2025 Kadish Lecture | A (Somewhat) Unified Theory of Flawed Consent Featuring David Enoch

A (Somewhat) Unified Theory of Flawed Consent Featuring David Enoch

Consent, of course, is a big deal. There is no plausible way of doing moral and political philosophy without assigning a major role for consent.

Consent, however, is also problematic. And there are many cases in which it is flawed, perhaps less than fully valid. These include cases of consent under coercive threats, manipulation, nudging, exploitation, false consciousness, misinformation, and perhaps other cases as well.

For the most part, the literature discusses these flaws separately. In this paper, however, I try to see how much progress can be made if we treat them together. I note some general features of the value of autonomy and of consent that can be seen as resources for dealing with all cases of flawed consent. I highlight some structural features that all the cases of flawed consent have in common. And I show how thinking of the different flaws alongside each other serves also to better understand the differences between them.

I conclude with a skeptical thought about whether the classification of the precise flaw involved in a case of flawed consent matters.

David Enoch is a Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Oxford and a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He works primarily in moral, political, and legal philosophy.