Immigrant Parents and Political Children:
How Do Changes in Parental Legal Status Shape the Political Attitudes and Behaviors of Their 1.5 and 2nd Generation Immigrant Children?[1]

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The political incorporation of immigrants and their children has long been critical to the civic health of the United States. From the nation's first days, governments, civic institutions, and ethnic organizations have faced the political consequence of the nation's continuing commitment to large scale immigration: the need to ensure that immigrants and, more importantly, their children become regular participants in the nation's civic and political life. The consequences of failure are potentially quite high. If immigrants and their descendants come to be excluded as a class from equal participation in the democratic process, the nation will not meet its ideals of equal participation. Over time, the excluded could potentially use their exclusion as a tool for mobilizing and come to organize in opposition to U.S. political institutions. An example of this pattern can be found in the more radical rhetoric of the Chicano Movement's response to more than one hundred years of manipulation of Mexican American political participation (Gutierrez 1973. The relative success of the United States at meeting this responsibility to incorporate most immigrants and their descendants has long been a subject of scholarly attention and popular concern (Tocqueville 2003, Smith 1997, Fuchs 1990, Huntington 2005; Zolberg 2006).

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There is no scholarly consensus on the appropriate path for immigrant civic and political incorporation, though the extant theories tend to focus on the role of immigrant generation in the process of incorporation. Several competing theories offer insights, but none has been tested sufficiently to know what expectations we should have in terms of changes in participation between the first and second or the second and third generation. This disjuncture between theories of incorporation and measurements of immigrant-stock political behavior probably reflect the reality of immigration from specific countries, at least until the present period. Political organization around nationality groups often serves as the first focus of group political activity among immigrants. Most immigrant/nationality populations have seen periods of peak migration from a specific country of less than forty years (and some considerably less). The consequence of this phenomenon for analytical purposes is that the cross-generational story that can be told is circumscribed. Early in a national/ethnic group's migration history, immigrants and their young children dominate the story and political activities are somewhat limited (excluding voting, which is by far the most studied political activity). As the immigrant/ethnic population matures into a full range of civic engagements, new immigration slows or stops. The story of the later generations, then, becomes part of broader societal story of ethnic politics, with little attention to incorporation across generations (or to the stages of incorporation). In other words, there have been few nationality/ethnic groups that have simultaneously had large numbers of first, second, and third and beyond generation immigrants resident in the United States.

The contemporary era – roughly the period since the expansion of migration from Mexico after World War II and the changes in national immigration law in 1965 – offers a much richer opportunity to assess immigrant incorporation across generations (Waters and

Ueda, with Marrow 2007). The nation is now at least forty years into a period of high immigration (longer for Mexicans) and shows no sign of slowing immigration. Immigration to permanent residence has averaged 900,000 annually since the early 1990s and is supplemented by 300,000 to 400,000 unauthorized migrants annually some of whom are able to move into legal status and whose U.S.-born children are U.S. citizens. This second generation is now maturing into ages when political activity is more common. Although Congress has taken increasingly rigorous steps to slow unauthorized migration in recent years, there has been only sporadic discussion of slowing the flow of immigrants to permanent residence (an annual cap on legal immigration was specifically rejected by Congress in 1996). Any legalization program for unauthorized immigrants would add to the demand for immigration to permanent residence for relatives of the newly legalized. As a result, of this on-going large scale immigration, the nation has a large first and second generation population and will soon have a large third generation (a phenomenon that already appears in the Mexican immigrant/ancestry population and, in considerably smaller numbers, in the Filipino community).

While this rich immigrant tapestry may create opportunities and tensions for the United States, it undoubtedly offers the foundation for rich scholarly analysis of the cross-generational process of immigrant incorporation. In this article, I review available models of the role of generation in immigrant political adaptation and test these models using data from a survey of immigrant mobility in the Los Angeles region conducted in 2004 (IIMMLA,

discussed in greater depth later). In this paper, I measure political attitudinal change across generations.[3]

Theories of Intergenerational Political Adaptation

Immigrant generation has figured centrally in theorizing about immigrant incorporation. I begin this discussion by assessing four models that might be useful for studying attitudinal change across generations and then discuss some empirical work that tests these models.

At the end of the previous era of large scale immigration, Marcus Lee Hansen developed an explicitly generational model of attachment to the United States (1938). His expectation – the famous "What the son wishes to forget the grandson wishes to remember" – establishes a non-linear pattern for cross-generational altitudinal change among immigrants and their descendants (it should be noted that it is the only one of the four models that focuses on attitudes rather than behaviors). Hansen predicts a greater loyalty to U.S. values and institutions in the second generation and a return to the values of the immigrant generation in the third generation. Although Hansen doesn't explore why this might be the case in great depth, this model implicitly suggests that the third generation comes to see that some of the promises of political opportunities in the United States are slow to be delivered leading to some feeling of isolation. This isolation is enhanced by a romanticized notion on the collective immigrant culture of the grandparent.

Also coming out of the previous era of large scale immigration, though somewhat later (after new immigration had largely disappeared for two decades and only slowly

[3] In previous analysis of these data, Frank Bean, Rubén Rumbaut, and I have analyzed changes in political behavior among Mexican, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan respondents, with particular attention to the likelihood of organizational participation and voting behavior among respondents whose parents originally entered the United States as unauthorized immigrants or whose parents naturalized (DeSipio, Bean, and Rumbaut 2005).

resumed), Dahl (1961) also identified a three generational model for immigrant incorporation. Dahl's model comes closest to notions of assimilation that sees each generation coming closer to being indistinguishable from Americans whose ancestors arrived in earlier periods. Dahl certainly recognizes that some racial/ethnic groups in New Haven are excluded from this path to incorporation. African Americans, for example, maintained the patterns of exclusion and group solidarity that characterized immigrant and second generation European migrants in New Haven. This observation about African Americans in New Haven should offer a caution for my analysis of Los Angeles-area immigrant/ethnic populations. Each is racially distinct from the European ethnic populations.

Raymond Wolfinger (1964) also looking at the New Haven of this era (late 1950s/early 1960s) finds that Italian American voting remain cohesive, contrary to what Dahl's more straight-line assimilation would predict. Voting for co-ethnics increases from the first to second generation. Wolfinger does not have data to extend this finding to the third generation, but his findings strongly indicate that ethnic voting will persist and, perhaps, expand in the third generation.

Although not developed with political attitudes or voting in mind, a fourth theoretical model offers some potential insights into the role of generation in immigrant political incorporation. Segmented assimilation theory, which has guided much thinking about the second generation in Sociology over the past decade and a half, offers a caution at examining generation in the context of national origin-based immigrant/ethnic groups (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Theories of segmented assimilation challenge the expectation of Dahl's work (at least for European ancestry populations) of a linear path to incorporation. The segmented assimilation scholarship is particularly attentive to human

capital difference both between and among national origin populations and, more importantly, to the context of reception that groups experience in the United States. Although the segmented assimilation scholarship does not directly address political incorporation, a reasonable extrapolation would be that cross-generational change will be shaped, in part, by the opportunities for participation in the parental generation and the degree to which immigrant/ethnic populations are the targets of group-focused mobilization efforts. Segmented assimilation, then, would suggest that immigrant/ethnic populations could see attitudinal change across generations that could steadily bring them closer to or further away from those of populations with earlier ancestries. This scholarship also offers the caution that there will be significant in-group differences based on human capital, particularly in the immigrant generation.

Thus, the three theories of ethnicity and vote choice and one of sociological incorporation in the second generation offer somewhat different expectations for the role of generation in political attitudes. Dahl predicts a declining significance of ethnicity across generations and an increase in the importance of individual characteristics in predicting vote choice. Wolfinger predicts an increasing salience of ethnicity between the first and second generations. Ethnicity, for Wolfinger, would most likely continue to play a role, and perhaps an even great role, in political socialization into the third generation. Hansen is not explicitly focusing on political values, but he expects that the second generation will differ from the first and third. Finally, segmented assimilation would caution us to expect within-group variation based both on the human capital of the immigrant generation at the time of migration and the context of reception.

Empirical Study of Attitudinal Change Across Immigrant Generations

There is a small empirical scholarship on political attitudinal change across immigrant generations, though most of this scholarship focuses on change between immigrants and their children[4]. An exception is Lamare (1982) who finds a linear progression of political integration through the first- and second-generation Mexican American children. In the third-generation, however, Mexican American children show declining levels of commitment to the American political community, trust in American institutions, and sense of political efficacy.

Two studies from data collected in the 1990s suggests that the patterns found by Lamare have sped up in the period since he collected his data. Michelson (2003) finds that trust declines between the immigrant and second generation. Tapping a 1989 survey of Mexican American adults, de la Garza, García, and Falcón (1996) also find a decline in connection to American values between the first and second generation (their analysis merges linguistic acculturation with immigrant generation). Their story, however, is somewhat different than Michelson's. Mexican immigrants, they report, manifest beliefs in American values at levels higher than do Anglos. So, the "decline" in attachment to American values between the Mexican immigrants and native-born Mexican Americans sees the Mexican Americans attaining attachment levels comparable to Anglos.

In a study of Mexican American political behavior in the 2004 election, Carole Uhlaner and I test whether cross-generational acculturation shapes the ways in which Mexican American voters selected between John Kerry and George Bush. We find that

[4] There is much more extensive scholarship on within group change among naturalized citizens based on length of residence and comparisons of the naturalized to the native born without making explicit reference to the generation of the native born (see DeSipio 2006 for a summary).

generation does shape Mexican American vote choice, both directly – in the simple measure of the generational dummy variables – and in the interaction between generation and partisanship, issue evaluation, religion, and state of residence (DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007).

Data

My analysis is based on a telephone survey of 1.5 and 2nd generation young adults (aged 20 to 40) in the five county Los Angeles region – the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles[5] (IIMMLA) survey. Respondents were randomly selected from households with survey-eligible individuals using the "most-recent birthday" method. The survey was conducted by Field Survey Research. All Latino respondents had the option of completing the survey in English or Spanish, and interviews were carried out from April 28 to October 11, 2004 (see Bean, Brown, and Rumbaut 2006 and Rumbaut, Massey, and Bean 2006 for further discussion of IIMMLA).

The full survey includes 4,780 respondents, of whom 3,448 were 1.5 and 2nd generation and 1,215 were third and beyond generation immigrants. The 1.5 generation includes immigrants who first migrated to the United States prior to the age of 15. The 1.5 and 2nd generation respondents include 844 Mexicans, 376 Salvadorans or Guatemalans[6], 401 Chinese, 401 Korean, 400 Vietnamese, 400 Filipino, and 626 people of other births/ancestries. The third generation respondents included 400 Mexicans, 402 Non-Mexican whites, and 405 non-Mexican Blacks. For comparison purposes, the survey also

[5] I express my appreciation to the IIMMLA team for the design of the IIMMLA survey: Rubén Rumbaut, Frank Bean, Leo Chávez, Susan Brown, Min Zhou, and Louis DeSipio.

[6] The IIMMLA sample design called for a single quota for Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the five county Los Angeles area. This decision was made based on available funds and the relative size of 1.5 and 2nd generation ethnic communities in the five county area. Clearly, these national origin populations are distinct and have different immigration and immigrant incorporation experiences. We do not, however, have a sufficiently large sample of either community to analyze its experience separately.

included 125 Mexican immigrants who migrated as adults (who are excluded from the analysis here).

The Mexican 1.5 and 2nd generation respondents were identified through random digit dialing. Approximately 45 percent of the Salvadoran/Guatemalan sample resulted from random digit dialing. The remainder were identified through calls to households with Spanish-surnamed respondents and to areas with high concentrations of Salvadoran and Guatemalan residents. The Asian origin/ancestry sample were drawn using a combination of random digit dialing throughout the region, random digit dialing in areas with high concentrations of the targeted populations, and random sampling from lists derived from surname samples. In the analysis presented in this paper, I focus exclusively on the 1.5 and 2nd generation respondents and the 3rd Generation Mexican and non-Mexican White respondents.

I offer two notes of caution before I begin my analysis. First, IIMMLA surveyed young adults (respondents were aged 20 to 40), who by the time of the survey had been resident in the United States for at least five years and, in many cases, for many more years. In most cases, one or both parents had been resident for as long or longer than the respondent. Unauthorized immigrants of the era in which many of our respondents migrated had opportunities to regularize their status, most notably through the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, that may not be available to unauthorized immigrants to the United States who are entering today. Over half of Salvadoran/Guatemalan migrants and nearly one third of Mexican immigrants who entered without legal status, for example, subsequently legalized their status *and* naturalized. To the extent that unauthorized migration is making up a larger share of current migration and

opportunities to legalize status are more rare, the consequences of unauthorized migration on the political engagement of 1.5 and 2nd generation immigrants may grow in the future relative to what we find here.

My second note of caution has to do with the "immigrants" analyzed here. All are 1.5 generation immigrants meaning that they were born abroad, but migrated to the United States before the age of 15. Thus, each, to varying degrees, has more political socialization in the United States than to immigrants who migrate as a adults. I would expect, then, that gaps on the attitudinal variables that I analyze will be more narrow than analysis based on adult immigrants or a cross-section of all immigrants from these nationality groups.

My analysis will focus on four attitudinal variables in IIMMLA: external efficacy, role of government in citizens' lives, equal opportunity, and perceptions of political knowledge. IIMMLA taped standard questions for each of these attitudes from the social science survey cannon. The exact question wording appears on the tables.

Findings

IIMMLA offers a rich portrait of changes between young adult first and second generation immigrants in Los Angeles, but faces the same dilemma Wolfinger did in New Haven forty years ago. There are simply too few third and beyond generation immigrants from the migrant countries that began to send large numbers of immigrants to the United States after the changes in the immigration law in 1965, other than Mexicans, to be able to draw representative samples. My analysis, then, will focus on differences in attitudes between 1.5 and 2nd generation immigrants for all of the nationality groups except Mexicans. For Mexicans, I will also look at differences between the second and third generations.

When I begin to discuss third generation Mexicans, I will also introduce the data on the third and beyond generation Anglo ("non-Mexican white") population.

Immigrants and the Children of Immigrants

Across the four attitudes studied, the widest gaps are found in perceptions of equal opportunity (see Tables One through Four, equal opportunity in Table Three). While there are statistically significant differences between the 1.5 and 2nd generation immigrants in each of the four attitudes measured, it is only in the equal opportunity variable that these differences are found among each of the immigration/nationality populations. Mexican origin/ancestry respondents are the most likely to see statistically significant differences across generations (in the role of government and political knowledge as well as equal opportunity). Salvadoran/Guatemalan and Filipino respondents are least likely to see difference across generations (only in equal opportunity).

[Tables One to Four Approximately Here]

In each of the generational comparisons indicating statistically significant difference, the changes appear to be relatively minor and do not tell a consistent story relative to the four theories. Chinese/Taiwanese appear to have slightly less efficacy in the second generation than the first, perhaps suggesting some support of Hansen. Second generation Mexicans and Koreans are less likely to see it as government's role to see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. That said, the majority of Mexicans agree strongly with this position as do a near majority of Koreans. This transition would seem to be in the direction predicted by Dahl. Although the shifts are subtle, the second generation in each immigrant/nationality group moves away from strong belief in the reality of equal opportunity. The majority for each 2nd generation group, except for Koreans, continues to

hold the "strongly agree" position, but these levels are lower than for the 1.5 generation. The respondents who strongly disagree also increase slightly in the second generation. While tentative, this would seem to offer some support for Hansen or Wolfinger. Finally, perception of political knowledge increases between the 1.5 and 2nd generation for Mexicans and would appear to decrease slightly for Vietnamese.

Within each generation for each attitudinal measure, I tested for cross-group differences. In each of the eight within-generation comparisons, the differences between the groups proved to be highly significant (at the 0.001 level or higher). Although not surprising, these differences suggest support for the premises of segmented assimilation.

Clearly, these group based differences could mask compositional differences within the immigrant/nationality populations and the measure of significance is at best a guide. In an effort to assess whether the differences between 1.5 and 2nd generation young adults within each of the immigrant/nationality groups reflect more substantial intergenerational differences, I test very basic logistic regression models[7] for each of the nationality groups. My goal is here is not to predict specific levels of change, but instead to test whether the generational differences that appeared in the bivariate data remain in multivariate tests. Instead of reporting specific results, I simply indicate whether significant results were achieved and, for the generational variables, its direction (see Table Five). The models include five other variables routinely shown to shape political attitudes: age, education, household income, gender, and months at current address (to measure stability).[8] I by no means think that this is a complete model and IIMMLA certainly offers a richer set of tools

[7] Because of the relatively small numbers of respondents reporting that the disagree with the proposition that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living, I sum the strongly disagree respondents with the somewhat disagrees and the strongly agrees with the somewhat agrees.
[8] I will be happy to provide more complete results to any reader interested in seeing them.

to predict political attitudes, but my goal here is more basic task of seeing how durable immigrant generation is as a predictor of changes in attitudes and what its direction is for each of the attitudes measured. The models focus on the question of perceptions of equal opportunity, the only one of the four attitudinal variables that proved to have significant differences in attitudes between each of the 1.5 and 2nd generation IIMMLA respondents.

[Table Five Approximately Here]

Immigrant generation does maintain its role as a significant predictor of difference in attitudes for four of the six nationality groups: Salvadorans/Guatemalans, Chinese/Taiwanese, and Filipinos. As the bivariate analysis would indicate the second generations of each of the nationality groups were less likely to perceive that individuals have an equal opportunity to obtain education corresponding to his or her abilities or talents. Second generation Mexicans, Koreans, and Vietnamese prove to not to have different attitudes from 1.5 generation immigrants in the multivariate tests. Overall, though, it should be noted that this simplified model has relatively weak ability to predict differences in attitudes toward equal opportunity. Education and age also proved to be significant predictors for differences in attitudes on equal opportunity for three of the nationality groups. Income only proved significant for Koreans and Vietnamese.

Without data on the third generation for all, but the Mexicans, these multivariate models do not necessarily enrich the tests of the four models relative to the bivariate data. On this one variable – perception of equal opportunity – there is some limited support for Hansen or Wolfinger, and some confidence from an analytical perspective that it is valuable to include generational analysis in studies of changes in immigrant attitudes across generations. That said, the majority of tests of differences in attitudes across generations

within each nationality group proved not be significant either in bivariate tests of significance or multivariate models.

And on to the Third Generation

When the history of U.S. immigration experiences is written in the distant future, it is likely than the Mexican story will be a unique one. In the early 21st Century, Mexicans have the longest experience with migration to the United States, a history of recruitment and exclusion, the greatest experience with the dangers and limits of unauthorized status, rich networks of family ties on both sides of the border, and patterns of circular migration that inform generations of new potential migrants of the opportunities available in the United States (Sanchez 1993; Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; Bean and Stevens 2003 as examples of the rich scholarship on the Mexican migration experience). As a result, generalizing from the experience of third and beyond generation Mexican migrants to the potential experiences of third and beyond generation migrants from other nations is dangerous at best and foolhardy at worst. With that caution in mind, however, the Mexican ancestry population is the only ethnic group with a sizeable new immigrant population and a third and beyond generation.

Levels of external efficacy are not different in a statistically significant manner between the second and third generation (see Table Six). In the third and beyond generation, Mexican immigrants have slightly lower levels of trust than do Anglos (the difference is significant), though the relative levels of trust appear to be converging.

[Table Six approximately here]

Each of the other three attitudes do achieve weak levels of statistical significance in the difference between second generation Mexicans and third and beyond generation

Mexicans. It should be noted though that these statistical differences are weak at best. Third and beyond generation Mexican Americans are somewhat less likely than their second generation co-ethnics to see government as responsible for seeing the every person has a job and a good standard of living. A near majority of Mexican Americans and approximately 31 percent of Anglos hold this position strongly. Overall, Anglos remain considerably more likely than Mexican Americans to disagree with this proposition.

Third and beyond generation Mexican Americans also are somewhat less likely to report that the nation lives up to its aspirations of providing equal opportunity in education and that they have good understanding of the political issues facing the nation than are their second generation co-ethnics. More than six in ten continue to see the nation as meeting its aspirations, but this is a decline from the nearly 68 percent of second generation Mexican Americans. In terms of political knowledge, the movement is largely from agreeing strongly to agreeing somewhat. In both cases, the directionality of these moves is toward the positions held by third and beyond generation Anglos, but (statistically) significant gaps remain.

These admittedly limited third generation data offer cautions for each of the theories under review. Unlike Dahl's expectation, Mexicans and Anglos do not come together in the third generation and it does not appear that they would in forth generation either. Hansen's theory does find some support in self-evaluations of political knowledge (not a subject that he took on), but none in the other three attitudes. Wolfinger's expectations on continually strong ethnic difference into the third generation do not seem to be met either.

As with the attitudinal comparisons between the 1.5 and 2nd generation, these tests into the third generation could reflect compositional differences rather than something unique

to the political socialization or political resources of each generation. Within the Mexican origin/ancestry respondents, the significance of generation proved to be more consistent in multivariate tests than it did for the wider range of nationality groups between the 1.5 and 2nd generation (see Table Seven). Although it proved irrelevant to the model predicting perceptions of external efficacy, it was significant in the models predicting difference in the other three attitudes. With each passing generation, Mexican respondents are less likely to believe that government has a responsibility to see that everyone in the country has a job and a good standard of living. The dropoff was steeper between the 1.5 and 2nd generation than between the 2nd and 3rd, but the pattern of decline continued. This does bring 3rd generation Mexicans somewhat closer to the patterns seen among third and beyond generation Anglos in Table Six. Although there was no difference between 1.5 and 2nd generation Mexicans on the question of perception of equal opportunity, the 3rd and beyond generation was less likely than the second generation to believe that individuals do have an equal opportunity to obtain education commensurate with their abilities. Finally, self-evaluations of political knowledge increase between the 1.5 and 2nd generations (with no increase between the second and the third plus generations). As would be expected, perceptions of political knowledge also increase with age, formal education, and increased household income. Men were more likely to report that they were politically knowledgeable than were women.

[Table Seven Approximately Here]

Conclusions

The 2005 anniversary of the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was soon followed by the Census Bureau's estimate that the U.S. population had reached 300,000,000. Few noted the relationship between the two events (Pew Hispanic

Center 2006, as an exception). Although many understood that immigrants add to the U.S. population, the relationship between their children and grandchildren and the changes (demographic and otherwise) they bring to U.S. society are less well understood or discussed. My goal here has been to highlight one of these areas where immigrants' children and grandchildren will undoubtedly have a dramatic effect on U.S. society over the coming generation: the attitudes that undergird politics.

Theories that have been developed to assess the likely trajectories of change across generations have been hampered by the absence of data with which they can be tested. Only now (and only cautiously, as IIMMLA indicates) can this testing begin. Although preliminary, I believe my findings have offered two insights. First, generation does intermittently prove to be a significant predictor of difference over and above the impact of demographic variables. This indicates that there is some unique set of experiences, political socialization, mobilization, or resources that are unique allocated or structured by generation. While undoubtedly, they can be unpacked with detailed analysis, generation offers a useful and valuable analytical shortcut to get to these differences (see also, DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007 which suggests how generation interacts with demographic or attitudinal variables to predict vote choice).

Second, no one of the existing models clearly trumps the other three in predicting the effects of immigrant generation on attitudinal differences. A simplistic three generation model of congruence between immigrant/ethnic populations and the "native stock" populations clearly finds no support. In a sense, though, we already knew this. Wolfinger's reexamination of New Haven showed that it was not the case even for Dahl's subjects (or at least the Italian Americans in Dahl's sample). Hansen's caution that the route to

incorporation (whatever the outcome) is not linear would appear to be substantiated with several of the differences identified here. And, the introduction of the multivariate controls, in and of itself, is a recognition of the validity of the core assumptions of segmented assimilation. What is interesting, though, is that these demographic controls do not have a consistent predictive power and have their greatest impact only on the self-evaluation of political knowledge variable. Generation, then, at least in pared down models such as these, captures some of the variance that usually comes from demographic traits.

The ultimate test of these models, and the development of a new model that proves to have more consistent predictive power, will likely only occur as immigrant/ethnic populations other than Mexicans begin to have large third and beyond generations and, probably more importantly, fourth and beyond generations. What these results certainly indicate, however, is that study of the political behaviors of immigrant/ethnic populations (and, increasingly, the national as a whole) must include generational data as part of their basic package of demographic information. A return of these data to the Census would be an important start.

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Table One. External Efficacy Among Los Angeles Area Immigrants, By National Origin Group and Immigrant Generation

	Mexican	Salvadoran/ Guatemalan	Chinese/ Taiwanese	Korean	Vietnamese	Filipino
	%	%	%	%	%	%
"Most elected officials don't care what people like me think"						
1.5 Generation						
Agree Strongly	30.1	21.6	8.6	12.4	19.3	17.0
Somewhat	35.8	39.2	48.6	45.4	36.1	44.0
Disagree Somewhat	20.9	23.4	36.2	34.7	32.5	28.6
Strongly	13.1	15.8	6.7	7.6	12.0	10.4
n	282	171	210	251	274	182
2nd Generation						
Agree Strongly	24.7	24.7	17.1	9.2	12.9	14.1
Somewhat	36.7	41.2	38.9	44.0	42.2	40.4
Disagree Somewhat	24.9	25.3	36.0	36.2	34.5	31.0
Strongly	13.7	8.8	8.0	10.6	10.3	14.6
n	542	194	175	141	116	213
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generations	**NS**	**NS**	**	**NS**	**NS**	**NS**

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004

Table Two. Evaluations of the Role of Government in Citizens' Lives Among Los Angeles Area Immigrants, By National Origin Group and Immigrant Generation

	Mexican	Salvadoran/ Guatemalan	Chinese/ Taiwanese	Korean	Vietnamese	Filipino
	%	%	%	%	%	%
"The government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living"						
1.5 Generation						
Agree Strongly	68.4	63.1	39.4	33.2	52.9	54.5
Somewhat	32.1	23.9	40.3	40.8	31.8	33.7
Disagree Somewhat	3.5	10.2	14.4	15.6	12.1	9.6
Strongly	7.0	2.8	6.0	10.4	3.2	2.1
n	285	176	216	250	280	187
2nd Generation						
Agree Strongly	53.1	64.0	38.8	46.5	40.5	50.7
Somewhat	27.1	23.4	37.1	36.8	38.8	33.8
Disagree Somewhat	12.5	6.1	16.9	11.8	14.7	12.7
Strongly	7.3	6.6	7.3	4.9	6.0	2.8
n	546	197	178	144	116	213
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generations	***	**NS**	**NS**	**	**NS**	**NS**

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004

Table Three. Evaluations of the Reality of Equal Opportunity Among Los Angeles Area Immigrants, By National Origin Group and Immigrant Generation

	Mexican	Salvadoran/ Guatemalan	Chinese/ Taiwanese	Korean	Vietnamese	Filipino
	%	%	%	%	%	%
"Everyone in this country has an opportunity to obtain an education corresponding to his or her abilities and talents"						
1.5 Generation						
Agree Strongly	76.9	78.0	65.8	65.0	76.4	75.9
Somewhat	14.0	15.3	26.5	25.2	16.4	19.8
Disagree Somewhat	4.9	1.7	6.4	7.5	4.6	3.2
Strongly	4.2	5.1	1.4	2.4	2.5	1.1
n	286	177	219	254	280	187
2nd Generation						
Agree Strongly	67.8	67.7	55.2	47.2	57.6	64.2
Somewhat	22.0	19.2	27.6	35.4	33.1	24.5
Disagree Somewhat	5.5	7.1	12.2	10.4	6.8	7.5
Strongly	4.7	6.1	5.0	6.9	2.5	3.8
n	550	198	181	144	118	212
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generations	**	**	**	**	***	**

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004

Table Four. Evaluations of Political Knowledge Among Los Angeles Area Immigrants, By National Origin Group and Immigrant Generation

	Mexican	Salvadoran/ Guatemalan	Chinese/ Taiwanese	Korean	Vietnamese	Filipino
	%	%	%	%	%	%
"I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country"						
1.5 Generation						
Agree Strongly	38.5	48.0	35.9	45.9	39.6	40.9
Somewhat	42.7	40.7	48.6	43.9	43.9	44.6
Disagree Somewhat	10.5	9.0	13.4	8.6	13.2	11.3
Strongly	8.4	2.3	1.8	1.6	3.2	3.2
n	286	177	217	255	280	186
2nd Generation						
Agree Strongly	48.3	52.8	33.7	36.8	20.3	36.2
Somewhat	40.7	36.5	49.2	50.4	59.3	53.5
Disagree Somewhat	8.5	7.6	13.3	11.8	12.7	8.5
Strongly	2.5	3.0	3.9	1.4	7.6	1.9
n	551	197	181	144	118	213
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generations						
	*******	**NS**	**NS**	**NS**	*******	**NS**

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004

Table Five. Multivariate Models of Perception of Equal Opportunity in the United States, By National Origin

	Mexicans	Guatemalans	Chinese/ Taiwanese	Korean	Vietnamese	Filipino
Age	**	NS	**	*	NS	NS
Education	***	**	***	NS	NS	NS
Household income	NS	NS	NS	**	**	NS
Length of residence at current address	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Gender	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Generation (1.5 to 2)	**NS**	*****	******	**NS**	**NS**	******
(Direction)		(-)	(-)			(-)
Constant	***	***	**	NS	NS	**

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004

Table Six. Attitudinal Measures for Second Generation Mexicans and Third and Beyond Generation Mexicans and Anglos

External Efficacy

	Mexican %	Non-Mexican White %
"Most elected officials don't care what people like me think"		
2nd Generation		
Agree		
Strongly	24.7	
Somewhat	36.7	
Disagree		
Somewhat	24.9	
Strongly	13.7	
n	542	
3rd and Beyond Generation		
Agree		
Strongly	23.1	17.5
Somewhat	37.8	35.5
Disagree		
Somewhat	25.6	37.3
Strongly	13.5	9.8
n	394	400
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generation (Mexican Ancestry Respondents)	**NS**	

Role of Government

	Mexican %	Non-Mexican White %
"The government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living"		
2nd Generation		
Agree		
Strongly	53.1	
Somewhat	27.1	
Disagree		
Somewhat	12.5	
Strongly	7.3	
n	546	
3rd and Beyond Generation		
Agree		
Strongly	47.0	30.5
Somewhat	34.4	36.7
Disagree		
Somewhat	12.3	20.6
Strongly	6.3	12.2
n	398	403
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generation (Mexican Ancestry Respondents)	*	

Equal Opportunity

	Mexican %	Non-Mexican White %
"Everyone in this country has an opportunity to obtain an education corresponding to his or her abilities and talents"		
2nd Generation		
Agree Strongly	67.8	
Somewhat	22.0	
Disagree Somewhat	5.5	
Strongly	4.7	
n	550	
3rd and Beyond Generation		
Agree Strongly	61.1	52.3
Somewhat	23.1	27.9
Disagree Somewhat	9.5	13.6
Strongly	6.3	6.2
n	398	403
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generation (Mexican Ancestry Respondents)	**	

Political Knowledge

	Mexican %	Non-Mexican White %
"I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country"		
2nd Generation		
Agree Strongly	48.3	
Somewhat	40.7	
Disagree Somewhat	8.5	
Strongly	2.5	
n	551	
3rd and Beyond Generation		
Agree Strongly	39.3	46.8
Somewhat	48.8	42.8
Disagree Somewhat	8.8	8.0
Strongly	3.3	2.5
n	400	402
Significance (Chi-Square) Between Generation (Mexican Ancestry Respondents)	**	

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004

Table Seven. Attitudinal Change in Mexican Immigrants/Mexican Americans Across Generations

	External Efficacy	Role of Govt.	Equal Opportunity	Political Knowledge
Age	NS	NS	**	*
Education	**	NS	***	***
Household income	NS	NS	NS	*
Length of residence at current address	NS	NS	NS	NS
Gender	NS	**	NS	**
Generation (1.5 to 2)	***NS***	*****	***NS***	*****
(direction)	(-)	(-)		(+)
Generation (2 to 3)	**NS**	**	*	**NS**
(direction)	(-)	(-)	(-)	
Constant	***	***	***	**

Significance levels: * p<=0.10; ** p<=0.05; *** P<= 0.01

Source: Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) Study, 2004