Handbook
of Competence
and Motivation

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CHAPTER 25

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The "Inside" Story

A Cultural–Historical Analysis of Being Smart and Motivated, American Style

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A popular video used in social science and education courses, *Preschool in Three Cultures*, presents highlights of a study comparing preschool practices in the United States, Japan, and China. In the video (Tobin, Wu, & Davidson, 1989), teachers from each of the three cultural contexts comment on each other's teaching and classroom practices. In the Japanese segment, a boy called Hiroki is obviously disrupting his class. He stands on the table, tosses around cards from a sorting game, tells jokes, sings, and engages other kids in noisy conversation while the teacher is giving a lesson. The teacher ignores him. The American teachers are alarmed by Hiroki's behavior, but are even more concerned by the teacher's inaction. They wonder aloud why the teacher does not intervene to stop Hiroki. They suggest that because he is very intelligent, perhaps gifted, and obviously bored by classroom routine, he should be given some individualized or special instruction. The Japanese teachers are taken back by this

characterization. While agreeing that Hiroki disrupts the class, they question how he could possibly be "very intelligent" if he does not even know how to control his behavior and fit in with his fellow students.

The example of Hiroki is instructive about competence and motivation, American[1] style. The American preschool teachers assume, as do many American teachers, supervisors, and employers, that intelligence displays itself in verbal output and through behavioral expressions that are in some ways distinctive. Their comments further reveal their belief that competent behavior requires that the student be personally interested and engaged. The surprise of the Japanese teachers at the American reflections highlights different understandings of competence and motivation. From their perspective, it is impossible to see Hiroki as a competent or gifted student. Competence and intelligence, Japanese style, requires knowing how to behave properly. A sensitivity to others and their expectations is the signature of motivation.

The mutual bewilderment of the two sets of teachers at what is regarded as smart or motivated by teachers in the other cultural context points to the influence of invisible networks of culture-specific assumptions about the social world. These assumptions include solutions to questions: What is a person? What are the sources of behavior? and What is the good and right way "to be" within this social world? We call these culture-specific sets of meanings and practices "cultural models." These typically tacit models render the actions in the Japanese classroom meaningful and coherent to the Japanese observers, and, simultaneously, peculiar to the American observers who are using different models to make sense of the classroom.

In this chapter, we examine the importance of cultural models to both scientific and lay understandings of competence and motivation. We (1) provide some examples of sociocultural diversity in models of competence and motivation, (2) describe the origins and nature of the common European American model that underlies most psychological theorizing and research, and (3) review recent comparative empirical research that illuminates the sociocultural specificity of many findings in the competence and motivation literature.

In examining cultural models, we draw on the cultural psychological literature. "Cultural psychology" is the interdisciplinary study of how cultural practices and meanings, and psychological processes and structures depend on each other (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Miller, 1994; Shweder, 1991). A cultural psychology approach focuses on the interpretive structures of the world within which the person is a participant. We analyze cultural models of competence and motivation as significant features of cultural contexts that fashion individual experience (Bruner, 1990; Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998). Being competent and motivated, as well as identifying competence and motivation in others, entails engagement with cultural models.

Although a variety of models of competence and motivation are possible and indeed exist in various contexts, the most prevalent and well-elaborated lay and scientific models within American contexts represent these phenomena as innate individual

properties and locate them firmly "inside" the individual. As these models are taken for granted and absorbed in the everyday practices of teaching and testing, their organizing force is made transparent, so that the search for the sources of competence and motivation focuses on the internal properties of brains, minds, and people. There are, of course, and have always been other theories and perspectives suggesting that competence and motivation—in fact, all of human behavior—is best understood by focusing on the outside: the external, the contextual, the social, the cultural, and the historical (e.g., Lewin, 1935; Vygotsky, 1978). Likewise, there have always been theories proposing that the self is socially constructed (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). Why the "inside" story tenaciously persists as the most prevalent interpretation of differences in competence and motivation is the story of this chapter.

The view that competence and motivation are primarily individual and internal forces is not the result of the unfettered observations of the way humans "actually are"; instead, this view reflects the incorporation of historically derived, widely dispersed systems of meanings and ideas about humans, the self, the role of others in action, and the consequences of action. This vast interpretive matrix is essential for human behavior; it affords individual experience. Yet a comparative approach reveals that the "inside" cultural model of competence and motivation is in many ways discretionary. It could have been, and perhaps could still be, otherwise.

SOCIOCULTURAL HISTORICAL MODELS: THE INVISIBLE FOUNDATION OF COMPETENCE AND MOTIVATION

What does it mean to be competent? In many American workplaces and schools, the answer is obvious. Competence, unless it is qualified (e.g., athletic or social competence), refers to intellectual competence. The focus is on the nature of the mind, thinking, and knowledge. The competent person is quick, sharp, able to express him- or herself, has a lot of knowledge, and is able to use it successfully to make connections and solve problems or intellectual puzzles. The social

context, social skills, relationships, and other people and their expectations are largely irrelevant and external to the domain of intellectual competence.

Most psychological concepts of "competence" (defined in this volume as ability or success, including phenomena such as aptitude, intelligence, proficiency, skill, etc.) are rooted in deeply entrenched but rarely articulated cultural models of intelligence (e.g., Carugati, 1990; Polanyi, 1957). These models include tacit assumptions, images, and metaphors that carry a far ranging set of commitments. For example, they define what competence is, what it does, where it comes from, and where to look for it.

A Machine or a Root?: Divergent Metaphors of Mind

Metaphors provide the initial blueprints for understanding competence and the source of competence (Sternberg, 1990; Weiner, 1991). For example, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), the mind is often conceptualized as

> a container image defining a space that is inside the body and separate from it. Via metaphor, the mind is given an inside and an outside. Ideas and concepts are internal, existing somewhere in the inner space of our minds, while what they refer to are things in the external, physical world. This metaphor is so deeply ingrained that it is hard to think about the mind in any other way. (p. 266)

In Western philosophy and in the science that is built on its philosophical assumptions, the mind is also often metaphorized as a mechanical device, a switchboard, a machine, a set of gears that "works" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). As people think, they can feel that the "wheels are turning" and have a sense that they are "cranking out a solution." Sometimes the mind is a calculator that counts and sums (e.g., "To what does it all add up?" or "What is the bottom line?" or "Give me 'an account' of what happened"). Problems are solved with "power" from the "engine" of the brain. In recent theorizing, the machine that is the mind is a computer: The mind is the software; the brain is hardware (Minsky, 1986). When the mind machine is experiencing difficulties, it

is said to be a little rusty or to be experiencing a mental breakdown. In an extreme statement, but one that aptly characterizes empirical work in psychology, Shweder (1990) argues that psychology

> assumes that its subject matter is a central (abstract and transcendent = deep or interior or hidden) processing mechanism inherent (fixed and universal) in human beings, which enables them to think (classify, infer, remember, imagine) . . . and that "all the other stuff—stimuli, contexts, resources, values, meanings, knowledge, religion, rituals, language, technologies, institutions—is conceived to be external to or outside of the central processing mechanism. (pp. 45–46)

Machine metaphors are central to Western conceptions of mind and thinking, and they simultaneously define what is involved in being a competent person. In many European American cultural contexts, the person is represented and realized as a separate, bounded, autonomous entity—an individual (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). Individual actions result from the attributes or the properties of the person that are activated and then cause behavior. Competence is one such individual property. Accordingly, competence is located *in* the individual, *in* the mind, *in* the brain. European American competence is active; it cranks, works, churns, turns, hums, percolates, crackles, and illuminates, and out come solutions and products. Typically, it involves technical intelligence that is distinctly separate from socioemotional expertise or skills (Goleman, 1995; Rogoff & Chavajay, 1995). People are understood to be powered by what is inside. Whether the right stuff is DNA, genes, neurons, hormones, traits, abilities, motivation, drive, or talent, it is what is inside that counts. The inside view sets up the powerful inside–outside dichotomy that pervades lay thinking and scientific theorizing alike. If the inside is good, the outside (the world, others and their expectations) is irrelevant, or maybe even corrosive to the inside.

Minds and intellectual competence take a different form in many non-Western contexts (Greenfield, 1997; Harkness, Super, & Keefer, 1992). In East Asian cultural contexts, minds are not containers with fixed boundaries marking inside and outside. In-

stead, they are entities more likely to be of the natural world, like wind or water, or organisms, like plants or roots, which are interdependent with the environment and require the sun and nutrients of the soil (Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). In some East Asian contexts, the "good" mind is not cranking and churning but is instead clear or blank or still, and is often described through metaphors of water. It is "a mind as clear and reflective as water is central . . for it is accurate information, whether it is in the detection of an opponent's next move in judo, or the anticipation of a subtle shift in consumer taste in automobiles that forms the basis for creative action" (Kraft, as quoted in Goleman, Kaufman, & Ray, 1992, p. 42).

In Korean cultural contexts, the mind and self are sometimes metaphorized as a white root. When a white root is planted within red soil, it becomes red; when planted within green soil, it becomes green. Similarly, in Japan, the mind becomes a willow and the self is a rice plant (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1995). Willows and rice plants are appropriate metaphors, because they grow and mature; they are flexible and bend, as should good minds, according to the requirements of social conditions and the press of one's responsibilities and obligations. Through these metaphors, the mind, competence, and motivation become inherently relational in nature and take form as a transaction between inside and outside. People and their actions are understood to be dependent on time, place, and circumstance. From a Western point of view, imagining the mind as a plant may seem like a demotion for such a critical and powerful entity. Yet once the mind is likened to a plant rather than to a machine, it is evident that the soil, the culture—what is often from a Western point of view, construed as the "outside"—is critical for development and growth of the mind.

A number of research groups within Western cultural contexts have sought alternative metaphors for the mind. Extending Mead's idea of thought as conversation with a generalized other, they have converged on notions of thinking as shared, collaborative, communicative, or intersubjective (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; Zajonc, 1992). Other researchers have challenged the long-standing distinction between the cognitive and the social (Greeno, 1988), and have described cognitive systems as social systems (Minsky, 1986). Others have described becoming competent as joining a conversation (Bruner, 1990), and learning as a process of becoming a member of a sustained community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, Baker-Sennett, Lacasa, & Goldsmith, 1995). These evocative ideas, however, have not been widely accepted in research on competence and motivation.

WHAT IS GOOD THINKING?

Gaining Knowledge

Metaphors of mind and intelligence carry with them assumptions about the nature and purpose of thinking, which are in turn tied to understandings about good thinking and desirable modes of being. In most Western conceptions, competence involves gaining knowledge, figuring things out, good reasoning, and problem solving. According to Aristotle, "All men by nature desire to know." The powerful underlying belief is that the world is systematic, and that it is possible to gain knowledge of it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Gaining this knowledge is an effortful, individual pursuit and involves the application of reason to discover the truth. The preference for self-generated knowledge reflects the Socratic tradition, which is skeptical of the beliefs of others and prizes only truth that is "neither prescribed by authority figures nor socially negotiated. Rather it is found by the self" (Tweed & Lehman, 2002, p. 91). Rodin's sculpture, *The Thinker*, captures the essence of good thinking, Western style. Prototypical good thinking is a highly effortful, private, and internal activity. It is done with eyes closed, the body hunched over, while the world is held at bay.

To assume that the goal of using the mind is to know or to gain information also fits well with a Cartesian world view, in which the pursuit of knowledge, truth, or reason is valued more than activities of doing, being, or feeling (Misra & Gergen, 1993). Given that knowledge is the goal, the more knowledge the thinker can gain, the better. Hence, rapid thinking or mental processing that quickly produces a general understanding is

most highly valued. The analysis of information processing from this perspective has led to discoveries of tendencies to "go beyond the information given" (Bruner, 1957), to find meaningful patterns, to take salient examples that are prototypical of the relevant general phenomenon, and to draw probabilistic, rather than determinate, conclusions (Fiske & Taylor, 1994). These tendencies, however, may reflect not basic human tendencies but instead Western mentalities that derive in part from Western assumptions about the purpose and meaning of thinking and intellectual competence (Goodnow, 1990).

In an analysis of American implicit theories of intelligence, Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, and Bernstein (1981) asked laypeople and experts to list characteristics of intelligence. The most important factor was problem-solving ability, which included behaviors such as "reasons logically and well," "identifies connections among ideas," and "sees all aspects of a problem." A second factor was verbal ability, which included "speaks clearly and articulately" and "converses well." Finally, a third but less important factor was social competence, which included "admits mistakes" and "displays interest in the world at large." These implicit theories reveal the pervading influence of a metaphor that conceptualizes intelligence as something internal to and contained within the person (Sternberg, 1990).

Dweck and her colleagues have also examined theories of intelligence and found two general types of implicit theories or meaning systems (Dweck, Chui, & Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Some people believe that intelligence is relatively fixed (an entity view), while others hold that intelligence is relatively malleable (an incremental view). The view that intelligence is an entity locates competence somewhere inside the person, away from influence. The view that intelligence is malleable and grows and changes focuses attention on the importance of effort and persistence in competence, and can signal a more social and relational view of competence. Such an incremental construction of intelligence can draw attention to the learner trying to meet the expectations and standards of others, and to the role of others in encouraging such persistence (Hong, 2001). Still, many descriptions of intelligence as incremental or malleable are relatively intrapersonal and foster an inside view of competence (Ames & Archer, 1988; Maehr & Yamaguchi, 2001). From the incremental, inside perspective, others serve primarily to evaluate performance, while the potential for mastery comes as a consequence of individual differences in internal qualities such as effort or intrinsic motivation.

Responding to Others

In many contexts other than European American ones, competence, thinking, and intelligence are associated with very different meanings and practices. These differences are linked to alternative ideas of what it means to be a person. The person is an interdependent being, a part that becomes whole only in relation to others (Markus et al., 1996). Consequently, the intelligence or competence of this interdependent being is naturally and decidedly more social and relational. The goal of good thinking is to maintain relations with others. Competence is not developed *within* individuals but is fostered *through* relations, particularly attending to the expectations of others. Using a methodology similar to that of Sternberg et al. (1981), Azuma and Kashiwagi (1987) found that when characterizing intelligence, Japanese respondents gave much greater emphasis to interpersonal qualities than to problem-solving and verbal ability (Shapiro & Azuma, 2004). The first interpersonal factor was characterized by sociability, humor, and leadership, and the second, by characteristics such as sympathy, social modesty, and the ability to take another's perspective. Notably, another important aspect of competence, Japanese style, was the ability to regulate or to achieve control over one's inner state.

Competence in many East Asian contexts is imagined not so much in terms of internal properties of the head, but instead in terms of relationships among hearts. And social competence is the litmus test for general competence. Lewis (1995) reported that Japanese educators emphasize "the relationship of hearts, the nurturing of bonding between the teacher's and children's hearts" (p. 56). Thus, Hiroki's problem in the opening example is that he was not properly responsive

to others and to his socializing milieu (White & LeVine, 1986). A smart child is one who is intelligent enough to know how to listen to others. According to the Japanese Ministry of Education, the goal of preschool is not academic preparation but instead to build the proper relationships and good habits that will become the bedrock of later competence (Peak, 1991; Shapiro & Azuma, 2004). In many Western schools and educated contexts, relating to others in the academic context is fraught with potentially negative associations; for example, a reliance on others to solve a problem is classified as cheating. In the everyday situations of many other cultural settings, however, not using a companion's assistance is regarded as folly or egoism (Rogoff & Chavajay, 1995).

Living in the Right Way

According to many diverse and richly elaborated Indian philosophical works (Das, 1994; Srivastava & Misra, 1999), competent persons are those who are reflective and sensitive to context, and who select the appropriate behavior for the situation. An emphasis is placed on "waking up, noticing, recognizing, understanding, and comprehending" (Srivastava & Misra, p. 160). Knowledge acquisition, while important, appears as a way station on the path to understanding. Knowing is not for its own sake; instead, thinking is for the purpose of living in the right way. Intelligence is not neutral. Instead, intelligence and morality are interwoven, and good intelligence is constructive and associated with happiness, pleasure, and prosperity, while bad intelligence is destructive and leads to unhappiness. Competence, then, both reflects and fosters karma, the doctrine by which one's deeds are related to the quality of one's life both currently and in the future incarnations.

Examining what it means to be intelligent in India, Srivastava and Misra (1999) identified hundreds of Sanskrit Suktis and proverbs spoken in Hindi that had some relevance to intelligence as it is commonly understood. These sukti and proverbs were coded for their meaning and were then grouped into a few broad categories. Across both sets of texts, intelligence and competence involved being good or smart at life.

The notion of being privately smart in a way that is not useful for life was relatively infrequent. A key aspect of social competence was situational sensitivity and knowing how to behave appropriately according to time, place, and person. Showing respect to parents, elders, and guests was another feature of intelligent behavior.

In Chinese cultural contexts, thinking also has a very important relational function, in particular, a hierarchy-maintaining function. When thinking in the presence of an elder, for example, tradition requires acknowledging one's relative incompetence. In such situations, one should wait to be addressed or questioned before beginning conversation. The lower status person should not direct the conversation, introduce topics, or begin a reply until the teacher or superior is finished, or answer a question if there is someone else for whom it is more appropriate to do so (Legge, 1967, as described in Scollon & Scollon, 1994, pp. 144–155). Learning is less likely to be associated with evaluating, questioning, and generating knowledge, which is referred to as "critical" thinking in the West; it is instead tuning into the insights and wisdom of those in the collective who have been recognized as exemplars (Tweed & Lehman, 2002). Within cultural contexts influenced by Confucianism, it may follow then that intelligence, competence, or good thinking, at least in the social domain, may not require snap judgments, rapid distinctions, quick inferences, or going beyond the information given to impose meaning, but instead requires listening, receiving, accepting, applying multiple frames, reflecting, letting meanings arise or reveal themselves, hesitating, or making a judgment only after an extended period.

An emphasis on social competence as the defining feature of competence is not confined to East Asia or to India. In fact, in virtually all contexts other than middle-class American ones, competence is in large part explicitly social. For example, in a comparison between Puerto Rican families in Puerto Rico's metropolitan areas and Anglo families in New Haven, Connecticut, Harwood, Miller, and Irizarry (1995) found striking differences in what parents valued and hoped to foster in competent children. Anglo mothers valued autonomy (children exploring settings on their own), self-control

(rather than control by others), initiative, and self-maximization. Puerto Rican mothers, like many mothers outside of middle-class American settings, valued displaying proper social demeanor and maintaining harmony within the group. The proper child in Puerto Rican settings would be "calm, obedient, and respectfully attentive to the teachings of his or her elders, in order to become skilled in the interpersonal and rhetorical competencies that will someday be expected of the well-socialized adult" (p. 98). Indeed in some settings, beyond an emphasis on harmonious and stable intergroup relations, there is a distinct prescription for intelligent people to conform. Harkness et al. (1992), report, for example, that in Kenya, parents defined intelligence as the "ability to do what is needed to be done around the homestead without being asked" (p. 105).

In studies conducted in Uganda, Wober (1974) asked samples of villagers, teachers, and medical students that differed in their level of education and contact with Western ideas to rate various concepts related to intelligence on 9-point semantic differential scales (consisting of pairs of adjectives with opposite meanings). Although there were important differences among the samples of Ugandans, there was also considerable overlap. Most notably, intelligence was not associated with haste or mental speed. Many respondents thought of intelligence as slow, careful, straightforward, and sane. The villagers were also likely to associate intelligence with terms such as "friendly" and "public," suggesting that a productive use of the mind is to be found in a reaching out to others and in a prosocial or public-spirited orientation. Wober's study reveals, however, that with exposure to Western ideas, intelligence becomes less social, and becomes instead a more individual and private entity. In contrast to the villagers, students were more likely to associate intelligence with rapid response, and not with pause or delay.

The literature on competence is replete with compelling theoretical statements (e.g., Berry, 1996; Luria, 1981) urging those who are interested in the nature of the mind, intelligence, or competence to attend carefully to the environment that the mind has been shaped to meet. These views, as well as a variety of recent ones (Shapiro & Azuma, 2004; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004), find

that different ecologies and situations recruit and create different ideas of competence and intelligence; thus, competence will necessarily assume a variety of forms. Moreover, recent theories of competence and motivation, for example, Gardner's (1993) multiple intelligences, Sternberg's (1997) triarchic theory of intelligence, Cantor's social intelligence (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1985), Goleman's (1995) emotional intelligence and Mischel and Shoda's (1995) cognitive-affective theory, increasingly reflect within a Western context some of the understandings of Hiroki's preschool teachers, and explicitly delineate the importance of the interpersonal context and the requirements and expectations of others in developing competence. Yet given the dominance of the "inside" story of competence in both lay and scientific imaginations, the theories of competence and motivation that challenge the inside–outside dichotomy and that instead conceptualize them as context-dependent and fundamentally interpersonal social phenoman (for a review, see Salili, Chiu, & Hong, 2001) have tremendous difficulty taking hold (Farr, 1996).

IMAGINING AGENCY: CONCEPTIONS OF TRYING AND DOING

The Force Within

Because competence and related concepts such as ability and intelligence often fail to adequately account for variation in achievement, other explanatory constructs have become necessary. The concept of motivation, like the concept of competence, is tied to a set of culture-specific understandings and practices that describe what motivation is and why it is necessary. Motivation is generally understood as the reason for behaving in some way, or the explanation for stopping one action and beginning another (Mook, 1986). The concept of motivation serves to justify and explain the direction and purposefulness that seem to characterize human action, at least in European American contexts (Stewart & Bennett, 1991).

Although the source of individual behavior could theoretically be social, relational, or located outside the person, in the most popular lay accounts of motivation, is an inside entity, a feeling of interest or enthusi-

asm, or a personal or individual force. Motivation is one of the set of internal attributes that defines the person and that causes behavior. Why is Hiroki misbehaving? Because he is not excited and interested by the lesson. He is bored; he is not intrinsically motivated. According to this account, people perform well or successfully because they are motivated, or they fail because they have insufficient motivation. Motivation is extremely important in European American contexts; a growing motivation industry produces speakers, seminars, books, tapes, and CDs exhorting people to feel the power of the force "within them" and to understand that what lies behind, or what lies ahead, is nothing compared to what lies "within." Lance Armstrong, six-time winner of the Tour de France bicycle race is described in an advertisement for Subaru cars to be "driven by what's inside." Similarly, in analyzing the outcome of a game, sports commentators often make statements such as "The losing team didn't have enough drive," or "The winning team was hungrier." Americans, in fact, are quick to make internal attributions for behavior relative to situational attributions (Ross, 1977), more so than people in other cultural contexts such as China and India (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994).

In analyzing metaphors of motivation, Weiner (1991) finds two dominant ones: the person as a machine and as a god. He argues that the machine metaphor has been attractive to Western theorists, because it incorporates concepts from the natural sciences related to energy, force fields, and associative connections, and seems to account parsimoniously for the initiation, maintenance, and termination of behavior. Freud construed the person as a steam engine that was allotted a fixed amount of energy to realize desired end states. Hull (1943), in what was characterized as drive theory, saw the behaving organism as "a completely self-maintaining robot" (p. 27).

The second metaphor for motivation, according to Weiner, is the person as a god. This metaphor was invoked as theorists grappled with how to explain individual choices and decisions. The idea is that people are perfectly rational and all-knowing. Such a metaphor provides the basis for theories of the person as a rational decision

maker and as a scientist. More recently, Weiner (2001) suggested that people are also judges, and when an individual acts, a field of others considers the action, and then judges the person—good or bad, responsible or not, moral or immoral, deserving sympathy or anger. The judge metaphor helps highlight the particular cultural models that guide our observations and attributions. People are assumed to "have" high or low ability. Those with high ability who do not work or try are judged harshly. Potential is an innate attribute, and not realizing it is regarded very negatively. Those with less ability but who nonetheless succeed through effort are regarded somewhat more positively. Despite the importance of effort, however, in many settings, those who succeed without much effort, working "smart" rather than hard, are often admired. The nature of these evaluations reveals the operation of a dense network of assumptions about the nature of competence and motivation, and how they work together to generate performance. As we explore later, these assumptions are not natural or human but are instead rooted in the Protestant ethic, which values overcoming obstacles through hard work, and in other assumptions about natural virtues (Spence, 1985; Weiner, 2001).

Agency in the World

The most common metaphors of agency are alike in their location of the driving force of behavior as inside the individual. Metaphors of agency in other contexts conceptualize the person as a more porous, fractional, and interdependent entity. In holistic world views, in which there is no clear division between the human and the natural or supernatural, agency is projected outward and located in the world at large (Misra & Gergen, 1993). Agency can be located in spirits, in the Evil Eye, in hexes or curses, in the imbalance of various forces, or more simply in social practices—the routine scripted social activities that structure life and require participation (Landrine & Klonoff, 1994). Drawing on his fieldwork among the Miamin in Papua, New Guinea, Gardner (1987) observes, "The concept of agency employed by the Miamin is embedded in social practices; far from there being any abstractions from these practices, in the form

of a model of human nature, the characteristics of specifically human agency are projected upon the world at large" (p. 174). Stewart and Bennett (1991) quote a Ghanaian government employee as saying, "We do not concern ourselves with motivation as the Americans do. We know what our job is and we do it" (p. 78). From this perspective, problems with individual performance are not located inside the individual but instead stem from role confusion, or from some difficulty in the social context, such as antagonism among groups.

Miller (1984, 1988) was among the first to draw attention to the social and interpersonal nature of motivation. For example, in American contexts, doing one's duty or sacrificing one's self for others is tantamount to giving up one's own agency or to being extrinsically motivated (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). In Hindu Indian contexts, on the other hand, performing interpersonal responsibilities—doing what relevant · others oblige one to do—is more frequently experienced as agentic and intrinsically motivated.

In Western contexts, the individualist assumption that people are separate from others is the cornerstone assumption in the most prevalent models of agency. To explain the actions of isolated individuals requires the postulation of a force to propel them, something to move them to work or achieve and to define them. One such force is the "achievement motive" (McClelland, 1961), variously defined as the desire to overcome obstacles, to exert power, or to do something as well as possible, or to master or manipulate it. Markus and Kitayama (2004) suggest, however, that if the individual is not described as an independent, autonomous self who seeks to express itself through action, but instead is characterized as an interdependent self who requires a relationship or a social setting in order to "be," then the characterization of motivation will take new forms. Motivation will involve other people and social situations, and independent actions or achievements will be less relevant or significant. Of greater importance will be behaving according to obligations, duties, rules, and privileges. Such motivations have often been regarded in European American settings as "outside," and therefore less legitimate, authentic, or powerful than internal factors.

Although the recognition of individuality and of purposeful agency appears to be universal, Markus and Kitayama (2004) contend that this recognition does not require a commitment to the European and American ideology of individualism and its particular normative models of human nature. In describing the various ways in which actions can be constructed, these authors use the word "agency" to refer to the "self in action." They propose that how actions are understood is tied to conceptions of the self. They find that European American contexts reflect an implicit cultural model of agency, in which normatively good actions originate in an independent autonomous self, and the actions of this self are *disjoint*, that is, in some ways separate or distinct from the actions of others. By contrast, East Asian contexts often reveal another implicit cultural model of agency, in which normatively good actions originate in an interdependent self, and the actions of this self are *conjoint*, that is, in some ways impelled by interactions or relationships with others.

This distributed view of agency is not restricted to New Guinea, Africa, India, or East Asia. Wherever there are contexts that encourage strong notions of relationality among people or between people and nature, agency and motivation are less likely to be viewed as abstractions detached from the world and as properties of people, and instead are assumed to be social in origin and conceptualized as shared. Lamont (2000), for example, notes that in both French and American working-class contexts, respondents in in-depth interviews signal an awareness that their actions and their fate are interdependent with others, and that their actions are responsive to the need to be responsible to others and uphold the moral order. Similarly, Markus, Ryff, Curhan, & Palmerscheim (2004) find that those engaged in working-class settings are more likely to be attuned to the requirements of others and to the demands of the situation. Given their occupations and living arrangements, they are more likely to understand themselves as maintaining their integrity and controlling themselves in uncertain material and social worlds, and may therefore be less likely to view themselves as freely choosing their own actions (Snibbe & Markus, in press).

In recent writings, achievement motivation theorists appear to be shifting the focus away from the inside, blurring the dichotomy between person and environment. Weiner (2001) underscores that success and failure do not occur in a vacuum, but "in a social context which affects and is affected by achievement performance" (p. 19). He also emphasizes that motivation has a strong interpersonal component. Other theorists are examining how the environment or the context influences the nature of an individual's goals (Steele & Sherman, 1999). Thus, task goals, or similar constructs such as mastery or learning goals (e.g., Dweck, 1986), draw somewhat more attention to the social nature of motivation, because they implicate others, and the expectations of others, more than performance goals, or similar constructs such as relative ability goals or ego goals (e.g., Maehr, 1984). When learning goals are present, for example, students are more willing to seek out others for academic help. And whether or not learning goals are present depends on the goal structure of the classroom (Urdan, 2001). Research explaining the performance gap between middle- and working-class students (Croizet & Claire, 1998), or between white and black students (Steele, 1997), is also explicitly training theoretical and empirical attention on more external, contextual factors in motivation. Thus, Graham (2001) argues that motivation is interpersonal, and that the broader context of cultural and social influences may provide a set of untapped clues for understanding minority achievement. Whether the "it's what's inside that counts" story of motivation, with its focus on internal and intrinsic factors, will be challenged by the accounts that illuminate interpersonal contexts will depend on how well theorists can create metaphors, narratives, and models that can effectively communicate and represent their more social perspectives on motivation.

HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE INSIDE STORY

Why is the inside story of competence and motivation so powerful in many European American contexts? Why is it difficult for a more contextual, social, or relational account to take hold? The historical and ideological foundation of the inside story has been forged out of a set of powerful and sometimes conflicting collective beliefs, including beliefs in inherited traits, in the power of the environment, and in the need for the self to feel autonomy and control to develop to its full potential.

Innate Faculties

The notion of innate faculties takes root in the ancient Greek concept of essentialism—that objects have inherent qualities. For example, Socrates spoke of God creating people of gold, silver, or brass and iron, which defined their place in society (e.g., as a commander vs. a craftsman) and that of their offspring. This concept of inborn competencies that are naturally occurring properties of a person has survived in some form throughout American history. The belief that people have innate faculties figured prominently in the discourse of the Founding Fathers during and after the formation of the American republic (Wiley, 1994). They believed, for example, that a natural aristocracy existed among men (Lemann, 1999) and that some (e.g., free white persons) were fit for self-government, whereas others (e.g., Indians and slaves) were not (Jacobson, 1998).

The notion that certain desirable qualities were heritable gained prominence in the latter part of the 19th century with the rise of Social Darwinism. This movement promoted the application of quasi-evolutionary principles, such as "survival of the fittest," to human behavior and social and psychological attributes. The popularity of Social Darwinism was made possible by the growing knowledge of the work of three British scientists: Darwin's evolutionary theory, Mendel's genetics, and Galton's behavioral genetics. In particular, in *Hereditary Genius*, Galton (1869/1978) explored the importance of genetics for the transmission of intelligence by analyzing families of "eminent" men. Galton also promoted the use of selective breeding techniques to improve the intelligence of the human race—a concept that he dubbed "eugenics." Influenced by Galton, psychologists such as McDougall, who conducted studies on inherited characteristics

and believed that individuals are motivated by inherited instincts, helped to introduce the study of eugenics and heredity to the United States. From roughly the 1890s to the 1920s, the eugenics movement spread through American academic and political institutions. The movement, which heralded the biological engineering of the body politic, was motivated in large part by recent waves of immigration to the United States from Southern and Eastern Europe, and the concomitant fear that these immigrants would pollute the American genetic pool.

The significant immigration during this time period, together with the establishment of compulsory education and American involvement in World War I, also produced a perceived need for identifying and classifying large numbers of people (Chapman, 1988)—a need soon satisfied by the development and widespread use of mental tests. American psychologist J. Cattell (1890), who had briefly worked with Galton, originated the term "mental test." At the turn of the century, Thorndike, one of his students, was developing a variety of intelligence measures. The American initiative to develop mental tests was also advanced by similar work in Europe. In 1904, the French government asked Binet and Simon to develop a test to identify slow learners, so that they could be given special help. The resulting Binet–Simon Intelligence Scale (1905, 1911) was meant as a measure of current performance, not innate intelligence. In 1916, Terman, a Stanford professor known to have eugenicist proclivities, adapted the Binet–Simon for Americans. At this point, the test lost its basis in performance and shifted to innate intelligence. The test measured IQ and was renamed the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scale. Mass testing of intelligence received a further boost during World War I, when the military needed a way to assess quickly and classify large numbers of new recruits. The first large-scale mental test was an IQ test administered to nearly 2 million recruits.

With the use of large-scale group testing, the American public began to accept the inside account of intelligence and the idea that people could be sorted into different levels of mental abilities. Testing became more widespread in schools and industry. A variation of the IQ test—the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)—was first administered in 1926. Broad-scale SAT testing emerged soon afterwards, aided by World War II, the GI Bill, the Cold War, the founding of the Educational Testing Service, and the vision of Harvard administrators of an elite democratically chosen on the basis of mental test scores (Lemann, 1999).

Testing has not been confined to the United States. In China, for example, civil service tests have long been used to assess knowledge of geography, law, military, and agriculture. In France, Germany, and Great Britain, students must pass the Baccalaureat, Abitur, and A-levels, respectively, to gain placement in university. In contrast to American tests, however, these tests are primarily knowledge-based. In the United States, the culture of testing has focused more on assessing how "smart" a person is rather than how much knowledge he or she has accumulated, or how much he or she has learned. This concern with native intelligence has manifested itself in the development and widespread administration of intelligence tests throughout the 20th century, and both IQ tests and the SAT are still in use today. For many, intelligence testing had appeal, because it presented a way to assess and sort students according to their capabilities. According to Lemann (1999), "Testing touched upon the deepest mythic themes: the ability to see the invisible (what was inside people's heads), the oracular ability to predict the future (what someone's grades would be in courses he hadn't even chosen yet)" (p. 18). These themes were made real when they were incorporated into practice. Once people were given an intelligence score, by definition, they were seen as "having intelligence and potential within them," or not.

Other countries have overtly rejected American-style mental testing, often because of its social implications. In the Soviet Union, for example, mental testing was abandoned, because it was believed to reinforce class structure. In the United States, the relationship of mental testing with race—rather than social class—has generally been a primary area of concern, although it has seldom been used as the basis for eliminating this form of testing. Instead, eugenicist ideas linking race and intelligence frequently reappear, perhaps owing to the widespread acceptance of the innate model of competence.

For example, in a 1969 article, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?," Jensen argued that racial differences in intelligence are due to heredity rather than to social factors such as poverty and discrimination. In 1994, Herrnstein and Murray published *The Bell Curve*, in which they discussed the relationship of intelligence (genetically determined) to social structure and argued that whites are genetically superior to blacks with respect to IQ.

Although some controversy exists within the field about the conceptualization of intelligence, the vast majority of theories still posit that intelligence is internal—confined to what is inside the head. At the height of the testing movement, one of the most influential theories, British psychologist Spearman's (1927) *g* factor, catapulted the notion of general intellectual ability into academic and public discourse. Other theorists, although still working with the model of intelligence as inside the head, subsequently presented more multifaceted views of intelligence (e.g., Gardner's multiple intelligences [1993], Sternberg's triarchic theory [1985]). Nonetheless, the idea of *g* and IQ still resonate strongly, not just in the field of psychometrics but also in education, the military, and corporate America (see, e.g., Gladwell, 2002).

The Power of the Environment

Despite its predominance, the "inside" story has been paralleled by an "outside" story. Many scholars have voiced the opinion that what is "outside" (e.g., the environment, culture) has a significant influence on individuals' behavior and development. For example, in the 17th century, the idea of the mind as a "blank slate," written on by experience, was introduced by Locke (1690/1979), who wrote:

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience. (p. 104)

Locke believed education, not natural genius, to be the prime determinant of success: "I think I may say, that of all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten are what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education. 'Tis that which makes the great Difference in Mankind" (1693/1989, p. 83). Locke's influence in academic psychology came in part from his empiricism, the idea that knowledge must be based on observable things and events. He proposed that people do not possess innate ideas but experience the world through their senses, that a person's ideas are mental models of experienced reality, and that mind is a receptacle of input meanings. Locke believed that unequal faculties were the effect unequal environments (Wiley, 1994).

This idea lay somewhat dormant during the 19th century, and the influence of environmental circumstance on the individual resurfaced with the rise of behaviorism. For many behaviorists, the mind was, in a sense, the ultimate blank slate, while for others, there was no slate to be written on, because what was inside the mind did not affect the stimulus–response sequence. In either case, from the behaviorist perspective, intelligence testing and the innate faculties approach in general were an erroneous way of understanding human behavior. In staunch opposition to the notion of innate faculties, Watson (1924) famously said,

Give me a dozen healthy infants . . . and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant . . . regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. (p. 82)

From this perspective, environmental conditions were seen as much more powerful predictors of human potential than how an individual scored on an IQ test.

During this same period, in anthropology, Boas and his students proposed that culture casts a shadow on biology as the prime determinant of social behavior. The Boasian vision of environmentalism, culture, and human changeability, unlike Social Darwinism, explained human variation in a way that was compatible with an egalitarian form of government (Wiley, 1994). The concept of culture thus gained popularity in part as a reaction to the events in Nazi Germany. In the 1950s, M. Mead, a student of Boas, helped increase the popularity and prevalence of the concept of culture in the social sciences. However, with the discovery of the double helix in the mid-1950s, the pendulum began to swing back in the direction of the inside, natural story. By the 1980s, the computer metaphor had taken hold in psychology, and sociocultural approaches that attempted to see how psychological processes are grounded were met with resistance, in favor of the notion of basic, universal psychological processes.

The Rise of the Self

While the study of environmental and cultural influence, which shifted focus away from the self and articulated a more external and social view, did penetrate the American public and academic discourse, other ideologies and psychological theorizing sustained a powerful American belief that the key to being successful lay within the self. In the 19th century, in an address on the elements of success, R. Cushman stated: "The things which are really essential for a successful life are not circumstances, but qualities, not the things which surround a man, but the things which are in him; not the adjuncts of his position, but the attributes of his character" (1848, as quoted by Wyllie, 1954, p. 21). And in the 20th century, although it was acknowledged that intelligence and aptitude tests could shed light on the inner contours of the mind, success was still seen as emanating from a person's willpower, perseverance, ambition, and industry. Through a combination of American ideology and psychological theorizing, the self became seen as the key to being competent and motivated. In particular, ideas about the self's independence and self-reliance, personal responsibility and control, and psychological theories of optimal self-development were fueled and invigorated by the foundational ideologies of independence, the Protestant ethic, and the American Dream.

Independence and Self-Reliance

American institutions, practices, and psychological tendencies reflect an ethos of independence and individualism (Baumeister, 1987; Plaut, Markus, & Lachman, 2002). Locke's "liberal individualism"—the idea that societies are made up of autonomous individuals who form governments in order to protect their natural rights—forms the philosophical foundation of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. Lockean philosophy reflects an ontological individualism whereby the individual is seen as prior to society; moreover, this philosophy is atomistic, in that it views society as an aggregation of independent entities. This model of the person as independent and free from others has survived throughout American history (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Fiske et al., 1998). Freedom is, according to Bellah et al., "perhaps the most resonant, deeply held American value" (1985, p. 23). American notions of freedom and autonomy include wanting to be left alone by others and not to be imposed upon by other people's values, beliefs, or lifestyles. Whereas some cultural contexts may stress the importance of tradition and meeting social standards, U.S. culture emphasizes a "socially unsituated self" that thrives on "separating oneself from the values imposed by one's past or by conformity to one's social milieu, so that one can discover what one really wants" (p. 24). In American contexts, this emphasis on independence leads to respect for the individual and fosters initiative and creativity (Bellah et al., 1985).

Independence and self-reliance became key to the American understanding of success in the 19th century. Transcendentalists such as Emerson and Thoreau articulated and helped popularize these concepts. For example, Emerson (1950) wrote in his 1841 essay "Self-Reliance" that one should "trust thyself" (p. 146), that "[s]ociety everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members," and that to be a man, one need "be a nonconformist" (p. 148). Moreover, Emerson espoused the belief that the key to success lay within the person, evidenced, for example, in the following statement: "The reason why this man or that man is fortunate is not to be told. It lies in the man" (p. 367). In his 1840 commentary on democracy in America, de Tocqueville (1840/2000) made the following observation about Americans: "They are in the habit of always considering themselves in isolation, and they willingly fancy that

their whole destiny is in their hands" (p. 484). Indeed, the independent, self-reliant, self-made man, who rose out of obscurity on his own personal merit without external help, soon became a powerful image in American society (Wyllie, 1954).

Personal Responsibility and Control

Notions of personal responsibility and control have contributed significantly to American models of competence and motivation. Two ideologies in particular, the Protestant ethic and the American Dream, have contributed to the individualistic focus of current conceptions of success and achievement in American culture (Spence, 1985).

The Protestant Ethic. Success in America has long been associated with moral superiority. Success and morality are linked under the Protestant ethic, which emphasizes the duty to pursue one's calling and the moral superiority of industriousness and hard work. According to Weber (1904/1958), under the Protestant ethic, the individual's highest moral obligation is to fulfill his duty in worldly affairs. This idea is derived from the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, which holds that God predetermines who will be saved from damnation. People cannot work toward becoming one of the few "elect"; however, they should regard themselves as chosen, as an act of faith, and should demonstrate that faith by pursuing success in a calling. Attaining that success came to be regarded as a sign that a person was in a state of grace. Calvinism, according to Weber, supplies the moral energy and drive of the capitalist entrepreneur. This is in contrast to a religion such as Confucianism, for example, which set as the ideal the harmonious adjustment of the individual to the established order of things (Munro, 1969).

The link between religion, hard work, and success has a long history in American discourse, reflected in, for example, the lessons of Benjamin Franklin. Franklin, a product of Puritan Boston, was highly influenced by Cotton Mather, who wrote that God approved of business callings and rewarded virtue with wealth (Wyllie, 1954). Franklin's adages, such as "Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and

wise" and "Remember that time is money," reflected a can-do ideology—the idea that one can get ahead on one's own initiative. They also implied that virtues (e.g., industry, frugality, honesty, and integrity) both lead to and reflect success. This ideology, also called utilitarian individualism (Bellah et al., 1985; Spence, 1985), is considered to be a secular version of the Protestant ethic.

Whereas Weber (1904/1958) claimed that by Franklin's time, the religious basis of capitalism had "died away" (p. 180), others have demonstrated a strong link between the church and economic practices. Many Congregational clergy wrote on success, and both clergy and secular writers continued to stress the importance of the secular calling, the pursuit of wealth as a religious duty, the importance of frugality, and the moral superiority of the rich (Wyllie, 1954). De Tocqueville (1840/2000) remarked that, in America, the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom "united intimately with one another: they reigned together on the same soil" (p. 282). More recently, psychologists have commented that religion in U.S. contexts is tied to ideas of personal control and independence (Cohen, Hall, Koenig, & Meador, 2003; Snibbe & Markus, 2002).

Regardless of whether the Protestant ethic endures in a religious or secular form, the ideology continues to influence ideas about the person. Well into the 20th century, "[p]uritanism lingered on, not so much as a search for individual salvation or as a celebration of the virtues of thrift and industry but as a recognition of the dignity of the individual and of his duty to achieve both spiritual and material prosperity" (Commager, 1950, p. 410), so that the Protestant ethic remains one of America's core values (Hsu, 1972). Lamont's (1992) cultural sociological study comparing American and French workers in the 1980s reveals that in the United States, ambition and hard work are seen as central to moral character, that dynamism and energy signal competence, and that hard work and competence are seen as signs of moral purity (at least in upper-middle-class male culture). The Protestant ethic ideology continues to be reflected in American patterns of psychological well-being and attitudes toward work (Plaut et al., 2002; Quinn & Crocker, 1999).

The American Dream. American notions of competence and motivation have also been shaped by the American Dream ideology. The American Dream is a central ideology in American culture and is the cornerstone of American individualism, combining success and self-interest, and promoting the idea that the greatest good is to be as individually successful as possible (Bellah et al., 1985; Hochschild, 1995). This ideology has promoted a perspective of optimism in one's capacity for success and of personal control and determination in achieving success.

The American Dream took root in the promise of "a new world where anything can happen and good things might" (Hochschild, 1995, p. 15). From the colonial period to the present, the United States has been perceived as a land of opportunity and plenty (Potter, 1954), and many immigrants have come with hopes of improving their economic status (Takaki, 1993). The United States has long promoted the idea that it is not where one came from or what one did before that matters, but what one does now: One can shed the past and invent a better future. This emphasis on opportunity, imagining the future, and starting over has been embodied in many American institutions (e.g., western land grants of the 19th century, the Civil Rights Acts), in common practices (e.g., political campaigns run on "change," change management), in cultural artifacts (e.g., Horatio Alger's rags-to-riches stories), and in popular ideas (e.g., the frontier, Manifest Destiny) (McElroy, 1999; Turner, 1920).

A central assumption of the American Dream is that people can remodel themselves if they possess determination; thus, seeking success is under their control. Nineteenth-century guides for success touted maxims such as "*Will* it and it is thine" and "To the man of vigorous will there are few impossibilities" (quoted in Wyllie, 1954, p. 40). More recently, in a 1993 speech, President Clinton remarked: "The American Dream that we were all raised on is a simple but powerful one—if you work hard and play by the rules you should be given a chance to go as far as your God-given ability will take you" (quoted in Hochschild, 1995, p. 18). The American Dream promises that everyone, regardless of ascribed traits, family background, or personal history, may

reasonably seek success through actions and traits under their own control (Hochschild, 1995), and implies that it is important to possess such a mind-set.

In addition, the American Dream ideology's focus on optimism, control, and determination fosters an expectation of success and an association between success and individual satisfaction. Success is central to Americans' self-image, and Americans not only expect or hope to achieve but are also not gracious about failure (Hochschild, 1995; Spindler & Spindler, 1990). De Tocqueville (1840/2000) famously wrote that every American is "devoured by the desire to rise" (p. 599). In a 19th-century business self-help book, Marden wrote, "The Creator made man a success-machine, and failure is as abnormal to him as discord is to harmony" (quoted in Wyllie, 1954, p. 37). Although the American Dream's emphasis on material rewards may seem to suggest that the focus is solely on external contingencies, it is a thoroughly "inside" story. The American Dream involves doing better and getting ahead not just for the sake of material wealth but also out of a sense of personal investment in and commitment to one's work and to personal advancement. Feeling personally satisfied and fulfilled, and that one has "made it," are integral to this ideology.

The American Dream is not just a relic of the past; it is still alive and well. For example, a recent television commercial for the financial services company American Century states, "American determination, American enlightenment, American optimism," while showing a graduate running across a college campus; NBC has entitled a new prime-time drama, *American Dreams*; and multimillionaire Latina singer–actress Jennifer Lopez has recently been called the perfect Horatio Alger story.

Psychological Theorizing

Pragmatism. In psychology, many scholars have channeled independence, the Protestant ethic, and/or the American Dream in their theorizing. For example, Pragmatism, introduced in the early 20th century by James (1978), who built on the work of Pierce, was a highly individualistic philosophy. Pragmatism attempted to make philosophy more

practical, stressing that the meaning of a belief depends on the practical difference it makes in one's life. Thus, Pragmatism emphasized personal experience, the effect of one's thoughts or actions, and changing existing realities. Pragmatism therefore reflected qualities in the American character: "It assigned to each individual, as it were, a leading role in the drama of salvation, gave him a share and a responsibility in making what he held good come true ... and decreed that he succeeded or failed through his own efforts ... [and] emphasized his uniqueness rather than his conformity" (Commager, 1950, p. 95). Pragmatism suggested that people held the future in their own hands and encouraged optimism.

Drives and Needs. Many theories of motivation developed in the United States have conceived of motivation as the internal processes that cause individuals to move toward a goal. For example, Hull (1943), arguably the most influential drive theorist, believed that human behavior could be reduced to the drive—the major underlying instigator of behavior. Also depending on a view of motivation as emanating from within the individual, McClelland and colleagues (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lovell, 1953) developed a theory of motivation based on intrinsic motivational needs. Building on the work of Murray (1938), who developed the concept of achievement motivation and the Thematic Apperception Test, McClelland et al. (1953) distinguished between people high in need for achievement (*n* Ach) and those low in *n* Ach. This theory of achievement motivation captured the spirit of the traditional work ethic (Spence, 1985), and is reminiscent of de Tocqueville's observation that Americans are eaten up with longing to rise.

Self and Psychological Development

Self-Actualization. Although it opposed drive theories and incentive–goal theories, the humanist perspective on motivation also focused on processes within the autonomous individual. According to humanism (e.g., Maslow, 1970; Rogers, 1977), people's actions are influenced by a need for personal growth and fulfillment, and people have free will to determine their destiny. People create

their own perceptions of the world and actively choose their own life experiences. A key concept in humanism is self-actualization, which is thought to be a fundamental need that motivates people to fulfill their potential and is seen as the ultimate level of psychological development. Self-actualization theory has been influential in business, psychotherapy, and education. Perhaps its popularity outside of academic psychology stems in part from its focus on the independent, self-determined, satisfaction-seeking individual, consistent with the American Dream ideology. After all, self-actualization theory regards the individual as capable of overcoming repressive social constraints in order to achieve the highest level of psychological development (Hewitt, 1989). And, although it was influenced in part by Buddhism and Hinduism (Wilson, 1997) and stimulated by a rejection of materialist goals, self-actualization has been referred to as "another facet of unbridled individualism" (Spence, 1985, p. 1290).

Competence, Self-Efficacy, and Control. Theories of competence (White, 1959) and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1997) also hinge on a model of the person as autonomous and in control of his or her environment and actions. White introduced to the study of motivation the notion of "competence," defined as the capacity to interact effectively with the environment. According to White, the motivation needed to attain competence could not come from drives alone and required effectance motivation to produce a feeling of efficacy. The need for efficacy was considered to be a fundamental motive that was highly important in the growth of personality. "Self-efficacy" is defined by Bandura (1997) as "beliefs in one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments" (p. 3). It is perceived as necessary for success. A strong relationship has been established between self-efficacy beliefs and cognitive engagement, academic performance, and persistence (Pintrich & Schrauben, 1992; for a meta-analysis, see Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991).

A vast literature on control has also emerged in psychology. Rotter's (1966) work on locus of control and Weiner's (1985) model of attribution, for example,

center on notions of personal responsibility and beliefs about the individual's ability to control events (Miller, 1996). Research on illusions of control emphasizes the positive consequences of believing that one has control over one's outcomes (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Other work has introduced a distinction between primary and secondary control, the former involving behaviors aimed at changing the world to fit the needs of the individual, and the latter involving behaviors aimed at fitting in with the world (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Heckhausen and Schultz (1995) have claimed that across cultures and history, primary control has functional primacy over secondary control in development, while secondary control takes on a support role.

In response to notions of control as individual and primary, cross-cultural research has suggested some important cultural variation. Some have suggested that that people in East Asian contexts emphasize secondary control more than do people in Western contexts (Gould 1999; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). Others believe that the important distinction is between indirect and direct primary control, and argue that the Japanese evince more indirect primary control, which involves the modification of existing reality not through direct confrontations but by deliberately using tactics that are expected eventually to modify behavior in appropriate directions (Kojima, 1984). Others have suggested that the Japanese meaning of success is control over one's inner state as opposed to achieving control over external circumstances, which is more common in U.S. contexts (Shapiro & Azuma, 2004). Markus and Kitayama (2004) have distinguished between disjoint and conjoint models of agency, with disjoint agency permeating U.S. contexts and conjoint agency occurring more frequently in East Asian contexts. Researchers have also looked at variation within the United States by comparing the models of agency that are prevalent in working-class or high school-educated versus middle-class or college-educated contexts (Snibbe & Markus, in press).

Self-Determination and Intrinsic Motivation. A class of theories of motivation has rested on the assumption that human beings

have an inborn need to exert mastery, or control, over their external environment (deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975). It is generally assumed that these innate intrinsic motives serve as the milieu out of which springs intrinsic motivation (Spence, 1985). According to Spence, the belief in the intrinsic value of work is a permutation of the Protestant work ethic. This view encourages the notion that work should be engaged in primarily because it is inherently satisfying, and it assigns greater value to intrinsic than to extrinsic motivation.

Researchers have constructed a dichotomy between motivation that comes from internal as opposed to external sources and have repeatedly demonstrated that external sources can undermine intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). According to cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1980), events that negatively affect a person's experience of autonomy or competence diminish intrinsic motivation, whereas events that support perceived autonomy and competence enhance intrinsic motivation. To the degree that the controlling aspect of an external reward is salient, the reward will undermine intrinsic motivation because of the perceived external locus of causality (deCharms, 1968), which is the sense that the behavior stems from a source outside the self. Furthermore, according to self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), external goals and rewards (e.g., social recognition and money) can provide only indirect satisfaction of basic psychological needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence. And focusing on external cues and contingencies as the basis for regulating behavior instead of on internal needs and feelings can have significant personal and interpersonal costs (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Decades of research indeed have revealed that people (at least in U.S. contexts) are most motivated when able to initiate and direct their own behavior (Condry, 1977; Rotter, 1966). Choice and control have been found to affect intrinsic motivation positively (Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Deci & Ryan, 1985). In contrast, removing choice (Brehm, 1966; Wicklund, 1974) or imposing someone else's choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999) has been shown to affect intrinsic motivation negatively.

COMPETING STORIES:
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES

Models of competence and motivation are not merely cultural construals used to interpret behavior after it has occurred. Rather, they are lived; that is, they are institutionalized and given a material form, thereby structuring behavior. For example, in the American novels of the must-read humanities canon, the heroes are most often those who show competence and motivation, American style. Their competence and motivation spring from private, internal stores, and they are capable of standing out from the group and going their own way. Many educational practices, such as testing and ability tracking, also reflect the commitments of these models, and play a role in identifying and fostering competence and motivation as personal, internal entities. People live their lives in terms of the blueprints provided by these models, thereby making them reality (Adams & Markus, 2004). If people's worlds are set up in such a way as to foster a particular model of competence and motivation, then, on average, the behavioral tendencies of many people engaged with these contexts will reflect that model. Through people's actions, which reproduce the model, the inside story becomes the real story and the true story.

Yet the inside story is a particular one, a historically and socioculturally specific one. In other contexts, there are other models of competence and motivation. A growing number of empirical studies carried out in contexts other than European and American ones reveal patterns of behavior that reflect these different models. Major dimensions of cultural variation include whether achievement is considered to be individual or social; how self-efficacy relates to performance; perceptions of the roles of effort and ability in success; the relationship between choice, control, and intrinsic motivation; and styles of competence and acknowledgment of different styles.

Achievement: An Individual
or Social Construct?

Empirical evidence suggests that cultural contexts differ in the extent to which people seek more affiliative, or social, as opposed to individual goals. This line of inquiry arose, in part, in response to the need for achievement literature that was prevalent in the 1960s and deemed to reflect individualistic achievement values (Salili, 1996). In the subsequent three decades, researchers have explored cross-cultural differences in the achievement construct, arguing that this construct takes on different meanings in different cultures, and that it is important to understand these sociocultural variations (Fryans, Salili, Maehr, & Desai, 1983; Maehr, 1974; Niles, 1998).

Divergent Goals: Individual versus Social

Research in this area has generally revealed more individual-oriented achievement motivation in U.S. and other Western contexts than in Asian and Latin American contexts, where a socially oriented motivation is more prevalent. For example, Japanese and Native Hawaiians have been found to associate achievement with goals of affiliation and social belonging more than with individual goals (De Vos, 1973; Gallimore, Boggs, & Jordan, 1974). Research in India also has revealed more emphasis on group-related goals than on individual ones (Agrawal & Misra, 1987; Singhal & Misra, 1989). Similarly, Niles (1998) found Sri Lankan adults to be more family- and group-oriented in their achievement goals than Australians, although Sri Lankans were also found to have important individual goals. In a study comparing Chinese and Australian gymnasts, the Chinese rated affiliation motivations as more important than did the Australians (Kirkby, Kolt, & Liu, 1999). In a review of learning style and achievement orientation in Asian contexts, Salili (1996) argued that socially oriented achievement motivation is more common in Asian than in Western cultures because of cultural differences in attitudes toward learning and education; for Asian students, success is defined in terms of recognition and smooth social relationships. In Japanese contexts, "success only for oneself has been considered a sign of excessive, immoral egoism" (De Vos, 1973, p. 181).

Some research suggests that individual and social motivation may be more entangled in Asian than in U.S. contexts, where affiliative and individualistic achievements are seen as mutually exclusive. In a study of university students in the Philippines and in the United States, Church and Katigbak (1992) found a closer relationship between intrinsic task motives and affiliative motives in the Filipino than in the American sample. They suggested that school is a more interpersonal experience for Filipinos, and that need for achievement and for affiliation are more intertwined in Filipino contexts. Similarly, Salili (1994) found that for Chinese adult students, affiliative and individualistic achievement were closely related.

These types of differences have also been examined within the United States. Results of one study revealed that Mexican American and black subjects scored higher on family achievement than did Anglo subjects (Ramirez & Price-Williams, 1976). "Family achievement" was defined as goals from which the family would benefit or that would gain recognition from family members. Notably, Mexican American and black subjects emphasized both family and individual achievement, indicating that, in some cultural contexts, the achievement for purposes of self and family are not considered contradictory. In some U.S. minority contexts, achievement may be pursued for the purpose of family and peer-group solidarity and identification, rather than, or in addition to, individual and independent attainment (Gallimore et al., 1974; Ramirez & Price-Williams, 1976). According to Fryberg and Markus (2004), learning in American Indian settings reflects a concern with family and with community relationality.

Pleasing Parents and Family Pressure

Research in this area has also revealed that pleasing parents, parental pressure, and responsibility felt toward one's family are strong motivations for achievement in Asian and Latino contexts. Azuma (1994) observed that pleasing the mother was one of top three reasons Japanese fifth graders gave for doing well on tests. Similarly, Salili and Ching (1992, cited in Salili, 1996) found that when they asked Chinese students to rate their reasons for working hard, both low and high achievers rated pleasing parents as the most important reason. In an investigation of Asian American students' success in high school, Reglin and Adams (1990) found Asian American high school students to be more influenced by their parents' desire for success than were their non-Asian counterparts. The authors argued that, for Asian American students, perceived parental desire for success creates pressure to achieve, motivating them to spend more time on homework. In examining Asian children's adaptation to U.S. schools, Hirayama (1985) argued that parents emphasize the welfare of the family as a whole, and children assume the moral burden of succeeding for the whole family.

Similar observations have been made about the role of the family in Latin American and Latino contexts. For example, Mexican children feel responsible for the honor of the entire family, and Central American refugee students whose families have experienced misfortune in coming to the United States feel both guilt and responsibility (Suarez-Orozco, 1987). Trueba and Delgado-Gaitan (1985) have argued that education-relevant motivations change as immigrant children learn different motivations in U.S. schools, such as competition and individualism.

Predicting Achievement

Cultural variation has also surfaced in predicting achievement. In one study, need for affiliation, rather than need for achievement, predicted reading achievement for Native Hawaiians (Gallimore, 1974). Another study revealed that qualities found to be predictive of achievement in U.S. samples, such as high mastery, high work orientation, and low competitiveness, did not predict academic achievement in Fijians (Basow, 1984). Fryberg and Markus (2004) found that self-ratings of interdependence predicted grades for American Indian high school students but not for European American high school students.

Feelings of Competence and Self-Efficacy:
Tied to Performance and Persistence?

Relationship between Performance
and Self-Efficacy, Competence,
and Fear of Failure

The link between self-efficacy and performance that is strong in North American contexts, and that reflects and promotes the incorporation of the inside story, does not

obtain in Asian and Asian American contexts. One study revealed that although Taiwanese children rated themselves significantly lower on perceived competence than American children, they outperformed the Americans academically (Stigler, Smith, & Mao, 1985). In a similar study, Kwok (1995) found that Chinese children downgraded their competence, as compared with Canadian children. Eaton and Dembo (1997) examined differences in motivational beliefs and performance on a word unscrambling task among Asian American and non-Asian (mostly Anglo) ninth graders. While Asian American students reported lower levels of self-efficacy beliefs, they outperformed their non-Asian counterparts. Similarly, Whang and Hancock (1994) found that Asian American students scored higher than non-Asian students on standardized math tests but reported lower self-concepts for mathematical ability relative to non-Asian students. According to Eaton and Dembo (1997), Asian Americans focus less on self-efficacy, or perceptions of capability to complete a task, and more on the importance of excelling at a task. In contrast, non-Asian children in U.S. contexts may overestimate their abilities. Children in these contexts are encouraged to maintain self-esteem regardless of their academic performance, which may contribute to self-protective illusions, or overestimating one's competencies relative to actual performance (Oettingen, Little, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 1994; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Whereas self-efficacy concerns individuals in non-Asian U.S. contexts, failure seems to weigh on the minds of individuals in Asian contexts. In a study by Steinberg, Dornbusch, and Brown (1992), Asian American students showed simultaneously the highest academic achievement and the highest fear of failure. Eaton and Dembo (1997), in the same study described earlier, discovered that fear of the consequence of academic failure best explained the performance of Asian American participants but least explained results for non-Asian students. Their main explanation for these findings relates to the previous discussion of parental pressure: Fear of academic failure stems from Asian American parental stress on academic success for their children (Siu, 1992).

*Self-Enhancing versus
Self-Improving Motivations*

Whether self-efficacy is tied to motivation may depend on whether motivation centers on enhancing the self, reflective of an internal, individualistic model of motivation, or on improving the self and meeting expected standards, reflective of a more relational model. In a study of Filipino and American university students, for example, Church and Katigbak (1992) found that approval and self-improvement motives ranked higher for Filipino college students than for American students. Similarly, Heine et al. (2001) tested the hypothesis that Japanese students focus more on self-improving motivations, while North American students focus more on self-enhancing motivations. Results confirmed their hypothesis: North Americans persisted more on a creativity task after success than after failure, whereas Japanese persisted more after failure than after success. Moreover, North Americans, but not Japanese, were more likely to view creativity as important for life success if they had done well, while Japanese were more likely to view creativity as important for life success if they had done poorly. Finally, North Americans felt better after success than did Japanese. The authors concluded that although individuals in both cultures want to do their best, North Americans pursue this goal by focusing on their strengths, while Japanese pursue this goal by focusing on their shortcomings. Oishi and Diener (2003) likewise found that European Americans' choice of a second task was based on how well they thought they had done on an earlier task, but this did not hold for Asian Americans. Furthermore, choice was related to more enjoyment of the second task for the European Americans, but not for the Asian Americans.

If one is interested in self-advancement, one will work harder to stick out, which is more common in American cultural contexts. In contrast, if self-improvement is the goal, one will work harder to avoid sticking out, which is more prevalent in Asian cultural contexts. In these contexts, fulfilling role obligations may be a more salient goal, requiring more attention to meet a minimum standard than to surpass the standard (Su et al., 1999).

**Perceived Determinants
of Success: Ability or Effort?**

If an individual assumes that motivation is linked to actualizing one's potential and displaying one's ability, as is more common in American contexts, then he or she most likely will view ability as relatively fixed and most predictive of success (Heine et al., 2001). However, if one believes that motivation is linked to discovering shortcomings and correcting them, as is more prevalent in Japanese contexts, one most likely will view ability as malleable and may believe that effort plays a larger role in determining success than does innate ability. Heine et al. tested the hypothesis that cultures differ in their emphasis on entity versus incremental theories and found cultural variation on the Beliefs in Incremental Abilities Scale. This scale asked participants to respond to concrete behavioral scenarios (e.g., "Imagine that Michelle, a sophomore, scored the highest grade in her history class. Only knowing this about Michelle, please do your best to estimate what percentage of her performance in the class was due to her natural-born ability and how much was due to her effort and studying"). The Japanese believed that abilities were more incremental (i.e., more effort-based) than did European Americans. Moreover, on an item that asked what percentage of intelligence is due to natural ability versus effort, European Americans reported on average that 36% was due to effort, Japanese reported 55%, and Asian Americans reported 45%.

Although implicit theories of intelligence are conceptualized primarily as an individual difference construct (e.g., see Dweck & Leggett, 1988), it seems likely that they will also vary by cultural context, insofar as models of competence and motivation also vary. Moreover, if an incremental view predominates, tasks will likely be understood as reflecting process (e.g., effort), and performance will not likely be linked with underlying traits and self-worth. If an entity view prevails, however, tasks will likely be understood as measuring permanent intelligence (e.g., intelligence tests in the United States) and achievement. Empirical observations indicate that Japanese and Chinese respondents' beliefs about achievement outcomes center primarily on effort, while American respondents assign more importance to ability (Lewis, 1995; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992; White, 1987). Thus, one reason for Hiroki's teachers' surprise at the Americans' insistence that he was gifted, as described earlier, is that in Japanese contexts, "the notion that children's success and failure and their potential to become successful versus failed adults has more to do with effort and character and thus with what can be learned and taught in school than with raw inborn ability" (Tobin et al., 1989, p. 24).

Research on attributions for academic achievement also has suggested cultural variation in perceptions of the importance of ability and effort, with individuals in U.S. contexts generally seeing ability as the primary determinant of success, and individuals in Asian contexts attributing academic success and failure to effort (Holloway, 1988; Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). In one study, American undergraduate and graduate students attributed academic achievement significantly more often to ability than did Asian (Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Southeast Asian) students (Yan & Gaier, 1994). American students also believed that effort was more important for success than lack of effort was for failure, whereas Asian students believed effort to be equally important for success and failure. Hess, Chang, and McDevitt (1987) compared the attributions of Chinese mothers living in China, Chinese American mothers, and Caucasian American mothers. Whereas Chinese mothers in China viewed lack of effort as the major cause of their children's low performance, Caucasian American mothers attributed least to effort and distributed responsibility more evenly across the options. Chinese American mothers also viewed lack of effort as important but assigned considerable responsibility to other sources. Holloway, Kashiwagi, Hess, and Azuma (1986) examined attributions for math performance by Japanese and American mothers and children. Whereas American mothers and children emphasized ability, Japanese respondents emphasized effort, particularly when assessing low performance.

Studies also show that Americans support rewarding people for their accomplishments rather than for their efforts

(Hochschild, 1995). In Japanese cultural contexts, on the other hand, the process is just as important as the outcome and must involve *gambaru*, which means working hard and persisting (White, 1987). In work by Mashima, Shapiro, and Azuma (1998), 70% of Americans described success or failure in terms of achieving some effortful goal, in contrast with only 29% of Japanese. Instead, Japanese described the internal process of exerting effort, without mentioning whether the final outcome had been achieved.

Research indicates that although individuals in American and Asian contexts use the categories of effort and ability to understand achievement, the meaning and relationship of these categories differs (Miller, 1996). For example, whereas in U.S. contexts, ability and effort are perceived as having a compensatory relationship, in Chinese contexts, they are often seen as being positively related, implying that ability can be increased through effort (Hong, 2001; Salili, 1996). Under Chinese models of competence and motivation, "people working hard have higher ability and those who have high ability must have worked hard" (Salili & Hau, 1994, p. 233).

Intrinsic Motivation: Personal Choice and Control Required?

Theories of achievement motivation developed in U.S. and other Western contexts generally have been based on individualism, emphasizing personal choice and responsibility (Miller, 1996; Spence, 1985). In so doing, these theories have also contributed to the development and perpetuation of the inside story. Under the predominant model of motivation, controlling one's environment, self-determination, and freedom of choice are associated with higher intrinsic motivation, whereas feelings of being controlled can decrease intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). The relationship between intrinsic motivation and control may assume a different form in cultural contexts in which alternative models of motivation prevail—ones that stress indirect or secondary modes of control, relational sources of control, tolerance, and flexibility (e.g., see Weisz et al., 1984).

Internal and External Sources of Control

Iyengar and Lepper (1999) questioned the assumption that intrinsic motivation and the provision of individual choice and self-determination go hand in hand by examining the relationship between choice and motivation across cultures. In one study, Anglo American and Asian American grade-school children were asked to work on an anagrams task. Anglo American children performed best and spent more time working on the anagrams when they chose which anagrams they would work on for themselves, while Asian American children performed best and spent more time working on the anagrams when they thought that their mothers had chosen the anagrams for them. Iyengar and Lepper obtained similar results when children were told that an outgroup (children at another school) or ingroup (their own classmates) had made the selections.

Asian American children may perform best and appear to enjoy tasks most when valued ingroup members choose for them, because of the different models of motivation that permeate their cultural contexts. It is not surprising that children are more motivated by "what Mom thinks" in a cultural context that stresses the relational nature of motivation than in one that stresses the independent, internal sources of motivation. Moreover, boundaries between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are culturally defined (Iyengar & Brockner, 2001; Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Iyengar and Lepper note that in American society, if someone behaves in order to please someone else or conform to their ideals, then that behavior is viewed as extrinsically motivated (deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975). In East Asian settings, external sources of motivation may not inherently contradict or interfere with internal motives. For example, Church and Katigbak (1992) found a closer relationship between intrinsic task motives and affiliative motives among Filipino than among American university students. Salili, Chiu, and Lai (2001) observed that in Chinese cultural contexts, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation may work side by side. According to Tweed and Lehman (2002), in Chinese contexts, external goals, such as social recognition, are positively associated with mastery goals,

suggesting that the Confucian emphasis on pragmatic learning does not preclude learning-related goals.

Practices of Choice and Control

Different cultural contexts also provide varying degrees of opportunity for exercising choice and control. For example, whereas in American contexts, choice may figure prominently in daily life, having and making choices is not part of a students' normal daily routine in Japanese contexts (Lewis, 1995). Instead, conforming to the preferences of a social group or adjusting to others is more prevalent. Furthermore, according to Tweed and Lehman (2002), the Socratic approach to learning common in Western cultures is associated with a desire for self-directed tasks, but cultures that stress Confucian approaches to learning may not foster self-determination to the same extent. A recent study by Morling, Kitayama, and Miyamoto (2002) examined cultural variation in the affordance of direct control. They asked Americans and Japanese to describe actual social situations in which "you have influenced or changed the surrounding people, events, or objects according to your own wishes" or in which "you have adjusted yourself to surrounding people, objects and events." Respondents also indicated when the events had occurred. Americans recounted more recent influencing events than adjusting events, but Japanese recounted more recent adjusting than influencing events.

The inside story, although common in American cultural contexts, is not uniformly distributed across social settings. For example, studies find that people in working-class contexts are less likely to be acting upon the world by expressing their own preferences through choice, and are perhaps more likely to be adjusting to the world by conforming to relational norms and meeting obligations (Kusserow, 1999; Lamont, 2000). As a result, working-class participants may respond differently to choice than do middle-class participants. For example, Snibbe and Markus (in press) examined social class differences in personal choice within the United States. Results indicated that college-educated participants, but not high school-educated participants, like an object better if they have chosen it themselves.

Competence: Competing Perspectives?
Different Styles of Competence

Models of competence and motivation can also be linked to the styles of thinking that pervade a cultural context (Cole & Scribner, 1974; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Consistent with the more relational models in Eastern cultures, holistic or relational–contextual thought predominates in these cultures. In holistic thought, there is greater attention to the field in which objects are embedded. In contrast, and consistent with the inside story, an analytic approach to the world is more characteristic of Western cultures. Analytic thought emphasizes paying attention primarily to the object and to the categories to which it belongs. For example, Ji and Nisbett (2001) examined Chinese and American participants' use of relationships versus categories as bases for grouping objects together. They found that Chinese participants were more likely to group objects on the basis of relationship (e.g., "Because the sun is in the sky"), while Americans were more likely to group objects on the basis of category or shared object features ("Because the sun and the sky are both in the heavens"). In a study by Masuda and Nisbett (2001), which also examined cultural variation in thinking styles, Japanese and American students saw animated vignettes of underwater scenes. Subsequently, they were shown figures that had either been previously seen or not seen, and that were either in their original setting or in some other setting. Japanese students recognized previously presented figures more accurately when seen with the original background than with the new background, whereas the latter manipulation had no effect on American subjects.

Awareness of Difference

Within American contexts, some researchers who focus on explaining differences between ethnic and racial groups in academic performance achievement motivation have drawn attention to the role of the context in perfor-

mance (Jones, 1999; Markus, Steele, & Steele, 2001; Steele, 1997). Mainstream contexts typically inscribe the ideas and practices of the majority. Thus, those who examine these contexts from the perspective of the minority are often in a good position to see the context, which is often invisible to the majority. The mainstream context can facilitate performance for some and impair it for others. Without acknowledging that the context of learning and motivation may differ for those in the majority and those in the minority, explaining the gap among students and employees from different backgrounds in terms of internal factors can seem reasonable. And historically, researchers have pursued this exact explanatory path, thereby continually reinforcing the inside story. Even social psychologists have leaned toward explanations that focus on internal basic processes. As Steele and Sherman (1999) argue, despite the initial impact of Lewin's theoretical formulations, researchers have paid relatively little attention to "the 'life-space' contexts of people's lives—their socioeconomic position in society, their position in a family, their group identities, the cultures they are immersed in, the status they enjoy, the stigmas they endure, and the opportunities and resources they possess" (pp. 393–394).

Charting the particulars of the relevant contexts reveals, for example, that those in the majority, compared to those in the minority (e.g., white students compared to black students in a predominantly white school), are not in the same context. They are often assumed by teachers, principals, and other students to be able to succeed, and they are expected to succeed. Furthermore, whites are likely to have benefited from contexts with relatively better schools and more prepared teachers, to have better educated parents, and to live in homes and neighborhoods with more school-relevant resources (Lamont & Lareau, 1988; Ogbu, 1991). Whites also are relatively free from a whole concert of negative stereotypes and limiting evaluations that are often associated with minority groups in academic contexts (Crocker & Major, 1989). Steele and colleagues (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) found that if negative stereotypes of academic ability of black students are present in a context, then even well-qualified black students can experience a threat to

their identity and perform less well than they do in a context free of these stereotypes. Seen from the point of view of the minority, many elements of the context and its potential impact on competence and motivation are in relatively high relief.

Given the prevalence of the inside story in mainstream American cultural contexts, majority members are less likely to notice how the context may be more supportive and less toxic for them than it is for those in the minority. Since the scaffolding provided by the supportive social context is rarely delineated, especially when the context is supportive and affirming, the inside story gains credibility. Competence and motivation are seen to stem from their internal traits and properties. The ways in which the assumptions, expectations, representations, and practices of the context afford the inside view are hidden. For majority learners or observers in a majority context, it is as if they were "born on third base" (with all of its relative advantages), yet believe, thanks to the automatic engagement of the inside cultural model, that they have "hit a triple."

Most American mainstream educational contexts, while seemingly fostering a "general" or "basic" model of education, promote mainstream or European American ideas and practices of education (Bruner, 1996). Students who have been socialized according to this model may have an important, yet largely unseen, advantage over those with very different frameworks of understandings relevant to education and competence. For example, Fryberg and Markus (2004) found that education in American Indian contexts involves fostering a trusting relationship between student and teacher. Yet schooling, as practiced in mainstream settings, focuses on the autonomous, independent individual and may be experienced as threatening to valued relationships. Oyserman, Gant, and Ager (1995) found that, whereas for white students, achievement is related to individualism and the Protestant work ethic, for blacks, it is related to collectivism and ethnic identity. A reasonable congruence between the models that the student invokes and the models that are predominant in the student's school setting is likely to facilitate academic success, while a lack of congruence may decrease the likelihood of such success.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As with all psychological phenomena, competence and motivation are multiply afforded and maintained. Surely, both individual differences in capacities identified as internal, as well as differences in individual engagements with the social context, will prove to be significant in the analysis of competence and motivation. The main point of the chapter, however, is that the story of being smart and motivated in America has been, and continues to be, primarily an inside story. It is an inside story, not because the weight of the evidence overwhelmingly supports this perspective, but because the inside understanding of competence and motivation fits like Cinderella's slipper to the predominant cultural model of behavior. When parents, teachers, and employees seek to explain variation in competence and motivation, they most commonly look to what is believed to be inside the person—to an entity or a set of entities, or to a force or energy that powers and controls behavior. Whether these entities or forces are presumed to be innately given faculties or the result of effort and persistent engagement with the relevant tasks, they are believed to reside inside the person and to be subject to individual, willful control.

Given the historical and ideological foundations of the American and European contexts in which these theories have developed, peering inward is natural and obvious. In individualistic cultures that prize, above all, freedom (both freedom from the constraint of others and the freedom to express one's self through choice and control), it is unthinkable to locate the sources of positive, desirable behavioral tendencies (those associated with achievement and success) anywhere but inside the person. Many analyses of competence and motivation then quite reasonably seek and find these phenomena or processes within the person. Given the ideological landscape and the extensive system of practices and institutions that accord these ideas a real and objective status, the relative underdevelopment of a social or relational understanding of competence and motivation is hardly surprising. A collective preference for a view of the actor as independently mastering the environment obscures the potential role of the social context.

Our argument is that the inside model is prominent and powerful, not that it is the only model of competence and motivation that has been theorized in American and European contexts. Certainly, the role of the social context, particularly the expectations of others, has been explored. However, these views are swimming upstream against a dense and forceful flow of meanings and practices, both in science and in the everyday world, and these more social views of competence and motivation have not caught on and have not stuck. Our review of the literature reveals that in contexts in which the person is regarded as an interdependent part of an encompassing social network, the social nature of competence and motivation is decidedly more obvious and natural. Our review of these studies serves primarily to underscore that the prevalent, implicit cultural models in a given context shape the scientific search, analysis, and interpretation strategies in ways that are important to identify and delineate. As a science, have we searched for the sources of competence and motivation and found them "inside" because they are there, or have we searched where the cultural spotlight is brightest?

Is it a problem that an "it's what's inside that counts" cultural context has "it's what's inside that counts" theories and practices of competence and motivation? Our view is that it is a problem if the scientific goal is to develop a comprehensive human psychology, not a particular or a partial one. Socially and practically, within European and American contexts, it matters because, as a growing number of empirical studies suggest, the social context is important for competence and motivation, but this may be the case particularly for those outside mainstream contexts—those who engage or have engaged in cultural contexts different from the middle-class European American one— and for those who have been historically marginalized and excluded from full participation in mainstream contexts. For these individuals, failures to manifest competence or motivation may result from different understandings and approaches to motivation, but they are often immediately explained with inside accounts (e.g., these people are stupid or lazy). The role of the context, as well as the potential mismatch between the prevalent models in a context and those that stu-

dents or employees bring with them, may be relatively invisible and unidentified. To be competent and motivated in a given context requires behaving in a culturally appropriate manner. Those who are motivated by friends and family more than by their own interests may be judged as followers; those who are very receptive to others, and to relations with others, may be seen as dependent and uncreative; those who criticize rather than enhance themselves may be judged as unmotivated or may not be noticed at all. Moreover, those who expect that a positive and effective context is an interdependent, relational one may not respond well in contexts requiring separation, independence, and relative autonomy from others. Finally, failures to manifest competence and motivation that arise because people are required to contend with the pressure of being stereotyped, devalued, and otherwise limited may go completely undetected. Under the influence of the inside model, those in this predicament may be readily labeled as incompetent or unmotivated.

The situation of Hiroki, whom Americans judged as gifted and Japanese judged as unintelligent, is a powerful reminder of the importance of explicitly examining the prevailing implicit cultural models of competence and motivation. What does it mean to be competent or motivated in this situation? What is the source of this understanding? Does the arrangement of classrooms and workplaces foster one model of competence and motivation at the expense of others? Who is privileged by this arrangement of the context, and who is disadvantaged? What is missing in many European American contexts is the idea that competence and motivation arise from complex, dynamic relations between people and their social environment. Enriching the inside story with a more social view will serve to generate more competence and motivation. The inside story, while a best-seller, is not the full story, and it leaves a lot of competence and motivation on the shelf.

NOTE

1. When we refer to "American" or "American style," we mean pertaining to "mainstream" U.S. cultural contexts and to those who have engaged with dominant, middle-class U.S. ideas and practices and participated in U.S. institutions. Depending on the literature being reviewed or the studies being portrayed, in some places, we use the term "European American" to denote Americans of European descent, and "Anglo" to mean Americans of British descent. By "Western," we mean from countries that are culturally Western, most of which are located in Europe and North America, and have been strongly influenced by Greek and Roman culture and Christianity.

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CULTURE: DYNAMIC PROCESSES

CHAPTER 26

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Cultural Competence

Dynamic Processes

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The rapid increase in global interconnectedness has created a pressing demand for a model of cultural competence in many areas, including management, medical professions, counseling, social services, and education (e.g., Bernal & Castro, 1994; Sue, 1998). Experts in the field have different opinions on what "cultural competence" is, despite the strong agreement on its importance (Cunningham, Foster, & Henggeler, 2002). Most practitioners believe that cultural competence involves self-understanding, knowledge of others whose cultural origins and values are different from one's own, and adapting one's own behaviors to the needs of culturally diverse groups (e.g., Hansen, Pepitone-Arreola-Rockwell, & Greene, 2000). However, little is known about the roles of awareness, knowledge, and skills in enabling people to function effectively in a variety of cultures.

In this chapter, drawing on recent research in cultural and cross-cultural psychology, we offer a framework for conceptualizing the nature of cultural competence, and for identifying its major components. We also discuss the relationships between multicultural experiences and cultural competence, and the implications of our conceptual framework for studying the psychology of culture.

THE NATURE OF CULTURAL COMPETENCE

There is a lesson that cultural competence researchers can learn from the social competence literature. In his seminal paper, Edward Thorndike (1920) defined "social competence" as a kind of intelligence analogous to abstract academic intelligence. Whereas abstract academic intelligence is "the ability to understand and manage ideas and symbols," social intelligence is "the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and girls—to act wisely in human relations" (p. 228). Inspired by Thorndike's idea, numerous attempts have been made by researchers to identify the specific expertise and skills (e.g., expertise in decoding communicative behaviors, expertise in judging people, tacit knowledge about