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I would like to thank, ) Tj 0 -13.44 TD -0.0142 Tc -0.1058 Tw (Graeme Dinwoodie,) Tj 96.96 0 TD 0.0741 Tc -0.1941 Tw ( Rochelle Dreyfuss,) Tj 95.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0051 Tc -0.1251 Tw (John Duffy, Brett Frischmann, Cynthia) Tj 188.16 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.032 Tc -0.152 Tw (Ho, ) Tj -386.4 -13.92 TD 0.0117 Tc -0.1317 Tw (Timothy Holbrook, Justin Hughes, and Janice Mueller ) Tj 264 0 TD 0.0605 Tc -0.0605 Tw (for helpful discussions and ) Tj -264 -13.92 TD 0.0735 Tc 0 Tw (comments) Tj 49.92 0 TD -0.0248 Tc -0.0952 Tw ( on earlier drafts) Tj 78.24 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (. ) Tj 8.64 0 TD 0.0238 Tc -0.0958 Tw (I also thank the DePaul University College of Law\222s Center ) Tj -136.8 -13.92 TD -0.001 Tc -0.039 Tw (for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology) Tj 280.8 0 TD 0.0617 Tc -0.1817 Tw ( \(CIPLIT) Tj 44.16 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.6 Tc 0 Tw (TM) Tj 11.52 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.156 Tc (\)) Tj 4.32 0 TD 0.024 Tc -0.144 Tw ( for the ) Tj -340.8 -13.44 TD 0.084 Tc 0 Tw (opportu) Tj 37.44 0 TD 0.0288 Tc -0.0848 Tw (nity to discuss some of the ideas presented in this article at its Symposium on ) Tj -37.44 -13.92 TD 0.0167 Tc -0.1367 Tw (Ownership and Control in the Academic World. ) Tj 236.64 0 TD 0.0447 Tc -0.0047 Tw (Finally, I am ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0378 Tc -0.0378 Tw (grateful to my research ) Tj -301.44 -13.92 TD 0.0127 Tc -0.0367 Tw (assistants, Glen Gesicki and Andrew Smith) Tj 208.32 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (,) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0 Tc -0.0407 Tw ( for their assistance with this project) Tj 173.76 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (.) 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Tj 9.6 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (C) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2244 Tc (HI) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.4994 Tc 0 Tw (L.) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.3214 Tc (EV) Tj 11.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0933 Tc -0.2133 Tw (1017, 1024) Tj 46.08 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD -0.0257 Tc -0.041 Tw (30 \(1989\) \(discussing the \223incentive to invent\224 theory\) [hereinafter ) Tj -145.44 -11.52 TD -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw (Eisenberg, ) Tj 44.64 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0086 Tc -0.1286 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science) Tj 144.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0583 Tc 0 Tw (].) 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I) Tj 12.96 0 TD 0.048 Tc -0.048 Tw (nstead, it has focused ) Tj 106.08 0 TD 0.0225 Tc -0.2385 Tw (on the distinction between commercial ) Tj -227.04 -27.84 TD 0.112 Tc -0.232 Tw (and non) Tj 38.88 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.0498 Tc -0.0702 Tw (commercial use) Tj 74.88 0 TD 0.0283 Tc -0.0523 Tw (, with commercial use categorically ) Tj 174.24 0 TD 0.0148 Tc -0.1348 Tw (ineligible for) Tj 61.92 0 TD 0.072 Tc -0.192 Tw ( the ) Tj -353.76 -27.36 TD -0.0014 Tc -0.1186 Tw (\223experimental use\224 ) Tj 95.04 0 TD 0.1056 Tc 0 Tw (exemption.) 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Tj 305.76 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (13) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0252 Tc 0.0252 Tw ( This recent ) Tj 62.4 0 TD 0.044 Tc -0.164 Tw (precedent ) Tj -376.8 -27.84 TD 0.0303 Tc -0.1503 Tw (demonstrates the difficulty of producing) Tj 193.44 0 TD -0.102 Tc -0.018 Tw ( re) Tj 12 0 TD 0.0013 Tc -0.0413 Tw (asonable results in individual cases while ) Tj -205.44 -27.36 TD -0.018 Tc -0.102 Tw (maintaining the co) Tj 89.28 0 TD 0.045 Tc 0 Tw (mmercial/non) Tj 67.2 0 TD -0.156 Tc (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0 Tc -0.1207 Tw (commercial rubric.) Tj 91.2 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (14) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -260.16 -27.84 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.032 Tc -0.152 Tw (Thus, in the most recent Federal Circuit opinion on the subject, ) Tj 306.72 0 TD /F2 12 Tf -0.0024 Tc 0 Tw (Madey) Tj 32.64 0 TD -0.008 Tc -0.112 Tw ( v. Duke ) Tj -375.36 -27.36 TD 0.0888 Tc 0 Tw (University) Tj 50.4 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 5.76 0 TD -0.0102 Tc -0.1098 Tw (university research wa) Tj 107.52 0 TD 0.0455 Tc -0.1655 Tw (s placed on the commercial side of the divide be) Tj 231.84 0 TD -0.0291 Tc -0.0909 Tw (cause it ) Tj -395.52 -27.84 TD 0.0175 Tc -0.1375 Tw (\223unmistakably furthers the ) Tj 131.04 0 TD 0.0194 Tc 0 Tw (institution\222s) Tj 57.6 0 TD -0.0101 Tc 0.0821 Tw ( legitimate business objectives, including ) Tj -188.64 -27.36 TD 0.0102 Tc -0.0768 Tw (educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects.\224) Tj 382.08 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (15) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.36 Tw (With ) Tj -396.48 -37.92 TD -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 227.04 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 224.64 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.68 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (12) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0026 Tc -0.1174 Tw (Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858) Tj 257.76 0 TD 0.0044 Tc -0.2204 Tw (, 863 \(Fed. Cir. 1984\), ) Tj 91.68 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0254 Tc 0.1454 Tw (superceded on ) Tj -358.56 -11.52 TD 0.1371 Tc -0.2571 Tw (other gr) Tj 32.64 0 TD 0 Tc -0.1205 Tw (ounds by ) Tj 38.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0077 Tc -0.1277 Tw ( 35 U.S.C. \247 271\(e\);) Tj 80.64 0 TD -0.0032 Tc -0.0731 Tw ( Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 ) Tj -151.68 -11.04 TD -0.0024 Tc -0.1176 Tw (\(Fed. Cir. 2000\).) Tj 67.2 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -67.2 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (13) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0255 Tc -0.1455 Tw (Roche Products) Tj 64.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0406 Tc -0.0794 Tw (, 733 F.2d ) Tj 42.72 0 TD -0.0389 Tc -0.0811 Tw (at ) Tj 9.6 0 TD -0.08 Tc 0 Tw (863) Tj 15.36 0 TD -0.0234 Tc -0.0566 Tw ( \(holding that courts should not \223construe the experimental use rule so ) Tj -141.12 -11.52 TD -0.0195 Tc -0.1005 Tw (broadly as to allow a violation of the p) Tj 154.08 0 TD -0.0137 Tc -0.1063 Tw (atent laws in the guise of \221scientific inquiry,\222 when that inquiry has ) Tj -154.08 -11.52 TD -0.0332 Tc -0.0868 Tw (definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes\224\)) Tj 262.08 0 TD 0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (;) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0248 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 31.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0794 Tc -0.1994 Tw (, 216 F.3d ) Tj 43.68 0 TD -0.0389 Tc -0.0811 Tw (at ) Tj 9.6 0 TD -0.0349 Tc -0.0851 Tw (1349 \(finding that ) Tj -351.36 -11.52 TD -0.028 Tc -0.0484 Tw (tests performed \223expressly for commercial purposes\224 did not implicate the 35 U.) Tj 322.56 0 TD -0.0488 Tc -0.0712 Tw (S.C. \247 271\(e\) exception\)) Tj 98.4 0 TD -0.4022 Tc -0.1978 Tw (; ) Tj -420.96 -11.52 TD 0.0179 Tc -0.1379 Tw (Madey v. Duke University) Tj 106.08 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (,) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0397 Tc -0.1597 Tw ( 307 F.3d 1351, 1362) Tj 86.4 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0047 Tc -0.1247 Tw (1363 \(Fed. Cir. 2002\)) Tj 87.36 0 TD -0.2222 Tc 0.1022 Tw (. S) Tj 12.48 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0524 Tc -0.0676 Tw (ee also) Tj 28.32 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0765 Tc 0.1165 Tw (Integra Life Sciences, ) Tj -328.8 -11.52 TD -0.1512 Tc 0.3512 Tw (Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,) Tj 85.92 0 TD 0.1044 Tc -0.2244 Tw ( No. 02) Tj 30.24 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0013 Tc -0.1187 Tw (1052 \(Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003\) ) Tj 122.88 0 TD -0.1236 Tc 0 Tw (\(Newman) Tj 38.88 0 TD -0.0578 Tc 0.0578 Tw ( concurring in part and) Tj 90.72 0 TD -0.0084 Tc 0.3684 Tw ( dissenting) Tj 43.2 0 TD -0.0811 Tc -0.0389 Tw ( in ) Tj -415.2 -11.52 TD -0.0786 Tc 0 Tw (part) Tj 15.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (\)) Tj 3.36 0 TD 0.1006 Tc -0.2206 Tw ( at 21) Tj 22.56 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.24 Tc (33) Tj 10.08 0 TD -0.0564 Tc -0.0636 Tw ( \(disputing) Tj 42.72 0 TD -0.0266 Tc -0.0934 Tw ( recent Federal Circuit interpretations of the common law experimental use ) Tj -97.44 -11.52 TD -0.0389 Tc 0 Tw (exception\).) 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Tj 2.4 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -244.8 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (15) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0135 Tc 0 Tw (Madey) Tj 27.36 0 TD -0.12 Tc (,) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1079 Tc -0.3879 Tw ( 307 F.3d ) Tj 40.8 0 TD -0.0389 Tc 0 Tw (at) Tj 7.2 0 TD 0.12 Tc -0.24 Tw ( 1362) Tj 23.04 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.12 Tc (63.) 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Tj 38.4 0 TD 0 Tc 0.36 Tw ( ) Tj 6.24 0 TD 0.0625 Tc -0.1825 Tw (It does not tell us the extent) Tj 133.44 0 TD -0.0206 Tc 0.0446 Tw ( to which the alleged infringer is interfering with the ) Tj -178.08 -27.36 TD 0.0275 Tc -0.1105 Tw (patentee\222s ability to recoup her research and development investment or the extent to ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0257 Tc -0.1457 Tw (which the use is primarily aimed at follow) Tj 202.56 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.052 Tc -0.172 Tw (on invention. ) Tj 69.6 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -276 -27.36 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD -0.14 Tc 0.02 Tw (The ) Tj 21.12 0 TD 0.0377 Tc -0.1577 Tw (problem with the commercial/non) Tj 163.68 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0085 Tc -0.1285 Tw (commercial distinc) Tj 91.2 0 TD 0.0644 Tc -0.0884 Tw (tion is not confined to ) Tj -315.84 -27.84 TD -0.004 Tc -0.116 Tw (the non) Tj 36 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0462 Tc -0.1662 Tw (commercial end of the spectrum.) Tj 157.92 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.0045 Tc -0.0285 Tw (Another recent Federal Circuit case, ) Tj 176.16 0 TD /F2 12 Tf -0.06 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 37.44 0 TD -0.084 Tc -0.036 Tw ( v. ) Tj -417.12 -27.36 TD 0.0454 Tc -0.1654 Tw (Service Engineering Corp.) Tj 128.64 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0049 Tc -0.1249 Tw (, illustrates the equally troubling consequences of giving ) Tj -128.64 -27.84 TD 0.042 Tc 0 Tw (patentee) Tj 40.32 0 TD 0.0027 Tc -0.1227 Tw (s complete veto power) Tj 108 0 TD 0.0283 Tc -0.1483 Tw ( over all \223commercial uses\224 of ) Tj 149.28 0 TD 0.02 Tc 0.02 Tw (a patented invention ) Tj -297.6 -27.36 TD 0.0492 Tc -0.2492 Tw (regardless of the purpose of the use.) 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Tj 2.88 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (23) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0155 Tc -0.0822 Tw ( Embrex was the exclusive licensee of the ) Tj -202.08 -44.64 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 192.48 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 190.08 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (20) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.1207 Tw (See also Integra) Tj 65.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.067 Tc -0.427 Tw (, No. 02) Tj 32.16 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD -0.0211 Tc -0.0989 Tw (1052 \(Fed. Cir. 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She opined that \223an ultimate ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.028 Tc -0.062 Tw (goal or hope of profit from successful research should not eliminate the exemption.\224 In Judge Newman\222s) Tj 421.92 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -421.92 -11.52 TD -0.0501 Tc -0.0699 Tw (view the research in ) Tj 82.08 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0121 Tc 0 Tw (Integra) Tj 30.24 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0299 Tc -0.0558 Tw ( was aimed at improving upon the patented compound and should fall under the ) Tj -112.32 -11.52 TD -0.0297 Tc -0.0903 Tw (experimental use exemption. ) Tj 120 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.1217 Tc 0 Tw (Id) Tj 8.64 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.027 Tc -0.147 Tw (. at 29. ) Tj 32.16 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj ET endstream endobj 37 0 obj 8945 endobj 35 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 32 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 36 0 R >> endobj 39 0 obj << /Length 40 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -218.88 -678.24 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (9) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -218.88 664.8 TD -0.176 Tc 0.056 Tw (law ) Tj 19.68 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 6.24 0 TD 0.0025 Tc -0.0352 Tw ( providing means to recoup appropriable investment \(the \223incentive to invent\224\) ) Tj -25.92 -27.84 TD 0.0131 Tc -0.0798 Tw (while permitting continued technological progress based on the inventive ) Tj 355.2 0 TD -0.0315 Tc -0.0885 Tw (idea \(the ) Tj -355.2 -27.36 TD -0.0089 Tc -0.1111 Tw (\223incentive to disclose\224\). ) Tj 121.44 0 TD 0.0203 Tc -0.0967 Tw (This work builds upon and incorporates many of the insights in ) Tj -121.44 -27.84 TD 0.0082 Tc -0.1282 Tw (the pioneering work of ) Tj 112.32 0 TD 0.0111 Tc -0.1311 Tw (Ronald Hartman) Tj 80.16 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (31) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.144 Tc -0.024 Tw ( and ) Tj 23.52 0 TD -0.0206 Tc -0.0994 Tw (Professor Rebecca Eisenberg) Tj 139.68 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (32) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.1392 Tc -0.2592 Tw ( on the ) Tj -375.84 -27.36 TD 0.019 Tc -0.139 Tw (experimental use exception) Tj 131.52 0 TD 0.022 Tc -0.142 Tw ( and is i) Tj 36.96 0 TD 0.0852 Tc -0.2052 Tw (n agreement with many of) Tj 126.72 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD -0.1752 Tc 0 Tw (their) Tj 21.6 0 TD 0.0324 Tc -0.1524 Tw ( conclusion) Tj 55.2 0 TD 0.246 Tc 0 Tw (s.) 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Tj 361.44 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD ( ) Tj -367.2 -27.36 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD -0.0058 Tc -0.0342 Tw (In its focus on the internal logic of the patent law, this analy) Tj 288 0 TD 0.0127 Tc 0.1073 Tw (sis also differs from ) Tj -324 -27.84 TD 0.232 Tc 0 Tw (the) Tj 14.88 0 TD -0.016 Tc -0.104 Tw ( work of ) Tj 43.2 0 TD 0.01 Tc 0 Tw (Profes) Tj 30.72 0 TD 0.132 Tc (s) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.022 Tc -0.094 Tw (or Maureen O\222Rourke, in which she advocates adoption of a multi) Tj 318.24 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj -411.84 -27.36 TD 0.0329 Tc -0.1529 Tw (factor test modeled on copyright law\222s fair use exception.) Tj 276.48 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (35) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0137 Tc -0.1337 Tw ( While acknowledging the ) Tj -285.12 -27.84 TD 0.0402 Tc -0.1602 Tw (relevance of many of the factor) Tj 150.24 0 TD 0.0214 Tc -0.1414 Tw (s Professor O\222Rourke identifies, this analysis seeks a more ) Tj -150.24 -27.36 TD 0.0493 Tc 0 Tw (practical) Tj 40.8 0 TD 0.0177 Tc -0.0577 Tw ( regime which will not require judges and juries to make complicated ) Tj -40.8 -27.84 TD 0.0321 Tc -0.1864 Tw (assessments of market failure, patentee incentives, and so forth. Instead, many of the ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0291 Tc -0.1491 Tw (factors identified by) Tj 96.96 0 TD -0.0249 Tc 0.0249 Tw ( Professor O\222Rourke are relevant) Tj 157.92 0 TD 0.0073 Tc -0.0473 Tw ( in devising the experimental use ) Tj -254.88 -27.84 TD 0.0251 Tc -0.1451 Tw (exceptions p) Tj 60.96 0 TD -0.017 Tc -0.103 Tw (roposed here.) 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Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1555 Tc 0 Tw (S) Tj 5.28 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1471 Tc (OC) Tj 11.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0034 Tc (\222) Tj 3.84 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1315 Tc (Y) Tj 5.28 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0276 Tc -0.0924 Tw ( 617 \(1986\) [hereinafter Hantman, ) Tj 139.68 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0266 Tc -0.1466 Tw (Experimental Use as an Exception) Tj 139.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0583 Tc 0 Tw (].) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -330.72 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (32) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc -0.0963 Tw (See ) Tj 16.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw (Eisenberg, ) Tj 44.64 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0074 Tc -0.1926 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science, supra) Tj 172.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0194 Tc -0.1006 Tw ( note ) Tj 22.08 0 TD /F0 10.08 Tf -0.0782 Tc 0.1182 Tw (Error! Bookmark not defined.) Tj 129.12 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0518 Tc -0.0682 Tw ( and ) Tj -394.08 -11.52 TD -0.0627 Tc -0.0573 Tw (accompanying text.) Tj 77.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -77.76 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (33) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0214 Tc -0.1414 Tw (See generally) Tj 54.72 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1342 Tc 0.0142 Tw ( Hantman, ) Tj 43.2 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0229 Tc -0.1429 Tw (Experimental Use as an Exc) Tj 114.24 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (eption) Tj 24.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0636 Tc -0.0564 Tw ( at 639) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.072 Tc 0.048 Tw (40, 44 ) Tj 27.84 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (and) Tj 14.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.107 Tc -0.013 Tw ( Eisenberg, ) Tj 46.56 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0679 Tc -0.1879 Tw (Patents and the ) Tj -365.76 -11.52 TD 0.0197 Tc -0.3797 Tw (Progress of Science) Tj 79.68 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1089 Tc -0.2289 Tw ( at 1078.) Tj 35.04 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -114.72 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (34) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw (Eisenberg, ) Tj 44.64 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0086 Tc -0.1286 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science) Tj 144.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0403 Tc -0.1603 Tw ( at 1031.) Tj 34.56 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -233.28 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (35) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.0607 Tc 0.1007 Tw (Maureen A. O\222Rourke, ) Tj 95.04 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0208 Tc -0.1941 Tw (Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, ) Tj 189.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.08 Tc 0.28 Tw (100 ) Tj 17.76 0 TD -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (C) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1258 Tc (OLUM) Tj 23.52 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.4994 Tc 0 Tw (L.) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.3214 Tc (EV) Tj 10.56 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.0967 Tc -0.2167 Tw ( 1177 \(2000\) ) Tj -378.24 -11.52 TD -0.0782 Tc -0.0418 Tw ([hereinafter O\222Ro) Tj 71.04 0 TD -0.0544 Tc -0.0656 Tw (urke, ) Tj 22.56 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0248 Tc -0.1448 Tw (Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law) Tj 184.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0583 Tc 0 Tw (].) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -284.16 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (36) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.093 Tc -0.027 Tw (Unlike ) Tj 29.28 0 TD 0.0364 Tc 0 Tw (Professor) Tj 38.4 0 TD -0.0264 Tc -0.0593 Tw ( O\222Rourke\222s proposal, however, the proposals in this article would not apply if a ) Tj -76.8 -11.52 TD -0.0325 Tc -0.0275 Tw (competitor markets a directly infringing product. O\222Rourke, ) Tj 245.28 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0248 Tc -0.1448 Tw (Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law) Tj 184.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj ET endstream endobj 40 0 obj 9289 endobj 38 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 32 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 39 0 R >> endobj 42 0 obj << /Length 43 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (10) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 664.8 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.02 Tc 0 Tw (The) Tj 18.24 0 TD 0.0234 Tc -0.0368 Tw ( distinction between recouping investment in appropriable invention and ) Tj -54.24 -27.84 TD 0.0282 Tc -0.1482 Tw (controlling follow) Tj 86.88 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0309 Tc -0.1509 Tw (on innovation is a well) Tj 109.44 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0322 Tc -0.1522 Tw (defined and meaningful criterion that can be ) Tj -204 -27.36 TD 0.0264 Tc -0.1464 Tw (used to evaluate proposals for unauthorized research use and to design a robu) Tj 371.52 0 TD 0.078 Tc -0.198 Tw (st ) Tj -371.52 -27.84 TD 0.0326 Tc -0.1526 Tw (experimental use exception.) Tj 134.4 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (37) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.0208 Tc -0.1408 Tw (Concentrating attention on this distinction highlights) Tj 253.44 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.08 Tc 0.28 Tw (two ) Tj -407.04 -27.36 TD 0.0143 Tc -0.1343 Tw (distinct types of experimental use of patented inventions. Experimentation aimed at ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0159 Tc -0.0825 Tw (verifying, designing around, or improving upon a patented invention ) Tj 332.16 0 TD 0.051 Tc 0.069 Tw (\(as in the) Tj 44.16 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F2 12 Tf -0.06 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 36.96 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -416.16 -27.36 TD -0.0336 Tc -0.0864 Tw (case\) ) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.0243 Tc -0.1443 Tw (plays essentially the same role as patent disclosure.) Tj 246.24 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (38) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.0296 Tc -0.1496 Tw (As discussed below,) Tj 97.92 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.06 Tc -0.18 Tw (because ) Tj -388.8 -27.84 TD -0.0255 Tc -0.0945 Tw (of differences between self) Tj 129.12 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.09 Tc -0.21 Tw (disclosing and non) Tj 91.2 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.252 Tc (self) Tj 16.8 0 TD -0.156 Tc (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0275 Tc -0.0515 Tw (disclosing inventions that have not ) Tj -248.64 -27.36 TD -0.004 Tc -0.116 Tw (been widely recognized, ) Tj 119.52 0 TD 0.021 Tc 0 Tw (such) Tj 22.56 0 TD 0.0083 Tc -0.1283 Tw ( \223experimenting on\224 a patented invention h) Tj 207.36 0 TD 0.042 Tc 0.318 Tw (as ) Tj 12.96 0 TD -0.0204 Tc 0.3804 Tw (relatively ) Tj -362.4 -27.84 TD -0.068 Tc -0.052 Tw (little ) Tj 24.96 0 TD -0.0018 Tc -0.1182 Tw (impact on the in) Tj 77.76 0 TD -0.0368 Tc 0.0768 Tw (centive to invent ) Tj 82.56 0 TD 0.0431 Tc -0.0671 Tw (and should be broadly permitted ) Tj 158.88 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 6.24 0 TD -0.0092 Tc 0.0492 Tw ( without regard ) Tj -350.4 -27.36 TD 0.0396 Tc -0.1596 Tw (to the commercial or non) Tj 120.96 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.048 Tc (c) Tj 5.28 0 TD 0.0196 Tc -0.1396 Tw (ommercial nature of the user. Such a) Tj 179.04 0 TD 0.0388 Tc -0.1588 Tw ( broad exemption for ) Tj -309.12 -27.84 TD 0.0163 Tc -0.0296 Tw (\223experimenting on\224 patented inventions is already available in many ) Tj 332.64 0 TD -0.0341 Tc -0.0859 Tw (countries, including ) Tj -332.64 -27.36 TD 0.0445 Tc -0.1645 Tw (Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan.) Tj 205.92 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (39) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0011 Tc -0.0338 Tw ( The United States would do well to follow ) Tj -214.56 -27.84 TD 0.0146 Tc -0.1346 Tw (these countries\222 example.) Tj 122.4 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (40) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -131.04 -28.32 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 319.2 432 0.48 re f BT 521.76 316.8 TD ( ) Tj -432 -12 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.019 Tc -0.101 Tw (at 1206. Professor O\222Rourke advocates the possibility of such an exemption when the infringing product ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0223 Tc -0.0677 Tw (constitutes a major advance over the initial invention, but is still subject to patent blocking. ) Tj 369.12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0411 Tc -0.1611 Tw (Id. ) Tj 15.84 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1048 Tc -0.0152 Tw (The ) Tj -384.96 -11.52 TD -0.0279 Tc -0.0921 Tw (analysis of such situations is beyond the sc) Tj 170.88 0 TD -0.0189 Tc -0.0574 Tw (ope of this Article, though it bears superficial similarity to the ) Tj -170.88 -11.52 TD -0.0314 Tc -0.0246 Tw (research tool problem discussed below. The potential for blocking patents differs from that problem, ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0284 Tc -0.0616 Tw (however, in that it can arise only after an improvement is made. Once the improvement ) Tj 353.76 0 TD -0.0035 Tc -0.1165 Tw (is made, both ) Tj -353.76 -11.52 TD -0.0247 Tc -0.0671 Tw (patentees have incentives to come to an agreement that would allow the improvement to be marketed. ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0258 Tc -0.0184 Tw (Further investigation of this issue is clearly warranted. However, I do not think it is sufficient reason to ) Tj T* -0.0351 Tc -0.0849 Tw (abandon the relatively straightf) Tj 124.32 0 TD -0.0153 Tc -0.0678 Tw (orward approach to experimental use advocated in this Article in favor of a ) Tj -124.32 -11.52 TD 0.0622 Tc 0 Tw (multi) Tj 21.6 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0414 Tc -0.0306 Tw (factor test that will be extremely difficult to apply in practice.) Tj 245.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -270.24 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (37) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0214 Tc -0.1414 Tw (See generally ) Tj 57.12 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0578 Tc -0.0622 Tw (Graeme B. Dinwoodie) Tj 89.76 0 TD -0.0375 Tc -0.0825 Tw ( & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ) Tj 123.36 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0419 Tc -0.2579 Tw (Preserving the Public Domain of ) Tj -279.36 -11.04 TD 0.0338 Tc -0.1538 Tw (Science Und) Tj 50.88 0 TD -0.0137 Tc -0.1063 Tw (er International Law) Tj 83.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0668 Tc -0.0532 Tw ( \(forthcoming\)) Tj 58.56 0 TD -0.0413 Tc -0.0787 Tw ( [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, ) Tj 149.28 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0091 Tc -0.1291 Tw (Preserving the Public ) Tj -341.76 -11.52 TD 0.0277 Tc -0.3877 Tw (Domain of Science) Tj 75.84 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0533 Tc 0.0933 Tw (] \(distinguishing between patents giving power in product markets and patents giving ) Tj -75.84 -11.52 TD -0.0447 Tc 0.012 Tw (power over innovation markets\). As an aside, I might note tha) Tj 249.6 0 TD -0.033 Tc 0.009 Tw (t the distinction between recouping ) Tj -249.6 -11.52 TD -0.0334 Tc 0.0241 Tw (appropriable investment and exercising control over subsequent innovation might prove useful in defining ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0238 Tc -0.0642 Tw (\223normal exploitation\224 of a patent as it is used in Article 30 of TRIPS. ) Tj 281.76 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.2259 Tc 0 Tw (id.) Tj 10.56 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1006 Tc -0.2206 Tw ( at 15) Tj 22.56 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD 0.28 Tc (26.) Tj 12.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -347.52 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (38) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0121 Tc 0 Tw (Integra) Tj 30.24 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.0084 Tc -0.1284 Tw (No. 02) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0 Tc -0.1207 Tw (1052 \() Tj 25.92 0 TD -0.0258 Tc -0.0942 Tw (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003\) at 26) Tj 114.24 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0782 Tc -0.0418 Tw (7 \(Newman ) Tj 48.96 0 TD -0.0578 Tc 0.0578 Tw (concurring in part and ) Tj 91.2 0 TD -0.0084 Tc 0 Tw (dissenting) Tj 40.32 0 TD -0.0794 Tc 0.1994 Tw ( in part) Tj 28.32 0 TD 0.0034 Tc -0.1234 Tw (\) ) Tj -426.72 -11.52 TD -0.0323 Tc -0.0397 Tw (\(discussing the relationship between disclosure and experimentation on patented subject matter\).) 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Tj 201.6 0 TD 0.057 Tc -0.177 Tw ( Section V) Tj 53.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -412.32 -27.84 TD 0.0155 Tc -0.1355 Tw (offers conclusions and summarizes the comprehensive approach to experimental use ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD -0 Tc 0 Tw (suggest) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0112 Tc -0.1312 Tw (ed by the analysis of this Article.) Tj 157.92 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -175.68 -27.84 TD -0.144 Tc 0 Tw (II.) 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Tj 23.52 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (47) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0268 Tc -0.1168 Tw ( Rather, this brief reprise focuses on how the exception has evolved to lose track ) Tj -32.16 -27.84 TD 0.0535 Tc -0.2335 Tw (of the need for an exception to permit \223exper) Tj 216.48 0 TD 0.0172 Tc -0.1372 Tw (imenting on\224 the invention and become ) Tj -216.48 -27.36 TD -0.015 Tc 0.055 Tw (mired in an all) Tj 69.12 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 4.32 0 TD 0.029 Tc -0.149 Tw (encompassing focus on the commercial/non) Tj 211.2 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0251 Tc -0.1451 Tw (commercial distinction.) Tj 113.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -401.76 -27.84 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0139 Tc -0.0939 Tw (The experimental use defense to patent infringement has its origins in the ) Tj -36 -27.36 TD 0.0012 Tc -0.0678 Tw (jurisprudence of Justice Story, in his days riding circuit in) Tj 277.92 0 TD 0.0388 Tc -0.1588 Tw ( the early nineteenth century. ) Tj -277.92 -27.84 TD 0.042 Tc 0.318 Tw (In ) Tj 13.44 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0293 Tc -0.1493 Tw (Whittemore v. Cutter) Tj 101.28 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0015 Tc -0.1215 Tw (, Justice Story first addressed the issue in an aside while ) Tj -114.72 -27.36 TD 0.0109 Tc -0.0966 Tw (discussing a jury instruction describing infringement as the \223making of a machine fit for ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0237 Tc -0.0903 Tw (use, and with a design to use it for profit.\224) Tj 202.56 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (48) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.042 Tc -0.002 Tw ( In ) Tj 18.72 0 TD 0.022 Tc -0.062 Tw (the absence of today\222s specific statutory ) Tj -229.92 -27.36 TD 0.071 Tc 0 Tw (enumeration,) Tj 62.88 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (49) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0216 Tc -0.1416 Tw ( the defendant objected to including the making of a machine within the ) Tj -71.52 -27.84 TD 0.0054 Tc -0.0226 Tw (realm of infringement. Justice Story upheld the instruction, commenting that it was, in ) Tj 0 -35.52 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 146.4 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 144 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (46) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0608 Tc 0.0592 Tw (See supra ) Tj 42.24 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0194 Tc -0.1006 Tw (note ) Tj 19.2 0 TD -0.0337 Tc -0.0863 Tw (__ and accompanying text.) Tj 107.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -178.08 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (47) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0214 Tc -0.1414 Tw (See generally ) Tj 57.12 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0913 Tc -0.0287 Tw (Richard E. Bee, ) Tj 64.8 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.1205 Tw (Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Inf) Tj 165.12 0 TD -0.0083 Tc 0 Tw (ringement) Tj 40.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.04 Tc 0.16 Tw (, 39 ) Tj 17.28 0 TD -0.1006 Tc 0 Tw (J.) 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Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1555 Tc 0 Tw (S) Tj 5.28 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1471 Tc (OC) Tj 11.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0034 Tc (\222) Tj 3.84 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1315 Tc (Y) Tj 5.28 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -429.12 -11.52 TD -0.0526 Tc -0.0674 Tw (357 \(1957\), Hantman, ) Tj 90.24 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0077 Tc -0.1123 Tw (Experimental Use as an Exception) Tj 139.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0645 Tc 0.1845 Tw (, Eisenberg, ) Tj 49.44 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0086 Tc -0.1286 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science) Tj 144.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (, ) Tj -423.84 -11.52 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.08 Tc (and) Tj 15.36 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0655 Tc -0.0545 Tw ( O\222Rourke, ) Tj 47.04 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0026 Tc -0.1174 Tw (Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law) Tj 184.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (.) 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Tj 42.72 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (54) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0165 Tc -0.0765 Tw ( The exception was given renewed legitimacy ) Tj 225.6 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 6.24 0 TD 0.096 Tc -0.216 Tw ( and a) Tj 28.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.096 Tc -0.216 Tw (de ) Tj -401.28 -27.84 TD 0.0566 Tc 0 Tw (minimis) Tj 38.4 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0467 Tc -0.0733 Tw ( direction) Tj 45.12 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 6.24 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0219 Tc -0.1419 Tw (when it was adopted by the famous Robinson patent treatise of 1890. ) Tj -95.52 -56.16 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 180.96 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 178.56 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (50) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc 0 Tw (Whittemore) Tj 47.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1089 Tc -0.2289 Tw ( at 1121.) 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Cas. 934, 935 ) Tj -349.44 -11.52 TD 0 Tc -0.1203 Tw (\(C.C.D. Mass. 1852\) \(inte) Tj 104.64 0 TD -0.0219 Tc -0.0981 Tw (rpreting the experimental use exception as founded on an assumption of ) Tj 289.92 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0422 Tc -0.1622 Tw (de ) Tj -394.56 -11.52 TD 0.0338 Tc 0 Tw (minimis) Tj 32.16 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0847 Tc -0.0353 Tw ( injury\).) 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No Act an Infringement unless it Affects the Pecuniary Interests of ) Tj -6.24 -13.44 TD 0.029 Tc -0.149 Tw (the Owner of the Patented Invention. ) Tj 180.48 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -180.48 -13.92 TD ( ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.021 Tc -0.101 Tw (The interest to be promoted by the wrongful employment of the invention ) Tj T* 0.0309 Tc -0.2042 Tw (must be hostile to the interest of the patentee. ) Tj 220.32 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0933 Tc -0.4533 Tw (The interest of the pa) Tj 102.24 0 TD 0.104 Tc -0.224 Tw (tentee ) Tj -322.56 -13.44 TD 0.0436 Tc -0.2005 Tw (is represented by the emoluments which he does or might receive from the ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0299 Tc -0.1499 Tw (practice of the invention by himself or others. These, though not always ) Tj T* 0.061 Tc -0.2877 Tw (taking the shape of money, are of a pecuniary character,) Tj 272.64 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.056 Tc 0.128 Tw ( and their value is ) Tj -272.64 -13.92 TD 0.0031 Tc -0.1231 Tw (capable of estimation like ) Tj 126.24 0 TD 0.0392 Tc -0.1592 Tw (other property. Hence acts of infringement must ) Tj -126.24 -13.44 TD 0.0329 Tc -0.116 Tw (attack the right of the patentee to these emoluments, and either turn them ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0104 Tc -0.0196 Tw (aside into other channels or prevent them from accruing in favor of any ) Tj T* 0.0226 Tc -0.0553 Tw (one. An unauthorized sale of the invention is always such an ) Tj 294.24 0 TD -0.0036 Tc -0.1164 Tw (act. But the ) Tj -294.24 -13.92 TD 0.0397 Tc -0.1966 Tw (manufacture or the use of the invention may be intended only for other ) Tj 0 -13.44 TD 0.0283 Tc -0.3403 Tw (purposes, and produce no pecuniary result) Tj 202.56 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.085 Tc -0.205 Tw (. Thus where it is made or used ) Tj -202.56 -13.92 TD 0.0356 Tc -0.1556 Tw (as an experiment, whether for the gratification of scientific tastes, or for ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.048 Tc -0.328 Tw (curiosity, or for amu) Tj 99.84 0 TD 0.0641 Tc -0.3041 Tw (sement, the interests of the patentee are not ) Tj -99.84 -13.92 TD 0.0548 Tc -0.3057 Tw (antagonized, the sole effect being of an intellectual character in the ) Tj 0 -13.44 TD 0.0543 Tc -0.2616 Tw (promotion of the employer's knowledge or the relaxation afforded to his ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0591 Tc -0.2134 Tw (mind. But if the products of the experiment are sold, or used for ) Tj 312 0 TD 0.232 Tc -0.352 Tw (the ) Tj -312 -13.92 TD 0.0402 Tc -0.2038 Tw (convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are conducted with ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0691 Tc -0.3891 Tw (a view to the adaptation of the invention to the experimentor's business, ) Tj 0 -13.44 TD 0.0619 Tc -0.2419 Tw (the acts of making or of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0277 Tc -0.4677 Tw (infringements of his paten) Tj 124.8 0 TD 0.024 Tc 0 Tw (t) Tj 3.84 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0304 Tc -0.1504 Tw (. In reference to such employments of a ) Tj -128.64 -13.92 TD 0.0224 Tc -0.0624 Tw (patented invention the law is diligent to protect the patentee, and even ) Tj 0 -13.44 TD 0.0276 Tc -0.1912 Tw (experimental uses will be sometimes enjoined though no injury may have ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0028 Tc -0.1228 Tw (resulted admitting of positive redress) Tj 177.6 0 TD 0.0164 Tc 0.0556 Tw (. [Footnotes omitted. Emphasis ) Tj -177.6 -13.92 TD -0.048 Tc 0 Tw (a) Tj 5.28 0 TD 0.066 Tc (dded.]) Tj 30.24 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (55) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -80.16 -13.92 TD ( ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0184 Tc -0.1384 Tw (Robinson\222s still) Tj 75.36 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 4.32 0 TD 0.0157 Tc -0.0823 Tw (influential treatise, with its exclusive focus on pecuniary effects ) Tj -115.68 -27.84 TD 0.0064 Tc -0.0624 Tw (on the patentee, its failure even to mention the social goal of trading exclusivity for ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0227 Tc -0.1427 Tw (enhanced progress, and its failure to discuss the category of experimenta) Tj 348.48 0 TD -0.006 Tc -0.114 Tw (l uses aimed at ) Tj -348.48 -27.84 TD 0.0274 Tc -0.1474 Tw (\223experimenting on\224 the invention to \223ascertain the verity and exactness of the ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD -0.0032 Tc 0 Tw (specification,\224) Tj 69.6 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (56) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0222 Tc -0.1022 Tw ( shaped the direction of experimental use doctrine in the United States ) Tj -78.24 -27.84 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 100.8 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 98.4 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.68 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (55) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.0845 Tc 0 Tw (W) Tj 9.12 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1186 Tc -0.0014 Tw (ILLIAM ) Tj 29.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0617 Tc 0 Tw (C.) Tj 9.6 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1061 Tc (OBINSON) Tj 35.52 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (,) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc 0 Tw (T) Tj 5.76 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1586 Tc 0.0386 Tw (HE ) Tj 12.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc 0 Tw (L) Tj 6.24 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2458 Tc 0.1258 Tw (AW OF ) Tj 26.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1555 Tc 0 Tw (P) Tj 6.24 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1187 Tc 0.2387 Tw (ATENTS FOR ) Tj 49.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (U) Tj 7.2 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.0914 Tc -0.0286 Tw (SEFUL ) Tj 26.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (I) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1204 Tc (NVENTIONS) Tj 45.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.077 Tc -0.197 Tw ( \247 898 \(1890\).) Tj 57.6 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -354.72 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (56) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0331 Tc 0 Tw (Sawin) Tj 24.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0372 Tc -0.1572 Tw (, 21 F. Cas. at 555.) Tj 75.36 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj ET endstream endobj 61 0 obj 6774 endobj 57 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 51 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R /F4 58 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 60 0 R >> endobj 63 0 obj << /Length 64 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (16) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 664.8 TD 0.0285 Tc -0.1048 Tw (throughout the twentieth century. Thus, Justice Story\222s statement of an ) Tj 346.08 0 TD -0.0272 Tc -0.0928 Tw (experimental use ) Tj -346.08 -27.84 TD 0.0066 Tc -0.1266 Tw (exception for \223philosophical experiments\224) Tj 203.52 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (57) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.024 Tc -0.0907 Tw ( is widely cited, while the second prong of ) Tj -214.08 -27.36 TD 0.0237 Tc -0.1037 Tw (his analysis, focused on experimentation to understand the operation of the patented ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0.0013 Tc -0.0227 Tw (invention more fully, is rarely discussed) Tj 192.96 0 TD 0.0589 Tc -0.1789 Tw ( by the courts) Tj 65.28 0 TD -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw ( and remains) Tj 60.96 0 TD -0.024 Tc 0.144 Tw ( essentially ) Tj -319.2 -27.36 TD 0.08 Tc 0 Tw (undeveloped.) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -64.8 -27.84 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0249 Tc -0.1449 Tw (As the courts attempted to apply the Robinson formulation of the doctrine, the ) Tj -36 -27.36 TD 0.02 Tc -0.1 Tw (emphasis on pecuniary effects on the patentee evolved into a distinction between ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0412 Tc -0.1612 Tw (commercial and non) Tj 98.4 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0105 Tc -0.1305 Tw (commercial users.) Tj 86.88 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (58) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0346 Tc -0.1546 Tw ( Some such evolution was perhap) Tj 164.64 0 TD -0.0578 Tc -0.0622 Tw (s inevitable ) Tj -362.4 -27.36 TD 0.0145 Tc -0.0279 Tw (because of the inherently circular character of a \223pecuniary ) Tj 287.04 0 TD 0.0371 Tc -0.1571 Tw (interests of) Tj 52.8 0 TD 0.042 Tc -0.162 Tw ( the patentee\224 ) Tj -339.84 -27.84 TD 0.0024 Tc 0 Tw (test.) Tj 19.68 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (59) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0 Tc -0.0508 Tw ( The question whether a particular unauthorize) Tj 226.56 0 TD 0.0124 Tc -0.0364 Tw (d use affects the pecuniary interes) Tj 163.2 0 TD 0.078 Tc 0.282 Tw (ts ) Tj -418.08 -27.36 TD 0.0111 Tc -0.1311 Tw (of the patentee is, of course, answered by the judicial determin) Tj 300.48 0 TD -0.0467 Tc 0.0467 Tw (ation of the legal rule) Tj 102.24 0 TD 0.06 Tc -0.18 Tw ( that ) Tj -402.72 -27.84 TD 0.0272 Tc -0.2158 Tw (determines the scope of the patentee\222s exclusive rights) Tj 261.6 0 TD 0.0467 Tc -0.1133 Tw (. If the use in question is deemed ) Tj -261.6 -27.36 TD 0.0246 Tc -0.1446 Tw (\223experimental,\224 the patentee has no right to royalties or other pecuniary benefits from the ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.024 Tc -0.144 Tw (use. If the use is not \223experimental,\224 the ) Tj 198.72 0 TD 0.012 Tc -0.052 Tw (patentee\222s pecuniary rights are clearly affected ) Tj -198.72 -27.36 TD 0.0219 Tc -0.0219 Tw (since no consideration was ) Tj 132 0 TD 0.0212 Tc -0.1412 Tw (paid for the unauthorized use.) Tj 143.04 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (60) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -283.68 -27.84 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0091 Tc 0.0081 Tw (The pecuniary interests approach cannot tell us ) Tj 228.96 0 TD 0.0077 Tc -0.1277 Tw (which unauthorized uses, if any, ) Tj -264.96 -27.36 TD 0.0158 Tc -0.1358 Tw (should be excused. Thus, the \223emoluments which [a patentee]) Tj 297.12 0 TD 0.0648 Tc -0.1848 Tw ( does o) Tj 34.56 0 TD 0.0155 Tc -0.0155 Tw (r might receive from ) Tj -331.68 -27.84 TD 0.0066 Tc -0.0666 Tw (the practice of the invention by himself or others) Tj 234.24 0 TD -0.048 Tc 0 Tw (\224) Tj 5.28 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (61) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0043 Tc -0.1928 Tw ( are necessarily defined by the legal ) Tj -248.16 -27.36 TD 0.0202 Tc -0.1033 Tw (boundaries of the patentee\222s rights. To decide whether a particular unauthorized use ) Tj 0 -40.32 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 169.44 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 167.04 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (57) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc 0 Tw (Whittemore) Tj 47.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.0932 Tc -0.3332 Tw (29 F. Cas. at 1121.) Tj 75.84 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -136.8 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (58) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.01 Tc -0.11 Tw (Ruth v. Stearn) Tj 57.12 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.1362 Tc 0.4962 Tw (Roger Mf) Tj 39.36 0 TD -0.0606 Tc -0.0594 Tw (g. Co.,) Tj 26.4 0 TD 0.0259 Tc -0.1459 Tw ( 13 F. Supp. 697 \(D. Colo. 1935\), ) Tj 137.76 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0384 Tc -0.3184 Tw (rev\222d on other grounds) Tj 92.64 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0439 Tc -0.1639 Tw (, 87 F.2d 35 ) Tj -365.76 -11.52 TD 0.1611 Tc 0 Tw (\(10) Tj 13.92 4.32 TD /F1 6.72 Tf -0.4541 Tc (th) Tj 4.8 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0159 Tc -0.1041 Tw ( Cir. 1936\).) Tj 46.08 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -64.8 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (59) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw ( Eisenberg, ) Tj 47.04 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0246 Tc -0.2406 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science) Tj 144.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.067 Tc -0.187 Tw ( at 1034) Tj 32.64 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.12 Tc (35.) Tj 12.48 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -263.04 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (60) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0145 Tc -0.1055 Tw ( Alternatively, one could view the pecuniary interests test as encompassing any use for which th) Tj 384 0 TD 0.0422 Tc 0.0778 Tw (e law ) Tj -390.72 -11.52 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0636 Tc 0 Tw (could) Tj 22.56 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0328 Tc -0.0338 Tw ( provide compensation to the patentee. Interpreted in this way, a pecuniary interests test is simply a ) Tj -22.56 -11.52 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0357 Tc -0.1557 Tw (de minimis) Tj 44.16 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0911 Tc -0.0289 Tw ( exception.) Tj 43.2 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -87.36 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (61) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0608 Tc 0.0592 Tw (See supra ) Tj 42.24 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0616 Tc -0.0584 Tw (note _ and accompanying text.) Tj 121.44 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj ET endstream endobj 64 0 obj 6734 endobj 62 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 51 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 63 0 R >> endobj 66 0 obj << /Length 67 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (17) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 664.8 TD 0.0257 Tc -0.1457 Tw (deprives the patentee of legitimate returns, one must know ) Tj 284.16 0 TD 0.0206 Tc -0.1406 Tw (whether the unauthorized use ) Tj -284.16 -27.84 TD 0.0272 Tc -0.1472 Tw (falls within the experimental use exception. A more well) Tj 275.04 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0378 Tc -0.1578 Tw (defined test is needed. ) Tj 112.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -391.68 -27.36 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0184 Tc -0.1384 Tw (The commercial/non) Tj 99.84 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0278 Tc -0.1478 Tw (commercial distinction is an attempt to capture the ) Tj -139.68 -27.84 TD 0.0104 Tc -0.0431 Tw (pecuniary effects idea but it has not been entirely successful in doing) Tj 330.72 0 TD 0.0648 Tc -0.1848 Tw ( so because, as the ) Tj -330.72 -27.36 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0936 Tc 0 Tw (Madey) Tj 33.12 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.016 Tc 0.136 Tw ( and ) Tj 23.04 0 TD /F2 12 Tf -0.06 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 36.96 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0108 Tc -0.0108 Tw ( cases illustrate, the financial impact on the ) Tj 210.72 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.018 Tc 0 Tw (patentee) Tj 40.8 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0022 Tc 0.0022 Tw ( is not always ) Tj -344.64 -27.84 TD 0.0191 Tc -0.1391 Tw (captured by the financial motives of the ) Tj 193.44 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0053 Tc 0 Tw (infringer) Tj 43.2 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.88 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (62) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.02 Tc 0 Tw (The) Tj 18.24 0 TD 0.0447 Tc -0.0447 Tw ( \223legitimate business\224 expansion ) Tj -272.16 -27.36 TD 0.0127 Tc -0.0927 Tw (of the idea of \223commercial use\224 is an attempt to deal with u) Tj 286.08 0 TD 0.0131 Tc -0.1331 Tw (nauthorized uses which, ) Tj -286.08 -27.84 TD 0.0242 Tc -0.1842 Tw (though not undertaken \223for profit\224 by the infringer, appeared to have substantial ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD -0.006 Tc 0.126 Tw (pecuniary effects ) Tj 84.96 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0646 Tc -0.1846 Tw (on the patentee) Tj 73.92 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0133 Tc -0.0024 Tw (. Thus, while in 1935 a district court based an ) Tj -158.88 -27.84 TD 0.0124 Tc -0.1324 Tw (experimental use exception entirely on the fact that the infringing ) Tj 316.8 0 TD 0.0416 Tc -0.0416 Tw (user was an academic ) Tj -316.8 -27.36 TD 0.0252 Tc -0.1452 Tw (research institution,) Tj 94.56 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (63) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0244 Tc -0.0911 Tw ( by the 1970\222s the Court of Claims, in ) Tj 184.8 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.042 Tc -0.162 Tw (Pitcairn v. United States) Tj 118.56 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (,) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -411.36 -27.84 TD 0.0269 Tc -0.1469 Tw (rejected the United States government\222s argument that the manufacture and use \223for ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD -0.0019 Tc -0.0495 Tw (testing and experimental purposes\224 of certain infringing helico) Tj 300.96 0 TD 0.0284 Tc -0.0284 Tw (pters should be permitted ) Tj -300.96 -27.84 TD 0.0075 Tc -0.1275 Tw (under the experimental use doctrine.) Tj 175.2 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (64) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD ( ) Tj -189.6 -27.36 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0304 Tc -0.1504 Tw (Though the government clearly had no \223) Tj 195.36 0 TD -0.0012 Tc 0 Tw (commercial) Tj 55.68 0 TD 0.0226 Tc -0.074 Tw (\224 motive for its use, the court ) Tj -287.04 -27.84 TD 0.0323 Tc -0.1223 Tw (held that the tests in that case were necessary for any new helicopter and were \223intended ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0157 Tc -0.1357 Tw (uses of the infring) Tj 86.88 0 TD 0.0235 Tc 0.0165 Tw (ing aircraft manufactured for) Tj 139.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0071 Tc 0.0101 Tw (the defendant and [were] in keeping with ) Tj -228.48 -27.84 TD -0.0203 Tc -0.0997 Tw (the legitimate) Tj 65.28 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0686 Tc 0 Tw (busines) Tj 36.48 0 TD 0.0394 Tc -0.0794 Tw (s of the using agency\224 and ) Tj 130.08 0 TD 0.064 Tc -0.184 Tw (not exempted.) Tj 68.16 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (65) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.14 Tc 0.02 Tw ( The ) Tj 27.36 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.003 Tc 0 Tw (Pitcairn) Tj 39.84 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.036 Tc -0.084 Tw ( court ) Tj -378.24 -27.36 TD 0.0472 Tc -0.1672 Tw (apparently did not ) Tj 90.72 0 TD 0.0011 Tc -0.0731 Tw (consider whether the disputed tests of \223lifting ability, effect of ) Tj -90.72 -27.84 TD -0.0268 Tc -0.0932 Tw (vibration on in) Tj 70.56 0 TD 0.0251 Tc -0.0971 Tw (stalled equipment, flight speed and range, engine efficiency, and numerous ) Tj -70.56 -35.52 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 146.4 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 144 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (62) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw (Eisenberg, ) Tj 44.64 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0086 Tc -0.1286 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science) Tj 144.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.028 Tc -0.092 Tw ( at 1035 \(recognizing that \223th) Tj 116.64 0 TD -0.0376 Tc 0.0776 Tw (e difference between ) Tj -315.36 -11.52 TD -0.0272 Tc -0.0645 Tw (commercial and noncommercial research in fact often has little to do with the financial interests of patent ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0716 Tc 0 Tw (holders.\224\).) Tj 41.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -41.76 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (63) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0608 Tc 0.0592 Tw (See supra ) Tj 42.24 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.05 Tc -0.07 Tw (note __ and accompanying text.) Tj 126.72 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -178.08 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (64) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0556 Tc 0.0956 Tw (Pitcairn v. United States,) Tj 99.36 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0097 Tc -0.1297 Tw (547 F.2d 1106, 1124) Tj 84 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (1126 \(Ct. Cl. 1976\).) Tj 80.64 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -278.88 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (65) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc (P) Tj 6.24 0 TD -0.1376 Tc (itcairn) Tj 26.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.0217 Tc -0.0983 Tw (547 F.2d at 1125) Tj 68.16 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.28 Tc (26.) 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Tj 135.84 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (78) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0063 Tc -0.0451 Tw ( Had it been enacted, it ) Tj 116.16 0 TD 0.0624 Tc 0 Tw (might) Tj 28.32 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0386 Tc -0.1586 Tw (have been read to) Tj 84.48 0 TD -0.024 Tc -0.096 Tw ( have ) Tj -376.32 -27.84 TD 0.0311 Tc -0.2311 Tw (adopted the \223experimenting on\224/ \223experimenting with\224 distinction.) Tj 321.12 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (79) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD ( ) Tj -332.64 -27.36 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0201 Tc -0.1401 Tw (Because the legislation that eventually superseded the specific holding of) Tj 351.36 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.1464 Tc 0 Tw (Roche) Tj 30.24 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -420.48 -27.84 TD 0.0072 Tc -0.0792 Tw (was directed primarily to the pharmaceutical industry, it left the ) Tj 308.64 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.1464 Tc 0 Tw (Roche) Tj 30.24 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0434 Tc -0.1634 Tw ( opinion\222s more ) Tj -338.88 -27.36 TD 0.0183 Tc -0.0644 Tw (general discussion of the common law experimental use exception intact. Any doubts ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0228 Tc -0.1428 Tw (about the Federal Circuit\222s continued commitment to the commercial /non) Tj 356.64 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.1344 Tc (comme) Tj 35.52 0 TD -0.1368 Tc -0.4632 Tw (rcial ) Tj -396 -27.36 TD 0.0295 Tc -0.0695 Tw (distinction were erased by the court\222s ) Tj 182.88 0 TD /F2 12 Tf -0.06 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 36.96 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0212 Tc 0.0188 Tw ( ruling in 2000.) Tj 74.4 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (80) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.042 Tc -0.002 Tw ( In ) Tj 18.72 0 TD /F2 12 Tf -0.06 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 36.96 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.044 Tc -0.164 Tw (, the court ) Tj -358.56 -27.84 TD 0.0152 Tc 0.0248 Tw (relied heavily on ) Tj 83.52 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.1464 Tc 0 Tw (Roche) Tj 30.24 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0197 Tc -0.0917 Tw (, despite the legislative supersedence of its specific holding, and ) Tj -113.76 -27.36 TD 0.0124 Tc -0.079 Tw (emphatically reaffirmed the rule that any experimentation with \223definite, ) Tj 352.32 0 TD 0.012 Tc 0.348 Tw (cognizable, and ) Tj -352.32 -27.84 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 237.12 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 234.72 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (76) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw (Eisenberg, ) Tj 44.64 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0086 Tc -0.1286 Tw (Patents and the Progress of Science) Tj 144.96 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0409 Tc 0.0169 Tw ( at 1078 \(recommending that \223[a] patent holder should not ) Tj -198.72 -11.52 TD -0.0159 Tc -0.1041 Tw (be entitled to enjoin the use of a patented invention in subsequent research in the filed of the inv) Tj 384 0 TD 0.0171 Tc -0.1371 Tw (ention, ) Tj -384 -11.52 TD -0.0249 Tc -0.0631 Tw (which could potentially lead to improvements in the patented technology or to the development of ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0361 Tc -0.0039 Tw (alternative means of achieving the same purpose\224\).) Tj 204.48 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -204.48 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (77) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0803 Tc 0 Tw (H.R.) Tj 18.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2014 Tc (EP) Tj 9.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (N) Tj 7.2 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1315 Tc (O) Tj 5.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (101) Tj 15.84 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0024 Tc -0.1176 Tw (960. pt. 1 \(1990\).) Tj 69.6 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -156.48 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (78) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0803 Tc 0 Tw (H.R.) Tj 18.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2014 Tc (EP) Tj 9.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (N) Tj 7.2 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1315 Tc (O) Tj 5.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (101) Tj 15.84 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD 0 Tc -0.1204 Tw (960. pt. 1, at 1 \(1990\). ) Tj 94.08 0 TD -0.0878 Tc -0.0322 Tw (More recently, ) Tj 60.48 0 TD -0.0417 Tc 0.0817 Tw (the National Institutes of Health Working ) Tj -241.44 -11.52 TD -0.0281 Tc -0.0599 Tw (Group has taken the position that the distinction between \223experimenting on\224 and \223experimenting with\224 a ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0476 Tc -0.0724 Tw (patented inventi) Tj 63.84 0 TD -0.0415 Tc 0.0415 Tw (on is a \223sensible distinction.) Tj 112.32 0 TD -0.1555 Tc 0 Tw (\224) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.0337 Tc 0.0203 Tw (Report of the National Institutes of Health Working Group ) Tj -185.76 -11.52 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw (on ) Tj 12.48 0 TD -0.0356 Tc -0.031 Tw (Research Tools, Appendix D \(June 4, 1998\), available at ) Tj -12.48 -11.52 TD -0.0413 Tc -0.0787 Tw (http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/appendd.htm. ) Tj 218.88 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -218.88 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (79) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.031 Tc 0.0176 Tw (Though it is not entirely clear how the provision would have been interpreted since it purported simply to ) Tj -9.12 -11.52 TD -0.0432 Tc 0.0032 Tw (clarify, and not to change, existing ) Tj 140.64 0 TD 0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (l) Tj 2.88 0 TD -0.1178 Tc 0.4778 Tw (aw. ) Tj 19.2 0 TD -0.0803 Tc 0 Tw (H.R.) Tj 18.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2014 Tc (EP) Tj 9.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (N) Tj 7.2 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1315 Tc (O) Tj 5.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (101) Tj 15.84 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD 0.0123 Tc -0.1323 Tw (960. pt. 1, at 27 \(1990\). ) Tj 99.36 0 TD -0.0633 Tc -0.0567 Tw (Also, the exemption ) Tj ET endstream endobj 77 0 obj 9037 endobj 75 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 72 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 76 0 R >> endobj 79 0 obj << /Length 80 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (21) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 664.8 TD 0.0124 Tc -0.1324 Tw (not insubstantial commercial purposes\224 constituted infringement.) Tj 313.44 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (81) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0157 Tc 0.0563 Tw ( The court appeared ) Tj -322.08 -27.84 TD 0.0311 Tc -0.1511 Tw (to give no weight to the fact that the infringement occurred during an attempt to design ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0502 Tc -0.1702 Tw (around the patent.) Tj 86.4 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (82) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD ( ) Tj -100.8 -27.84 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.36 Tw (With ) Tj 26.88 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0936 Tc 0 Tw (Madey) Tj 33.12 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0156 Tc -0.1356 Tw (\222s disqualification even of non) Tj 145.92 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.0089 Tc 0.026 Tw (profit experimental use when it is in ) Tj -245.76 -27.36 TD 0.0118 Tc -0.1318 Tw (keeping with the alleged infringer\222s \223legitimate business,\224 the Federal Circuit\222s reading ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0288 Tc -0.1488 Tw (of the experimental use exception is confirmed to be \223very narrow\224 indeed.) Tj 361.92 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (83) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0463 Tc -0.1663 Tw ( Only use ) Tj -370.56 -27.36 TD 0.0274 Tc -0.0789 Tw (that is \223solely for amusement, to satisfy ) Tj 193.44 0 TD 0.0072 Tc -0.2072 Tw (idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical ) Tj -193.44 -27.84 TD 0.0151 Tc -0.0915 Tw (inquiry\224 without any connection to the infringer\222s legitimate business is currently ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0827 Tc 0 Tw (exempted.) Tj 49.44 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (84) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0067 Tc -0.0581 Tw ( Yet it seems unlikely that even this \223very narrow\224 exemption can survive ) Tj -58.08 -27.84 TD -0.0016 Tc 0.0016 Tw (for long since, as ) Tj 84.48 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0936 Tc 0 Tw (Madey) Tj 33.12 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.044 Tc -0.164 Tw ( demonstrates, th) Tj 82.08 0 TD 0.0151 Tc -0.0551 Tw (e \223legitimate business\224 concept can \(and ) Tj -199.68 -27.36 TD 0.025 Tc -0.145 Tw (inevitably will\) be expanded to cover almost any conceivable use that could cut into the ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0155 Tc -0.0395 Tw (patentee\222s potential market for the invention.) Tj 216 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -180 -27.36 TD -0.0022 Tc -0.0492 Tw (While the United States currently embraces a ) Tj 219.84 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.172 Tc -0.292 Tw (de minimis) Tj 53.28 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0019 Tc -0.1181 Tw ( interpretation of the ) Tj -309.12 -27.84 TD -0.048 Tc 0 Tw (e) Tj 5.28 0 TD 0.0576 Tc -0.1776 Tw (xemption, e) Tj 57.12 0 TD -0.0107 Tc -0.1093 Tw (lsewhere in the world, ) Tj 108.96 0 TD 0.0618 Tc -0.1818 Tw (as noted above, ) Tj 77.76 0 TD 0.004 Tc -0.028 Tw (national patent law has recognized ) Tj -249.12 -27.36 TD 0.0151 Tc -0.1351 Tw (the distinction between \223experimenting on\224 \(experimental use aimed at understanding the ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0.0145 Tc 0.0545 Tw (invention itself\) and \223experimenting with\224 \(using an invention as a tool for resear) Tj 390.72 0 TD 0.04 Tc 0.32 Tw (ch into ) Tj -390.72 -27.36 TD 0.0487 Tc -0.1687 Tw (another matter\) and) Tj 94.56 0 TD 0.0246 Tc -0.0246 Tw ( provided an exemption ) Tj 116.64 0 TD -0 Tc -0.3594 Tw (for \223experimenting on.\224) Tj 114.24 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (85) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD ( ) Tj -339.84 -37.92 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 227.04 432 0.48 re f BT 521.76 224.64 TD ( ) Tj -432 -12 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.023 Tc -0.0717 Tw (for use \223to create a product outside the scope of the patent covering such invention\224 might sweep in some ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0197 Tc -0.1003 Tw (instances of \223experimenting with\224 a patented research tool.) 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Stauffer Chemical ) Tj -286.56 -11.52 TD -0.1217 Tc 0 Tw (Co) Tj 12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.03 Tc 0.09 Tw (. and ) Tj 22.56 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0157 Tc -0.1043 Tw ([1995] RPC 515, ) Tj 70.56 0 TD -0.0787 Tc -0.0413 Tw (Klinische Versuche ) Tj 80.64 0 TD -0.0435 Tc 0.1635 Tw (I \(Clinical Trials I\), ) Tj 80.64 0 TD -0.0126 Tc 0.0126 Tw (GRUR Int. 1996, 58, ) Tj 86.88 0 TD -0.0505 Tc 0.1705 Tw (Klinische Versuche ) Tj -353.28 -11.52 TD -0.0848 Tc 0.2048 Tw (II \(Clinical Trials II\), ) Tj 87.36 0 TD -0.0181 Tc -0.0619 Tw (xx. Likewise, the statutory schemes of several other European nations, including ) Tj -87.36 -11.52 TD -0.0404 Tc 0.095 Tw (Spain, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Ireland permit experimentation relating to ) Tj 348.96 0 TD -0.0347 Tc 0.0347 Tw (the subject matter of ) Tj ET endstream endobj 80 0 obj 8003 endobj 78 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 72 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 79 0 R >> endobj 82 0 obj << /Length 83 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (22) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -185.76 664.8 TD 0.0194 Tc -0.0958 Tw (For example, the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom case, ) Tj 305.76 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.0083 Tc -0.1283 Tw (Monsanto Co. v. ) Tj -341.76 -27.84 TD 0.0398 Tc -0.1598 Tw (Stauffer Chemical Co.) Tj 107.04 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (,) Tj 2.88 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (86) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0389 Tc -0.1109 Tw ( explained that the exemption would apply to experiments to ) Tj -118.56 -27.36 TD 0.0035 Tc -0.1235 Tw (discover something ) Tj 96.48 0 TD 0.024 Tc -0.048 Tw (unknown, to test a hypothesis, or to evaluate an invention\222s ) Tj -96.48 -27.84 TD 0.0085 Tc -0.0916 Tw (workability in conditions different than those contemplated by the inventor, even if the ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0098 Tc -0.1298 Tw (experimentation was carried out with a commercial motive.) Tj 286.08 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (87) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0152 Tc -0.0392 Tw ( Similarly, the German ) Tj -294.72 -27.84 TD 0.0082 Tc -0.1282 Tw (Supreme Court interprete) Tj 121.92 0 TD 0.0139 Tc -0.1339 Tw (d its statutory experimental use provision) Tj 198.24 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (88) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.117 Tc -0.237 Tw ( to exempt ) Tj -328.8 -27.36 TD 0.0208 Tc -0.0669 Tw (experimentation with a patented invention that \223served to gain information and thus to ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0291 Tc -0.1491 Tw (carry out scientific research into the subject matter of the invention\224) Tj 327.36 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (89) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0645 Tc 0.1845 Tw ( even if an ) Tj -336 -27.36 TD 0.0304 Tc -0.1504 Tw (additional commercial purpose w) Tj 160.8 0 TD -0.0251 Tc -0.0949 Tw (as involved.) Tj 57.6 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (90) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0263 Tc -0.0092 Tw ( Though Canada has no statutory ) Tj -227.04 -27.84 TD 0.0137 Tc -0.1737 Tw (experimental use exception, the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld an experimental ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0283 Tc -0.1483 Tw (use exception very similar to that found in European statutes:) Tj 294.24 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -258.24 -27.84 TD 0.035 Tc -0.155 Tw (. . . no doubt if a man makes things merely by way of bona fide ) Tj 0 -13.44 TD 0.0246 Tc -0.1446 Tw (experiment, and not with the intention of selling and making use of the ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0408 Tc -0.1608 Tw (thing so made for the purpose of which a patent has been granted, but with ) Tj T* 0.0192 Tc -0.0706 Tw (the view of improving upon the invention the subject of the patent, or with ) Tj T* 0.02 Tc -0.14 Tw (the view of seeing whether an imp) Tj 165.12 0 TD 0.0446 Tc -0.1646 Tw (rovement can be made or not, that is not ) Tj -165.12 -13.44 TD -0 Tc -0.0394 Tw (an invasion of the exclusive rights granted) Tj 203.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.033 Tc -0.153 Tw (by the patent. Patent rights ) Tj -206.4 -13.92 TD 0.0148 Tc -0.0911 Tw (were never granted to prevent persons of ingenuity exercising their talents ) Tj 0 -13.92 TD 0.0371 Tc -0.1571 Tw (in a fair way.) Tj 63.36 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (91) Tj 8.64 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -72 -13.92 TD ( ) Tj -36 -13.44 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD -0.14 Tc 0.02 Tw (The ) Tj 21.6 0 TD 0.0332 Tc 0.0868 Tw (United States\222 ) Tj 71.52 0 TD 0.0137 Tc -0.1337 Tw (current ) Tj 36.96 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.1187 Tc -0.2387 Tw (de minimis) Tj 52.8 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.06 Tc -0.18 Tw ( approach,) Tj 49.92 0 TD 0.011 Tc -0.011 Tw ( which virtually untethers ) Tj -268.8 -27.84 TD -0.0014 Tc -0.1186 Tw (\223experimental use\224) Tj 92.16 0 TD 0.048 Tc 0.072 Tw ( from ) Tj 29.28 0 TD 0.0439 Tc -0.0839 Tw (its origins in the connection between ) Tj 180 0 TD -0.0152 Tc 0 Tw (experimentation) Tj 77.76 0 TD 0.144 Tc -0.024 Tw ( and ) Tj -379.2 -27.36 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 223.68 432 0.48 re f BT 521.76 221.28 TD ( ) Tj -432 -12 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0462 Tc 0.0595 Tw (the invention. Western Europe is by no means alone in permitting experimental use relating to a patented ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0364 Tc -0.0836 Tw (invention\222s subject matter. ) Tj 110.88 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 5.28 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc (e.g.) Tj 14.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0526 Tc 0.1072 Tw (, Brazil Industrial Property Law, Article 43\(2\). Japanese Patent Act ) Tj -144.48 -11.52 TD -0.0454 Tc -0.0746 Tw (\24769\(1\), Korean Paten) Tj 85.44 0 TD -0.026 Tc -0.064 Tw (t Law Art. 96\(1\). Closer to home, Canada, like the United States, has no statutory ) Tj -85.44 -11.52 TD -0.0217 Tc -0.0983 Tw (experimental use exception; the exception in Canada is a creature of the judicial system. ) Tj 357.12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc -0.0963 Tw (See ) Tj 16.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0311 Tc 0.3911 Tw (Micro ) Tj -373.92 -11.52 TD -0.0635 Tc 0.1569 Tw (Chemicals Ltd. et al. v. Smith Kline & French Inter) Tj 205.92 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0447 Tc -0.0753 Tw (American Corp.,) Tj 66.72 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1183 Tc -0.2383 Tw (2 C) Tj 14.4 0 TD 0.0282 Tc -0.1482 Tw (.P.R. \(2 Md\) 193 \(1971\), ) Tj 102.24 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0565 Tc 0 Tw (quoting) Tj 31.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -426.24 -11.52 TD -0.0732 Tc 0.1932 Tw (Frearson v. Loe,) Tj 65.28 0 TD 0.035 Tc -0.155 Tw ( 9 Ch. D. 48 \(1878\), ) Tj 83.52 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.08 Tc 0 Tw (and) Tj 15.36 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0333 Tc -0.0867 Tw (Dableh v. Ontario Hydro,) Tj 101.76 0 TD 0.0506 Tc -0.1706 Tw ( [1996] 3 F.C. 751. ) Tj 82.08 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -350.4 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (86) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0423 Tc -0.0091 Tw (Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. and another) Tj 207.84 0 TD 0.114 Tc -0.394 Tw (, [1995] RPC 515.) Tj 73.92 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -290.88 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (87) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.06 Tc 0 Tw (Monsanto) Tj 40.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (,) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.0174 Tc -0.1374 Tw (RPC 515 at __.) Tj 60.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -115.68 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (88) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0153 Tc 0.0153 Tw ( German Patent Act \24711\(2\).) Tj 111.36 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -118.08 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (89) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0796 Tc -0.0404 Tw (Klinische ) Tj 40.32 0 TD -0.0714 Tc 0.3114 Tw (Versuche I \(Clinical Trials I\),) Tj 119.04 0 TD 0.0174 Tc -0.0174 Tw ( GRUR Int. 1996, 58.) 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Cir. June 6, 2003\)) Tj 118.08 0 TD -0.0702 Tc 0.0874 Tw ( \(Newman concurring in part and dissenting ) Tj -250.56 -11.52 TD -0.0676 Tc -0.0524 Tw (in part\)) Tj 28.8 0 TD 0.1524 Tc -0.2724 Tw ( at 11.) Tj 24.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 4.8 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0106 Tc -0.1094 Tw (See also) Tj 33.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.1251 Tc 0 Tw (Integra) Tj 29.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.0876 Tc -0.0324 Tw (No. 02) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0278 Tc -0.0922 Tw (1052 \(Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003\) at 20 \(majority opinion citing the ) Tj -159.84 -11.52 TD -0.0164 Tc -0.1036 Tw (National Institutes of Health definition of research tools as \223tools that sci) Tj 291.84 0 TD -0.0227 Tc -0.0973 Tw (entists use in the laboratory, ) Tj -291.84 -11.52 TD -0.0279 Tc -0.0485 Tw (including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0336 Tc -0.0224 Tw (chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools \(such as PCR\), methods, laboratory equipment and ) Tj T* -0.0616 Tc 0.1816 Tw (machines,\224 Sharing Bio) Tj 95.04 0 TD -0.0209 Tc -0.0991 Tw (medical Research Resources: Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH ) Tj -95.04 -11.52 TD -0.0229 Tc -0.0689 Tw (Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72092 n.1 \(Dec. 23, 1999\), but declining to discuss ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0254 Tc -0.0946 Tw (the common law experimental use exception\). ) Tj 189.12 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -189.12 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (95) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.146 Tc 0 Tw (Roche) Tj 25.44 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.0614 Tc -0.1814 Tw (733 F.2d at 861.) Tj 65.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -105.12 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (96) Tj 6.72 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.0811 Tc 0 Tw (T) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.24 Tc (h) Tj 5.28 0 TD -0.0332 Tc -0.0068 Tw (e Telephone Cases, 126 US 1, 533) Tj 138.24 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.0011 Tc -0.1211 Tw ( \(1888\) ) Tj 31.68 0 TD -0.039 Tc -0.033 Tw (\("Other inventors may compete with him for the ways of ) Tj -192.48 -11.52 TD -0.0432 Tc 0.0432 Tw (giving effect to the discovery, but the new art he has found will belong to him and those claiming under ) Tj 0 -12 TD -0.024 Tc -0.096 Tw (him during the life of his patent."\).) 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Tj 2.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -161.76 -7.68 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (100) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0149 Tc -0.1051 Tw (Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d ) Tj 213.12 0 TD 0.0147 Tc -0.1347 Tw (735, 745 \(Fed. Cir. 1993\).) 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This fact has been recognized by the Court in the doctrine of equivalence ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0235 Tc -0.1435 Tw (context, where one of the primary justifications for expanding infringement beyond the ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0033 Tc -0.1233 Tw (literal language of the claims is the difficulty of expressing physical ) Tj 328.32 0 TD 0.1004 Tc 0.0196 Tw (phenomena in ) Tj -328.32 -27.36 TD 0.132 Tc 0 Tw (words.) Tj 32.16 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (102) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0183 Tc -0.0983 Tw ( Enablement doctrine also recognizes the limitations of written expression of ) Tj -45.12 -27.84 TD 0.0188 Tc -0.1388 Tw (technological matters, upholding as sufficient a patent specification that requires some ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0023 Tc -0.035 Tw (experimentation to enable the practice of the invention as long as t) Tj 318.72 0 TD 0.0756 Tc -0.1956 Tw (he amount of ) Tj -318.72 -27.84 TD 0.0273 Tc -0.1473 Tw (experimentation required is not \223undue.\224) Tj 196.32 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (103) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD ( ) Tj -212.16 -35.52 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 146.4 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 144 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (101) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0248 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 31.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1394 Tc -0.4994 Tw (, 216 F.3d) Tj 40.8 0 TD -0.0232 Tc -0.0403 Tw ( at 1350 \(noting that the infringing tests \223were not shown to cause any loss of profits ) Tj -84.48 -11.52 TD -0.0143 Tc -0.1057 Tw (to Embrex\224 and remanding for computation of a reasonable royalty rate.\).) 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Published ) Tj -280.8 -27.36 TD 0.0085 Tc -0.0325 Tw (results are reproduced by those seeking) Tj 188.64 0 TD 0.0429 Tc -0.1629 Tw ( to build on them not only, or necessarily even ) Tj -188.64 -27.84 TD 0.0436 Tc -0.1636 Tw (primarily, to \223verify\224 them, but to understand them ) Tj 249.12 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 6.24 0 TD -0.001 Tc -0.119 Tw ( to see in detail how they were ) Tj -255.36 -27.36 TD 0.0222 Tc -0.1053 Tw (obtained and to explore their limitations and features not presented in the published ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0.0043 Tc 0.0443 Tw (description. As ) Tj 78.24 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.02 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 37.44 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.003 Tc 0.117 Tw ( vividly illus) Tj 60.96 0 TD 0.0529 Tc -0.1729 Tw (trates, the attempt to build on what has been ) Tj -176.64 -27.36 TD 0.024 Tc -0.144 Tw (established will almost unavoidably touch upon the previous results.) Tj 328.32 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (104) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0026 Tc -0.2374 Tw ( An experimental ) Tj -341.28 -27.84 TD 0.0323 Tc -0.1523 Tw (use exception for experiments directed at understanding, designing around, and ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0292 Tc -0.1492 Tw (improving upon the subject matter of the inv) Tj 214.08 0 TD 0.0369 Tc -0.1569 Tw (ention would per) Tj 81.6 0 TD 0.0217 Tc -0.1417 Tw (mit the disclosure ) Tj -295.68 -27.84 TD 0.01 Tc -0.13 Tw (requirement t) Tj 64.32 0 TD -0.0254 Tc 0.1454 Tw (o achieve its intended result.) Tj 136.8 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (105) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0152 Tc -0.0752 Tw ( Because the patent system anticipates that ) Tj -214.08 -27.36 TD 0.0139 Tc -0.1339 Tw (competitors will use the patent disclosure to make improvements or \223design) Tj 364.8 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.045 Tc -0.165 Tw (arounds\224 ) Tj -368.64 -27.84 TD 0.0388 Tc -0.1588 Tw (there is no reason to confine this type of exper) Tj 222.72 0 TD -0.0088 Tc -0.1112 Tw (imental use to non) Tj 88.32 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.0492 Tc -0.5508 Tw (commercial ) Tj -314.88 -27.36 TD -0.0028 Tc -0.1172 Tw (applications. ) Tj 63.84 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -27.84 -27.84 TD 0.0396 Tc -0.1596 Tw (A potential objection to a proposal to exempt \223experimenting on\224 a patented ) Tj -36 -27.36 TD -0 Tc -0.0395 Tw (invention from infringement liability is that the unauthorized use will decrease the ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0332 Tc -0.2218 Tw (patentee\222s returns from the patent and thus decrea) Tj 239.04 0 TD 0.0056 Tc 0.0115 Tw (se the incentive to make the invention ) Tj -239.04 -27.36 TD -0.0707 Tc -0.0493 Tw (in the firs) Tj 45.6 0 TD 0.024 Tc -0.064 Tw (t place. However, as Section III.B) Tj 165.6 0 TD 0.048 Tc -0.168 Tw ( shows, a close examination of the ) Tj -211.2 -27.84 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 237.12 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 234.72 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (104) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0248 Tc 0 Tw (Embrex) Tj 31.2 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.1079 Tc -0.4679 Tw (216 F.3d ) Tj 38.4 0 TD 0.067 Tc -0.187 Tw (at 1346) Tj 30.24 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.072 Tc (1347.) Tj 22.56 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -142.56 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (105) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0121 Tc 0 Tw (Integra) Tj 30.24 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.1044 Tc -0.7044 Tw (No. 02) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD -0.0142 Tc -0.1058 Tw (1052 \(Fed. Cir. June 6, 2003\) at 27 \(Newman) Tj 181.92 0 TD -0.0369 Tc 0.0369 Tw (, concurring in part and) Tj 93.12 0 TD -0.0084 Tc 0.3684 Tw ( dissenting) Tj 43.2 0 TD -0.0811 Tc -0.0389 Tw ( in ) Tj -412.32 -11.52 TD -0.0786 Tc 0 Tw (part) Tj 15.36 0 TD -0.0326 Tc 0.0326 Tw (\) \(stating \223[t]here would be little value i) Tj 161.76 0 TD -0.0115 Tc -0.1085 Tw (n the requirement of the patent law that patented information ) Tj -177.12 -11.52 TD -0.0225 Tc -0.0708 Tw (must be removed from secrecy in consideration of the patent right to exclude if the information is then ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0282 Tc -0.0518 Tw (placed on ice and protected from further study and research investigations.\224\). ) Tj 313.44 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0106 Tc -0.1094 Tw (See also) Tj 33.6 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc -0.2011 Tw ( E) Tj 8.64 0 TD -0.0746 Tc -0.0454 Tw (isenberg, ) Tj 38.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0686 Tc -0.1886 Tw (Patents ) Tj -394.08 -11.52 TD 0.0112 Tc -0.2512 Tw (and the Progress of Science) Tj 111.84 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0275 Tc -0.0605 Tw ( at 1022 \(stating that \223[I]f the public had absolutely no right ot sue the ) Tj -111.84 -11.52 TD -0.0339 Tc 0.0268 Tw (disclosure without the patent holder\222s consent until after the patent expired, it would make little sense to ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0358 Tc 0.0758 Tw (require that the disclosure) Tj 103.68 0 TD -0.0214 Tc -0.0719 Tw ( be made freely available to the public at the outset of the patent term. The fact ) Tj -103.68 -11.52 TD -0.0258 Tc -0.0408 Tw (that the patent statute so plainly facilitates unauthorized uses of the invention while the patent is in effect ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0393 Tc -0.0274 Tw (suggests that some such sues are to be permitted.\224\) ) Tj 205.44 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (and) Tj 15.84 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1578 Tc 0.0378 Tw ( Ned ) Tj 21.6 0 TD -0.0918 Tc 0.2118 Tw (A. Israelsen, ) Tj 52.32 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0279 Tc -0.1479 Tw (Making, Using, and Selling ) Tj -295.2 -11.52 TD -0.0112 Tc -0.0788 Tw (Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. Section 271\(e\) and the Experimental Use Exception to ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0085 Tc -0.1115 Tw (Patent Infringement) Tj 80.64 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.12 Tc 0 Tw (, 16 ) Tj 17.76 0 TD -0.1751 Tc (AIPLA) Tj 28.32 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0203 Tc 0 Tw (Q.J.) Tj 16.32 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0358 Tc 0.0358 Tw (457 \(1989\) [hereinafter Israelsen, ) Tj 136.32 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0293 Tc -0.2453 Tw (Making, Using, and Selling Without ) Tj -283.2 -11.52 TD 0.0494 Tc 0 Tw (Infringi) Tj 30.72 0 TD 0.24 Tc (ng) Tj 10.08 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0349 Tc 0.0216 Tw (] \(stating \223[i]t could not have been the intent of Congress that once an invention is patented, and ) Tj ET endstream endobj 99 0 obj 7454 endobj 97 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 91 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 98 0 R >> endobj 101 0 obj << /Length 102 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (28) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 664.8 TD 0.0219 Tc -0.1419 Tw (relationship between disclosure and the patent system\222s incentive to invent shows that ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0.0045 Tc -0.1155 Tw (increasing the effectiveness of disclosure will b) Tj 227.52 0 TD 0.0357 Tc -0.0357 Tw (e unlikely to have a significant impact on ) Tj -227.52 -27.36 TD -0.0087 Tc -0.1113 Tw (incentives to invent) Tj 93.6 0 TD 0.0217 Tc -0.0457 Tw ( because disclosure has an inherently greater impact on inventions ) Tj -93.6 -27.84 TD 0.0147 Tc -0.1347 Tw (that could have been maintained as trade secrets, for which the patent system\222s incentive ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0425 Tc -0.1625 Tw (to invent is unnecessary.) Tj 118.08 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -82.08 -27.84 TD -0.222 Tc 0 Tw (B.) Tj 11.04 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 24.96 0 TD 0.112 Tc -0.232 Tw (The Rel) Tj 37.92 0 TD 0.0285 Tc -0.1485 Tw (ation Between the Patent Incentive Structure and Follow) Tj 271.68 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.108 Tc 0.252 Tw (On ) Tj 18.24 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -403.68 -13.44 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD ( ) Tj 36 0 TD 0.0324 Tc 0 Tw (Innovation) Tj 52.32 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -106.08 -13.92 TD ( ) Tj 36 -13.92 TD -0.18 Tc 0 Tw (1.) Tj 9.12 0 TD /F3 12 Tf 0 Tc 0.024 Tw ( ) Tj 8.64 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0185 Tc -0.1385 Tw (Overview of the Distinction) Tj 134.4 0 TD 0.0287 Tc -0.1487 Tw ( Between the Incentive to Invent and the ) Tj -134.4 -13.92 TD 0.0107 Tc -0.1307 Tw (Incentive to Disclose) Tj 101.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -119.04 -13.44 TD ( ) Tj -18.24 -13.92 TD 0.0263 Tc -0.1094 Tw (Over and over, scholars and courts have explained that the patent system is ) Tj -36 -27.84 TD 0.0222 Tc -0.1422 Tw (justified by th) Tj 66.72 0 TD 0.0029 Tc -0.0696 Tw (e twin theories: \223incentive to invent\224 and \223incentive to disclose.\224) Tj 312 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (106) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.042 Tc -0.002 Tw ( In ) Tj -391.68 -27.36 TD 0.0026 Tc -0.0487 Tw (most scholarly and judicial expositions, the incentive to invent is featured, while the ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.019 Tc -0.107 Tw (incentive to disclose is mentioned in passing and then set aside as though it merely ) Tj 0 -27.36 TD 0.0348 Tc 0 Tw (supplement) Tj 55.68 0 TD -0.0011 Tc -0.0656 Tw (s the free rider analysis of the incentive to invent.) Tj 237.12 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (107) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.102 Tc -0.222 Tw ( What ) Tj 35.04 0 TD -0.0293 Tc -0.0907 Tw (seems to go) Tj 56.64 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -397.44 -27.84 TD 0.0166 Tc -0.1366 Tw (unnoticed in these discussions is that these two theories are not parallel justificat) Tj 386.88 0 TD 0.0675 Tc -0.1875 Tw (ions, but ) Tj -386.88 -27.36 TD 0.0075 Tc -0.1275 Tw (alternatives that ) Tj 79.2 0 TD 0.0228 Tc -0.1428 Tw (apply quite differently to different types of inventions. ) Tj 264.48 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -343.68 -47.04 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 273.12 432 0.48 re f BT 521.76 270.72 TD ( ) Tj -432 -12 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0288 Tc -0.0347 Tw (the public has received the \221early disclosure\222 of the invention, all progress that requires investigation of the ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0427 Tc 0.0027 Tw (discovery claimed in the patent should ce) Tj 165.12 0 TD -0.0121 Tc -0.1079 Tw (ase for 17 years.\224\).) Tj 75.84 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -240.96 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (106) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc (e.g.) Tj 14.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0563 Tc 0.0963 Tw (, Robert Merges, ) Tj 69.6 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0062 Tc -0.0538 Tw (Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on ) Tj -115.2 -11.52 TD -0.0477 Tc 0 Tw (Innovation) Tj 43.68 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD 0.24 Tc (76) Tj 10.56 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (C) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.3329 Tc (ALIF) Tj 16.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.4994 Tc 0 Tw (L.) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.3214 Tc (EV) Tj 10.56 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (805) Tj 15.84 0 TD -0.0421 Tc -0.0779 Tw ( \(1988\), Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, ) Tj 177.12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0221 Tc -0.0221 Tw (Novelty and Disclosure in ) Tj -314.4 -11.52 TD 0.1059 Tc -0.2259 Tw (Patent Law) Tj 46.56 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (, ) Tj 4.32 0 TD 0.24 Tc (21) Tj 10.56 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2915 Tc 0.1715 Tw (AND ) Tj 18.72 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1006 Tc 0 Tw (J.) Tj 6.24 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc 0 Tw (E) Tj 6.24 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1419 Tc (CON) Tj 16.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0442 Tc -0.1642 Tw (. 131 \(1990\),) Tj 52.32 0 TD -0.0706 Tc -0.0494 Tw ( Merges & Nelson, ) Tj 77.76 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0335 Tc -0.1535 Tw (Economics of Patent Scope) Tj 109.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1473 Tc 0.3473 Tw (, Mark A. ) Tj -360 -11.52 TD -0.0963 Tc -0.0237 Tw (Lemley, ) Tj 35.04 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0059 Tc -0.1141 Tw (The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law) Tj 243.84 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0175 Tc -0.0339 Tw (, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 \(1997\) ) Tj -278.88 -11.04 TD -0.0846 Tc 0.2046 Tw ([hereinafter Lemley, ) Tj 84 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0133 Tc -0.1333 Tw (The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law) Tj 244.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0583 Tc -0.0617 Tw (], ) Tj 8.16 0 TD -0.0819 Tc -0.0381 Tw (Seymour v. Osborne) Tj 81.6 0 TD 0.36 Tc 0 Tw (, ) Tj -418.08 -11.52 TD -0.027 Tc -0.093 Tw (78 U.S. ) Tj 32.64 0 TD 0.0514 Tc -0.6514 Tw (516, 533) Tj 35.52 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0896 Tc -0.0304 Tw (534 \(1871) Tj 40.8 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0583 Tc 0 Tw (\),) Tj 5.76 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0986 Tc -0.0214 Tw (Kewanee Oil Co) Tj 66.24 0 TD 0 Tc -0.1202 Tw (. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 \(1974\), ) Tj 179.52 0 TD -0.0108 Tc -0.1092 Tw (Bonito Boats, ) Tj -366.24 -11.52 TD -0.0733 Tc 0.1453 Tw (Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.) Tj 130.08 0 TD 0.0093 Tc -0.1293 Tw (, 489 U.S. 141, 151 \(1989\).) Tj 109.92 0 TD -0.0432 Tc 0.0672 Tw ( In this Article, I primarily take what Professor ) Tj -240 -11.52 TD -0.0661 Tc 0.1261 Tw (Clarisa Long has called the \223simple view\224 of patent) Tj 206.4 0 TD -0.0517 Tc 0.0517 Tw ( rights, \(Clarisa Long, ) Tj 90.24 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0489 Tc -0.1689 Tw (Patent Signals) Tj 59.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.04 Tc 0.16 Tw (, 69 ) Tj 17.28 0 TD -0.0989 Tc 0 Tw (U.) Tj 9.6 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (C) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.2244 Tc (HI) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.4994 Tc 0 Tw (L.) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -412.32 -11.52 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1586 Tc (EV) Tj 10.08 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.88 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0159 Tc -0.0741 Tw (625 \(2002\)\), assuming that the benefit to the patentee takes the form of additional profit resulting ) Tj -21.6 -11.52 TD -0.0377 Tc 0.0077 Tw (from the exclusive market for the patented invention, though I note in several places how a sign) Tj 382.56 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw (aling ) Tj -382.56 -11.52 TD -0.0136 Tc -0.1064 Tw (function might be incorporated into the analysis.) Tj 193.92 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -193.92 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (107) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0167 Tc -0.1367 Tw (See, e.g.) Tj 33.12 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0336 Tc -0.0864 Tw (, Kurt Saunders, ) Tj 67.2 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.1204 Tw (Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology ) Tj -112.8 -11.52 TD 0.0144 Tc 0 Tw (Suppression) Tj 49.44 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.24 Tc (15) Tj 10.08 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (H) Tj 7.2 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.0181 Tc (ARV) Tj 16.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1006 Tc 0 Tw (J.) Tj 6.24 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc 0 Tw (L) Tj 6.24 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.3173 Tc 0.1973 Tw (AW ) Tj 14.88 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.1622 Tc 0 Tw (&) Tj 7.68 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0811 Tc 0 Tw (T) Tj 5.76 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc (ECH) Tj 16.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.09 Tc -0.21 Tw (. 389, 397) Tj 40.8 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0274 Tc -0.1474 Tw (398 \(2002\) ) Tj 47.04 0 TD -0.2118 Tc 0 Tw (and) Tj 13.92 0 TD -0.059 Tc -0.061 Tw ( Eisenberg, ) Tj 47.04 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.023 Tc -0.143 Tw (Patents and the Progress ) Tj 104.16 0 TD 0.1589 Tc -0.2789 Tw (of ) Tj -411.84 -11.52 TD -0.0092 Tc 0 Tw (Science) Tj 30.72 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc -0.0697 Tw ( at 1028 \(stating that the incentive to disclose argument is \223more popular with the courts than with ) Tj -30.72 -11.52 TD -0.0497 Tc 0 Tw (commentators\224\).) 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Tj 40.8 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (,) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.0462 Tc -0.1662 Tw ( 416 U.S. at 484.) 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Tj 15.84 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (114) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.0149 Tc -0.0549 Tw ( Thus, all other things be) Tj 122.4 0 TD 0.019 Tc -0.043 Tw (ing equal, the invention can ) Tj -281.76 -58.08 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 399.84 432 0.48 re f BT 521.76 397.44 TD ( ) Tj -432 -12 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0217 Tc -0.0183 Tw (generated by the ability to maintain secrets. Focusing on the trade secret return also permits us to ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0397 Tc 0.0797 Tw (distinguish between disclosure ) Tj 125.28 0 TD -0.0198 Tc -0.1002 Tw (of the technical idea to the ) Tj 108 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.12 Tc 0 Tw (public) Tj 25.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0447 Tc 0.0313 Tw (, which is the goal of the incentive to ) Tj -259.2 -11.52 TD -0.0146 Tc 0.0146 Tw (disclose, and disclosure to ) Tj 107.52 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0135 Tc -0.1065 Tw (potential investors) Tj 74.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0408 Tc -0.0259 Tw (, which is sometimes necessary for commercialization. Any ) Tj -181.92 -11.52 TD -0.0379 Tc 0.0051 Tw (needed disclosure to potential investors will be reflected in the trade sec) Tj 287.52 0 TD -0.025 Tc 0.085 Tw (ret return. If an inventor needs to ) Tj -287.52 -11.52 TD -0.0281 Tc -0.0919 Tw (attract outside capital to commercialize the invention, various scenarios are possible. For example, it may ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0224 Tc -0.1296 Tw (be possible for the inventor to disclose the invention privately to potential investors under confidentiality ) Tj T* -0.024 Tc -0.0455 Tw (agreements. In such a case, the trade secret return for the invention is largely unaffected by the disclosure ) Tj T* -0.037 Tc -0.003 Tw (to investors and depends only on the properties of the commercialized inventive product or process. On the ) Tj T* -0.0288 Tc -0.0912 Tw (other hand, there may be inventions w) Tj 152.64 0 TD -0.0107 Tc -0.1093 Tw (hich will attract sufficient capital only if information about the ) Tj -152.64 -11.52 TD -0.0288 Tc -0.0407 Tw (invention is \223leaked\224 to produce a \223buzz\224 of excitement about its potential. In such cases, the trade secret ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0369 Tc -0.0093 Tw (return may be affected by the amount of information about the invention that mu) Tj 323.04 0 TD -0.0614 Tc 0.0214 Tw (st be leaked. In the ) Tj -323.04 -11.52 TD -0.0318 Tc -0.0582 Tw (extreme case, the need to attract investors may require releasing so much information that a technically ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD 0.08 Tc 0 Tw (non) Tj 14.88 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0389 Tc (self) Tj 14.4 0 TD 0.0034 Tc (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0311 Tc -0.0203 Tw (disclosing invention is effectively transformed into a \223self) Tj 232.32 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0249 Tc -0.0951 Tw (disclosing\224 invention. ) Tj 92.64 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.1217 Tc 0 Tw (Id) Tj 8.64 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.1089 Tc -0.2289 Tw (. at 1029) Tj 35.52 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj -424.8 -11.52 TD -0.0341 Tc 0.0341 Tw (30. The analysis h) Tj 74.88 0 TD -0.0114 Tc -0.0804 Tw (ere is based on the trade secret return, which can be defined for all of the possibilities ) Tj -74.88 -11.52 TD -0.0272 Tc -0.0423 Tw (described. \(I am grateful to Professor Justin Hughes for pointing out the need to consider the case in which ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0263 Tc -0.0937 Tw (a \223buzz\224 about the invention is necessary to attract inv) Tj 217.92 0 TD -0.0142 Tc 0 Tw (estors.\)) Tj 29.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0478 Tc 0.0238 Tw (Moreover, Professor Clarisa Long has ) Tj -252 -11.52 TD -0.0913 Tc -0.0287 Tw (argued ) Tj 29.28 0 TD -0.0432 Tc 0.0603 Tw (in her recent discussion of patent \223signaling,\224 ) Tj 184.8 0 TD 0.06 Tc -0.18 Tw (that ) Tj 17.76 0 TD -0.0245 Tc -0.0422 Tw (it is also possible that patenting itself \(as distinct ) Tj -231.84 -11.04 TD -0.0345 Tc 0.0345 Tw (from the information about the invention disclosed in a patent\) is used by investors as a sign) Tj 368.64 0 TD 0 Tc -0.1203 Tw (al of potenti) Tj 48.48 0 TD -0.0389 Tc -0.0811 Tw (al ) Tj -417.12 -11.52 TD -0.0265 Tc -0.0615 Tw (commercial success so that the private returns from patenting should include returns from signaling. ) Tj 405.12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -419.04 -11.52 TD -0.1518 Tc 0.0318 Tw (Long, ) Tj 25.44 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0489 Tc -0.1689 Tw (Patent Signals) Tj 59.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0636 Tc -0.0564 Tw ( at 639) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.24 Tc (43) Tj 10.56 0 TD -0.12 Tc (. ) Tj 7.2 0 TD -0.2648 Tc 0.1448 Tw (The ) Tj 17.28 0 TD -0.0045 Tc -0.0555 Tw (analysis here is based on the trade secret return) Tj 188.64 0 TD 0.0065 Tc -0.1265 Tw ( and patent return) Tj 70.08 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (, ) Tj -408.48 -11.52 TD -0.0576 Tc 0.1296 Tw (which can be defined for all) Tj 111.84 0 TD -0.24 Tc 0.12 Tw ( o) Tj 7.68 0 TD -0.0486 Tc -0.0714 Tw (f the possibilities described.) Tj 110.88 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -230.4 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (114) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0311 Tc -0.0289 Tw (Here again a distinction between invention and innovation is not necessary to the analysis because both ) Tj -12.48 -11.52 TD -0.0301 Tc -0.0579 Tw (can be absorbed in the appropriable investment, R, which should be understood to include whatever ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.1041 Tc 0 Tw (investment) Tj 43.68 0 TD -0.0565 Tc -0.0635 Tw ( in techn) Tj 34.08 0 TD 0.0011 Tc 0.3589 Tw (ical knowlege) Tj 56.16 0 TD -0.0175 Tc -0.0385 Tw ( is unique to the first comer in the market and appropriable by others once ) Tj -133.92 -11.52 TD -0.0291 Tc 0.0221 Tw (the invention is fully disclosed, including any part of the investment in commercialization that is subject to ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0434 Tc -0.0766 Tw (free riding by compet) Tj 85.92 0 TD -0.0072 Tc -0.0168 Tw (itors. Where appropriate, R should) Tj 141.12 0 TD -0.018 Tc -0.102 Tw ( also be interpreted to include investments in ) Tj -227.04 -11.52 TD -0.0163 Tc -0.1304 Tw (related research that did not bear fruit. In other words, a prospective inventor will consider the possibility ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0232 Tc -0.0568 Tw (that some research efforts are unsuccessful when comparing expected returns to expected investmen) Tj 400.8 0 TD -0.0211 Tc 0 Tw (t.) Tj 5.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj ET endstream endobj 118 0 obj 9577 endobj 116 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 110 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 117 0 R >> endobj 120 0 obj << /Length 121 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (34) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 664.8 TD -0.0288 Tc 0.3888 Tw (profitably ) Tj 49.92 0 TD 0.096 Tc -0.216 Tw (be ) Tj 14.4 0 TD 0.0194 Tc -0.0521 Tw (made if T>R and will not be made if T < R.) Tj 209.76 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (115) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.048 Tc 0.048 Tw ( \(See Fig. 1.\)) Tj 65.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.04 Tw ( When T > R, ) Tj -352.32 -27.84 TD 0.0063 Tc -0.0893 Tw (trade secrecy provides a sufficient \223incentive to invent\224 and a patent is not needed) Tj 394.56 0 TD 0.132 Tc -0.012 Tw ( to ) Tj -394.56 -27.36 TD -0.0524 Tc -0.0676 Tw (induce inven) Tj 61.44 0 TD 0.012 Tc 0 Tw (tion) Tj 18.72 0 TD -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -47.04 -27.84 TD 0.0165 Tc -0.1365 Tw (When a patent on the invention is available, the ) Tj 230.88 0 TD 0.0282 Tc -0.1482 Tw (time of exclusivity) Tj 90.24 0 TD 0.504 Tc -0.144 Tw ( i) Tj 6.24 0 TD 0.0252 Tc -0.1452 Tw (n the market ) Tj -363.36 -27.36 TD -0.112 Tc 0 Tw (can) Tj 16.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0447 Tc -0.0047 Tw (in some cases ) Tj 69.12 0 TD 0.0223 Tc -0.1423 Tw (be increased by obtaining a patent) Tj 163.68 0 TD 0.0267 Tc -0.1467 Tw (, thus increasing the amount that the ) Tj -252.48 -27.84 TD 0.0292 Tc -0.1892 Tw (inventor can recoup over and above what would be available without patent pro) Tj 383.04 0 TD -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (tection) Tj 32.64 0 TD -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -418.56 -27.36 TD 0.0376 Tc -0.1276 Tw (We can define the patent return, P, as the amount that an inventor can recoup from ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0 Tc 0.2004 Tw (commercializing the invention ) Tj 149.76 0 TD 0.05 Tc -0.17 Tw (if she chooses) Tj 67.68 0 TD -0.0157 Tc -0.1043 Tw ( the market exclusivity available ) Tj 158.4 0 TD 0.048 Tc 0 Tw (from) Tj 23.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -399.36 -27.36 TD 0.072 Tc 0 Tw (patent) Tj 29.76 0 TD 0.008 Tc (ing) Tj 14.88 0 TD -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.88 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (116) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 6.24 0 TD -0 Tc -0.1194 Tw (Thus, we would expect that the invention will b) Tj 228.48 0 TD 0.03 Tc -0.03 Tw (e made if either the) Tj 92.64 0 TD 0.072 Tc -0.192 Tw ( patent ) Tj -387.84 -27.84 TD -0.056 Tc 0 Tw (return) Tj 28.8 0 TD -0.12 Tc (, ) Tj 5.76 0 TD -0.0169 Tc 0.0769 Tw (P, or the trade secret return, T, is sufficient) Tj 205.44 0 TD 0.0862 Tc -0.2062 Tw ( to recoup the ) Tj 69.12 0 TD 0.0273 Tc 0.0927 Tw (research and ) Tj -309.12 -27.36 TD 0.0371 Tc -0.1571 Tw (development ) Tj 65.28 0 TD 0.0132 Tc 0 Tw (investment) Tj 52.8 0 TD -0.222 Tc 0.102 Tw (, R) Tj 13.92 0 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (. ) Tj 11.52 0 TD -0.008 Tc 0.128 Tw (\(See Fig. 2a.\) ) Tj 70.56 0 TD 0.0447 Tc -0.1647 Tw (On the other h) Tj 69.6 0 TD -0.0082 Tc -0.0432 Tw (and, if both P and T are less) Tj 133.44 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -417.12 -27.84 TD 0.0234 Tc -0.1434 Tw (than R, the inventor cannot expect to recover ) Tj 218.88 0 TD 0.012 Tc 0 Tw (her) Tj 15.36 0 TD 0.0318 Tc -0.1518 Tw ( research and development i) Tj 134.4 0 TD 0.0653 Tc -0.1853 Tw (nvestment ) Tj -368.64 -27.36 TD 0.0081 Tc -0.0999 Tw (either by obtaining a patent or by keeping a trade secret. Thus, the potential inventor will ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0223 Tc -0.1423 Tw (not make the investment necessary to the invention) Tj 245.76 0 TD 0.0235 Tc -0.1435 Tw ( and neither trade secrecy nor ) Tj -245.76 -27.36 TD -0.0019 Tc -0.0221 Tw (patenting provides sufficient incentive to invent) Tj 229.44 0 TD -0.0372 Tc 0.0372 Tw (. \(See Fig. 2) Tj 60.96 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (b) Tj 6.24 0 TD -0.138 Tc (.\)) Tj 6.72 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -303.36 -58.56 TD ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 261.6 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 259.2 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.68 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (115) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD -0.0362 Tc -0.0238 Tw (This way of putting it is a slight over) Tj 147.36 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0086 Tc -0.0677 Tw (simplification. It is always possible that there will be no ) Tj -163.2 -11.52 TD -0.0405 Tc 0.0216 Tw (investment in an invention even if T > R simply because some other investment is more attractive. More ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.021 Tc -0.051 Tw (precisely, the point at which T = R is the poi) Tj 178.08 0 TD -0.0191 Tc -0.1009 Tw (nt at which secrecy is sufficient to \223level the playing field\224 ) Tj -178.08 -11.52 TD -0.0276 Tc -0.0604 Tw (between the invention and other potential investments that do not involve intellectual property. The ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0229 Tc -0.0371 Tw (analysis here implicitly assumes, as does the free rider theory, that this is the goal of t) Tj 342.24 0 TD -0.0556 Tc 0.1756 Tw (he patent system. ) Tj -342.24 -11.04 TD -0.0304 Tc 0 Tw (One might, of course, argue that investment in research and development should be encouraged by giving ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0284 Tc -0.0436 Tw (rewards that will tilt the playing field toward such investment. It is not necessarily clear why this should be ) Tj T* -0.0464 Tc -0.0736 Tw (the goal. Once the p) Tj 82.08 0 TD -0.0169 Tc -0.0292 Tw (laying field is leveled, the success of the commercialized invention will presumably be ) Tj -82.08 -11.52 TD -0.0493 Tc 0.0705 Tw (determined by its societal value. There may be no obvious reason to encourage investment in patentable ) Tj 0 -11.52 TD -0.0112 Tc -0.1088 Tw (inventions if the result is less valuable than non) Tj 189.6 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0065 Tc -0.1135 Tw (inventive alt) Tj 49.92 0 TD -0.082 Tc 0.202 Tw (ernatives. Long) Tj 64.32 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0067 Tc -0.1133 Tw (term research, which does not ) Tj -310.56 -11.52 TD -0.0205 Tc -0.0995 Tw (produce results that are attractive in the short) Tj 180 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0206 Tc -0.0994 Tw (term perspective of investors, is generally not patentable and ) Tj -183.36 -11.52 TD -0.0498 Tc -0.0702 Tw (generally publicly funded. Government) Tj 159.84 0 TD 0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.36 0 TD -0.0417 Tc 0.0417 Tw (funded research produces a different spectrum of problems ) Tj 238.56 0 TD -0.0518 Tc 0.4118 Tw (and ) Tj -401.76 -11.52 TD -0.0152 Tc -0.1048 Tw (potential solutions. ) Tj 81.12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf -0.0237 Tc 0 Tw (See) Tj 13.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0364 Tc -0.1564 Tw (generally ) Tj 40.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0372 Tc -0.0828 Tw (Brett Frischmann) Tj 69.12 0 TD /F2 10.08 Tf 0.0011 Tc -0.1211 Tw (, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the ) Tj -209.76 -11.52 TD -0.0108 Tc -0.1092 Tw (Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy) Tj 202.08 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (, ) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.24 Tc (24) Tj 10.08 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0778 Tc 0 Tw (V) Tj 7.2 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf -0.1858 Tc (T) Tj 4.32 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.12 Tc (.) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.4 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.4994 Tc 0 Tw (L.) Tj 8.16 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 1.92 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0034 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj 6.72 0 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.3214 Tc (EV) Tj 11.04 0 TD /F1 10.08 Tf 0.0442 Tc -0.1642 Tw (. 347 \(2000\).) Tj 52.32 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -315.36 -7.2 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (116) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0174 Tc -0.1026 Tw ( Just as the trade secret return depends on the cost of maintaining secrecy,) Tj 295.2 0 TD -0.0025 Tc -0.0375 Tw ( the patent return can be ) Tj -305.28 -11.52 TD -0.0282 Tc -0.0518 Tw (defined to take into account the costs of obtaining and enforcing the patent.) Tj 300.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj ET endstream endobj 121 0 obj 8356 endobj 119 0 obj << /Type /Page /Parent 110 0 R /Resources << /Font << /F0 6 0 R /F1 8 0 R /F2 15 0 R >> /ProcSet 2 0 R >> /Contents 120 0 R >> endobj 123 0 obj << /Length 124 0 R >> stream BT 415.68 744.96 TD 0 0 0 rg /F0 12 Tf -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (WORKING ) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0.0864 Tc 0 Tw (DRAFT) Tj 41.28 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -48.96 -13.92 TD -0.0213 Tc 0 Tw (7/16/2003) Tj 48.96 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -51.36 -13.44 TD 0.0703 Tc -0.1903 Tw (11:45 AM) Tj 51.36 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -221.76 -678.24 TD -0.24 Tc 0 Tw (35) Tj 11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -185.76 664.8 TD -0.12 Tc 0 Tw (If e) Tj 16.32 0 TD 0.0031 Tc -0.0794 Tw (ither the patent return or the trade secret return is greater than) Tj 294.72 0 TD 0.022 Tc -0.142 Tw ( the R&D ) Tj -347.04 -27.84 TD 0.0369 Tc 0 Tw (expenditures,) Tj 64.32 0 TD -0.0073 Tc -0.0327 Tw ( the incentive to invent is sufficient.) Tj 171.84 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 3.36 0 TD 0.348 Tc 0.012 Tw ( T) Tj 10.08 0 TD 0.0157 Tc 0.0243 Tw (he inventor will decide whether to ) Tj -249.6 -27.36 TD 0.0378 Tc -0.1578 Tw (patent the invention based on a comparison of P, T, and R.) Tj 281.28 0 TD 0.0083 Tc 0.0088 Tw ( Thus, if the trade secret retur) Tj 144.48 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0.12 Tw (n ) Tj -425.76 -27.84 TD -0.0531 Tc 0.4131 Tw (is insufficient) Tj 65.28 0 TD 0.026 Tc -0.066 Tw ( to enable the inventor to recover the investment in research and ) Tj -65.28 -27.36 TD 0.0138 Tc -0.1038 Tw (development, \(T < R\), the inventor will have to obtain a patent simply to justify making ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD 0.0166 Tc -0.0406 Tw (the invention. \(See Fig. ) Tj 118.08 0 TD -0.144 Tc 0 Tw (3a) Tj 11.04 0 TD 0.22 Tc -0.18 Tw (.\) A ) Tj 24.96 0 TD -0.0033 Tc -0.1167 Tw (small trade secret return) Tj 115.68 0 TD 0.0269 Tc -0.1469 Tw ( correlates with a shorte) Tj 114.72 0 TD 0.0549 Tc 0.0651 Tw (r period ) Tj -384.48 -27.36 TD 0.006 Tc -0.126 Tw (of market exclusivity, signifying) Tj 156.48 0 TD 0.0277 Tc -0.0944 Tw ( that the invention is relatively easily copied by ) Tj -156.48 -27.84 TD -0.0073 Tc 0.0793 Tw (competitors once it is commercialized ) Tj 185.28 0 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 6.24 0 TD 0.0204 Tc -0.0719 Tw ( in other words, the invention is ) Tj 155.04 0 TD -0.048 Tc 0 Tw (\223) Tj 5.76 0 TD -0.252 Tc (self) Tj 17.28 0 TD -0.156 Tc (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.0284 Tc (disclosing.) Tj 51.36 0 TD -0.048 Tc (\224) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD ( ) Tj -433.44 -27.36 TD -0.024 Tc -0.096 Tw (\(See Fig. 3b.\)) Tj 64.8 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 3.36 0 TD ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD -0.0284 Tc -0.0916 Tw (For such self) Tj 61.92 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0036 Tc 0.1164 Tw (disclosing inventions, where T < R, the) Tj 189.12 0 TD 0.048 Tc -0.168 Tw ( primary function of ) Tj -325.92 -27.84 TD 0.0131 Tc -0.1331 Tw (the patent system is to increase the period of market ) Tj 252 0 TD 0.0489 Tc -0.2649 Tw (exclusivity enough to provide a ) Tj -252 -27.36 TD -0.0052 Tc -0.1148 Tw (sufficient patent return to give an) Tj 159.36 0 TD -0.0012 Tc 0.0412 Tw ( \223incentive to invent.\224) Tj 106.08 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -229.44 -27.84 TD 0.0288 Tc -0.1488 Tw (On the other hand, inventions) Tj 142.56 0 TD -0.0133 Tc -0.0267 Tw ( for which the trade secret return) Tj 156.48 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0154 Tc 0.0246 Tw (is sufficient to ) Tj -337.92 -27.36 TD 0.006 Tc 0 Tw (offset) Tj 27.36 0 TD 0.132 Tc -0.252 Tw ( th) Tj 12.48 0 TD -0.0051 Tc -0.1149 Tw (e research inves) Tj 76.32 0 TD 0.1008 Tc 0 Tw (tment) Tj 27.84 0 TD -0.138 Tc 0.018 Tw (, \() Tj 9.6 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.054 Tc 0 Tw (i.e.) Tj 14.88 0 TD /F1 12 Tf 0.008 Tc -0.08 Tw (, T > R\), are different. These are the ) Tj 178.56 0 TD -0.048 Tc 0 Tw (\223) Tj 5.76 0 TD -0.08 Tc (non) Tj 18.24 0 TD -0.156 Tc (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.252 Tc (self) Tj 16.8 0 TD -0.156 Tc (-) Tj -391.68 -27.84 TD -0.0192 Tc (disclosing) Tj 48.48 0 TD -0.048 Tc (\224) Tj 5.28 0 TD -0.0185 Tc 0.0585 Tw ( inventions. ) Tj 61.92 0 TD -0.024 Tc 0.024 Tw (\(See Fig. 3b.\) ) Tj 71.52 0 TD 0.008 Tc 0.032 Tw (Because these inventions can be successfully ) Tj -187.2 -27.36 TD 0.0276 Tc -0.1039 Tw (commercialized as trade secrets, the patent system is not needed to ) Tj 323.52 0 TD -0.0234 Tc 0.1434 Tw (level the playing field ) Tj -323.52 -27.84 TD -0.0055 Tc -0.1145 Tw (to stimulate) Tj 56.16 0 TD -0.002 Tc 0.0877 Tw ( invention in these cases. In ) Tj 138.72 0 TD -0.0109 Tc -0.1091 Tw (these cases the primary public benefit) Tj 180.96 0 TD 0.06 Tc -0.18 Tw ( of the ) Tj -375.84 -27.36 TD -0.0027 Tc -0.1173 Tw (patent sys) Tj 48 0 TD 0.0085 Tc -0.1285 Tw (tem is to provide an \223) Tj 103.68 0 TD -0.0164 Tc -0.1036 Tw (incentive to disclose) Tj 97.44 0 TD -0.0091 Tc 0.0262 Tw (\224 the invention rather than keep it ) Tj -249.12 -27.84 TD -0.0377 Tc 0 Tw (secret.) Tj 31.2 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc (117) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 27.84 0 TD ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD ( ) Tj -41.76 -27.36 TD 0.0265 Tc -0.1465 Tw (An inventor will decide whether to obtain a patent on such a non) Tj 311.04 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.132 Tc (s) Tj 4.8 0 TD -0.38 Tc (elf) Tj 12 0 TD -0.156 Tc (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0288 Tc 0.3312 Tw (disclosing ) Tj -371.52 -27.84 TD -0.04 Tc 0 Tw (invent) Tj 29.76 0 TD 0.0445 Tc -0.1645 Tw (ion by comparing the ) Tj 105.6 0 TD 0.069 Tc 0.291 Tw (expected ) Tj 46.08 0 TD -0.0044 Tc -0.1156 Tw (patent return, P, with the ) Tj 120.96 0 TD 0.069 Tc 0.291 Tw (expected ) Tj 46.08 0 TD -0.012 Tc -0.108 Tw (trade secret ) Tj -348.48 -27.36 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 86.4 0 TD ( ) Tj ET 89.76 154.56 144 0.48 re f BT 233.76 152.16 TD ( ) Tj -144 -7.68 TD /F1 6.72 Tf 0 Tw (117) Tj 10.08 -4.32 TD /F1 10.08 Tf -0.0313 Tc -0.0247 Tw ( Throughout this discussion \223disclosure\224 refers to everything that is disclosed in the patent specification ) Tj -10.08 -11.52 TD 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (\226) Tj 5.28 0 TD -0.0519 Tc 0.069 Tw ( including the disclosure meeting each of ) Tj 166.56 0 TD -0.0364 Tc -0.0236 Tw (the written description, enablement, and best mode requirements ) Tj -171.84 -11.52 TD -0.0088 Tc -0.1112 Tw (of 35 U.S.C. 112. 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If the ) Tj 50.4 0 TD -0.0009 Tc -0.0231 Tw (trade secret return is greater ) Tj 137.28 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (\() Tj 3.84 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.054 Tc (i.e.) Tj 14.88 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.0816 Tc 0.0816 Tw (, T > P\) ) Tj 39.36 0 TD 0.0554 Tc -0.1754 Tw (\(most likely because the ) Tj -274.56 -27.84 TD 0.0034 Tc -0.0274 Tw (invention can be kept secret for longer than the patent term) Tj 283.68 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (\)) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.12 Tc (,) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.072 Tc -0.192 Tw ( the ) Tj 20.64 0 TD -0.0065 Tc -0.1135 Tw (inventor has no incentive ) Tj -311.04 -27.36 TD 0.0173 Tc -0.1106 Tw (to obtain a patent and will be expected simply to keep the invention a trade secret. \(See ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0.0463 Tc -0.0737 Tw (Fig. 4.\) ) Tj 40.32 0 TD 0.0208 Tc -0.1408 Tw (From the inventor\222s perspective, o) Tj 165.6 0 TD 0.0135 Tc -0.0735 Tw (btaining a patent would only force a premature ) Tj -205.92 -27.36 TD -0.0096 Tc 0.0096 Tw (disclosure of the invention. 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The inventor ) Tj -212.16 -27.36 TD 0.0153 Tc -0.101 Tw (can choose not to patent the invention, thus avoiding the required patent disclosure, but ) Tj 0 -27.84 TD -0.0212 Tc -0.0028 Tw (settling for a lesser return fr) Tj 132.96 0 TD 0.252 Tc 0 Tw (om) Tj 15.84 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 2.88 0 TD 0.0303 Tc -0.1503 Tw (the current invention) Tj 100.32 0 TD 0 Tc 0.04 Tw (. 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Tj 49.92 5.28 TD /F1 8.16 Tf 0.24 Tc 0 Tw (118) Tj 12.96 -5.28 TD /F1 12 Tf 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj 5.76 0 TD 0.0138 Tc -0.0465 Tw (It is in this set of circumstances, and this set of ) Tj -168.96 -27.36 TD 0.0355 Tc -0.1555 Tw (circumstances alone, that the) Tj 138.72 0 TD 0.186 Tc -0.306 Tw ( so) Tj 13.92 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD 0.0544 Tc -0.1744 Tw (called \223quid pro quo) Tj 98.88 0 TD 0.0187 Tc -0.2987 Tw ( of patent disclosure) Tj 96.48 0 TD -0.048 Tc 0 Tw (\224) Tj 5.28 0 TD 0.0773 Tc -0.1973 Tw ( operates.) Tj 46.08 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj -367.2 -27.84 TD 0.0066 Tc -0.0137 Tw (Thus, to sum up the analysis so far \(see Figure 4\): The \223incentive to invent\224 is ) Tj -36 -27.36 TD -0.0017 Tc -0.1183 Tw (active for \223self) Tj 71.04 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (-) Tj 3.84 0 TD -0.033 Tc (disc) Tj 19.68 0 TD -0.348 Tc (lo) Tj 9.12 0 TD -0.006 Tc 0.006 Tw (sing\224 inventions for which a) Tj 135.84 0 TD 0.0159 Tc -0.0559 Tw ( patent is necessary to stimulate ) Tj -239.52 -27.84 TD 0.0221 Tc -0.1421 Tw (invention because the ) Tj 107.04 0 TD 0.0135 Tc -0.0375 Tw (research investment is greater than ) Tj 169.44 0 TD -0.004 Tc -0.116 Tw (the trade secrecy return) Tj 112.32 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0.036 Tw ( \() Tj 6.72 0 TD /F2 12 Tf 0.054 Tc 0 Tw (i.e.) Tj 14.88 0 TD /F1 12 Tf -0.366 Tc 0.246 Tw (, T ) Tj -410.4 -27.36 TD 0.0159 Tc -0.1059 Tw (< R
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-0.1627 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj
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-0.12 Tc (.) Tj
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6.72 0 TD 0.0249 Tc -0.1449 Tw ( but they gain nothing by delaying ) Tj
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294.72 0 TD -0.156 Tc 0 Tw (I) Tj
3.84 0 TD 0.0526 Tc -0.0126 Tw (I\) it can be developed and ) Tj
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32.16 0 TD 0.003 Tc -0.0793 Tw ( considering the implications of this analysis for a potential experimental ) Tj
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5.28 1.44 TD /F1 12 Tf
0.024 Tc 0.096 Tw (, where I) Tj
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-0.1627 Tc 0 Tw (R) Tj
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0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj
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11.52 0 TD 0 Tc -0.12 Tw ( ) Tj
-185.76 664.8 TD 0.0118 Tc -0.0949 Tw (There are several reasons to expect a narrow spread in research times for ) Tj
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204.96 0 TD 0.0021 Tc -0.0688 Tw (e thing, in contrast to the developer of a ) Tj
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186.24 0 TD 0.0079 Tc -0.0406 Tw (earch. Even if the tool inventor does not have the ) Tj
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0 -27.36 TD 0.0138 Tc -0.0969 Tw (necessary investment, to contract for quick performance of the research. Because the ) Tj
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137.28 0 TD 0.0295 Tc -0.1931 Tw ( the choice of researcher should not be critical and there ) Tj
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76.32 0 TD -0.156 Tc (\)) Tj
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