transparency. on their work to every local people’s congresses delegate regularly, including on their handling of major cases; that courts invite delegates to attend cases and participate in enforcement activities; and that each court establish a text messaging system to report to people’s congress members on their work; see also *Henan Sanji Fayuan Quanbu Kaitong Renda Daibiao Zhengxie Weyuan Zhanxian Dianhua* (河南三级法院全部开通人大代表政协委员专线电话) [Three Levels of Courts in Henan All Opened Hotlines for People’s Congress Representatives and People’s Consultative Committee Members], *ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG HENAN PINGDAO* (中国法院网河南频道) [China Court] (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/04/id/479195.shtml (discussing the creation of hotlines to be used by people’s congress delegates to contact the courts 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and requiring courts to respond to any enquiries within one working day).

70 See He Weifang, *Sifa Gaige Bixu An Fali Chupai* (司法改革必须按法理出牌) [Legal Reform Must Follow Legal Principles], *ZHONGGUO MIN SHANG FALU WANG* (中国民商法律网) [China Civil and Commercial Law Net] (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.civilaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=43340 (arguing that populist justice is sometimes bad law and that some of Zhang Liyong’s reform measures may set a bad example for judicial reform); Guo Guangdong, *Yuanzhang, Qing An Fali Chupai* (院长，请按法理出牌) [Court President, Please Play by Legal Principles], *NANFANG ZHOUMO* (南方周末) [Southern Weekend] (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.gongxue.cn/landunfalv/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=97378; *Buan Fali Chupai Zhi Yuanzhang Yulu de Shixiang Zai Zhiyi* (不按法理出牌之院长语录的十项再质疑) [10 Doubts on the Quotations of the Court President Who Does Not Follow Legal Principles], *ZHENGYI WANG* (正义网) [Justice Net] (Apr. 6, 2012), http://chinaszjt.fyfz.cn/art/1048006.htm (arguing that only one or two measures Zhang adopted are reasonable but that others hurt the independence and credibility of the judicial system); Guo Shushan, *Zhang Yuanzhang Chuli Pingdingshan Fayuan De Zuofa Fansi* (张院长处理平顶山法院的做法反思) [Reflection on Chief Judge’s Measures for Handling Pingdingshang Court], *FALU WANG* (法律网) [Legal Net] (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.66law.cn/domainblog/24124.aspx (article by lawyer criticizing reforms under Zhang Liyong for confusing the role of courts and “ordinary Party-state entities” and for undermining judicial independence).

71 See Su Yongtong, *Buan “Fali” Chupai De Gaoyuan Yuanzhang* (不按“法理”出牌的高院院长) [High Court President Does Not Play According to Legal Principles], *NANFANG ZHOUMO* (南方周末) [Southern Weekend] (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.infzm.com/content/24067 (describing promotion of informal trials and mediation, increasing role of popular input, deemphasis on judicial professionalism, and increasing administrative oversight over lower courts).

72 *Zhang Yifei,* *Bubi Keze Henan Fayuan De “Zhang Yuanzhang Xinzheng”* (不苛责河南法院的“张院长新政”) [It is Not Necessary to Criticize Court President Zhang’s New Measures], *HONG WANG* (红网) [Red Net] (Mar. 6, 2009),
II. FINDINGS

1. Overview

a. County Court

The 177 county court cases included criminal charges against 273 defendants. In the county court the types of cases were largely what would be expected: the largest categories of crimes were theft, willful injury (generally relating to fights), traffic accident crimes, concealment of criminal proceeds (largely reselling stolen goods), and fraud. But the cases also include a range of crimes that provide a sense of the types of issues local police, procuratorates, and courts process, everything from dissemination of porn online, to illegal logging or cutting of trees, to abduction and sale of children or women, rape, bigamy, corruption, and gambling. A large number of cases involve fellow villagers. Table 1 sets forth the range of crimes and number of defendants prosecuted for each in the county court in 2010. In the county court 133 cases were handled in summary procedures or simplified normal procedures; often these were tried without procurators attending. Although most such

http://hlj.rednet.cn/c/2009/03/06/1720208.htm
(praising Zhang Liyong’s reforms as compatible with the reality of China); Sifa Shijian Weishenme Mei An Fali Chupai (司法实践为什么没按“法理”出牌) [Why Doesn’t Judicial Practice Follow “Legal Principles”], FALÜ BOKE (法律博客) [Law Blog] (Nov. 13, 2009), http://liumushuofa.fyfz.cn/art/544585.htm (arguing that courts are not trusted in Chinese society and that courts should do more to emulate administrative agencies); Wang Liping, Sifa Gaige De Kunjing Yu Lujing (司法改革的困境与路径) [The Predicament of and Path for Judicial Reform], ZHONGGUO RENMIN DAXUE LUSHI XUEYUAN (中国人民大学律师学院) [Lawyer College Renmin University of China] (Apr. 21, 2011), http://lawyer.ruc.edu.cn/html/lswy/3870.html (arguing that under the reforms in Henan judges are shifting from more elite status to “legal service providers,” and are “entering into society” with their primary focus being on social stability, and noting that the reforms are consistent with the general political framework in China).

73 Cases B66, B99, and B200.
74 Cases B45, B51, B80, and B92. Although classified as environmental crimes, these cases largely appear to be handled as theft cases.
75 Cases B32 and B94.
76 Case B166.
77 Case B2.
78 Cases B104, B169, B203, and B213.
79 Case B90 (for gambling) and B97 (for operation of a gambling facility).
80 Procurators attended the trials of 77 of the 133 defendants tried through simplified or simplified normal procedures. The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law did not require procurator attendance in cases tried through simplified procedures. 1996 Criminal
cases were minor cases in which defendants did not contest the charges against them, others involved more serious charges, including one case in which a defendant was convicted of rape.  

[Table 1]

b. Intermediate Court

Tables 2-4 provides an overview of cases in the intermediate court in first instance cases, on appeal, and in rehearing cases. The intermediate court tried 37 first instance cases involving 67 defendants. The court decided 239 cases on appeal, involving 442 defendants. The intermediate court also decided 16 criminal cases through rehearing procedures, including 21 defendants.

The intermediate court first instance cases were, not surprisingly, more serious: murder and negligent homicide, illegal manufacture of explosives, drug trafficking, illegal detention of others and robbery while impersonating a police officer. A number of commercial and financial crimes were also tried in the intermediate court, including defendants convicted of illegally soliciting deposits (presumably running an illegal bank), selling fake medicine, and the sale of counterfeit goods. A few of the financial fraud cases resulted in suspended death sentences (for example, for the sale of counterfeit money) or life imprisonment (for a first time offender convicted of selling counterfeit money).

[Tables 2-4]

2. Leniency and Settlement

Scholars in China and the west have noted the national adoption of the policy of “balancing leniency and severity.”  

Procedure Law, art 153. The 2012 Criminal Procedure makes procurator attendance mandatory at all trials. 2012 Criminal Procedure Law, art. 210

81 Case B166. Although the opinion stated that the court used simplified procedures, three judges heard the case (as opposed to most simplified cases, where generally only a single judge hears the case). The defendant contested guilt, arguing that sex had been consensual. Nevertheless, the court deemed defendant to have confessed because he admitted having sex with the mentally-disabled victim.

82 Case I5b (life sentence).

83 Case I44b (life sentence for trafficking 1000 grams of opium, where 1000 grams is the threshold for a sentence of ten years to death).

84 Case I51b.

85 Case I43a.

86 Trevaskes, supra note ; Margaret K. Lewis, Leniency and Severity in China’s Death Penalty Debate, 24 Colum. J. Asian Law 303,317 (2011) (discussing debate over leniency and severity in capital cases); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guanche Kuanyanxiangji Xingshi Zhengce De Ruogan Yijian De Tongzhi (最高人民法院印发
2005 and implemented beginning in 2007,\(^{87}\) is generally understood to be a reaction to the perception that prior reliance on “strike hard” campaigns against crime had been ineffective and had generated a strong negative backlash.\(^{88}\) The “balancing leniency and strictness” policy encourages procurators and courts to treat serious crimes harshly but also encourages them to be lenient toward minor crimes, in particular those not reflecting malice or posing significant risk of harm to society. In the courts the emphasis on leniency is primarily manifest in reduced sentences for those who confess and on the use of suspended sentences in minor criminal cases for those who agree to pay restitution or compensation to their victims.

Chinese Criminal Law\(^{89}\) provides multiple mechanisms for a court to be lenient (or not) in its disposition of a case. The law generally stipulates a range of punishments for each crime based on whether

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\(^{88}\) See, e.g. Liu Renwen, *Xingfa de Jiegou yu Shiye* (刑法的结构与视野) [The Structure and Scope of Criminal Law] 274-291 (2010) (arguing that the policy is primarily aimed at introducing leniency into the Chinese criminal justice system, as a reaction to the prior policy of striking hard against crime).

offending conduct was minor, serious, or extremely serious, or for monetary crimes whether the amount involved was small, large, or extremely large.\(^90\) A court first must determine the severity of the crime, placing it within a sentencing band for a specific crime as set forth in the law. A court then selects a sentence within the band. A court that seeks to be lenient thus can assign a sentence at the bottom of the range for the offense, referred to as *congqing*, or lightening the sentence.\(^91\)

In certain cases, a court may also issue a sentence below the minimum for a specific crime set forth in the Criminal Law, referred to as *jianqing*, or mitigating a sentence.\(^92\) A court may decide to convict a defendant but exempt the defendant from punishment, referred to as *mianchuchufa*.\(^93\) In cases of minor crimes courts may also determine that the conduct in question did not constitute a crime.\(^94\) In addition, the Criminal Law states that defendants who are sentenced to terms of three years or less may be granted suspended sentences if they do not pose a threat to society.\(^95\) Taken together, these provisions mean that Chinese courts have a very high level of discretion in sentencing.\(^96\)

In addition to the Criminal Law, the SPC has provided guidance to lower courts regarding leniency and the use of suspended sentences, stipulating that defendants sentenced to three years in prison or less may receive suspended sentences or be exempt from punishment.\(^97\) In practice this means that defendants convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is three years or less are eligible for suspended sentences, as are those convicted of a more serious offense who are given only a three year sentence. The Henan High People’s Court has issued its own sentencing

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\(^{90}\) The Criminal Law provides little in the way of guidance as to what type of conduct constitutes serious or very serious; such specifics are generally provided in subsequent judicial interpretations.

\(^{91}\) For examples of such provisions, see Criminal Law arts 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 65. For a more detailed discussion of how sentencing works in practice, see Li Li, *Nulla Poena Sine Lege in China: Rigidity or Flexibility?*, 43 Suffolk U. L Rev. 655, 658 (2010).

\(^{92}\) For example, see Criminal Law arts. 20, 21, 24, 28, 68. A number of provisions in the Criminal Law give courts the discretion to lighten or to mitigate a sentence.

\(^{93}\) For example, see Criminal Law arts. 24, 67, 351.

\(^{94}\) Criminal Law art. 13; 1996 Criminal Procedure Law art. 15.

\(^{95}\) 1997 Criminal Law art. 72. Revisions to the law in 2011 – after the cases examined in this article were decided – added greater specificity to article 72. Such changes were largely consistent with the judicial interpretations discussed below, see infra note, that were applicable in 2010.

\(^{96}\) The limited scholarship on sentencing in English has generally emphasized this discretion. See, for example, Li Li, *supra*, at 658-663.

guidelines, which add detail to those issued by the SPC. Generally speaking, in Henan defendants sentenced to three years or less are divided into two categories. Court rules state that suspended sentences should be given to those who are minors, pregnant, or over seventy-five. For all others the imposition of a suspended sentence is discretionary and is determined with reference to a range of factors relating to the specific conduct of the defendant. Judges say that official policy in Henan is that courts should try to use suspended sentences in cases in which the statutory sentence is three years or less. Yet the policy grants significant discretion to local courts; as a result actual practice at the local level varies.

Until recently formal law did not authorize courts to base sentencing determinations on whether a defendant had paid compensation to her or his victim. Nevertheless, the practice emerged and spread throughout the 2000s, in particular following a 2010 notice from the SPC concerning implementation of the Combining Severity with Leniency policy. The notice stated that reconciliation in criminal cases helped to resolve cases and prevent petitioning. In the SPC’s 2010 annual work

98 Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayun Renmin Fayuan Liangxing Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) Shishi Xize (河南省高级人民法院《人民法院量刑指导意见（试行）》实施细则) [Implementation Provisions of the Henan High People’s Court’s People’s Court Criminal Sentencing Guidelines (Provisional)] (promulgated by the Henan High People’s Ct, effective Oct. 1, 2010) available at http://www.lawtime.cn/article/lll38346403839734oo28122 (stating that defendants qualify for a suspended sentence when they are given a sentence of three years or less and meet other specified provisions).
99 Id. chapter 2, article 3, par. 7 (stating that defendants who are sentenced to three years or less and who meet other specified preconditions may have their sentences suspended); Interview 2012-25.
101 Interview 2012-26. Supreme People’s Court Guideline on Sentencing (Provisional), supra note , art. 2-3-6. The Criminal Law provides only rough guidelines regarding when a defendant who has been sentenced to three years or less of detention may be given a suspended sentence: when the circumstances of the crime are light, when the defendant has shown remorse, when there is no risk of reoffending, and when there would be no negative effects on the local area from a suspended sentence. See also Criminal Law, art. 72.
report to the National People's Congress, the SPC noted the value of mediating compensation agreements in cases of defendants sentenced to suspended death sentences.\(^\text{103}\) China’s revised Criminal Procedure Law, which became effective on January 1, 2013 explicitly authorizes the use of criminal settlement procedures in specific circumstances, including crimes arising out of private disputes punishable by three years or less or crimes of negligence punishable by seven years imprisonment or less.\(^\text{104}\) At the time of the cases examined in this article, however, China’s Criminal Procedure Law did not authorize courts to consider compensation agreements as factors influencing sentences.

The promotion of settlement in criminal cases followed a general renewed emphasis on mediation in China’s courts in the early 2000s. Embrace of the practice reflected the belief that mediated cases were less likely to result in escalation, protest, and petitioning from victims or defendants (or their families). The policy also reflected resource concerns in the criminal justice system resulting from increased numbers of criminal cases and the belief than many minor offenders, in particular first offenders convicted of non-violent crimes, did not need to be incarcerated.

In this article I use the term “leniency” to refer to two specific phenomena in China’s courts: the widespread use of suspended sentences, in some cases even for defendants facing a sentence in excess of three years; and the decision to give a suspended death sentence or life imprisonment to a defendant whose conduct made him or her eligible for the death penalty. My focus is thus on the actual sentences courts grant, not on the legal provisions concerning leniency.

My findings provide evidence of how the policy is being implemented at the local level and suggest that local courts’ embrace of leniency and settlement exceeds national policy. Judges in Henan stated that they try to be lenient where they can, in particular in cases involving

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\(^\text{103}\) The SPC emphasized the importance of courts’ not immediately carrying out death sentences in order to allow for victims’ families and defendants to reach a settlement and thus “reduce social contradictions.” Zuigao Fa’: Yange Zhangwo He Tonyi Sixing Shiyong Biaozhun (最高法：严格掌握和统一死刑适用标准) [Supreme Court: Death Penalty Strictly Controlled and Subject to Uniform Standards], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [Xinhua] (May 25. 2011), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/220005/222646/14738739.html.

\(^\text{104}\) 2012 Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 277-279. For an analysis of the new provisions, including controversy leading up to their adoption, see Rosenzweig et al., supra at 21-32. The revised law also explicitly states that in such cases the procuratorate may recommend that a defendant receive a lenient sentence or be exempt from punishment. 2012 Criminal Procedure Law art 279. Prior to the revision, the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law authorized settlement only in cases involving private prosecutions. 1996 Criminal Procedure Law art. 172.
minor crimes, crimes committed by youths or students, crimes committed within a family, cases involving defendants who turn themselves in, and cases in which a family member turns in a relative. As one judge explained, if “cases come from ordinary lives” then courts will try to be lenient, even if there is no formal legal basis for doing so. Likewise

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105 Official reports list seven categories of cases in which courts ordinarily should issue suspended sentences in Henan: defendants who take appropriate action to minimize harm; minors; deaf, mute or disabled defendants who lack the ability to harm society; those who terminate their crime; those who turn themselves in or engage in meritorious service after the crime; those who assist in cracking a case; and those who commit crimes of negligence. In an additional five categories of cases courts in Henan have the discretion to issue suspended sentences: cases of intentional crimes in which there is little negative intent; those who actively repay stolen goods; those who actively pay compensation to victims; those who pay fines in advance; and those who turn themselves in, confess, or otherwise engage in conduct stipulated in law as a basis for leniency. The policy also specifically excludes certain defendants from eligibility for suspended sentences: those who fail to confess, fail to show remorse, cause serious harm; defendants who have “despicable motivations;” defendants who use the proceeds of crimes to engage in other illegal conduct; defendants who take part in a collective crime whose conduct is serious or who commit multiple crimes; defendants with a prior criminal record or who have been subject to administrative sanction twice or more in the past; defendants whose crime involves the use of national relief funds or materials or whose crimes otherwise have serious characteristics. Similarly, defendants whose crimes are subject to punishment of a minimum of three years or more will not be eligible for a suspended sentence unless they have surrendered or engaged in other legally stipulated basis for leniency. Defendants whose crimes are to be punished by a sentence of five years or more are only eligible for a suspended sentence if there is a legal basis for reducing their sentence to three years or below. Henan Fayuan Nitui “Huanxing Yugaoshu” Zhi (河南法院拟推“缓刑预告书”制) [Henan Courts Plan to Apply Suspension Advance Notice Policy], HENAN PINDAO (河南频道) [Henan Channel] (Aug. 13, 2009), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2009/08/13/411406.html.

An article by a judge in the Henan provincial capital, Zhengzhou, provided some additional details as to how judges apply the policy. The judge noted seven types of cases in which suspended sentences are used: traffic accidents and other crimes of negligence; minor crimes involving students at universities or other schools; minor crimes involving minors; cases of minor harm to persons, serious harm resulting from negligence, serious harm with an “antecedent,” or cases of harm to property or causing other economic harm in which the defendant actively agrees to pay compensation; minor crimes to property such as theft; criminal disputes resulting from disputes among neighbors or family members; and cases involving crimes of negligence, accomplices, those who terminate their crimes, who turn themselves in, or in which the defendant engages in meritorious service or takes preventative action or otherwise takes action to minimize the harm. Qianxi “Huanxing Yugaoshu” De Sifa Jiazhi (浅析“缓刑预告书”的司法价值) [A Brief Analysis of Suspension Advance Notice’s Judicial Value], HENAN FAYUAN WANG (河南法院网) [Henan Court Net] (Aug. 17, 2009), http://hnfy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2009/08/id/746727.shtml.
courts may seek to be lenient in cases where a victim was partially at fault, such as in intentional injury cases arising from fights.\(^{107}\)

Judges acknowledged some flexible adaptation of the SPC’s official policy. Henan courts often impose suspended sentences for crimes that ordinarily would result in a three to seven year sentence, for example by sentencing the defendant to three years and then suspending the sentence. Some observers suggested that the policy was in tension with the SPC’s intent that suspended sentences be used only for minor crimes,\(^{108}\) although technically the SPC rules do permit the use of a suspended sentence for those sentenced to three years for a crime for which the legally stipulated range is three to seven years.

The 177 county court decisions in my dataset resulted in criminal sentences for 232 individual defendants. Sixty-six percent of these sentences, 153, were suspended sentences, meaning that defendants spent no time in prison following the judgment. Forty-one additional defendants received only fines or were sentenced to detention or control.\(^{109}\) Many others who received a sentence received a relatively short one. The median sentence for such defendants was three years, reflecting the fact that most county court cases concerned relatively minor crimes. Cases that resulted in suspended sentences generally involved first time offenders charged with relatively minor crimes – fights, traffic offenses resulting in personal injury, low-value thefts. Most outcomes appear consistent with the SPC’s instructions on balancing severity and leniency.

Yet the leniency apparent in cases in the dataset appears to go beyond that announced in official policy. Numerous cases that one might expect to result in incarceration under China’s Criminal Law instead resulted in suspended sentences. Thus, for example, the dataset includes multiple traffic crime cases in which a drunk driver caused a fatality or fatalities but received only a suspended sentence, despite the Criminal Law specifying a sentence range of three to seven years.\(^{110}\) Other cases involved violent conflict with local authorities that nevertheless resulted in suspended sentences, including a defendant who drew a knife on local officials seeking to seize counterfeit cigarettes\(^{111}\) and a case in which a

\(^{106}\) Interview 2012-25.
\(^{107}\) Interview 2012-25.
\(^{108}\) Interview 2012-25.
\(^{109}\) Detention refers to a short sentence, not to exceed one year, administered by the police in a police-run detention facility, not a prison. In theory those sentenced to detention have greater liberty than those sentenced to prison. Control refers to defendants who are not incarcerated but have their movements monitored by the police and who must obtain police permission for a range of activities. Criminal Law, art. 39. Four defendants received detention and a fine, all for theft. Cases B49, B184, B187, B189.
\(^{110}\) For example, see Case B193 (suspended sentence despite multiple fatalities).
\(^{111}\) Case B153.
villager attacked a local birth planning official in his home with an axe.\textsuperscript{112} Likewise the county court granted suspended sentences in a case involving arson\textsuperscript{113} and in four separate cases involving corruption by local officials,\textsuperscript{114} the largest of which involved the theft of 70,000 yuan\textsuperscript{115} (in contrast, a defendant in a credit card fraud case who was convicted of stealing 10,000 yuan received six years in prison and was fined 60,000\textsuperscript{116}). The practice of granting leniency in cases involving corruption by officials appears directly in conflict with an SPC notice on the policy of balancing leniency and severity, which explicitly called for strict punishment for crimes involving official malfeasance.\textsuperscript{117} In another case a defendant convicted of manufacturing and selling low quality (presumably fake) fertilizer was given a suspended sentence. Although the court found that their crime had yielded 120,000 yuan in profit and caused 340,000 yuan in harm, it nevertheless gave defendants a suspended sentence in a simplified trial.\textsuperscript{118}

Settlement with the victim or victim’s family appeared to be the most significant factor leading courts to impose lenient sentences. Eighty-two of the county court cases reported settlements with victims or their families\textsuperscript{119}; another 5 cases reported payment of restitution, compensation in cases not involving personal injury, and 17 reported the return of stolen goods.\textsuperscript{120} Fifty-six of the cases in which defendants paid victims mentioned that defendants had “obtained the forgiveness of” victims or family members, and court decisions explicitly discussed compensation to families as a basis for a suspended sentence.\textsuperscript{121} Although some in China have drawn parallels between reconciliation in criminal cases and models

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{112} Case B55. The defendant had argued and fought with the official earlier in the day, apparently when the official visited defendant’s home in the course of his duties as the local birth planning official.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{113} Case B91.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{114} Cases B104, B169, B199, and B213.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{115} Case B199.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{116} Case B142.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{117} Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing some Advice on Implementing the Criminal Policy of Combining Leniency with Strictness, supra , art 8}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{118} The court noted that the defendants had surrendered and had assisted the police in locating other criminals. Case B130. The sentence was in line with China’s Criminal Law, which provides for a sentence of up to two years when the amount sold is less than 200,000 yuan. Criminal Law, art 140. Nevertheless, the punishment appears light compared to other financial and business crimes.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{119} In sixty-nine of these cases the court opinion specified a compensation amount. In the other thirteen cases either no compensation was paid pursuant to the settlement or the court did not specify the amount paid.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{120} Restitution was specifically mentioned in two cases, B179 and B187. For additional examples, see cases B61, B70, B144, B156 (discussing return of goods or repayment to victim).}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{121} Case B1.}
\end{footnotes}
of restorative justice elsewhere, the Chinese system relies almost entirely on direct payment to victims and their families as a direct factor justifying mitigation of a sentence.

Settlement cases were largely made up of cases resulting from traffic accidents and fights. Because compensation determinations in criminal cases come through attached civil compensation claims, compensation levels should correspond to compensation in tort cases. In practice, settlement values ranged widely, and it is difficult to discern whether settlement amounts correspond to amounts potentially available in tort. The largest settlement, in a case involving multiple fatalities, was 370,000 yuan. The defendant was found to have been drunk and to have fled the scene, which would potentially have exposed the defendant to a sentence in excess of seven years. Yet after paying the compensation the defendant received only a three year sentence, suspended for five years, meaning no prison time. Defendants received suspended sentences in virtually all county court cases involving settlements. Yet the number of settlements in the county I studied may actually be low compared to elsewhere in Henan: settlement rates in criminal cases at some first instance courts in Henan reached 80 or 90 percent. One lawyer commented that the actual practice of settlements in Henan extends far beyond what is authorized in law: “the reality of practice exceeds real life.”

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122 Case B193.
123 Case B193. The defendant may also have been helped by his status as deputy director of the local family planning bureau (and son of a local official).
124 Interview 2012-17.
125 Interview 2012-7. For additional discussion of the practice in Henan, see Henan Xinmi Tui Peichang Baozhengjin, Qingzui Xianfan Jiaoqian Ke Mianyu Pibu (河南新密推赔偿保证金 轻罪嫌犯交钱可免于批捕) [Xinmi, Henan Adopts Compensation Deposits, Misdemeanor Suspects Can Pay To Avoid Arrest], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/2010-08/23/content_2253710.htm (stating that for minor crimes, defendants may be able to provide a “compensation guarantee payment” to the police and thus avoid being formally arrested by the procuratorate, and that the policy was the explicit reaction to the overuse of compulsory measures against defendants charged with minor crimes); Henan Sheng Jiancha Jiguan Yi Nian Hejie 6433 An (河南省检察机关一年和解 6433案) [Henan Procuratorate Settled 6433 Cases in One Year], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/2010-04/30/content_2129568.htm (stating that 75 percent of the cases in Henan in 2009 involved sentences of three years or less; 68 percent of these defendants received a suspended sentence, a sentence of control or detention, were exempt from criminal punishment, or were subject only to a fine; the procuracy also reported resolving approximately 10 percent of cases through mediation before going to court, a total of 6,433 cases involving 7,622 people in 2009); Henan Geji Fayuan Yi Nian Tiaojie Jiean 221732 Jian (河南各级法院一年调解结案 221732件) [Henan Courts Mediated 221732
My dataset also includes a number of cases in which defendants convicted of relatively minor crimes did not receive a suspended sentence, apparently at least in part because the defendant did not reach a settlement with the victim. Thus, for example, defendant Wang Xisheng was sentenced to a year in prison following a fight that caused minor injury to a neighbor. The two parties were unable to reach a settlement and the court sentenced Wang to prison, in contrast with other cases involving fights in my dataset where the defendants settled.126 In one of the two traffic crime cases that resulted in a prison sentence, defendant Liu Tao failed to come to the immediate assistance of his alleged victims after an accident that left two people riding an electric bicycle dead and a third injured, and also failed to compensate his victims. The court found his conduct involved “particularly bad circumstances,” thus warranting a five year jail sentence.127 The court explicitly stated that the failure to compensate the victims’ families was a factor justifying a heavier sentence.128 The other defendant sentenced to prison in a traffic crime case was a recidivist who received an effective sentence of eight months. All other traffic crime cases involved both settlement and compensation.129

Cases in One Year], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/2010-04/30/content_2129568.htm (discussing emphasis on mediation in Henan courts generally and a nearly 50 percent increase in the percentage of cases mediated); Yang Tao, “Xingshi Hejie” Zhong Faguan Buneng Dang Heshilao (“刑事和解”中法官不能当和事佬) [Judges Cannot Be the Peacemakers in Criminal Settlement], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Sep. 27, 2012), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Frontier_of_law/content/2012-09/27/content_3872770.htm (noting that China’s new Criminal Procedure Law, restricts the use of mediation in criminal cases to specific categories and discussing the risk that mediation will be overused or forced on parties by courts seeking quick resolution of even serious criminal cases); “Xingshi Hejie” Xingui: Furen Ke Jiao Fakuan Qiongren Zhineng Zuolao? (“刑事和解”新规:富人可交罚款穷人只能坐牢?) [New Rules of Criminal Settlement: the Rich Can Pay Fine, While the Poor Can Only Go to Prison?], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Sep. 27, 2012), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/commentary/content/2012-09/27/content_3873374.htm (discussing concerns that emphasis on settlements in criminal cases will favor the rich).

126 Case B95.
127 Case B5. The defendant had apparently pledged to compensate a small amount, 5,400 yuan, but had defaulted on the compensation payment.
128 Case B5. No provision in the Criminal Law authorizes the imposition of heavier sentences to defendants who fail to compensate. One intermediate court case likewise affirmed a three year sentence for a defendant in a traffic accident. Although the defendant had paid compensation, the defendant had apparently not obtained the forgiveness of the victim’s family. In addition, although the defendant requested leniency the defendant’s lawyer contested guilt on appeal. Case I3.
129 Only cases B5 and B98 had no suspended sentence in a case arising from a traffic crime Cases B1 B4 B7, B9, B12, B16, B27, B42, B71, B87, B103, B112, B120, B128,
Particularly unlucky were those defendants who had spent the proceeds of a crime and thus were not able to pay restitution. For example, although the dataset includes a number of cases involving motorcycle thefts where the defendants returned the stolen goods and received suspended sentences, it also includes cases such as that of Hou Yunchang who stole a pig and motorcycle and wound up in prison, both because he fled after the crime and because he was apparently unable to pay restitution. In another case involving motorcycle thefts two defendants were treated differently because one had sold and thus not returned a stolen motorcycle while the motorcycles stolen by the other defendant had all been returned.

Although somewhat less pronounced in influence, intermediate court cases suggest that settlements are likewise important both in first instance trials in the intermediate court and in appeals. Eleven defendants who were tried in the intermediate court and convicted of murder or of intentional injury leading to death received either life sentences, suspended death sentences, or fixed terms of imprisonment after paying compensation to victims’ families. In at least one of these cases the court explicitly stated that it was imposing a life sentence, presumably instead of death, because the defendant had compensated the victim’s family and had “obtained the understanding” of the family. In another case, a defendant who killed someone in a fight but confessed and paid compensation received a 15-year sentence, while a defendant in another case who contested the allegations and failed to pay compensation received life. In a third case, a defendant convicted of the kidnapping and killing of a child was sentenced to life in prison despite the Criminal Law specifying the death penalty for a killing in the course of a kidnapping. The court noted that the defendant had settled and had surrendered.

B129, B134, B154, B170, B180, B181 B193, B205, B206, B207, B216 and B220 were traffic crime cases resulting in suspended sentences.

130 Case B62.
131 Case B19.
132 Case I14a. Likewise a co-defendant received a fixed term sentence because he paid compensation and assisted in capturing the primary defendant.
133 Cases I27b, I28b.
134 Case I5a. Article 239 of China’s Criminal Law states that a defendant who kills another person in the course of a kidnapping shall be sentenced to death. As Margaret Lewis has noted, a surge in suspended death sentences has in recent years also resulted in public questioning of whether corruption is playing a significant role in courts’ decisions to grant suspended death sentences instead of the death penalty. Lewis, *Leniency and Severity*, supra. One commentator at a presentation of this article in China noted that victims’ families in murder cases often have the choice of accepting compensation or having the defendant executed.
Settlement was also an important factor in cases in which sentences were revised on appeal to the intermediate court. As discussed below, 27 defendants (out of a total of 442 defendants in the cases on appeal to the intermediate court) had their sentences revised down by the intermediate court, mostly because of settlements subsequent to the initial trial. Judges confirm that settlements may result in reduced punishment in some serious cases and that settlements of cases subsequent to first instance verdicts may lead the intermediate court to revise sentences on appeal.\(^{135}\)

In interviews judges confirm that compensation is an important factor determining outcomes, in particular in relatively minor cases, such as traffic crimes leading to injury, theft, and assault.\(^{136}\) Compensation claims may be resolved privately or through the resolution of civil claims attached to criminal cases. For example, intermediate court judges reported that in general roughly half of their first instance cases have civil cases attached to them and that half of these are resolved through settlement. Other cases may be resolved through settlements outside of court.\(^{137}\) Cases can be settled at any point in the criminal process, including after courts have issued their decisions,\(^ {138}\) although in practice it appears that courts often wait to see if cases are resolved via reconciliation before issuing their judgments.

Although most of the focus on criminal mediation has been on minor cases, it is clear that compensation also affects outcomes in capital cases. Lawyers state that in capital cases settlement agreements can make the difference between death and a suspended death sentence.\(^ {139}\) to avoid the death penalty a defendant must pay compensation.\(^ {140}\) One lawyer drew a direct link between the recent decline in executions in China and the emphasis on mediating outcomes in criminal cases.\(^ {141}\)

Judges (and procurators and police) at times play active roles in settlement negotiations, in some cases telling a defendant how much compensation to pay.\(^ {142}\) As one judge noted, “we work very hard to try to

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\(^{135}\) Interview 2012-19.

\(^{136}\) Interview 2012-17.

\(^{137}\) Interview 2012-19.

\(^{138}\) Interview 2012-12; Interview 2012-18.

\(^{139}\) Interview 2012-23.

\(^{140}\) Interview 2013-5.

\(^{141}\) Interview 2013-5.

\(^{142}\) Interview 2012-6; Interview 2013-11; Chen Ruihua: Xingshi Susong De Sili Hezuo Moshi (陈瑞华: 刑事诉讼的私力合作模式) [Chen Ruihua: Integration of Private Remedy into Criminal Litigation], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Nov. 1, 2010) , http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/2010-11/01/content_2335275.htm (discussing prevalence of negotiated outcomes in criminal cases in Beijing and noting success at avoiding petitions); Xingsufa Shishi Zhong De Zhongdian Nandian Wenti (刑诉法实施中的重点难点问题) [Key Points and Difficulties in Application of Criminal
resolve cases via settlement.” 143 Courts explain relevant standards governing compensation in order to persuade victims to accept compensation. 144 Court efforts to settle will often be guided by the amounts potentially available in civil cases. 145 Judges say they question victims or their family members to ensure they are satisfied with compensation agreements and in some cases add money to that agreed. 146 Such efforts are guided by the belief that settlement works. 147 As another judge noted, settlements reduce contradictions and the possibility of escalation; thus judges “want a settlement.” 148

Judges describe their roles as neutral actors seeking to ensure that the rights of victims are protected. Yet it is clear that in some cases courts place pressure on both sides of a case to agree to a mediated outcome. 149 Lawyers argue that defendants are sometimes under extreme pressure to pay compensation to victims, with trials delayed to encourage settlement. 150 Judges confirm that courts sometimes pressure defendants to settle, noting that criminal trials can be delayed for up to two months in cases in which a civil claim is attached to the criminal case. 151 A few of the cases in the dataset involved delayed trials for minor crimes while a defendant remained in detention, suggesting that the court was attempting to encourage a settlement. In one case, 152 the defendant was sentenced to

Procedure Law], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [Legal Daily] (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Frontier_of_law/content/2013-01/09/content_4119385_2.htm (discussing preference of procurators and police for mediating criminal cases during the trial stage).

Interview 2013-9.

Interview 2013-11.

Interview 2012-26.

Interview 2013-11.

Interview 2013-11.

Interview 2013-11.

Interview 2013-2.


Interview 2012-6.

Interview 2012-17.

Case B115.
eighteen months in jail for causing an injury in a fight between neighboring families. The defendant was alleged to have injured the neighbor by throwing a brick on his foot. The court initially delayed the trial by two months, apparently to encourage the two sides to mediate. When they failed to reach an agreement the court ordered a relatively modest compensation of 3,834 yuan, but also imposed an eighteen month jail sentence.

In the county court the average time from indictment by the procuracy to court decision was 32.2 days. Twenty-five cases took more than 45 days from indictment to court judgment; only 11 cases took more than 80 days. In these 11 cases nine of the thirteen defendants eventually either paid compensation or some form of restitution, suggesting that ongoing settlement negotiations may have played a role in the delays. The court appeared to move relatively quickly to decide cases when a settlement seemed unlikely or impossible, with cases not involving a settlement being resolved more quickly than those involving a settlement. The average time from indictment to trial in cases involving crimes against identifiable victims was 29 days for cases non-involving settlements and 37 days for those with settlements. In the intermediate court the average time from indictment to judgment was longer, 74 days. Yet some intermediate court cases also moved quickly from indictment to trial. For example, only 21 days elapsed from indictment to judgment for a defendant charged with fraudulently raising nearly three million yuan in capital. The defendant, who lacked legal representation, was sentenced to life in prison.

It is also common for cases involving multiple defendants accused of the same crime to result in different sentences depending on whether the defendants paid compensation. Defendants who compensate victims often receive suspended or reduced sentences; those who do not receive prison terms. Some of the cases in my dataset reflect this trend. For example, a defendant convicted of intentional homicide had his sentence reduced on appeal from five years to four years after he paid 35,000 yuan in compensation to the victim’s family. The defendant had been part of a group that went to the victim’s home to pressure her to repay a gambling debt. The victim drank pesticide, killing herself in front of the defendants. The court affirmed a finding of intentional homicide but accepted one defendant’s argument that the sentence should be reduced in light of the compensation paid and the secondary role played by the defendant in the crime. In a companion case three others

153 The fastest case was decided five days after the filing of the indictment. The slowest case took 399 days.
155 Interview 2012-6.
156 Interview 2012-6.
157 Case I156.
who were convicted of participating in the same crime but who failed to pay compensation had their sentences affirmed.\(^\text{159}\)

Although judges say that they consider settlement offers even in cases in which victims’ reject such settlements\(^\text{160}\) it is impossible to verify this from the written judgments. Judges also say they take account of defendants who cannot pay,\(^\text{161}\) although the cases do not provide support for this claim. Courts also acknowledge that in some cases victims may lack the resources to pay. Judges say that in general defendants will borrow from friends and family in order to come up with money to pay compensation.\(^\text{162}\) In some cases courts may also provide funds to victims’ families from court assistance funds to encourage settlements, in particular where the defendant or defendant’s family has tried to settle but lacks adequate resources.\(^\text{163}\) Defendants also sometimes act strategically when it comes to organizing settlements: in one traffic accident case the defendant fled after the accident and then waited to turn himself in until the two families had reached a settlement. He received a suspended sentence.\(^\text{164}\) Yet cases that were not amicably resolved sometimes resulted in defendants receiving jail sentences even when they did pay compensation. Defendant Wang Xisheng was charged with willful injury after he punched his neighbor in the chest, causing “minor harm.”\(^\text{165}\) Wang did so after his neighbor dug a hole outside his house, into which he fell. Wang agreed to compensate his neighbor 7,000 yuan, an amount approved by the court. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to a year in prison. The court, while rejecting the victim’s demands for additional compensation, nevertheless decided that Wang deserved a prison sentence—in contrast to numerous other cases where defendants charged with crimes arising out of fights received only suspended sentences.

Surrender and confession are also important factors affecting leniency, although the county court made clear that surrender must be useful to the authorities and confession must be truthful. Confession is a prerequisite to the imposition of a suspended sentence.\(^\text{166}\) The overwhelming majority of defendants confessed: 203 of the 273 defendants in the county court confessed at some point in the process. A small number of cases involved

\(^{158}\) Case I14b.

\(^{159}\) See also case 6c (defendants who settled received lighter sentences than co-defendants who did not settle for beating corncob seller after motorcycle crashed on spilled corn cobs).

\(^{160}\) Interview 2012-17.

\(^{161}\) Interview 2013-11 (judge noting that in cases in which a defendant lacks fund the court will seek to explain the situation to the victim or victim’s family).

\(^{162}\) Interview 2013-11.

\(^{163}\) Interview 2012-17.

\(^{164}\) Case B103.

\(^{165}\) Case B95.

\(^{166}\) Interview 2012-26.
multiple defendants in which one defendant was treated more harshly than codefendants because of failure to confess.\(^{167}\) Helping victims after an accident was also a factor courts considered in imposing a lenient sentence.\(^{168}\) Informing on others and providing evidence of other crimes were also useful routes for those seeking leniency. Failure to surrender or to confess, in contrast, can lead to a heavier sentence. Thus, for example, a defendant who tried to escape after being detained was sentenced to four months for a minor crime that otherwise almost certainly would have resulted in a suspended sentence.\(^{169}\)

Some apparent lenient outcomes may reflect court and procuratorate attempts to adapt to local customs and expectations. Thus, for example, a defendant who attacked another person with an axe was prosecuted for attempted murder but sentenced at the bottom of the specified range to 144 months in the trial court. On appeal the intermediate court reduced the sentence to 72 months. The defendant had acted in response to an attempt by the victim to “cure defendant’s wife by superstitious means.” Prior to the attack the two had argued, with the victim stating that the defendant had offended the heavens and was cursed.\(^{170}\) In another example of both leniency and efforts to reconcile disputes among neighbors, the intermediate court affirmed a one-year sentence for a defendant for willful injury. The defendant was apparently a traditional healer who the court said used “witchcraft” to attempt to remove a serpent that she said was inside the victim. The victim was suffocated when the defendant compressed her neck and held her nose closed during the treatment. The defendant paid more than 100,000 yuan to the victim’s family prior to trial.\(^{171}\)

The cases provide a window into the practice of leniency in Henan that likely is over- and under-broad. Many cases settle during the investigation phase under the guidance of the procuratorate; these cases never proceed to court. Likewise many traffic cases that could potentially lead to criminal charges are settled by the police; charges are dropped once compensation is paid.\(^{172}\) Procurators say that it is common to drop charges for minor crimes when the defendant agrees to compensate the victim. Compensation agreements can also affect the criminal charge selected by the procuratorate.\(^{173}\)

\(^{167}\) Case B73. In additional cases longer sentences appeared to be based both on failure to settle and on the other defendant committing additional offenses. Cases B139, B113, B79.

\(^{168}\) Case B154.

\(^{169}\) Case B62.

\(^{170}\) Case I88a.

\(^{171}\) Case I92a.

\(^{172}\) Interview 2013-11.

\(^{173}\) Interview 2013-12.
Yet suspended sentences may not reflect leniency at all: some interviewees suggested that many suspended sentences reflect cases where defendants should never have been charged with or convicted of a crime in the first place. Chinese courts in criminal cases serve almost entirely as fora for determining sentences, not guilt. Courts are under enormous pressure to convict all defendants, and suspended sentences may thus be a proxy for cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict.\textsuperscript{174} Although most non-public cases involve juveniles, it is also possible that courts choose not to make certain cases public.

Confession, surrender, and compensation are not the only factors affecting sentencing. Courts may also consider factors not stated in the opinion; one judge noted that courts will often consider factors such as whether the defendant has children, although the court may not put such reasoning into an opinion.\textsuperscript{175} Suspended sentences may also reflect direct corruption.\textsuperscript{176} Although it is impossible to know how many such cases occur, defense lawyers acknowledge that defendants can sometimes win suspended sentences through direct payments to judges.\textsuperscript{177}

3. \textit{Over-Criminalization and State Interests}

Despite the official embrace of leniency, the county court decisions also show that the criminal justice system continues to criminalize a wide range of minor conduct. Thus while many criminal defendants appear to be treated leniently, the county cases suggest that the criminal justice system handles a significant number of what appear to be primarily civil disputes. Many of the cases appear to reflect the criminalization of tort disputes or business disputes, perhaps reflecting the difficulty of winning and enforcing a civil judgment. Hence the dataset includes numerous cases that involve fights among neighbors resulting in minor harm, in one case a fight resulting in minor harm to a finger, that become criminal cases.\textsuperscript{178} Such cases largely follow statutory guidelines, which impose sentences of up to three years for intentional harm resulting in minor injury. Nevertheless, the large volume of such cases appears in tension with efforts to mediate minor criminal matters. Settlement is encouraged, but even very minor crimes remain a concern of the state. Likewise, the cases include what appear to be fairly routine traffic accidents, in one case caused by a wheel falling off a car, being treated as criminal matters.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{174} Interview 2013-2.
\textsuperscript{175} Interview 2013-8.
\textsuperscript{176} Interview 2012-6.
\textsuperscript{177} Interview 2012-6.
\textsuperscript{178} Case B159.
\textsuperscript{179} Case B134.
Property disputes, in particular illegal use of land that does not belong to the defendant, were another source of criminal cases. China is not unique in criminalizing such conduct, but the cases reflect the long reach of the criminal justice system. In many such cases the charges appeared to be brought at least in part to compel a settlement.

Procurators and lawyers say that it is common for the criminal system to be used to resolve civil cases, in particular economic cases and disputes among neighbors. The threat of criminal charges is at times used to extract compensation from an opposing party. The criminal system is also used to force those who refuse to comply with civil cases to do so. This was most clear in a case in which a defendant was convicted and sentenced to a suspended sentence for refusing to pay out on a prior civil award for 440,000 yuan resulting from a traffic accident. The court noted that the defendant had spent money decorating his house and purchasing household appliances despite claiming to lack resources to pay the judgment.

The cases also show that harsh punishments are imposed when core interests of the state are involved or where there are concerns about repeat or copycat crimes. Thus the county court imposed long sentences for creating a tax fraud scheme, stealing parts from highways, or stealing electrical wires or electrical installations belonging to the power grid or installations or materials belonging to telecommunications companies. Crimes involving threats of violence, guns, or trafficking of women and children were treated relatively harshly. One of the longest sentences in the county court came in a case involving defendants who created a company for the purposes of exporting labor to Singapore. The scheme apparently involved charging victims a fee in exchange for promising to arrange work. The defendants were able to return only 10 percent of the money collected. The primary defendant received an 11-year sentence. Those with prior criminal records likewise were treated harshly, virtually

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180 Cases B17, B47, and B63; see also case I69a (dispute about use of land leads to criminal charges for destruction of property; court orders defendant to pay 40 percent of victim’s damages).
181 The cases also do not include defendants sentenced to reeducation through labor or other forms of administrative custodial detention.
182 See, for example, Interview 2013-7 (lawyer stating that it is easy to use criminal cases to resolve economic or business disputes).
183 Case B195.
184 Case B79 (defendant sentenced to six years for selling fake value added tax certificates).
185 Case B139.
186 Cases B6; B14; B157.
187 See, e.g., cases B133; B221 (five month sentence for crime of troublemaking and provocation for an assault in which defendant stole 24 yuan); cases B90, B32, and B94.
188 Case B161.
always receiving criminal sentences regardless of the seriousness of the crime charged. Thus a defendant in the intermediate court who was convicted of stealing 200,000 yuan in jewelry received a life sentence despite the fact that there was no suggestion of violence, apparently because of a prior conviction for theft.  

Courts also are careful to ensure that sentences imposed generally exceed time held in pre-trial detention, thus avoiding a suggestion that the procuratorate or police had erred in ordering that a defendant be detained. All of the 168 county court defendants held in detention for a period prior to trial were found guilty, and most of them received criminal sentences that were equal to or greater than the time already served in detention. Yet 82 of these defendants had their sentences suspended, meaning they likely served no additional time in detention. Nevertheless, the imposition of a suspended sentence or fine (as opposed to a non-guilty verdict) also precluded a state compensation claim that the procuratorate or police had erred in their decisions to detain the defendants.

4. High Profile Issues

The cases provide insight into how the criminal justice system is being used to address a number of contentious social issues, including corruption, land disputes, issues touching on social stability, and violent domestic disputes. They also provide details on crimes charged against women.

a. Corruption and Financial Crimes

Six county court cases involve what might be thought of as crimes relating to corruption: bribery, corruption, embezzlement, and misappropriation of public funds. The cases are notable given widespread public discussion suggesting that the criminal justice system is ineffective in fighting corruption. In all but one of the cases defendants received a suspended sentence.

189 Cases I29a, I29b. The prior case had resulted in a suspended sentence.
190 Case B70 (defendant policeman received suspended sentence for accepting money in exchange for attempting to eliminate a criminal sentence).
191 Case B169 (defendant sanitation bureau head convicted of stealing 30,000 yuan by falsifying financial statements of his department); Case B213 (defendant adjusted electricity meters to collect more money).
192 Case B104 (three year sentence, suspended for four years, for misappropriating 60,000 yuan in public funds); Case B203 (embezzled public funds by stealing from a rural health fund).
193 Case B199 (defendant received a two year sentence, suspended for two years, for misappropriating 70,000 yuan to use in personal stock trading).
194 The one defendant who did not receive a suspended sentence received a twelve year sentence for embezzling more than 100,000 yuan from a local rural health fund. Case
In contrast, a number of defendants who were not state employees received significant sentences for financial crimes. Seventeen county court cases involved other forms of financial crime: fraud, contract fraud, credit card fraud, extortion and blackmail, forgery or sale of state certificates or fake tax invoices, and illegal business activities. Sentences were suspended in only eight of these cases, with some defendants receiving sentences up to thirteen years. Differences in sentencing may reflect underlying provisions in the Criminal Law and in the amount of money involved. A number of the contract fraud and financial crime cases that resulted in criminal sentences involved large amounts of money, while the amounts involved in many of the official corruption cases were relatively small. More serious sentences were imposed in corruption and embezzlement cases tried in the intermediate court. Nevertheless, the cases suggest the possibility that financial crimes involving state officials are treated more leniently than those committed by non-state employees and that the criminal justice system is being used to resolve business disputes. In interviews lawyers confirm that it is common for officials to receive comparatively lenient sentences in particular when funds are returned. Most of the cases in the dataset involve low ranking officials. But one first instance intermediate court case involved the prosecution of a county Party secretary, the highest ranking official at the county level, on forty-nine corruption counts, totaling more than five million yuan. The defendant, who argued that he acted in the public interest and that the funds were used to buy gifts for other officials, was sentenced to eighteen years.

B203. The finding is not surprising: at numerous workshops in China at which I presented this paper there was general consensus that prior to 2013 officials convicted of corruption and related offenses generally were treated leniently unless their conduct was extremely serious.

195 Cases B46, B 61, B101, B144, B161, B202, B204, B214.
196 Cases B10, B88, B209.
197 Case B23.
198 Cases B40, B65 (both receiving suspended sentences).
199 Cases B53, B210, B79.
200 Case B161.
201 For example, see case I6a (fifteen year sentence for embezzling three million yuan intended to be used for relocation payments to villagers).
202 In another case in which a lower court appeared lenient toward a defendant charged with corruption, a county court convicted a police officer of abuse of power for extorting money but then ordered him exempt from punishment because the consequences were slight and the defendant had been subject to Party discipline. The procuratorate successfully objected and the intermediate court imposed a two year sentence. Case I4A.
203 Interview 2013-7.
204 Case I21a. This was the second trial in the intermediate court for the defendant. A prior conviction, resulting in a life sentence, was reversed and remanded by the provincial high court.
b. Land Disputes

A number of cases demonstrated the prevalence of land disputes in rural China in recent years. Some such cases involved fights arising from disputes over land. Three cases were brought against defendants for illegal occupation or use of farmland, generally for use of land in ways not approved by the state or for using land that did not belong to the defendant. Thus, for example, two defendants were prosecuted for illegally selling sand from their land, in one case by digging a hole 11 meters deep. In another case a defendant was convicted of illegal use of farmland after opening a dairy. Numerous other cases resulted from conflicts relating to land disputes. One case of particular note involved defendants prosecuted for beating villagers who refused to cooperate with a relocation order in conjunction with a land seizure. Defendants were sentenced to thirty months, with the intermediate court affirming a decision to treat defendants leniently because they had assisted other investigations.

c. Social Stability and Protest

A few cases touched on issues concerning social stability, hinting at unrest. One case in the county court involved an attack on a local high school by villagers, the result of an apparent dispute between two villages. A county court case resulting from a labor dispute ended in convictions for looting for employees charged with stealing crops. In another case the intermediate court convicted a defendant for abuse of power for entering into a contract that resulted in massive financial losses to a hotel. The court’s opinion noted the deep unhappiness of the defendant’s employees, presumably from the resulting job losses. The case suggested that the prosecution was at least in part a response to a fear of labor unrest.

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205 Case B106 (fight arising from land dispute)
206 Cases B17, B47, B63.
207 Cases B17, B63.
208 Case B17. The court stated that the defendant had caused “serious deterioration to farmland.”
209 Case B47.
210 For example, see case 17 (defendant convicted of cutting down neighbor’s trees after neighbor cut down defendant’s trees following contract dispute over land use rights).
211 Case I83a.
212 Case B190. In another case defendants were prosecuted for illegal detention after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager. Although they prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted. Case I70a.
213 Case B183.
214 Case I26.
In a case that concerned both land and social stability, the intermediate court affirmed a lower court sentence of five years for extortion. The defendant was unhappy about a separate decision in the lower court determining the amount of land assigned to the defendant and her family pursuant to a land use transfer agreement. She told the court that unless it paid her 1 million yuan she would go to Beijing to protest. In response, the procuratorate brought criminal extortion charges. Other cases showed how persistent petitioning can affect the courts. In a case that began in 2002, defendants were convicted of disturbing public order after they allegedly organized a protest at local government offices. They served thirty months in prison. Upon their release they began petitioning, seeking to have the judgment reversed. They eventually succeeded in convincing the provincial high court to order the case retried – but the county court once again found them guilty, and the intermediate court affirmed.

d. Female Defendants and Family Crimes

Court opinions provide only limited information about individual defendants: age, gender, and in some cases education level and employment status. In the county court 27 of the 273 defendants were women. In the intermediate court, 72 of 530 defendants were women, including nine defendants in first instance cases. The limited sample size makes generalizations about either types of crimes committed by or sentencing of women difficult. Women were prosecuted for crimes ranging from organized robbery to forgery to intentional harm and trafficking or abduction of women or children. Women involved in serious crimes, such as organized robbery, received sentences along the lines of their male accomplices or counterparts given the crimes charged, although with some evidence that women were detained for shorter periods pretrial. Women involved in trafficking cases received harsher sentences than their male accomplices, but courts found that the women were the primary culprits in these cases, actually selling the women and children, as opposed to their male accomplices who received only suspended sentences for introducing the defendant women to buyers.

Tables 5 and 6 list forth crimes with which women were charged in the county court and in first instance intermediate court cases.

215 Case I68. The defendant had already been to Beijing to protest three previous times, almost certainly drawing the ire of the local court.
216 Case I90; see also case I129 (affirming sentence for four defendants who organized crowds to protest against inadequate compensation for land taken for a construction project)
217 All but one of the remaining defendants were male; one defendant was a corporation.
Yet a few cases do stand out as likely reflecting gender issues or potential bias. One defendant was convicted of the crime of bigamy and sentenced to six months in prison after she began living with a man other than her husband. In defense she argued that she had done so only after her husband had an affair with another woman. The criminalization of what appears to be a routine domestic dispute strongly suggests that the criminal system was being used to settle personal scores, to the detriment of the female defendant.

Trends in crimes committed within families were more readily observable, confirming the perception that courts are lenient in their handling of intra-family crimes, including spousal killings. In one county court case a defendant was convicted of negligently causing the death of a woman following a domestic argument. The defendant and the victim were living together; the victim, who was married to another man, suffered from mental illness. The court reported that the two argued after drinking. The defendant left the woman to sleep on a concrete floor in an unheated room while wearing only her underwear and a coat. She froze to death; the defendant received a six year sentence. The case was the only non-traffic accident case involving the death of a victim tried in the county court. All other cases involving death of the victim were treated more seriously and thus were tried in the intermediate court.

Similar trends appear in the intermediate court cases. In another case apparently involving leniency for a defendant in a domestic dispute, a defendant who killed his wife received a suspended death sentence. The court’s opinion emphasized the defendant’s unhappiness in his marriage, perhaps providing a basis for avoiding a death sentence. Another defendant who killed his wife was convicted of intentional injury, not murder, and sentenced to just under 10 years. The court found that there was no intent to kill. In interviews judges and lawyers confirm that

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218 China’s Criminal Law criminalizes cohabitation with someone other than one’s spouse, but provides that charges may only be brought by a private complaint.

219 Case B167.

220 Case I3a. The case had been decided twice previously by the intermediate court; each time it was remanded for retrial by the provincial high court. It appears that the defendant had settled with the victim’s family, as the family had dropped their civil case as the case proceeded.

221 Case I4c. In contrast, a defendant convicted of intentional homicide for choking his girlfriend to death received a suspended death sentence. Case I20. The fact that death penalty cases are not made public makes comparisons difficult, but the apparent trend of avoiding death sentences in such cases is consistent with observations from local lawyers. In another case a defendant received a suspended death sentence for the intentional killing of his wife. Defendant explicitly argued that he should be treated leniently because the murder took place in a domestic dispute. Case I3a; see also case I40 (fifteen
serious crimes that occur within families, mostly notably the killing of a spouse, are treated relatively leniently, with the death penalty virtually never imposed.\footnote{222}

Not all assailants were male. One woman was convicted of homicide in the intermediate court for killing her husband by setting fire to a building and locking him inside. The defendant argued that she had intended to burn down the home of a woman she believed was having an affair with her husband when she was discovered by her husband. The court imposed a suspended death sentence, stating that it was acting leniently because the defendant had surrendered. But the court also argued that further leniency was not warranted, in part because the defendant failed to provide any evidence of an actual affair.\footnote{223}

5. Lawyers and Legal Arguments

Few of the defendants in the county court had lawyers or other legal representatives. This observation is not surprising: the lack of lawyers in criminal cases has been widely noted. But the cases nevertheless give a sense of just how common it is for defendants to be convicted with no legal representation. The cases also describe the types of arguments made by defendants and their lawyers at trial and on appeal.

The county court cases I examined involved a total of 273 defendants; only 50 defendants had a legal representative of any kind. Three defendants were represented by basic level legal workers;\footnote{224} an additional three were represented by family members. The remaining 44 were

years for killing brother in a fight; lawyer argued for leniency because it was a family dispute and victim’s family argued for leniency).

Only one appeal to the intermediate court appeared to involve a domestic dispute. In that case the defendant husband assaulted his father-in-law, who had come following a fight between the husband and wife. The victims appealed, arguing that compensation was too low and that the sentence was too short. The procuratorate, however, did not participate in the appeal, suggesting a reluctance to become more deeply involved in the case. Case I141. In another appeal that reflected the interaction of gender roles and traditional values in the countryside, the court affirmed sentences of up to three years for robbery for a woman and her two sons after they allegedly detained and demanded money from their daughter/sister’s boyfriend. They argued that he had forced them to lose a bride price by having sex with his girlfriend – and thus should pay compensation as a result.

Other crimes of passion likewise appeared to receive relatively lenient treatment. See, for example, case I47b (fifteen year sentence for willful injury for killing in a fight; defendant, who had a prior record, suspected victim was having an affair with his girlfriend).

\footnote{222} Interview 2012-17.  
\footnote{223} Case I9b.  
\footnote{224} Basic level legal workers are state-licensed para-professionals, generally with limited legal training. Basic level legal workers are authorized to represent clients in civil cases; they are not permitted to represent clients in criminal cases.
represented by lawyers. Representation rates in first instance cases in the intermediate court were higher, reflecting the more serious charges faced by defendants in such cases. Fifty of the 67 first instance defendants were represented at trial; 49 of these were represented by lawyers. Rates of representation were much higher in the most serious cases, although representation was not uniform. All of the nine defendants sentenced to suspended death sentences had lawyers; 15 of the 20 defendants sentenced to life in prison had lawyers. Cases on appeal to the intermediate court had lower rates of representation: only 123 of the 442 defendants in cases on appeal to the intermediate court had legal representation detailed in the court opinions.

Table 7 sets lists the cases in which defendants in the county court were represented by lawyers, listed by crime charged. Table 8 presents similar data for the intermediate court.

[Tables 7 & 8]

The county court cases also show that defendants and (where represented) their lawyers are rarely effective when they contest guilt. In only one county case did the court indicate that it was accepting a defendant’s argument regarding guilt: in that case the court accepted the defendant’s argument that the evidence provided failed to support the procurator’s claim that the defendant had participated in one of four alleged thefts (the defendant was sentenced for the three other thefts).

The court rejected defense arguments in the other eight cases in which a defendant or a lawyer contested guilt. Lawyers represented defendants in only five of the nine cases in which defendants contested guilt. Lawyers in Henan say that courts will generally, but not always, mention

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225 The remaining defendant was represented by a family member.
226 See, for example, case I6 (woman sentenced to life in prison for drug trafficking not represented by lawyer); case I9 (no lawyer for defendant sentenced to life for defrauding 2.92 million yuan). The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law mandated legal representation only in cases in which a defendant faced a potential death sentence or was blind, deaf, mute, or a minor.
227 The cases specified that 128 defendants had legal representation, while 238 lacked representation. For an additional 86 defendants the opinions provided no information. It is thus likely that the actual number with some form of legal representation was higher than 128 – but nevertheless still significantly below half of the cases. Eleven of 21 defendants in rehearing cases had legal representation.
228 Chinese criminal procedure does not bifurcate determinations of guilt and sentencing. Because a defendant generally must admit guilt in order to obtain leniency, defendants thus face the choice of contesting guilt and forgoing arguments for leniency or admitting guilt and arguing for leniency.
229 Case B26. A co-defendant was convicted of all four of the thefts.
230 Cases B5, B6, B20, B61, B161, B195, B209.
defense arguments in opinions.\textsuperscript{231} It thus is possible that some defense arguments are not reflected in the court opinions. Nevertheless it is clear from the cases that acknowledging guilt is by far the most common strategy.

The outcomes in the cases reflect a fact that is widely known: winning a non-guilty verdict is nearly impossible. No defendants in the county court cases received non-guilty verdicts. Three out of more than four hundred defendants in the intermediate court cases (including appeals and first-instance trials) received non-guilty verdicts. In one case the intermediate court reversed a conviction by a lower court. The acquittal was of a local village committee. The lower court had convicted the village committee of illegal occupation of farmland and had fined the committee 20,000 yuan. On appeal the intermediate court found that criminal liability could not be imposed on the village committee. The intermediate court affirmed criminal judgments against the farmers who actually illegally occupied the land. In a second case the intermediate court affirmed a non-guilty decision from a lower court in a malicious accusation case. Yet the case was a claim filed by a private individual, not the procuratorate, and thus did not reflect on the work of the procuratorate. In a third case a trial court had acquitted defendants of intentional assault; on appeal in response to a procuratorate’s objection the court vacated and remanded. No first instance trials in the intermediate court resulted in non-guilty verdicts.

County court judgments almost always convicted defendants of the exact crimes charged by the procuratorate. Court judgments differed from procuratorate charges in only two cases. In both cases the court convicted the defendant of an additional charge not alleged by the procuratorate.\textsuperscript{232} The intermediate court likewise convicted the defendant of the exact crime charged by the procuratorate in all 64 first instance cases for which data are available.

In interviews judges and lawyers confirm the almost total lack of non-guilty verdicts in criminal cases in Henan.\textsuperscript{233} Yet contesting guilt may not be fruitless. Judges and lawyers also acknowledge that they have other strategies to deal with cases they view as incorrectly decided or lacking evidence. Judges say that they will not rule against the procuratorate because doing so would affect the career development of both procurators and police involved in the case. Instead, courts will “communicate [with

\textsuperscript{231} Interview 2012-4.\textsuperscript{232} Case B23 (court added a charge of credit card fraud to procuratorate charge of concealment of illegal gains); case B80 (court added a charge of theft to procuratorate charge of illegal logging).\textsuperscript{233} Interview 2013-2 (lawyer stating that winning a non-guilty verdict is impossible, but that in some cases lawyers nevertheless have no option but to try).
the procuratorate] and work it out” if they find problems in cases. Courts may also impose suspended sentences or exempt defendants from punishment in order to avoid finding a defendant not guilty. Judges acknowledge mediating outcomes even in cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict. In other cases they may reduce a sentence on appeal to time served. Thus, for example, in one case the intermediate court initially remanded a conviction for illegal manufacture of explosives. On appeal from the trial court for a second time the court reduced the sentence from 72 to 21 months, effectively the time already served.

Some cases in which evidence against the defendant is weak are never resolved. One Henan lawyer described a case that was vacated and sent back for retrial twice. The lower court never reheard the case; instead, the defendant was released on bail and no further action was taken in the case.

Another lawyer stated that defendants prevail with non-guilty arguments only when they are already on bail or in cases filed by private

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234 Interview 2012-11. See also Interview 2012-4 (lawyer noting that courts are generally reluctant to offend the procuratorate).

235 Interview 2012-7; Interview 2012-10.

236 Interview 2012-26. For discussion of the issue, see Liu Wei, Wuzui Panjueli Qudi De Beimian (无罪判决率趋低的背面) [Behind Low Rate of Non-Guilty Cases], MINZHU YU FAZHI SHIBAO (民主与法制时报) [Democracy and Legal System News] (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/minzhuyufazhishibao/fanfu/html/1248/2012-10-29/content-552683.html (stating that court and procuracy evaluation standards directly overturn the presumption of innocence because they result in avoidance of non-guilty verdicts); Zhu Xiaoding, Shuzi Kan Zhongguo: Basan Nian Yilai Zuigao Fayuan Baogao Zhong De Xingshi Panjue Yu Wuzui Xuangao (数字看中国:八三年以来最高法院报告中的刑事判决与无罪宣告), SOHU BOKE (搜狐博客) [Sohu Blog] (Mar. 20, 2012), http://yeyuduxingzhe.i.sohu.com/blog/view/208173345.htm (arguing that the non-guilty rate is a measure of courts’ independence and noting that since 2009 the Supreme People’s Court has stopped disclosing the number of people found not-guilty in its annual Work Report); Morang “Wuzui Panjue” Qinzhou Jiancha Jinguan Shenpan Jiandu (莫让“无罪判决”掣肘检察机关审判监督) [Don’t Let “Non-Guilty Decisions” Circumvent Procuratorate Supervision], ZHONGGUO CAIXUN WANG (中国财讯网) [Caixun] (Jul. 10, 2012), http://www.ij7.cn/yc/20120710_1012.html (noting procuracy concerns that a non-guilty verdict will affect their evaluation and will have negative social effects); Chehui Gongsu Zai Woguo Lifa Ji Sifa Shiwu Zhong De Zhuangkuang (撤回公诉在我国立法及司法实务中的状况) [The Situation of Withdrawal of Prosecution in Legislation and Adjudication in Our Nation], FAZHI WANG (法制网) [Legal Daily] (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/2008-06/10/content_875885.htm (stating that any case in which a court proposes to find a defendant non-guilty must be submitted to court adjudication committees, that courts will consult with procuratorates in advance of any such decision, and that procuratorates will in practice withdraw a case prior to a court issuing a non-guilty decision).

237 Case I75a. Defendants had argued that they did not know how the fertilizer they were grinding would be used. The court found they were merely accessories to the crime.

238 Interview 2012-6.
parties (as opposed to the procuratorate).\textsuperscript{239} Other concerns also impact courts’ reluctance to issue non-guilty verdicts: judges may be worried about protests from victims’ families in cases in which they issue not guilty verdicts,\textsuperscript{240} may be concerned that judges may be blamed if the procurator files an objection to the decision resulting in the verdict being changed,\textsuperscript{241} or may be concerned about potential state compensation claims from the acquitted defendant.\textsuperscript{242}

Lawyers also note that it is often hard to contest guilt because many defendants have confessed prior to the intervention of lawyers.\textsuperscript{243} In such cases, lawyers who pursue a non-guilty defense risk being targeted for prosecution under Article 306 of China’s Criminal Law. Lawyers have no space to make independent assessments of the merits of a non-guilty defense because their clients have generally already been pressured into acknowledging their guilt.\textsuperscript{244} As one lawyer commented, “once you are at court it is too late.”\textsuperscript{245} Lawyers also say they need to be careful in criminal cases to avoid becoming potential targets of criminal sanctions themselves.\textsuperscript{246} They thus rarely present new evidence or seek out additional evidence; doing so is too dangerous.\textsuperscript{247} The general environment for lawyers is also widely viewed as having deteriorated in recent years, making lawyers less likely to take on difficult criminal cases.\textsuperscript{248} Constraints on lawyers likely also increase the pressure on defendants to agree to settlements.

Yet there were also a few cases in which lawyers appeared to mount spirited defenses. In one case, a defendant was sentenced to thirteen years for theft of 90,000 yuan from an office during a break-in. On appeal of a second trial in the case the defendant’s lawyer argued that the defendant’s confession resulted from torture and stated that the court should follow the presumption of innocence. The court rejected the argument, affirming the sentence, arguing that the defendant showed no physical evidence of torture.\textsuperscript{249} In another case a lawyer argued, unsuccessfully, that his client was denied access to counsel in the trial court.\textsuperscript{250}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[239] Interview 2012-28.
\item[240] Interview 2012-28.
\item[241] Interview 2012-28.
\item[242] Interview 2012-10.
\item[243] Interview 2012-7.
\item[244] Interview 2012-7.
\item[245] Interview 2013-7.
\item[246] Interview 2012-20.
\item[247] Interview 2013-2.
\item[248] Interview 2012-28.
\item[249] Case I18B.
\item[250] Case I41a. The intermediate court said that the defendant had clearly stated that she did want to be represented by a lawyer. The woman was convicted of threatening a victim and her parents after her son allegedly committed rape.
\end{footnotes}
There is substantial debate about the effectiveness of hiring lawyers, both in China generally and in Henan. Lawyers and academics note that procurators and judges will sometimes threaten defendants with longer sentences if they hire a lawyer, will pressure defendants to settle cases absent a lawyer rather than going to trial,\textsuperscript{251} or will offer lighter sentences if the accused does not hire a lawyer.\textsuperscript{252} As one lawyer noted, lawyers make procurators’ jobs harder, and they are likely to try to dissuade defendants from hiring lawyers in complex or problematic cases.\textsuperscript{253} Some judges likewise say that hiring lawyers can sometimes result in worse outcomes for defendants.\textsuperscript{254}

Yet lawyers also argue that they can add value by arguing for leniency and facilitating negotiations with courts and procuratorates.\textsuperscript{255} Lawyers state that in serious cases pleading for leniency (rather than contesting guilt) can mean the difference between life and death.\textsuperscript{256} In contrast, judges argue that lawyers are not as important to courts as are institutional dynamics in affecting outcomes. As one judge explained, judges are already under enormous pressure to avoid incorrect decisions; lawyers’ arguments thus play a marginal role in affecting how courts handle cases.\textsuperscript{257} Yet other judges noted that lawyers can be helpful in persuading their clients to settle cases. As one judge noted, parties often do not trust judges. Lawyers therefore can be useful in persuading parties to settle.\textsuperscript{258}

In Henan, as elsewhere in China, lawyers continue to find it extremely difficult to access their clients.\textsuperscript{259} It is common, say lawyers, to be denied access to their clients, even the limited access permitted under the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law.\textsuperscript{260} Local authorities largely ignore the provisions in the Lawyers Law that grant additional access, with some detention facilities in Henan posting signs that explicitly state that they follow the Criminal Procedure Law and not the Law on Lawyers, which prior to 2013 gave lawyers increased access to their clients compared to the Criminal Procedure Law.\textsuperscript{261} Conversations between clients and

\textsuperscript{251} Interview 2012-1.
\textsuperscript{252} Interview 2012-27.
\textsuperscript{253} Interview 2012-28.
\textsuperscript{254} Interview 2012-11.
\textsuperscript{255} Interview 2012-5.
\textsuperscript{256} Interview 2012-5; Interview 2013-4.
\textsuperscript{257} Interview 2012-19.
\textsuperscript{258} Interview 2012-19.
\textsuperscript{260} Interview 2012-20; Interview 2012-28.
\textsuperscript{261} Interview 2012-7. Prior to the 2012 revision of China’s Criminal Procedure Law, a conflict existed between article 33 of the Lawyers Law (adopted in 2007) and article 96
lawyers are monitored: as one lawyer noted, the most important role of lawyers “is to comfort” their clients.\textsuperscript{262} Likewise lawyers comment that it remains extremely difficult for them to access witnesses or documentary evidence.\textsuperscript{263} A non-party witness appeared to testify in court in only one case in the dataset. All other cases that involved witness testimony in court were cases in which the witness was also a victim seeking compensation.

6. Appeals and Rehearings

Outcomes of appeals to the intermediate court suggest that the court is far more active in reviewing lower court decisions than is commonly assumed to be the case of appellate courts in China. Yet the cases also confirm many of the widely recognized problems that exist with appellate review of criminal cases. A total of 442 defendants appealed to the intermediate court in 2010 or had their cases appealed by the procuratorate or victims. Of these, 86 had their cases vacated and remanded for trial, 28 had their sentences lowered, and three had their sentences increased. An additional 10 defendants had no change to their sentence but had civil compensation claims either remanded or revised.\textsuperscript{264} Taken together, the cases suggest that the intermediate court is adjusting outcomes or remanding cases for retrial in nearly one-third of the cases. This figure is far higher than is commonly assumed to be the case in

\textsuperscript{262} Interview 2012-28.
\textsuperscript{263} Interview 2012-28.
\textsuperscript{264} See, e.g. 165 (sentence affirmed but court increased compensation to victim’s family).
criminal cases in China or the estimate of 10 to 20 percent given in interviews. 265

Many cases involved appeals by multiple parties, including victims (plaintiffs in civil compensation cases) and the procuratorate. Table 9 lists the total number of defendants who had their cases appealed, by party filing the appeal. Table 10 sets forth outcomes on appeal.

[Tables 9 and 10]

As is standard practice in appellate review in China, court decisions vacating and remanding lower court decisions never stated the specific reasons for such a decision. Instead, appellate decisions indicate only whether the problem was with the evidence (generally by stating that the “evidence was unclear”), the procedure, or the application of law. The majority of the decisions remanding cases in my dataset simply stated that “the facts are unclear.” Appellate courts often, but not always, follow-up such decisions with either an internal, non-public letter to the lower court regarding the specific problems in the case or with a telephone call that explains the reason the case has been reversed. 266 As noted above, many of the cases in which the intermediate court changed outcomes on appeal were modest changes to civil compensation claims attached to criminal cases. Judges note that the largest category of cases that are changed on appeal is the result of settlements reached after the conclusion of the first

265 Interview 2012-19; see also “Tongyi Ershen Gaipan Biaozhun” De Diaoyan Baogao (统一二审改判标准“的调研报告) [Report on Unifying the Standard for Adjusting and Remanding Appeals], GUANGDONG FAYUAN WANG (广东法院网) [Guangdong Court Net] (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/gdcourt/front/front/content.action?lmdm=LM53&gjid=2012032022237085591 (reporting that nationwide between 2005 and 2007 on average 14% of appeals were adjusted and 7.1% were remanded); Woguo Wunian Lai Gong 90000 Yu Jian Xingshi Ershen Anjian Bei Yifa Gaipan Huo Fahui Chongshen (我国五年来共9万余件刑事二审案件被依法改判或发回重审) [90,000 Criminal Appeal Cases Were Adjusted or Remanded During the Past Five Years], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [Xinhua News Net] (Oct. 26, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/26/content_10254795.htm (reporting that between 2003 and 2008, 90,000 out of 470,000 criminal appeal cases were adjusted or remanded in China); Guangzhou Zhongyuan Xing Erting Xingshi Ershen Anjian Gaipan, Fahui Chongshen Qingkuang Fenxi (广州中院刑二庭刑事二审案件改判、发回重审情况分析) [Analysis of Remanded and Changed Cases in Guangzhou Intermediate Court Second Criminal Division], ZHONGGUO XINGSHI FALÜ WANG (中国刑事法律网) [China Criminal Law Net], http://www.lw315.com/ShowArticle.shtml?ID=201013121312166297.htm (reporting that between 2002 and 2004, Guangzhou Intermediate Court adjusted 11.48% and remanded 2.75% of 1054 criminal appeals).

266 Interview 2012-19.
instance trial. Eight appellate decisions made explicit reference to the payment of compensation as a basis for a reduction in sentence on appeal. Other cases changed on appeal involved defendants who paid fines or restitution subsequent to the original sentence.

Changes on appeal are not always in favor of defendants. Indeed, appealing can in some cases be dangerous for defendants. In one intermediate court case defendants were charged with illegal manufacture and sale of explosives. Defendants appealed a county court judgment imposing sentences of ten and four years on the two primary defendants; the procuratorate did not appeal. The appellate court vacated and remanded the decision. On retrial the case was assigned to a different court, which increased the sentences to twelve and ten years. The appellate court then affirmed.

Appellate courts may also impose longer punishments than those imposed in the trial court in response to an appeal by the procuratorate or in a retrial, or zaishen proceedings. Twenty-two of the appellate cases involved kangsu, or “objections,” filed by the procuratorate either alone or alongside an appeal filed by a defendant or victim challenging a compensation award. In nine of these cases only the procuratorate appealed. The intermediate court increased the defendant’s sentence in five of these nine cases, affirmed the decision in four cases, and vacated and remanded the remaining three cases to the trial court. In all five cases in which the intermediate court increased a sentence its reasoning was exactly in line with the procuratorate’s argument. Thus, for example, the intermediate court increased a defendant’s sentence from six to twelve

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267 Interview 2012-19.
268 Cases Ii56, I79, IiI, I133, I144a, I79, I83 I13b. In case I79 the reference was indirect: the court noted that subsequent to the original court decision the victim forgave the defendant and withdrew her civil claim. The lower court had ordered defendant to pay 3255 yuan in compensation but the defendant’s family subsequently paid 14,000 yuan. The victim then requested that the court treat the defendant leniently; see also case I35 (intermediate court vacates and remands decision in traffic accident case after lower court imposed three year sentence despite settlement of civil compensation claim and the fact defendant took victim to the hospital following the accident). Sometimes the adjustment is minor. One defendant has his sentenced reduced from 210 months to 204 months on appeal following the payment of compensation. Case I13b (defendant with prior record sentenced for assault in the context of an organized crime syndicate).
269 Case I19 (defendant paid fine and returned stolen goods after conviction in county court; appellate court reduced sentence from two years and three months to fifteen months, exactly the time already served).
270 Although Article 190 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law stated that an appellate court could not increase a defendant’s sentence absent an appeal filed by a procuratorate, the restriction did not apply to first instance courts retrying a defendant following a reversal and remand. The 2012 Criminal Procedure Law removes this loophole, stating that on remand a trial court may only increase a sentence where the procuratorate brings new criminal charges. 2012 Criminal Procedure Law, art. 226.
months for the crime of concealing 18,000 yuan in stolen property; the court stated that the original sentence was “inappropriate.” In a child trafficking case the intermediate court imposed a five year sentence on a defendant who had received only a suspended sentence at trial.

Judges say that many kangsu petitions come at the request of victims or their family who object to the sentence but who cannot directly appeal the sentence. Under the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, victims could appeal a compensation award in their status as plaintiffs in an attached civil compensation case, but could not appeal the actual sentence; the same is true under the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law. One of the objections filed by the procuratorate was in direct response to complaints from the victim’s family: the court increased a sentence from 13 to 15 years for a defendant who killed another man in a fight. The court noted that the defendant failed to compensate the victim’s family and did not “obtain the family’s forgiveness,” and thus the sentence in the lower court was too light. In an additional three cases involving four defendants the intermediate court vacated and remanded lower court decisions following a procuratorate objection to the lower court decision. One such case was a rare lower court acquittal of a defendant in an intentional injury case. The intermediate court remanded, finding the facts unclear, following an objection to the sentence from the procuracy and an appeal of the failure to award compensation by the victim. Although not technically an acquittal, another remand occurred in a case in which the lower court had imposed no prison sentence on a defendant convicted of fraud.

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272 Case I3b.
273 Case I29. The court found that the defendant had not merely purchased trafficked children, but had actually engaged in trafficking. Another case involved a case heard via retrial procedures at the request of the procuratorate (who apparently had failed to file an appeal on time). The court agreed to increase a sentence from 30 months to 36 months for a recidivist defendant convicted of stealing electric bicycles. Case I4b. The procuratorate’s successful argument noted that the sentence imposed below was below the range set forth in the criminal law.
274 In some locations procuratorates may also be required to file a certain number of kangsu each year. Jiancha Yewu Kaoping Jizhi Ying Fuhe Sifa Guilu [Procuratorial Kaoping Should be Consistent with the Law], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan [Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China] (Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2008-11-24/0003421232.html.
275 Case I21. It is unclear why the procuratorate charged the defendant with willful injury rather than homicide, although the fact that the defendant attacked the victim after the victim harassed the defendant’s daughter (forcing her to urinate in front of him) likely played a role.
276 Case I21b, I43b, I97a (two separate defendants).
277 Case I43b.
278 Case I97a. The court imposed a 50,000 yuan fine. A co-defendant, who received a suspended sentence and a fine, likewise had his case remanded.
Yet given the widespread portrayal of Chinese courts largely complying with the procuracy in criminal cases, the four cases\textsuperscript{279} in which the intermediate court rejected the objection filed by the procuratorate were perhaps more noteworthy. In one case the procuratorate objected to a lower court’s imposition of a suspended sentence for a coal company official prosecuted for misappropriating 100,000 yuan in public funds; the intermediate court affirmed without a hearing, stating that the procuratorate lacked evidence to support its argument.\textsuperscript{280} Other cases in which the intermediate court refused a procuratorate objection requesting a higher sentence involved the theft of a Tang Dynasty Buddha, an intentional injury case arising out of a knife fight at a mahjong game,\textsuperscript{281} and a complex case in which the procuratorate and defendant both appealed after a defendant was found guilty of misappropriation of public funds and tax evasion.\textsuperscript{282} The procuratorate argued that the defendant should have been convicted of the more serious crime of corruption. The defendant had used public funds to start a company; he then returned the money and sold the company. The defendant also appealed, arguing that the sentence was too harsh because he had acted on the instruction of the company board. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the cases as to why the procuratorate failed in these cases, in particular whether any of the defendants had particularly strong cases or sources of external support that might have affected court determinations.

Sixty-nine cases involved appeals by victims or their families. Although victims may only appeal compensation awards, many victims contested both compensation amounts and the sentence.\textsuperscript{283} In three cases victims succeeded in receiving additional compensation through an appellate court judgment.

Eight of the cases in my appellate dataset involved appellate review of a case for at least the second time. Lawyers say such cases generally are those in which courts have discovered problems with lower

\textsuperscript{279} Cases I13, I7b, I8e, I20a.

\textsuperscript{280} Case I13. The defendant also appealed, suggesting perhaps that the procuratorate’s objection was in part an effort to prevent a reduction in sentence.

\textsuperscript{281} The defendant had already compensated the victims, thus perhaps explaining the court’s reluctance to increase the sentence.

\textsuperscript{282} Case I20A. In the original trial the defendant was sentenced to five years. The procuratorate objected, the court vacated and remanded, and the trial court retried defendant and imposed an eight year sentence. The procuratorate and defendant then both appealed. The defendant argued that he was not guilty of misappropriation because he had acted on the instruction of the company board. The procuratorate argued that that defendant had used public funds to start a company and thus should have been convicted of the more serious crime of corruption.

\textsuperscript{283} For example, see case I43b (court vacates and remands compensation award, but states that it cannot reconsider the sentence).
court decisions but are unwilling to issue a non-guilty verdict. Some of the cases clearly represent attempts to avoid decisions being classified as incorrect. Thus, for example, the intermediate court twice remanded for retrial the conviction of the boss of a state-owned hotel for abuse of power after he entered into an allegedly unauthorized contract resulting in massive losses. In the third trial in the county court the defendant was again convicted, but the court imposed no punishment. In a third appeal the intermediate court affirmed. Other cases reflected ongoing disputes concerning compensation; in one case in which the compensation amount was the only issue in dispute the court remanded the same lower court decision three times. In another case the appellate court ordered that the lower court try a case for the fifth time, despite the fact that the defendants had already served three-year sentences. Other cases were reopened many years after the conviction – including one for a defendant who was convicted of fraud in 1983 and served an eight-year sentence. The defendant, who never appealed the original sentence, apparently successfully petitioned the provincial high court to order a rehearing. The intermediate court did so but, applying the law of the 1980s, affirmed.

In one of the stranger cases in the dataset, a defendant originally arrested in 1990 on charges of intentional injury for an alleged killing in a fight fled after being detained. He was eventually arrested in 2001, and then tried and acquitted in 2002 by the trial court. The victim’s family apparently appealed the attached civil compensation case and the intermediate court ordered a retrial of both the criminal judgment and the civil case, something it was not permitted to do absent the initiation of formal rehearing procedures. By this point the defendant had been found non-guilty and had skipped town. He was located in 2008, eighteen years after the incident, and retried and sentenced to eight years. Both the defendant and the procuratorate appealed, and the appellate court again vacated and remanded. In 2010, 20 years after the alleged crime, the trial court tried the defendant for a third time (and a codefendant for a second time) and increased his sentence to nine years. On appeal for the third time the intermediate court affirmed, with the primary defendant receiving a nine year sentence and the second defendant receiving a suspended sentence.

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284 Interview 2012-6.
286 The third remand was because the lower court had impermissibly assigned the case on retrial to the same three judges who initially tried it. The reasons for the prior two remands were unclear. Case I57.
287 Case I16a. The four retrials apparently came after repeated petitioning by the defendants. Three of the retrials came after successful appeals. One came after a successful petition for rehearing.
288 Case I16b.
289 Case I86.
Judges estimate that they hold hearings on appeal in only 10 percent of cases. This reflects the fact that generally hearings are held on appeal only in cases involving an objection filed by the procuratorate, where a hearing must be held, or in major cases. My data are consistent with such estimates: only eight percent of the appeals indicated that the court had held a hearing.

Defendant arguments on appeal largely focused on arguments for leniency. The inclusion of new evidence on appeal is rare; as one lawyer commented, “who would dare to do it?”, a reference to the risk of prosecution for fabricating evidence.

7. Roles of Individual Judges

Participants in trials in the county court not surprisingly were repeat players. In the county court a relatively small number of judges presided over the overwhelming majority of cases: a total of seven judges and one people’s assessor heard the cases. Sixty-five defendants were tried by a single judge sitting alone; 169 were tried by a three judge panel. One judge participated, either alone or as part of a panel, in the trials of 172 of the 273 defendants. For 144 of the defendants two of the three judges were the same. A people’s assessor, a non-judge, sat on panels for 39 of the 273 defendants. The same people’s assessor was involved in all of these cases. The people’s assessor participated in many of the more serious crimes, perhaps reflecting an attempt to suggest that the court was soliciting public input in such cases.

8. Pretrial Detention and Bail

In the county court 168 of the 273 defendants were held in pre-trial detention at some point, for periods ranging from two days to 369 days. The average period in detention pre-trial was 61 days. But some defendants were held for comparatively long periods prior to trial: five defendants (in four separate cases) were detained for 300 or more days prior to trial. All of these cases involved relatively complex cases involving large amounts of money: the issuance of false value added tax invoices and fraud or contract fraud.

One hundred sixty-six of the 232 defendants in the county court were granted bail, including 80 granted bail after initially being detained. Only eight of the bailed defendants eventually received non-suspended criminal

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290 Interview 2012-19.
291 Interview 2012-6.
292 People’s assessors are laypeople, often former cadres or teachers, who are selected to hear cases alongside judges in some cases.
sentences, suggesting that the decision to grant bail is a strong predictor of whether or not a defendant will face incarceration after trial. Of the remaining bailed defendants, one received no sentence or fine (but nevertheless was convicted), 30 received fines but no criminal sentence, 39 received fines and a suspended sentence, and 82 received a suspended sentence but no fine. Although defendants charged with a wide range of crimes were granted bail, the largest categories of bailed defendants were those sentenced for traffic offenses, willful injury, concealing criminal gains, and illegal logging. Although the court judgments do not provide information regarding a defendant’s residence, in interviews judges notes that only local residents receive bail. Likewise, agreeing to compensate a victim is also generally a prerequisite to being granted bail.

Not surprisingly, defendants in cases appealed to or tried in the intermediate court were generally detained far longer. Defendants in first instance trials for which information was available averaged 367 days in detention prior to trial. Defendants in appeals were detained for shorter periods – 215 days – but nevertheless far longer than defendants in the county court. Defendants in cases on review in the intermediate court for the second or more time on average had been detained for 411 days.

III. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS

The empirical analysis presented above provides insights into everyday criminal justice in China largely missing from prior scholarship. This section discusses the implications of the analysis above for four areas of the empirical and theoretical literature.

1. Methodology and Empirical Findings

293 Defendants in cases B20 (two of three defendants), B62, B66 (three of eleven defendants), B67, B69, B128 all received non-suspended sentences. One of the defendants in case B23 received a six year sentence suspended for twelve months, making for an effective sentence of five years.

294 One of the fined defendants was also sentenced to public surveillance. Another was sentenced to public surveillance but then had the public surveillance sentence suspended.

295 Interview 2013-11.

296 Interview 2013-11.

297 The intermediate court cases did not always include complete information on detention periods, in particular for cases on appeal. As a result, these figures may not be representative. The cases provide data on pretrial detention periods for 56 of the 73 first instance defendants, 223 of the 452 defendants on appeal, and 13 of the 21 defendants in cases heard in rehearing procedures. Defendants in rehearing procedures on average had been detained for 243 days.

298 The cases provide information on six of the eight defendants in such cases.
Many of this article’s findings will not be surprising to scholars familiar with the Chinese legal system: the lack of lawyers, prevalence of confessions, and near impossibility of winning a non-guilty verdict are well known. Nevertheless, this study offers some of the first concrete empirical evidence of just how widespread such phenomena continue to be. This article thus confirms findings that have been based on observational studies of and interviews in courts or based on research conducted prior to the recent reemphasis on populism in China’s legal system. The lack of access to earlier cases makes it impossible to compare 2010 to prior years. Qualitative evidence from interviews, however, suggests that such problems are persisting even as China embarks on its most important reforms to the criminal justice system in more than 15 years. Likewise the lack of access to prior decisions makes it difficult to determine to what degree making opinions public affects the quality and substance of court decisions. Nevertheless, this study offers a baseline against which future developments can be measured. The data also provide a narrative of ordinary criminal justice in rural China, presenting a picture of the nature of crime and punishment as well as insight into institutional dynamics within the criminal justice system.

Some of this article’s findings, however, are surprising. Recent literature has described the policy of balancing leniency and severity or has focused on specific cases of individuals purchasing leniency through compensation to victims. Prior literature has not looked more broadly at how leniency is manifest across a range of cases. Evidence from court decisions and from interviews with lawyers and judges suggests that settlement and compensation to victims, through direct negotiations with the family or as part of a civil case attached to a criminal decision, are playing a far greater role in the criminal justice system than previously recognized in routine criminal matters and in serious cases. I lack access to capital cases and thus am unable to observe the most serious cases that do not receive leniency. Yet it is clear that in a wide range of cases leniency in the wake of confessions and settlement is a common tool for resolving criminal matters. Although most of the cases appear

299 Participants at workshops in China and interviewees noted that some recent legal changes are already having a significant effect, most notably amendments to the Criminal Law in 2010 that mandate a term of detention for defendants convicted of drunk driving and also heightened focus on official corruption in the wake of China’s 2012 leadership transition. Interview 2013-8; Interview 2013-9; Criminal Law, as amended 2010, art. 133 (a).

300 For example, McConville’s important study found that only 11 percent of defendants in basic court cases received non-custodial sentences. McConville, supra, at 363-364. One earlier study found that 84 percent of defendants received a prison sentence and that 64 percent received a sentence in excess of five years. Hong Lu & Terance D. Miethe, Confessions and Criminal Case Disposition in China, 37 Law & Society Review 549, 571 (2003).
technically in compliance with SPC guidance on leniency, the scope of the use of suspended sentences in the county court and the apparent use of settlement to reduce sentences in cases tried in the intermediate court at the very least represent a liberal interpretation of the SPC’s guidelines.

This article’s findings thus challenge common western assumptions about the Chinese criminal justice system, in particular the focus on heavy punishments. The findings provide empirical support for those in China who have argued that wealth is becoming a key determinant of criminal sentences. I do not claim that the system is always lenient: the system can treat defendants extraordinarily harshly, in particular when the state considers its interests threatened. A decision that appears lenient may in fact be excessive if it results from court doubts about the guilt of the defendant. The cases also manifest a strong state interest in maintaining control by criminalizing minor disputes or those that present a threat to social stability. But my findings suggest that more attention should be paid to developments in routine cases and that leniency is used in even some serious cases.

This article also makes a methodological claim: that there is significant value in studying the vast volume of routine cases now publicly available in China. I am well aware of the limitations of my data and of the risks of western scholars over-relying on court opinions. There are numerous cases described in this article in which one is left to speculate regarding likely behind the scenes machinations. The ability to read entire case files would certainly add to detailed understanding of how courts process criminal cases. Some such work is now being done by scholars in China.301 But the cases available in Henan provide a new window into the practice of ordinary justice in China, one that has yet to be explored in depth by scholars in China or elsewhere. The hundreds of thousands of cases available are a massive untapped resource for scholars, both for learning what is actually going on in the Chinese legal system and for mapping out future lines of scholarly enquiry. Most prior scholarship on China’s courts (including my own) relies heavily either on what judges say they do or on cases selected for researchers by judges. The widespread availability of large numbers of opinions allows us to compare what judges say they do with what actually happens.

More can be done with the data presented in this article. Future work will include more sophisticated quantitative analysis and also more detailed analysis of particular types of cases. The possibility now exists to examine issues such as the effect of lawyers on outcomes in criminal cases and perhaps the role of individual judges. Related projects based on this study are likely to include more detailed analysis of how judges interpret

301 McConville’s study also relied in part on analysis of case files conducted by members of his research team. McConville, supra, at 20-22.
and adapt national laws, judicial interpretations, and policy guidelines; analysis of how courts process a wide range of financial crimes, including corruption; the use of non-death sentences for intentional and negligent homicide; the impact of the relationship among victims and defendants on outcomes; the role and meaning of confession; the role of appellate review and whether certain types of cases are more likely to succeed on appeal; and potentially the impact of gender and family relations on the criminal justice system.

2. Leniency and the Roles of Chinese Criminal Law

As noted above, the definition of leniency is contested in China. Leniency in sentencing in China can be manifest through formal law, judicial policy, and actual practice. Chinese law and court guidelines provide technical answers to when and how courts should act leniently, setting forth conditions under which a defendant may have a sentence reduced or may receive a suspended sentence. My analysis suggests another definition, focusing on when individuals are able to avoid jail time (in relatively minor cases) or avoid death (in more serious cases).

Discussing leniency in a system in which there is virtually no chance of acquittal at trial and in which wrongful convictions are common is counterintuitive. Not everyone receives leniency, and victims play an important role in determining whether leniency is granted. Nevertheless, policy and practice in Henan suggest that many defendants are receiving sentences that are lower than what is likely or even possible under formal legal rules and that are lower than might otherwise be expected. My claim that courts are surprisingly lenient should be understood narrowly to state that the data show a surprisingly large number of cases (compared to popular and scholarly expectations)\(^\text{302}\) in which defendants receive only suspended sentences or receive life or suspended death sentences for murder.

The practice of leniency also provides insight into the goals of the Chinese criminal justice system. The evidence presented in this article

\(^\text{302}\) In discussing this project with numerous distinguished Chinese criminal justice scholars I have been struck that virtually all have been surprised at the prevalence of suspended sentences in routine cases. Likewise participants at presentations of this paper in China expressed surprise; one judge stated that my findings were “impossible.” Yet the findings were also confirmed with judges in county B, one of whom stated that non-public juvenile cases would show even more surprising levels of leniency.

It is clear there is widespread variation in the frequency with which suspended sentences are granted, both within Henan and nationwide. Data are difficult to obtain. One workshop participant estimated that suspended sentence rates in one major city in Henan would not exceed thirty percent.

There has been less surprise at my finding that compensation can make a difference between life and death in more serious cases.
suggests that the policy of leniency is not being used primarily to protect defendants’ rights or to further an interest in restorative justice. In contrast to most models of restorative justice, negotiations between victims and defendants appear to influence charging decisions and court determinations regarding guilt; courts place extreme pressure on the parties to reach negotiated outcomes, often guiding the parties to such outcomes; and reconciliation focuses overwhelmingly on financial payments. Negotiations in China take place in the context of a system that has no real mechanism for protecting the rights of defendants and in which money and stability concerns play a large role in determining outcomes.

Resource concerns are one factor leading to greater use of suspended sentences: China has seen a significant increase in the number of criminal cases in the past decade, from 656,788 in 2000 to 884,737 in 2010. The growth in cases makes continuation of “strike hard” policies both impracticable and also perhaps risky: such policies risk alienating a widening segment of the population. Yet resource concerns do not appear to be main factor. Instead, the primary goals in embracing leniency are to maintain state legitimacy, ensure social stability, insulate the courts from criticism, and protect individual judges from responsibility for potentially incorrect decisions. In interviews judges repeatedly noted that mediated and settled cases are much less likely to result in petitions, protests, or appeals than are ordinary criminal matters.

The strong emphasis on compromise in the cases also suggests that courts are focused less on the legal correctness of their decisions than on ensuring cases are resolved. Evidence from Henan suggests that courts’ jobs today focus less on what the criminal procedure law suggests is their job – determining the guilt of the defendant – and more on preventing social instability. Trials determine only sentences, not guilt. The cases analyzed also demonstrate that procurators and courts have extreme discretion when it comes to bringing charges and imposing sentences.

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303 See 2001 LAW Y.B. CHINA 1256, 1258; 2011 LAW Y.B. CHINA 1051, 1053.
304 China is certainly not the only system that treats a large range of defendants leniently; Japan’s incarceration rates are also very low. Routine cases in many U.S. jurisdictions likely would appear lenient to many outside observers. Nor is China the only place in which bargaining is a key aspect of the resolution of criminal disputes, although parallels to plea bargaining (and the resulting low number of non-guilty verdicts) in the U.S. should not be overstated. Negotiations in China rarely include lawyers and victims have extraordinary power in the process. China has undergone a shift from a traditional authoritarian law and order approach to criminal cases; as recently as 18 years ago it was possible for defendants to be executed for theft. Yet it also seems clear that the Chinese system is not converging toward either the Japanese model or western liberal systems that put heavy emphasis on procedure.
305 The fact that procurators face incentives to obtain convictions, but not to achieve specific sentences, also encourages flexibility and leniency.
Although there is a technical legal basis for most lenient (and harsh) outcomes, the cases show just how large this discretion can be in determining the crime charged, as in the corruption and financial crime cases, and the sentence imposed. Efforts to make the criminal justice system more rule-based may be in tension with the extensive discretion that judges and procurators possess and that is an important tool for encouraging negotiated outcomes. Whether the inconsistency that results from such discretion poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system remains to be seen.

It is also clear from the data that the criminal justice system is not serving the interests of the state alone. In contrast with the traditional characterization of people in rural China avoiding contact with the formal legal system, my data suggest it has become routine for the criminal system to be used to settle disputes among strangers (traffic accidents) and among neighbors and family (fights). The large number of what appear to be primarily tort disputes reflects the weakness of the tort system. Litigants, prosecutors and judges use criminal charges strategically to force settlements or to ensure that tort judgments are paid. There is also evidence that the criminal system is being used to settle scores, in particular in the context of financial crimes. Evidence from Henan suggests that much of the victims’ rights discourse that dominates discussions of criminal settlement in China may be overlooking the potential use of the criminal system for personal animus, something made possible by the fostering of direct negotiations between the parties prior to a court hearing a case. One key question that the cases raise but do not answer is why traditional community-based institutions for dispute resolution are not functioning. Another is whether the desirability of a system that relies so heavily on settlement varies depending on the crime charged: whether there is a difference between an emphasis on settlement in traffic and fight cases compared to corruption cases.

The emphasis on mediated outcomes may reflect both China’s legal history and also changes in contemporary Chinese society. Aspects of the practice have clear historical antecedents. At the same time, however, the heavy emphasis on settlement may also reflect trends in contemporary Chinese society: all of society has become an exchange, in which money and personal relationships dominate outcomes.

Prosecutors elsewhere, including the U.S., often have extensive discretion in changing decisions. In China, however, such discretion is exercised with little or no subsequent oversight from the courts.

Involving another person in the legal system was a common means of retaliation in traditional China. The use of money to reduce sentences was also common. Because China’s imperial legal system did not distinguish between civil and criminal disputes it was also common to see disputes that today might be classified as civil disputes being resolved though the use of criminal sanctions.
The evidence presented in this article represents a modest first step toward creating a theory of the practice of ordinary criminal law in China. The state continues to focus on law and order as a mechanism for maintaining legitimacy and for maintaining control, evidenced by the heavy punishments in cases affecting state interests and extreme discretion in the hands of police and procurators. Yet the data in this article also suggest other themes that appear to be increasingly important in criminal cases in China: repairing social ties; maintaining social harmony; and ensuring compensation to victims, in particular those who have lost a key bread-winner in a society lacking a social safety network. The Chinese system also provides minor criminals with one, but only one, second chance; reinforces communal norms, even when those norms are in tension with formal law (as appears to be the case in family disputes and the one bigamy case); and may also introduce elements of collective punishment by ensuring that family members and neighbors bear the financial cost of crime.

China appears to be shifting toward a bifurcated criminal justice system. Routine cases are resolved through negotiated outcomes and suspended or short sentences, while more serious cases result in long sentences. A key insight from the data presented in this article is that defendants may wind up in the second category not only because of the seriousness of their crime, but also because of their inability to settle or the victims’ unwillingness to settle. The data also make clear that there is significant randomness in both who gets punished and in how much punishment they receive. Flexibility on the part of procurators and police and the apparent randomness of outcomes may further state interests in social control by sending a message that all are potentially at risk.

Most debate within China focuses on technical issues directly linked to specific reforms: eliminating torture, increasing access to lawyers, forcing appellate courts to decide cases before them when they find problems (not simply engaging in repeated cycles of vacating and remanding problematic decisions). The cases described above, however, suggest that more fundamental issues concerning the larger goals of criminal law in China are contested as well. Understanding the reality of everyday criminal justice in China provides a first step to conceptualizing the goals of Chinese criminal justice. Evidence from Henan suggests that the focus of Chinese criminal law in China has shifted from primary focus on incarceration and control toward a system that mixes emphasis on legal principles with quick resolution of disputes, compensation for victims,

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308 As one lawyers noted, the system may make sense for China given that victims generally lack resources and can be financially crippled by the loss of a breadwinner. Interview 2013-2.

309 In rural areas it is common for family members of defendants to rely on neighbors to come up with the money necessary to pay a settlement. Interview 2013-2.
observance of community norms, and reliance on high levels of discretion by decision makers.

3. The (D)evolving Roles of China’s Courts

This article’s findings also contribute to literature on the roles being played by China’s courts and the evolution of institutions in an authoritarian system in which stability counts above all else. The observation that courts are innovating and adopting flexible practices not entirely consistent with formal laws in order to minimize discontent and insulate themselves from criticism is not unique to criminal cases. I have recently written of a similar phenomenon in medical disputes and others have noted similar trends in other areas. Recent scholarship has noted the emphasis on mediation in recent years in civil cases and the focus in the courts on anjie, shiliao – deciding the case and resolving the dispute. Henan’s bar to posting mediated cases online provides an additional incentive to courts to mediate cases.

The trends this article describes in Henan show how such policies have extended to criminal cases. Authorities believe that mediating or compelling settlements in criminal disputes will reduce threats to social stability, most significantly the threat of protest or petitioning. Specifically, mediated outcomes prevent victims (or their families) from protesting sentences they view as too light and prevent defendants’ families from objecting to sentences viewed as excessive.

In contrast with the social worker model of adjudication emphasized in literature in the U.S., however, the primary concern of China’s courts appears to be problem elimination, not problem solving. Hence courts appear not only to compel settlement, but to implicitly and explicitly threaten those who do not comply with such settlements, as evidenced by cases that target repeat petitioners. The state is also taking an active role in resolving what we might otherwise think of as private (non-criminal) disputes that appear only indirectly to affect state interests. Resolution of such cases appears based less on efforts to meet social expectations or impose community norms than on a functional focus on eliminating disputes.

China appears to be seeking to use courts to create a “no loser” model, where focus on outcomes not procedure (or law) leads all parties to

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310 In some jurisdictions in China judges may be evaluated both on whether or not a decision is reversed or vacated and also on whether or not there is an appeal at all.
312 Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? supra; Minzner, supra.
313 For a more detailed discussion of stability concerns, see Benjamin Liebman, China’s Law Stability Paradox, forthcoming DAEDALUS (2014).
accept negotiated outcomes, and where failure to do so is an indication that courts are not doing their job. The conflict between this approach and the adoption of a rule-based system has been widely noted in China, with many arguing that such moves undermine China’s efforts to construct a legal system.

The encouragement of state-mediated (or coerced) settlements may be particularly troubling in the criminal sphere. The promotion of negotiated outcomes marks a sharp departure from recent efforts to create a more adversarial system. The emphasis on settlement introduces a new element of coercion into the system.\footnote{Rosenzweig et al report similar findings and provide additional details regarding the coercive nature of criminal mediation. Rosenzweig et al, supra note, at 29-31.} The focus on negotiated outcomes reinforces the fact that courts are not a forum for determining guilt. Equity concerns are also readily apparent. Although most criticism within China of the embrace of settlement and mediation in the criminal context has focused on serious crimes—where defendants in effect purchase their life\footnote{For example, see Lewis, Leniency and Severity, supra, at 329, discussing equity concerns in capital cases}—my data suggest similar concerns in the imposition of sentences in routine cases. This article shows not only that some defendants are receiving strikingly lenient sentences but also that defendants who either refuse or lack the ability to pay may be punished harshly. Whether negotiated outcomes actually produce stability is unclear: criminal cases continue to be a primary source of complaints concerning the courts, in particular from victims’ families reportedly concerned that defendants will avoid punishment through back-room deals.

The data also show that courts are willing to assert their authority in some cases. One of the most surprising findings is the high rate of reversal of or changes to decisions on appeal to the intermediate court. This rate is much higher than generally understood to be the case within the legal community or rates reported in most prior research and in the official media. Yet this high rate of reversal is not limited to this one court or to criminal cases: I have also noted a high rate of reversal in medical malpractice cases in courts elsewhere in China.\footnote{Liebman, Malpractice Mobs, supra.} Some of the changes and reversals almost certainly reflect attempts to appease particular parties, or to encourage further settlement. But it also seems clear that the intermediate court is taking its role in reviewing cases seriously. In some cases institutional relationships and the fear of a case being labeled an error result in a dynamic in which the appellate and basic level courts are locked in a standoff, with cases remanded only to have lower courts issue the same or similar decision at retrial. This finding contrasts with those who have argued that appellate review in China has little effect, or that higher courts are generally unwilling to reverse lower court decisions.
because of the impact such decisions have on the career development of judges below. Likewise, the cases show that courts will in certain cases challenge and reject procuratorate determinations or arguments on appeal. Imposing lenient sentences may also allow courts to disagree with procuratorates without issuing a non-guilty verdict. Increased oversight over the courts appears to be making judges more careful and less willing to sign-off on clearly incorrect cases.

Future research will provide insight into the interplay between the adoption of formal law (the revised Criminal Procedure Law) and new procedural requirements and continued concerns about stability and emphasis on settling cases. The new law should in theory result in numerous changes readily apparent in case decisions: procurators are now required to attend all trials (something clearly not done in many cases handled via summary procedures in my dataset); appellate courts will be required to decide more cases on appeal (as opposed to remanding them); and witnesses should begin to attend trials. Many of these provisions in the new law are based on the assumption that the system is shifting toward an adversarial model of adjudication and impartial determination of guilt by judges. The evidence presented in this paper shows how far the reality is from such a model, and thus highlights the challenges facing attempts to implement the new law.

Henan’s experiment with judicial transparency also provides insight into innovation in China’s courts. Henan’s reforms have resulted in part from attempts to address widely-publicized egregious cases of injustice. They also reflect the personal goals of Zhang Liyong, the president of the Henan High People’s Court. Innovation has helped to boost Zhang’s profile; it remains to be seen to the degree to which the reforms outlive his time on the court. Henan’s innovations, the most important in China’s courts in the past decade, were not designed to increase judicial power. Innovative steps were part of an attempt to make the courts function more efficiently and make fewer errors, and in so doing win greater popular support. Legitimacy for the courts does appear to be a goal, but it is legitimacy rooted in meeting popular expectations, avoiding instability, and serving the interests of the state.

The fact that judges in China play roles different from those played by their western counterparts has long been observed in academic literature, as has the growing tension between judges’ own aspirations regarding their roles and the actual roles they play. I have argued elsewhere that many of the roles being played by Chinese courts today represent a continuation of revolutionary and pre-revolution tradition rather than a shift against efforts to build some form of a liberal rule of law system. This article shows how these trends manifest themselves in the criminal justice system, where judges balance efforts to resolve disputes with their own self-interest in avoiding being responsible for any
mistakes. The cases studied also provide insight into the roles lawyers play in such a system, with most focusing on technical arguments for leniency and on facilitating negotiated outcomes. Substantive arguments not relating to leniency are almost entirely unsuccessful. The cases thus provide an initial window into an as yet understudied topic: the role of lawyers in a system in which compelled mediation is dominant.

4. Authoritarian Transparency

Finally, this project also adds to literature about the role of transparency in the Chinese political system and authoritarian systems more generally. In some respects the courts in Henan today are the most transparent in China. Yet this transparency has very specific goals: controlling judges, reducing errors, and in so doing increasing public confidence in the courts. The fact that so much continues to go on behind the scenes makes the efficacy of such efforts at least questionable. Most notable, however, is the parallel to other areas in which the state has similarly embraced an instrumentalist view of transparency. Such areas include the adoption of freedom of information regulations and the “controlled transparency” model of media supervision of the legal system. Absent from discussion of the Henan policy of making cases available online is either concern with citizens’ right to know or focus on the possibility that making vast amounts of information publicly available may also play a role in furthering the development of the Chinese legal system. Instead, official discussion focuses almost entirely on the need to ensure judges obey the rules.

Henan’s experiment with judicial openness highlights three characteristics of China’s emerging model of authoritarian transparency. First, transparency is targeted, applying in limited areas and with specific constraints. This is evident from the limitations on publication of a range of types of cases, arguably some of which would provide the best window into courts’ performance in the most difficult cases. Second, transparency appears directed mainly at curbing official wrongdoing, not empowering individuals. This is true both in the courts and in media coverage of official corruption. Third, appeals to transparency are combined with appeals to populism. As Zhang Liyong noted, putting cases online is

317 Publication of cases is not the only possible metric of judicial transparency: the cases tells us little about whether trials were actually open to the public.
318 For example, the Henan cases provide no insight into the rule of court adjudication committees or Party Political legal committees. For a discussion of the general functioning of the courts, see Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q 633 (2007).
intended to subject judges to scrutiny by the online masses. Transparency is aimed at scaring judges into better performance and creating a platform for state oversight, with populism playing a functional role in supporting such goals.

Henan’s experiment is of particular relevance now, as the SPC seeks to encourage and require courts nationwide to place decisions online. Yet the SPC’s new rules also highlight some of the apparent uncertainty among court and Party-state leaders about the utility of transparency. The SPC rules will require the Henan courts to make some decisions publicly available that were not previously made available under Henan’s own rules on publication of court documents. Yet in one crucial respect the SPC rules will reduce transparency in Henan. The SPC rules state that court decisions may only be posted online one case decisions are “effective” – meaning either that the time period for filing an appeal has passed, or an appellate court has decided the case. Prior to the SPC rules Henan required publication of first instance decisions even when they were pending on appeal. Henan court officials note that this is no longer permitted. The ban on publication of decisions on appeal suggests discomfort with the possibility of public scrutiny of pending cases. Scrutiny is permitted only once courts have reached a definitive outcome. Transparency is being used for specific purposes – but is also being controlled.

The nearly daily corruption scandals in China in the past two years show that increased transparency and public scrutiny are not easily contained. New technologies are combining with increased focus by the state on attacking corruption to provide fertile ground for individuals and activists alike to expose wrongdoing. Yet this dynamic supports, rather than undermines, this model of authoritarian transparency, in significant part because such efforts are not rule (or law) based. Those who are exposed receive little in the way of legal process, and those not exposed fear online exposure or popular reaction rather than sustained compliance with legal rules. There is value in increased transparency in the Chinese system, but there is also danger in equating such steps with fundamental changes to how the system functions. Transparency may be a virtue, but it is also a tool of control.

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320 Interview 2014-1 (stating that “less will be made public under [the] SPC rules” that had previously been the case in Henan).
V. CONCLUSION

This article represents a first step toward taking advantage of the vast amount of data now available to scholars of Chinese law regarding court decisions. This article is also an initial step toward conceptualizing what such data mean for our understanding of the Chinese criminal justice system and for broader trends in the Chinese political-legal system. What remains most surprising is that such research is now possible, in large part due to Party-state interest in asserting oversight over China’s courts.
Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Cases Prosecuted in the County Court by Crime Sentenced

Total number of cases: 177

Total number of defendants: 273

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and trafficking of children (拐卖儿童罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and trafficking of women (拐卖妇女罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson (放火罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigamy (重婚罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery (受贿罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of illegal gains (掩饰隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (贪污罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of electrical equipment (破坏电力设备罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination of obscene materials (传播淫秽物品罪)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance of the peace (寻衅滋事罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embezzlement (职务侵占罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion and blackmail (敲诈勒索罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsely issuing exclusive value-added tax invoices (虚开增值税专用发票罪)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery and/or sale of state authorities' certificates (伪造、买卖国家机关证件罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗罪)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling (赌博罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal business act (非法经营罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal logging (滥伐林木罪)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal occupation of farmland (非法占用农用地罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal possession of guns (非法持有枪支罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal sale of invoices (非法出售发票罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional destruction of property (故意毁坏财物罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference with public administration (妨害公务罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary manslaughter (过失致人死亡罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of gambling facility (开设赌场罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized robbery (聚众哄抢罪)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and/or sale of fake and substandard products (生产、销售伪劣产品罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape (强奸罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>Defendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to execute court decision (拒不执行法院判决)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (抢劫罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure by force (抢夺罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accident (交通肇事罪)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times. The total number of unique cases is 177.

“Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple times.
Table 2: First Instance Intermediate Court Cases by Crimes Charged

Total cases: 37
Total Defendants: 67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Fraud (信用卡诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Counterfeit Money (出售假币罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery (受贿罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Fraud (合同诈骗罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (抢劫罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of Public Funds (挪用公款罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of Stolen Goods (掩饰，隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willful Injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Homicide (故意杀人罪)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt Fraud (票据诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harboring Criminals (窝藏罪)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping (绑架罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking (贩卖毒品罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (贪污罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Fraud (贷款诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraudulent Raising of Capital (集资诈骗罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Manufacturing of Explosives (非法制造爆炸物罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Swindle (骗取贷款罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple times.

“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
Table 3: Appeals in the Intermediate Court by Crime Charged

Total number of cases: 239
Total Defendants: 442

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Accident (交通肇事罪)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perjury (伪造证据罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Fraud (保险诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture (刑讯逼供罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the Mafia (参加黑社会罪)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery (受贿罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Fraud (合同诈骗罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructing Testimony (妨害作证罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructing Public Law Enforcement (妨害公务罪)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provocation (寻衅滋事罪)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid in Destroying Evidence (帮助毁灭证据)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Criminals to Escape Punishment (帮助犯罪分子逃避处罚罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Theft (抢劫枪支罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (抢劫罪)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and sale of Children (拐卖儿童罪)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and sale of women (拐卖妇女罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of Funds (挪用资金罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of Stolen Goods (掩饰,隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Homicide (故意杀人罪)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Property Damage (故意毁坏罪)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion (敲诈勒索罪)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes related to criminal syndicate (涉及黑社会性质犯罪)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Logging (滥伐林木罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse of Power (滥用职权罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect of duty (玩忽职守)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing and selling fake and inferior goods (生产、销售伪劣产品罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excavating Ancient Tombs (盗掘古墓)</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabotaging Production and Business Operation (破坏生产经营罪)</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Defendants</td>
<td>Defendants charged with more than one crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping (绑架罪)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embezzlement (职务侵占罪)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembling crowd to disturb social order (聚众扰乱社会秩序罪)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mob gathering and brawling (聚众斗殴)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False reporting of company registration capital (虚报注册资本)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗罪)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False accusation (诬告陷害罪)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking (贩卖毒品罪)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (贪污犯罪)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying Counterfeit Money (购买假币罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling (赌博罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negligent Infliction of Injury (过失致人重伤罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax evasion (逃税罪)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowingly Selling Merchandise Under a Fake Trademark (销售假冒注册商标的商品罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Fake medicine (销售假药罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing fake medicine (生产假药罪)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal trading of explosives (非法买卖爆炸物)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal production of and sale of falsified receipt (非法制造、出售非法制造发票罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal manufacturing of explosives (非法制造爆炸物罪)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Occupation of Farming Land (非法占用农用地罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegally accepting deposits from the public (非法吸收公众存款罪)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal detention (非法拘禁)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Possession of Guns (非法持有枪支罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful business operation (非法经营)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Practice of Medicine (非法行医罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Mining (非法采矿罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawing Public Funds for Investment (抽逃出资罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsified tax receipts (虚开抵扣税款发票罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime of having a large amount of undisclosed property (巨额财产来源不明罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime of concealing deposits offshore (隐瞒境外存款罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>550</strong></td>
<td><strong>277</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple times.
“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.

Table 4: Rehearing (*Zaishen*) Cases in the Intermediate Court

Total Cases: 16

Total Defendants: 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Accident Crime (交通肇事罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of Public Funds (挪用公款罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (贪污罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willful Injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provocation (寻衅滋事罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Detention (非法拘禁罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse of Power (滥用职权罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple times.

“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
Table 5: Female Defendants in the County Court by Crime Sentenced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Type</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized robbery (聚众哄抢罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery and/or sale of state authorities' certificates (伪造、买卖国家机关证件罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and trafficking of women (拐卖妇女罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of illegal gains (掩饰、隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and trafficking of children (拐卖儿童罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigamy (重婚罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance of the peace (寻衅滋事罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling (赌博罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal sales of invoices (非法出售发票罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accident (交通肇事罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: Female Defendants in First Instance Trials in the Intermediate Court

Total Cases with Female Defendants: 7
Total Female Defendants: 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Fraud (信用卡诈骗罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of Stolen Goods (掩饰,隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Homicide(故意杀人罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt Fraud (票据诈骗罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harboring Criminals (窝藏罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking (贩卖毒品罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Fraud (贷款诈骗罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Manufacturing of Explosives (非法制造爆炸物罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Swindle (骗取贷款罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple times.

“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
Table 7 – County Court Cases with Legal Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic accident (交通肇事罪)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of illegal gains (掩饰、隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination of obscene materials (传播淫秽物品罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and sale of fake and substandard products (生产、销售伪劣产品罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (贪污罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal logging (滥伐林木罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction and trafficking of children (拐卖儿童罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigamy (重婚罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance of the peace (寻衅滋事罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embezzlement (职务侵占罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extortion and blackmail (敲诈勒索罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falsely issuing exclusive value-added tax invoices (虚开增值税专用发票罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling (赌博罪); Illegal possession of guns (非法持有枪支罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal business act (非法经营罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of electric equipment (破坏电力设备罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal to execute court decision (拒不执行法院判决罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total number of cases with legal representation is 41. Two cases that involved multiple charges are counted twice under “cases.” Defendants are listed by the most serious crime charged.
**Table 8: Legal Representation in First Instance Intermediate Court Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Defendants</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Ds with Legal Rep?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Fraud (信用卡诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling Counterfeit Money (出售假币罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery (受贿罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Fraud (合同诈骗罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery (抢劫罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misappropriation of Public Funds(挪用公款罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealment of Stolen Goods(掩饰，隐瞒犯罪所得罪)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willful Injury (故意伤害罪)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Homicide (故意杀人罪)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (盗窃罪)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt Fraud (票据诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harboring Criminals (窝藏罪)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping (绑架罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud (诈骗)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Trafficking (贩卖毒品罪)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (贪污罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Fraud (贷款诈骗罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraudulent Raising of Capital (集资诈骗罪)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Manufacturing of Explosives (非法制造爆炸物罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Swindle (骗取贷款罪)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: Appeals Filed by Defendants, Victims, and Procuratorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Bringing the Appeal</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff (Victim)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procuratorate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant and Plaintiff (Victim)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant and Procuratorate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff (Victim) and Procuratorate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant, Plaintiff (Victim) and Procuratorate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Not applicable” reflect cases with multiple defendants where one or more defendants did not appeal. In cases where multiple defendants did appeal, all defendants that appealed were counted in the “Defendant” row. In cases concerning multiple defendants where the procuratorate appealed, the “Procuratorate” row reflects the number defendants for whom the procuratorate launched the appeal.
### Table 10: Outcomes on Appeal (Second Instance Defendants Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th># of defendants</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmed</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacated and remanded for retrial</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced the criminal sentence</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased the criminal sentence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed the applied law but sentence affirmed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal case affirmed but the attached civil compensation case vacated and remanded for retrial</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal case affirmed but attached civil compensation amount increased</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversed (Defendant acquitted)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total defendants</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Not applicable” refers to circumstances where a case had multiple defendants, one or more of whom did not appeal. As a result, the trial verdict against these defendants was effectively unchanged. This number is lower than the number of defendants coded as “not applicable” in Table 9: Appeals Filed by Defendants, Victims, and Procuratorate because in certain appeal decisions, particularly those where the criminal case was vacated and remanded, defendants who did not appeal benefited from the appeal of their co-defendant.