DRIGINAL

Transcript of Proceedings

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH

SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON

AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS

Bethesda, Maryland

Friday, 19 May 1972

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
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	1	<u>P</u> <u>ROCEEDINGS</u>	
×.	2	DR. GROMMERS: Can you hear me this morning?	
	3	(Laughter.)	
	4	I have been doing some thinking about why we seem	
	5	to be having some kind of problem. It is a very action-oriented	
	6	group and as I talked to each of you in small groups, everyone	
	7	is ready to go.	
	8	I think most people are feeling a little anxious	
	9	that we are not doing something that we have not yet organized	
	10	in order to do something. I am trying to figure out why.	
	11	I might just throw out for your thought about it, because	
	12	you will see where it has led me, I think the problem lies	
	13	in our identity as a committee and I was thinking about what	
	14	kind of a committee were we.	
	15	. We could have been either a task force of experts	
	16	or a lay body with no information; and if we had been chosen	
	17	as a task force, then our job might have been to each of us	
	18	bring to the issues all the information that we have had in	
~	19	our past experience, develop a set of issues, develop a set	
	20	of actions and make a report to the Secretary.	
-	21	If we were constituted as a lay body with no infor-	
	22	mation, we would obviously have to have a great deal more	
	23	information than I have, at any rate, in order to come up with	
r Fortune	24	a set of issues and \mathbf{a}_{i} set of policy recommendations.	
ue ~ Federal Reporters	, Inc. 25	I suggest we are in the middle, that some of us have	

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an expertise, we have been thinking about these processes and 1 problems for a long time in a narrow sense. Some of us have 2 been thinking about them in a broad sense. One of the prob-3 lems we have in communicating with each other is we still do 4 not know each other well enough to know just where we sit. 5 I have had some experience teaching people who 6 know nothing about computers, doctors, how to use the MIT 7 Time Sharing System, and it has taken about three months before 8 they have really gotten a good feeling of how to use the com-9 puter and what the potential is. I would guess that a number 10 of us who have no experience with computers, it would take 11 about three months to really understand what is the technical 12 problem that we are talking about.

As far as I am concerned, I do not know how long 14 it would take me to learn enough about the law and enough about, 15 for example, I just found out yesterday that because I applied 16 for an American Express Card, that I am in that credit rating 17 You guess that I should have known that, but I really system. 18 did not appreciate that. I suppose there are a lot of other 19 pieces of information of the same sort that I would be learning 20 as we proceed through this committee. 21

I would like to suggest that the way we act, and I 22 am throwing this out for your reaction, that we act as a lay 23 body, that we pretend that we do not have any information about 24 what the issues are, and that we use our expertise to develop 25

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that set of information that we ought to have, and therefore, 1 we will act as a surrogate for the public and that we develop, 2 also, a list of the people whom we would like to have testify 3 to us or to the public in order to arrive at a set of all 4 the information necessary to make a decision and then form 5 the policy in terms of whatever that information turns out 6 to be; and that our final report could be something like ---7 did all of you see the Congressional Record, the -- Senator 8 Proxmire's insert of the televised program on credit reporting? 9 Did any of you see that? 10 This is a -- this is an excerpt from the Congressional 11 Record in 1969, which occurred apparently, about the time the 12 hearings on the credit -- Fair Credit Reporting Act was being 13 We all have it. You all have it in your blue developed. 14 folders. 15 One of the television programs presented a highly 16 dramatic presentation of what in fact, the issues were, a few 17 of the issues were. We could commission such a program to be 18 developed. I do not know how much this would cost. We could 19 get public response to this program in the form of mail, or 20 testimony, or letters, or committee, made up of the public 21 actually being on television, and in fact, responding to it. 22 Another suggestion might be that we could on the 23 basis of all the information we have assembled, get a debate 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. on television about the issues of having people such as Belli 25

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Ú.	1	or some other counsel, I do not know who, with a highly
	2	responsive group of people on the other side who are looking
	3	at some of these issues and then getting public reaction to
W	4	that, or have them present it in front of this panel.
	5	I suggest we could use the most modern form of
	6	communication that we have which is the television as our
	7	method of presentation of the report of our recommendations
	8	to the public as well as to the Secretary.
	9	We could certainly prepare a document which summarizes
	10	the conclusions.
	11	DR. BURGESS: Conclusions of what?
\mathbf{O}	12	DR. GROMMERS: The conclusions we have reached on
	13	the basis of the information that has been made available to
	14	us.
	15	DR. BURGESS: I do not understand what the content
	16	of these presentations will be. I mean, you know, are we
	17	going to turn over to television producers, the job or laying
	18	out the issues which I would suppose is our job?
	19	DR. GROMMERS: No. No. If we decided to do this,
	20	and it is not at all sure we would want to, we would only
-	21	turn over to television producers, the job of presentation.
	22	DR. BURGESS: I just just to react, I do not
\$	23	you know, we all all we have talked about, you know, most
A Fact	24	of yesterday afternoon and now the beginning, again this morning
e - Federal Reporters,	^{Inc.} 25	are staging kinds of issues. It seems to me that, you know,

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1	there are people here who want to do different things.
2	I think those people ought to be encouraged to go
3	do them and we ought to, you know we ought to develop
4	you know, we have a little social history to this group. We
5	are getting to know each other and appreciate each other. I
6	think we ought to begin to develop an intellectual and exper-
7	ience history for the group where people who have experience
8	in services on the delivery side, people who have experience
9	on the technical side, people who have experience on other as
10	aspects of this issue ought to, you know, be preparing
11	documents and circulating those documents before meetings.
12	We ought to develop a I think out of that and
13	out of that circulation and subsequent discussion, we would
14	develop issues that are important. It seems to me we are
15	searching for gimmicks, you know, that are substitutes for our
16	doing the work that we are appointed to do. You know, I for
· 17	one, am not, you know, very interested in kind of being the,
18	you know, a mirror for letters from the public.
19	I mean, I think if anybody believes that these
20	issues have not been spelled out it seems to me, it is
21	quite clear that these issues have been spelled out in various
22	places. It does not take much imagination to know where to
23	go to get those issues.
24	DR. GROMMERS: Could you give me a list?
ers, Inc. 25	DR. BURGESS: We can start with Arthur Miller's book

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on the one side, we can start with Sam Ervin's committee on 1 2 the other. We can go to the people who have got serious problems 3 in the service delivery side with cost accounting, program 4 evaluation. End #1 5 Start #2 These things are all documented and laid out. 6 Ι 7 submit the problem is not at its base a problem with the computer or a technical problem. It is really a value question 8 about the balance between, you know, social utility on the 9 one side and the social cost on the other. 10 I think that the utilities and costs have to be 11 laid out. We do not know what those utilities are and we 12 do not know what those costs are. I for one, would much rather 13 sit here and listen to people who have responsibilities for 14 delivering services or for evaluating programs, who are --1.5 whose oxen are going to be gored by continuing the way we 16 are or not continuing the way we are, than spending a lot of 17 time receiving letters from people who are, you know, reactive 18 to a dramatic presentation. 19 DR. GROMMERS: What I am suggesting then is that you 20 should be allowed to do that. But there are other 21 people on the committee who do not feel that that is the way 22 to do so. There is not a consensus here. 23 What I am suggesting is a vehicle whereby you can 24

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25 do that and other people can do the other thing that they are

1 interested in doing as well and that out of that, we get a
2 consensus. **

I am not suggesting that we should be spending4 six months designing a television show.

5 DR. BURGESS: I would suggest if there is going to 6 be a television show, there ought to be six months spent 7 designing it. The issues, you know, with respect to the costs 8 and benefits have, say, a common unique identifer to take the 9 central issue, that, you know, that we really do not know 10 very much about that.

We know what the issues are, but we could not know what these substantive kinds of --

DR. GROMMERS: What -- would you confine your remarks 13 to the process rather than your opinions of what the issues 14 are. We will have plenty of time to talk about that. 15 We are just talking about the process. What other -- if you do 16 not -- if you prefer not to act as a lay body, and use your 17 expertise to determine where the sources of information are, 18 to which this group should react, what would you like to do? 19 Think about that and I will come back to you. 20 Mr. Gentile. 21

MR. GENTILE: Yes. I would like to respond to that question even though it was not addressed to me. I do not concur with the attitude you just expressed about the role of the committee and I would like to offer an alternative. The 1

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alternative is that each of us put ourselves in the position of the Secretary of HEW and ask ourselves what it is that we would do if we had that job, and I think we could recognize that we would want to establish certain positions and policies and be responsive to the Senator Ervin's committee, and help manage the personal data systems that exist throughout states

And I would organize it in the way that would list a number of issues and have committees which represent both sides of the issues all on the one committee, develop and exploit those ideas and develop a position paper that would then be reported back to the group at large.

as a result of the Department's activities.

DR. GROMMERS: How would you go to the issues? MR. GENTILE: For example, I will give you some examples of issues; some will be more specific than others.

One thesis might be the exposure to the invasion of personal privacy is real and in existence at this time--

DR. GROMMERS: Excuse me, Mr. Gentile. I would rather not have you speak about those particular issues at the moment. Just talk about process for a moment. How would you get at which issues would be decided by this group, rather than those that would be used?

23 24 ^{•• Federal Reporters, Inc.} MR. GENTILE: One alternative would be to form four or five groups right now, with the charge to each group that they isolate issues, and come back within an hour and

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and propose issues to be addressed, and I think that there is 1 much being said about the lack of consensus in the group, and 2 I believe that there is a lack of consensus in the group. 3 However, I do not think it is as overwhelming as 4 some would lead us to believe. It might be well to take a. 5 sample poll as to how the other people on the committee feel, 6 but I sense a certain degree of unrest, and I feel that a number 7 of people on the committee that I have spoken with are very 8 concerned to move ahead and to be somewhat specific, as specific 9 as we can be. 10 DR. GROMMERS: I would like to do what you are 11 suggesting. In fact, at a certain time of the day, today, I 12 would like, in fact, to break up into groups or however you 13 all want to organize yourselves. 14 MS. COX: We spent two days making lists of issues 15 last time. We spent a lot of time discussing issue and listing 16 A lot of different people listed issues. them. 17 DR. GROMMERS: Right. I also would like a list of 18 what kind of information is needed about those issues and I 19 think --20 MS. COX: Would not the committee, the group then 21 get all that together and make a report on that? 22 DR. GROMMERS: They could, but I think you will find 23 you do not have agreement on what these issues are. 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. MS. COX: I do not know. Have we ever checked that? 25

DR. GROMMERS: 1 That is what we will do. No. We 2 will go from there. I think it is a very valid way of starting. 3 MR. DOBBS: To the point of whether we should act as a lay body which -- I presume we get, based on the assumption 4 that there is a lack of information, and I guess my impression 5 is that that maybe the case in terms of specifics. 6 7 There are some of us who are oriented toward tech-8 nology and have a good deal of information there, but my impression that -- to the contrary, rather than being uninformed 9 this is a highly expert collection of people in, you know, some 10 11 fairly specific kind of areas and that a large number of them have, in fact, come in contact with these issues and the 12 problems as vague and undefined as they may be in their par-13 14 ticular area of expertise. 15 I guess, to me, at least, it is not clear to what extent we have to get additional information, and input from 16 17 the viewpoint of really being a lay group. I think that distorts reality. I do not think we are, at all. 18 DR. GROMMERS: We are not, but we could add to one. 19 20 MR. DOBES: To what end? That, I guess, is what I do not understand? 21 Collecting the body of information DR. GROMMERS: 22 together in one place that would be required to make a convincing 23 case for any policy that we would decide to recomment. 24

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Professor Allen?

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1	DR. ALLEN: I think that Arthur Miller, Gerald Davey,
2	Joe Weizenbaum; would find it hard to disregard what they know
3	about these issues among others in this room, and that to pre-
4	tend we are really a lay body on this would be we would not
5	be right in that, I believe.
6	MR. ARONOFF: But that does not mean that with all
7	your sophistication in a particular area, that you are not,
8	perhaps, lay in the kind of solutions that the Secretary
9	is looking for.
.10	You are experts in the field of technology and the
11	fears that you are going next week to express to the
12	committee and convince us and persuade us in. But in terms of
13	starting from that base and then reaching out for the charter,
14	I think that maybe there is this would not be as expert a
15	committee, I would say, as a group of constitutional lawyers.
14	You, being one there you would perhaps be expert

You, being one there, you would, perhaps, be expert in that. In terms of solutions, we may -- the balance of the group may be very much in the category of being lay. I think what the Chairman was saying, was bring your expertise to this group, to the lay people on the group then so we can understand your fears.

I think that is what Joe wanted to do yesterday,
was to persuade some of the lay people in this group.

MR. DOBBS: I am not sure he wanted to persuade the ederal Reporters, Inc. 25 lay people, he may have wanted to persuade some of the experts.

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1	Pat is an expert in what she does. She is associated with
2	a system that has all these characteristics. She does not,
3	I do not think, need additional expertise in the sense of
4	technological kind of arguments, you know what I mean?
5	She saw a computer yesterday, and she said, "You
6	see one, you have seen them all."
7	MR. ARONOFF: Then she went back to drinking, too.
8	(Laughter.)
9	DR. GROMMERS: Mr. Anglero?
10	MR. ANGLERO: Yes. I would say the way I look at
11	this, I feel it is not a problem of being a layman or being
12	expertise. In the place we are and with the problem we are
13	facing, we have to level in terms of the specific problems,
14	in terms the knowledge, and to be educated, so as to react
15	to it, really.
16	We have to understand that in some way, we are
17	almost expertise. If not, we would not be here, you know.
18	But I would say that even though we can be arguing here for
19	ten years or for six months and never getting to an agreement,
20	we have to develop a way to come into the basic role of solving
21	or recommending something.
22	I agree with the recommendation that we, some way,
23	try to define the issues that are behind the problem. That
24	really will help us to start moving. If we can not run, at

least, work. But move in a direction to go into recommendations

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and after we have defined these issues, there could be, and ſ 2 I recommend, that we all split today or whenever it is convenient, in small groups and bring those issues to be debated by the group and be adopted. We have to have the basic issues to be clear of, and then we develop a strategy of how to live with them, how End #2 to answer these issues. のに、「「「「「「」」」」 - Federal Reporters, Inc.

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Mr. De Weese? DR. GROMMERS: 1 It seems to me the best way to get to MR. DE WEESE: 2 the specific facts and issues that we are trying to get at would 3 4 be to concentrate on the specific data systems that are operated by HEW. 5 I mean it seems to me that we have a case here where 6 7 we are the advisory committee to the Secretary who has under his direct responsibility I think probably literally hundreds of different data systems of which he doesn't know anything about 0 the security or privacy problems involved with each one. 10 DR. GROMMERS: I want to keep you on the issue. 11 We are talking about process. Then we are going to have 12 some presentations. 13 MR. DE WEESE: This is the process I am trying to get 14 I think we ought to isolate four or five different data at. 15 systems in HEW, ones that are planned for the future, ones that 16 are in operation today --17 Who would do this? DR. GROMMERS: 18 This committee. MR. DE WEESE: 19 Who? Would you list five? Who would DR. GROMMERS: 20 list five data systems? 21 I think the one we talked about MR. DE WEESE: 22 yesterday, H.R. 1 --23 I mean who would do it? Who DR. GROMMERS: No. 24 WIAL Reporters, Inc. on the committee would make the choice? 25

I think we as a committee if we had MR. DE WEESE: 1 the facts before us could find five representative -- five or 2 six data systems. 3 Somebody has first to put the facts DR. GROMMERS: 4 before us. 5 MR. DE WEESE: I don't think the real problem is 6 finding the five systems. 7 DR. GROMMERS: I am just looking at process here. 8 What do we do tomorrow; what do we do this afternoon? How 9 do we actually arrive at something? 10 You are suggesting that as part of this process, one 11 of the outputs is a list of five systems that I gather what you 12 are saying is the whole committee speaks about together, as 13 opposed to breaking up into small groups. 14 MR. DE WEESE: I think it would be easier if you 15 divide into five small groups. There is the expertise to 16 analyze and tear apart any data system this agency develops. 17 If H.R. 1 is ever passed, I can see the Secretary . 18 being asked to testify before a committee where a liberal 19 senator asks him, "Have you considered the privacy problems 20 involved with this computer data system?" What's he supposed 21 to say, "No, I don't know anything about it."? He says, "Do 22 you talk about a -- do you have an advisory -- " 23 You are not really speaking to the DR. GROMMERS: 24

Beta Reporters, Inc. point right now.

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Miss Cross.

MR. DE WEESE: I am sorry.

MS. CROSS: As I look at this, it seems to me I would support both the lay board and the expert board. We have both an information overload and a lack of information.

6 It seems to me one of the problems is that our 7 information is not directed to the questions that have to be 8 answered.

As far as process, what I would like to propose is that we identify, as a group, agree upon what the questions are that have to be answered. Then bring our expertise to bear on those questions instead of just listening to more information about the problem in general because I feel a need for directed information.

DR. GROMMERS: How would you propose we identify. Mr. Gentile has suggested we identify by splitting up into groups, presumably on a voluntary basis, and that during an hour's discussion each group comes out with a set of issues. Do you have an alternative to that method or do you

20 think that's a good method?

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DR. GROMMERS: How would you get a group of issues?

Each person write down three? 1 MR. GENTILE: We have a group of issues. 2 MS. CROSS: Can we reach an agreement, then? If we 3 have a group of issues, we are not going to be any ahead to break into groups and get more issues. 5 Maybe we need consensus on whether those issues are 6 CR 6173 acceptable. End #3 7 #4 I would like to remind people again DR. GROMMERS: 8 of a couple of comments that came out during the discussion, 0 Mr. Boyd's discussion, where Dr. Weizenbaum and Dr. Miller 10 pointed out that there were certain characteristics of very 11 large organizations, of very large data banks which -- and I 12 think Mr. Davey also pointed out that one of the things that 13 happens is that the system begins to act for the sake of the 14 system and not for the sake of the people. 15 I think there are a number of issues that are hidden 16 here and that people at MIT that I know of and people at 17 Harvard that I know of and I am sure other people as well, are 18 trying to study. 19 We are not really trying to design safeguards for 20 any system that now exists, but for a system that may be built 21 in the future which we really don't know what it's going to be 22 like. 23 There is a large body of data being gathered as to 24

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Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 what it might be like in the future. I don't know if any of

you have time to read Professor Weizenbaum's article which we gave you a copy of, but it's how do you design a system for the future when you don't know what it's going to be.

That is, in my opinion, one of the problems you are all having here as a group. I don't know that you have as a group really all of the information that it would enable you to collect.

8 I would like to try Mr. Gentile's suggestion at a 9 later date, later hour today and see how we will do.

10 What we are going to do today is we have three 11 presentations that are possible to us.

I would like the group to consider the MR. ANGLERO: 12 possibility of meeting instead of two days at least three days. 13 Now, we are facing the pressure of a time at this 14 moment and I think, personally, that, for example, yesterday 15 it was a long journey, a long day. We cannot come here and 16 prepare even when we get all this material. I would recommend 17 that we can extend at least to a three-day meeting if it is 18 possible. 19

DR. GROMMERS: We will take up that later on in the afternoon, how we are going to organize our future meetings, when they are going to be.

23 What we have, we have three people who are here 24 available with some more information for us: Mr. McLean, who ³⁰⁽¹³⁾ Reporters, Inc. 25 can bring us information on the fair credit account; Mr.

White, who can give us some information on the ANSI standard; 2 and Mister -- I am sorry, I don't have the correct spelling 3 of everybody's name here - Mr. Turn, from Rand Corporation, 4 who can give us some information on one of the projects that is 5 looking into what some of the issues might be. For example, 6 is it possible to have a secure computer system. 7 Also, Dr. Rourke will come later on in the morning and tell us more about the NIH need for an identifier in a 8 || 9 particular system. 10 I would like to suggest that we have the 11 presentations, each of them about 20 minutes apiece and 20 12 minutes of discussion on these presentations. That's four 13 hours of work and that we -- I guess we better make that 14 15 and 15; otherwise, we won't get done. 15 Before lunch we make a division into groups on any 16 basis that you all want to do so, on any voluntary basis. Ι 17 would like you to be thinking about and make a list for me 18 without your name on it of two things that you can give to me 19 after lunch:

20 One. One or more issues that you perceive to be 21 important; and what information would have to be available to 22 substantiate and to explain this issue, and what information 23 you might be lacking.

And a second thing is one proposal that you would ^{131 Reporters, Inc.} 25 have for a change in the existing practice that you can think of.

I will go over these again. The second -- as an 1 example of the second, supposing you would say you would like 2 that there be a law that any time any record was made about you, 3 you got -- you, the individual, got a notification of this 4 record. In other words, you don't have to try to be -- to 5 write down all of the things that you right now as an expert 6 feel you would like to have happen as a result of legislation, 7 but I would like to see what the group in general is thinking 8 about, see whether we do have already, maybe, a basis for 9 policy recommendations and that we could spend the next six 10 months refining that rather than searching for it. 11 And after lunch we can start discussing some of these 12 We can discuss the results of the debates of the small things. 13 We can -- I will put on the board or on a list of groups. 14 paper the changes that people have -- the changes that people 15 have thought about and the issues people have thought about. 16 We can turn our discussion to those three things. 17 Mr. McLean, could we ask you to give us a 18 15-minute -19 This is Kenneth McLean, a professional MR. MARTIN: 20 staff member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency 21 and one of the most expert people on Capitol Hill in the 22 problems that arise from the fair credit legislation and the 23 problems arising from that legislation. 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. I am very glad to be here today to talk MR. MC LEAN: 25

to you somewhat about the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 1 I know you have a very difficult and somewhat 2 elusive assignment. Perhaps my remarks won't add to your 3 attempts to clarify your responsibilities. 4 I work for the Senate Banking Committee, specifically 5 for Senator Proxmire on that committee, who has been interested 6 in a wide variety of issues in the consumer credit field. 7 It started out with Truth-in-Lending. In the course 8 of our work on Truth-in-Lending, we received numerous complaints 9 from consumers who had trouble getting credit and who had 10 trouble correcting their credit records with confidential credit 11 bureaus or credit reporting agencies. 12 Therefore, in 1968 the Senator became interested in 13 reform legislation in the credit reporting field. However, 14 when we got into the issue we soon found we were only touching 15 the tip of the iceberg and there was a vast, additional amount 16 of reporting going on that was not necessarily credit reporting. 17 For example, many organizations specialized in 18 insurance type reporting, reporting much of the same information 19 that credit bureaus gather, information on persons' financial 20 status, his creit capacity, his mode of living, his moral 21 character, et cetera; and many of these organizations also 22 branched out into the field of employment reporting. 23 So, we decided at the outset that if we were going to 24 an Reporters, Inc. do anything meaningful we really ought to cover the entire 25

range of reporting in data collection going on in these private
systems rather than strictly credit reporting.

3 There are basically two divisions of the industry in 4 the credit reporting or data collection field.

5 One would be -- could be termed reciprocal credit 6 bureau which maintains a relationship with local merchants and 7 local credit grantors and it basically is a repository of 8 credit-type information on a person's bill-paying capacity, 9 certain financial data about him, and also public record infor-10 mation about arrests, convictions, judgments, divorces, law-11 suits, et cetera.

The other branch of the industry might be termed 12 the investigative reporting segment. This branch concentrates 13 primarily for insurance reporting purposes or employment 14 reporting purposes and rather than merely receiving the more or 15 less factual information on a person's debt-payment capacity 16 from merchants, they actually go out and investigate. Thev 17 talk to neighbors, friends, associates, employers, about the 18 person and deal more in subjective-type information about the 19 person's character and moral qualities rather than objective-20 type information. 21

22 We felt it was very important to cover both segments 23 of this industry.

24 The Retail Credit Company based in Atlanta, t 'fial Reporters, Inc. 25 Georgia is probably the largest investigative-type reporting agency in the country. They have offices in about 3000 communities. They have dossiers on over 45 million people and they do upwards of 30 million reports a year, perhaps 80 percent in the insurance area and the rest divided between credit and employment, a very big organization and a very vast data network.

7 Very little of it, I might add, is computerized,
8 although they are looking into the possibility, but since their
9 investigative reports are often subjective and deal with
10 opinions, it presents certain problems to computerize this
11 information.

The Associated Credit Bureaus of America is a grade association for most of the major credit bureaus in the country. Collectively these credit bureaus have files on about 10 million people in the country and they do about 100 million reports a year.

Some of them are beginning to computerize; some are already computerized. The trade associations sell a contract with a data processing firm to develop a nationwide system so that the credit bureau in Panook, Iowa can connect up with the credit bureau in Poughkeepsie, New York and the credit bureaus can talk to one another and a person's credit record can be transferred throughout the country.

24 The third firm has grown quite rapidly in the last Figural Reporters, Inc. 25 three years. It's based in California, the Credit Data

Corporation which is now a subsidiary of TRW. It started out 1 with a few million accounts with Bank of America and has 2 expanded nationwide so that it is now in several states. 3

During the hearings, they estimated within a few 4 years they expected to have files on between 40 and 50 million 5 people. I believe they are probably at the 15 to 20-million 6 figure now, although I haven't checked it recently. 7

When we worked on the legislation, designed the 8 legislation, we had three principal objectives in mind: 9

The first objective was accuracy. We wanted to be 10 sure these reports were as accurate as possible and the person 11 who was adversely affected by these reports had a chance to 12 challenge the accuracy, had full access to the information, 13 could make an input and would be confronted with the informa-14 tion and be given a chance to give his side of the story. 15

The second objective was to assure the confiden-16 tiality of the information once it's in the file, to be sure 17 that it is used for the purpose for which it is collected and 18 not indiscriminately sold to anyone who came in with the 19 purchase price. 20

The third objective was to assure the relevancy of 21 the information, that is to put some restrictions on the type 22 of information going into the file, to be sure that it is 23 reasonably related to the purposes at hand and does not 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. constitute an undue invasion of the individual's right to 25

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privacy. 1 If you talk to people in the credit collection --2 credit reporting field, they have a general attitude that the 3 creditor, the insurance company, the employer has an unlimited 4 right to collect information on people. After all, it's the 5 person that is applying for credit; he's applying for insurance; 6 or he's applying for employment. He gives his implied consent 7 to be investigated and the employer or insurer, creditor has 8 an absolute right to get any information he thinks fit. 9 Obviously in our conflictive society there has to be 10 a balancing between the right of the person to collect infor-11 mation and the right of the individual to be -- to remain 12 reasonably free in his privacy. 13 We achieved one of these objectives fairly well. One 14 I would say middling, and the third, very imperfectly. 15 As far as accuracy goes, we have given the 16 individuals a statutory right to have all of the information 17 in their credit file disclosed completely and accurately. 18 Whenever a person is turned down for insurance or 19 employment or credit because of an adverse credit report, the 20 person rejecting the applicant must indicate that it's on the 21 basis of a credit report, either wholly or partly, and give 22 the name and address of the credit reporting agency. This puts 23 the consumer on notice that there is an adverse report 24 -Federal Reporters, Inc. circulating on him. He then has a right to go down to the 25

1 credit reporting agency and have the information in his file
2 disclosed to him.

Now, he does not have a right to a physical copy of the report in writing and this is one of the problems in the administration of the Act. The credit bureau lobby was warned that if individuals got a written copy of their credit report, they would simply take it and use it with other creditors to obtain credit and therefore the revenues that the reporting agency would otherwise derive would be bypassed.

So, they make an oral disclosure and in practice it's -- it sometimes has been difficult to determine whether the -- all of the information actually is being disclosed.

The individual has a right to enter his version of a dispute in the case of a disagreement over the accuracy of an item. The credit bureau is required to investigate the matter. If it can't be reverified, it has to be deleted. If there remains a dispute, the individual could put his version into the file and this would have to be communicated on subsequent reports.

The credit reporting agency also has a statutory obligation to insure the confidentiality of the information and to use it only for certain defined purposes: obtaining insurance, employment or credit or for another legitimate business purpose involving a specific transaction with the consumer.

1 On that point the Federal Trade Commission has 2 recently ruled that credit reporting agencies cannot sell the 3 information in their files to market research firms who want to 4 develop mailing lists about all consumers with specific 5 characteristics. They have made this interpretation on the 6 grounds that there is no specific pending transaction with the 7 consumer which he is aware of and therefore the information in 8 the file cannot be released for this purpose.

As far as the objective of relevancy is concerned, I
believe the Act is sadly deficient. We started out with the
provision giving the FTC the power to write rules and
regulations defining what types of information could go into
the file with the general requirement that it be recently
related to the purpose and that it constitute an undue invasion
of the right to privacy.

This was eliminated from the bill and the only
remaining provision bearing on relevancy is a rather weak
disclosure requirement. Whenever someone orders an investigative
report on a consumer, he is required under the law to disclose
in advance that an investigative report is being run and to
describe in very general terms the nature and scope of that
investigative report.

Now, the theory behind disclosure, if the public knew the extent to which they were being investigated, particularly by the insurance reporting firms who go into great mml

detail about a person's sex life, his housekeeping habits, his associates, his general political or psychological attitudes, ad inifinitum, the public would be so upset that insurance companies would be forced to delete these obtrusive type questions from their questionnaires.

In practice, the disclosure has been so general that consumers -- few consumers have availed themselves of the disclosure that I don't believe the objective has been achieved.

I have given you a very quick rundown of the act. We do intend to hold some oversight hearings on the act next year, to see how it is working. I have identified some of the problems in the act, the lack of a written disclosure of a credit report.

Also, we are concerned about the timing of the 15 so-called trigger device in the bill. An individual does not 16 learn of an adverse report under the law until he has actually 17 been turned down for either insurance, employment or credit. 18 In many cases, it may be too late to do anything about it, 19 particularly if he has applied for a job. He finds he has 20 lost the job, he goes down to the credit bureau, he gets the 21 report corrected, but in the meantime, someone else has the 22 job, so it really doesn't do him much good. 23

24 We are giving considerable thought to moving the ¹ redenal Reporters, Inc. 25 trigger device back and require that whenever an adverse mm2

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report goes: out of the system, a consumer be given a copy of that adverse report. Then he is able to challenge the accuracy or authenticity of the report with the actual decisionmaker who is presumably about to act on the report.

5 The major problem there, of course, is defining what 6 is adverse information.

7 Credit reporting agencies take the argument that 8 they simply report facts, they make no evaluative judgments 9 on it, and thatunder certain circumstances, almost any 10 information could be considered adverse by someone.

However, I think these are largely conjectural fears and that it would be possible to draft a statute and administer regulations that would come up with a reasonable definition of what is adverse information, and when the consumer must be notified.

In conclusion, I would make two recommendations to your association, your Advisory Committee. I am glad to see that you are getting into this field. I would hope that some of your recommendations might have a bearing on what we are doing on Capitol Hill and that we might, perhaps, work together on it.

First of all, I would give serious thought to including the private data systems now in effect or underway as well as public data systems. I think it would be somewhat meaningless to have all these safeguards in the public sector

of the economy when private credit reporting firms or consumer
 reporting firms are doing the same thing with far fewer
 safeguards.

Moreover, there is a substantial interchange between these data systems. We found in our hearings that government investigators frequently use the information in private data collection banks and I suspect, although I haven't been able to verify it, there is a reciprocal arrangement on the part of private firms with the government collection agencies.

I think Arthur Miller, who is a member of your Advisory Committee, testified during our hearings that there is a buddy system that has sprung up on the part of investigative firms. Investigators, regardless of their location in the public or private secotr, often cooperate with one another in sharing information.

Therefore, I think it is important that your recommendations go to the essential thrust of the problem and not confine itself to a particular sector of the economy,or to a particular sector of the government.

20 Obviously the Secretary of HEW can do something 21 specific about the data systems under his own control, but he 22 also is a very forceful individual, he enjoys a high degree of 23 respect within the Administration and with the Congress, and 24 I think his recommendations for other agencies or for legisla-25 tion to control private data systems would carry great weight. mm4

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Secondly, I think you should focus on the problem of privacy in data collection systems rather than the particular technological means for processing that data.

An individual can be just as damaged by a handoperated data collection system as he can by a computerized system. In fact, we found in the private systems the worst offenders were the insurance reporting firms which are largely manual in their operation.

Some of these data systems are not computerized
now, but they perhaps lend themselves to computerization or
to advanced processing techniques. It seems to me the focus
ought to be not on the particular technology used, but on
the problem to the consumer and to the public involved in
personal data banks.

15 That ends my presentation. I would be very happy 16 to answer any questions you might have about the Fair Credit 17 Reporting Act.

MR. DOBBS: A couple of questions.

19 There are certain kinds of credit transactions in 20 which the consumer himself is charged directly for the credit 21 search.

MR. MC LEAN: That is right.

23 MR. DOBBS: Does he by virtue of that fact, have any 24 additional rights to direct report of that data?

MR. MC LEAN: No, no.

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The credit bureaus take the view that that is a 1 report to their client, and before the Fair Credit Reporting 2 Act, many credit bureaus would deny the consumer the right to 3 any type of disclosure. 4 MR. DOBBS: So, even though he is charged directly 5 for that service, he gets no -- no right accrues to him as 6 a result of that? 7 MR. MC LEAN: The concept of being charged for the 8 service is a little artificial. Whether he is charged 9 directly or indirectly, he is still paying for it. 10 Some creditors simply pack it on their finance 11 charge, or in the price of the merchandise. 12 One way or the other, he is paying for it. 13 MR. DOBBS: The second question is, in many instances 14 the establishment offering a product or service handles the 15 collection of the credit information in some direct fashion 16 like in a department store, for example, and/or some other 17 kinds of service. Then subsequently may, in fact, pass that 18 credit information on to yet a third person who collects the 19 money, agency? 20 MR. MC LEAN: : Yes. 21 MR. DOBBS: Do the restrictions of the act now 22 cover both of these matters in the transaction? 23 MR. MC LEAN: Let me make sure I understand you. 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. A merchant is dealing with a specific customer, and 25

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collects the credit information himself, calls around town, 2 compiles a credit report. 3 MR. DOBBS: Subsequently, passes that credit 4 information on to yet another party. 5 MR. MC LEAN: Then he becomes a credit reporting 6 agency and he would be regulated as a credit reporting agency. 7 If he keeps it to himself, he is not regulated 8 under the act. 9 MR. GALLATI: Is there any pattern of sequencing 10 of these files, clarification? 11 In other words, are they all name, address, DOB, 12 and so on? Are they sequenced in order of Social Security 13 number, or is there no pattern? 14 Is there interface between the various agencies and 15 on what basis? 16 I am not entirely familiar with just MR. MC LEAN: 17 howthey are operating in that respect, and I suggest you might 18 want to get someone from the industry to talk to you on that. 19 The few credit bureaus that I have seen have had 20 their -- were not mechanized and had the information filed 21 simply alphabetically. 22 MR. GALLATI: They do interchange among themselves? 23 MR. MC LEAN: Right. 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. I would assume they would be looking towards a 25

the customer comes in and applies for credit. The merchant

numerical identification number such as the Social Security mm71 number as the universal means of identification. 2 DR. BURGESS: When you receive testimony on the 3 relevancy issue, what is the -- did there appear to be good 4 reasons for most data that were collected in the 5 investigative reporting? 6 MR. MC LEAN: No, not at all. 7 In fact, some of the information seemed to be 8 entirely frivolous. We had a representative from the life 9 insurance industry before us, and we showed him the actual 10 forms that were used by insurance reporting agencies, and we 11 went down question by question, what is the relevancy of 12 that? 13 One of the question was, how many bathrooms does 14 the individual have in his house, and then, a follow up was; 15 are the number of bathrooms adequate for the number of people? 16 We said, well, how was this related to mortality? 17 You mean statistics showing that people with fewer 18 bathrooms die? 19 And, he, of course, admitted, no. He admitted 20 himself the question was frivolous and he couldn't understand 21 how it had gotten on the form. 22 One of the problems is, of course, that like all 23 bureaucracies, they have an inclination to go -- insurance 24 companies have an insatiable appetite for information. They derat Reporters, Inc. 25 don't want to pay too much for the information, so they have

probably got the worst of all possible worlds, they have a 1 lot of information that is probably inaccurate, and not 2 very useful, and doesn't really help them out in their 3 underwriting decisions. 4 DR. BURGESS: Lots of times, any single item on a 5 questionnaire will be suspect out of the context of an index 6 that it is part of, or -- independent of a model that may be 7 an important element in. 8 Was there any indication that these people were 9 using sophisticated models to project these kinds of things? 10 MR. MC LEAN: None whatsoever. 11 We asked, for example, to relate -- for the 12 insurance companies to relate evidence on extra-marital 13 behavior to mortality and they had no such information. 14 They do, it seems to me, have a legitimate right 15 to collect information on alcoholism. That is, you know --16 there are statistics on that to show alcoholics die more. 17 The advice given during the hearing was that if 18 someone was having an extra-marital affair and the other 19 husband finds out about it, he might shoot him. That is all. 20 DR. BURGESS: Might live longer, too. 21 MR. MC LEAN: Another justification was frightening. 22 The auto insurance industry also conducts a 23 complete investigation of anyone who applies for auto 24 -Federal Reporters, Inc. insurance. Their questions are even more obtrusive than the 25

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1 life insurance people. They want to know who you associate with 2 what your attitudes, your manner of behavior, whether you are 3 a neat housekeeper.

We asked how is this related to driving ability and the witness said, it really isn't, but we are insuring these people against liability, so we may be compelled, some day, to defend them in a legal action before a jury, and if they, in any way, have some deviant behavior characteristics, they wear pink shirts, or have long hair and a mustache, they read Karl Marx --

(Laughter.)

12 MR. MC LEAN: Onthat basis, almost all of us in 13 the room would flunk.

This is their rationale. If you admit that rationale, there is a certain spurious logic to it, there is no limitation to what they can collect. They can look in your library and see what books you read, what: magazines you subscribe to.

19DR. BURGESS: I would like to ask just one more20question.

In the Office of Management and Budget, where clearance is required for many kinds of survey instruments that are used, has there been an evaluation of -- or are you -- I imagine you would be involved in that.

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MR. MC LEAN: I am not involved. I am familiar with

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the function.

Whenever a federal agency sends a questionnaire · 2 out to the business community, that has nothing to do --3 DR. BURGESS: What I wanted to ask was, have 4 any clearcut criteria of relevance or test of relevance, been 5 developed through that experience? 6 MR. MC LEAN: I could not really say. 7 I would imagine that is what the bureau does. They 8 ask the agency -- why do you need this information? 9 How will it help you in your assigned mission? 10 Is there some other way you can get it without 11 burdening the business community with more red tape? 12 I would like to make a comment about MR. DAVEY: 13 part of the credit bureau, or the industry. 14 I was with Credit Data Corporation. We felt during 15 the hearings and the like that mixing investigative reporting 16 with the other type of credit reporting was kind of a mistake 17 because it kind of broadened things out to such an extent that 18 the code of ethics which we were essentially operating under 19 and we were proposing to be adopted as standards, that 20 our -- some of the -- well, let me say that I think that there 21 was a lot of good that was obtained through the bill by 22 bringing attention to these things, particularly in the area 23 of investigative reporting. 24

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But I think that it did tend to lower the standards

1 that were being used in other parts of the industry.

2 MR. MC LEAN: I think you are right. I think our 3 initial objective was to occupy, so to speak. The trustee 4 at one time pursued an item of considering the problem of 5 credit reporting separately and insurance reporting and 6 employment reporting. We felt if we split the bill up in 7 three pieces, we would be lucky to get one out of the three.

Rightly or wrongly, our judgment was to get a
comprehensive statute, occupy as many fields as we can,
however perfectly, and then work on improving the act in
subsequent years.

I think you are right. The act is deficient in the investigative reporting field and that needs to be straightened out.

DR. ALLEN: On the privacy question for individuals, 15 that is the right to privacy versus the privilege of 16 organizations to collect any and all, and to freely transfer, 17 information, if we were to recommend to the Secretary a 18 definition of the word right of privacy, that for individuals 19 who provide information to a collector, that with that collec-20 tion, there be an indication and notice of for what purpose 21 that was being collected, and that the individual should have 22 a right that it not be used for other purposes than that or 23 transmitted to others unless -- and then there might be a 24 -Federal Reporters, Inc. set of conditions under which it could be done, that is 25

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ť		1	obtaining the permission of the individual or a certain kind of
		2	transmission if the information was aggregated so that
		3	there was no possibility of tracing putting all of the
S		4	information together on that individual, or a residual
		5	procedure whereby, perhaps to a privacy commission in instances
		6	where it was for specified reasons impractical to get
		7	all of the authorizations of the individuals who had provided
		8	the information.
		9	But a set of safeguards of this type.
		10	Who would have difficulty living with that kind of
		11	definition of right of privacy and for what reasons?
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MR. MC LEAN: Well, if you would apply that to the insurance investigative reporting industry, and would require advance disclosure and require advance permission of the consumer along with taking the advance permission, there has to be a very clear disclosure of what types of questions the insurance company was going to ask, they take the view that this would simply destroy their present system.

8 They are in the business of selling life insurance. 9 Life insurance is sold not bought, and after a two- or three-10 hour harangue, trying to sell some guy life insurance, if you 11 say, "Well now, I have to get your permission to investigate 12 you, and here are all the questions we are going to ask; we 13 are going to ask about whether you have extra marital affairs, and whether you are a good housekeeper," the guy would say, 14 "To hell with it; I do not want the insurance." 15

16 The position is that they want minimum disclosure
17 and no permission.

DR. ALLEN: I was trying to focus on where the provider of the information was the provider, himself. He was put on notice of the purpose for which that information was to be used, and that that use was not to be extended without his permission or alternatively.

23 MR. MC LEAN: I see what you mean. Yes. The more 24 you safeguard the confidentiality of information collected for -Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 a specific purpose and prevent it from being used for other

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purposes, the less the invasion of privacy problem becomes.

However, I can still see a problem. Even if you
had all these safeguards on confidentiality and you were going
to confine the information only to that purpose, there still
ought to be some limit as to the type of information of prospective employers or insurance company, or collectors, can
collect.

8 He still does not have an unlimited right to coerce
9 the individual into revealing this information, particularly
10 if it is, you know, an employment situation. The individual
11 is anxious to get the job and the employer says, well now, I
12 am just going to keep this in my confidential files. I have
13 to know about this, this, this, and that.

The individual is really in an imperfect bargaining situation. He is in no position to counter the claims of his prospective employer. I think we have to go beyond that and draw the line, difficult as it may be, of the right of the employer to collect personal information and the right of the employee to be free from undue invasion of his privacy.

MS. CROSS: Have You given any attention to the kind of regulations that might be drawn up to prevent exchange of information? I am thinking particularly of where it is inappropriate. Is there any way to stop private companies, for instance, from merging files, whether you do it by technical means or handwritten files? (

1	MR. MC LEAN: The merging of the files itself, is						
2	not the problem. It is using them for different purposes.						
3	For example, in credit, it does not particularly bother me						
4	that a creditor in California can go to the credit bureau in						
5	Maine, and find out your credit rating. If you'revisiting in						
6	California, that actually helps you. You are able to get						
7	credit instantly through this network.						
8	It is not so much the merger of the files, but con-						
9	fining that information to that purpose to make sure it is not						
10	used for other legitimate purposes.						
11	MS. CROSS: That is exactly what I am interested in.						
12	MR. MC LEAN: Now, the Act does say that. Our infor-						
13	mation is imperfect as to how well it is being complied with,						
14	but it does say, information collected for credit, insurance,						
15	or employment purposes, can only be used for those purposes						
16	and cannot be used for generalized market research.						
17	The FTC has also held credit bulletins are illegal.						
18	These are directories of everyone in town, showing their credit						
19	rating. It is a great big telephone book and they hand it out						
20	to individual merchants on Main Street. They keep it under						
21	the counter and the kid that comes in Saturday, can find out						
22	about everybody in town, whether they pay their bills, where						
23	they have accounts. There is no privacy at all.						

DR. GROMMERS: Did you find out that the general -ce-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 public knows this is going on about them, that everybody who

1 applies for insurance --

2 MR. MC LEAN: No. No. In fact, we get letters No. 3 every day from people who profess shock and amazement about 4 these investigative reports. The insurance companies have 5 been almost reprehensible in the meager disclosure requirements that are in the Act now. They leave the impression that the 6 7 investigation itself is required by the Fair Credit Reporting 8 Act, not to -- not the disclosure, but the investigation.

9 Every once in awhile, we get a letter saying, "How 10 come you are requiring these investigations? I think it is 11 terrible."

DR. GROMMERS: Do you think that if the public knew that they were being investigated on extramarital affairs in order to buy insurance that they might want to do something about the privacy question?

16 MR. MC LEAN: Yes. That was the theory of disclosure. They do not have to disclose a detailed list of all the questions 17 they are asking. They simply disclose, in a general way, we are 18 going to investigate your background and personal character-19 istics and etc. To the average person, it is gobbledegook. 20 DR. GROMMERS: Did you get response that the public 21 might be willing to take action if they only knew what was 22 going on? 23

MR. MC LEAN: From the few people that have written ECE - Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 in, yes. I think it is -- can be readily predicted just from human nature, human psychology that people do place a value
 on their privacy. If they could see these questionnaires the
 insurance companies actually use and go down the checklist of
 all the questions that are asked, they would certainly put up
 some very strong objections.

So, that is one approach, is the disclosure approach.
In other words, let the person know exactly what is being done,
what the questions are, who is going to ask the questions, of
whom they are going to be asked, and require him to give his
advance permission before the investigation can be run.

The other approach would be the regulatory approach, having some governmental agency, if you will, define what kind of information can be collected. That is the latter approach.

14 It is much more difficult and gets involved in very 15 tricky problems of free speech and governmental regulations.

DR. GROMMERS: One more question.

17 Senator Proxmire inserted in the Congressional Record 18 the script from a television program --

MR. MC LEAN: "Judd for the Defense," right? 19 DR. GROMMERS: Have you any idea how that program 20 came to be written? Was it commissioned or was it gratuitous? 21 MR. MC LEAN: No. I called the producer for the 22 It was not commissioned. It was simply a topic of transcript. 23 interest at the time. I think Vance Packard had written about 24

the privacy invaders, and there were some initial hearings, I

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think, by Congressman Gallagher of New Jersey, so it was
 becoming a topic of interest. Some smart writer seized upon
 this topic and wrote a very excellent script.

I might add, there was also a recent and similar
script on "The Bold Ones," which we also have the transcript
for. I am not sure we put that in the record.

MS. HARDAWAY: There was also much advertising by
NBC now that they had so many requests to show that again that
it would be shown during the summer months twice. They had
been flooded by requests. It is a two-part thing, two Sunday
nights.

12 MR. MC LEAN: I might put out before our hearings, we got CBS interested in the question of confidentiality and 13 credit bureaus. Mike Wallace of CBS formed a completely fic-14 titious, bogus company, got a letterhead printed up, and then 15 went to 20 credit bureaus in 20 different cities throughout 16 the country, and he picked names at random from the phone book 17 in those cities. Then he sent them a letter under his bogus 18 letterhead saying that his firm was thinking of extending so-19 and-so credit and could he get a credit report. 20

Although he was not -- this bogus firm did not
exist, and wasnot a member of the credit bureau, and although
the credit bureau is supposed to determine the authenticity of
these requests, check on the validity of the person, he was able
to get reports in ten out of twenty cases.

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DR. GROMMERS:

2 information? 3 MR. MC LEAN: On the contrary. CBS is being sued. (Laughter.) 4 5 DR. GROMMERS: For what? 6 MR. MC LEAN: I am not sure what the charge is. Probably libel and making false representations, and fraud. 7 Ι 8 talked to the producer just about two, or three days ago, and he was going on the witness stand. I think it is clearly one 9 of these harassment type suits, but the suit did result in their 10 taking part of the program off the air. 11 They had about three or four segments of the program. 12 They only ran the first two. But we did -- we got a copy 13 of the show and showed it during our committee hearings. 14 It had a tremendous impact on our committee. It showed just how 15 easy it was for anybody to get access to these credit files. 16 The show was really a little bit unfair in that it 17 was kind of a setup. They asked the executive director of the 18 trade association -- "Now some people say that anybody can go 19 into a credit bureau and get the files, is that true?" 20 He said, "No, it is absolutely false. We have 21 these procedures, we have these safeguards." 22 Then they would switch to Mike Wallace and he would 23 be coming in that we have a report from Dolphin, Alabama, and 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. here is one from Wichita. They would switch back and say, "Are 25

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Did he do anything with that

1 you sure no one can get these reports, absolutely sure?" 2 (Laughter.) 3 MR. MC LEAN: Is that it? 4 DR. GROMMERS: I guess. 5 MR. MC LEAN: Thank you very much. 6 I enjoyed being with you and I wish you success 7 in your very difficult assignment. 8 DR. GROMMERS: Would you like to have a coffee-break 9 now, or like to have another presentation? 10 MR. ARONOFF: Presentation. 11 MS. HARDAWAY: Break. 12 DR. GROMMERS: It is now ten minutes to eleven. We 13 might have a quick coffee-break if anyone wants coffee. 14 Otherwise, we would not break before lunch. 15 MR. DAVEY: This is about the only time we can break 16 before lunch. 17 DR. GROMMERS: Let us say, we will be back here in 18 about ten minutes. (Recess.) 19 20 21 22 23 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25

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DR. GROMMERS: Now we are going to have two more presentations. The first is going to be the Rand Corporation presentation. When we are through with that, we can have Dr. Rourke's presentation.

I will first call on Dr. Mario Leon Juncosa of Rand. 5 DR. JUNCOSA: I would like to rather briefly 6 outline what we have been doing. We have a grant in exploratory 7 research on the technological and theoretical aspects of 8 privacy in computerized data banks. It is really a two-year 9 approved study that was approved for one year in terms of 10 We just went through our grilling to find out if budget. 11 we are going to go on to our second year. 12

Primarily the contributions we will be making will 13 be at the theoretical and at the systems level, so there is 14 some degree of extra work and extrapolation before we get 15 down to the point where one would have some results that 16 would be directly applicable or immediately applicable to 17 policymakers or to the people that are going to immediately 18 implement these things in a computer system. 19

You have to remember this is exploratory research. 20 Some of the goals of the project are sort of 21 scientific goals. One is interested in trying to formulate 22 a basis for a theory of information privacy and other goals 23 are to develop guidelines for designers of systems. We are 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. not spending a lot of time deciding whether something should 25

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or should not be in a data bank. We are not spending a lot of time discussing the sociological questions involved in 2 data banks, although we recognize there are many, and we have 3 probably about as much time devoted to this kind of an 4 activity in both sessions that we have, but it is not part 5 of the formal investigation of the problems. 6

We divided our work into three pieces: the 7 systems studies, the theoretical studies, and the technological 8 studies, and then as a small effort besides that, doesn't fall 9 in these categories, and that is an updating of a previous 10 grand bibliography on privacy. This bibliography has gone 11 through one update, about 2000 issues or so, copies have been 12 requested over the past several years. 13

However, the bibliography brings one up only to 14 1969, and we are trying to get it up to the present time or 15 actually in to the early part of 1973, if we continue. 16

The systems studies are largely concerned with 17 taxonomy of the problem. There is a model of the data bank 18 system. This work has primarily been done by Mr. Rein Turn 19 who will give you more details on this kind of work. He is 20 the computer systems engineer. 21

The other people were mathematicians that have 22 to have interests in many different things, and it is hard 23 to say exactly what they are doing, when you come down to 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. the final design of a system. Nevertheless, in these systems 25

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studies one has the catalogue of data banks, the model data bank system, catalogue of threats, and countermeasures.

The goals here are, of course, to begin to get the requisites in order to make some trade-offs or at least a formulation of trade-offs and methodology for trade-offs in the technological studies.

7 The theoretical studies have very many parts to 8 them. One part, trying to answer or has actually answered 9 a highly theoretical question about whether or not there 10 exists uncrackable data banks, whatever that really means.

The problem arose in some work that Joe Coats at the National Science Foundation had done earlier when he was at Idaho, when he tried to formulate this logical question. It does not include a situation of going in and bribing somebody or physically breaking down the bank or something like that, but it is largely a question, you might say, close to saying whether or not an incrition can be broken.

With some qualifications, there is no such a bank that you can break all of these situations. There is a qualification, and you cast the category in the symbolic logic using the KRISH function theory.

It helps one when one tries to formulate some theories as to -- in order to decide on his course of action as to what he is going to do next. If he knows something exists, he may try to find out. If he can prove it doesn't

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exist logically, then he doesn't spend any time looking for it. It is the kind of thing mathematicians like to argue about.

Another part of the theoretical studies has been 4 devoted to a formulation of models of conflict between a 5 would-be information controversy, a data bank intruder, and 6 the protector. It is not exactly at the level of classical 7 gain theory, but one does see a conflict model arising. 8 The conflict is based, of course, on the assumptions that it 9 would be information that he is going to get some return 10 from cracking the bank, had it been for one article or piece 11 of information or maybe a so-called mailing list of informa-12 tion. In other words, information on very many people, 13 either by name or belonging to a certain set described by 14 certain characteristics he may have. 15

16 If he can get some value out of it, he is going 17 to invest some effort to get into it and he has got to have a 18 positive, an expected positive return or otherwise he is not 19 going to do this. That means that one has to have some kind of a value function on information. CR6173

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Part of the theoretical studies next year would be
 devoted to trying to formulate methodologies for empirically
 determining the values of this information. A simple one might
 be to say, "What do you value the information that you put in
 your IRS Form in case somebody wanted to take it?"

6 Well, you know, everybody has his price. You know
7 the way the old joke goes. A simple way that has been proposed
8 by someone who has worked on this project as well, was to
9 suppose that each of you had the opportunity to check off a
10 box on your IRS Form. If there is a check there, you will
11 receive a reduction of a certain amount from the income tax
12 that you are going to pay.

13 There is not a check there, then the information---14 well, you will get a reduction from the income tax that you 15 would pay, and the government would be able to sell a copy of your IRS Form to anybody either for publication costs for 16 \$5, or something like that. But, if you do not check this, 17 then it has to be kept in the way it is right now, a level of 18 confidentiality and protection of it like we have at the 19 present time. 20

Now, the question is how much would you take, a reduction, if you checked it. Some people might say \$50. Some people might say \$2 thousand. This is a way of trying to measure the value of this kind of information.

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Well, we play these kinds of games to see if we can

get some ideas as to how to determine the functions that
 would go into this conflict model of the protective intruder
 interactions. The protector, of course, he has to consider that
 he has some losses too, if he loses information.

He is looking right at the start. He has to put effort and money into protection. If there is a loss, libel suits, who knows what else, so there are even greater losses. In the long run, the kind of thing that happens is that there is a tendency for the invader to go up to a certain investment level, to crack the bank; and the protector, likewise, in the long run, will tend to a certain kind of investment level.

12 Once you have found what these levels are, and if 13 you know what kind of a function one has, measuring the infor-14 mation loss given, that the invader puts in an amount, say "X," 15 and the protector puts in an amount, say "Y," to protect that 16 information, loss can then be determined and it may, or may 17 not be above tolerable levels.

18 If it is at an intolerable level then you have some 19 policy that is going to tell you you had better start changing 20 this system.

Another theoretical study, highly theoretical study,
is aimed at trying to get measures of security and measures of
data utility. This study is motivated by the fact that there
are very many data banks in the government and elsewhere, the
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private ones, that have information in them that are tagged to

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4 the class of utility for which the bank has been set up. The
5 bank may have been set up for regulatory purposes, investiga6 tory purposes, and so on.

7 The kinds of information I am talking about does 8 not have to be tagged to the individual. It is useful, say, 9 for psychological studies, perhaps, maybe interested in formu-10 lating government policy for certain kinds of groups, and you 11 do not have to have the individual's name. Now, if this infor-12 mation is not immediately available, what you might think of 13 is going out and conducting some new surveys.

But in the aggregate of banks that exist, much of this information can already be obtained. So now what one is interested in doing is see if one can make a set of privacy transformations, a name we kind of coined for this, which would protect this individual's privacy.

19 If the transformation is one to one, you just code 20 the individual's name or some other thing, then that is one 21 kind of a privacy transformation and many people may not like 22 that because they feel then that it is reversible, if you can 23 crack that code.

24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 Formation such as the thing one has in the output of the Bureau

of the Census where the data may be gathered individually but
 then it is aggregated so you have information given in terms
 of averages for small areas or small sets of people, but still
 enough in there to protect the privacy through the anonymity
 of numbers.

The -- numbers of people that have the same property, 6 for example, given the average salary or average income for 7 groups that are no less than say, 100, you happen to be in this 8 group, to a large extent it give you a fair degree of privacy 9 providing there are not other little problems such as, let us 10 say, another average which exists for almost all of those 11 people, so you can take one and subtract it from the other and 12 you are left with the average of only a couple of people, maybe 13 just two. 14

15 This is an inadvertent disclosure because two such 16 surveys exist.

Well, one is interested in trying to find out what kinds of aggregations one can make and still protect this privacy but make the aggregations such that they still have some statistical utility, when one is done.

Here relatively esoteric, mathematical theory called
 Here relatively esoteric, mathematical theory called
 the Theory of Absalon Entrophy, due to a certain number of
 Russians; Komman, Smirnhoff, Mishkin, seems to show some promise.
 One can make a sort of analogue between some relatively abstract
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1	The data in the bank is in the form of records and				
2	a single record can be looked upon as a point in some abstract				
3	in dimensional space. The different items in the record are				
-4	the different components in the point in this space. One has				
5	to have some notion about distances between points and once				
6	the distances between points, the function that finds the				
7	distances between these points, not the kinds that you use				
8	down in geometry classes, but much more abstract distance,				
9	it enables you to calculate the so-called Absalon entrophy,				
10	and that is a measure of the uncertainty in the information.				
11	The more uncertainty that you have, the more				
12	entrophy that you have, and the more the privacy is protected;				
13	but also the less statistical utility one has. One would like				
14	to get in a balance between this protection of privacy and				
15	the statistical utility. Well, on the other hand, one has to				
16	have some kind of a measure of the statistical quantities that				
17	are derived from micro data, which is what you are going to take				
18	as the most exact kinds of data that you can get, or the statis-				
19	tical derivates of that data, the most that you are going to				
20	be able to get.				
~ 1	. You would like to get the distance between that and				

You would like to get the distance between that and
 the statistical derivate, maybe they might be correlations,
 they might be co-variances, they might be sampled distribution
 functions. The ones that you would get from aggregated data.
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 In other words, if I want a large stream of data and I take

1 blocks of it and I take averages in those blocks, and I take 2 that kind of micro data and produce these other statistical 3 quantities, I am definitely going to get an approximation to 4 what I would have gotten in the more aggregate case and if the 5 approximation is too crude, the utility goes down.

6 We are trying to get a theory to balance one against 7 the other.

8 Going a little further, I should say in the systems 9 studies, maybe they could also be looked upon as theoretical 10 studies. We have tried to look at the question of centralized 11 data banks versus noncentralized data banks. Many people feel 12 that centralization of the data banks poses more of a threat 13 to privacy than to have it diffused in all these little data 14 banks around the country and in other places.

It is our feeling that this question is not clear cut, at all, that in actuality, the centralized data banks, given that the information is in data banks. That centralization, in the main, does not pose a greater threat than to have it in noncentralized data banks, and the argument is a rather long one.

I do not want to go into it here. Lots of it is based on economic considerations. One has to consider what the groups are that are being threatened. There are mass threats, and then there are threats against individuals. Sometimes the individuals are very wealthy, and sometimes they are

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down in the minority groups, minority and low income groups,
and the nature of the threats are very different. Also, the
nature of the costs that go into the invasion of aperson's
privacy and the costs that go into the protection of a person's
privacy varies from group to group with the person's economic
status.

7 The argument that we have is largely based on economic considerations. That is the main thing I want to 8 9 point out, and even though, for example, one might say, "Oh, the small individual has little protection against "Big Brother 10 Government," or something like that; in some kind of an argu-11 12 ment about centralized data banks, the big government has practically infinite resources to pit against the poor individual 13 who might like to fight this system. 14

Nevertheless, it is very investigatable. When the data bank is centralized, much more controls are going to be put on the big bank than these smaller banks. This is part of our argument. I do not want to go much further into details unless there are further questions later on.

We also made a small incursion into some theoretical questions into access control, password, generation, things of this type. The systems studies are rather detailed and they fall in a number of different categories. Dr. Rein Turn, who spent most of his time on this, will now tell you about what he has done in this area.

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C	1	If there are questions after his presentat	ion,
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DR. TURN: We promised our chairman we would have a 2 one-two punch, so I will delivery the second part of it.

3 I am an engineer, so I will talk in sort of simple 4 engineering language, and talk about what you call the systems studies.

6 I have some pictures here. What I tried to do is 7 sort of derive a functional model of a data bank and personal 8 information data bank, what it might look like, and try to 9 identify what one might call the actors in it, persons or 10 agencies.

11 Here is what I came up with and naturally we were 12 concerned with the subject of this data, the people whose 13 records are collected in the data bank.

(Slide.)

15 The data bank is a block here. It will contain. 16 the computerized files and computer system used to retrieve 17 this information and store it and so on.

18 Now the data itself is in the hands of a custodian 19 agency, maybe HEW, NIH. The data is gathered, perhaps directly 20 from the subject, if it is Census, by mail, or through some 21 other agency that acts as a collector.

22 Naturally, there should be users to this data and 23 they are sitting over here. Also in the picture is what I call 24 the controller, an agency or perhaps just legislature that Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 establishes this data bank and gives authority to the custodian

to collect and get the data and may actually require the subject under the penalty of law, to produce it, perhaps like Census was.

Society also enters the picture here because many of these data bank systems really are established to produce some benefits to the society in general and naturally, then the subject, being a member of society, will also benefit.

But in doing this, the subject is giving up some of his information about himself so the question of right of privacy enters here and as far as that goes, the subject is really against the whole rest of this data bank.

Actually, the subject is the only one in this case of a personal information system who may suffer losses because of some -- well, unproper behavior of the rest of the data bank, including the society. Society includes the public and the news media and all that who may have different interests in the subject's private life.

As far as the right of privacy is concerned, we 18 are not really studying that very much. Dr. Juncosa already 19 said we are more interested in the technical aspects of it. 20 I think that the treatment of right of privacy as 21 Westinghouse has done it, is a very useful one, mainly the 22 questions that you ask when you discuss the right of privacy 23 have to do with what data is collected about the subject, and 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. who is then allowed to be the user and for what purposes. 25

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requested for whatever program this data bank supports, and 2 maybe there is one place for one to start protecting this 3 right of privacy, really scrutinize whether or not the . 4 particular item of information really is required, and how it can 5 be used for the purposes stated for this data bank system. 6 Now, in this little region that I labelled 7 confidentiality then are the data bank, the custodian. 8 This has to do with the confidentiality and the 9 protection that is promised to he subject by the collector 10 when he says, let's establish this data bank. 11 We will take special safeguards to make sure this 12 data is properly used and this -- maybe the legislators think 13 like private 13 for the Census Bureau that says the data 14 may not be released. 15 We also have a person or agency here called an 16 intruder, who is trying to get unauthorized access to this data 17 and some -- this intruder would be -- would launch deliberate 18 attempts to get into this system and by some subterfuge or 19 trying some way to bypass or circumvent or nullify the procedures 20 that are built in the data security procedures, then they are 21 mainly technical safeguards against this unauthorized attempt. 22 Now, any one of these actors here may become an 23 intruder, including the subject himself if the subject is a 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. criminal whose criminal history sitting in this data bank he 25

These are the questions to be asked when data is

1 may be very much interested in having wiped out and maybe
2 launch something against the system.

3 Actually, our -- my interest has been a lot along this data security part of it, namely what technical safeguards 4 you can implement to prevent this type of unauthorized attempt 5 6 to get to the data for various purposes, and like Dr. Juncosa 7 said, some of the purposes that we have considered -- we 8 have been thinking of rational intruders who have some economic gain in trying to get in the data and various types of 9 these mailing lists, using now generic term, a mailing list 10 may be a commercially motivated thing or it might be a list 11 12 of mailing -- mailing bombs to specific types of individuals, 13 and one can utilize the capabilities of a computer to search the data for a specific characteristic of those persons that 14 use -- this intruder may want to put on its list. 15 I am not ruling out then an intruder being also, 16 perhaps, the collector. 17

18 The collector may have some -- I mean the controller 19 or the custodian. There may be various reasons why they want 20 to bypass the disclosure rules.

I have a list -- a little list of threats against
this type of data bank system.

(Slide.)

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-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 These names one may challenge. Legislative threat, one can

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challenge that.

(Laughter.)

Just as a law can be established to restrict a disclosure of data, so can a law be passed through widening the data that may be distributed.

6 What the reasons are for doing that, I am not 7 going to -- I am not analyzing that but sort of a change in 8 the general mood in the country might be one. As a matter 9 of fact, it is hard to tell what type of information may 10 become sensitive information. Is it national origin --11 whatever -- occupation, or being a member of Rand Corporation? 12 Who knows. Various things like that.

Then at a lower level where we have the custodian 13 and the collector within the data bank system and the user 14 there is what I call -- should be in quotes, "an executive 15 threat" namely the custodian of the data bank may on his own, 16 perhaps, arrange for an exchange of data, kind of a guid pro gud 17 basis. I do this for you when you do that for me, or, perhaps 18 to build up a little credit of good will with other agencies. 19 There is a source of threat that may exist. 20

Then there is something called the subversive threat. That might be a very real one. Namely, the personnel of any element, I mean custodian or so on, are certainly open for attempts to subvert them through blackmail or whatever; and as far as case histories go, at this time in trying -- in these unauthorized intrusions in computer systems, it has always been the personnel of some computer facility that have, on their own, for some financial gain or under some other people's influence, tried to bypass all the protection that has been built in.

6 So it is these kinds of threats that I guess 7 would be high on the list, really.

8 But then this intrusion here would be an unauthorized 9 attempt to go in, in some subversive way, from trying to 10 bypass the built-in schemes.

There is physical invasion and overt attack. There have been such attacks around the Wisconsin computer, for example, that was bombed. And certainly, the threat of a tape theft might be the easiest way to get access to the data if one wants to.

There are accidental malfunctions. The personnel can release the data and violate the disclosure rules.

Lack of data integrity itself is also a threat.
This was discussed already in the context of the credit bureaus.
Certainly it is a threat to the privacy of the person,

or at least threatens his ability to operate in a society if it is mislabelled into some category.

23 While these are the sources of threats, I don't have a list -- I think you had a list here yourselves, of how they Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 really may affect a person.

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mm 7	So well, I will just show I attempted to
2	classify data bank systems from the point of view of providing
. 3	data security data security is mainly my interest.
4	The privacy part is much more difficult, the
4 5	confidentiality.
end 10 6	(Slide.)
start 11 7	
	It seems to me the data banks could fall into
8	these categories where these are really the boundaries of
9	this line. There is lots of gray inbetween all these
10	dimensions.
11	Publicly, government operated; private would be
12	something like a credit bureau. This refers to the type of
13	controller that you have, a group of persons who formed a
14	corporation and now control it and lay down the rules or is
15	it the legislature that applies it.
16	Then there is the purpose of the data bank in a way
17	addressing the question of whether or not the personal
18	identification is required at the output of this data bank.
19	A statistical data bank doesn't require it. The output is
20	aggregations.
21	A dossier type data bank requires it. It is used
22	for regulation or administration, or perhaps providing
23	intelligence for some operation that requires that the specific
24	individual be named and the information on the specific
- Federal Reporters, Inc. 25	individuals be acquired.
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I am using the word dossier here free of all the emotional connotations that it might have. It seems to me it is a word that described the fact that there are personal records kept in that data bank.

5 Then coming down the computer system, dedicated or 6 shared means there are other users in the case of shared data 7 bank on the same computer which makes breaching of the data 8 security safeguards easier. If it is dedicated, it is only 9 for the purpose of this data bank. There is less risk that 10 someone from outside could get in.

Centralized versus decentralized. I mean here in 11 the geographical sense. A decentralized data bank would 12 imply communication links hooking togehter this data 13 bank system. Those are vulnerable to wiretapping or whatever. 14 So it would be less -- it would be more difficult to provide 15 security in a decentralized system in my sense, than one 16 that is hooked together in a communication network. 17

The fact whether it is off line or on line refers to whether or not a user can directly get to the data through the terminal without some operator intervening.

So again, I don't know how much this classification and my knowledge of data bank helps you in the determination of a personal identifier, but perhaps it does illuminate a little bit.

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To complete this thing --

DR. BURGESS: The right-hand side, though, is less secure.

DR. TURN: Yes.

I tried to arrange it that this would be the best situation from a point of view of providing data, security, public, so there would be a nice statute, perhaps, that is statistical and it is only for the data bank and centralized in the same vault. It is off line so the user can't get his hands on it.

10 The other side would be the other extreme, the 11 hardest to provide data security.

12 This can probably be debated, but this is my 13 view of it.

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(Slide.)

Now, to finish off I will show you a slide that Dr. Willis WAre, who is a member of your committee here in 17 1967 produced and presented, and it shows the worst of all possible environments that a computer system may encounter from the point of data security.

It shows all the sources of threats and the types of threats that may arise. I guess this is just to show you that it could be very bad. It may not, again, have an impact on your deliberations here, but pointing out that there is not only wiretaps that could be on lines from terminals to the switching center to the processor, but there may be radiation

¢	mmlO	1	that could be picked up.
`		2	All of this implies that there is someone that
		3	really wants it and wants to make an investment large enough
		4	to be able to pick up this type of radiation.
	-	5	There are the users who may try to even an '
		6	authorized user trying to do some unauthorized processing
		7	of the information or getting into someone else' data file.
		8	So there are other things records that could
		- 9	be attached, eavesdropping bugs that could pick up the
		10	accoustical signal from the terminals. You name it. It is
		11	a James Bond world, really.
\mathcal{C}		12	Then there are all types of ways. The system
		13	itself may fail, malfunctions sending one person's data on to
		14	some other user's terminal and thereby violate the disclosure
		15	rules.
		16	There are the programmers who may have their own
		17	goals rather than the goals of the data bank system and while
		18	maybe not in a personal information data bank system, but
		19	certainly in a commercial system where money is involved or
		20	marketing plans, certain programmers may have their own ideas
		21	how it should be distributed.
		2 2	There are operators who have the opportunity to tam-
(23	per with the protections and get into the same kinds of little
		24	illicit activity.
:e F	ederal Reporters	, Inc. 25	The maintenance man can do things to hardware, the

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programs themselves; not only are they prone to errors because 1 of their incompletely checked out -- which means that once again they can distribute the data to some unknown places -- but they 3 can also be tampered with; and so there are the files that could 4 be stolen or copied. 5 Sometimes people say it's easy to walk out with a 6 reel of tape from some government agency. I don't know how true that is. But that also implies you know what reel to take and 8 there are thousands of them in some places. One can go on 9 these fishing expeditions and see what you can get. 10 (Laughter.) 11 Well, so much of this environment of computer network 12 vulnerabilities and so much of what I meant to say. Dr. 13 Juncosa's and my talk was meant as a progress report to the 14 National Science Foundation and we didn't have this opportunity 15 we could talk to you too, or we would have tailored our talk a 16 little bit to match your interests. 17 Thank you, very much. DR. GROMMERS: 18 Dr. Rourke is only going to be with us until 12:30 19 so I would like to have -- will you be here later? 20 DR. TURN: Yes. 21 DR. GROMMERS: We would like to have a few questions 22 Would you like to ask your question now? 23 DR. WEIZENBAUM: I was just going to remark, 24 e - Federal Reporters, Inc. expecially on this last slide, you are talking about the 25

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security of data systems.

What you are talking about there is the problem of stealing information, unauthorized access to information by various ways, by various means, many of which are described there.

There is -- of course the other problem, that is of aggregating records in some sense quite legitimately and putting the agency in a position to, in effect, build a model of the individual about whom these -- whose records these are in some sense, such that something is revealed which would not be revealed if these records were to be taken one at a time. DR. TURN: That is right.

DR. WEIZENBAUM: Security in that sense has not
been discussed at all then.

DR. TURN: No.

DR. WEIZENBAUM: The question is when you talk about security and safety and all that sort of thing, whether you are restricting yourself to this aspect of it all, including also the aspect he mentioned?

20DR. JUNCOSA: I am talking about that aspect as well.21DR. TURN: We have been receiving some guidance from22our panel at the National Science Foundation to address these23types of questions some more.

24 DR. WEIZENBAUM: I suggest that there seems to be =e-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 an overlap between your work, the panel that you have just

mentioned the existence I didn't know of until a microsecond 1 ago, and what we are trying to do, and perhaps we ought to find 2 some way of making some connections here. 3 I would be glad to help. DR. TURN: 4 DR. WEIZENBAUM: Thank you. 5 MR. DOBBS: I was interested in the use of conflict 6 models and my interest comes just from the label in the sense 7 that you would like to think that in fact the goals of the 8 user and the system operater and the person from whom the 9 information is being collected are cooperative and not in 10 fact in conflict. 11 You know, I ask whether that in fact is considered 12 in your studies or not. 13 In this model we are not looking at it DR.JUNCOSA: 14 that way. The model is concerned with someone who is, you 15 know, inimical to the person who is the potential victim. 16 So, he is trying to get something from the bank. 17 I guess the real question is is in any MR. DOBBS: 18 way the technique that you are using applicable to the 19 situation where, in fact, there are cooperative players in the 20 game who may have incomplete information, you know, at the 21 system bounds, because it seems to me that, I hope, that's the 22 kind of thing we are really trying to address. 23 24

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1	DR. JUNCOSA: We have not looked at that. It is a
. 2	more sophisticated kind of problem. We may get to this later.
. 3	DR. GROMMERS: Are you here in Washington?
4	DR. TURN: No. Santa Monica, California.
5	DR. GROMMERS: I see.
6	DR. WEIZENBAUM: The question you asked is the
7	same question that bothered me. Put it in a practical perspec-
8	tive. You have a number of cooperating agencies.
9	DR. JUNCOSA: Yes.
10	DR. WEIZENBAUM: And you have a number of clients who
11	are going to cooperate because they are getting welfare checks or
12	their income tax is going to be reduced or they are going to
13	get health services.
14	Each of them is interested in cooperating and now
15	because of a failure of insight or whatever, this cooperation
16	results in the in some sense, the generation of information
[·] 17	out of raw material and building up a hierarchy of information
18	such that suddenly a picture emerges about the individuals
19	about whom information is collected which picture is then
20	recognized as being undesirable.
21	Such pictures ought not to exist in the hands of
22	the government. Since it is fundamentally the same question,
23	I think.
24	DR. JUNCOSA: It is certainly related. Perhaps,

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-ce-Federal Reporters, Inc. we ought to get back into the argument about this later this

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C	1	afternoon. I have the personal feeling there is a problem of
	2	symmetry in the business of what is a threat. If you look
	3	back about a hundred years or so ago, there was much less
	4	privacy about an individual than there is today.
	5	You lived in a small town and the data bank was
	6	not automatized, but it was in the gossip and everything else
	7	that was spread around. Everybody knew what everybody else
	8	was worth. If they did not know that there was a bank balance
	9	somewhere, they knew his farm was that big, and knew what it
	10	produced.
	11	Furthermore, they knew who was sleeping with whom
C .	12	in town but that fellow who knew that also knew who else was
	13	doing that.
	14	Because of that he had a certain amount of symmetry
	15	in the situation that he did not feel threatened in this
	16	symmetry.
	17	Now we have a situation where considerably less is
	18	known about the individual but there is no symmetry. You do
	19	not know what that fellow is going to do to you. A big com-
	20	ponent of this thing is psychological.
	21	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Also you should add in the earlier
	22	situation, if the fellow felt himself threatened, he could run
í	23	away, go west, for example. In that ability, with modern
	24	communication techniques and so on, and so forth, that ability
·ce Federal Reporters,	1nc. 25	is now lost in society. There is no longer any place to hide.
		•

That is another feature. 1 DR. JUNCOSA: I do not 2 really want to get into this thing, as I said, because it goes on for hours, and hours, and hours. You cannot paint the 3 thing black and white. 4 You are down to a situation where you consider what 5 are the risks, human people are being damaged in the system. 6 You cannot deny the fact that a piece of information, no matter 7 whether it is automatized, no matter where it is, is somehow 8 connectable to an invasion of the person's privacy. 9 It is foolish for anybody to believe that there is perfect privacy. 10 You are going to make some sort of compromise with 11 the real world, the best that you can. A good deal of it 12 requires a reformulation of your psychological attitudes. 13 There are different attitudes today than there were before. 14 MR. GALLATI: I was wondering in your data bank 15 model, you had the squiggly line confidentiality and included 16 the collector, data bank and custodian. You failed to extend 17 it to include the user. 18 We found this is one of the problems that we ran 19 into that we did not in the past thing, too much. 20 DR. TURN: Right. When the user gets that, he gets 21 the responsibility of adhering to these rules of disclosure. 22 He should be inside that. 23

24MR. GENTILE: One quick question. You mentioned thatFederal Reporters, Inc.
25when you had Figure One up on the board, you had the data

1 bank, and then you had a wriggly line and the intruder. You
2 said, most of the activity was in that area called data
3 security.

DR. TURN: My personal interest has been in it, yes.
MR. GENTILE: I wonder if your report will contain
some constructive means of improving security, however, the
data bank is defined, whether they be in files ---

B DR. TURN: We hope our report will have a large part having to do with this question. We are trying to, as Dr. Juncosa said, trying to establish some of the measures as to how much security you get for what technical feature that you put in and look at the costs, how much will it cost you and then have the model, like you mentioned, if you also know about the value of the information.

Then one could have a rational security system
designed, say, technique developed.

MR. GENTILE: So then, if I grant that we will never have absolute security or a fine Utopia, in your technical and expert opinion, do you feel that there are definite measures that can be taken to improve data security over what exists now?

22 DR. TURN: Definitely. Given the resources to do 23 it. But that is a security, as we define it, against unauthor-24 ized intruders who try to dig their way into the data bank -Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 to get something out.

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C	1	The confidentiality part it is necessary, a pre-
	2	requisite, to have data confidentiality, but the things that
	. 3	have to do with laws and human problems may not necessarily be
	4	involved by these techniques of data security, by the technical
	5	solution.
	6	DR. GROMMERS: For example, the problem that Joe
	7	raised, is not necessarily being addressed by what they are
	8	doing.
	9	DR. TURN: Right.
	10	DR. WEIZENBAUM: In this aspect of the work?
	11	DR. GROMMERS: In this aspect.
C	12	MR. GENTILE: I might note I read somewhere like
	13	over 75 percent of any breach in security was in the area that
		Dr. Gallati researched, out in the user area. It was not
	15	a physical assault, or someone stealing a tape from a data
	16	center, but rather after the material was printed out, published,
	17	what happens to it then.
	18	This can be covered by administrative
	19	DR. TURN: Let me point out there are technical ways
	20	of also making the users adhere to some of the disclosure
	21	rules. In the case of statistical data banks, where you do not
-	22	release to the users anything but the aggregates, you auto-
í · ·	23	matically apply disclosure requirements on the data you give
ſ	24	to the user.
2e – Federal Reporters	, Inc. 25	He may still have some requirements to keep the data

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He may still have some requirements to keep the data

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1 for a specific purpose or use it for a specific purpose and so 2 on that he has, himself, adhered to not just passed it out to 3 anyone.

DR. GROMMERS: I would like to switch over to Dr. Rourke's presentation, right now but these gentlemen will be here. When you split into your groups, if you would like to have them come and speak with you about a particular point --

DR. ROURKE: Thank you very much.

9 I feel like I am packing off to something you have already considered which was some of the groundwork. 10 I under-11 stand I was invited as someone laboring in the vineyard who was not an expert in protection, but at least, to give you 12 13 some background on the benefit and some of the potential problems that I, as a physician, a physician computerman, who 14 is interested in data processing as a life's interest in the 15 medical environment, what sort of benefits and problems I 16 could see that was coming up. 17

Joe Naughton raised some questions yesterday that
we did not answer and I think in light of the short time that
I do have, are there questions remaining from yesterday?
Some of you promised to help me remember what they
were.

 No questions remaining from yesterday?
 I think medicine, if I can start within the hospital
 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 in very mundane sort of terms, there is much that could be learned and much that could be done for the benefit of the
 patient if we could link data sources in multiple locations
 in the hospital. Hospitals establish a common identifier
 for the sojourn through the episode in the hospital, the patient
 number.

6 Some institutions will use social security number,
7 most will use a unit record number that will relate to the
8 one hospitalization. A few will use a unit record number which
9 they maintain for that individual as long as he is at the
10 same hospital.

11 They use it to link the X-ray Department, the clin-12 ical laboratories, the medical record department afterwards 13 in order to retrieve his data nad in fact, here at NIH, we are 14 doing -- we assign the number. We have several automated 15 systems which we link by patient number.

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Does this problem or this desire come up in medicine in general? Yes, it does.

There is a desire to link -- records for an individual together even though the data has been collected at multiple sites and in multiple locations.

In brief there is no way I know of in existence other than some of the third party pairs that are now in the business of putting together data that comes from multiple sources.

9 Let me go back to just one experience in Missouri to show that some of this data is in fact needed. 10 The regional medical program came along and said we want to put money out 11 to the people to get health care. The state planners said we 12 have to know what the problems are. One of the things we have 13 to do is go out to the hospitals and find out what they are 14 seeing in our state so we can structure our programs to those 15 particular problems. 16

17 They set about, set up a data collection system, 18 were so successful they were collecting somewhere like 92 per-19 cent of the discharge diagnoses for all the patients in the 20 state of Missouri who did not go to the metropolitan areas of 21 St. Louis and Kansas City.

That is a great deal larger data base than any state I know of. They got it all together and had collected data items which would be race, sex, age, discharge diagnosis, infor-Inc. mation they thought would be useful. They went through and

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counted up the number of hospitalizations in various counties 1 2 for various things and all of a sudden somebody said wait a 3 minute. This is fine, but we don't have any identifier of the person involved and we can't find out whether we treated 20 4 older people for congestive heart failure and treated each one 5 once or whether we are looking at one person we treated 20 times. 6 7 One says we distributed care to the populous in a fairly good fashion and the other one says we are losing and 8 that we are investing huge amount of resource in a very few 9 10 people. I would submit that our problem of cross-populations 11 is to pick up records that originated in different places, dif-12

13 ferent hospitals, different health care institutions, facilities, 14 and link them together to get a case profile of a given disease 15 entity.

16 A common identifier used in all locations would give 17 us that ability. If the common identifier was confidential to 18 the individual and his medical environment, there would be no 19 problem, but the common identifiers that we have will be common 20 to more than just his medical environment.

His identifier will become public information, any-22 body can ask for it and get it. May I go back a little bit.

I went from Missouri which is a relatively trusting area of the country, out in the country, you knew the guy at Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 the store, he'd extended credit to you.

He might call up the local credit bureau and say is he bouncing checks, does he have an account at the local bank, the bank says yes he's good for that much money. They extend credit.

5 I went to California. In California they would not 6 extend credit unless I told them my social security number.

The common identifier, if we have one, will become a public number, and if we are associating confidential and private information. And we agree most medical information is private, if we use the same identifier for the private interactions that we do for the public interactions, we store the identifier in both types of files. There is nothing I know of that will keep those from being linked together in our present system.

I see that as a major area of concern that I would think you would worry about.

Now, I would think that medicine is a system in which the server, or the data collector, is alive with the interests of the individual. We all think of our family doctor as concerned of us first. He may or may not be. Nasty things are said that he is interested in padding his own pocket.

In either case his interest is in preserving the confidentiality and furthering the interests of the individual because we all realize that if our patient doesn't trust us, he will not tell us things. If he does not tell us what he carries around in his head, we are helpless to treat him.

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People have estimated how much information in treating
 for a given disease, or at least teaching a person how to live
 with this disease, how much comes from what the patient says
 or how much comes from what you examine or the blood you draw.

5 It's heavily weighted on the side of what the patient 6 tells you. The physician needs this information from his 7 patient. It is in his interest to preserve the confidentiality.

8 I submit we have two types. We have those tight 9 communities where it's in the interests of the people who get 10 the information to protect it. And there are other communities 11 that are, as we have just talked about, antagonistic situations 12 where somebody wants to find something out about another person, 13 not for his benefit but for the individual who is finding it 14 out.

Between those two extremes there will be continual problems if in fact one solution is attempted to be applied to both.

18 Let me go back to a broad idea about data processing.
19 Those of us in research, those of us in national government,
20 those of us in any area look to computers or automated data
21 processing because it reduces the cost of collecting or pro22 cessing data.

23 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 In the past the major overhead has been in processing Computers allow you to collect it once and process it many times for many purposes.

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What we all really want to do is collect it once,
use those multiple files for good purposes, whatever the good
purposes are. It's a basic dichotomy that if we have enough
information so we can link those records, which is cost savings,
we also have the problem of -- I am sorry.

I lost thought in mid-sentence.

7 The benefit to come from automation is in fact in 8 reducing the costs and is in fact putting things together, it's 9 perceived that putting things together is something that is bad.

I suspect within the environments where you can guarantee that people who put them together have the same interests that the individual does, we won't have problems.

Where we have problems is in those areas where people doing it are not perceived as having the same interests as the individual.

Let me go through two examples that I have been through recently in research studies and the problems that are involved when you have protection of given data items.

Hepatitis -- we have all heard about the blood
banking problem where there has suddenly been an antigen discovered that seems to tell us whether somebody has had hepatitis
or whether he can give hepatitis. What is totally unknown
about that disease is whether it's communicable between people
other than by blood contact.

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In my particular situation we had the question whether

hospital employees who are exposed to patients with hepatitis have a higher incidence of the disease or whether they have a higher incidence of catching some clinical disease, acquiring the virus, and perhaps being a potential threat to other patients within the hospital.

Now we would like to isolate it. We would like to
get two groups, one which is high risk for exposure to hepatitis
and we would like to make sure that no other factor interferes.

9 It has been said that age makes a difference as to
10 whether you have the disease or not. As you get older, more
11 people acquire it so maybe old people are a risk.

12 It has been said that socioeconomic area has some-13 thing to do with area. It has been said that race has something 14 to do with it. The scientific question: Does exposure to 15 hepatitis increase your risk of getting it.

If that is true, does your having it increase the risk of transmitting it to somebody else. Nobody knows. We would like to set up the study where we match two populations, where we had a male Caucasian age 35 who was in a high risk hospital situation, blood contact situation. We would like to find another one, same characteristics, Caucasian 35 years old in a non-high risk population.

23 We found in personnel files around NIH we could get 24 age GS status. We couldn't get race. Race had been taken out rederal Reporters, Inc. 25 of the files. It's protected and can be used only for preparing

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equal opportunity employment reports. I take no question of 1 2 whether that's a good thing or bad thing to do. 3 I only come back to the medical situation which is 4 the cost of the study to find a race matched population was a 5 great deal higher. We couldn't go find individuals and say you 6 have the right characteristics, please give. 7 We had to match by three of the four characteristics 8 we had and go out and make our own decision as to what the race 9 was. 10 We had to collect a lot more data before we could get 11 a population to use as a match group. 12 We needed to know the individual in order to do the 13 study or even to ask him to participate. We needed to be able to trace from one place to another. I don't know the solution. 14 I am only saying this is one of the things we run up 15 If items are sequestered away and how tightly they are 16 against. sequestered. In this particular situation there was an advo-17 cacy procedure in which you had to go to the equal opportunity 18 coordinator on campus. He had strong pressure groups on him 19 to keep that information hidden. 20 That may or may not have been of interest to the public who were a risk. 21 The problem is aligning advocacy or the protectors 22 with the individuals who are being protected. 23 The same problem would come up with sickle cell dis-24 Federal Reporters, Inc. We have had some instances where an individual health ease. 25

service, employee health service, specifically, had been
providing the testing for individuals as they came through the
mployee health clinic.

All of those go into our central files in the hos-5 pital because we have a central computer file for all that work.

6 Can that information be released for people who 7 wish to do research, wish to find patients. The cost of doing 8 it that way is very small if we could look into the central file 9 of information, send out questionnaires, ask people to partici-10 pate in that study because we want to use that case or type of 11 cases to do research.

12 If we cannot use those central files, we have to pay 13 the cost of going out and finding them which is essentially 14 rescreening a new population. I don't know answers. I am only 15 presenting the kind of problems that I run into in a medical 16 research environment, in that the data exists, it has been 17 collected, it is automated.

18 If I am allowed to use it so as not to impinge on 19 somebody's private life, studies will occur because of the low 20 cost of finding cases.

If the cost of finding cases is high, the studies
will not occur and medical research will be slowed down. I have
one other thought and that is the universal identifier. It's
the technical one. I don't know whether this is the appropriate
place so I will say about two words: that is that any system

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that relies on human transcription of some numeric identifier is fallible to people miscopying. There are systems available which will allow you to detect some classes of miscopying, like check digits for those of you who know what they are. 10=13 - Federal Reporters, Inc. -Ace

CR 61731 If one is identified, I hope there would be some way **#14** dh 1 that we could validate the identifier when it is given to us so 2 3 that we could at least eliminate 85 percent of errors that occur not because somebody wants to tell us the wrong number, but 4 simply because somebody copies it wrong. 5 All of our credit cards in our pockets have check 6 digits in them. The social security does not. Anyone who comes 7 in and says my number is -- and reads the number, I can't tell 8 whether it is or isn't. 9 That's a small aside, and it's up to you. 10 Are there questions? I have condensed or tried to skip rapidly through a 11 lot of the things that I wanted to say. 12 MR. DOBBS: One thing that confused me a little bit 13 in your discussion and the way in which you termed the need for 14 a common identifier in order to get at a case profile. 15 It seems to me that what you were saying, that you do, in fact, 16 have to have something which is stable from the view point of a 17 particular patient to track him through this environment. 18 I would argue that that requirement may be a totally 19 different one than the broader requirement of an identifier 20 which in fact has to be transferred out of that system context 21 you described to some other kind of context and that there are 22 a variety of ways of solving your particular problem. 23 Now, I would like to hear your answer to that. 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. DR. ROURKE: The problem I see is that most of our 25

systems will require the patient to provide his identifier. 1 If he provides a constant identifier, -- he has to provide it at 2 multiple locations. However, you get it into this file where 3 you can link multiple episodes, so to speak, the problem is how 4 do you translate from one that is public data on the outside to 5 something else that is transferred the same way in all locations. 6 7 Does any one location know how to translate into it, plus the translator can read any record in the system. 8 9 DR. WEIZENBAUM: May I suggest a solution to that I have exactly the same note here to ask. problem? 10 You use the phrase, "common identifier used in all " 11 locations." It's the "used in all locations" that I object to. 12 Let me take your -- If I may step to the blackboard, let me take 13 your Missouri case. 14 You have 20 people. Let's suppose there are only 15 4, just because chalk is expensive. Suppose you have 4 people 16 and there case numbers are 147, 391, 511, and 713. 17 Those are the cases that -- the case numbers as they come to you. 18 Now it turns out that the secret information -- we all 19 know that in fact, these 2 people, those 2 cases, are the same. 20 The fellow moved from one town to the other, and rentered the 21 hospital and had another such episide and so on. 22 MR. GENTILE: May I ask a question, how did you know 23 that? 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. DR. WEIZENBAUM: I'm playing God for the moment. I'm 25

dh 3.

I'm saying we know that.

2	But now those physicians are sent to some medical
3	researcher who is trying to determine what is going on here, and
4	his results are going to be disturbed to the extent that he does-
5	n't know that in fact here he is talking about the same indiv-
6	idual. Of course, the dates are associated with this. This
7	happens to be the first, this happens to be the second episode.
8	For the medical research purpose, that is an important date
9	that he needs to know.
10	What he is suggesting is that if a universal common
	What he is suggesting is that if a universal common identifier used in all locations, and in particular in the lo-
11 12	identifier used in all locations, and in particular in the lo-
11 12 13	identifier used in all locations, and in particular in the lo- cations of those various hospitals from which those data were
11 12 13 14	identifier used in all locations, and in particular in the lo- cations of those various hospitals from which those data were gathered, then, of course, it would be easy to agregrate this
11 12 13 14	identifier used in all locations, and in particular in the lo- cations of those various hospitals from which those data were gathered, then, of course, it would be easy to agregrate this and to make this discovery and consequently the medical research

17 patient enters this particular hospital, suppose those are 4
18 different hospitals, H1, H2, H3, and H4. When a person enters
19 the particular hospital, the hospital assigne a number to him,
20 in this case, 147, which just happens is the 147th such case
21 they have seen, and simply forget all the others.

At the same time it asks him for his universal ident-23 ifier which may be his name, address, mother's maiden name, date 24 of birth, or it may be social security or whatever. Okay. It ederal Reporters, Inc. 25 asks him for that. What it does not is to translate this number

together with -- let me change notations -- it now translates dh 4 1 || this number, together with his universal identifying number, I 2 will write U_, it translates this pair to another data bank, 3 citing where else all together. 4 What this other bank does is to store the universal 5 identifying number, together with this -- with the 147, and in ъ 7 fact which hospital it came from. It stores that. Okay, simply for all the others. There is this data 8 9 bank in Kansas City, say, which has -- all it has is triplets of numbers like this universal identifier, number assigned by 10 the hospital, and hospital number. That's all it has. 11 Now a medical researcher like you comes and says, 12 I have to have records like that. Okay, all of these hospitals 13 send you these numbers and now you appeal to this other data 14 bank, of course, and all you tell them is that I have got a 15 number 147 from H1, in other words, you give them this pair, 16 okay? . 17 And I have got -- in other words, you give them these 18 data, these pairs, okay? You say you would like to know whether 19 any of them are in fact the same individual. 20 Okay, this data bank which may very well be, so to 21 speak, in a numbered bank account in Switzerland -- I'm sugges-22 ting that it should be protected against subpoena is what I'm 23 trying to say. This data bank now sends you simply a list --24

in this particular instance it simply tells you while your 147

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U, and 511 U, are the same individuals -- that's what it tells dh 5 1 you. That satisfies your purpose. 2 3 The only possible objection to that is that this is somewhat more expensive than the -- than storing the universal 4 identifier all over the place. 5 Okay, now the question that Dr. Juncosa and others 6 have raised, the question of balance between social utility, 7 expense, and so on. That question then has to be answered. 8 9 Of course, that question can be answered in general, simply from this example. But you see there is a solution. 10 You think it's not practical? 11 DR. ROURKE: I don't think it's economical. 12 DR. WEIZENBAUM: When you say not practical, which 13 means not economic, which means you're making a judgement as to 14 the social utility of one thing against another thing and so on 15 and so forth. 16 Now that's a value judgement and you're entitled to 17 make your judgement. This committee has to make judgements of 18 this kind. It's terribly important to recognize that this is 19 not a question of the possibility of technological this and that 20 or that this is a question the answer to which could be computed 21 or rationally determined and so on and so forth. 22 In fact, there are value judgements involved here. 23 What I'm calling attention to is the existence of a solution 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. in the same sense that Dr. Juncosa, for example, called attention 25

dh 6	1	to the nonexistence of a perfect data bank.	
	2	DR. ROURKE: I entirely agree with you that the	
	3	choice is a sociological one of cost versus benefit or what's	
	4	it worth tc you.	
	5	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Right. Let me rattle on for just a	
	6	moment. You know one can come up with very far-fetched examples	•
	7	This is not far-fetched, but one can come up with very far fetch	ed
	8	examples that young people or people who don't read the newspape	cs
	9	might find incredible.	
1	10	But people who are a little older and have longer mem	-
1	11	ories know to be examples from reality. Now. we're talking abou	t
ſ	12	medical research here. I can imagine, for example, a national	
	13	register of say, identical twins, associated with social securit	Z
1	14	number.	·
• 1	15	Okay. Now that's fine. You know, we have a benevo-	
į	16	lent government here, and I.don't fear I have no fears about	
1	17	that.	
1	18	Okay, but I think the Republic of Germany was a	
1	19	benevolent government and supposedly they had computers. Suppose	e
2	20	medical doctors, people who took the Hippocratic Oath, at least,	
2	21	cooperated at one point in experiments were identical_people,	
2	22	what they called racial, just in other words, were in fact	
2	23	subjected to experiments which killed most of those twins.	
1	24	Those twins had to be found. Now, they were difficul	:
	^{nc.} 25	to find and there were some good people who separated identical	

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dh 7	1	twins so they couldn't be identified and found, some hid them,
	2	so on and so forth. There is a horrible chapter in the history
	3	of the world that is withing menory in which I must say medical
	4	doctors participated and so on and so forth.
	5	The expected value and the expected risk of the kinds
	6	of things we are talking about here, those are very, very ser-
	7	ious they're very serious because those expected values and
end 14	8	expected risks are sometimes very, very high.
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MR. GALLATI: I think I'm going back a little bit to 1 Guy's point, but I didn't see anything in your presentation that 2 required you to go outside the medical profession, and when we 3 talked about universal identifiers which might be universal for 4 purposes of the medical profession, but would still maintain the 5 confidentiality associated with the medical profession. and I get a little disturbed when we get off on universal identifers 7 when I feel you don't need it for the purpose described. 8 MR. DOBBS: You would be far better offf than we are 9 because you would have the benefit of that data being incorpor-10 ated as part of the medical record with the pretext that that 11 currently implies. 12 Nobody else has got that. Either from a legal or 13 professional point of view. 14 DR. ROURKE: I think that's one of the possibilities 15 that there is a private identifier for the invididual and he 16 controls who gets it. No one can require it of him. 17 The Federal Government can't pay him on the basis of 18 The third party payers can't pay him on the basis of it. it. 19 It's a non-competive number and used only in the private systems 20 lawyers, preachers, physicians, whatever else. 21 Perhaps a public number which could be fairly severely 22 restricted on what could be required or could also be required. 23

Prederal Reporters, Inc. 25 birth, though, to have it really valuable?

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DR. ROURKE: It would be a lot more valuable if it was.

3	MR. ANGLERO: This analysis is supposed to be headed
4	toward a better society, supposedly. Can we have any indicators
5	that can tell us that through this investigation we are able,
6	or we have had we are having a better society than other
7	societies not having all this analysis and capability?
8	DR. ROURKE: Well, I don't know. I guess it's faith.
9	MR. DOBBS: You have to keep the faith, Juan.
10	DR. ROURKE: You really do. There is faith that you
11	can track the course of disease if it's in a population of
12	multiple time servers, that you can fail with you can inter-
13	upt the early course of the disease. We don't know how to handle
14	people who come into the office because we don't know what happens
15	to people like this. It's faith.
16	MR. ANGLERO: In terms of progress, we can take it,
17	but in terms of output, when we talk about family planning, for
18	example, we're not dealing with individuals as such. We have
19	to deal with a population growth, and if everything that we do to
20	have a family planning program, do not prevent or do not con-
21	trol growth of the population, increase of the population, after
22	all, what are we doing?

And if we start all those mechanisms, and we sophis-24 ticate all of our techniques, supposedly because we are going Federal Reporters, inc. 25 to improve the health, or some indicators show us that we're

dh 3

3

1 going that way, I ask if you have those indicators in terms of 2 our societies, anyplace.

DR. ROURKE: One doesn't have them.

4 MR. ANGLERO: This is a means. You can say the events 5 of the life of the individuals or some other indicators would 6 tell you this society is better than other societies.

7 DR. ROURKE: Well, you're asking output analysis, 8 assuming that across society, factors are controlled, like 9 genetics which we know is a big impact on how healthy you are or 10 what diseases you suffer from. But we have no tool to optimize 11 within our society, to look across -- let me take an example 12 that again we have probably all heard of and that is the Kaiser 13 business of multiphasic health screening.

Lots of people do it. There is no evidence that that does anything to help the population stay healthier. There is some preliminary evidence that it does keep those people with known diseases healthier because they're getting a routine follow up in an economic fashion.

But overall, if you were to offer it or adopt it as a national policy, that this is the way we want to adopt health care, we don't know if it's effective. Even in the Kaiser system, we don't know how many other people go to other doctors to get health care. We don't have a measure, nor do they, of how much health care they're getting on the outside.

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It's that population activity, what services they get

1 what methods have been applied that I'm looking for. Whether 2 this is a solution to the confidentiality problem or medical 3 identifier number number would be it, I don't know. I'm only 4 looking as a means to look across the population to find out 5 what services they get, what expenses they have.

6 MR. MC LEAN: Could I ask one rather practical ques-7 tion on the reporting act as it relates to medical information? 8 Insurance investigating firms acquire, with other information, 9 a vast amount of medical information in connection with applica-10 tions for life insurance.

The pact specifically excepts the disclosure of medical information to the consumer when he walks into the office of a reporting agency. This exemption was largely lobbied into the Medical Force Bureau in Boston, which is one of the largest collectors of repositories of medical information.

They argued that that only a qualified physician ought to be releasing this information and that it would be even appropriate for a recording agency to release it without the proper medical interpretation. I would like to know your opinion on that and your judgement as to whether that is a valid exemption?

DR. ROURKE: May I ask, when you say "exemption," that says you may not require of an individual applicant, you may not require from him a medical history, but you can require of his physician a medical history?

dh 5]	MR. MC LEAN: No. When the medical agency is dis-
2	closing the information, then their physician must disclose
3	everything except medical information to the person being re-
. 4	ported on.
5	DR. ROURKE: I 'm not sure I understand.
6	MR. MC LEAN: The individual looking in his own file.
7	In other words, if you walk into a reporting agency and say,
8	let me see my file, they will disclose everything, save the
9	medical information.
10	This is a specific exemtion.
. 11	DR. ROURKE: I can be philosophical as to why I think
í Í	its a good idea in that I don't believe, in may cases, the in-
(13	dividual is prepared to interpret it. I have cases in a clinical
14	center now who are here for treatment of suspected cancer. It
· 15	is my judgement they do not have the psychological equipment,
16	nor does the family have the emotional stability to handle the
17	problem if it's not a real problem.
18	I feel grave damage would be done if I handed them
19	the chart, and it says first rule out first diagnosis
20	rule out cancer, when I know it's a problem for the patient.
21	I will deal with that problem with that individual.
- 22	MR. MC LEAN: This was largely the argument that the
23	medical information bureau gave.
24	DR. ROURKE: Whether it's a spurious argument in your
-e – Federal Reporters, inc. 25	case or not, I don't know. Did the data come from physicians,

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did it come from --

1 MR. MC LEAN: Yes. Physicians or hospital records. 2 3 DR. GROMMERS: I do think there are some doctors : that would disagree with Dr. Rourke. I think there are prob-4 ably few. 5 DR. ROURKE: Many of my colleagues, and I guess I'm 6 -- I think I'm representative, there are a few of the younger 7 group who would not sit down and go over an entire case and 8 everything about it with their patient. 9 MR. MC LEAN: From the point of view, of being, of 10 the consumer, he has applied for insurance, been rejected, and 11 goes and tries to find out why. They say, we can't tell you, 12 it's medical information and is exempt. 13 DR. ROURKE: Are you telling me he doesn't have the 14 right to get an advocate and trying to go find that information? 15 If you're saying his physician cannot go and find out for him, 16 then I would agree it would be a bad thing. 17 MR. MC LEAN: He has no statutory right at the moment. 18 But that may be a possible procedure. In that case, I think it 19 would be a bad thing. That's a personal opinion, if the patient 20 or applicant for insurance -- he should be able to get someone 21

who can understand what was going on and that he could pick 22 that individual at his choosing, duly licensed and all that sort 23 of stuff. 24

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Can an individual walk into legal situations and

dh .7	demand records? I'm ignorant. I really don't know. I suspect
	2 what one does is get a lawyer and say, Charlie, I need to find
	3 out. Go find out for me.
•	4 He knows how to get in and interpret the language on
	5 the documents and say to the client, You violated this, and part
	6 of the penalty was you lost some of your civil rights. That's
end 15	7 the law, and there is no way around it.
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()#6173	1	• DR. ALLEN: How high would you perceive the cost to
Dennis #16 HEW	2	be if the secretary were to issue a regulation saying their
<u>-</u> 1.	3	rights to privacy including your not using that information for
	4	any other purpose than for which it was provided to you unless
	5	either he gave permission subsequently to do that or by some
	6	other means you secured authorization to do that?
	7	Would that make it something that you as a researcher
	8	would find it very difficult to live with?
	9	DR. ROURKE: It's a two-way problem.
	10	The amount of trouble it would take to go back to a
	11	individual who had in the first case said no you can't have my
C	12	data and you discover he is the kind of case you really want.
-	13	If you know he is the right kind of case you have
	14	probably already divulged what he didn't want divulged.
	15	If I have sickle cell and there is an investigator
	16	who wants to find people with sickle cell trait because he wants
	17	10 cc of blood, if they pester me to get 10 cc of blood, I
	18	would say my privacy has been violated, perhaps.
	19	So by cutting it off completely that you would have
	20	to get advance permission, you would close off the data source.
	21	That is one alternative, one option.
	22	DR. ALLEN: That might be the kind of situation where
í	23	there might be an advocacy proceeding as an alternative to
`	24	going to the individuals themselves and making an argument on
ace – Federal Reporters,	Inc. 25	the merits of the research to be done, either to approach the

individuals or perhaps to authorize to proceed.

DR. ROURKE: There was a discussion last night over dinner about what you could get people to do. The comment was that it depended on education, what they would sign in when they first came in.

If I walked in and they said we will distribute information about your blood, we want 10 cc, we draw 10 cc and distribute it any way we want, I might well say no, what do you want it for, I will give it to you for a given study, but I won't give it to you for whatever because whatever is much to broad for what I want.

12 Most of the people in this country don't realize
13 what that would mean, what the possible uses could be and might
14 well say yes.

As it is when I give my pint of blood I sign a state-Ment that says NIH may use it any way they see fit which includes distributing to the research laboratories.

I don't say they can distribute it any way they want and they can come back and pester me because they found interesting things. But there is the dual problem that if they find something dangerous to my health in that I am going to keel over and I shouldn't take any one of the seven drugs. Then, there is the question of whether or not the investigator is immoral if he doesn't tell me.

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I don't know the answers. But I think there is both

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1 needs: To be able to find answers for his benefit, for a con-2 tinuing following along medical research investigation, and 3 there is also a need to protect him from making this relation 4 to an antagonistic individual whose interest is not the same 5 as the individual who has the knowledge, provided the informa-6 tion or owns the information.

7 MR. ANGLERO: Is there any kind of number in Medicaid 8 or Medicare that would provide for some kind of, this kind of 9 linkage?

DR. ROURKE: I can't answer that. Is that the social security number?

MS. GAYNOR: Medicare.

13 DR. ROURKE: Medicare is social security. Does 14 Medicaid require for you social security?

MS. GAYNOR: No.

DR. ROURKE: I am not sure now when somebody asks for my social security number that I probably wouldn't want to provide it.

My government has taken my social security which I 19 am not required to give anybody and assigned the same number to 20 me as a military identification number which is published in a 21 big book. Anybody can get that. That's public record. 22 My military number. They go to any other data source they have 23 access to, either deliberate or accidental or casual, and they 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. can find out anything else they want on me. 25

1 · MS. HARDAWAY: Do you object to that? 2 DR. ROURKE: I do. I object to people dunning me with letters to buy products because I am in a given economic 3 4 bracket. 5 I don't want to be bugged. DR. GROMMERS: I just want to illustrate what this 6 really points out in my own words. It's not really a question 7 of identifier or universal identifier, but universal identifier 8 easily accessible. 9 10 DR. ROURKE: I had no choice as to whether my social security number, my tax number, was printed in a book and dis-11 tributed to anybody who wanted to read it. 12 My government didn't give me a chance to say, "Guys, 13 I don't want that same number, I don't want to give away that 14 link." 15 Anybody who can pick up a copy of that, an insurance 16 salesman and can read what I make per year on the same book. 17 can transfer that into a credit system and sell it to anybody 18 in the country. It's not authorized but it's very neat and 19 concise. 20 I suspect in the California credit system they can 21 now link what I made from that source with any other place that 22 requires a social security number. 23 Given a social security number, if there is a hospital 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. or medical system that codes my medical data under a social 25

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security number, and there are some of them, the access to
 information in that particular environment isn't protected
 physically because hospitals are clubs.

Nobody inside the club will deliberately hurt anybody who comes in as a patient, nobody will deliberately release information about them. But inside, it's public information; any nurses' aid could read any chart they wanted to in the hospital and find out anything they wanted to about it.

9 While you are a patient on a psychiatric ward, any10 body who is accredited to get in there can get in there.

DR. GROMMERS: All it takes is a white coat.

DR. ROURKE: Not even that. I have to tell a story. Jordan Barish was a layman back six years ago.

14 At the time the medical staff pounded on the table and said, 15 "Mr. Barish, you have to have security. All these things that's 16 public information, anybody can go up and ask for data. You 17 have to have better security."

They went on for three hours. Everything they proposed they found exceptions to one way or the other.

He finally said, "Gentlemen, gentlemen let's not spend any more time. I will match whatever is the current level of security in this institution to your satisfaction. If I do that will you accept me?"

And they talked a little while and said, "Okay. If -Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 we are the judges of whether you match it or not we will let

l you do it."

He said, "Thanks, guys, we have been here three
hours. Can I go to the bathroom?"

4 He got up and walked down to the record room and said, 5 "Hello, Betsy."

6 Pulled one chart out of the rack, stuck it under his 7 arm, pulled out a card check, pulled it out, put three under his 8 arm, said, "Bye, Betsy, I will bring these back in five minutes." 9 He walked out, dropped them on the table, and said, 10 "Gentlemen, I will match anything that the current system pro-11 vices."

We rely in medical institutions on the sociologic structure to protect medical data. While the patient is there visible in bed nobody will tell anything on the outside anything.

Someone who knows how the system works can walk in and find out anything. Once the physical record gets down to the record room, it's fairly secure.

Our particular institution is very secure in that Dr. Marston came over one day and asked for a record and the girl at the front desk said, "Who are you?" He said, "I am Dr. Marston," and pulled out his cards.

23 She walked over to the chart and looked to see who 24 she could give cards to.

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She said, "You are not one of ours."

1A lot of it depends on the sociology around it, not2on the first security. But there are problems.

I have been building more computer systems, a clinical center, as the hospital hasn't had a great many in the past. I worked with some programmers.

I said, "Look, this is confidential information, it's
the name and the unit number and the discharge diagnosis. We
are building a file to help researchers find cases. This is
really pretty confidential information, be careful of it, lock
it in your desk. It's not security data, there aren't a hundred
spies out to get it. Be careful of it."

12 They didn't perceive how important it was. I walked 13 over and found a box of scrap paper going out to "Save the 14 Trees Campaign" with my listings, this tall.

15 It was an old listing. There was one character
16 left out of the diagnosis. It was miscoded. It wasn't
17 any good.

18 They threw it out the hall and it went down the street 19 Physicians, medical people realize how important 20 confidentiality is to them because they can't work without it. 21 I couldn't work if a patient didn't trust me.

The data processing people will never have the same cultural interestsin preserving the security of the data that I do.

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When we get into more and more publicly --

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8 ل	1	MR. DOBBS: Wait. Wait. I can't let that pass.
	· 2	The reason I can't let it pass is that you are very competent
	3	as a supervisor. Dr. Naughton, yesterday, in terms of the data
	4	center pointed out that he felt that his responsibility ended
	5	as long as he provided the best possible services at the lowest
	6	cost.
	7	I would submit that as long as that endures, you are
	8	right. As long as that is his value in terms of the profession
	9	and the way in which he views it, you are absolutely right.
	10	But it does not have to be that way. There are
ænd 16	11	some of us who think that we share that responsibility.
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6173 (# 17	1	DR. ROURKE: Ok.
# 17 dh 1	2	MR DOBBS: I'm off the soap box.
	. 3	DR. ROURKE: No. I would do my very best with Joe to
	4	say, Joe, what you provide me isn't good enough and he says fine,
	5	it will cost you another blank dollars. I say, Joe, I can
	6	cure people for that amount. What kind of damage do I do to
	· 7	them if I don't spend that amount? It comes down to what I'm
	8	willing to pay for what am I going to get.
	9	MR. DOBBS: It's not the money. Joe has the feeling
	10	of that same sociological pressure that you as a physician,
	11	caused you to feel that it the relationship between you and the
C	12	client is important and therefore you have to protect that con-
	13	fidentialty.
	14	He and all the rest of us who are involved in infor-
	15	mation systems have to feel that same way. Those all, I'm say-
	16	ing.
	17	DR ROURKE: Okay. I wonder if we will accomplish it.
	18	MR. DOBBS: I don't know. I think part of what you
	19	have to do is believe that it's possible and to not let people
	20	say that my responsibility, if they're involved in this kind of
	21	system, which is predicted, ends at a certain point.
	22	We are all responsible and we're all culpable.
	23	DR. ROURKE: I would summarily agree. I think we have
ve – Federal Reporters	24	changed gears, however, from the manual days in which the amount
e - i energi veharigis	, inc. 25	of protectible information we would entrust to somebody who didn't

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understand was very small and in tiny pieces and we are now
 handling the bucketsful with very little more sociologic instruc tion, teaching than we did before.

DR. WEIZENBAUM: Let me make a new couple of points about this example that you just stated. I think it's useful to stick to real examples as opposed to general philosophy.

In the first place -- I need your attention.

DR. ROURKE: I'm sorry.

9 DR. WEIZENBAUM: In the first place, there is a ques-10 tion of how this stack of paper with all those names on it and 11 so forth and so on, got generated. You say it had an error in 12 it, and that's why it wound up on the floor.

This suggests to me that the program that produced that generator had a bug in it. I suggest it's sloppy procedure on Mr. Naughton's part, that's his responsibility, to debug programs with real and moreover sensitive data.

17 That's one point. Now, -- I will just leave that 18 there. No further comment on that. Now I ask you the following 19 question:

I would perhaps much rather ask Mr. Muchmore who unfortunately isn't here. He is a banker dealing with millions of dollars in a giant corporation and that sort of thing. I wonder, had his board of directors had made a decision to purchase or to sell some very large block of shares such that that particular sale, or some other strategic business decision,

dh 3 1 such that that decision could affect, significantly affect the 2 market, whether he would in fact take a piece of paper with that 3 decision on it, okay, and hand it to a programmer and say please 4 put this in the system for me. In the clear, that is not en-5 crypted in anyway, whatever. Okay?

And furthermore, whether that programmer knows he is dealing with a financial institution, he knows that this is a business decision, and so on and so forth. Chances are, he won't do that. He might for example get a terminal in his own office to do his own encrypting and take all sorts of safety measures.

There are value judgements involved here, and I think the example I have just cooked up makes it very clear that many of us, that matters involving lots of money are much more important than matters that involve human lives, the dignity of human individuals, and so on.

MS. HARDAWAY: Doctor, do you feel if I come in as a welfare patient wherever I'm totally not able to pay for any care, no matter large or small, do you feel that I have a right as a dependent upon the government to protect myself against not you, but the medical profession misusing me in any way, or if I lost part of that privilege when I have become dependent totally upon a government service to care for me2

24 DR. ROURKE: You're asking for a lot of my own cul-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 tural feelings.

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MS. HARDAWAY: I realize that.

DR. ROURKE: We all came with advantages and disadvantages. If in fact through no fault of our own, we're in that situation, I think its becoming our national purpose to provide all the supports necessary for good health without restriction, and I would submit that the sociological restriction that would then put you in the data bank and disqualify you from holding up your head at some future year might be bad.

9 I know the other side that, of course, this is the 10 fifth time around for some medical condition, that you didn't 11 take care of yourself and the government doesn't have a right 12 to be punitive at that point.

Well, the two are in conflict.

DR. GROMMERS: Particularly if the problem is an illegitimate child, or 50 illegitimate children. It really focuses on the question: Does the woman have the right to have an illegitimate child paid for by the government?

DR. ROURKE: I don't know the answer. As a physician, I would feel a lot better about it and be more effective, personally, for the individual if they had faith in me and their were no requirements to report the personal business of the individual.

23 MS. HARDAWAY: Let me go one step further, if I have 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 MS. HARDAWAY: Let me go one step further, if I have welfare mother, totally dependent, and my child has some birth illness that is serious but can possibly be . 8

1 cured with follow up treatment, do you feel that I have a right
2 to take that baby and go out of that hospital and be lost, or
3 do you feel because you have supplied my total care that you have
4 a right to require of me who depended upon government funding
5 Do you have that right for the follow up to the child

6 or do you feel I have the right to take the baby and let it die, 7 in fact?

DR. ROURKE: Thank you.

9 MS HARDAWAY: I'm talking about here, if I'm depen-10 dent upon the government for my financial care while I have been 11 under care.

DR. ROURKE: I think some of the solutions there are -- some of the answers that we live by are built into other structures, and the way I feel about it, the social welfare dependent has mechanisms whereby they can take custody of that child.

Do you have as a mother the right to go out and let the child die or be deformed for life, or injured? I think our society says no, but they're terribly careful about interfering, on the other hand.

21 MS. HARDAWAY: I was speaking more about the fact that 22 my care was paid for by the government.

23 DR. ROURKE: I don't think that makes a great deal of 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25

1 paid for your delivery --

MS. HARDAWAY: Even a legitimate child.

3 DR. ROURKE: A legitimate child. Do I have the right
4 to interfere with your education or treatment of that child?
5 We have mechanicms that say, in some cases, yes.

The mechanisms are not used very often, are not used 6 as far as some people would like to see them, but we don't use 7 them because we're afraid of the situation that occurred in 8 Germany. where does does the state have control over the child? 9 We are wrestling with it as an individual problem. 10 have seen some places where I have gotten into it, and triggered 11 the legal mechanisms so the state will take over, the battered 12 child coming in beaten up by their parents, I have reported a 13 few of those. 14

MS. GAYNOR: But those aren't welfare, either, are
they?

DR. ROURKE: No.

MS. HARDAWAY: I'm speaking of a welfare mother where I have been assigned a number.

DR. ROURKE: I think it's immaterial. But I think as a national policy, we would like to know about all children and all parents and be able to find out what the morbidity -the mortality was of children under certain situations. I would like to know that whether you're welfare or not.

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But if I have collected from one person, those that

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would feel the state having paid for it now as special rates on 1 2 the child, will try to use the information. There will be large forces in our society that will try and do it. 3

DR. GROMMERS: I think we want to thank Dr. Rourke 4 very much. He has to leave. 5

The Chair is going to respond to the pressure of the 6 I know you're all terribly anxious to split up into 7 group. groups. I would like to have you do so for a working session 8 for the next few hours. 9

Let's say, -- it's now loo'clock. Say until 2:30 10 you have lunch and can split up into any groups you like for 11 any basis. . 12

I don't know quite how you're going to do that. 13 Ι would suggest Dr. Weizenbaum has suggested that he would be the 14 nucleus of a group. I believe Mr. Gentile would like to be the 15 nucleus of a group, anybody else who would like to do so, I would 16 like to have you form an informal group. 17

You can discuss whatever it is that you as a group 18 decided you would like to discuss and at 3 o'clock when we come 19 back, we will find out what those kinds of things are. 20

I would like us also to make 3 lists, and you can do 21 this out of the group or as individuals and the first list I 22 would like, one or more issues as grounds for recommendations to 23 the Secretary. This doesn't need to be exhaustive. I want to 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. get a sample of what kinds of issues you as a group feel you

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dh 8 1 would like to address.

This is to be an anonymous listing unless you want 2 3 to put your name on it. The second list is a list of persons or resources that you would see necessary to make a clear case 4 for the issue to a relay man, someone who knew nothing about it 5 In your test as an expert, yourselves, it is certwhatsoever. 6 ainly appropriate to put this down in this case. 7 The third list is one or more changes that would in 8 fact be proposed by the Secretary. If you could devise right 9 now the list of policy changes that you would like the Secretary 10 to have as the basis for whatever action he takes, what one 11 thing would you like to see on it. 12 You can put several. It doesn't need to be exclusive 13 at all. We're not going to leave at what comes out of this 14 listing. 15 MR. DOBBS: Madam Chairman, may I suggest one thing 16 I have a sneaking suspicion that around about procedurally? 17 3 o'clock, or shortly thereafter, half of the people are going 18 to finally leave the room, trying to catch airplanes. Maybe 19 we ought to, if we possibly could, compress .lunch to the mini-20 mum amount of time and move up your 3 o'clock get together. 21 DR. GROMMERS: That's fine. How late was the meeting 22 scheduled for? 23 MR. MARTIN: 5. But it can stay over until tomorrow 24

Federal Reporters, Inc. as far as that goes.

۰. ما	dh	9	1	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Why don't we just have a show of
F			2	hands of people who could, just from a practical point of view,
			3	stay over until tomorrow?
			4	(Show of hands)
			5	(Laughter)
			6	DR. GROMMERS: How many people will be here after
			7	3:00?
			8	(Show of hands)
			9	DR. GROMMERS: For the purpose of this, at any rate,
	·		10	why don't we have luncheon meetings of those groups and get
	1		11	together at 2:00. This is not going to be the definitive work
(•		12	on what we're doing anyway.
,		. *	13	MR. DAVEY: I will be happy to work with a group, too.
			14	DR. GROMMERS: Anyone who right now knows that he
			15	would that they have a particular point they would like some
			16	group dynamics on, if you would raise your hands, we can iden-
			17	tify you.
			18	Mr. Davey, Professor Weizenbaum, Mr. Gentile, anyone
			19	else who feels he has a position and would like a group to work
			20	with?
			21	MR. ANGLERO: I have a suggestion to make. I would
			22	prefer to have a definite amount of groups, of subgroups, say
(23	5 or 6.
(4		24	DR. GROMMERS: We're going to do that later. This
- ce – Fec	aeral R	eporters,	Inc. 25	is just for the purpose of getting some group dynamics going on

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dh	-10	1	these new points. They're not definitive groups, they may
*C.2		2	never meet again. We're not ready to do what you said.
		3	MR. ANGLERO: Okay. But I think if we can have
		4	even something we can do now, if we have 7 to stay
		5	DR. GROMMERS: I don't want to do that right now.
		6	MR. ANGLERO: It's hot hard.
		7	DR. GROMMERS: I don't want to do that right now.
		8	Anyone is free to work by themselves without splitting into a
		9	group. Why don't we split up now and meet back here at 2:00?
		10	(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was recessed,
end	#17	11	to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., this same day.)
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#1 (dh	.8 -1	1	AFTERNOON SESSION
		2	(2:15 p.m.)
		3	MR. MARTIN: One point of procedure on which I would
		4	like to get the pleasure, or of each member, no public
		5	announcement has yet been made by the Department of the forma-
		6	tion of this advisory committee. Such an announcement will
		7	be made shortly, and customarily those announcements include a
		8	brief resume of each member, perhaps 4 or 5 sentenœs, a sort
		9	of key aid figure performing character statements of each of
		10	you.
ł		11	. The information would be selected from the resumes
(12	which were distributed to you last time with the indication
		13	that this would be their ultimate possible use and which each of
		14	you has reviewed and corrected and each of you has received a
	•	15	copy of your own, and everyone else's resume.
		16	We can go to greater or lesser lengths to increase
		17	the extent of publication of the present release by leaning on
		18	the Department's regional offices, who would make extra efforts,
		19	over and above the effort that is made in Washington, just
		20	issuing the release, to take the present release around to
		21	local media in the region from each from which each of you
		22	comes and, in effect, try to sell the release as a piece of
(•	-	23	news pegged to the fact that such and such a person from that
	_	24	local region has been appointed to the committee.
uc e – Fed eral	Reporters,	^{Inc.} 25	The consequence of that is that if the story plays

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with a little more prominence, then it might be apt to do so,
 the play is apt to be geared to you as a person and secondly is
 likely to give rise to interest in you by members of the local
 press, be it newspaper press, or radio, whatever.

5 In other words, reports may come and want to talk to 6 you, interview you, take your picture. Anybody who would prefer 7 not to be exposed to that risk of additional notoriety may, by 8 indicating that that is his or her preference, avoid that risk, 9 and we will not display the regional office with the capacity to 10 increase your risk of notoriety.

So would any of you who would prefer not to run that risk of notoriety, please raise your hand. I guess that's the simplest way. If you're willing to take what the media do as it comes, keep your hand down.

Any hands up?

MR. ANGLERO: Modification to that? You're talking about getting it to the regional, regions to make it putlic, also?

MR. MARTIN: Yes.

20 MR. ANGLERO: In my own case, it happened through 21 other ways, it became already public in Puerto Rico.

MR. MARTIN: There have been some announcements of the individual appointments of some of you by reason of the interest of perhaps Congressmen, Senators, Governors, anybody Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 who knows you're a member. I'm talking now about what the

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Department will do.

2 MR. ANGLERO: I agree in the case with the Department, 3 but to try to get it to -- for example, to get it to be made in 4 Puerto Rico, not to try to make that effort.

5 MR. MARTIN: You would prefer we did not make the 6 effort in your case?

7 MR. ANGLERO: To go to Puerto Rico, any department.
8 The department to make the announcement it has to make, okay.
9 MR. MARTIN: But nothing special about Puerto Rico?

MR. ANGLERO: Yes.

MR. MARTIN: All right. Fine.

Depending on how ingenious and how much effort our 12 department public education people muster for this, some are 13 quite ingenious and will note that you're a graduate from such 14 and such a university. They may go to the CYS alumni bulletin 15 or the college newspaper if they're still publishing in your 16 community, if you're a member of a faculty, and what you're 17 saying by not raising your hand is that you're willing to 18 court whatever effort is made by our PR people and whatever 19 effort is made by the press. 20

MS. GAYNOR: Count me low-keyed in whatever region.
 MR. MARTIN: Florence Gaynor wants to be low profile
 and Juan Anglero wants to be low profile in Puerto Rico.

DR. GROMMERS: If there are any other issues that Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 you're still working on -- Sasser is going to xerox for every-

dh-3 1	body if you can just give it to Jim Sasser, he is going to
. 2	zerox it so everybody can have a copy of it all.
3	MR. MARTIN: I have Florence Gaynor and Pat Lanphere
4	and Juan Anglero, low profile.
5	MR. DE WEESE: I would like to be high profile.
6	(Laughter)
7	MR. MARTIN: This may be academic because we cannot
8	assure what will happen, but we can try with more success to
9	assure a low profile than we can guarantee a high profile.
10	DR. BURGESS: It's getting close to November, isn't
. 11	it?
12	DR. GROMMERS: How many different groups were there,
13	about 4?
14	How many different groups were there? I wondered if
15	we were going to have reports from all of them.
16	Is everyone leaving at 3 o'clock? Is 3:30 all right?
17	MR. DAVEY: Let's start at 2:30 and keep on going.
18	(Discussion off the record.)
19	DR. GROMMERS: Anybody who has to leave before 3:30,
20	fine, but those of you who can stay until 3:30, we will on
21	principle of 3:30 as the time of breakup of the meeting.
22	MS. HARDAWAY: Will we choose a date for our next
23	meeting?
- Federal Reporters, Inc.	DR. GROMMERS: Yes. We have to organize that. Let
25	me outline a little bit what I have asked some people to do and

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what that has to do with those lists.

I have asked Dr. Weizenbaum and I will be asking Dr. 2 Allen and Arthur Miller to draft an outline of the chapters 3 that should go into the recommendations to the Secretary at 4 That is not our conclusion. But what it -this stage. As a 5 first pass, what the possible indications of things that we 6 wath to be covering shall be, I will be meeting with them in 7 We will get a draft outline prepared and sent out to Boston. 8 you all so that you can react to it, make any additions to it 9 that you wish, make any notations and reorganize it in any way. 10 . At our next meeting, we will then modify it and vote 11 it into whatever form it will be finally and then over the next 12 3 months, we will divide up into groups to work on these chap-13 ters that we all decided are the ones that we want to work on 14 and how we divide up depends on what those chapters turn out 15 to be. 16 Therefore, our next meeting ought to be 4 weeks from 17 now. 18 MR. GALLATI: Where? 19 (Discussion off the record.) 20 MR. DAVEY: Could we make that a Friday meeting? 21 MR. GALLATI: In Miami. 22 (Laughter) 23 DR. GROMMERS: What about everybody putting down the 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. dates that they're not available. 25

dh-5	1	MR. DAVEY: You better get out a list. We will never
The specific	2	arrive at it that way.
	3	DR. GROMMERS: How do we arrive at it?
	4	MS. LANPHERE: Set a date and everybody sticks up
-	5	their hand if they can come, like we did the last time.
	6	(Discussion off the record.)
	7	DR. GROMMERS: In general people might be able to do
	8	it the 15th, 16th and 17th, or the weekend after that.
	9	DR. WEIZENBAUM: May I make a suggestion? If it were
	10	to be in Washington, and I have no idea what the feeling is, but
	11	if it were to be in Washington, there is an apparently important
C	12	meeting that Arthur Miller called our attention to last time,
	13	yesterday, on the 22nd and 23rd here in Washington that apparently
	14	we should attend if we can or some such thing.
	15	If we were to make it on the 19th, 20th, and 21st,
	16	assumint it's a three day meeting, then we could those who
	17	wanted to, and could stay for that other meeting could then stay.
	18	MR. DAVEY: I would suggest one of those 3 days be on
	19	a weekend.
	20	MS. HARDAWAY: It would have to be for me.
	21	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Then that knocks out that suggestion.
	22	MR. ARONOFF: 15th, 16th, 17th?
	23	(Discussion off the record.)
	24	DR. GROMMERS: All right. We will come back to that.
ce – Federal Reporters,	Inc. 25	We will just drop it for a moment.
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dh-6	1	MS. GAYNOR: Are going to decide on a date now?
<u> </u>	2	DR. GROMMERS: In about 15 minutes we are.
	3	MS. GAYNOR: The only reason is I have to fix my
	4	calendar. If I don't know in advance
	5	DR. GROMMERS: Are you leaving at 2:30?
	6	MS. GAYNOT: 2:45.
	7	DR. GROMMERS: Can we let you know tomorrow or some-
	8	thing like that?
	9	MS. GAYNOR: Yes, you can.
	10	Is Mr. Baskir still here?
ŀ	11	MR. MARTIN: No.
\circ	12	DR. GROMMERS: I would like to take limit each
	13	person, the head of each of those 4 groups five minutes just to
	14	present the material. Everybody will get a xerox copy of all
	15	of the things that everybody wrote down, but let's have 4
·	16	presentations and then we can relate to all of it.
	17	Who would like to begin?
	18	MR. DAVEY: Can't without the notes.
	19	MS. COX: They have the only copy.
	20	DR. GROMMERS: All right could we ask Mr. White to
	21	speak to us for
	22	MS. COX: Or bring in one as soon as it's ready.
1	23	DR. GROMMERS: I think they're probably not in the
-	24	building.
∴e – Federal Reporters	, Inc. 25	Could you speak to us, then, about form in a very
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C	dh-7	ı	brief manner while we are waiting?	
	85. s (**s.	2	MR. WHITE: Certainly.	
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医尿道 法公司 医外宫室 1 MR. WHITE: Briefly, I would like to cover the 2 3 role of standards in this area of technology, and specifically talk about the program that has been forwarded for considera-4 tion as the American national standards. 5 I am the Associate Director of the Bureau of 6 Standards. 7 And, essentially, the Bureau has a role of providing 8 technological services to the public, to industry, and to 9 other government agencies. 10 In this area of computer technology, we look at 11 the industry primarily as a service industry, as such. 12 I want to simply draw your attention to the three 13 documents that were provided to you yesterday, and rather than 14 attempt to cover all of the material that's contained in that 15 document, to simply point out some of the pages and paragraphs 16 that I think will be of particular interest to you. 17 In the development of standards, we are concerned 18 with standards at three levels, essentially: 19 The international standards which are developed 20 by the International Standards Organization. 21 And, there is information starting on Page 95 22 relating to that activity. 23 The American national standards, and the information 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. is contained, starting on Page 63, about those activities. 25

Within the Federal Government, the Bureau of 1 Standards, by 2 legislation, has responsibility for making recommendations to the President relating to the establishment 3 of uniform standards in the area of computers and information 4 processing, and this was promulgated through the Public 5 Law 89306. 6

And, this bill -- also known as the Brooks Bill --7 is identified on Page 15 of that publication, and the require-8 ments of our standards program are listed on Page 46 of the 9 document. 10

Specifically, the standards that we are concerned 11 with, as it relates to this committee, are the standards that 12 are used to facilitate information interchange among various 13 data processing activities. 14

There is a task group of American National Standards 15 Institute, of which I happen to be the Chairman, that is the 16 resonsible party for defining standard codes and representations 17 for the interchange of data. 18

This committee is X3L8, and some of the standards 19 we are involved with are standard codes for geographic places, 20 standard identities for organizations, individuals, accounts, 21 standard representation of dates and times, and standard 22 representation of units of measurements of packaging. 23 The proposed standard that we are referring to, 24 essentially, is contained in that reprint of June, 1970, which

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Federal Reporters, Inc.

is again one of the publications that was provided to you.

In the development of this standard, this started back in 1967 by a -- one of our task groups, X3L84 and Sheila Smythe, a member of your committee, was chairman of that task group.

Through about three years of deliberation by the 6 task group, the program was approved by the Technical Committee 7 and was finally submitted for a final ballot by ANSI, 8 but, before taking this ballot, it was decided to get a 0 position from the Frederal Government, particularly the 10 Office of Management and Budget, and second, as -- was to 11 refer it to Senator Ervin's committee for a comment from the 12 Congress. 13

As a result, after these referrals, it was 14 determined that even though this standard that was developed 15 primarily to serve the needs of the data processing community 16 by promoting more effective and economic use of our ADP 17 resources, that because of the social complications involved, 18 and it raised a whole lot of questions of data interchange and 19 the aspect of privacy, the ANSI Committee has deferred final 20 action on the consideration of this American national standards 21 pending, essentially, the recommendation that would be coming 22 from the Secretary of HEW. 23

Now, as far as the standard itself is concerned, •Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 and this was allowed to in some of the discussions previously

in the last couple of days, there is a need, whether it be
 automated or manually to collect and post to the right
 records information about individuals.

The presence of a universal identifier, whether it 4 be a social security number of any other number allows for 5 that effective collection. Part of the problems that we are 6 seeing as it relates to credit files is that without the 7 absence of a number of only using a number alone, information 8 collected about one individual is by error posted to another Q individual's file; so again this points up the benefits of a 10 standard identifier. 11

12 On the other aspect, the disadvantages of a universal 13 identifier, it provides, let's say, the linking of various 14 data bases and we recognize: that this linking can either be 15 an advantage or a disadvantage; and, here again, I am pointing 16 to essentially one major aspect which I think you will address 17 and that is the aspect of authorized versus unauthorized 18 disclosure of information.

19 The other aspect that I wanted to mention about our 20 techonology, and this was mentioned in the session yesterday, 21 is that there are essentially two types of individuals 22 involved on your panel:

23 Those who are in the computer industry and those 24 of you who are concerned from the use of the information Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 systems. The major a

The major aspect that I wanted to address as it relates to our technology in the computer industry is that we are not able to do anything that -- as far as processing is concerned, that you could not do by manual means.

We essentially have the capability through automation to do it faster and more consistently; and, essentially, that consistency, we have made an error in our programers, that is going to be consistently repeated as well as the correct programers.

10 Another aspect of our technology that makes it more difficult is the form of the representation of our data 11 12 in essentially that when you are familiar with working with 13 manual forms, you can look at the form; you can see smudges and mistakes on the forms. When we convert the data from a 14 manual sense into a machine sensible form, you can no longer 15 examine it essentially with your eyesight; and that takes on 16 a, say, an aurora that surrounds the whole computer technology. 17

Another major aspect -- and this is -- we see every day -- is the belief that all data coming out of a computer is, in fact, true. Because of the, say, the magnitude of the machines and the cost and the technology involved, in many cases we see people pick up data coming out of a computer and accepting it as fact.

24 In many cases, the data should be evaluated just as The set of the second s

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In summary, I would like to essentially close with this:

The problem as we see it from the technology point 3 of view is not a technical problem. The problem of invasion 4 of privacy and the exchange of information essentially was a 5 problem long before we had the computer technology; and, 6 essentially, it is the technologist that has caused the focus 7 on the problem as you are seeing it today. It was mentioned 8 in some of the talks earlier that there is just as much 9 misuse of information in a manual system as there is in 10 automated systems, and I hope that some of the recommendations 11 that you make are not addressed as an attack on the technology 12 involved, but viewing it from the standpoint of disclosure of 13 information, whether it be in a manual or automated form. 14

Another aspect of this is that the problem you are 15 addressing is not essentially an HEW problem. It is not 16 related to the welfare system alone as was described 17 This is a problem of national magnitude and yesterday. 18 essentially this committee hopefully will address it from that 19 point, and not only say from the data systems of the Depart-20 There is the problem of the use of information in ment, HEW. 21 the private sector; there is the problem of the use of 22 information among other government agencies, and the exchange 23 of information among government agencies in the public and 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. hopefully, you will address it, say, from that viewpoint and 25

not only from the viewpoint of the Secretary of HEW. 1 I wanted to ask just one question: 2 MR. DOBBS: If it were not for the ANSI standard relying for 3 its numeric part on the social security number, would ANSI, 4 in fact, be in the position that it's in? 5 That is to say, if it were some other number, 6 other than that, you would have said this is going to be the 7 standard for those people who want to interchange, would you 8 then not be free to move in principal, at least? 9 MR. WHITE: No. Because the problem is essentially 10 hid. Regardless of whether it is the social security number 11 as a universal identifier, the only reasons that this 12 committee happens to be under HEW was because the social 13 security number was the one identified as the number in the 14 identification system. 15 For example, in Sweden, and in other countries in 16 Europe, they use what we call a generated number. It is made 17 up -- it is the date of birth, place, sex, and then a serial 18 number within that to identify an individual. 19 I think the problem is not -- is not that of which 20 number, it's a matter of the universal number that is used for 21 purposes of identification; and, another important aspect of 22 this standard is that it trys to stress that neither name or 23 number alone should be used singularly as a means for identifi-24 That both name and number together can only be used cation. 25

- Federal Reporters, Inc.

as a means of identification, and as was mentioned by
 Doctor Rourke this morning, it -- his problem was in people
 making errors in recording that number and then trying to
 post information to a file based upon that number alone.

5 The standard qualifies that and says, if you 6 do that you are not in accordance with the standard, that for 7 the posting and filing information, it should be based upon 8 essentially two attributes: The name and the number, and not 9 just one alone.

10 MR. GALLATI: Both of which can be fabricated so 11 readily it's not even humerous. This whole system is based 12 upon your thought of the accuracy of posting of the data.

Yet, I can go in with any kind of a number, any kind of a name, and get data posted to Guy's file which will embarrass the hell out of him. The whole system is ridiculously ununiversally identified.

I say again, the only way you are going to do it is with fingerprinting. There is no other way to make sure you are posting to the right number.

20 MR. WHITE: The system is based upon a cooperative 21 environment and the type of interchange that is common today.

MR. GALLATI: Cooperative compulsion.

MR. WHITE: There is nothing in the name or number that says the holder of that is in fact the person involved.

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Essentially, what you are addressing is a matter of

(1	verification and not identification.
	2	MR. GALLATI: You don't have identification if you
	3	don't have verification. Okay?
	4	MR. WHITE: You don't have the reliability.
	5	MR. GALLATI: Then the whole system falls?
	6	MR. DOBBS: I guess to follow up slightly, I was
	7	asking the question about the use of the SSN versus something
	8	else to see whether it was the SSN that had ANSI in its
	9	particular holding pattern.
	10	The next question I would ask is that I think as
l	11	practical people, we accept the fact that there are some
C	12	files which in fact are already linked, that there are in
	13	fact going to be some more that are going to be linked for
	14	good reasons.
· •	15	I suspect practical people have reached that
	16	conclusion.
	17	Now then, is it not the case that from the view-
	18	point of the standard that you have suggested, which says that
	19	if in fact you want a common identifier and if you want to
	20	interchange information, that this is what you should use,
	21	could be separated from the kind of discussion that we are
	22	having in terms of whether or not the information in a file
· · ·	23	ought to be shared and/or linked?
	24	MR. WHITE: That's right.
≝e – Federal Reporters,	Inc. 25	There are essentially two issues. One, it was

prompted by the issue of having a standard identifier and the
 consequences and the consequences with essentially the
 unauthorized exchange of information.

4 MR. DOBBS: Assume somebody authorized it. The 5 information could in fact be exchanged.

6 MR. WHITE: Also, from a practical matter, if we 7 didn't have a standard identifier, we would still be able to 8 link files. Those linkings, from that standpoint may not be 9 as desirable because you are disclosing more information 10 about the individual to disclose that linking than you are 11 when you are only disclosing the social security number which 12 has no significance.

MR. DOBBS: What I am trying to pin down then, the heart of the problem that you are describing is the appropriate mechnanisms for authorizing information transfer? Okay.

You have suggested the number doesn't really mean that much.

I agree with you.

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You have also suggested that it may, in fact, be a poor way to cross link if you really want to do the job right. MR. WHITE: If you want positive identity, it's not going to solve the problem.

MR. DOBBS: It's the key issue of how you authorize and who you might authorize, that such information ought to be transferred, linked or shared? There are no mechanisms for

that? 1 MR. WHITE: In other countries, they issue 2 identification cards. 3 Essentially, we haven't gotten to that in the 4 United States. 5 Your identification card has a photograph and it 6 has your standard identifier. It hasn't got to the point 7 where you have fingerprints associated with it. 8 MR. GALLATI: Some countries have. 9 DR. GROMMERS: I think we have to thank Mr. White 10 and go on to a presentation of the views while we are waiting 11 for the zerox to come back. Nobody can do that yet. 12 DR. WEIZENBAUM: Yes. I can. 13 MR. WHITE: I would like to mention that Sheila 14 will be available to you and she certainly can provide you 15 with some of the criteria that led to the development of 16 this standard, why we selected the social security number, and 17 some of the technical aspects of the standard. 18 I would make myself available, on call to the 19 committee anytime you want to get into the management or 20 administrative aspects of standards. 21 DR. GROMMERS: Thank you veyr much. 22 DR. WEIZENBAUM: May I add one comment? 23 I think it is just terribly important to be 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. iconoclastic when there are images to be smashed, especially 25

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if the images are dangerous. 1 You asserted we can't do anything with computers 2 that we couldn't have done without. 3 That is patently not so and ought not to be 4 believed. It is dangerous to believe that. 5 For example, let's take the centralization of 6 banking and financial activities we are experiencing today. 7 Take the operation of the stock market. If it 8 weren't for computers, I am not suggesting there would be no 9 stock market, no Wall Street, but it would in fact be very, 10 very different because it would have to be modularized, 11 decentralized, so on and so forth. 12 There are things we can do without computers. The 13 strategy we get by using computers have an impact on society 14 generally. 15 I think it's terribly important to understand 16 that. 17 It's not just a question of well, you could do it 18 manually but it's more efficient to do it with computers. 19 There are lots of consequences. 20 MR. WHITE: The point I was trying to make was 21 addressing it toward the welfare system is that you can do 22 the same job if you filled the room with 500,000 clerks. 23 DR. WEIZENBAUM: But you can't do that. It's no 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. longer the same job and it's questionable whether you can do 25

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C	- 1	that.
•• <i>#</i> '	2	There are lots of things, and I can give you a list
	3	of examples: Air traffic control. Even if we had all the
	4	airplanes we had, and we wouldn't have them if we didn't have
	5	computers, but suppose we had them, we couldn't have the
	6	present air traffic system that we have if it weren't for
	7	computers; space flight.
	8	There are an enormous number of things we do in one
	9	way or do at all because we have computers. Some are good,
	10	some are bad.
	11	In any case, they all have social consequences and
	12	it's dangerous to believe that it doesn't make any difference
ъ.,	13	whether you do it with computers or otherwize.
	14	Okay, now if I may give you the presentation of
	15	what went on in our group, I must preface that by saying it is
	16	totally unauthorized by other members of the group, and also
	17	we didn't issue membership cards so it is not clear to me
	18	what the membership is.
	19	As I understood the short conversation we had over
	20	lunch
	21	MR. ARONOFF: Would you identify the members of
	22	your group.
(23	MS. COX: No, sir.
Tedavit Dever	24	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Everyone who considers himself a
≘e - Federal Repo rters,	Inc. 25	member of the group hold up their hand.

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	ı	(Show of hands)
· ·	2	MR. GALLATI: They invaded our privacy.
	. 3	DR. WEIZENBAUM: I might say Larry Baskir sat in
-	4	on the discussion so he was a member of the group ex officio.
	5	DR. GROMMERS: Just one thing. Mr. Baskir will
	6	make a presentation to those of you who are still able to
	. 7	stay after 3:30.
	8	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Okay. Totally unauthorized reports
	9	subject to refutation and argument by other members.
	10	As I understood, what we were talking about was
ı	11	fundamentally three things: One was the nature of the tradeoff
Ç	12	between economy, efficiency on the one hand and maintenance
	13	of social values, dignity, human individuality and the other
	14	thing on the other hand.
	15	We simply agreed and gave some examples that there
	16	are some reasonably deep issues here we should explore.
	17	Secondly, differential considerations that are
	18	applied when data systems are being considered for the poor
	19	and otherwise defenseless and opposed to the considerations
	20	that may be applied when one is thinking of data systems that
	21	apply to the not poor and not otherwise defenseless. That
	22	ought to be explicated as well:
(23	Finally, explication of the we feel that one of
t a - Fadaral Danat	24	our tasks ought to be the tasks ought to be the explication of
≁_e – Federal Report	25 25	of complex assumptions underlying policy positions presently

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1 advocated or discussed and that we ought to present critiques 2 of those assumptions and perhaps present alternative 3 assumptions that could be made. 4 We spent only 30 or so minutes with one another 5 and I am willing to listen to amendments, refutations or whatever from -- or criticism from the other people who were 6 7 there. 8 DR. GROMMERS: Should we have --9 MR. ARONOFF: I am against. 10 Would you repeat the third one, please? I said, it fast. Don't blame 11 DR. WEIZENBAUM: yourself. 12 13 We said -- I said, we felt one of our tasks should be the explication of complex assumptions underlying policy 14 15 positions presently advocated or discussed with respect to data banks and that we should make critiques of those 16 assumptions and possibly present alternative assumptions that 17 could be made. 18 DR. GROMMERS: Do you want to give an example? 19 The figure we had yesterday is a kind MR. DOBBS: 20 of example. 21 DR. WEIZENBAUM: We discussed examples. 22 Mr. Boyd in discussing HR 1, yesterday, gave evidence to those who were 23 willing to perceive that of -- very complicated assumptions 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. that underly the policy recomendations that he was in fact 25

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1 making.

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I am sorry, I can't think -- we came up with some examples at the time at lunch but I can't recall them at the moment.

5 You know, those are -- whatever those assumptions 6 were that he made, both technical and social, so to speak, 7 were by no means the only assumptions that could have been 8 made and should certainly be made explicit and possibly 9 criticized and perhaps alternatives.

10 MR. GALLATI: One of the assumptions, gentlemen, 11 was the fact we have a problem, a real criminal element we 12 are dealing with here, and we have to surveil everything they 13 do.

MR. DOBBS: A polite assumption is that in fact the cheating population and system performance should be maximized to deal with that. We ought to try to make those things explicit if they exist and bring them out in the light of day.

DR. WEIZENBAUM: That's right.

20 One of the optimization criteria of the HR 1 21 system should be the discovery and punishment or at least 22 recover from "cheaters."

23 This is worth an enormous amount of money to do that.

MR. GALLATI: And privacy risk.

DR. WEIZENBAUM: Right. 1 DR. GROMMERS: Could we have a presentation of the 2 other positions and then we will talk about them altogether. 3 MR. GENTILE: Okay. 4 Our group simple did not have much time as we would 5 like to take, but we did come up with three or four issues 6 that we would like to propose. 7 Number 1, are there some -- and we put them all --8 we phrased them all in a question format rather than a particu-0 lar statement that we could attack or defend for information 10 that we thought might be misinterpreted if we took the latter 11 approach. 12 Members of our group, raise your hands. 13 (Show of hands.) 14 MR. GENTILE: Number 1, are there some immediate 15 steps that the Secretary of HEW should take to control the 16 use of the social security account number and we thought for 17 information we would want to investigate such things as the 18 Secretary's regulator powers, possibly directives that have 19 been completed in various State Governments through their 20 Govenors or legislators, and other Federal agencies. 21 Issue No. 2, is the use of the social security 22 account number currently so widespread that it is in fact 23 approaching or is at that point where it is more feasible to 24

controle its use rather than discontinue its use and the

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1	supportive information we would seek for that issue is a
2	survey we would like to conduct of the various States, 50
. 3	States, to accumulate information on the extent of the use of
4	the social security account number in the data filed in State
5	Governments and these files include such things as personal
6	health records, vital statistics, birth and death, Medicaid,
7	Welfare, Social Service programs, law enforcement systems,
8	correctional institutional inmates, mental health patients,
9	drivers license, owners of motor vehicles and so on.
10	We have 19 categories in which personal data are
11	collected in each State.
12	We would like to get the number of records in
13	those files and whether or not the social security account
14	number is used as a whole or as an added data element and
15	we would like to ask other questions concerning the use of those
16	files and the number.
17	Issue No. 3 was, should the Government or should
18	government regulatory policies be developed to improve
19	measures taken to protech individual policy?
20	The kinds of things we would like to review are
21	currently implemented regulations, not only in the Department
22	of HEW but other federal agencies, the approach for regulation
23	that was taking taken in other industries, for example,
24	through the FCC, FTC, ITT.
, Inc.	We have addressed a fourth issue, but did not come

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-ce - Federal Reporters, Inc. 25

We have addressed a fourth issue, but did not come

to agreement on it because we were running out of time. 1 That was is it possible to interlink data files in a controlled 2 3 environment for the public interest provided certain criteria are met. 4 5 As I say, we didn't get too far on that and many other issues were mentioned, but we just didn't have time to 6 put them all in writing. 7 If there are any comments -- I don't mean to imply 8 we even had time to get a full consensus of this, but I think 9 that was the sense of the small group that met. 10 MR. DOBBS: Didn't the task force do such a survey? 11 Didn't they do a State survey? 12 MR. GENTILE: I am not aware of it, if they did. 13 It was not in their report. 14 DR. GROMMERS: Anyone else have anything to comment 15 from that group? 16 If not, would someone like to present another 17 group? 18 MR. DAVEY: All right. 19 There were about six people in our group. Do you 20 want to raise your hands? 21 (Show of hands) 22 MR. DAVEY: Okay. 23 DR. GROMMERS: Would you raise them long enough 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. so I can write them down. 25

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(ı	MR. DAVEY: I think I have it listed here.
L.	2	DR. GROMMERS: We made a number of points here.
	. 3	The first one is do we need safeguards for personal
	4	data banks?
	5	Do we need a common identifier?
	6	What is the degree of use or misuse of the social
	7	security number?
	8	Should there be links established among various
	9	automated files?
	10	What are the cost implications of No. 3?
	11	That is, what are the cost complications of having
·	12	varous automated files, and I will amplify this in just a
	13	moment.
	14	What is the need to exchange this is in both
		-
	15	
	15 16	
·		the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or
·	16	the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information?
,	16 17	the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information? Where and to what degree do the dangers lie within
·	16 17 18	<pre>the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information? Where and to what degree do the dangers lie within each personal data system?</pre>
	16 17 18 19	<pre>the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information? Where and to what degree do the dangers lie within each personal data system? What groups, social economic, ethnic, etc., are</pre>
	16 17 18 19 20	<pre>the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information?</pre>
	16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information?</pre>
	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>the public and private sectors personal identifiable data or information?</pre>

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1 be reformulated in the form of issues rather than in the form
2 of a program.

I think that that list is still a valid list and one which we discussed at some length, felt this should be included here.

6 Then, going over to the second list of persons or 7 resources required we felt that it would be nice to have a list 8 of public and private potential users and this refers to the 9 social security number; and, then this next one is the -- make 10 a study of the cost implications.

I have been giving some thought to this, and I think that a couple of students over the summer, we could come up with some rather -- not precise data, but I think we could certainly come within 25 or 50 per cent of what various types of systems cost and the costs of gathering the data, the costs of exchanging data, what the implications of common identifiers are, and the like.

18 I think this would be a worthwhile study to do. I would be happy to work on this if it makes sense.

Then, the third source would be a list of agencies served by other agencies. This question of -- I know this is a broad one, but we are talking -- we were talking yesterday with Gerald Boyd, and this new thing -- it was clear there were a number of agencies that were interchanging information.

bc 22 1 It would be worthwhile to have a list of such 2 agencies and the interaction they have with each other. 3 Then, finally, we were not able to come up with any kind of recommendations as to the precise things that should 4 be done other than to put them in the form of a question and 5 these -- we came up with: 6 One, should the social security number be restricted 7 to the public sector; 8 9 And, two, if a need for a common identifier exists. Who or what agency will administer it? 10 We don't know what the answers are, but these we 11 feel are certainly questions that should be answered. 12 That completes our -- that group. 13 DR. GROMMERS: Is there another group? 14 This is essentially all? 15 You all have a copy -- I think we are expecting a 16 couple of copies. You will get them before we leave. 17 The Chair will intertain comments about these posi-18 tions, and we could discuss that. 19 I would also like to suggest that those of you who 20 can and feel so inclined could work on these same principles 21 and make more detailed outlines, add to them, and if you will, 22 send them to David, I think that would be the best. 23 MR. DAVEY: May I make a comment? · 24 ⇒e – Federa'l Reporters, Inc. DR. GROMMERS: Sure. 25

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- 1	1	MR. DAVEY: At least from those we heard, I didn't
	2	hear anything that was inconsistent with those of the other
	3	groups. As a matter of fact, I was amazed at the similarity
	4	of the points that were brought up.
·	5	I think one of the fears we had earlier about being
	6	a great difference, I think that it is surprisingly similar.
	7	DR. GROMMERS: I would like to see all those ideas
	8	developed.
	9	You obviously weren't meeting in committee for the
	10	chance of coming up with definitive ideas.
r	11	If you will individually, or in such groups as you
(12	wish to make in the interim, elaborate on this and send them
ι	13	to David, we can get them to the group that is going to be
	14	drafting the draft programs.
	15	Already we can start reacting to some of these
	16	ideas before the next meeting and get them possibly all
	17	organized together.
	18	DR. BURGESS: Could you tell us more about the
	19	draft program?
	20	DR. GROMMERS: Well, you know there is to be a
	21	program to Richardson, the recommendations to of this
	22	committee a report.
<u></u>	23	DR. BURGESS: I do understand that.
	24	But, I was talking about the program to be drafted
🚾 – Federal Reporters,	^{Inc.} 25	in the interim period.

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	1	DR. GROMMERS: I have asked two lawyers and a
₩ 6 , 1,7	2	computer political scientist
	3	DR. WEIZENBAUM: I gave that up. I give that up,
	4	the political science part.
	5	DR. GROMMERS: At any rate, to make a draft of
	6	chapters, not of conclusions. That is, to draft a first cut
	7	at what ideas should be included, no matter how the conclusions
	8	are phrased, whether they are pro or con, in order to have
	9	something for the group to react to at the next meeting.
	10	The group in its full session, or possibly in smaller
I	11	groups which will then react to that, and will add to it,
0	12	will modify that in any way they wish.
	13	Chapters then will definitely be decided on, and we
	14	will divide up this committee into subcommittees to work on
	15	these chapters.
	16	This is simply something for us to react to.
	17	And, I hope by the mechanism of having you all put
	18	in your own ideas on paper, and send them through David to the
	19	group, any of you who have ideas and wish to see them entered
	20	into this report, we will see that this does get done.
	21	Would you all like to talk at all about it
. . .	22	MR. ARONOFF: Are you in a position yet to decide
(23	on the next meeting?
1	24	DR. GROMMERS: How does the 15th, 16th, and 17th
⊷ce – Federal Reporters,	, Inc. 25	suit you?

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	MS. COX: How many can't come?
· 2	DR. GROMMERS: How many cannot come?
3	MS. KLEEMAN: I am raising my hand for Pat Lanphere.
4	DR. GROMMERS: Cannot come?
5	MS. KLEEMAN Cannot come.
6	DR. GROMMERS: Is that two hands that cannot?
7	MS. KANE: There is a chance Arthur Miller may not
8	be able to come. I am not real definite. There is a
9	possibility.
10	MR. DAVEY: Is it any better for the 22nd, 23rd,
11	and 24th?
C 12	DR. WEIZENBAUM: Oh, no. He certainly can't come
13	on the 22nd and 23rd.
14	He told us that.
15	DR. GROMMERS: The next time then will be the first
16	week in July, but I do think we would like to have Professor
17	Miller here.
18	MS. KANE: He can come for part of the time. There
19	is a chance on the 17th that I think he has to be elsewhere.
20	I could let you know on Monday.
21	DR. GROMMERS: How about 5, 6, and 7 of July?
22	MR. DAVEY: 5, 6, And 7 of July? Those are a
23	holiday weekend.
24	MR. MARTIN: When is the 4th of July celebrated
∞e – Federa) Reporters, Inc. 25	this year? Is that one of those Monday holidays?

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156 #23 MS. HARDAWAY: Will we be coming here, Madam 1 arl 2 Chairman? 3 DR.GROMMERS: Yes. 4 DR. WEIZENBAUM: Hawaii loses again. 5 DR.GROMMERS: Okay. That's the 15, 16, and 17. Will 9:00 o'clock on the 15th to 3:00 o'clock on 6 7 Saturday --8 MR. DAVEY: Would it also be possible to have some evenings which are not completely filled up with activities? 9 10 DR. GROMMERS: Yes. I think we will plan to have the work during the 9:00 to 5:00 and time for thinking in the 11 evening. You are not thinking of frivolous activities like 12 13 theater? MR. DAVEY: Heaven forbid. Gracious me. 14 DR. GROMMERS: You are thinking of a chance for sub-15 groups to get together? 16 17 MR. DAVEY: I have to admit I wouldn't abhor the possibility of going and doing something besides working. 18 (Discussion off the record.) 19 DR. GROMMERS: Well, we have to get something out. 20 21 MR. DAVEY: I agree with that. But looking at yesterday as an example and also last time as an example, I 22 think there were a lot of us starting to really run down by 23 6:00 or 6:30. On any kind of a formal basis -- I think on an 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. informal basis, it's just fine. 25

DR. GROMMERS: We will try to have the sessions 1 ending at 5:30. And then in evening, what we will be doing, 2 as you remember, what we will be doing is reacting to the 3 chapter structure, adding, subtracting, hopefully we will 4 get some group activity on chapter development which could 5 happen in the evening. 6 MR. DAVEY: Very good. 7 DR. WEIZENBAUM: You are saying the place will 8 be available in the evening, if somebody wants to escape and 9 go to the theater, he does this on his own conscience? 10 DR. GROMMERS: Yes. 11 (Laughter.) 12 Would you be able to -- did I under-MR. ARONOFF: 13 stand you correctly, the group that is going to be working 14 on the outline will meet in Boston and then after that's 15 drafted, will you try to get it within enough time that we 16 can really think about your outline? We are finally at the 17 place where people wanted to be. 18 DR. GROMMERS: We will try to get the outline to 19 you a week before the meeting, that is the outline, so that 20 you can have thought about it and added to it. We would like 21 to have your inputs before that time. 22 MR. ARONOFF: Beyond that you really ought to be 23 able in the morning session of the week that we come back, 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. decided upon the outline?

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DR. GROMMERS: I should think so, if everybody has 1 looked at it and reacted to it, and added to it. 2 MR. ARONOFF: Thereafter you are still, in effect, 3 going to be talking about presentations, is that right? 4 DR. GROMMERS: Maybe. Maybe working. Maybe actually 5 going into groups and dividing up according to chapters. 6 That would be the idea. Having working sessions. 7 MR. ARONOFF: I still would not mind hearing the 8 presentation from the technology group that held up the meet-9 ing a while yesterday, but validly so, if they would be in a 10 position to make it as one of the inputs to the -- god, there 11 I go, using that word. You got me. I am finally a captive. 12 DR. GROMMERS: I think we will plan to have our 13 presentations. Just right at the moment I don't know what 14 they are, and I would be very open to suggestions. 15 MR. ARONOFF: I would like to hear the presentation 16 from Professor Weizenbaum and the group that was going to work 17 on that presentation. 18 MS. HARDAWAY: Also, is there a possibility that 19 we can hear from IBM according to the \$40 million that they 20 have alloted on the privacy situation so that we can know 21 what their thinking is, what led them to do this, what they 22 are looking for? 23

DR. GROMMERS: What I was hoping to get in number two was who you wanted to make presentations.

159 MS. HARDAWAY: That's just what I said, the 1 proper representative from IBM. 2 DR. GROMMERS: Is that on your list? 3 MS. HARDAWAY: Yes. 4 DR. GROMMERS: What I am going to do is go through 5 that list --6 MS. HARDAWAY: I am not sure it is on the list, but 7 I would like to add it. 8 MR. DAVEY: We all add it. 9 DR. GROMMERS: Be sure you do add things like that, 10 and also write to use if you think of that, or call us. 11 MR. DAVEY: Another thing that would be very helpful, 12 I would like to hear Bob Gallati talk about the New York state 13 information system. I think that's really a model, in many 14 respects. 15 MR. GALLATI: Thank you, Gerry. 16 MR. ARONOFF: And the fingerprinting that you are 17 anticipating. 18 MR. GALLATI: Get those prints. 19 MR. DAVEY: I think that that represents another 20 kind of data file which we have not been exposed to, where 21 you don't have a population which is cooperative. 22 DR. GROMMERS: Actually I don't really see -- for 23 example, here under persons or resources, it says description 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. to the extent to which personal data has been collected. 25

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1 That's not a specific person you want to hear from. Maybe
2 it wasn't clear.

3 MR. DAVEY: From our standpoint we are looking more 4 at resources.

5 MR. IMPARA: That was my comment, and I don't know 6 who would be able to provide that. To the best of my knowledge, 7 OMB is conducting a study which might have that information 8 available.

DR. GROMMERS: Okay.

10 Any other people that you all would like to hear 11 from that you may not be thinking of right now, but that 12 when you go home, if you will work on these kinds of lists 13 and send them to us, then we can take what steps are necessary, 14 hopefully to get these people for you.

MR. DAVEY: I think as we move into a private sector, that it makes sense to get people who represent the private sector.

DR. GROMMERS: Let me say if I don't hear from you
all as to specific people or topics, it won't be done by next
time.

21 MR. DAVEY: I don't know that it necessarily needs 22 to be done by next time.

23 DR. GROMMERS: Probably. Though we may find we 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 do over the next month. We may meet only in groups in the next 1 couple of months to write the chapters. The groups may wish
2 to have people come to them, and we can arrange that, too.
3 But we have to know who you want to hear from.

In my suggestions, I use the term MR. GALLATI: 4 rather than indicating individuals, the term staff study, 5 staff review, staff report. Am I perhaps being unrealistic 6 in expecting that we have that kind of staff support to do 7 studies and reviews and reports on specific areas? 8 For example, I think we do have to know exactly 9 what legislation exists today in terms of what is -- what has 10 been passed and signed and so on, but also legislation which is 11 in gestation, has been introduced and has not been passed 12 in reference to these matters. 13

We don't have, to my knowledge, any access to that at this time.

DR. GROMMERS: Is that in here?

MR. GALLATI: I made that suggestion. I said staff review.

MR. IMPARA: If it was not in yours, it is in mine.
MR. ARONOFF: This isn't complete yet, is it?
MR. IMPARA: Yes, it is complete.
MS. HARDAWAY: We can certainly add to it, can't

DR. GROMMERS: You can add to it.

I just wondered

23 we?

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-e-Federal Reporters, Inc. if I had it already.

MR. GALLATI: Do we have that kind of staff 2 support?

I can't answer that question in the MR. MARTIN: 3 air, Bob. One thing that I would -- I would ask each of 4 who you to do proposes some substantial survey activity, gathering 5 of information. John Gentile's question about the use of the 6 Social Security number in state government data processing 7 activities, I would suggest that you ask yourself the question 8 and then answer it for our benefit, and for the benefit of 9 those who will be dragooned one way or the other, or whatever, 10 to do the work, what difference will it make to you to have 11 that information? I think a method which a group like this 12 is apt to get into, unless somebody challenges it not to 13 get into it, is to think of all sorts of things it wants to 14 know, but have no idea of how it would make life any different 15 for you if you knew that information; and an effort to kind 16 of push you through that process was the outline on the 17 identifier issue. 18

19 Unfortunately, that whole presentation, because
20 of Sheila's illness and so on, didn't occur the way we had
21 hoped to have it occur.

But if you look at the ABA survey of the use of the 23
Social Security number which was made a few years ago, it 24
Federal Reporters, Inc. 25
But if you look at the ABA survey of the use of the security number which was made a few years ago, it seems to me that it doesn't help you at all to address the issues, and we have talked at previous times. Maybe it would

be nice to know who is using the Social Security number, 1 why would it be useful to know that. 2 The reason I say that, I don't think -- I have got 3 to be careful as I interact with program people or consultants 4 that we don't end up asking them to do a lot of work which 5 reflected nothing more than someone's sense of inability to 6 focus on what they were really trying to decide and we can 7 set all sorts of work going that will be fruitless. 8 MR. GENTILE: I agree. I am one of the states 9 that would be receiving such a questionnaire. I share your 10 I promise this: Before I send out a questionnaire, concern. 11 I will clear it with a one-page questionnaire. 12 MR. MARTIN: John, I don't care what you do in 13 Illinois. I am just answering Bob's question. The kind of 14 work we get done for the committee depends on your 15 specifying what it is that you want. I urge you to think 16 carefully about why you want it. Make some assumption of 17 what it would be like if you had it. 18 MR. IMPARA: Excuse me. David, may I make a 19 point? It may be a question. 20 If you were to do a questionnaire for the purpose 21 of obtaining information for this committee, and you told 22

David about it, that might put David in the extreme hot 23 water with the office of management and budget. If you want 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. to do a questionnaire for your own purposes which might add 25

to your body of knowledge about the workings of this committee, 1 then that may or may not be --2

MR. GENTILE: Well, I think, Jim, that the 3 questionnaire could go out under the auspices of another 4 organization, not HEW, but I also feel that there might be 5 some questions to be answered from this survey that might be 6 able to be modified and serve more than one purpose, maybe 7 some other group might have a need for information that is 8 slightly modified. 9 Further, and even more importantly, is that you 10

might be aware of some other survey that has already been taken 11 that has this data. 12

MR. IMPARA: All I am suggesting on David's behalf 13 is that OMB clearance takes about six weeks. Be very careful 14 about any letter you send to him relative to any kind of 15 questionnaire or survey so you don't get him in a bind because 16 of ignorance of certain federal policies. 17

MR. MARTIN: Let me give an example of the kind 18 of reasoning you might go through. Jim Impara, at the 19 last meeting, as a result of our last meeting, went back to 20 Florida and discovered that certain information is being 21 collected about high school students and put in the file and 22 is accessible and blah, blah, blah. This surprised him. 23

Having learned that about Florida, you might all 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. decide and you might have decided it without knowing that it 25

is true in Florida, analytically that the kinds of data Jim has found is being collected and put in files about students in Florida ought not to be there, and you could arrive at a judgment on the basis of analysis and thought that you wished to recommend that data systems of public schools in America be constrained not to include such information in files about high school students.

8 You don't have to know whether this is being done 9 or not or whether it is being done in most states or from 10 most high school students to arrive at that conclusion.

Not uncommonly, what someone would do when they think about the question, they don't want to think about it and make a decision or arrive at a conclusion without knowing what is practice. You can make an assumption about what practice is and say in some they do and some they don't. Maybe it is 80-40, 70-30, whatever you want.

Then you say that's what I found, after exhaustive 17 survey, thousands of dollars, months of effort, that's what I 18 How do I feel now? Would I feel differently if I found. 19 had verified that survey? If you conclude that it doesn't 20 affect your conclusion and maybe you would be prepared to 21 reach the conclusion without going through the expense and 22 delay of getting the information. 23

On the other hand, as with respect to the use of eral Reporters, Inc. 25 the Social Security number, for instance, this committee might

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ar .	ı	arrive analytically at the proposition that you want to take
A .	2	a strong stand against the use of the Social Security number
	3	as a use of a universal identifier. But you say to yourselves
	4	that we don't know how realistic that proposal is, how much
	5	political flack is that going to generate; how much resistance
	6	is it going to generate. That might leave you to say we
	7	don't know what reliance is being placed on it, what will it
	8	cost to try to prohibit it, and from that infer how much
	9	resistance there will be and how you might overcome that
	10	resistance. There might be good reasons for conducting the
i	11	survey.
C	12	I am not trying to prejudice what conclusions you
	13	reach, but I think it is important to have some sense of why
	14	you want the data other than you didn't think it through,
	15	which I think is very easy for all of us to do.
	16	The first thing is to collect data, but not know
	17	why to be doing it. That costs money and time, and I have
	18	got to be careful about that.
	19	Larry, this meeting has been sort of a happening.
	20	We are very, very fortunate in having with us Lawrence Baskir,
	21	who is the counsel for Senator Ervin's Senate subcommittee
	22	on constitutional rights, and Larry has been laboring in the
Ĺ	23	vineyard of the enterprises of that subcommittee for some time.
t,	24	He came today in part to get a sense of what we are up to.
-ce – Federal Reporters	, Inc. 25	Obviously he and his fellow staff members and the Senator and

1 that subcommittee are very interested in the existence and 2 the work of this subcommittee.

Larry, I think it might be helpful, although I 3 realize it is sort of catching you off guard, if you would be 4 willing to informally, you know, but on the record here, for 5 the benefit of those present so we can Xerox that record and 6 share it with those who have left, and were absent at this 7 meeting, to give a little account of what the Ervin committee 8 has been up to, and where it is trying to get, what sort of 9 legislative aims you may have, anything you feel that would 10 be useful for the committee to know about this very important 11 force in this general subject matter area with which we are 12 concerned. 13

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MR. BASKIR: The Subcommittee is a subcommittee of the U. S. Judiciary Subcommittee. It is a subcommittee dealing with a variety of problems, all having to do with individual liberties.

5 Basically, our jurisdiction is the area encompassed 6 by the Bill of Rights, and we do a lot of things in addition 7 to the kinds of subject matter in the area of privacy, criminal 8 law, separation of Church and State, a variety of things that 9 you all have nothing to do with in this committee.

We came into the area of privacy and computer somewhat gladly. One of the areas we were concerned about was the rights of federal employees. As we were doing work on their legal and administrative rights as to what happens to them on the job and outside the job, we came to discover that the government asks an extraordinary amount of information about their employees.

17 There is some reaosn for some of these things.
18 There is a lot of cases where there is no reason for a lot of
19 these inquiries, and so the very first thing that we did in
20 terms of our privacy study, which has now grown quite a bit,
21 was to first make an inquiry and then to draft some legislation.
22 That legislation is probably seven years old, now.

23 It goes back to the beginning of reported time, so far as we 24 are concerned. The legislation was very simple; we tried to Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 block out certain areas of inquiry by the government of its

employees that we thought there was no justification for. One 1 2 thing we discovered was, which I think has continuing validity, that there is almost nothing that you can ask of a person that 3 you can come back, and say, there is no reason to ask that; 4 and this was in the area of employment. You want to find out 5 about their financial background. They will say, "Conflict of 6 Interest." You want to find out about their social background, 7 their sexual activities, a variety of things. There will 8 always be a reason that the question should be asked, and when 9 you take a look at the legislation as it has finally come down 10 to the point where it has passed the Senate now, three times, 11 there are a few areas, but very few, in which we could persuade 12 the Senate that the government should not ask its employees. 13

14 The Bill is now over in the House and there are 15 many, many more qualifications on those prohibitions.

I think the lesson we have learned is that you cannot make an arbitrary decision that this class of information should never be collected from an individual; and indeed, it is very difficult also, to say, that not only in the abstract you cannot ask it, but that this kind of government interest, be it criminal law, be it health, be it education, be it personnel, does not need X kind of information.

I do not say that all information can be thoroughly justified. What I do say is that the people who are working in that area will almost always be able to give you a reason

1	for wanting the information; and so in the area of pure privacy,	
2	it is very difficult to make those determinations, especially	
. 3	if it is a give-and-take it is a political situation where	
4	you have to persuade people to give up something and there are	
5	forces back and forth, because the argument that, let us say,	
6	the administrators of a program can make or the researchers,	
7	in favor of getting X information, is always going to be much	
8	more powerful than the argument you can use not to collect it.	
9	We moved from the area of collection of information	
10	on government employees to the general collection by government	
n	of information about individual citizens. We have come nowhere	
12	near even beginning to draft legislation to try to control	
13	that and that exists irrespective of computers. The introductio	1
14	of computers and the increase of the government's ability to	
15	collect information and use it give an entirely new dimension	
16	and a much greater impetus to our inquiry because the govern-	
17	ment of course, has been collecting information from the begin-	
18	nings of time, and as somebody mentioned here today, we have	
19	in a sense, come to learn how to deal one way or the other with	
20	the government's collecting information.	

Our fear is the area of computers will change the balance so much that there would not be the kind of tacit or informal or underground, or whatever kinds of controls now exist to balance government and individuals.

Federal Reporters, Inc. 25

We have had a series of hearings most recently, about

a year ago, which consisted primarily of a general survey of
 the area of collection of data and privacy. We have two volumes
 printed already. The first is the testimony and the second
 has to do with criminal justice and political information,
 basically, the army and the Department of Justice.

A third volume which will reprint a number of responses
to surveys, we have sent out to all government agencies
presumably will tell us the kinds of data systems that government agencies have on people outside the government, what
kinds of controls they have on them. We hope eventually to
publish that, but it tends to go out of date, even before we
get it.

I will say that we have seen another aspect in the 13 area of data collection which I think, might be very important 14 for you all. That is that we can kind of divide roughly govern-15 ment data systems into what I generally call, benign systems, 16 and, malignant systems. There are some government collection 17 systems which collect information to do things bad to the 18 people, criminal law, political data systems and the like, 19 which strike at very familiar rights that we have, the right 20 of political freedoms, criminal law. 21

When we deal with those in a sense we are dealing in an area that certainly, as lawyers, and certainly in making political judgments where the interests at stake are very Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 familiar to us, and we can -- and we have a system that is already set up, outlined in the Bill of Rights. They are part
 of our entire heritage. We can easily see the danger that
 collection or use of certain kinds of information in these
 areas will have to individual citizen's rights. We do not even
 often call them privacy rights. We call them political rights,
 rights of criminal and due process and the like.

7 The other area is the area that HEW deals with that 8 are in a sense, what I call benign. They are the giving of 9 services to individuals. The collection of information ought 10 to do that in a better way. There we find it is extremely 11 hard to formulate what the interest is that we call privacy.

We even find it difficult to formulate the dangers we want to avoid. We can say, obviously we want to avoid error, we want to avoid mistake, but what is the real human interest involved in not collecting so much data? That is very difficult.

It is very difficult to try to verbalize and is much more difficult when you try to start making choices. We find there are almost always other interests on the other side. it may be fishy, it may be catching welfare cheaters, it may be something else. But the government interest on the other side is always much, much more powerful. This puts it at a very great disadvantage in trying to strike balances.

24 The most that you can do is to come up with some ederal Reporters, Inc. 25 rhetoric on the interests of privacy, the interests of human

It is difficult to verbalize this thing and difficult 1 man. · 2 to make choices when trying to express it which does not mean that it is not important. We all think it is important and 3 4 it may be important in very practical ways. some people from 5 the National Science Foundation came in the other day talking about research data and confidentiality. They have a very 6 strong interest in confidentiality in a practical way and that 7 8 is, they would not get cooperation.

9 They would not get cooperation from people because
10 they cannot guarantee confidentiality. Their research is then
11 no good. That is the kind you can explain to somebody and then
12 make a balance judgment and even force certain kinds of privacy
13 or confidentiality.

Unless you can find something like that, the balance is extremely difficult and we have had very little -- as I say, we have had very little success in trying to do something about these other areas in the benign data collection.

We are at the point now, where I think, we certainly recognize the kinds of issues that are involved and I think we have a pretty good idea of the state of the art, if you will, how far these developments are moving.

A real problem now is trying to devise some practical methods for the interests of privacy and confidentality and security and get them locked into these systems, as they are beginning to grow, because the systems grow irrespective of 1 what these systems are. Once they grow, it is almost impossible2 to impose these controls on them.

What I think we would like to see, are some very practical suggestions as to what a data system in health or data system in HEW, what do you think ought to be done, what would you put in if you were in a government agency in terms of regulations, and what should go in the statute rather than doing more research.

9 Not that all of it has been done, by any means, but 10 I think we are all familiar with the kinds of problems and the 11 time is getting very close to come up with practical solutions 12 in terms of rules and regulations in this area.

I would be glad to answer any questions.

MS. HARDAWAY: In the beginning, you stated that you started out to get rid of several questions that were asked of the employees by the Federal Government. Can you give me an example of those questions?

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ć.		MR. BASKIR: Yes. Personal information having to
~ -		2 do with sexual attitudes, financial information, and information
		3 with respect to region. I think of all of those, the one that
		4 comes the closest in terms of being able to make a straight
		5 prohibition, there is no information at all that is necessary
		6 on region. That fell through when we talked to the security
		7 organizations who felt they had to have that information in
		8 order to assign personnel in terms of national security assign-
		9 ments.
	1	MS. HARDAWAY: Are there any questions such as
	1	what state have you registered to vote in, what precinct,
\cap	1	2 et cetera?
C	1	3 MR. BASKIR: I can't recall specifically whether
	ı	4 those are asked of government employees. Those kinds of
	1	5 questions are asked by the government of citizens all the time
	ı	6 for all sorts of reasons. What we have found is that as
	1	7 Dave was talking with respect to you all, maybe if this
	1	B Committee comes to the conclusion it is not going to get more
	1	9 information but make value judgments, even based on the
	2) little information, one of the things you might suggest would
	2	be that the government doesn't need all the information it is
	2	collecting, that it is kind of information collection crazy and
	2	3 that more information doesn't necessarily result in better
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1	collect information on the theory that the more you have, the	
2	better your decision is. This is an almost irrisistible	
. 3	drive within government and computers of course justified this	
4	thing tremendously.	
5	MZ. HARDAWAY: You know Will Rogers said fortunately	
6	we do not get all the government that we pay for.	
7	MR. BASKIR: Yes. I am afraid of computers because	
8	it might make the government more efficient.	
9	There is a real point there. Bob and I had a meeting	
10	in New York a few months ago. I can't remember what we discusse	d
11	but one of the things that came up with was with respect	
12	to the enforcement of traffic tickets in the New York system.	
13	There is a lot of slack in government and that is what makes	
14	government and society livable, that is the government	
15	doesn't do everything that it wants to do and when you really	
16	enforce traffic tickets you come to an intolerable situation.	
17	MZ. HARDAWAY: In the area of privacy and from	
18	your knowledge of working on this as long as you have, and if	
19	you can get away from federal and down to state where I	
20	think probably 90 percent of the states ask on their employment	
21	applications are you registered, what county, what precincts, et	
22	cetera, would you feel that the asking of that question	
23	would violate the privacy of an individual or do you feel	
24	how that information is used would be the point where the	
s, Inc. 25	privacy would be invaded?	

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ı	MR. BASKIR: Let me say that kind of information has
2	to be asked by government for certain purposes. It certainly
3	has to be asked by government with respect to voting
4	information. You have to know where a person is registered
5	and what his registration is.
6	MZ. HARDAWAY: I am talking about on an application
7	for employment, now.
8	MR. BASKIR: Right. There is no reason to put it
9	on an application for employment. One very important thing
10	that I think we have seen is that tacit controls on the
11	collection of information that may have existed to some extent
12	in the past with a function of your ability to use the informa-
13	tion or store it even and there was no real necessity to ask,
14	for instance, a question like that, of just anybody in the
15	world just because you have more things important that you
16	had to know.
17	Now of course those constraints are dropping off
18	with computers that enable you to get the information plus
19	you can justify the space of the computer by collecting more.
20	Another thing is to replace the old constraints

20 Another thing is to replace the old constraints 21 of time and usefulness which are now gone with computers with 22 artificial rules.

23 MZ. HARDAWAY: In some ways the states would challenge 24 you on whether or not those are necessary questions. I think ^{Inc.} 25 most states feel an obligation to employ their own -- people

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that are living within their state and who have an interest 1 in that state government, and I believe that is the purpose 2 for asking that question, are you residing in our state, 3 are you registered to vote, do you intend to, you know, live 4 here and support this state that you are attending and that 5 you are taking your earnings from. 6

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There is no question that you could MR. BASKIR: 7 give a very legitimate reason for almost every piece of 8 information asked by government. Indeed when you get into 9 administering programs if you can't think of something definite, 10 you can say we want to find out whether that information is 11 pertinent. So we are collecting to see if it is pertinent. 12 That is what we ran into in the very small area of government 13 employee privacy. That is that the government or collector 14 will always have a very persuasive reason to collect a piece 15 of information. 16

MR. MC LEAN: Larry, the situation is largely 17 analogous to the area of classification of government infor-18 mation. There is no power to avoid over classification so when 19 in doubt the typical bureaucrats classifies. If he under-20 classifies, he gets penalized. 21

MR. BASKIR: You never know, of course, when a 22 piece of information might become useful. Three days from 23 now when somebody says why don't we find out, or what about 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. this. 25

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MR. GALLATI: The same rules apply to purging. They say gee whiz, remember this case 10 years ago; we couldn't have solved this case if we didn't have this information.

5 DR. GROMMERS: What are you doing about legislation 6 at this time?

7 MR. BASKIR: Well, we have pretty much reached a 8 dead end. We have found one data bank that had absolutely 9 no justification for and that may be the only one in the world. 10 That was the Army political system. We even have difficulty 11 drafting legislation with respect to making that prohibition, 12 the tacit political prohibition that has been created. The 13 Army will begin to tell you we do have a reason to collect up 14 to here. Well, how do you draw the line? We have great 15 difficulty in drafting it much less getting it enacted.

16 With respect to other kinds of systems, let's say criminal systems where we can see very clearly the danger 17 18 point in there, the pressures on those systems to create them 19 and the other elements of them are very, very great. We 20 indeed haven't even come to the drafting point of that. We 21 are pretty much at the point where I think Senator Ervin has decided the talents within the subcommittee staff and the 22 23 problem is so large we can't begin to do any drafting of legislation within our own community. 24

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DR. GROMMERS: Like where?

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(1	MR. BASKIR: Where? I am not sure at this point.
	2	As a matter of fact we have just discussed it in the last day
	. 3	or two and somewhat this morning.
	4	I would think that whatever we would do in terms of
	5	creating a group would build upon the kind of thing that
	6	this Committee would do even if this Committee only restricted
	7	itself to things within the department that the secretary
	8	could do himself as models because there are very few models
	9	running around even with respect to individual systems.
•	10	MR. ANGLERO: I think you got into a very critical
	11	point when you said that one of our recommendations could
C	12	be not to have so much information and to have a sense of
	13	information and to have an idea of the information that is
	14	gathered, we need to know a list of other systems that
	15	operate. We have to know exactly the not the thematics
	16	of the machinery, but how the systems operate and how would
	17	they be designed to be used in terms of policy making because
	18	we can gather and gather more information and never come
	19	up with anything; and I suspect that a lot of that is in the
	20	system. So I can identify not because of the system but
	21	because of the way they work that there is not a common way
•	22	to do it, there is not a system. There is not a rationale,
(23	and even if the information could be gathered on a data
😁 – Federal Reporters,	24	basis, could be gathered on an individual basis to come here
	25	to Washington. I know that and I think you know all that.

T	Myself, on the state level, and let's call it a state, it
2	is Puerto Rico, I regret, to gather information at the state
3	level is not needed on an individual basis because really I
4	would do nothing in terms of the individual. That would not
5	help me or us to improve services or to provide services for
6	decision making. For evaluation that could be a great thing,
7	but there should be some kind of rationale, some kind of system
8	design behind it and not having been able to see in any of
9	these presentations that we have had here, the rationale,
10	the systems that comes, not as such in the private sector, not
11	even here, in terms of health, education, and welfare; and
12	whenever we talk about this, we talk about procedures, we
13	talk about processes. I have nothing and I would like for
14	someone to tell me why the information is gathered and the
15	use being given to that information because that is the only
16	way I think or one of the few ways that we will be able to
17	determine the kind of information to be gathered and where
18	should it be kept.

MR. BASKIR: One of the things that we came for that doesn't get us very far is a determination we would like to build into the question in process, a limitation structure, some requirement of justifying why a piece of information is requested; and there is no such system now anywhere. It is all internally devised within the group that decides it needs information and there are limitations, budgetary, how

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8	1	long the form. It has to go through the Bureau of Budget.						
	2	But there is no outside force asking the question what do you						
	_ 3	need this information for. When we have done it, we have						
	4	done it in a form I can't recall the form number personal						
·	5	health information. I know the services use it very much. They						
	6	had a medical history. You checked a box. Form 69, that is						
	7	right.						
	8	All sorts of information. Finally we started to						
	9	ask questions about that, nobody could say what this						
	10	information was used for or why it had to be gathered. We						
	11	came pretty far towards eliminating that questionnaire. But						
C	12	the numbers of years, the amount of work that went into						
V	13	eliminating that one questionnaire couldn't be done on a						
	14	general basis.						
. End #2	5 15	MS. HARDAWAY: Do you suggest a regulatory board?						
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\bigcirc	arl	ı	MR. BASKIR: One thing Arthur Miller proposed
		2	once and Senator Ervin was very interested in, was some
		. 3	independent system that whatever rules were imposed upon
		4	government information collection systems, this would
		5	administer those rules. If some organization were to say
		6	we want to computerize, we want to collect this kind of data
		7	for this kind of program, they would have to go and at least
		8	say that they have these rules for security, these rules for
		9	privacy, these rules for confidentiality and get an okay
		10	from the regulatory system.
		11	MR. WHITE: This is a licensing in a sense?
С		12	MR. BASKIR: Not only for the government, but for
		13	the private sector. A much smaller area, and in some
		14	respects easier. You would only have to propose that idea
		15	as beneficial as it would be to come up with all the diffi-
		16	culties involved in that, not the least difficulty is that
		17	regulatory systems always are captured by the well, the
		18	industry in a private area, by the constituency they are
		19	supposed to regulate.
		20	MS. HARDAWAY: And many times they are politically
		21	manipulated, according to how they come about.
•		22	DR. GROMMERS: Mr. Baskir, have you had some
(23	conversation which I am not aware, what is the problem? Is
		24	it that there is a lack of constitutional basis for the
≞.e — Fede	eral Reporters	s, Inc. 25	privacy of the individual or is it that nobody has tested it in $\frac{1}{16}$

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the courts, tested the fourteenth and first in the courts? ľ MR. BASKIR: You are now talking about the social 2 welfare as opposed to criminal and political systems? 3 DR. GROMMERS: Yes. 4 MR. BASKIR: Arthur Miller could go into it much 5 further. The law just has not been developed to the point 6 where we understand this thing called privacy. There is no 7 structure that helps you make judgments when you have to make 8 a decision with respect to somebody's privacy. 9 DR. GROMMERS: There is fourteen and there is 10 first amendments and the Constitution does guarantee a right 11 to liberty. Is it possible a series of test cases would have 12 to be developed? 13 Senator Ervin's approach to this is MR. BASKIR: 14 that the first amendment, primarily, and also the requirement 15 of due process, gives you a constitutional structure to make 16 these decisions, and I think it does. But there is no --17 in having said that, as you are starting principle, you don't 18 have enough experience and we have no experience, let me put 19 it that way, and what little experience we have is all nega-20 tive, that gives you the little subsidiary rules to actually 21 make real decisions. 22 When you come down to it, nobody is going to protect 23

24 you if a government agency for a legitimate reason collects 25 your religion and then gives it to somebody else.

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DR. GROMMERS: Why not? Is there a lack of law? 1 MR. BASKIR: Yes. Put quite simply, there is a 2 lack of law. Also the kinds of injury we are talking about 3 is not an injury which so far as law is concerned, which 4 we know how to manipulate and make decisions about it. If 5 somebody is improperly thrown into jail because information 6 was collected wrongfully about him, you know, a search, a 7 search warrant, we know what to do about that. A person 8 has been deprived of his liberty. 9

DR. GROMMERS: Suppose a person loses his job? 10 MR. BASKIR: If you can prove it. Yes. 11 Unfortunately when you come down to violations of privacy, 12 the kinds of information, kinds of programs that HEW deals 13 with, benign systems, it is hard to find the injury. What is 14 the injury? If you find the injury, how do you know what 15 caused it? 16

MR. GALLATI: You have to get back to property. 17 The whole law is based on the concept of property. When you 18 try to define your injury based upon a violation of privacy, 19 it has to be translatable into some form of property, a job, 20 some damage that has occurred to you in most cases. This is 21 where you get into the whole ball of wax that our law is 22 based on property 23

24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 This is the only thing the law recognizes in terms of invasion

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of privacy. Someone's feelings that his psyche has been injured because someone told something about him that they shouldn't have, that is not translatable into any kind of legal consequence.

MR. MARTIN: I am wondering what kind of interaction, 5 if any, there has been within the Congress among three that 6 I can think of sources of initiative in this area that are 7 conceptually related. We had a presentation earlier today 8 from Ken McLean on the credit reporting account and some 9 process has been created there without any root in property 10 I don't think it is essential that damage, monetary right. 11 damage, be accountable to arrive at the point where you decide 12 we need some process through which the forces of opinion 13 and attitude and feeling can operate to change things. 14

MR. GALLATI: It is a very good statement, Dave, except I would like to call your attention to the fact that the basis for activity, the tremendous activity in the federal reporting act was that there were people who were being injured propertywise.

20 MR. BASKIR: It did have a property base. You got 21 your credit card and continued to be billed for things 22 that never had been bought.

23 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 MR. MC LEAN: The biggest area was the question of relevancy, determining what information goes into the file. That is where the law is most deficient and that is where we had the biggest problem convincing senators and members
of Congress that there ought to be some reasonable restrictions
on the kinds of information that could be collected. It is
just not a recognized tort concept.

5 MR. MARTIN: Let me pursue this a little bit 6 further. There is also the Post Office and Civil Service 7 Committee, I believe, which has also been trying to get at 8 what kinds of information is appropriate to ask government 9 employees.

MR. BASKIR: That's the flip side of our bill. 10 MR. MARTIN: And there is your committee. And 11 there may be others. Now what sort of interaction goes on 12 among these separate sources of initiative? Why, for example, 13 is there not pending legislation that applies the process 14 which has been developed for the credit reporting field in 15 other areas where exactly the same -- let's -- formulation 16 of a right of access to what's in a file could be created by 17 legislative prescription. 18

MR. BASKIR: The answer may be the squeaky wheel, in a sense, a tremendous groundswell of public objection to the abuse of computer systems in the area of credit cards, for instance.

23 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 Of course, the public concern goes beyond the scope of that bill. A simple concern in the area of, let's say, individual liberties -- I say except for a

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few areas like spying, surveillance kind of thing, which 1 people react to very easily, it tends to taper off in other 2 The counter interest, catching spies, whatever you areas. 3 want to say, dealing with riots, catching criminals, is very, 4 very strong. That means that trying to strike a balance 5 becomes very, very difficult. Trying to get the momentum 6 where people are prepared to strike a balance is even difficult 7 for us. 8

And the Post Office, Civil Service Commission, 9 in a sense, is a very good example. The privacy bill Senator 10 Ervin developed for government employees had its toughest 11 fight only with its application to the CIA. Then when we had 12 a vote on the issue, 90 to 4, 90 senators against only 4, 13 because Senator Ervin had managed to persuade the Senate as 14 to the importance of these areas of privacy for government 15 employees. 16

In the House, it goes to the Civil Service 17 Commission which is very responsive to the needs of government 18 personnel and management. That bill has been over there three 19 times without any but the slightest kind of movement. They 20 are very fractious and they find location in the Senate 21 with privacy very strong in our subcommittee, and therefore 22 the government management interests is very strong in the 23 House committee. 24

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MR. MARTIN: This committee has a very difficult

strategic dilemma. Much of the discussion which goes on,
 has gone on in this committee, has been in terms of broad
 principles, general statements about the desirability of
 people being able to get into their record and make sure that
 it is accurate and so on.

6 Yet, given from what you have said, that there is 7 no capacity within the Congress for conceptual infection 8 across the jurisdiction of committees, that you don't --9 unless you have interest group pressures at work that move 10 committees, this committee needs, it seems to me, to take 11 account of what the -- the map of Congress is, particularly 12 if it is going to recommend anything in the way of legislation.

My own view, based at this juncture, which is a 13 long way from the end of the road, is that it doesn't repay 14 us to think about these issues in general terms, that we are 15 probably going to have to think about them in particular 16 areas of application of data systems such as the health area 17 because maybe there is a chance then of moving the committees 18 of the Congress that write health legislation or in education, 19 because maybe there is a chance of moving the committees of 20 Congress that write educational legislation as our one 21 One committee was able to move in the area of precedent. 22 credit and steal a little from other committees and include 23 insurance and employment, and I am wondering whether we 24 Federal Reporters, Inc.

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1	MR. BASKIR: That is a problem we faced and have not
. 2	yet resolved. That is whether to go at this, specific problem
3	by specific problem; or try to seek a general approach to it.
4	MR. MARTIN: I think the committee needs help and
5	any insights you and Ken, and others can offer
6	MR. BASKIR: There are a number of equal arguments
7	on whether to go into the particular or into the general.
8	MR. MARTIN: It needs advice on how to develop a
9	sense of strategy and package its insights and recommendations
10	so as to maximize the likelihood they can catch a breeze,
11	legislatively; if one of the aims turns out to be to catch a
12	legislative breeze.
13	MR. BASKIR: I can see two things I would like out
14	of this committee's results and they are opposites, both things.
15	Because the need is great on both sides of it. I think, for
16	instance, if the committee came up with specific things that
17	the Secretary could do with respect to the organization of
18	the systems under his control, such that he might have sniping
19	from outside the Department, but basically that all would be
20	within his control to impose without answering to anybody else.

21 MR. MARTIN: And create a model situation?
 22 MR. BASKIR: That is right. That would be extremely
 23 valuable. It is nice to have a model somewhere.

On the other hand, if it is only particular, it - Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 may be fine for HEW and have no application to any other place

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1 in the government and may not advance us in general. Obviously, 2 it would, because we would have 40 percent of the government 3 systems covered by these regulations. We would be 40 percent 4 along the way.

I would also like to see something that the committee
does which would advance, and stimulate, and be a voice, let
us say, from Secretary Richardson, as to what government ought
to do as government in general.

9 In other words, I think the committee ought to come 10 down very hard in terms of recommending privacy, recommendations 11 on behalf of privacy as a general issue, as well as come up 12 with specifics that Richardson would find directly applicable 13 in his own shop.

The need is there for both.

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MR. MC LEAN: I would concur very strongly with what Larry just said. I think one way of managing that would be go divide up the recommendations in terms of the areas in which data banks are located, perhaps, starting with HEW as one major system, and then, perhaps, looking at other governmental data systems, and agencies, such as Internal Revenue. Bureau of the Census, etc.

A third chapter, looking at the private sector, private reporting firms. Perhaps third would be looking at welfare data systems. Then there would be looking at data Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 systems compiled by corporations for their own purpose. If the

<i>i</i> .	1	corporation is large enough, it has a significant effect upon
	2	the welfare and well-being of their employees. so this would
	3	be it seems to me, a very convenient way of managing the
	4	work of the committee, and then trying to develop a conceptual
	5	framework to analyze all of these various data systems in
	6	terms of the information that goes in, what kind of informations
	7	go in, what kinds of safeguards should there be, what kinds of
	8	mechanisms and procedures should the affected people have to
	9	gain access, to gain recourse, channel the information.
	10	It may be that you need different answers or differ-
	11	ent approaches, different specific solutions depending upon
prove the second s	12	the kinds of system you are talking about. I think you could
C	13	probably develop a conceptual framework that would serve to
	14	analyze all data systems and then perhaps apply different
	15	solutions to each particular data system.
	16	DR. GROMMERS: Let me push you a little harder on
	17	that, Ken. I take it you are just tossing out a possible
	18	organization into chapters?
	19	MR. MC LEAN: Right.
	20	MR. MARTIN: One thing which Nancy Kleeman and
	21	others of us in the Department and I have been trying to do
	22	over the last several weeks, is to conceptualize a little about
	23	this and let us just take your suggestion, not to take it
(24	apart, but to show you the difficulties.
🛥 – Federal Reporters	, Inc. 25	A chapter on HEW, a chapter on State and Local

A chapter on HEW, a chapter on State and Local

6	1	Government.	
C.	2	Okay. HEW is not a monolithic single system,	
	3	it is "H," at least two sets of "Es," several "Hs," several	
	4	sets of "Ws," and then it is several things that are hard to	
	5	label easily.	
	6	"H," "E," and "W"; you might say, okay, if HEW	
	7	is not the right answer, make it HE and W.	
	8	MR. MC LEAN: Or subchapters.	
	9	MR. MARTIN: Okay. HEW interacts with state and	
	10	local government and it does that in a variety of ways. Some	
	11	is along the H line and along the E line and along the W line	
C	12	and some, much less, is in terms of relationships with general	
	13	purpose government; the Governors office or the Mayor's office,	
	14	and the task of conceptualizing what might be a rational way	
	15	for HEW to exercise authority by administrative action within	
	16	its existing authority, to cause effects within H, E, and	
	17	W, and state and local government do not necessarily marry	
	18	comfortably with how it should be organized to relate to the	
	19	Congress.	
	20	If we lack authority in some ways and need to get	
	21	legislation	
	22	MR. MC LEAN: I do not think you need to organize	
, I	23	your report in terms of what administrative actions could be	
	24	taken by HEW, what administrative actions could be taken by	
e Federal Reporter	s, Inc. 25	other agencies, what administrative actions could be taken by	

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Congress or various state and local governments. I would
 organize it around the different types of data packages and
 then in the conclusions and recommendations, on each type of
 data package, list the specific actions which could be taken
 by these various groups.

MR. MARTIN: By whatever actors need to act?
MR. MC LEAN: some might have to depend on the
Congress, some might have to be referred back to state and local
governments. It seems to me, it is the data bank itself, and
its peculiar requirements that ought to be the first division
into your undertaking.

DR. GROMMERS: Could someone answer the question;
13 it is not clear to me why there is a right to collect data,
14 why there is a right to not give it?

MR. MC LEAN: Bargain power.

MR. BASKIR: I think that is the simplest answer.

MR. MC LEAN: The person on whom the data is collected 18 is usually applying for a benefit.

DR. GROMMERS: Is that not coercion?

MR. MC LEAN: Yes.

21 DR. GROMMERS: Is that not against the law? 22 MR. BASKIR: No. But -- you want to get welfare, 23 you have to fill out the form. You want insurance, you have 24 to fill out the form.

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MR. GALLATI: We, on this committee had to fill out

1 a lot of forms.

MR. MARTIN: It does not have to involve coercion.
MS. HARDAWAY: It is a matter of your choice. If
you want the insurance, you have the choice.

5 MR. MARTIN: If the government, for example, has authority to do something in relation to people and in turn 6 7 that authority is constrained in such a way that it is limited 8 authority to do something with respect to some people, now it 9 has to be able by a process of information-collection to deter-10 mine whether or not the particular some people for whom it is going to act, are the people with whom it has authority to 11 act; for example, programs for the blind. 12

13 You have to find out whether the people are blind If they are not blind, they are not eligible to be or not. 14 beneficiaries and if they are blind, they are; and if you 15 do not find out so that you can do for the blind what you have 16 been authorized, or directed to do, and only for them; but 17 operate in such a way as to confer the benefit on just anybody, 18 the General Accounting Office will come around after awhile 19 and say, "You have aided other than the blind." Or, "You have 20 exceeded your authority, you have been a bad government agency." 21 Part of the need for information is to be sure that 22

23 as the government acts, it acts only within the limit of the 24 authority which has been given to it, else it will do what Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 it pleases.

DR. GROMMERS: I can, right away, think of a way of insuring that only the blind get that benefit without any record being kept, without any data being apssed. Just, for example, have a very bright light shine in these peoples' eyes. MS. HARDAWAY: But there are times when you do not End #27 see that person that is blind. ederal Reporters, Inc.

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DR. GROMMERS: All I am syaing is that it is -- it should be the fact that it is useful that should make it legal to have information. It is useful to do lots of things that are not legal.

5 MR. MC LEAN: That is a good example you gave where 6 you have a simple requirement where you are blind or not blind. 7 In many other cases the government acts as an employer.

8 MR. MARTIN: Take the poverty program. HEW has a 9 number of programs in which the benefit which it is seeking to 10 confer, the money which it is spending, is limited to intended 11 benefit for a particular population defined as "poor" by what-12 ever definition in the statue may be.

The deviation in the statute may be sufficiently imprecise to make it necessary in order, conscientiously, to constrain the behavior of government to an execution of the authority no less and no more than the Congress has conferred, to get quite a lot if information.

18 MR. MC LEAN: That is a little more complicated, but 19 still fairly objective.

I was thinking of the case where the government is acting as an employer in its charge of carrying out its mission and hiring people to perform that mission.

23 For example, the Federal Housing Administration 24 insures the home mortgage. 25 percent of them go through either Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 FHA or VA. They run a credit report on insurance applicants and and they are gathering the same type of seemingly marginal and
 other related information on FHA applicants that insurance
 companies are gathering.

MR. MARTIN: Take employment for a minute now. I would suggest, without wanting to be a defender of all the blanks in the federal employment application form, I would suggest that most of the information which is obtained for purposes of federal employment arises from Congressional action.

9 It is Congress which has, for example, voted a
10 preference to veterans. I can't see much relevance in knowing
11 a lot about someone's military career of X years ago incident
12 to his employment as an employee of the government. But if he
13 has a certain characteristic, namely he is a veteran, then he
14 is entitled to something that Congress said he should have.

So, the only way you can tell that you create that preference for that class of persons, per the will of the Congress, is to find out which of all the people that you are dealing with are entitled by Congressional edict to be given a certain treatment and so it goes, case after case.

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MR. MC LEAN: That is not at issue.

21 But what about the background investigations that are 22 conducted by the Civil Service Commission or by the FBI or by 23 the other investigative agencies of government on a prospective 24 employee's employment application. They go into his background, mee-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 the meetings he may have attended while he was in college, what 1

his political views were, what his associates were.

These are the far more serious questions that occur. MR. MARTIN: I sat in -- I think there is something the Congress could do there. The Congress could provide the same kind of access to the record which you all have provided in the credit reporting field.

Tony Mondello, the counsel of the Civil Service
Commission, will come up and fight hard against your doing that
on the ground that it will burden enormously the personnel
function of government to enable employees to have this right
of access.

MR. MC LEAN: It is more than access It is the right of asking the questions in the first place.

MR. MARTIN: This is why I am asking for help. That
is the product of a tacit if not a legislated arrangement
between the Post Office and Civil Service Committees or key
figures over the years and the Civil Service Commission.

Is uspect that nearly every information gathering
practice that you could find with respect to Civil Service
employees of the government has come to pass because in part of
some kind of interaction with the Congress which may or may not
be revealed in the U.S. code.

23 I am not going to again say that there are probably 24 some managers who feel that certain information if useful. Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 Maybe there has been a creep in information gathering from

employees for the decision making process of management and Т government that is born purely out of the incitement of this. 2 kind of behavior of the business schools of America or 3 wherever personnel officers are trained, but I think the 4 Congress is much more guilty of having induced the behavior by 5 the executive than the discussion you and Larry have engaged 6 in here would suggest you acknowledge that it has. 7 MR. BASKIR: Let me ---8 MR. MC LEAN: I would vigorously disagree with that 9 I don't think,, with all due respect to the marvelous House 10 hearings Mr. Ervin has held and others have held, I don't 11 think the average person of Congress is really all that aware 12 of the types of information gathering activities that are 13 taking place. 14 MR. MARTIN: Average member; no, particular commit-15 tee or subcommittee that wants reports, most of the reports 16 that are prepared in the executive branch are prepared to meet 17 the appetite. of some Congressman or subcommittee. 18 MR. BASKIR: A number of the things we say depends 19 on the direction we look at. 20 Certainly in Congress we have the feeling that most 21 of the stuff that goes on in the world has nothing to do with 22 what we say or don't say, you being where you probably see the 23 exact opposite. 24 - Federal Reporters, Inc. MR. MARTIN: I have been in your shoes before. Now 25

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we are in new shoes.

This committee has come in as a surrogate for the public, and weigh all the perceptions it gets, some from the executive, legislative, some from experts, and so on, and try to come up with some proposed actions that will move the ball in some direction that most people agree is a good direction for it to move.

8 MR. BASKIR: Let me say with respect to government 9 employment that to be sure the things that Ken mentioned about 10 political reliability, if you want to call it that, that is in 11 large measure either required explicitly or implicitly by 12 Congress.

There is a considerable amount that goes on beyond
that that the administrators of that system decide they need.
MR. MARTIN: Amen.

MR. BASKIR: With which, of course, Congress has nothing to do.

And then on top of that, certainly the employment 18 area in government, merely the principle that you use the man-19 power that you have as best you can moves you to ask all sorts 20 of things in terms of placement and everything else that nobody 21 outside of those, the personnel area, have any idea about in 22 terms of validity or importance and even within the personnel 23 area, if you really ask them, does the collection of this kind 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. of information result in better decisions, when you press them 25

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6 -	sw6	1	after a couple of hours they will say nobody has ever studied
		2	whether or not the information we have collected in terms of
		3	background and education, everything else, and the decisions
		4	made on the basis of that information ends up being better or
		5	worse.
		6	Much of the information is never validated. It
		7	doesn't have any impact.
		8	All of that is being done outside of the power of
		9	Congress.
		10	MR. MARTIN: That is the fruit of the power on
		11	Congress, not the executive. It is the fruit of the power on
C		12	Congress of the Civil Service employee lobby which is trying
		13	to impact on the Civil Service Commission and through it on the
		14	personnel functions of government agencies to run a merit
		15	system of classified employment service, and the poor personnel
		16	people have very little to do really.
		17	They are a staff function, and anybody that thinks
		18	that the personnel function in government agencies is a strong
		19	condition of decision making by line managers is just off his
		20	rocker.
		21	So, you have an enormous information system here
		22	that has been built, I submit, by demands placed implicitly and
	•	23	explicitly by the Congress on the Civil Service Commission
		24	through the Civil Service Commission on the rest of the federal
ce – Federal	Reporters,	Inc. 25	executive branch to keep a mirage of a person's going to satisfy

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C	sw7]	the power structure of the Civil Service employee lobby.
· • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 2	Now, how do you break that?
	. 3	MR. BASKIR: Well, one thing you do is ask them
	4	explicitly why you are asking that question.
-	5	MR. MARTIN: As you said, they will have a good
	6	answer for you.
	7	The real answer will be because that is the way the
	8	forces that impinge on our behavior want it, in this instance,
	9	the Post Office and Civil Service Committees and whatever
	10	gallery it is playing to.
	11	Even though, in reality, if people are frank, it
<i>C</i> .	12	isn't having any effect. There is a an example, you know.
	. 13	I don't know whose interest was being served by this, but up
	14	to a few years ago, we lawyers got a very simple little degree
	15	as we came out of law school called an LLB degree, a Bachelor
	16	of Laws Degree.
	17	Okay. What the forces lead that forces that lead
	18	to your being able to turn in your LLB to get a Doctorate
	19	Jurisprudence, a JD, but now manyLLB's are turning in and
	20	getting a JD degree and run around to the Civil Service
	21	classification process and say I have a doctorate. That is
	22	worth two or three steps in grade or a higher grade level.
	23	MR. BASKIR: That is why the change.
(. 24	MR. MARTIN: We have an information system that takes
e – Fede	ral Reporters, Inc. 25	account of the difference between an LLB degree and a JD degree
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and some other kinds of degree which, I say, is part of a 1 classified system of Civil Service wich has been mandated by 2 3 the Congress and these are some of the effects_it leads to. So, if things aren't wight in this business, every-4 5 body has got a very big share in why they are the way they are and therefore a very big share of trying to undo it and here 6 is a committee which I think has an enormous opportunity to at 7 8 least shine daylight insome areas and even perhaps put some initiative behind some proposals for change insofar as 9 those initiatives are going to be legislative initiatives. 10 11 I feel personally and I suspect. most of the members.of the committee must feel equally if not more so, 12 terribly much in the dark about how do you play the Congressional 13 e 28 14 piano. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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۱	MR. MC LEAN: If I could just comment on that for
2	a moment, I think you have to consider these factors, of
. 3	course, but there also is a danger in overmphasizing the
4	politics of the issue and underemphasizing the substantive
5	nature of the issue. It seems to me your job is to work
6	primarily on the substantive nature, thinking about the
7	politics. But that is really our problem. Let us work in
8	the final analysis, worry about the politics of it and you
9	worry about the rationale and the justification for doing
10	something.
n	It seems to me you can get all bogged down in whether
12	or not it ought to go to this committee or that committee,
13	this senator, that senator, and in the end those types of
14	considerations could be self-defeating.

15 MR. MARTIN: I wouldn't suggest we should take the initiative in that. All I am, I guess, making a plea for is 16 that you, having been exposed to this dimension of the 17 difficulty of our problem, that you keep thinking about it 18 and maybe consult with like-minded friends on other staffs 19 of other committees so that at some point in time when this 20 Committee has the lock on the presentation, if you have any 21 sort of wisdom to offer about what will make things move through 22 the system better, rather than worse, those insights can be 23 taken account of when the packaging job is finally done. 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 I agree with you entirely. We have got to

1 concentrate on substance but how it is packaged can make a
.
2 big difference.

3 MR. BASKIR: I think one of the great things this Committee could concentrate, assuming it got the blessing of 4 5 the secretary, is that here you have a national figure, the Secretary of HEW, saying all thse impractical things, like 6 7 there ought to be prvicacy. That gives an extraordinary 8 amount of push, political push, if you want to say it, no 9 matter what he says, no matter how impractical it might be. 10 MR. MARTIN: Might create a climate for change?

MR. BASKIR: That is right. The Committee is not merely a victim of political pressures but is an actor in the process and that if this Committee came up with a clear statement in terms of privacy and all these rules that ought to be, the actual implementation of those laws will be quite a bit.

17 MR. MARTIN: The secretary is not unaware of his role, not so much personally as secretary to do this. 18 In 19 fact, he did it. How many people have noticed it, I don't 20 know, in the area of women's rights and opportunities. He 21 created in the department a women's action program. He 22 caused it to generate a fairly hefty report with over a hundred recommendations whose implementation he has now mandated. 23 And he sought to get as much publicity and attention for the 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. fact that he did it in part to legitimize the issue, legitimize 25

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the concern about it, and make more people take it seriously.
I think that is what you are suggesting that he could do
here, that by giving it the visibility and the attention and --

that a cabinet officer's concern about it would give it, to
raise the level of attention for it and change the climate
of opportunity for change.

7 DR. GROMMERS: What you are speaking about though is 8 a right to privacy even though there are no dollars involved 9 because if there are dollars involved that has already been 10 established?

Right. One way the law gets created is 11 MR. BASKIR: that there is an interest, a value that becomes more and more 12 recognized so that people then decide, well, here is a value 13 we ought to protect. Statutes are passed that way. Somebody 14 has an idea something ought to be and then the legislative 15 process, in the end, may be nothing more than the locking in 16 of place of something which people have generally decided 17 ought to be and it was the end of one stage of a process. 18

19 If you have groups like this and other groups 20 being to enforce and speak on behalf of this right to privacy, 21 you would then give it much more substance and it gets further 22 along the line of being a recognized right.

23 23 DR. GROMMERS: Has there been any discussion about 24 data about one's self being an extension of one's self? MR. BASKIR: There are considerable theories running

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Federal Reporters, Inc.

(c. 1	around. Arthur Miller is very familiar with these and
2	Arthur Weston. One of them is the right to control information
	about yourself, if you would accept that, it has great
	implications, legally and administratively which means that
:	you couldn't do anything about information about me that
6	I gave you unless I approved which would be a great change
7	now over Ken's experience is that information is the
٤	product of the people who collect it, has nothing to do with
. S	the people. There is a property value in information such
10	that you, yourself, have no right to the information about you.
11	MR. MC LEAN: They think they know the information
(12	and sell it as they see fit.
13	MR. BASKIR: In terms of economic and legal
14	reality, they own the information.
15	DR. GROMMERS: Isn't this largely present in
16	health, which is the only field I am really familiar with?
. 17	There are a growing number of people who feel records aren't
18	necessary and it is a very tenuous position to hold because
19	for years people have been keeping health records?
20	MR. BASKIR: Every once in a while somebody will
21	say there is no value in information. Then they will not push
. 22	it very far because it is questioning the unquestionable.
23	But I personally think that with all the data being collected,
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⊶e – Federal Reporters, Inc 25	the earlier discussion, what does it mean in terms of health

1 benefits to have all of this information being collected. 2 Not only may it not improve the product, but it may detract from 3 the product to have all this information. 4 First, because there is so much noise, the important 5 data is missed, and second, because decisions may be made based upon a flamboyant piece of data which is really 6 7 irrelevant but just as eye catching. You find this all the 8 time. 9 DR. GROMMERS: Is this common law? Is this the way 10 common law --11 MR. BASKIR: This has very little to do with law. DR. GROMMERS: Just because it has always been 12 13 done that way and nobody has realized what was being done up to now and computer systems have now made it a little more 14 15 apparent what is being done? 16 MR. BASKIR: Yes. You try to collect the law on what is a public record. You can't do that. When you do, 17 18 they have relevance to the real world of 1970 because they were passed in 1870, passed in a climate in which information had a 19 considerable amount of difference about what was public and 20 21 not public. If the stuff that was public -- if the information 22 now which is legally permitted to be public were really as 23 public as those statutes say literally, we would be in a terrible 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. situation. The real danger is that with computer it really will 25

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		2	MR.	GALLATI:	Freedom [,]	of info	rmation i	.s goir	ig to
		3 get very	free?						
	End #29	4	MR.	BASKIR:	Yes.			•	
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DR. GROMMERS: What would happen if we came out with a recommendation that all information about a person had to be paid for by the people who got it and --

4 MR. GALLATI: It is a property right, that informa-5 tion about yourself is a property right.

6 DR. GROMMERS: Supposing that we recommended this.
7 What -- I was actually adding something to this, not just a
8 property right, but this vests the ability and the control in
9 the person. What if we recommended this? Is this in any way
10 going to get a serious consideration?

What it will do is reflect added MR. BASKIR: 11 support to the very small group of people that think that is 12 the way we ought to structure the problem, and the more people 13 -- if you all are persuaded by that, there can, let's say three 14 or four lawyers who are now pushing that as a concept, then you 15 have an added push behind it; not to say that it will ever 16 succeed, but you have advanced that as a concept. 17 You have enforced it, in other words. 18

19DR. GROMMERS: What you have to do is match the20lobbyists. You have to get lobbyists to match the lobbyists?

MR. BASKIR: Yes. That is the idea -- the way an idea finally wins is that it collects more and more support. Right now the information is now that right of access to the most basic information has really not gotten very far in practical terms because the pressure is against it.

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(; · ·	DR. GROMMERS: Why not? Excepting for health, which
2	I could refute for other reasons, why not?
3	MR. BASKIR: Your reason in health as discussed
4	before was matched by Tony Mandello's reason that it is too
5	expensive, and I can't rephrase it, but a lot of other
6	reasons; one of the reasons being that we do not want other
7	people poking our nose into how we are making decisions.
8	MR, MC LEAN: I will give you the argument raised by
9	credit agencies for denying consumers access.
10	They said the sources of information would dry up if
11	the person could see his credit files and see what other people
12	were saying about him. The sources would no longer be willing
13	to make statements that he is a dead bet or that he is carous-
14	ing around at night.
15	DR. GROMMERS: I am sorry for them if they go out of
16	business, but the right of the individual is more important
. 17	than their right to do business.
18	MR. MC LEAN: I think you are right, but that is
19	their story.
20	MR. BASKIR: I will be the devil's advocate and say
21	Tony Vondello will say that if you are going to make decisions
- 22	about an individual employee's performance, you need candid
23	commentary, and you are not going to get candid commentary
24	about it, and you are not goint to make good decisions if
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1	who said it.	
2	DR. GROMMERS: I agree with him except I would like	
. 3	to have him prove to me his first implication.	
[•] 4	MR. BASKIR: In the army, as a matter of fact, there	
5	is no such confidentiality. Efficiency reports are open to the	
6	individual. Who made the efficiency report is their superior.	
7	There are difficulties in the army evaluation sys-	
8	tem. While I do not think those difficulties are in terms of	
9	candor and accuracy, there are other kinds of difficulties.	
10	DR. GROMMERS: We just say to Tony he is not right.	
11	If he is right, that you need that confidentiality, the rest	
12	follows.	
13	MR. BASKIR: It is an unquestioned assumption.	
14	DR. GROMMERS: I am questioning it.	
15	MR. BASKIR: Enforced by a way of doing things which	
16	has been unchallenged since time began.	
17	DR. GROMMERS: I could even go so far as to challenge	
18	any regulation at all to whoever is evaluating the person and	
19	his ability to perform. I have never seen any proof in any	
20	sociological experience or rat experiment, or any	
21	MR. BASKIR: There are a whole series of psycologi-	
22	cal tests and other kinds of tests that are given people to	
23	find out about them; what kind of person they are, all for the	
24	purpose of making a better decision about that person's future	
, Inc. 25	performance, and somebody in personnel management once told me	

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that not one, not one of those tests, had ever been validated to show they showed anything at all.

3 DR. GROMMERS: There was not even an evaluation of 4 a child's I.Q. test and his performance in the next grade up. 5 These have been used with economic sanction. In fact, a 6 child who is limited by the stigmata of being a 90 I.Q. is 7 certainly losing -- and -- and --. This is something that we 8 should, I think, take as an issue. We have mentioned the use 9 of information in a personalized way, for comparison, okay; 10 for evaluation, okay; but why should it go to some other place 11 as to be aggregated. Really I cannot see what it is, why there 12 is a great effort to provide or develop planning systems and 13 evaluation systems at the state level at least.

14 From one side, from the federal government; and from 15 the other side, that gathering has been made in a centralized 16 way -- not living in the states with the basic information that 17 is needed for their own decisions.

18 What we are really saying here is that the standard 19 is an unvalidated standard that is being used to measure, and 20 nobody is questioning the fact that it is being -- part of the 21 wisdom of the center that these standards are correct, that 22 Tony's feeling that he needs these confident or unconfident 23 reports is a valid method, valid evaluator.

24 Maybe we could start using the techniques, systems Federal Reporters, Inc. technology, rather than saying what they are doing is wrong --25

proposing one that works.

2	MR. BASKIR: One real problem is that each of these
3	little areas has always had the ability to construct let's say
4	its own information system, its own testing, in spite of what
5	Dave said in terms of the actual questions being asked. The
6	people that administer the finance systems, they decide what
7	information to collect, and nobody questions it primarily
8	because one, nobody else is interested, and, secondly, nobody
9	else knows as much. There is no outside force that they have
10	to answer to in terms of the kind of information that they
11	collect. If there is a question, why are you collecting it, we
12	believe it will help or we know or it will help in order to
13	administer the system.

DR. GROMMERS: Supposing you prove to them that it 14 They still have the right to do it anyway. You is not so. 15 would be far enough ahead to get somebody to demand a legitimate 16 If you start asking these questions, they have enough answer. 17 clout behind you so they have to give you a legitimate answer. 18 You find suddenly within that organization will say we don't 19 need it after all. 20

MR. MC LEAN: Very often you can say that something 21 does not work. You have injustice on those who it selects 22 versus those who it actually does select out. 23

Even if you could prove -- supposing DR. GROMMERS: 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. You could make correlations you could prove it was gratuitous. 25

between police cars drawn by horses in the street and the rise
 of cholera. You could show that, in fact, it was purely spuri ous, and six other unrelated tests would show the same thing.
 Wouldn't they still have the right to do it?

5 MR. BASKIR: That kind of questioning is not done 6 very much.

DR. GROMMERS: You mean it might change whether or not they would do it or whether they have the right to do it?

9 MR. BASKIR: Most of what we do in the subcommittee 10 is asking questions and requiring a justification for an action. 11 That is a lot of what happens in Congress. The very process of 12 asking somebody to justify what he has done often works to 13 change the procedure. It is very slow. There are not very 14 many successes.

Earlier in talking about the difficulties of challenging somebody on a particular question, I tended to downplay it. I do not mean to say there is no value at all in it. Ask somebody to go back and question an assumption. They may find they are unable to give you an answer so they will change. DR. GROMMERS: But out of the goodness of their


21 heart? There is nothing that says they will have to?

MR. BASKIR: That is right.

23 DR. ALLEN: In some respect isn't one of the ques-24 tions focused at this committee, the use of the social security ^{Inc.} 25 number, focusing on that and defining something that is not

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1	MR. BASKIR: You could construct it in terms of
2	injury. The thing you can do with legislation that you cannot
3	do through the ordinary trial processes of challenging somebody
4	is that you can declare something to be wrong and then declare,
5	in a sense, almost arbitrarily, a consequence that you do it.
6	You may not be able to prove that the unauthorized use of
7	social security number has caused you any injury if you tried
8	to sue, but you can write a piece of legislation that says,
9	"Thou shalt not, and if you do, you pay approximately one
10	thousand dollars irrespective of anything else."
11	MR. MC LEAN: The social security number is merely
12	a mechanical device used to aid people. What you are really

12 a mechanical device used to aid people. What you are really 13 talking about is the criteria, the other criteria they employ 14 to make a substantive decision, and you are really challenging 15 whether that criteria is adequate. It is one thing to develop 16 information and collect safeguards for that information. It is 17 another thing to go to the heart of challenging.

DR. ALLEN: But you could challenge those in exactly the same way that you decided that racial information was irrelevant and undesirable to collect as part of employment criteria. You could prohibit it and provide penalties for those who violated that norm.

23 MR. MC LEAN: Yes. But when you begin with the 24 social security number, which is purely a mechanical device, to ^{s, Inc.} 25 racial information -- I fail to see the relevance of the concern

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1	about the social security number other than perhaps to provide
	the Secretary of HEW with a convenient handle on the whole
	problem, but let's recognize it as such and that would divert
	a lot of energies to worrying about whether peoples' social
	security numbers are being divulged or not.
	MR. BASKIR: What you do, and I think it is some-
;	thing like we were talking about before, is that the social
1	security number becomes a symbol, a convenient symbol and a
(convenient tacking place, to get at something you are much more
10	concerned about.
1	MR. MC LEAN: It is a handle on the problem.
12	MR. BASKIR: You could do that if it turns out you
L I	want to prevent linkage of disparate systems instead of saying
14	you shall not match this with this you
1:	MR. GALLATI: You are talking about linkage really.
10	MR. WHITE: Other linkages will, though, be
17	developed that will replace the social security number.
14	MR. GALLATI: Not if you deny linkage.
19	MR. BASKIR: You are object is, I think, in this
20	area to make it more difficult to match several kinds of data
2	on the same individual because you decide that if you do that,
. 22	bad consequences will happen that will form a wall to make it
23	more difficult to match these two systems.
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1 a totally different purpose for which he did not give the infor-2 mation. So, the barrier between the linkage has to be something 3 that the individual can control?

MR. MARTIN: Here, since you are still here, see how you respond to this question. The proposed identifier, as I recall the literature on it, is advanced to facilitate data interchange. The assumption in making that proposal is that facilitating data interchange is "a good thing" under all and any circumstances.

MR. WHITE: No. Under authorized circumstances.
MR. MARTIN: But you do not deal with that. The
standards fraternity just does not care about that. That is
not its problem.

MR. WHITE: That is your problem.

15 MR. MARTIN: Exactly. It may be that the problem is so big and is going to take so long to solve on a data 16 17 setting by data setting bases, on an analysis of linkage by linkage bases, that it then seems prudent to men and women no 18 less rational than standards builders that lets throw as big a 19 monkey wrench as we can in your standards setting operation, 20 recognizing you will find ways to repair the damage of every-21 thing thrown that wrench, but we will set you back a little 22 while we address the discrete and difficult case by case link-23 age problems. I think, you know, that is the two forces that 24 are at work here. 25

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í	1	You sort of abdicate the problem, and that is all
	2	right. The standards fraternity, it isn't its problem. It's
	3	got a very narrow specialist concern, namely to make the
	4	machinery work well. I think why this standard has run into so
	5	much trouble is because the standards fraternity has not been
	6	willing to engage in the difficult question of helping to solve,
	7	in some way or other, the hard to define, but real concerns
	8	about linkages, and it takes a posture that says linkages
	9	seems to take a posture that says linkage is a good thing.
	10	MR. WHITE: I would like to define two types of
	11	linkage which have not been addressed. One is the linkage
(⁻ -	12	between two files collected for different purposes and the
	13	degree that the standard identifier facilitates that type of
	14	linkage.
•	15	The other type of linkage which is just as important
	16	is that once a file has been established on a person and that
	17	file needs to be updated, then there has to be a absolute link-
	18	age so that as new data comes in, it is posted to the correct
	19	file so that it is to the benefit of the individual involved to
	20	assure that the data about him is posted to his file and not to
	21	somebody else's.
•	22	Those two types of linkages need to be taken into
<i>.</i>	23	consideration.
	24	MR. MARTIN: But your standard does not distinguish.
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your universal identifier. You do not need a universal identifier to post to any individual file. All you need is a unique identifier for that file.

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MR. WHITE: A unique identifier.

5 MR. MARTIN: Joe Naughton may be a little more sensitive and thoughtful than most computer center directors, but б even Joe's attitude to what is going on in his system is, "I 7 couldn't care less, I am running a service bureau." He tolerates 8 9 the fact that he has no control over a substantial number of personnel that work in his computer center, the people who 10 11 clean it and maintain it are -- and who quard it are not his If there are not enough of them, it is some other 12 people. bureaucracy that is responsible. If the cleaners are unreliable 13 and might do something that might compromise the security of 14 whatever level of security he has in his center, it is not his 15 responsibility. He is not accountable for it. 16

I think it does bother Joe, and I think Joe has bent a few lances on that basis, but most computer care center directors could not care less.

20 MR. WHITE: We are developing guidelines and stan-21 dards from that standpoint, too. This is the security versus 22 the privacy issue.

23 DR. GROMMERS: I am still very puzzled why two 24 powerful committees have worked a number of years on this and Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 have not yet solved it for us.

(Laughter.)

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	DR. GROMMERS: It is very naive, but it is my lack
2	of understanding the legislative process.
3	MR. MC LEAN: Because there are powerful forces in
. 4	our committee, our society, who do not want the problem solved.
5	They impinge upon the Congress much more heavily than the forces
6	that want it solved.
7	MR. BASKIR: The forces that want the problem
8	solved are very recently recognized. Privacy now, there is a
9	big rush to think about it, but not five years ago, or ten
10	years ago.
11	DR. GROMMERS: So it is still possible? It is
12	there has been a lot of inertia, but there is not an absolute
13	problem?
14	MR. BASKIR: Very early in the game we are thinking
15	about privacy.
16	MR. DE WEESE: I have a kind of a suggestion, maybe,
17	on how to overcome that particular problem. I was wondering to
18	the extent to which a lot of information people have come to
19	rely on the use of the social security number. I was wondering
20	if the Secretary took a position that the social security could
21	no longer be used for non-social security purposes until such
22	time as Congress passed sufficient legislation to protect
23	privacy. I was wondering if that would create a new lobby in
(24	the Congress for privacy legislation that possibly was not there
↔e-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25	before, i.e., the information users.

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what that would produce. There was a case, trying what you 2 3 were suggesting, in Washington. A fellow was improperly arrested, and the fellow wanted to do something about it. The Δ judge said, "Yes, erase all record of that arrest. This is 5 improper." Two things happened. First, he was substantially 6 versed and substantially modified. The immediate reaction was 7 first, a bill submitted into Congress that would permit the 8 distribution records as it has been going on from the FBI, 9 wherever it is supposed to go. While that is locked in 10 committee forever, for a good long time, we are now focusing on 11 the question of arrest records and its distribution. Very 12 casually on the floor, as an amendment goes in, the very same 13 legislation to reverse that judge's decision. Now, that is the 14 story as we have it, as of the day before yesterday, you see? 15 As soon as you do something you suggest, they come 16 sweeping back again and restore the status guo. It's not only 17 that. Because yesterday, as a matter of fact, they got that 18 rider struck out of the law on the House side, at least so that

we were -- we are still in a conflict on the issue that was 20 raised. 21

Before any legislation was solved, MR. GALLATI: 22 there was a --23

That is right. MR. BASKIR: It nearly slid right 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. back in the law to destroy the status quo. 25

DR. GROMMERS: Who wanted to put it in? 1 MR. DE WEESE: Senator Bible. 2 MR. BASKIR: Reflecting the interest of the law 3 enforcement and other communities who need the law enforcement 4 or for years have been using it and think they need it. 5 DR. GROMMERS: That is what I wanted to know. 6 What do they need the record for? 7 MR. GALLATI: Everybody wants records, criminal 8 records. 9 Sheila Smythe represents an organization whose head 10 called me up just before I left for Washington and said, we 11 used to get 30,000 criminal records a year from the FBI. 12 They will not give them to us. We want them from you. 13 We want those records. You give them to us. 14 . . . We are going to have some tough time with this 15 problem. But what was even more interesting, I found out 16 in this conversation that the Greater Associated Hospitals of 17 New York, or whatever it is, maintains a fingerprint file of 18 300,000 criminal offender records and fingerprints associated 19 therewith and has their own classified files and people 20 maintaining this file. 21 This is a private organization invested with a publid 22 organization. 23 DR. GROMMERS: Does everybody know this? 24

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Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 What would be the effect of one of the functions of

1 this committee bringing to light lots of things like this, 2 like the fact -- like the information the insurance companies 3 are, in fact, asking for. I didn't know that. 4 MR. GALLATI: I was shocked when I heard this. Τ 5 didn't know that. 6 DR. GROMMERS: What would be the effect of that? 7 There is a big value to bringing this MR. BASKIR: 8 kind of information up. All the information we have, Ken has 9 legislation, we don't. All we have done is to try to bring 10 these things to public attention to get people -- first 11 scare them and then get them thinking about it. 12 There is a big value to this. 13 MR. MC LEAN: It has a cumulative effect. There is a vast amount of lethargy in the Congress to change anything. 14 15 It is extremely difficult to bring about any change in Washington, no matter how simple or meritorious. 16 17 When you are talking about something as complicated and multi-faceted as the right of privacy, to collect public 18 information, you are talking about a considerable task indeed. 19 You have to -- it is a problem that you have to chip away at. 20 Hopefully the committee's report will be one 21 effort along with several efforts, and perhaps in five or 22 ten years, we will have moved the country. 23 DR. GROMMERS: We would be lost. Computers work 24 Federal Reporters, Inc. faster than that. 25

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mm 3	1	MR. MC LEAN: That is the time frame that is realistic	_
	2	DR. GROMMERS: We will have to do something before	
	2	then, or it will be too late.	
	•	MR. MARTIN: How about getting IBM in to give you	
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	6	MR. BASKIR: I think we would like to find we	I
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	8	last year for one purpose, and that was to get them there	
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	10	For years and years, of course, IBM was not saying	
	11	anything about privacy or the social implications of their	
f	12	machines.	
A.	13	The mere fact that the President has said, yes, we	
	14	are concerned about it and here is \$40 million is an extra-	
	15	ordinary step forward. Lord knows what they will do with it.	
	16	MR. MARTIN: It is a step.	ļ
	17	Let's not decide until we know which way they are	ļ
	18	going, whether it is forward or backward.	ļ
	19	MR. BASKIR: The first thing you have to do is	ļ
	20	get somebody to recognize there is a problem. It may not be	
	21	very big in terms of solving the problem, but when they don't	
	22	realize there is a problem, you get them to recognize there is	
	23	a problem, you can say you have come a long way towards	
ς	24	starting.	
🕶 – Federal Reporters,	, Inc. 25	DR. GROMMERS: Can we stop?	
		(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)	

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