School Integration Through Carrots, Not Sticks

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The time is ripe for promoting the racial integration of schools through financial incentives instead of by exclusive reliance upon coercion. Although substantial progress has been made in the more than twenty years since *Brown v. Board*, we fear that the desegregation effort is stagnating, especially in large urban centers. Moreover, the problem of racial isolation has become one which courts and coercion are unlikely to resolve. Voluntary arrangements inevitably will assume greater importance, and we think that states should try financial incentives to stimulate them. To that end, we have drafted a Model Integration Incentive Act, recently published in *Parents, Teachers and Children: Prospects for Choice in American Education* (San Francisco, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1977). The Model Act was circulated among legislators, educators and political analysts and introduced in the 1977 session of the California Legislature as SB 1064. In October, 1977, the California Senate Education Committee held hearings on SB 1064. As a result of these first reactions we have now revised the Model Act. In this essay we provide (1) a discussion of some of the more difficult policy issues that must be resolved in drafting an integration incentive plan, (2) a revised version of the Act itself, and (3) some cost estimates based on California school district data.

Basically, the Act would provide financial bonuses to school districts for giving pupils integrated education opportunities. A school district, pursuant to a plan approved by the Department of Education, would receive a $500 bonus for each of its pupils who is not a member of the largest racial/ethnic group in his school. The bonus money would have to be spent in the school generating the bonus. The Act also encourages extra-district transfers to both public and private schools by providing a $500 per pupil bonus to a qualified receiving school for each transfer student who furthers integration, and, in some cases, an added $500 bonus to the sending school district. All transfers from neighborhood public schools must be with family consent in order to qualify for bonuses. Should a school district fail to provide integrated education, families could demand transfers as a matter of right.

Using state funds to stimulate and support integration is not a novel idea. Wisconsin has in effect a plan similar to that which would be established by our Model Act. Boston's Metco program for suburban integration with city children also shares similar features. These programs illustrate the general feasibility of our approach, and a wider appreciation of the prob-

lems and possibilities of such programs is badly needed.

Any bill providing financial incentives for integration is a product of difficult policy decisions, each affecting the amount of integration achieved and the amount of bonus dollars paid. In this revised Integration Incentive Act we have made choices reflecting our present judgments about integration incentives in the light of California demography. Others may reach different conclusions concerning some of the policy issues; such decisions could easily be substituted into the bill. The ensuing discussion of most of the crucial questions offers reasons for our choices, followed by the bill itself.

Bonuses for Both Past and Future Integration?

For cost-benefit reasons perhaps an incentive act should pay only for integration beyond that which already exists when the program is adopted. The restriction of bonuses to "new" integration raises important fairness questions, however. First, its effect would be to penalize pupils in school districts which have made substantial progress toward integration, while rewarding those districts which have not. Second, such a restriction ignores the difficulties that desegregated districts must face to maintain that status and to integrate each year both first graders and transfer students. Therefore, this bill would pay for "old" as well as "new" integration.

A related question is whether the integration to be paid for is only that which is, or has been, voluntary on the part of the district. This bill is not so restrictive, however, and would apply to court-and HEW-ordered integration as well. Viewed simply as an incentive, the bill would be most effective were it restricted to districts integrating without court orders; school officials would then have a very strong reason to act decisively before a judgment was entered against them. Nonetheless, on grounds of fairness to children, our preference is to provide funds for integration, however achieved. Moreover, districts ordered to integrate will most likely have extra costs, and it is hoped that, since the bonus money will help relieve this burden, the district will carry out its imposed desegregation plan with less reluctance. We assume that the courts and HEW, in any event, will continue to insist on remedies for illegal segregation; thus the bill should not be seen as rewarding wrongdoers or paying officials to obey the law.

Bonuses for Both Extra-District and Intra-District Integration?

While court orders demanding desegregation continue to be entered in district after district, in our largest cities there are beginning to be too few white children with whom minority children can be integrated. Since there are plenty of whites in the suburbs, the solution in such communities seems to be some kind of metropolitan integration plan. But we cannot count on the federal courts to provide such a remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a showing of suburban or state participation in intentional segregation is required (a very difficult thing to prove) before the suburbs can be made part of an order. (*Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) Moreover, even in de jure cases, the Court has recently held that the remedy is the undoing only of the racial isolation "caused" by the illegal conduct. This limitation often will put a severe crimp in the effectiveness of a judicial victory and multiply the costs of litigation. (*Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman*, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).

Without coercion or incentives, cities and suburbs seldom join together to achieve cooperative integration. Hence, an important focus of the bill should be, and is, out-of-district transfers; if forced by limited funds to make a choice, we would emphasize and prefer extra-district arrangements. Yet since many cities do provide integrated education, and because there is still plenty of room for improvement at the district level, we also reward intra-district integration efforts in the bill.

Include Private Integrated Schools?

For some minority families, private schools, because of location and racial characteristics, may represent the best source of available space for integration. Hence, the bill includes private institutions within the range of schools eligible for bonus payments. Apart from those conditions attached to participation in the bonus plan itself, the bill imposes no further regulation on private schools other than those already required by state law. For historic reasons, private schools have sometimes been viewed as a problem so far as integration is concerned. This is not because the bulk of them (90 percent parochial) have a poor record; in many places their contribution to integration has been splendid. The problem has been principally the white "academies" formed since *Brown v. Board.* Whether officially segregated or not, these have been the proper cause of concern as the conscious object of white flight. Obviously, the bill would not support such schools, since it only aids transfers that further integration. However, with the financial aid provided by the bill, minority families, with the help of their districts, might begin to break down the "white-only" character of certain private schools. They would be encouraged by federal civil rights laws which forbid private schools to exclude by race.

Private schools may play another important role. Under the bill, suburban public schools would not be *required* to cooperate with central cities wishing to transfer or exchange students, and local political pressure in some suburbs could be a serious obstacle to participation. If, however, private schools in these suburbs were voluntarily to participate in the program, their example might prod district officials to do so as well. Private integration would be an embarrassing political phenomenon for the public establishment.

The Supreme Court has been very unreceptive to most efforts by state legislatures to provide financial assistance in support of children receiving private education. (*Committee for Public Education and Liberty v. Nyquist,* 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The programs so far reviewed by the Court, however, almost exclusively aided religious school users and in fact were motivated by the hope of strengthening the parochial system. Our bill is fundamentally different. On the private side, non-religious schools could play a greater role; and the legislative purpose is far different from the days of "parochiad." The aim here is the delivery of integrated educational opportunities. Were there ever a case with a chance to broaden the Court's perspective, this should be it.

Must Families Consent?

Most families probably regard the opportunity to attend in their local public district as a right. In deference to this sense of entitlement, extra-district transfers to public or private schools under the bill must be by family choice. The most difficult problem about choice arises concerning within-district integration; currently many compulsory transfers from neighborhood schools clash with the wishes of families, both white and minority, whose children are bused. Consent requirements would prevent some existing integration from qualifying for bonuses. Insistence on consent would also probably mean that the bill would achieve less new body mixing than otherwise. If compulsion qualified for the bonus, the financial incentives of the bill might be enough in some districts to tip the political balance in favor of compulsory racial mixing of every child.

On the other hand, a consent requirement should prod districts to provide an integrated experience which will appeal to the families of the participating children. It should also move the district to give families multiple options. And when space exists in other integrated schools preferred by the family, we seriously question requiring minority students to attend where they are unwelcome. This version of the bill therefore imposes a consent requirement on out-of-neighborhood intra-district integration (an earlier version did not).

Requiring consent does not mean that the family must take the initiative. Yet, to insure that the consent is real, it must be informed; thus, the provision by public authorities of adequate information is insisted upon in the bill.

How is Rewarded Integration Defined?

In many parts of the country today integration is not simply a matter of black and white. Thus, the bill recognizes six distinct groups (including whites): Asian or Pacific Islander (non-Filipino), black (not of Hispanic origin), Filipino, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaskan native and white (not of Hispanic origin). This list can easily be changed to reflect local conditions or values. Some might wish to list separately white ethnic groups such as Greeks or Italians. Others might wish to focus on the integration of blacks only.

One crucial question to be faced is whether the state plan should pay for inter-minority group integration—that is, blacks with browns, browns with Asians, et cetera—or whether it ought to restrict itself to the integration of minorities with whites. This bill would pay for inter-minority integration as well as white/non-white integration, but the question is a close one.

A related question is whether the state should pay only for the integration of minorities in schools predominately majority or whether integration the other way should also count. For example, let us assume that there are only whites and blacks in a hypothetical district and that whites are in the majority. Should bonuses be paid only for blacks attending white majority schools, or should they also be paid for whites attending black majority schools? Although some consider any school segregated if it is 90 percent black and 10 percent white, our own perception depends upon a range of factors. Suppose, for example, the school had been 100 percent black but the principal has been able to attract and keep a cadre of white students; why should the school not be rewarded to that extent? In any case, for a school that has only a miniscule percentage of whites the bonus would be limited accordingly. Further, conversations with minority group leaders have led us to conclude that many minority families would prefer that their children attend schools in neighborhoods in which more than half the students are from their own ethnic group but with a healthy percentage of other groups in attendance. It might be especially appropriate to reward such a school in a district that is, say, 55 percent white and 45 percent black. Finally, some minority leaders

also view a restriction to one-way integration as putting a bounty on the heads of minority children; while not everyone regards this as a bad notion, perhaps it is wise to avoid the issue. Thus, this version of the bill pays for integration both ways.

Specifically, with respect to intra-district integration, a participating school would earn a bonus for every child who is not a member of the largest group in that school, whichever of the six groups that happens to be. This rule means that, if inter-minority integration is to be rewarded, the more racially diverse the school the greater the number of bonuses received — the maximum can exceed 50 percent of its pupils. (If only white/non-white integration were to count, the maximum for each school would be bonuses for 50 percent of its pupils, so that the more evenly balanced the school, the more the money.) For extra-district transfers, bonuses are to be paid each time a child of any of the six groups is transferred to a school in which he is not a member of the largest classified group. Because their integration problems should be minimal, the bill excludes from eligibility for intra-district bonuses those districts which do not have at least a 5 percent representation from two of the six groups.

This method of awarding bonuses is only one of many possible approaches. A preferred racial mix could be established, with more money paid the closer the school's ratio approximates the "ideal." Various forms of minimum integration could also be required before any money is paid; perhaps 10 percent of a school's pupils would have to be minorities before any money is paid, or perhaps it could be required that every school in the district have some minimum amount of integration before any school could receive bonuses.

An earlier version of the bill illustrates another possibility; it concerned itself with proportional representation based upon the *district's* racial makeup. If, for example, the district were 80 percent white and 20 percent black, the bonus would be paid for black integration in white-dominated schools in which the blacks made up 30 percent or less of the population — a 10 percent overrepresentation standard. (However, black representation above that percentage meant that no money would be paid, creating a potentially serious notch effect which has been eliminated by the rule of the current bill.) The prior version also paid money for white integration in districts that were minority dominated and to that extent was colorblind. The mix rewarded could on the other hand be based on *statewide* racial proportions; this probably would encourage the greatest number of out-of-district transfers. It would, however, be very difficult under such a rule for minority-concentrated districts to qualify for funds unless they deliberately maintained some all-minority schools so as to avoid overpopulating others. This result seems plain undesirable.

Require More Than Body Mixing?

It would be easier for the state simply to pay for a body count of the desired sort than to concern itself with the type of integrated education children actually receive. This no-strings-attached approach, taken in an earlier version of the bill, also probably maximizes the attractiveness of the incentive to local authorities. In any event, because of differences in local circumstances and the lack of consensus about what is the "best" approach to education in integrated settings, it is just not sensible to insist that the receipt of bonuses be tied to the adoption of any specific educational program.

On the other hand, perhaps some requirements should be imposed on bonus-earning districts to further the goals of meaningful integrated education. Therefore this bill first insists that the bonus money be spent in the school whose integration generates it. Second, participating districts must adopt a plan designed to provide integrated educational opportunities that attend to the cultural and linguistic needs of their minority students. How this is to be done is left open; but the district must submit such a plan to the State Department of Education for approval. (The bill directs the Department to authorize all but clearly inadequate proposals.) Third, the bill requires that a parental advisory board be established at each school to advise on the use of the bonus dollars received. Finally, the bill requires that the teaching staff in participating integrated schools either be broadly representative of the racial makeup of the students attending or have had specialized training in integrated education.

These requirements may at least help to give minorities some confidence that the district will act with their needs and interests in mind and will not pursue bonus dollars with a singleminded economic motive. Should the requirements prove unnecessary, they should be relaxed so as to avoid their bureaucratic costs, leaving districts to plan and function as they think best.

How Large a Bonus?

The bill provides that intra-district integration will generate bonuses of $500 per qualifying pupil. The amount of the intra-district bonus should cover the costs of transportation, extra administration and serious program upgrading. Some researchers have

argued that a critical mass of at least $350 is required for any compensatory program to be effective, suggesting that the $500 amount is probably about right.

For extra-district transfers, the receiving school is given a bonus of $500 per qualifying pupil, and, in addition, the sending district will receive a bonus of $500 times the number by which pupils transferring out of the district exceeds the number transferring in. Extra-district bonuses must be substantial enough to provide incentives to both parties to the transfer. The approach taken must consider the role of tuition and state aid apportionment as well. The bill contemplates that the sending district will continue to receive state aid with respect to the students it transfers out but requires that the sending district pay an amount of tuition agreed upon by it and the receiving district. The receiving district will therefore demand tuition in an amount which, when added to the $500 bonus, at least covers its extra costs of educating the child in question. No tuition may be demanded from or paid by the families. Since districts which transfer out more pupils than they receive may be required to pay more in tuition than they save in not educating those transferred, the bill provides the extra $500 per pupil for net out-transfers with the hope of providing sufficient incentives.

Giving Families a Right to Integration?

Perhaps this bill's most interesting feature is a *right* to integrated education for families desiring it but whose children are assigned to segregated public schools. If a child is in the largest group in his assigned school but his group is not the largest in the district, his family may force the district to afford him an extra-district transfer (to which the bill's bonus rules will apply). In such event, he may attend any other public or private school which will enroll him, so long as he is not a member of the largest group in that school, and provided further that his group is less represented than it is in the school from which he is transferring. For such transfers the home district must pay the child's full tuition, which in these cases may be no more than the average cost per pupil in his district. No district need be subject to this self-determined out-transfer; all it must do to avoid it is provide integrated education. But if it is unwilling or unable to, it must honor the requests of its families who prefer that their children attend schools meeting the bill's standards.

In order to make the child's integration right effective, the bill imposes on districts the obligation to inform their families of integration opportunities. Further, for all extra-district transfers the bill requires that free transportation be provided within reasonable minimum and maximum distances.

The right to integration provision could, of course, be made even stronger by giving all families the power to have their children attend at state expense any school, public or private, wherever located, so long as the attendance increases the racial balance of the school selected. We actually favor this stronger right, the exercise of which also would trigger bonus funds, but we recognize that its political potential may be less than the integration right included in the bill.

The Model Integration Incentive Act

Section 1. Classified Groups. Pursuant to regulations adopted by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, elementary and secondary school pupils shall be classified into six groups: Asian or Pacific Islander (not Filipino), Black (not of Hispanic origin), Filipino, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaskan Native, and White (not of Hispanic origin). Students who are members of the first five classified groups shall be considered minority students for purposes of this chapter.

Section 2. Intradistrict Integration Bonuses. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall apportion to each school district an intradistrict integration bonus in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) annually for each pupil who is not a member of the largest classified group attending his or her individual school; provided that the following conditions are met:

(1) the school district has a pupil concentration of at least 5 percent of two or more of the six classified groups.

(2) the school district has adopted an integration plan that has been approved by the Integration Division of the Department of Education established under Section 5. Such plan shall contain the following provisions:

(i) the bonus shall be spent in the school in which it is generated;

(ii) the bonus shall be used to assure to each pupil an appropriate integrated educational experience, and in particular to provide for the cultural and linguistic needs of the minority students in the school;

(iii) the professional staff of the school receiving the bonus shall be broadly representative of the groups attending the school or shall have received appropriate training in providing integrated education; and

(iv) each school receiving bonus moneys shall organize a parental advisory body representing the classified groups attending the school. This group may make recommendations concerning the use of bonus moneys.

Provided further that (1) while a school district may develop a plan for only some of its schools, its eligibility for bonus funds shall be limited to those schools included in the plan; and (2) no money shall be apportioned with respect to any pupil whose parent or guardian has not given his informed consent to his placement in a particular school if that school is any other than the school of the appropriate grade level closest to the pupil's home.

Section 3. Extradistrict Integration Bonuses.

(a) For purposes of this section and Section 4.

(1) A qualifying school may be either (i) any public school outside the district of the pupil's residence or (ii) any private school which satisfies the general requirements for private schools in this state.

(2) A qualifying integrated school is a qualifying school whose tuition-paid pupils do not belong to the classified group that is the largest in the school.

(3) A tuition-paid pupil is one whose school district, pursuant to this section, pays his full tuition at a qualifying integrated school.

(b) In order to participate in the program established by this section, school districts and qualifying integrated schools may contract for the purpose of providing pupils with an education in an integrated environment, and pursuant to such contracts, sending school districts shall pay the amount of the full tuition of the qualifying integrated school; provided, however, that (1) in the case of a public qualifying integrated school, the contract shall be made on its behalf by its school district; and (2) for all qualifying integrated schools, the tuition amount shall, within reasonable minimum and maximum distances, include arrangements for and provision of free transportation to and from the school.

(c) A tuition-paid pupil shall be counted as part of the average daily attendance of the school district which contracts for his education at the qualifying integrated school and pursuant to that contract pays the full tuition. A tuition-paid pupil shall count as a pupil of the qualifying school for purpose of group counts within that school but not for purposes of funding under Section 2.

(d) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall make apportionments as follows:

(1) to each qualifying integrated school an extradistrict integration bonus in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) for each tuition-paid pupil, and

(2) to each school district contracting out pupils under this Section five hundred dollars ($500) times the number by which the pupils contracted out by the district exceeds the tuition-paid pupils received by the district; provided that no funds for any tuition-paid pupil shall be apportioned unless the following conditions are met with respect to such pupil:

(i) the contract shall occur pursuant to a plan which has been adopted by the sending school district and the receiving school district or private school approved by the Integration Division, which plan shall provide that (A) the receiving school will provide appropriate integrated educational experiences and will provide for the special linquistic and cultural needs of its minority pupils, and (B) if the receiving school has more than 15 tuition-paid pupils, a parental advisory body representative of the tuition-paid pupils shall be organized by the school to make recommendations concerning the use of bonus dollars; and

(ii) the informed consent of the parent or guardian of the contracted pupil has been obtained.

Section 4. Right to Integration. Any pupil who is not a member of the largest classified group in his district, but is a member of the largest classified group in his school may, through his or her parent or guardian, request to be transferred to a public school in his district in which he would not be a member of the largest classified group. If such request is not granted, his district, at the request of the parent or guardian, shall be obligated to contract for his education, pursuant to Section 3, as a tuition-paid pupil in a qualifying integrated school to which he has been accepted and in which he will not be a member of the largest classified group; provided that his classified group is proportionally smaller in the receiving school than in the sending school; and provided further that his tuition is in an amount that does not exceed his district's average expenditure per pupil in a comparable grade.

Section 5. State Responsibility.

(a) A division of the Department of Education to be known as the Integration Division shall be established to administer this chapter. There shall be appropriated $_____ for the use of this Division. The Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Integration Division shall provide to the legislature an annual report and evaluation of the results of the program.

(b) The Division shall have the responsibility of approving integration plans submitted pursuant to this chapter. Any plan which furthers integration, fulfills the requirements of this chapter, and provides for the interests of minority students in each participating school shall be approved by the Division. In determining whether the conditions of this chapter are met, the Integration Division will, whenever possible, give deference to school district innovation and discretion.

(c) In addition to any other appropriations under this chapter, there shall be appropriated _____ dollars to the Division to be awarded to applying school districts (1) as planning grants to be used by the school districts to formulate and organize integration plans subject to Division approval and (2) to fund selected pilot efforts in different forms of integrated educational experiences.

(d) The Superintendent of Public Instruction, with the advice of the Integration Division, shall adopt regulations implementing this chapter, including regulations which shall determine how to deal with school population turnover and any ensuing altered entitlement to bonus funds during the course of a year.

(e) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall assure through appropriate regulation that school districts inform all families of the opportunities for integrated education available under this chapter and particularly under Section 4. This right to information shall be enforceable by parents in a private cause of action in which there may be awarded monetary damages and attorney fees.

California Cost Estimates

Some cost estimates of the bill were made from an analysis of 1973-74 California data (the latest available with school-by-school racial breakdowns). Total average daily attendance in California public schools that year was 4.4 million, of which the non-white total was 1.3 million or about 30 percent. The maximum potential cost of *intra-district* integration was estimated to be $616 million annually. To the extent that extra-district integration is pursued, the potential cost is even higher.

While we did not try to estimate how much future integration might occur, we did ask what the intra-district integration actually in place would cost the state had the bill been in effect in 1973-74 and assuming all districts were to meet all other conditions of the bill. This provides an indication of the bill's "base" cost. The amount was estimated to be $465 million, suggesting that the state as a whole was already 75 percent of the way towards complete intra-district integration as defined in the bill; 100 percent would be reached when all pupils who are not in the largest group in their district attend schools in which they are not in the largest group.

This information is rather encouraging regarding the state of integration (though the program would be costly). However, a different picture appears when the focus is narrowed to the 25 California school districts having at least 5000 students in two of the six groups. These 25 mainly urban districts enrolled about one-third of all the pupils in the state but more than one-half of the minority students. The maximum potential cost of intra-district integration in these districts was estimated to be $340 million annually. The 1973-74 actual costs under the bill, however, would have been about $203 million, approximately 60 percent of the potential. By contrast, it appears that all the remaining — mostly smaller — districts in the state would have qualified for an average of 95 percent of their maximum potential bonuses had the bill been in effect in 1973-74. These results suggest that the smaller districts, in general, may not "need" intregration incentives.

Table 1 displays the 25 key districts, their average daily attendance, the funds they would have earned under the bill using 1973-74 data, their potential maximums, and the percentage of that maximum which would have been achieved in 1973-74. The table reveals the numerical dominance of Los Angeles, its present comparatively low rate of integration, hence its high potential. None of the other districts would have earned less than 60 percent of the maximum bonus, while Los Angeles would have earned only 38 percent of its potential.

A Funding Alternative

The reality of substantial existing intradistict integration in California districts other than the key 25, plus the reasonable amount of integration even in 24 of these, led us to estimate the cost of an alternative bill with somewhat different parameters. First, only districts meeting the condition of enrolling 5000 students in each of two groups (the 25 districts discussed above) would qualify. Second, the first 50 percent of desegregation would be unrewarded; that is, the bonus would be provided as the district moved from being half way to being completely integrated. (This

change would necessitate revising the requirement that the money must be spend in the school generating the bonus.)

The results of this variation, again assuming that all 25 districts meet the other conditions of the bill, are displayed in Table 2. They reveal a potential maximum cost of about $170 million at full integration, $53.5 million of which would have been earned in 1973-74. Los Angeles would not yet have qualified for anything. Among the other 24 districts, the percentages earned would have been more varied that under the bill as drafted, revealing which districts are quite integrated — given their population mix — and which are not.

In principle we favor the payment rules of the bill as drafted; the funds, if necessary, could be taken from flat grants otherwise uniformly distributed throughout the state. If, however, political reality demands a more limited investment, this alternative cutdown version could be reasonably attractive.

Table 1

Model Integration Incentive Act Applied to 25 Key Districts in California Using 1973-74 Data

	(1) Average Daily Attendance in Thousands	(2) Cost (in $ Millions)	(3) Maximum Cost (in $ Millions) With Full Integration	(2) as a % of (3)
Los Angeles	611	65.3	170.0	38
San Diego	123	12.1	16.8	72
San Francisco	78	21.0	27.1	77
Long Beach	62	6.6	7.5	88
Oakland	61	7.8	11.5	68
Fresno	55	6.6	9.0	73
Garden Grove	50	3.8	3.8	100
Sacramento	48	8.8	9.3	95
Richmond	39	6.1	8.1	75
San Jose	37	3.3	5.2	63
San Bernardino	33	4.9	6.3	78
Hacienda	30	5.3	6.0	88
Stockton	30	5.4	6.5	83
Norwalk	27	3.6	4.1	88
Santa Ana	27	5.5	6.9	80
Pasadena	25	6.6	7.0	94
Hayward	24	3.3	3.3	100
Montebello	24	4.4	4.9	90
Pomona	21	3.9	5.1	76
Sweetwater	21	3.4	3.6	94
Bakerfield	20	2.8	4.3	65
E. Side Union	17	3.3	3.7	89
Alum Rock	16	3.5	4.0	88
Berkeley	14	3.5	3.8	92
Baldwin Park	12	2.6	2.7	96
Total	1505	203.4	340.5	60

Table 2

Integration Bonus Limited to 25 California Districts and Paid Only After 50% Integration Using 1973-74 Data

	(1) Cost (in $ Millions)	(2) Maximum Cost (in $ Millions) With Full Integration	(3) (1) as a % of (2)
Los Angeles	0	85.0	0
San Diego	3.7	8.4	44
San Francisco	7.5	13.6	55
Long Beach	2.9	3.8	76
Oakland	2.1	5.8	36
Fresno	2.1	4.5	47
Garden Grove	1.9	1.9	100
Sacramento	4.2	4.7	89
Richmond	2.1	4.1	51
San Jose	.7	2.6	27
San Bernardino	1.8	3.2	56
Hacienda	2.3	3.0	77
Stockton	2.2	3.3	66
Norwalk	1.6	2.1	76
Santa Ana	2.1	3.5	60
Pasadena	3.1	3.5	89
Hayward	1.7	1.7	100
Montebello	2.0	2.5	80
Pomona	1.4	2.6	54
Sweetwater	1.6	1.8	89
Bakersfield	.7	2.2	32
E. Side Union	1.4	1.8	78
Alum Rock	1.5	2.0	75
Berkeley	1.6	1.9	84
Baldwin Park	1.3	1.4	93
Total	53.5	170.9	31

Conclusion

We hope that this Integration Incentive Act will serve as a model for those who might introduce such bills throughout the country. It should be plain from our discussion that alternate versions can be easily drafted for those who would resolve the specific policy issues in other ways than we have. At this point, however, what is most important is not the detail but rather a national dialogue about the need to move the integration effort forward with carrots, not sticks.

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