The Magnificence of the Disaster

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Reasonable "speed bump" or Security and Privacy Nightmare?

First4Internet surreptitiously installed a rootkit

SunnComm installed over user's rejection monitored and phoned home contrary to eula created backdoor (privilege escalation vulnerability)

Installers backdoor allowed drive-by downloads of code

Anatomy of a disaster

- Standard technology: Autorun
- Standard disclosures (for the most part)
- Lack of concern for externalities
- Users hampered by lack of usable privacy and security
- Security researchers hampered by law

Why did this happen? Why hide software?

Why bury terms?

Why create security holes?

Status quo, technology, & law



Digital Copying for Personal Use

CDs DVDs

Expectations can become entrenched

Resilient Expectations

Disaster Avoidance

Disclosures

standardized, shorter, timing, manner

Limits

Costs of externalities = some exchanges should be prohibited

Containment and escape need for sandboxes, virtual machines and uninstall

Lines of Defense

Security Researchers

Accountability (liability) for security risks

Usable Privacy and Security

What's at stake?

drm facilitated offerings

End to end principle

Partners

Aaron Perzanowski (on this paper and on DMCA rulemaking and client advice)

Jens Grossklags and Nathan Good on experimental research on notices

Noticing Notice: A Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License Agreements (Good, Grossklags, Mulligan, Konstan) CHI 2007