## **Post-Grant Patent Review**

1

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### The problem – brief review

Rapid growth in patent applications leading to Large increase in patent office workload Higher grant rates? Increase in patent litigation Consensus that the average standard being applied during the past decade is too low, especially in newer technology areas Long list of legal, economic, policy scholars and practitioners..... 2

### **Possible causes**

- overburdened patent office
- lack of expertise in the relevant areas
- lack of prior art databases
- weakening of the non-obviousness test, partly through court decisions
- Some of these problems already addressed by USPTO
  - Hiring changes (computer scientists)
  - Second exam for 705 patents
  - Increased prior art availability; better searching methods
  - Etc....

3

### More is not necessarily better

- Trivial patents confer market power without consumer benefit
- Slows advance in cumulative technologies
  - increases level of fragmentation of rights
- Some areas of research avoided by small and new firms (Lerner 1995)
- More patents => more litigation
  - Investment in innovation and commercialization slowed by uncertainty over patent validity
- Clogs the process at the USPTO, especially as others increase patenting in response

### **Evidence**?

 Compare grant rates at the EPO for applications with US and non-US priority dates

- Difference in grant rates has risen from 0% to about 16% during the past 20 years
- Suggests a decline in the standard of US applications
- Compare grant rates for US priority patent equivalents at EPO and USPTO (OECD study)
  - Difference in grant rates at USPTO versus EPO has grown from 12% to 30% during the past 20 years
  - Suggests a decline in the standard of patentability

Source: OECD and Harhoff calculations

### Post-grant patent reviews – expected benefits

- Who is most likely to be able to demonstrate obviousness using non-published prior art?
  - Competitors who are familiar with the area
- Fast feedback to current patent examination
- Second pair of eyes improves quality; PTO spends more time on valuable patents
- Revoked patents cannot cause litigation high welfare gains (Graham et al. 2004)
- Dampening effect on aggressive patent portfolio strategies

# Post-grant patent reviews – expected drawbacks

#### Too costly?


- additional financial burden for patent holders
- Too lengthy?
  - delays enforcement of patent rights (but so does litigation)
  - general delay of uncertainty resolution?
- Is the USPTO capable of running such a process?
  - Not without additional resources
- Independent inventors and small entities may be disdavantaged in such a process
  - But no evidence that they are more subject to either US reexam or European opposition
  - Process costs less than litigation and should be faster


### **Backup slides follow**

 Aggregate US patent applications and grants 1965-2003
Further data on grant differences at EPO between US priority and non-US priority

8

### The problem?





### A look at the European experience Outcomes of EPO examination – by technical field

Technical Field	Non-US Grant Rate*	US Grant Rate**	D
Electrical	69.7%	57.8%	11.9%
Instruments	67.0%	60.1%	6.9%
Chemicals	68.4%	56.7%	11.7%
Processes	68.4%	61.7%	6.7%
Mechanical	70.4%	61.7%	8.7%
Construction	62.9%	51.6%	11.3%
All Fields	68.3%	58.4%	9.9%

Application years 1990 and earlier. Grants include grants after appeal.

\* Grant rate for EPO applications with non-US priority

\*\* Grant rate for EPO applications with US priority

11