
What Can be Expected of Government in Supporting the U.S. Mortgage Market?

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Crisis: Challenges and Solutions to the Mortgage
Meltdown**

Government Interventions in the U.S. Mortgage Market

- ◆ The failure of government to regulate the GSEs and bank mortgage operations is not encouraging for government activity in the U.S. mortgage market.
- ◆ Nevertheless, there is strong advocacy for government interventions to moderate the crisis and to restart the mortgage market:
 - Public policies to expand mortgage modifications;
 - Policies to control predatory lending/securitization;
 - Longer-term government guarantees to replace the GSE role for conforming mortgages.

Positive Case for Mortgage Modification: Commercial Mortgages

- ◆ The owner of a half-occupied office building can expect a friendly loan modification from the bank:
 - The bank recognizes that rental income is the only source for loan payments—no recourse.
 - The rent rolls are objective and verifiable.
 - Other owners with fully occupied buildings cannot pretend to require similar modifications.
- ◆ Bottom line: commercial mortgage modifications are often the best alternative facing the bank.

Residential Mortgage Modifications are Vastly More Difficult

- ◆ It is impossible to control a borrower's cash flow decisions, past, current, and future.
 - Modifying loans for borrowers unable to make payments encourages more borrowers to default.
 - Modifying loans when borrowers are making payments is basically a gift.
 - Modifying loans is also a gift to 2nd lien holders.
 - Modified loans have high relapse rates.
- ◆ “Win-win” applies to a limited number of loans.

The Current Policy Role of the GSEs and FHA in Loan Mods

- ◆ GSEs/FHA are urged/required to modify (HAMP) or refinance (HARP). Since guarantees, no new costs.
 - Concern these actions eradicate fraud claims.
 - GSEs now have higher risk charges.
 - GSEs/FHA pay subsidy costs, face future losses.
 - Investors, including Government, lose on refis.
 - Principal forbearance > principal forgiveness.
 - Issues noted for private investor modifications—
2nd liens, etc.--apply here as well.

The Moral Hazard of Securitization

- ◆ Sheila Bair:
“All along the chain of securitization—from originators, to securities underwriters and rating agencies to investor and regulators—insufficient attention was paid to both safety and sound and basic consumer protection.”
- ◆ Argument fails when investors at end of the line are the world’s largest and most sophisticated firms.
- ◆ This is only case of failed securitization in 30 years.
- ◆ Dodd-Frank 5% risk retention requires banks to hold more risk. Contradicts securitization goal.

Predatory Lending and Predatory Foreclosures are a Different Matter

- ◆ Predatory lending is now regulated under the Fed's July 2008 additions to the Truth in Lending Regs. Key is new suitability requirements. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may expand further.
- ◆ Predatory foreclosures remain open issue:
 - Judicial foreclosure rules were created for a good purpose over 100 years ago.
 - If banks felt they were archaic, they should have appealed for changes, not simply circumvented the intent.

Mortgage Reform: The Feb. 2011 Treasury White Paper

- ◆ GSEs to be closed down over the next 5 to 7 years with lower conforming limits, higher guarantee fees.
- ◆ Retain FHA/HUD programs for low income borrowers.
- ◆ Three Options on how to replace GSEs:
 - Option 1 replaces GSEs with fully private markets.
 - Option 2 adds FHA backstop for future crises.
 - Option 3 has more complete government insurance.
- ◆ I favor plans 1 or 2: Private markets can work; Government insurance will fail.

Two Positive Final Thoughts

- ◆ Recycle foreclosed homes as rental properties:
 - Ken Rosen and Lew Ranieri have one plan.
 - New Fed White Paper strongly endorses idea.
- ◆ Redesign mortgage contract:
 - For principal reductions on existing loans, provide lender with “appreciation strip” for future appreciation.
 - For new mortgages, have loan balance adjust automatically to house price index changes.