

GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE



A GUIDE TO PROTECTING COMMUNITIES
AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES



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AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES

AN INITIATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT

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Available at www.constitutionproject.org in late 2006:
Model legislation to codify the Constitution Project's *Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance*.

PREFACE

The Constitution Project is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization that seeks consensus on controversial legal and political issues through scholarship and advocacy. In the days following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Constitution Project launched its Liberty and Security Initiative. Guided by an ideologically diverse committee of prominent Americans, the Initiative addresses a wide range of issues, including the tension between rapidly changing technology used to enhance security and constitutional values relating to personal liberty and privacy. The Initiative is committed to developing and advancing proposals to protect civil liberties even as our country works to make Americans safe.

While much attention has been paid to efforts on the federal level to enhance our safety in the aftermath of September 11th, state and local programs also directly affect the security and civil liberties of Americans. For many communities, the desire to implement video surveillance systems stems not from a reaction to September 11th, but from the desire for crime control. This report is designed to provide a set of practical guidelines for state and local officials who are contemplating installation of—or who have already installed—public video surveillance systems. Through these guidelines, the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Initiative seeks to demonstrate that communities can choose to implement such security systems in ways that protect residents’ privacy rights and civil liberties.

The Constitution Project sincerely thanks the law firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP for its invaluable work researching and drafting this report. In particular, we thank Marc Jonathan Blitz, now a Professor at the Oklahoma City University School of Law, who conducted the initial research and worked with the Initiative to craft recommendations to reconcile constitutional values with law enforcement and anti-terrorism goals; and Will T. DeVries, who shared with us his expertise in law and technology, as well as his skills in writing a practical report that will be informative to policymakers, the legal community, the media, and the public at large. The Constitution Project also thanks the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic at U.C. Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School of Law, including its Director, Deirdre K. Mulligan, and students, Tara Wheatland, David C. Yang, and Peter Maybarduk, for their important research and drafting assistance.

In addition, we are grateful to the Public Welfare Foundation and the Community Foundation for their support of the Liberty and Security Initiative’s work on the Constitution Project’s *Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance*. We also thank the Open

Society Institute, the Wallace Global Fund, and an anonymous donor for their support of the Constitution Project in all its work.

Finally, the Constitution Project, in conjunction with the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, is currently developing model legislation designed to codify these guidelines. We hope that communities considering implementation of public video surveillance systems will be able to use this model legislation in establishing such systems in their own jurisdictions. The model legislation will be available on the Constitution Project's website, www.constitutionproject.org, later this year.

—Joseph N. Onek, Senior Counsel and Director, Liberty and Security Initiative
—Sharon Bradford Franklin, Senior Counsel

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Courts, lawmakers, and legal scholars have grappled for decades with how best to regulate law enforcement use of video surveillance in light of the constitutional rights and values such surveillance implicates. To this point, most decision-makers have simply defaulted to those minimum protections established by existing constitutional jurisprudence and the practical limits of the technology. Constitutional law protects the home and other private spaces and, for the most part, video cameras were not capable of changing the anonymous nature of the public streets.

In recent years, however, technological advances and social changes have ushered in new and more pervasive forms of public video surveillance with the potential to upset the existing balance between law enforcement needs and constitutional rights and values. Modern public video surveillance systems consist of networks of linked cameras spread over vast portions of public space. These cameras can be equipped with technologies like high resolution and magnification, motion detection, infrared vision, and biometric identification—all linked to a powerful network capable of automated tracking, archiving, and identifying suspect behavior. These types of systems are beginning to cover the American urban landscape, from metropolises like Chicago and Washington, D.C. to cities and towns like Virginia Beach and Cicero, Illinois.

It is understandable that American cities and their law enforcement officers place great emphasis on developing new tools to confront the increased threat of terrorism faced by Americans in the twenty-first century—and the apparent value of surveillance footage in the investigation into the July 2005 bombings in London only strengthens the appeal of this particular tool. Likewise, it is understandable that authorities would want to use any available means to prevent or deter other serious threats to public safety. But the value of modern video surveillance must be balanced with the need to protect our core constitutional rights and values, including privacy and anonymity, free speech and association, government accountability, and equal protection. The new technologies may help protect the public, but they also enable authorities to more deeply intrude upon these rights. Lawmakers can no longer rely on constitutional law and technological limits—they need to proactively seek ways to harmonize constitutional rights and values with the new surveillance capabilities. We believe that constitutional rights and values can be reconciled with law enforcement and anti-terrorism goals, but officials often lack the resources to properly gauge how to achieve such reconciliation.

The Constitution Project's Liberty and Security Initiative has therefore formulated guidelines to assist local and state officials charged with authorizing, designing, and managing public video surveillance systems. These guidelines will help communities meet the challenge of reconciling Americans' strong and legitimate interest in protection against terrorism and other dangers with their longstanding and constitutionally-enshrined commitment to individual freedom. In addition, these guidelines can lower the overall cost of a video surveillance system by identifying unnecessary or ineffective aspects of the design and reducing the likelihood of legal challenge to public video surveillance.

In summary, our recommended guidelines for public video surveillance systems are as follows:

I. Core Principles Governing the Creation and Design of Public Video Surveillance Systems

1. Create a public video surveillance system only to further a clearly articulated law enforcement purpose.
2. Create permanent public video surveillance systems only to address serious threats to public safety that are of indefinite duration.
3. Ensure that public video surveillance systems are capable of effectively achieving their articulated purposes.
4. Compare the cost of a public video surveillance system to alternative means of addressing the stated purposes of the system.
5. Assess the impact of a public video surveillance system on constitutional rights and values.
6. Design the scope and capabilities of a public video surveillance system to minimize its negative impact on constitutional rights and values.
7. Create technological and administrative safeguards to reduce the potential for misuse and abuse of the system.
8. Ensure that the decision to create a public video surveillance system, as well as major decisions affecting its design, are made through an open and publicly accountable process.

II. Publicly Accountable Procedures for Establishing Public Video Surveillance Systems

1. For permanent or long-term public video surveillance systems, conduct a civil liberties impact assessment and overall cost-benefit analysis through a public deliberative process that includes community input.
2. For temporary public video surveillance systems, demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that the system has no greater scope or capabilities than reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

III. Principles and Rules for Use of Public Video Surveillance Systems

1. Once a public video surveillance system is authorized, no additional approval is necessary to use the capabilities of the system for “observation.”
2. “Record” footage from public video surveillance systems only to the extent necessary to further the system’s stated purposes.
3. Under most circumstances, individuals may be “tracked” or “identified” by a public video surveillance system only pursuant to a warrant: (a) law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to using a public video surveillance system to track or identify an individual; (b) law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to using a “watch list” to automatically identify individuals, except when using a federal anti-terrorism watch list.
4. A public video surveillance system may be used for legitimate law enforcement purposes other than its original purpose, subject to certain restrictions: (a) no additional approval is required for incidental use of the system; (b) law enforcement must obtain administrative approval for secondary use of “pre-archival” stored video surveillance footage; (c) law enforcement must obtain a warrant for secondary use of “archival” stored video surveillance footage.
5. Employ technological and administrative safeguards to reduce the potential for misuse and abuse of the system: (a) provide safeguards for use of stored video surveillance data; (b) provide safeguards for personnel with access to a public video surveillance system; (c) provide public notice of surveillance where appropriate.

6. Prohibit, to the extent possible, sharing of public video surveillance data with third parties, including private litigants, and restrict sharing with other governmental entities.
7. Establish mechanisms to protect the rights of identifiable individuals captured on video surveillance data.
8. Apply to any law enforcement use of privately collected video surveillance data the same standards that apply to public video surveillance data.
9. Provide appropriate remedies for those harmed by misuse or abuse of public video surveillance systems.

GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

I. Introduction

Within days of the July 2005 bombings on London's subway and bus system, authorities had identified the bombers, retraced their paths, and detained suspected accomplices thanks in part to footage from London's elaborate public video surveillance system. While the cameras did not prevent the attacks, their value in the subsequent investigation has reinvigorated movements, both in the United States and elsewhere, to develop similar systems. From Washington, D.C. to Paris, France to Cicero, Illinois, local officials are expressing renewed interest in video surveillance. And this surveillance is a far cry from the simple closed-circuit camera systems employed by law enforcement agencies in the past. Officials concerned about terrorist and other serious threats are seeking public video surveillance systems that are pervasive, intelligent, and outfitted with the latest technologies.

The potential of video surveillance has generated interest among state and local law enforcement officials,* who see video surveillance as a cost-effective and unobtrusive means of combating serious threats to public safety. Many civil libertarians and privacy advocates, in contrast, believe that pervasive government surveillance, which will inevitably capture the activity of law-abiding people, is antithetical to the ideals of a society that values individual rights, autonomy, and freedom from government intrusion. Reconciliation of these important concerns demands the serious attention of citizens, lawmakers, law enforcement agencies, and eventually the courts.

* We intend these guidelines to be used by state and local officials and law enforcement agencies. Federal authorities, whose jurisdiction includes national security, border regions, and other anomalous areas, will find many of the recommendations in this document to be inapplicable. Nevertheless, we invite federal officials to apply the principles of this document to the extent feasible.

As we use the term here, a “public video surveillance system” is a camera network administered by or for law enforcement to monitor activities in a public place or places.* At its simplest, it is nothing more than a small network of cameras that allows an officer to quickly scan current activity in an area. At its most complex, such a surveillance system can include hundreds or thousands of cameras—equipped with technologies like high resolution and magnification, motion detection, infrared vision, and automated identification—all linked to a powerful network capable of automated tracking, archiving, and identifying suspect behavior. What was once the grist of science fiction novels is quickly becoming the reality of modern law enforcement.

Without question, the legal and social implications of surveillance networks are vast. To protect the spirit of our most important constitutional rights and values, assuage public fears of “big brother,” and manage liability, public video surveillance systems must be designed narrowly, used carefully, and examined thoroughly. At the same time, effective public video surveillance systems should not be abandoned merely because they can be abused. We believe that constitutional rights and values *can* be reconciled with law enforcement and anti-terrorism goals, but officials often lack the resources to properly gauge *how* to achieve such reconciliation. To that end, the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Initiative offers these guidelines for public video surveillance programs.

II. Background

As the legal, social and technological issues surrounding video surveillance are complex, this section provides necessary background. We briefly examine the status of video surveillance in its modern manifestation: large-scale, long-term, pervasive camera networks capable of rendering a city center into the surveillance equivalent of a bank lobby. We also discuss the technologies of modern video surveillance, from “pan, tilt, and zoom” to automated information based on biological features (“biometric” identification) to intelligent networks, as well as the terrorism threats that spurred their development and deployment. This section also discusses the constitutional rights and values implicated by public video surveillance systems and the existing legal status of such surveillance.

* While the principles we describe can aid those concerned about the private deployment of surveillance cameras, such as in a mall or theme park, these guidelines are not aimed directly at private surveillance. If, however, a privately created surveillance system or footage from one is made available to law enforcement, it should be treated as public for the purposes of these guidelines. These guidelines also do not address law enforcement surveillance of non-public places, which is subject to a variety of additional legal restrictions.

A. Developments in and Use of Video Surveillance

Modern public video surveillance systems do not lack antecedents. Cities first experimented with mounting cameras over public streets in the 1960s.¹ And, while most early camera installations have been removed, police have continued to make selective use of public video cameras to gather evidence from a specific place or individual in the course of an investigation. Also, as the famous images of the September 11th hijackers illustrate, law enforcement has used extensive footage from privately operated monitoring cameras—such as those on ATMs, in convenience stores, and in airports. In recent years, driven by concerns regarding terrorism and improvements in technology, cities and communities have begun to install the next generation of video surveillance—pervasive networks of cameras equipped with the latest high-tech features.

1. The threat of terrorism

As the reaction to the July 2005 attacks in London demonstrated, the increased threat of terrorism over the last several years has drastically changed the perceived value of video surveillance systems. Terrorism is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other criminal threats. In terms of physical cost, damage to life and limb, and long-term social impact, the potential costs of terrorism far outstrip those of all but the most virulent crimes. Moreover, while criminals and zealots have resorted to terrorism for centuries, the potential impact of terrorist attacks has increased exponentially in modern society. Dense urban environments, public reliance on vital and sensitive infrastructure, and the accessibility of weapons of mass destruction each multiply the dangers of terrorism.

In response, law enforcement agencies around the world, including here in the United States, are increasingly seeking systems like the one in London—a vast network, with constant monitoring of likely “targets,” automated identification of suspected terrorists or suspicious activity, and the ability to track individuals from location to location.² Indeed, the London system itself was deployed largely to combat the earlier terrorist threat of the Irish Republican Army.³ These systems are a far cry from those of even a few years ago, when public video surveillance was primarily a selective law enforcement tool—used on a temporary basis at certain times and places to track known individuals.

2. New technology

The ability of new camera and network technologies to identify, track, and investigate the activities of formerly anonymous individuals fundamentally changes the nature of video surveillance. While the various technological developments overlap, for these guidelines we conceive of four distinct types of surveillance technologies, each of which calls for differing rules and restrictions (*see* Sections III.C.1.–3., *infra*): (a) observation technologies; (b) recording technologies; (c) tracking technologies; and (d) identification technologies. A final section discusses technologies that may be employed to *mitigate* the impact of surveillance on constitutional rights and values.

a) Observation technologies

The ability of video cameras to observe has developed significantly. Early closed-circuit surveillance cameras—and the ones still used by many private and public entities—can “see” about as far as a human eye but with a narrower field of view. Modern cameras, in contrast, can pan and tilt at the direction of controllers to expand their effective coverage area, and magnification can exponentially improve the detail that camera images can render. With a mere 60-times optical zoom lens, a camera “can read the wording on a cigarette packet at 100 yards;”⁴ some cities are reportedly deploying cameras capable of 400-times magnification.⁵ Other observation technologies allow cameras to render usable images in very low light, and infrared “night-vision” technology can render clear images with no visible light whatsoever.

b) Recording technologies

In addition to lowering storage costs and improving the quality of recordings, the advent of digital video technology permits manipulation of recorded video data in ways impossible with analog recordings. First, digital video records can be supplemented with “metadata:” information about the recording itself or the captured images that increases the usefulness of the recording. For instance, records from cameras filming an urban financial district could be supplemented with date, time, location, summary data concerning numbers of people or automobiles, or even information about recognized individuals—such as criminal records or previous visits to the same location. Second, recorded digital footage may also be searched more cheaply and easily than analog footage. Combined with rich metadata, a database of video footage could be searched for specific individuals or activity matching a specified pattern, or used to create a “digital dossier” about an individual.⁶ Perhaps more importantly, law enforcement can instantly review footage from any time and location that exists in the database.

c) Tracking technologies

Today's cameras and camera networks can also be equipped with technology allowing them to track movement in their field of view or across networked cameras. Not only can simple motion sensors enable a camera to activate when it detects motion, but more advanced technology can allow the camera to automatically track an object moving through its field of view. Combined with pan, tilt, and zoom technology, such a camera could track a person walking the length of entire city blocks, around corners, or from a storefront to a vehicle.

Moreover, software can be added to the systems running the cameras to enable more sophisticated tracking, identification of suspicious or unusual movement, and deduction of useful data such as speed, path, and destination. In contrast to the popular image of a lone security guard watching a bank of grainy monitors, systems commercially available today can provide a unified, virtual-reality perspective of a monitored area—similar to the interface of the popular Google Earth software⁷—allowing an operator to automatically follow an object as it moves from camera view to camera view. In real time or using stored data, law enforcement can actively and pervasively track specific individuals or activity in large areas, or even be notified if the system detects unusual activity.⁸

d) Identification technologies

Automated identification software continues to improve. Traditionally, identification was not a central purpose of video surveillance because law enforcement officers already knew the identity of the individual or individuals they were monitoring. Even where authorities sought to identify a suspect caught on video, they generally solicited citizen aid.⁹ This is changing. Already, video surveillance of license numbers can identify individual cars: London has supplemented many of its downtown cameras with technology that automatically captures and analyzes drivers' license plates—a technology increasingly employed across the U.K.¹⁰ Radio-frequency identification, already used in employee badges and “E-ZPass” systems, can be employed in conjunction with surveillance systems as well.¹¹

Facial recognition systems, while far from perfect, are steadily improving in quality as recent advances increase the reliability of the identification process.¹² These technologies are attractive to law enforcement agencies, which hope to be able to automatically check videotape for suspects the way fingerprints at a crime scene can be automatically checked against a database of known criminals. Beyond the fingerprint analogy, moreover, facial recognition may one day be used to quickly and cheaply create a catalog of an individual's every movement through a surveilled area. Members of Congress and other officials have shown interest in using biometric identification, such as facial recognition and iris scanners,

to identify individuals on terror watch lists,¹³ but smaller-scale facial recognition systems are already in place. Virginia Beach, for instance, used facial-recognition devices in its permanent boardwalk video surveillance system.¹⁴ New York has reportedly contemplated installing numerous biometric recognition devices in Times Square.¹⁵ Perhaps most famously, security for the 2001 Superbowl included hundreds of facial recognition cameras.¹⁶

e) Technologies that can mitigate the impact of surveillance

Conversely, there are also technologies that can mitigate the invasive effects of those described above. Some technologies simply help limit the information captured. For instance, cameras can be programmed so that they cannot pan or tilt in ways that would reveal private spaces, such as looking through windows into private residences. Similarly, “digital masking” technology can automatically hide the faces of non-targeted individuals on recorded footage.¹⁷ Other technologies can help authorities effectively protect recorded data from unauthorized use or disclosure. Stored data can be supplemented with encryption technology, which permits only those with the proper decryption “key” to unscramble the stored footage. Other means of data authentication, such as a digital “watermark,” do not prevent access to recorded footage, but can be used to create a record of when and where data is accessed.

3. Expansion of scale, permanence, and prevalence of public video surveillance

The confluence of the increased threat of terrorism and new, more powerful technologies has spurred a dramatic growth not only in the prevalence of public video surveillance systems, but in their scale and scope as well.

In the past few years, many American cities and public organizations have come to view public video surveillance not merely as a tool for specific investigations, but as something that might be a permanent feature of public space. Looking to the example of London, American cities such as Washington, D.C. and Chicago have made similar plans to install networks of cameras. To address terrorist threats, these networks are being designed to cover transportation networks, business districts, public areas, monuments and government buildings, and other vital infrastructure.¹⁸ Chicago’s surveillance network may be the nation’s most extensive and advanced, making its residents “some of the most closely observed in the world.”¹⁹ The city has built a massive, 1000-mile fiber-optic grid equipped “with cameras and biochemical sensors to watch for signs of terrorism, crime and traffic tie-ups.”²⁰ The system is reportedly linked to software that can automatically alert police whenever an individual near a sensitive location “wanders aimlessly in circles, lingers outside a public building, pulls a car onto the shoulder of a highway, or leaves a package and walks away from it.”²¹ Other cities,

such as Baltimore, Maryland, Cicero, Illinois, and Newport, Rhode Island, are reportedly using federal anti-terrorism grants to build similar, if smaller, camera networks.²²

The rapid expansion of public video surveillance has sparked a fierce debate over the efficacy of the systems in fighting crime. A 2003 review by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta, Canada found the consensus amongst empirical studies to be that video surveillance has little effect on violent crime, and only a small positive effect on property crime.²³ This positive effect on property crime, moreover, was substantially less than the effect of improved lighting.²⁴ Also unclear is the effect of other simultaneous public-safety enhancements—such as improved street lighting—and the extent to which criminal activity was simply displaced to non-surveilled areas. Finally, given the cost of deploying, maintaining, and operating such systems, no data exists to demonstrate that video surveillance is a more effective use of public resources than traditional law enforcement.

Given such evidence, some cities have abandoned video surveillance plans. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), officials in Detroit, Michigan contemplated the use of generalized video surveillance for 14 years, but ultimately concluded that high maintenance and personnel costs could not justify the limited results.²⁵ In Oakland, California, the ACLU reports that the police department, after lobbying for three years for surveillance cameras in public places, eventually concluded that “there is no conclusive way to establish that the presence of video surveillance cameras resulted in the prevention or reduction of crime.”²⁶

While these studies and examples are grist for those who oppose video surveillance, the conclusions they draw by no means end the debate. Anecdotally, video surveillance has aided the investigation into high-profile crimes, and many cities and communities report their satisfaction with public video surveillance systems. In addition, no study to date tracks the effect of surveillance on terrorism. While suicidal terrorists are unlikely to be deterred by video surveillance, the technology may aid in the prevention and investigation of attacks. At the least, however, the mixed nature of the evidence should encourage any jurisdiction considering use of video surveillance to review existing literature, carefully weigh the monetary costs and social impact against the benefits of video surveillance, and engage in limited trials prior to full-scale implementation.

B. Constitutional Rights and Values at Stake

Public video surveillance systems implicate many fundamental values. This section identifies the range of constitutional rights and values at stake in the debate over public video surveillance.

1. Privacy and anonymity

Privacy is a general term, covering concepts that are often very different from one another. Privacy includes “informational privacy” rights, such as a consumer’s right to keep the businesses she patronizes from disclosing her name and address, “decisional privacy,” which includes such matters as reproductive decisions, and the more traditional “physical privacy” over one’s self and property. Though these different branches of the privacy right are conceptually separable and vary in their legal protection, they all center on the right to personal autonomy—what Justice Brandeis famously called “the right to be let alone.”²⁷ We use the term “privacy” in this broad sense.

Closely related to privacy is the right to anonymity. Alan Westin, author of a seminal privacy treatise, described anonymity as a form of privacy that “occurs when the individual is in public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and surveillance.”²⁸ Because of this anonymity, “he does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were known to those observing him.”²⁹ The Supreme Court has validated this view by recognizing that people should be able to remain anonymous while exercising certain constitutionally protected rights.³⁰ Anonymity remains a fundamental freedom even as urban environments and technology increasingly allow government or other interested parties to identify every passerby.³¹

Few would disagree that public video surveillance systems have the potential to be used in ways that infringe on privacy and anonymity rights. Commentators often erroneously assume that there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy” in streets or parks or other areas open to view.³² However, despite the legal doctrine relied on, this is false as an empirical matter. Most people expect to remain anonymous in many “public” contexts, such as entering an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, a psychiatrist’s office, an infertility clinic, or the headquarters of a fringe religious or cultural group. Similarly, even when they are in a public place, most people expect to keep private the information that might be detectable from such sources as the exposed words on a vial of prescription drugs, the moving lips of a couple engaged in hushed conversation, or diary entries written by a person sitting on a park bench. Ubiquitous, technologically-enhanced video cameras could enable the government to routinely capture footage of all of these activities.

2. Freedom of expression and association

As the First Amendment attests, our society has a deep commitment to preserving the right of individuals to freely express their ideas and to associate freely to share those ideas. To

protect this freedom, even laws or policies that merely “chill” free expression or freedom of association may be struck down.³³ The Supreme Court has recognized that the ability to freely express oneself or associate includes the right to do so without revealing one’s identity.³⁴ A sufficiently powerful public camera could endanger these rights by giving the government an extensive record of what individuals say and read, and with whom they associate.³⁵

3. Government accountability and procedural safeguards

Equally central to the concept of a free society is the principle that laws—rather than people—govern us. We submit to society’s laws knowing the authorities must do the same. Through representatives, the public enacts rules and procedures that dictate when the government can deprive any individual of life, liberty, or property. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ specific guarantee of “due process” is one aspect of this right, but it pervades all aspects and all levels of American society—requiring that government remain accountable to the governed. Open government or “sunshine” laws, notice requirements, and regular elections are all manifestations of this social value. Of course, central to this principle is the ability of the public to know if the government is adhering to its own rules and how it reaches its decisions.

Pervasive public video surveillance systems could allow officials to evade both procedural safeguards and accountability. The disclosure in December 2005 of the National Security Agency’s warrantless domestic surveillance program highlighted the critical need to maintain such controls. As the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Initiative and many others have pointed out in connection with the NSA surveillance program, it is essential that government surveillance be conducted only with independent oversight and as part of a system of checks and balances.* In the public video surveillance context as well, unless procedural limits are implemented, law enforcement officers might use video surveillance to improperly monitor private activity or otherwise go beyond the bounds of their authority. Without accountability safeguards, moreover, the officers might never have to explain their actions.

* In December 2005, the Liberty and Security Initiative released a statement criticizing the recently disclosed NSA warrantless surveillance program and refuting the Administration’s legal justifications for the program. The statement also noted that: “Although we fully agree that the president must be able to take action to protect our nation from the threat of terrorism, he must do so in a manner consistent with the rule of law, our commitment to civil liberties, and our constitutional system of checks and balances.” Statement available at: http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/1_5_updated_statement.pdf. In addition, on February 28, 2006, the Constitution Project and the Center for National Security Studies filed an *amicus* brief in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court analyzing the legal failures of the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program. Brief available at: http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/FISC_memorandum.PDF.

4. Equal protection and anti-discrimination

American society and law abhor discrimination for many reasons. Discrimination degrades its victims and also reinforces one of the heinous and most anti-American of social institutions: a class structure. Moreover, discrimination retards the very ability of any insular minority group—be it religious, racial, cultural, political, or ethnic—to participate fully in civil society. In *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, Justice Stone famously suggested that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”³⁶ This idea paved the way for much of modern Equal Protection and Due Process Clause jurisprudence.

The potential for discriminatory use by government officials is a significant problem for any video surveillance system. The British, who administer the largest video surveillance systems of any democratic nation, admit that some degree of ethnic, racial, and gender profiling exists. Two experts from the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at Hull University in Britain found that, based on data from the city of Hull’s surveillance system, “[b]lack people were between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half times more likely to be surveilled than one would expect from their presence in the population.”³⁷ Disproportionate surveillance of, for instance, young black men can lead to a false perception amongst law enforcement of that population’s criminality. Discriminatory use of surveillance can also give ammunition to those with salacious or malicious agendas: British officers have been caught offering for sale voyeuristic videos of women caught on surveillance tapes;³⁸ in Washington, D.C., a well-known police lieutenant was charged with using police databases to blackmail married patrons of gay establishments.³⁹ While hopefully such behavior is rare, it illustrates the discriminatory potential of video surveillance.

C. Existing Law and Regulatory Proposals

Legal authorities governing use of public video surveillance are sparse, and laws governing modern, technologically advanced public video surveillance systems are rarer still. Statutes and regulations generally lag behind technological development. Constitutional law typically develops at an even more glacial pace. While many laws and constitutional doctrines have important implications for public video surveillance, a review of these laws highlights the inadequacy of existing law and regulatory proposals to properly address the balance between security interests and implicated rights, liberties, and social values.

1. Constitutional law

Video surveillance implicates several constitutional doctrines—generally centered on the First and Fourth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” but no court has yet found law enforcement use of video cameras to surveil activity on public property to be an unreasonable search. While the Supreme Court has recognized that “people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks”⁴⁰ and that constitutional privacy interests may well be implicated when a camera is focused on activities the government has no legitimate interest in monitoring, such as “a class ring” or “identifiable human faces,”⁴¹ it has not extended protection to cover the routine use of video surveillance. Many lower courts have in fact claimed that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public areas.⁴² This conclusion may be based on the fact that, until recently, authorities could not easily deprive people of the seclusion of an isolated public space or the anonymity of a crowded street. Doing so would have required authorities to target a particular individual, conceal their own presence, and track her movements.

Similarly, courts have not yet recognized that modern video surveillance may chill or otherwise intrude upon protected First Amendment activities. First Amendment jurisprudence does acknowledge the special role of public places in expressive activity,⁴³ and forbids laws or policies that disproportionately burden expression in such places,⁴⁴ but “neither the speech or association guaranties are likely to provide a basis for constitutional regulation of most public surveillance, at least when it is visual only.”⁴⁵ The Supreme Court rejected, for instance, a claim by Vietnam-era antiwar protesters that their extensive surveillance dossiers, collected by the Army, chilled their ability to freely express themselves.⁴⁶ Thus, while little question exists that the values and liberties that undergird the First and Fourth Amendments can be violated by overzealous video surveillance, the jurisprudence to this point has been very permissive.

2. Federal statutes

A few federal laws peripherally affect public video surveillance, but none substantively limit law enforcement’s use of cameras. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which limits law enforcement or private parties’ ability to intercept or access private communications, applies only to “aural” communications—and thus does not apply to video surveillance lacking sound.⁴⁷ Even footage *with* sound may not trigger ECPA, as claimants would still have to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the intercepted conversation.⁴⁸ Federal anti-terrorism and foreign intelligence laws, including the USA PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), not only fail to limit

government use of video surveillance, they in fact streamline intergovernmental sharing of surveillance data in any investigation relating to terrorism.⁴⁹ The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which requires the federal government to make information available to the public, may also be a legal means through which surveillance data on individuals could be released to the public, though the law contains a privacy exception that may prevent disclosure to private parties.⁵⁰

Though they lack the force of federal law, the influential “Fair Information Practices” originated in recommendations written by the United States government.⁵¹ The Fair Information Practices provide helpful guidance for the treatment of any governmental-held record containing personally identifiable information, and have served as the model for much of international law on personal data, including the 1995 European Union Data Protection Directive.⁵² In their most basic form, the Fair Information Practices require that individuals be provided the following rights with respect to the collection, use, or transfer of their personal information:

- **Notice and awareness** of the purpose of data collection, and how such information is used;
- **Consent** to the collection of personal information, and choice concerning how it is used;
- **Access to and participation in** the process of data collection and use, including the right to correct errors;
- **Integrity and security** adequate to protect the information against loss or misuse; and
- **Redress and accountability** for injury resulting from loss or misuse of personal information.

3. State law

Several state statutes regulate aspects of public use of video surveillance. In New York, for example, video surveillance can only be conducted as part of a police investigation into the allegedly criminal behavior of an individual pursuant to a warrant. Because of what the statute terms “the reasonable expectation of privacy under the constitution of this state or of the United States,” the bar for authorizing or approving such a warrant is set quite high, and the alleged crimes must be quite serious.⁵³ Arizona, in contrast, merely makes it a misdemeanor for a person to use video “surveillance” in a public place without posting notice.⁵⁴ The laws of other states vary, and while any authority seeking to adopt such a system should investigate applicable law, state statutes generally affect video surveillance only in cursory fashion, if at all.

4. Regulatory Proposals

These guidelines are not the first attempt to propose a regulatory framework for public video surveillance. In 1999, the American Bar Association (ABA) published standards for technologically-assisted physical surveillance, including video surveillance, as part of the Third Edition of the *ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance (ABA Standards)*.⁵⁵ These standards stress that while crime-fighting may benefit substantially from video surveillance and other “technologically-assisted physical surveillance,” such as satellite tracking or use of chemical detection devices,⁵⁶ such technologies “can also diminish privacy, freedom of speech, association and travel, and the openness of society.”⁵⁷ The *ABA Standards* propose a number of principles aimed at ensuring that such potentially invasive technologies are not used arbitrarily, in a discriminatory fashion, or in ways that intrude upon privacy or “First Amendment freedoms and related values” more than is necessary to achieve their “legitimate law enforcement purpose.”⁵⁸ They also stress that such surveillance be subject to mechanisms of democratic accountability.⁵⁹ While the *ABA Standards* are a valuable tool and arrive at many similar conclusions as this document, they are incomplete—as both the 2001 terrorist attacks and most of the technological developments discussed above post-date their publication.

Many Canadian provinces have published guidelines for use of public video surveillance, pursuant to Canadian privacy laws that require various safeguards for any collection or use of personal information.⁶⁰ Based on the Fair Information Practices, these guidelines recognize the danger to privacy posed by video surveillance, and require procedures to curb those dangers. The Alberta guidelines, for example, cover any surveillance that collects information about identifiable individuals; require surveillance proposals to be subjected to efficacy analysis and a “privacy impact assessment;” and limit who may access and use stored records and for what purposes.⁶¹ Though specific to their respective provinces and based on Canadian law, several provisions of these guidelines could be productively incorporated into a more thorough system of rules under United States law.

A few other political entities have also proposed guidelines for regulating law enforcement use of video surveillance. The government of New South Wales, Australia, published in 2000 guidelines aimed at cities under its jurisdiction, including Sydney.⁶² The New South Wales guidelines recommend a number of steps to protect civil liberties, including community consultation, limited access to video footage, monitoring, and regular audits. In the United States, the city council of Washington, D.C. introduced rules in 2002 to govern how the city should use its video surveillance system going forward.⁶³ These models provide a helpful starting point or supplement for other cities or communities considering public video surveillance systems, though they are not comprehensive and are specific to their own jurisdictions.

III. Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance

The above background reveals several deficiencies in the resources available to American communities to address the benefits, dangers, and costs of modern public video surveillance. First, public video surveillance systems are fundamentally different—in terms of goals, capabilities, and scope—than the video surveillance systems of the past. Second, while the post-9/11 world requires innovative security measures, authorities must understand that public video surveillance systems pose new and more serious threats to constitutional rights and values than the surveillance cameras of the past. While any government-run camera can be used to infringe privacy or evade procedural limits, modern surveillance networks can also eliminate much of the privacy and anonymity individuals take for granted; chill a substantial amount of free expression; inhibit people from freely associating with others; create an unaccountable, unsupervised means of constant monitoring; and become a tool for discrimination against unpopular minority groups. Finally, existing law and regulatory proposals are insufficient to adequately cope with these threats. To address these deficiencies, the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Initiative proposes the guidelines that follow. While technology and social factors will continue to evolve, these guidelines allow any state, city, or community considering a public video surveillance system to develop a robust and effective regime that simultaneously protects the core constitutional rights and values of its residents, avoids potential liability stemming from infringement of these rights, and still permits law enforcement to fully address the real and dangerous threats of the modern world.*

Section A of the guidelines discusses core principles that should govern the creation and design of public video surveillance systems. These principles should help a community determine whether a surveillance system should be deployed at all, where it should be installed, its capabilities, and the procedural and substantive rules that protect against misuse and abuse. Section B outlines two specific procedures through which these substantive issues may be examined and resolved in a publicly accountable manner: (1) a detailed, participatory, and transparent process that includes a “civil liberties impact assessment” and a cost-benefit analysis to assess proposals for permanent, large-scale public video surveillance systems; and (2) a streamlined process involving judicial oversight and approval designed for shorter-term public video surveillance systems that must be implemented either quickly or

* As stated in Section I, while the principles we describe can aid those concerned about the private deployment of surveillance cameras, such as in a mall or theme park, these guidelines are not aimed directly at private surveillance. If, however, a privately created surveillance system or footage from one is made available to law enforcement, it should be treated as public for the purposes of these guidelines. These guidelines also do not address law enforcement surveillance of non-public places, which is subject to a variety of additional legal restrictions.

in secret. Section C sets forth rules and procedures to ensure that the use of a system, once installed, is aligned with core substantive principles. This section discusses technical and administrative constraints on the use of surveillance systems, including the retention of data, the identification of surveilled individuals, the deployment of enhanced technologies, and the rights of individuals captured on camera.

A. Core Principles Governing the Creation and Design of Public Video Surveillance Systems

This section outlines the core principles that should be considered throughout the lifecycle of a public video surveillance system, including: the purposes that justify its creation; the necessity of evaluating cost, efficacy, and the impact on constitutional rights and values; articulation of the coverage and capabilities of the system; and the creation of procedural and substantive safeguards to protect against misuse and abuse.

1. Create a public video surveillance system only to further a clearly articulated law enforcement purpose.

The initial step in the creation of a public video surveillance system is a clear statement of the legitimate law enforcement purpose or purposes for the system. This statement of purpose provides context for both the analysis of the system's social impact and economic cost and benefits before its installation (*see* Section III.B., *infra*), and its regulation subsequent to installation (*see* Section III.C., *infra*). The governmental body seeking to create the system must articulate its purpose as clearly and specifically as practicable to enable the public or reviewing body to assess the legitimacy of the stated purpose and evaluate the system's design and use. The statement of purpose provides several important benefits:

- It allows members of the affected communities to evaluate the legitimacy of the purposes and consider whether they are likely to be furthered by a public video surveillance system.
- Should the purposes be deemed valid, the statement then informs every aspect of the design—including whether the system should be permanent or temporary, the locations where it should be installed, the technological features it should embody, and the rules that govern its use. Only a system capable of achieving its purposes should be considered for installation (*see* Section III.A.3., *infra*).
- It provides a means for holding government publicly accountable for any failure of the system to serve or achieve its purposes.

- It allows the public to identify and punish individual abuse and misuse of the system by forcing officials to justify their use with respect to the purposes of the system.

2. Create permanent public video surveillance systems only to address serious threats to public safety that are of indefinite duration.

The risk of harm to constitutional rights and values posed by a public video surveillance system increases with its duration. The longer a system operates, the more activities and information it captures—permitting more and greater violations of privacy and anonymity and correspondingly higher probability of public outcry and legal liability. Moreover, the knowledge that surveillance is an enduring feature of the public landscape may inexorably render such spaces less suitable for the exercise of free speech and other liberties. Permanent systems, which maximize the potential for such violations, should be created only to address serious threats to public safety that are of indefinite duration.

While every community may reach its own conclusion as to which threats are “serious” and “of indefinite duration,” we conclude that, in general, the only law enforcement concerns that meet this test are (1) a persistent threat of terrorist attack or (2) danger to critical public infrastructure and the people who surround such sites. The threat of terrorism, which regrettably appears to be an enduring feature of the modern world, certainly rises to the level of serious and of indefinite duration for those communities with good reason to believe they may be attacked.* In addition to terrorist threats, danger to critical public infrastructure, both criminal and accidental, poses long-term risks to public safety requiring the utmost caution and preventative efforts. Such infrastructure includes public transportation networks, major traffic arteries and interchanges, and public utility facilities.

By contrast, we conclude that property crime and violent crime other than terrorism, regardless of seriousness, do not pose a threat of indefinite duration at any given location. While communities must be able to prevent and respond to these threats to public safety, we urge employment of other investigative or prophylactic means less intrusive than permanent surveillance systems—including additional policing or, if justified, a temporary public surveillance system. This recommendation is buttressed by evidence that public video surveillance has not been a cost-effective means of combating property and violent crime (*see* Section II.A.3., *supra*). Should a community conclude differently, however, we urge officials to nevertheless apply the seriousness and indefiniteness criteria to determine which threats

* Of course, while many communities may be understandably fearful of terrorist attack, each community must dispassionately assess the reasonability of its fears. This determination should be based on considerations such as the character of the location, its symbolic or strategic value, its role as critical public infrastructure, and specific threats or intelligence.

warrant the creation of permanent surveillance systems, as well as the remainder of these guidelines.

3. Ensure that public video surveillance systems are capable of effectively achieving their articulated purposes.

A public video surveillance system must be effective in addressing the stated purposes for which it was created. In light of the constitutional rights and values at stake, the costs of such a system, and the legal risks it poses, a community should carefully assess whether a video surveillance system is an effective means of combating the particular threats that justified its creation. For instance, an anti-terrorism system that contains automated identification features, yet lacks trained personnel who understand how to take full advantage of the specialized software, may not be effective or justify its continued use. Similarly, a system created to combat crime at night in a public park may not be effective if it is not equipped with low-light technology. As the *ABA Standards* note, a surveillance technique as powerful as video surveillance “should be capable of doing what it purports to do.”⁶⁴

Section B of the guidelines describes methods of assessing the efficacy of public video surveillance systems. In general, however, communities and officials should contemplate the efficacy of the system at the design stage, upon installation, and after the system has been in use. Each location, as well as the system as a whole, should be assessed. A community should also review existing data concerning the efficacy of such systems (*see* Section II.A.3., *supra*), investigate the experiences of similar cities and communities with public video surveillance systems, and consider limited trials followed by review prior to large-scale installation.

4. Compare the cost of a public video surveillance system to alternative means of addressing the stated purposes of the system.

A community considering a public video surveillance system must consider its cost* in comparison to alternative uses of those same resources. If a surveillance system consumes more resources than alternative means of addressing its articulated purposes, then—all else being equal—the community should direct its resources toward the cheaper alternative. For instance, if the resources necessary to purchase, install, and operate a public video surveillance system could employ ten additional police officers, the community should evaluate whether those ten officers, if deployed in the targeted area, could achieve the law

* While any negative impact of video surveillance on constitutional rights and values is also a “cost,” we use the term in the economic sense to refer only to monetary or resource costs. The term “cost-benefit analysis,” however, refers to both social and economic costs.

enforcement objectives as well or better than cameras. Alternatively, a mix of some new officers and more limited video surveillance may provide the most return on the community's investment.

5. Assess the impact of a public video surveillance system on constitutional rights and values.

While few law enforcement authorities would implement video surveillance in public places with the intent to infringe upon the constitutional rights and values of their communities, nevertheless the importance of those rights and values demands careful attention to the unintended effects of surveillance systems in the design of public video surveillance systems. These social “costs,” though more difficult—if not impossible—to quantify, are as important a factor in evaluating the design and use of public video surveillance as calculation of economic costs.

As described more fully in Section II.B., *supra*, public video surveillance implicates a number of important constitutional rights and values. Communities should consider and articulate the impact of the planned public video surveillance system on each of the following:

- **Privacy and anonymity** rights are clearly imperiled by public video surveillance systems, if misused. Cameras could routinely capture footage of individuals engaging in activities in which most expect anonymity, such as entering an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, a psychiatrist's office, or the headquarters of a fringe religious or cultural group. Similarly, cameras might capture things most people would seek to keep private, such as the label on a vial purchased at a drug store or an intimate conversation between two family members on a stroll.
- **Freedom of speech and association** are similarly at risk. A sufficiently powerful public camera could give the government an extensive record of what individuals say and read, and with whom they associate outside of the home—substantially “chilling” the ability or desire of individuals to engage in protected conduct.
- **Government accountability and procedural safeguards** that preserve the relationship between the government and the governed can be undermined by pervasive public video surveillance. Without procedural limits, law enforcement officers might use the technology to improperly surveil private activity or otherwise go beyond the bounds of their authority. Without accountability safeguards, the officers might never have to explain their actions.
- **Equal protection and anti-discrimination** rights, finally, are at risk. Discrimination, whether based on race, gender, religion, age, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or some other attribute, can occur during the development or use of public video surveillance

systems. For example, decisions about where the cameras will be placed can lead to a disproportionate impact on certain groups, or operators could improperly use the cameras to single out members of those groups.⁶⁵

Further, as with economic cost, communities should assess whether alternative methods of achieving the same law enforcement objectives would significantly decrease the negative impact on constitutional rights and values. Aside from demonstrating support for constitutional rights and values, such analysis and careful planning can improve public acceptance of the system and deter lawsuits alleging violation of these rights.

6. Design the scope and capabilities of a public video surveillance system to minimize its negative impact on constitutional rights and values.

Those designing public surveillance systems should further limit the negative impact of video surveillance on their communities by limiting the duration, geographical coverage, and technological capabilities of the system. A public video surveillance system should have no greater scope or capabilities than reasonably necessary to achieve its purposes. A system so limited will minimize the negative impact on constitutional rights and values when the system is used properly, will help reduce the likelihood that the system will be abused or misused, and can avoid legal expenses that may otherwise be incurred defending the legality of the system.

A system may be limited in several respects. First, the duration that a system operates should be no longer than reasonably necessary to achieve its articulated purpose. As discussed in Section III.A.2., *supra*, the danger to constitutional rights and values increases with the duration of surveillance, and permanent systems should be created only to address threats to public safety that are of indefinite duration.

Second, a public video surveillance system should not cover more geographic territory than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose. For example, a temporary public video surveillance system created to combat criminal activities in a public park should be limited to the areas of the park in which the criminal activity occurs. More specifically, each camera should be placed or equipped in a manner that minimizes, where reasonable, its ability to surveil unnecessary areas, such as the windows of private residences.

Third, the cameras and the camera network should be equipped with only those features or capabilities reasonably necessary to serve the purpose of the system. Technological features like magnification, night vision, infrared detection, and automatic identification and tracking, which pose significant dangers to constitutional rights and liberties (*see* Section

II.A.2., *supra*), should be used only where they are needed. For instance, a camera network created to monitor a busy urban freeway for accidents or stopped vehicles likely does not require facial recognition technology—the use of which would increase the impact on civil liberties and increase the cost of the system without furthering its legitimate purposes of aiding motorists.

7. Create technological and administrative safeguards to reduce the potential for misuse and abuse of the system.

In addition to limiting the scope and capabilities of the system itself, communities should create a set of technological and administrative safeguards designed to deter, detect, and punish misuse and abuse of the public video surveillance system. These additional safeguards can further reduce the negative impact of the system on constitutional rights and values. Technological safeguards could include, for instance, employment of encryption technology (*see* Section II.A.2.e), *supra*) to help limit and control access to stored surveillance data. Similarly, administrative safeguards could include rules requiring archived surveillance data to be held by a government agency independent of law enforcement. The employment of such rules and technologies is addressed in Section C.

8. Ensure that the decision to create a public video surveillance system, as well as major decisions affecting its design, are made through an open and publicly accountable process.

Public oversight and accountability are a vital means of ensuring that any public video surveillance system is designed to prevent misuse and abuse. Members of the community that would be affected by a proposed system should have the opportunity to participate in the decision to create such a system, as well as the subsequent major decisions affecting its coverage and capabilities. Public input and oversight will force public officials seeking to deploy a surveillance system to justify the installation of cameras by demonstrating to the public that the anticipated costs and ill effect on constitutional rights and values are outweighed by the system's prospective benefits.

Although each community may adopt different processes depending on its unique needs and circumstances, any chosen procedure should preserve—at the least—some form of public accountability. We outline two recommended procedural mechanisms to evaluate public video surveillance systems in Section B.

B. Publicly Accountable Procedures for Establishing Public Video Surveillance Systems

This section outlines two recommended procedural means for creating and designing a public video surveillance system: (1) a detailed, participatory, and transparent process designed for permanent, large-scale public video surveillance systems that includes a “civil liberties impact assessment” and a cost-benefit analysis; and (2) a streamlined process involving judicial oversight and approval designed for shorter-term public video surveillance systems that must be implemented either quickly or in secret. While both procedures require law enforcement officials to justify their planned system according to the core principles outlined in Section A, the first is a public, deliberative process in which the community has input and authority. The second, in contrast, recognizes that such *ex ante* public input and review sometimes can undermine the valid purposes of public video surveillance. To nevertheless preserve openness and accountability to the extent possible, this second process allows judicial oversight to substitute for direct public participation.

There are numerous variations on these procedures that may better accommodate the needs of a specific community. Certain steps may be unnecessary, or additional steps may be added. Similarly, a mix of public deliberations and non-public judicial review may be appropriate. However, any chosen method should preserve some measure of oversight and informed analysis of the proposed system by a neutral and qualified decision-maker to determine if a proposed system’s benefits outweigh its social and economic costs.

1. For permanent or long-term public video surveillance systems, conduct a civil liberties impact assessment and overall cost-benefit analysis.

Many communities will likely seek to create a permanent video surveillance system to combat threats viewed as severe and enduring (*see* Section III.A.2., *supra*).* For such systems, a community should engage in a “civil liberties impact assessment” (“CLIA”) and cost-benefit analysis prior to deployment. The fundamental goal of this process is to verify in a public and accountable manner that the proposed system is a cost-effective and minimally invasive means of achieving its stated purposes.

* It should be noted that even if a camera installation is not explicitly deemed “permanent,” if it persists for a long enough period of time it should be considered *de facto* permanent and subject to the requirements of a permanent system. For instance, if a temporary system deployed pursuant to the judicial authorization process (*see* Section III.B.2., *infra*) is repeatedly renewed, it should likely be considered “permanent” and therefore subjected to the procedures we recommend in this section.

This review process has several major steps, which may be repeated as necessary if analysis and debate lead to modifications in the proposal. These steps largely track the core principles outlined in Section A. While extensive, we imagine that this process will often help a community save money. The process will ease later installation, operation, and review of surveillance networks. Also, it can substantially reduce the risk that surveillance networks will become embroiled in costly litigation.

- **Articulation and evaluation of the legitimate law enforcement purposes that justify the system.** This requires answering basic questions such as whether authorities intend the system to deter and prevent harmful events, provide a means of investigating events after they occur, or both. Moreover, authorities should evaluate the overall “magnitude” of the threat by considering the impact of the harmful events, should they occur, and the likelihood of occurrence.
- **Production of an initial proposal outlining the geographic scope and capabilities of the system.** The proposal should provide as much detail as possible, including every location in which a camera is to be installed, the visual coverage of each camera, and the proposed technical specifications of the entire system.
- **Analysis of whether the proposed system will effectively address its purposes.** Proposed systems not likely to accomplish their intended goals should be abandoned or redesigned and resubmitted.
- **Analysis of the proposal's cost.** Authorities should consider all economic costs of the system—including equipment, installation, training, maintenance, operation, and oversight—as well as any economic benefits, such as increased tax revenues from businesses or improved real estate values.
- **Analysis of the impact of the system on constitutional rights and values (the CLIA).**⁶⁶ The CLIA must consider each camera location, its intended field of view and “incidentally” visible areas, and the capabilities of each camera and camera network. It should then study how the system will affect constitutional rights and values in each area to be surveilled, considering both the general character and current uses of these places.* The CLIA should also include any proposed technological or administrative safeguards that may mitigate the system’s social impact. Authorities may want to pose the following questions:

* Different rights and values may be at stake to varying degrees depending on the nature of the place—for instance, free expression is likely a more primary consideration at a public park next to a city hall than an alleyway behind a shopping mall. Similarly, the deployment of identification technologies may significantly chill free expression in the park, but in the lobby of a government building, these technologies may have only a minimal effect on individuals already required to present identification.

- Will the surveillance be conducted in places where it is likely to infringe upon expectations of privacy and anonymity, such as outside restaurants, nightclubs, medical clinics, or political party offices?
 - To what extent do the proposed cameras capture more detail and reveal more information than would be observed by a law enforcement officer at the scene?
 - Are the places to be surveilled used for demonstrations, picketing, leafleting, or other activities protected by the First Amendment?
 - Will the system create unaccountable law enforcement authority or unnecessarily increase the ability of negligent or rogue officers to misuse or abuse their authority?
 - Is the surveillance likely to have a disproportionate impact on a minority group or marginalized portion of the population?
- **Overall cost-benefit analysis of the proposed system.** The overall cost of the system is a combination of its burden upon a community's resources and the adverse impact of the system upon the constitutional rights and values of individuals. The anticipated benefit of the system could be roughly conceptualized as the product of the magnitude of the threats and the expected efficacy of the system. If this analysis cannot demonstrate the positive value to the community of video surveillance, the proposal should either be abandoned or revised.

Fundamental to successful integration of a public video surveillance system into a community is maintenance of the people's right to be informed as to the design, scope, location, use, and misuse of the system (*see* Section II.B.3., *supra*). We believe that the major components of a *permanent* public video surveillance system should never be secret, as secrecy reduces the accountability of the authorities and prevents individuals from understanding the implications of their actions. (For discrete targeted criminal investigations requiring secrecy, law enforcement should use the judicial approval process outlined in Section III.B.2., *infra*.) The involvement of the public should thus be preserved through a variety of means:

- An elected or publicly accountable body, such as a city council, legislature, or county committee, should undertake this process.
- To the extent feasible, the deliberations and debate of this body should be open to the community, and should permit public commentary.
- The CLIA and cost-benefit analysis should culminate in a public draft report, with a period set aside for the public to submit comments.
- The process can be repeated as necessary: the government body should review the comments, make necessary changes, and resubmit a revised proposal, culminating in a revised report.

2. For temporary public video surveillance systems, demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that the system has no greater scope or capabilities than reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

Recognizing that temporary public video surveillance systems often will require speedy deployment or secrecy, the public and deliberative nature of the CLIA and cost-benefit process described above may be impractical or even counter-productive. To preserve openness and accountability to the extent possible for such systems, however, we propose a streamlined process that substitutes judicial oversight for full public participation. This process also reflects the fact that temporary systems inherently pose less threat to constitutional rights and values than permanent systems, all else being equal (*see* Section III.A.2., *supra*). Like the corresponding public process, the judicial approval process requires law enforcement to justify the planned system according to the core principles outlined in Section A.

In order to obtain judicial approval through this process, law enforcement must first show that the proposed system both (a) will be temporary and (b) requires speed or secrecy* to be effective. Should law enforcement be unable to make this showing, the system merits a full, public process, and the reviewing court should dismiss the proposal. Once this first hurdle is cleared, law enforcement must then demonstrate that the system has no greater scope or capabilities than reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement purpose. The steps required to make this showing are a streamlined version of the steps outlined in the previous guideline:⁶⁷

- Explain the legitimate law enforcement purposes of the proposed system and show that the installation of surveillance cameras will produce evidence useful in serving these purposes.
- Show that the planned surveillance is likely to be more effective than other reasonable means of investigating or combating the crimes at issue.
- Describe the places and activities to be surveilled, and explain why surveillance of those locations and activities is reasonably necessary to further the law enforcement objectives.
- Demonstrate that the technological scope of the proposed system is not more powerful than reasonably necessary to further the law enforcement objectives.
- Demonstrate that the video surveillance will be limited to a period of time no longer than reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objectives.

* While the court proceedings would generally be public, those aspects of the system requiring secrecy could be presented *in camera* or pursuant to a confidentiality order.

- Show that the system contains other protections and safeguards to minimize the intrusion into the constitutional rights and values of individuals whose images will be captured by the surveillance but who are not suspected of criminal activity.

Finally, after law enforcement has demonstrated the above to the satisfaction of the magistrate, the system should be approved for the specified time period. Extensions should require further review and approval.

C. Principles and Rules for Use of Public Video Surveillance Systems

This section discusses rules and procedures designed to ensure that a system, once installed, is used in accordance with core substantive principles. It describes the different functions which video surveillance systems may perform—observation, recording, tracking, and identification—and outlines rules governing each type of use, with progressively tighter control recommended for each. (The technologies associated with these various types of video surveillance are described in Section II.A.2., *supra*.) It further describes technical and administrative constraints on the use of surveillance systems, including secondary uses of information gathered through surveillance, the retention of stored surveillance data, and the rights of identifiable individuals captured on camera.

1. Once a public video surveillance system is authorized, no additional approval is necessary to use the capabilities of the system for “observation.”

In the context of public video surveillance systems, we define “observation” as real-time viewing of live camera images. In the case of pure observation, no permanent record of an individual’s activities, other than the operator’s memory, will persist once the image is replaced with a new one. Relative to the other law enforcement uses of the system, observation is perhaps closest to the familiar, low-tech visual surveillance to which individuals are already accustomed. For this reason, observation generally presents the smallest risk of infringement of constitutional rights and values. Moreover, so long as a community has agreed to adopt video surveillance based on the procedures described in Section B above, *ex ante* restriction of simple observation adds little protection, since camera monitors cannot know what they will see until they see it. It is thus impractical and unnecessary to require advance approval before using permanent video camera installations for observation. Law enforcement officers observing public places through a video surveillance system should be able to act upon the information gathered as if they had witnessed it at the scene.

It is true that observation can pose significant dangers to constitutional rights and values. For example, the selection of which cameras to observe can be racially or otherwise biased and lead to discriminatory use of the resulting evidence. Moreover, technological supplements can significantly change the system's capabilities. As described in Section II.A.2.a), *supra*, magnification can reveal significantly more detail than would be visible to a human observer, and low-light or infrared cameras can see in darkness far better than the human eye. Based on the infringement of constitutional rights and values possible with such technology, these features should be carefully considered during the system's design approval phase. Moreover, the use of these technologies should be closely evaluated during the audit and review process, and law enforcement should create internal procedures to regulate how such capabilities may be used (*see* Section III.C.5.b), *infra*). Once the system has been approved, however, no additional *ex ante* approval is needed to use observation technologies.

2. "Record" footage from public video surveillance systems only to the extent necessary to further the system's stated purposes.

More significant in its implications is "recording," where images are preserved and stored for later review. Nearly unlimited amounts of recorded digital footage may be cheaply stored in databases, which may then be supplemented with metadata and quickly retrieved on demand (*see* Section II.A.2.b), *supra*). The stored data poses the risk that it will later be misused, lost, stolen, or repurposed—all of which undermine constitutional rights and values.

As with observation, however, the rules regulating the recording of video data should be established at the design phase of the system. General rules should govern if and when data should be recorded, and for how long it should be stored. A community may decide that a given camera or network should always record, record on request, record automatically in certain situations, or never record. These rules should ensure that the system records and stores video footage only to the extent necessary to further the system's stated purposes. More specific *ex ante* approval for recording would be neither practical nor useful.

Recorded footage lacking evidentiary or other documented value should be destroyed as a matter of course after a specified time. Any decision to retain footage past the time period allotted in the policy should be specifically documented for subsequent review and audit. All saved footage, regardless of age, should be closely monitored and protected—by procedural and/or technological means (*see* Section III.C.5., *infra*). Unlike the *recording* of video footage, *access* to stored footage will require *ex ante* approval in many cases (*see* Section III.C.4., *infra*).

3. Under most circumstances, individuals may be “tracked” or “identified” by a public video surveillance system only pursuant to a warrant.

Most dangerous to constitutional rights and values is the ability of modern camera networks to “identify” and “track” individuals, and thus additional precautions are required. “Tracking” refers to the use of public video surveillance systems to automatically follow an individual or her vehicle, regardless of whether her identity is known, so as to create a seamless record of her activity during a specific period.* “Identification” refers to the use of the system to ascertain or confirm the identity of an individual captured on video footage.† Tracking and identification can occur in real time or by using stored video footage. Although an individual may be identified without being tracked, or vice versa, we discuss the two terms together—distinguishing one from the other where necessary—since they raise similar concerns. See Section II.A.2., *supra*, for a discussion of tracking and identification technologies.

The use of identification and tracking technologies raises specialized concerns regarding constitutional rights and values. Even in public, most people expect to remain anonymous unless they are seen, recognized, and remembered by another individual present in that location. Pervasive use of automated identification undermines this expectation—implicating privacy, anonymity, and First Amendment freedoms. Even tracking alone can create a far more thorough record of activity than observation and recording. Identification, moreover, creates a record that is personally identifiable and traceable back to a specific person, which raises data privacy concerns far less present with other types of surveillance.⁶⁸ Finally, identification systems raise the potential for troubling issues of discriminatory profiling and misidentification. These concerns justify more stringent restrictions than necessary for other video surveillance technologies.

* The limitations in this section do not apply law enforcement’s ability to *manually* track an individual within a camera view (using pan and tilt functions) or between separate cameras by manual means.

† Identification includes manually appending personally identifiable information, such as name, address, or criminal history, to recorded images of those individuals, or automatically identifying an individual captured on video footage, in real time or using stored data, using biometric or other identification algorithms. These guidelines do not attempt to place specific limitations on identification of individuals in video footage based on visual recognition by law enforcement personnel or other individuals. Should that identification be entered into a database for later searching, however, the identification would be considered automatic and within the scope of this guideline.

a) Law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to using a public video surveillance system to track or identify an individual.

Subject to the traditional constitutional law exceptions and the use of federal anti-terrorism watch lists (discussed below), we recommend that law enforcement must obtain a warrant—limited as to the scope of the investigation—in order to use a public video surveillance system to identify or track an individual. Though, under current constitutional jurisprudence, a warrant is generally not required for use of public video surveillance (*see* Section II.C.1., *supra*), we recommend application of similar standards and procedures to those required for a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. In other words, law enforcement officers must demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that they have probable cause to believe that tracking or identifying a specific individual through use of a public video surveillance system will reasonably lead to the discovery of specified evidence of wrongdoing.⁶⁹ As with search warrants in the constitutional context, some narrow exceptions would apply—such as when the individual has consented to the identification or tracking or when exigent threats to public safety require action before judicial approval can be obtained.

As with warrant requirements in the context of other electronic surveillance, use of this procedure is likely to save resources that law enforcement would otherwise be forced to employ defending against legal challenge to surveillance evidence.

b) Law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to using a “watch list” to automatically identify individuals, except when using a federal anti-terrorism watch list.

Watch lists are precompiled lists of suspects and persons of interest used by the government for various law enforcement or national security purposes. For example, law enforcement might wish to create a watch list of the biometric profiles of individuals who are persons of interest in a criminal investigation, and then program certain video cameras to scan for biometric matches in case those individuals enter the surveilled area. Use of watch lists in conjunction with video surveillance increases the risk to constitutional rights and values, since they require constant use of identification technologies in the surveilled area to be effective. They also raise additional concerns about “false positive” matches that can lead to mistreatment of innocent individuals.

In general, we recommend that law enforcement must obtain a warrant to create a watch list or add individuals to an existing list. Specifically, officials should demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that they have probable cause to believe that identification of the specific individual will lead to evidence helpful to a particular criminal investigation. If law

enforcement officers obtain an arrest warrant for an individual, the showing required for the arrest warrant should suffice for addition of the individual to a watch list.

However, we recommend creating an exception for the use of anti-terrorism watch lists compiled by the federal government, because the reliability and necessity of federal anti-terrorism watch lists must be presumed.* This recommendation is based upon the national security and secrecy concerns underlying the federal lists as well as the practical concern that local officials likely would not be permitted access to the underlying data they would need to justify a warrant in court. This exception does not apply to any other watch lists, regardless of source.

4. A public video surveillance system may be used for legitimate law enforcement purposes other than its original purpose, subject to certain restrictions.

Although not all law enforcement purposes will justify creation of a public video surveillance system, once a system has been properly designed and implemented pursuant to a publicly accountable procedure, it may collect data that would be relevant to other legitimate law enforcement uses. Subject to certain restrictions (discussed below), law enforcement may use the system for these new purposes. Because the scope and capabilities of the system remain unchanged, new uses for the system should not pose significantly greater threats to constitutional rights and values than existing ones.

We distinguish between two types of extra-purpose use of video surveillance data and systems—“secondary” and “incidental.” Secondary use is an intentional, planned use of a system, a component of it, or the collected data, for a purpose other than the original one. For instance, if an officer has reason to believe that stored footage collected for traffic control purposes would show evidence of drug shipments and seeks to review the footage for this purpose, the use would be secondary. In contrast, incidental use describes a situation in which law enforcement is using the system for its intended purpose and incidentally notices something useful for a different purpose. For instance, if an officer monitoring a surveillance system deployed to prevent a terrorist attack incidentally witnesses a non-terrorism crime, the information would be useful for the purpose of investigating that crime.

* Although we have concerns regarding federal anti-terrorism watch lists, including the processes by which they are compiled, these concerns are beyond the scope of this report.

a) No additional approval is required for incidental use of the system.

A public video surveillance system properly installed in a publicly accountable fashion may be used incidentally for other legitimate law enforcement purposes. Similar to the “plain view” exception in Fourth Amendment law,⁷⁰ a police officer properly observing public scenes through a visual surveillance system should be able to act upon evidence of criminal behavior as if she had witnessed it in person. This is true whether the officer is viewing the footage in real time or via a recording.

b) Law enforcement must obtain administrative approval for secondary use of “pre-archival” stored video surveillance footage.

For regulation of secondary uses, we further distinguish between “pre-archival” and “archival” storage of video surveillance footage. “Pre-archival” footage is recently recorded data subject to routine review by law enforcement. This category may extend to include a community that, rather than staffing officers to observe every camera in real time, reviews recorded footage on a daily or weekly basis. “Archival” footage is data that has been stored beyond the short time period designated for routine review. A locality can define a reasonable time frame within which law enforcement must complete its routine review, after which the footage becomes “archival.” This distinction should be based on actual law enforcement practices rather than an artificial label.

Law enforcement may use pre-archival video footage for a secondary purpose if it secures administrative approval. No judicial approval is required, though the process and substantive standard for approval should be similar to the warrant process. That is, law enforcement officers should demonstrate that they have probable cause to believe the footage will provide evidence of specific criminal acts. The administrator may be an official in the law enforcement organization itself, but the approval process should be recorded and reported to the public for subsequent review and audit.

c) Law enforcement must obtain a warrant for secondary use of “archival” stored video surveillance footage.

Law enforcement may use archived video footage for a secondary purpose only if it secures a warrant from a neutral magistrate, as per the procedure described above (*see* Section III. C.3.a), *supra*). Such a rule preserves greater protection of archived footage, which may be voluminous. Nor do we expect such a requirement to be too great a burden: by the time footage is archived, there will rarely exist a secondary purpose that requires review so quickly that judicial approval cannot first be obtained.

5. Employ technological and administrative safeguards to reduce the potential for misuse and abuse of the system.

Technological and administrative safeguards are an important component of any public surveillance system. They should generally be developed at the design stage for the system (*see* Section III.A.7., *supra*).

a) Provide safeguards for use of stored video surveillance data.

The ability of a system to store video surveillance data can be technologically limited (*see* Section II.A.2.e), *supra*, for more information). For instance, a system intended for observation alone could be technologically prevented from recording at all. Similarly, a system designed to monitor traffic can automatically delete its data the following day. Administrative limits can have a similar effect, or be used in conjunction with limiting technologies. For many public video surveillance systems, however, some data will have ongoing value and must be stored for a long or indefinite period. For such storage, communities may employ specific safeguards:

- Encryption technology can prevent those without the proper decryption keys from having access to the stored data. Encryption is inexpensive, and can eliminate virtually any possibility that lost or stolen data will be misused.
- Use of “digital masking” or other technologies to remove identifying features of individuals who are incidentally captured on camera or whose identities are otherwise irrelevant to the purposes for which the data is stored. Photo-enforced traffic law systems already make use of similar technology by blurring the faces of passengers in issued citations.
- Administrative rules, used in conjunction with encryption, can require that stored footage be entrusted to a neutral entity, such as a public auditor independent of law enforcement. This entity can review requests for access to the stored data based on established procedures, and surrender access only when law enforcement can demonstrate a sufficient need for specified footage. If the data is encrypted, such an entity need not physically store or control the data; it can simply hold the encryption keys and access logs for the data.
- The use of digital watermarks or similar technologies can help create a clear record of when and where records were accessed. Administrative rules can similarly require officers to log when, where, and why they access stored footage.
- Data security technologies can be employed to protect the integrity of the data from hacking or other risks.

- Access to stored data can be limited to authorized personnel or individuals with a demonstrated interest in the footage (i.e., to defend themselves against a criminal charge).

b) Provide safeguards for personnel with access to a public video surveillance system.

Personnel who operate or have access to a public video surveillance system are obviously those who pose the greatest risk of abuse or misuse of the system. They should therefore be subject to various safeguards:

- Physical access to the facilities—such as control rooms, databases, or cameras—should be limited to authorized and screened personnel.
- All personnel authorized to have such access should undergo a training program covering both the technical operation of and applicable laws and rules regarding the system, including a discussion of sanctions for misuse or abuse.
- Administrative rules should govern when operators may use various system capabilities. For instance, to protect against discriminatory or arbitrary application, operators should use zoom or manual pan and tilt features pursuant to established “triggering” events and situations.
- Personnel failing to comply with rules regulating the operation of a video surveillance system should face sanctions, including reprimands, fines, and criminal penalties.

c) Provide public notice of surveillance where appropriate.

To permit informed choices and provide accountability, those subject to video surveillance should be made aware of it. While many communities will want to hide or disguise the actual cameras for security as well as aesthetic and social reasons, there is generally no basis for hiding the fact that an area is under government surveillance. These notifications need not be intrusive, but should nevertheless be visible. We recommend that authorities place small placards in the surveilled area noting the presence of video surveillance and providing contact information for those wishing more information about the camera system. Such placards may in fact increase a system’s deterrent effect.

Permanent public video surveillance systems should never be installed in secret (*see* Section III.B.1., *supra*), nor should the general locations of permanent cameras be withheld from the public. Permanent systems, therefore, should always include the type of notice discussed above. Some temporary systems may require secrecy. Should law enforcement wish to keep the fact or location of temporary video surveillance secret, permission must be obtained from a magistrate as part of the judicial approval process (*see* Section III.B.2., *supra*).

6. Prohibit, to the extent possible, sharing of public video surveillance data with third parties, including private litigants, and restrict sharing with other governmental entities.

Communities should restrict use of public video surveillance data by third parties. Especially to the extent the data reveals identifiable individuals, sharing of data with private litigants or other governmental agencies without the consent of the affected individuals severely undermines confidence in official motives for collecting such information, further threatens constitutional rights and values, and could generate legal liability for law enforcement. While releasing footage may be beneficial in some cases, such as to enlist public aid in apprehending a suspect or to perform an audit, in general, disclosures to third parties creates increased risk of the information being used for improper and unaccountable purposes.

Data collected by public video surveillance systems should generally not be available, or in any way discoverable, in a civil trial between private litigants. Private litigants would no doubt appreciate access to this data—not only in divorce cases, but also in traffic accidents, workers compensation claims, and a host of other cases. Such widespread use, however, would further infringe upon constitutional rights and values for private benefit. Private litigants, journalists, and others may also seek to employ the Freedom of Information Act (*see* Section II.C.2., *supra*) to obtain surveillance records. In addition to the implications for the rights and liberties of those captured on the requested footage, compliance with such requests can be extremely expensive if records are voluminous. While the privacy exception to FOIA may permit authorities to deny such requests, it is unclear how courts will interpret FOIA in this regard. Authorities can avoid much of this expense and danger to constitutional rights and values by destroying archived records as soon as possible.

Limitations should also apply, to the extent possible, to inter-governmental sharing of public video surveillance data. Authorities who are not accountable to the residents of the original jurisdiction may not adequately protect the surveillance footage of those residents. Other governmental authorities seeking access to the data should apply for a warrant from a neutral magistrate to demonstrate their need for the data in accordance with the standard in Section III.C.3.a), *supra*. However, some inter-government sharing must be allowed without a warrant. To the extent that federal law, for instance, requires sharing with federal law enforcement, local officials are of course bound to comply. Nevertheless, such required sharing should be disclosed to the public and the affected individuals whenever possible.

7. Establish mechanisms to protect the rights of identifiable individuals captured on video surveillance data.

Whether accomplished through biometric identification technologies or manual data entry, public video surveillance records can become personally identifiable information when an otherwise anonymous image is linked to a specific, identified person. Communities should establish rules requiring that whenever such data is collected or stored, the individuals so identified possess additional rights to help protect against the greater threats to constitutional rights and values posed by such records.

As a preliminary matter, law enforcement should protect individuals' privacy by avoiding unnecessary identification of particular people. Specifically, when law enforcement uses recorded footage, techniques such as "digital masking" (*see* Section II.A.2.e), *supra*) should be employed where feasible to automatically hide the faces of individuals who are not the subject of the investigation. Note that a community can eliminate much of any burden created by such necessary protections by using technology to ensure that unneeded identifying information is not stored at all.

Further, individuals should be protected through additional rights that generally track the substance of the Fair Information Practices (*see* Section II.C.2., *supra*).

- **Notice and awareness.** The community should be notified if and how the system collects, possesses, or uses personally identifiable video surveillance information (*see* Section III.C.5.c), *supra*).
- **Consent.** Where feasible, use or sharing of personally identifiable video surveillance information outside of the system's original purposes should occur only with the consent of the individual. For instance, should law enforcement wish to publish surveillance footage of a violent attack in order to enlist public help in locating the attacker, it should obtain the consent of the victim, if the footage identifies him, or rely on masking techniques to avoid such an identification.
- **Access and participation.** Unless valid law enforcement reasons prohibit it, individuals should have the right to request a report of their identified appearances—namely images that have been labeled or tagged with a person's name and/or other identifying information—on surveillance footage. Furthermore, individuals should have a reasonable opportunity to amend their data if it contains errors or inaccuracies.
- **Integrity and security.** Authorities in control of personally identifiable video surveillance information must take reasonable precautions to keep it secure (*see* Section III.C.5.a), *supra*).

8. Apply to any law enforcement use of privately collected video surveillance data the same standards that apply to public video surveillance data.

Private parties generate a substantial amount of surveillance footage, some of which becomes valuable to law enforcement. Footage from ATM cameras, for instance, captured images of some of the September 11th hijackers. Should law enforcement obtain such footage, it should follow all applicable rules discussed in Section III.C. Thus, use of the data to track or identify individuals should only be accomplished pursuant to a warrant, subject to the usual warrant exceptions; all technological and administrative safeguards applicable to public video surveillance data should be applied; personnel with access to such data should be trained; and any personally identifiable video surveillance information should be afforded additional protection.

9. Provide appropriate remedies for those harmed by misuse or abuse of public video surveillance systems.

Even a carefully designed and limited public video surveillance system can injure innocent individuals. Use of biometric profiles to identify an image of an individual can generate a “false positive,” a bored operator can become a voyeur, or an impatient officer can obtain stored data without a warrant. In these instances, those injured should have redress. The following is a sample of potential remedies, which may be appropriate for different types of violations.

- **Exclusion of evidence.** In the criminal context, exclusion of improperly obtained evidence provides both a remedy to the injured criminal defendant and a powerful deterrent to law enforcement.⁷¹ We recommend that states require that public video surveillance data collected in a major violation of the system’s rules would similarly be excluded (e.g., an officer fails to obtain a necessary warrant, or a system identifies the defendant using biometric identification software that was never approved by the community).
- **Private rights of action.** Injured parties could also be provided with a private right of action to bring suit for redress.
 - **Injunctive relief.** To provide a deterrent or to punish misuse or abuse, a community could allow injured parties to seek to enjoin uses of a public video surveillance system that fail to comply with the system’s stated purposes or limits.
 - **Monetary damages.** The community could require the government to compensate those harmed by the system. While damages calculations are difficult in the privacy and civil liberties context,⁷² statutory damages or class action suits could ensure that the awards are sufficient to remedy harms and deter bad behavior.⁷³

- **Informal remedies.** In addition to using the courts, the law enforcement agency itself can provide less formal remedies, such as issuance of public corrections or apologies for mistakes or misuse.

IV. Conclusion

The emergence of powerful video surveillance technologies is already providing law enforcement with invaluable new tools for battling crime and terrorism. As would-be criminals and terrorists themselves gain access to powerful new weapons and technologies, American law enforcement should likewise be able to take advantage of technological developments to protect the lives and safety of innocent individuals. However, these technologies must be designed and used not only to protect Americans against crime and terrorism, but also in ways that preserve accountability, procedural safeguards, and constitutionally protected rights of privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. Public camera systems arrayed over public spaces might not only deter criminals or terrorists from attacking, but could also intimidate individuals who express opposition to government positions, deter speech or associations considered eccentric or unpopular, or undercut the insulation that Americans have traditionally enjoyed against pervasive government monitoring of their personal affairs.

For this reason, the Constitution Project's Liberty and Security Initiative encourages lawmakers at all levels of government to think carefully about the permissible design and use of these potentially dangerous new surveillance technologies. We intend the principles we have outlined and described here to guide this inquiry. We hope that the Constitution Project's *Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance* provide a useful framework for protecting core constitutional freedoms and social values in a world of technologically-assisted law enforcement and real, serious threats to public safety.

Finally, to further assist communities to reconcile law enforcement goals with constitutional rights and values, the Constitution Project, in conjunction with the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic at U.C. Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of Law, is currently developing model legislation designed to codify these guidelines. We hope that communities considering implementation of public video surveillance systems will be able to use this model legislation when establishing such systems in their own jurisdictions.

The model legislation will be available on the Constitution Project's website, www.constitutionproject.org, by late 2006.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Quentin Burrows, *Sow! Because You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance*, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 1079, 1103 (1997). For a discussion of the history of video surveillance, see Robert D. Bickel, Susan Brinkley & Wendy White, *Seeing Past Privacy: Will the Development and Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology Compromise an Essential Constitutional Right in a Democracy, or Will the Courts Strike a Proper Balance?*, 33 STETSON L. REV. 299, 301–07 (2003).
- ² Eric Weiss, *D.C. Considering More Police Cameras*, WASH. POST, July 14, 2005, at B1 (citing the usefulness of video footage in the 2005 London bombing investigations in recent discussions of expanded surveillance systems).
- ³ *Cameras may yield clues to London attacks*, MSNBC, July 7, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8501576/>.
- ⁴ See Christopher Slobogin, *Public Policy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity*, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 222 (2002).
- ⁵ Steven Kinzer, *Chicago Moving to 'Smart' Surveillance Cameras*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A18.
- ⁶ See generally Daniel J. Solove, *Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy*, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, *THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE* (2004).
- ⁷ Google Earth: A 3-D interface to the planet, <http://earth.google.com/>.
- ⁸ See Ed Frauenheim, *Computer system said to help stop drowning*, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 31, 2005, http://news.com.com/Computer+system+said+to+help+stop+drowning/2100-1041_3-5558015.html (reporting on a camera by Poseidon Systems described at Poseidon, *The Lifeguard's Third Eye*, <http://www.poseidon-tech.com/us/index.html>).
- ⁹ This, for example, is how a murderer was identified in Florida in 2003. *Housemate Tips Police to Smith After Seeing Video*, CNN.COM, Feb. 6, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/South/02/05/missing.girl/index.html>.
- ¹⁰ See Mary Jordan, *Electronic Eye Grows Wider in Britain*, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at A1, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/06/AR2006010602100.html>.
- ¹¹ As one scholar noted, polls regarding devices like the E-ZPass automated toll system show that even when the information is “not very personal or private,” people nonetheless “seem to be concerned when a comprehensive information profile is constructed about *any* aspect of their lives.” Dorothy J. Glancy, *Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology*, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 165 (1995) (emphasis added).
- ¹² Cf. Noah Shachtman, *The New Security: Cameras That Never Forget Your Face*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/technology/techspecial2/25video.html> (“For now—and the foreseeable future—[commercial facial recognition software] is effective only in small, controlled environments where the lighting is consistent and only a few people pass in front of one camera at a time. Picking out criminal suspects on the street or in a crowd—as the city of Tampa, Fla., tried to do in its Ybor City district from 2001 to 2003—is still beyond the ability of [commercially available] surveillance system[s].”).
- ¹³ See Paul Festa, *Face recognition gets lift, U.S. says*, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 25, 2003, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-944111.html.

- ¹⁴ See Fred Gutel & William Underhill, *Taking A Closer Look*, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2004, at 42. According to local authorities however, Virginia Beach recently ceased operation of its facial recognition technology due to its ineffectiveness.
- ¹⁵ *Morning Edition: Profile: Use of Surveillance Cameras in New York City and Other Places Around the World* (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 25, 2002) (noting reports of thousands of cameras in New York City and deliberations about installing “a hundred cameras with face recognition software in Times Square”).
- ¹⁶ John D. Woodward, Jr., *Case Study: Super Bowl Surveillance*, in JOHN D. WOODWARD ET AL., BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY ASSURANCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 247, 251 (McGraw-Hill 2003).
- ¹⁷ See, e.g., Elaine Newton, et al., *Preserving Privacy by De-identifying Facial Images*, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Sch. of Computer Sci., Technical Report No. CMU-CS-03-119, Mar. 2003, available at <http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/people/sweeney/CMU-CS-03-119-600dpi.pdf> (proposing a mechanism by which “face recognition software is restricted” but details allowing for comparison between different anonymous images remain, so that “society can have both safety and privacy”).
- ¹⁸ See, e.g., Jess Bravin, *Washington Police to Play ‘I Spy,’* WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at B1 (reporting that Washington, D.C.’s cameras “already monitor mass-transit stations, monuments, and schools” and that officials have announced plans to extend the monitoring to “streets, shopping areas, and neighborhoods,” creating “one of the nation’s most extensive public surveillance networks”).
- ¹⁹ Kinzer, *supra* note 5.
- ²⁰ Hal Dardick, *City Will Keep Eyes Peeled Big Time*, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2005.
- ²¹ *Id.*
- ²² David A. Fahrenthold, *Federal Grants Bring Surveillance Cameras to Small Towns*, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2006, at A1, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/18/AR2006011802324.html> (describing how local law enforcement officers, due to the limits imposed on the use of federal anti-terrorism funding, are increasing their use of video surveillance). See also Electronic Privacy Information Center, *Spotlight on Surveillance: More Cities Deploy Camera Surveillance Systems with Federal Grant Money* (May 2005), <http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0505/>.
- ²³ Stephen Greenhalgh, *Literature Review on Issues of Privacy and Surveillance Affecting Social Behaviour* (Aug. 2003), <http://www.oipc.ab.ca/ims/client/upload/LitReview.pdf> (written for the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta).
- ²⁴ *Id.* at 1.
- ²⁵ *Privacy vs. Security: Electronic Surveillance in the Nation’s Capital: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on D.C. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform*, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Johnny Barnes, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area).
- ²⁶ *Id.*
- ²⁷ *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, *The Right to Privacy*, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
- ²⁸ ALAN F. WESTIN, *PRIVACY AND FREEDOM* 31 (New York: Athenaeum 1967). See also Slobogin, *supra* note 4.
- ²⁹ WESTIN, *supra* note 28, at 31.

- ³⁰ For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that political or religious expression is not “free” if speakers are obliged to disclose their identity. See *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission*, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995) (striking down an Ohio law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature and taking note of “a respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes”) (citing *Talley v. California*, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)); *Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton*, 536 U.S. 150, 166–69 (2002) (declaring unconstitutional a town law requiring those who wish to canvass door-to-door to first identify themselves in a permit application filed with the mayor’s office and made available for public inspection). Similar rules apply to free expression rights, see *Lamont v. Postmaster General*, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down government measure that required individual to notify post office of interest in certain political materials before receiving them in mail), and freedom of association. See *NAACP v. Alabama*, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (forbidding the state of Alabama from compelling the NAACP to disclose its membership lists).
- ³¹ See William H. Rehnquist, *Is An Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby*, 23 KAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1974) (“Suppose that the local police in a particular jurisdiction were to decide to station a police car at the entrance to the parking lot of a well-patronized bar from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every business day for the purpose of making a list of the license plates of cars that were driven in and parked in the lot during that time... I would guess that the great majority of people who might have the question posed to them would say that this is not a proper police function... There would be an uneasiness, and I think a justified uneasiness, if those who patronized the bar felt that their names were being taken down and filed for future reference.”)
- ³² For instance, the U.S. General Accounting Office noted in assessing the constitutionality of Washington, D.C.’s new public video surveillance system that there is no Fourth Amendment concern raised by video cameras used only in public space. GAO, Report to the Chairman, Comm. On Government Reform, House of Representatives, *Video Surveillance: Information on Law Enforcement’s Use of Closed Circuit Television to Monitor Selected Federal Property in Washington D.C.* (June 2003).
- ³³ See *Lamont v. Postmaster General*, 381 U.S. 301, 303 (1965) (invalidating a Federal law requiring recipients of “communist political propaganda” to specifically authorize the delivery of each such piece of mail).
- ³⁴ See *Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton*, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (expression); *NAACP v. Alabama*, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association).
- ³⁵ See Slobogin, *supra* note 4, at 257.
- ³⁶ 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
- ³⁷ Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, *Crime prevention effects of closed circuit television: a systematic review*, Home Office Research Study 252 (Aug. 2002), <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hors252.pdf>.
- ³⁸ See Jeffrey Rosen, *A Watchful State*, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 7, 2001, at 38.
- ³⁹ Avis Thomas-Lester & Toni Locy, *Complaint of Extortion Attempt Led to Probe of Police Unit*, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1997, at B4.
- ⁴⁰ *Delaware v. Prouse*, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (citation omitted).
- ⁴¹ *Dow Chemical Co. v. United States*, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 & n.5 (1986).

- ⁴² See, e.g., *Rodriguez v. United States*, 878 F. Supp. 20, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no expectation of privacy in public street); *McCray v. State*, 84 Md. App. 513, 519 (1990) (finding no expectation of privacy where complainant filmed walking across a public street). Some courts have found the Fourth Amendment implicated in surveillance of private places—even those visible from public vantage points. See *United States v. Torres*, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.). In scholarly journals, many have argued that the Fourth Amendment is properly read to include restrictions on public video surveillance, but their arguments remain theoretical. See, e.g., Marc Blitz, *Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity*, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2004); Slobogin, *supra* note 4, at 257.
- ⁴³ See, e.g., *Hague v. CIO*, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”).
- ⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Rev.*, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (holding that a tax on large quantities of ink and newsprint was unconstitutional because it burdened newspapers disproportionately).
- ⁴⁵ See Slobogin, *supra* note 4, at 253.
- ⁴⁶ *Laird v. Tatum*, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
- ⁴⁷ 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520. The statute defines a “wire communication” as “any aural transfer made . . . through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
- ⁴⁸ See *Kee v. City of Rowlett*, 247 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2001).
- ⁴⁹ USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (modifying 50 U.S.C. § 1861 to allow use of secret orders for the production of records related to terrorism investigations); FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et. seq.
- ⁵⁰ Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C § 552(b)(7) (excluding from FOIA “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”).
- ⁵¹ See U.S. Dep’t. of Health, Education and Welfare, *Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems* (1973).
- ⁵² Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). These guidelines use the Fair Information Practices to support a framework for treatment of video data containing information about identifiable individuals. See Section III.C.7., *infra*.
- ⁵³ See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW, Ch. 11-A, Pt. 3, Title T (“Procedures for Securing Evidence by Means of Court Order and for Suppressing Evidence Unlawfully or Improperly Obtained”), Art. 700. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20 (2002). The law includes serious felonies and drug-related crimes as sufficient to merit video surveillance. *Id.*
- ⁵⁴ ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3019 (2001).
- ⁵⁵ See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, SECTION B: TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE (3d ed. 1999), at 2.

- ⁵⁶ See *id.*, Standard 2-9.1(a) (“Technologically-assisted physical surveillance can be an important law enforcement tool. It can facilitate the detection, investigation, prevention and deterrence of crime, the safety of citizens and officers, the apprehension and prosecution of criminals, and the protection of the innocent.”).
- ⁵⁷ See *id.*, Standard 2-9.1(b).
- ⁵⁸ *Id.*, Standard 2-9.1(c), Commentary to Standard 2-9.1(c) (at 28).
- ⁵⁹ See, e.g., *id.*, Standard 2-9.1(f) (on “Accountability and Control”) and 2-9.3(b)(i) (under which use of overt public video surveillance must be authorized to meet certain standards by “a politically accountable law enforcement official or the relevant politically accountable governmental authority”).
- ⁶⁰ See, e.g., British Columbia Ministry of Labour and Citizens’ Services, Privacy Guidelines for Use of Video Surveillance Technology by Public Bodies, http://www.mserr.gov.bc.ca/privacyaccess/main/video_security.htm.
- ⁶¹ Alberta Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Office, *Guide to Using Surveillance Cameras in Public Areas* (June 2004), http://www3.gov.ab.ca/foip/other_resources/publications_videos/surveillance_guide.cfm.
- ⁶² See, e.g., New South Wales Government Policy Statement and Guidelines for the Establishment and Implementation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in Public Places, NSW Attorney General’s Department (2000), available at [http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/cpd/ll_cpd.nsf/vwFiles/cctv.pdf/\\$file/cctv.pdf](http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/cpd/ll_cpd.nsf/vwFiles/cctv.pdf/$file/cctv.pdf).
- ⁶³ Council of the Dist. of Columbia, Draft Report, *Investigation of the Metropolitan Police Department’s Policy and Practice in Handling Demonstrations in the District of Columbia* (Mar. 11, 2004), available at <http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/patterson/pages/prinfo/MPDreport31104.doc>.
- ⁶⁴ ABA STANDARDS, *supra* note 55, Standard 2-9(1)(d)(iv).
- ⁶⁵ See notes 37–39, *supra*.
- ⁶⁶ This process has its roots in the environmental impact reports required of federal agencies when recommending or planning any proposal that will have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). Similarly, the E-Government Act of 2002 requires that federal agencies produce a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) before they develop or use information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates personally identifiable information. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921–2922. The PIA must address what information is to be collected and why, the intended use of the information, with whom the information will be shared, what notice or opportunities for consent will be provided to individuals regarding their information, how the information will be secured, and whether a system of records is being created under the Privacy Act. § 208(b)(2)(B)(ii).
- This process also has similarities to the PIA required by many Canadian provincial governments for public use of video surveillance. Under those guidelines, the authority seeking to implement the system will create a report outlining the expected impact of the system on privacy and other rights and liberties (as per Canadian law). The report and any arguments in favor of the system are sent to the provincial Privacy Commissioner for review and approval. See, e.g., Alberta Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Office, *Guide to Using Surveillance Cameras in Public Areas* (June 2004), http://www3.gov.ab.ca/foip/other_resources/publications_videos/surveillance_guide.cfm.
- ⁶⁷ The following requirements are in part an elaboration on the standard developing in the federal courts in an attempt to apply ECPA to video surveillance. This standard has been adopted by a number of federal courts of appeal. See, e.g., *United States v. Williams*, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997); *United States v. Falls*, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); *United States v. Koyomejian*, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992); *United States v. Torres*, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).

- ⁶⁸ A surveillance database with identified individuals could be considered a “system of records,” which, when undertaken by a federal agency, falls under the Privacy Act of 1974. The Privacy Act imposes rules and restrictions for such records, including rules related to disclosure to third parties, subject rights of access, and criminal and civil remedies. *See* Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. *See also* Section III.C.7., *infra*.
- ⁶⁹ *See generally* 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (4th ed. West 2004) (covering the probable cause standard and search warrants).
- ⁷⁰ *See* 3 LAFAVE, *supra* note 69, at 671–74.
- ⁷¹ Exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is mandatory where the evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment. *See* 1 LAFAVE, *supra* note 69, at 3–5. Exclusion is also required in certain situations imposed by statute, such as in the Wiretap Act and ECPA. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
- ⁷² Because of the difficulty of proving actual damages in privacy cases, many privacy statutes impose statutorily defined “liquidated” damages. *See, e.g.*, Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710; Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
- ⁷³ ECPA provides this type of damages for violations of its terms. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 2510. It should be noted that a recent Supreme Court case, *Doe v. Chao*, calls into question the ability of plaintiffs to receive statutory damages without also proving actual harm. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).



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