## Manufacturing Barriers to Biosimilar Entry

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## Problem(s)

- *Small molecules*: generic competition puts price close to MC when patents expire
- Biologics: B/c of challenges, secrecy surrounding manufacturing, no "generic" competition after patent expiry

– Price decrease of 10-30%?

 Sub-optimal production of basic knowledge regarding biologic products, process

#### **Presentation Roadmap**

- Problems, possible solutions
- Significance for larger debates

# Caveat: spectrum of molecular complexity

**Chemical Structure Comparisons of Select Medications** 



#### Some sales figures

#### Table I: Combined global prescription sales for the top 50 pharmaceutical companies (excluding generic-drug companies) by molecule type (2009–2014).

Sales (\$ billion)							
Molecule type	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Difference in sales between 2009 and 2014
Small molecule	411	414	415	405	394	394	-4%
Therapeutic protein	65	68	70	72	74	76	17 %
Monoclonal antibody	38	43	48	53	58	62	63%
Vaccine	21	22	24	25	27	28	33%

Sources: Datamonitor, PharmaVitae Explorer, January 2010, and company-reported information.

#### Small molecules vs. Complex biologics

- Generic firm has molecular structure (or can reverse engineer)
- Different manufacturing processes lead to same product
- Showing bioequivalence of copy (Hatch-Waxman) takes \$1-2 m

- Even originator doesn't know precise structure
- Product dependent on process
- Under BPCIA need to show follow-on is "highly similar"
- Follow-on costs under BPCIA (including trials) \$100-150 m

#### **Related Scientific Challenges**

- Limitations of analytical techniques in proving identity of end product
- Product differences may depend on process differences
  - Including inadvertent changes batch-to-batch (Eprex)
  - FDA makes "comparability" determinations when originator explicitly changes process post-BLA approval

### Knowledge Limits By Firm

- Non-originator firms
  - Manufacturing process of originator firm is trade secret
- All firms (at least for complex processes, products)
  - Limited analytics w/r/t end product
  - Correlation between steps of process, product poorly understood
  - Limited incentives for understanding

#### Limited Incentives

- Originator firms
  - Regulatory lock-in produces suboptimal incentive to investigate manufacturing post-approval
  - Firms' internal CBA unlikely to push production of basic knowledge/"tech infrastructure"
- Follow-on firms
  - Firms' internal CBA doesn't incentivize production of tech infrastructure

#### Policy Options: Originator Trade Secrets ("OTS")

- Is enablement requirement of composition of matter patent(s) being fulfilled?
  - e.g. Mandel (2006)
  - 21 U.S.C. Section 372(d)
    - Problem is that we care about process at BLA filing/approval time
    - "updating" initial patent with subsequent process changes
  - product-by-process patents (Karshtedt 2011)?
    - Multiple patent apps at different stages?
  - policy question (policy as to disclosure and scope)

## Policy Options OTS (2)

- Pushing on patent disclosure may lead to originator's opting out of patents
  - 12-year exclusivity
- Carrots (e.g. additional regulatory exclusivity for disclosure)

#### Policy options, basic "tech infrastructure"

Public funding: Arrow plus Pasteur's quadrant

But expertise in private sector

Public-private: FDA's "quality by design" product manufacturing initiative

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#### Basic tech infrastructure (2)

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#### http://www.nist.gov/mml/bmd/biomanuf acturing.cfm) (cf. Sematech)

- Industrial: AbbVie, Agilent, Amgen, Biogen Idec, Boehringer-Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Coriolis Pharmaceuticals, Eli Lilly, Genentech, GlaxoSmithKline, Human Genome Sciences-GSK, Janssen (Johnson & Johnson), MedImmune, Novartis, Novavax, PepsiCo, Pfizer, Roche, Sandoz, Thermo Scientific, Waters
- Regulatory & Standards: FDA, Health Canada, MPA-Sweden, NIBSC-UK, USP, NIBRT-Ireland
- Academic: University of Birmingham, University of Delaware, Universities of Maryland (Baltimore and College Park) at the Institute for Bioscience and Biotechnology Research (IBBR), University of New Hampshire

"Precompetitive??" (how much trade secrecy remains)

### Larger Themes/Debates

- Role of regulatory lock-in (adaptive regulation?)
- Role of disclosure in justifying patents
- Patents vs. trade secrecy/secrecy
  - Here trade secrecy/secrecy appear to create very significant costs