Our Students
Jennifer Denbow
Year: Advanced to Candidacy (ABD) - JSP
Email: jdenbow@berkeley.edu
Education:Ph.D. Candidate, Jurisprudence & Social Policy, U.C. Berkeley, Degree Expected May 2010
J.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2007
B.S. (Philosophy, minors in Mathematics & Physics), University of Michigan, 2003
Political Theory
Legal Theory
Gender Studies
Feminist Jurisprudence
Reproductive Rights
Public Law
The Autonomy of Constructed Selves: Abortion and Sterilization
The notion that we are socially constructed – that is, products of social processes and contexts – challenges the idea that we are or even can be autonomous. If the processes that deeply construct us are largely alien to us, then how can we be self-governing? My dissertation addresses this question by reformulating the concept of autonomy in a way that rejects the atomistic autonomy commonly associated with liberal theory. Relying on the diverse work of Foucault, Butler, Mill, and Kant, I develop a constructionist autonomy that does not presuppose that individuals are autonomous, but that values the production of autonomous selves. On this approach, being afforded greater autonomy allows one greater room to participate in the collective processes of construction, which in turn facilitates the production of more autonomous selves. The value of autonomy, then, lies partly in the fact that it allows for greater participation in the collective processes of construction. When we have more effective options, fewer pressures, and a less hegemonic social context, we have greater autonomy and hence an enhanced ability to participate in constructing processes.
My dissertation is especially focused on how law and policy produce subjects with regard to reproduction. In particular, I consider the production of women both as maternal and subordinated through exploration of the practices of abortion and sterilization. I thus examine the social, legal, and policy context within which women make reproductive decisions. I also explore the possibility for reformulating rights in a way that takes into account the productive power of law. Specifically, I argue for a constructionist autonomy approach to reproductive rights. On this approach, the importance of autonomy ceases to be whether an individual is objectively self-governing and able to carry out her desires. Autonomy is not an implicit condition of being afforded rights; rather, rights are a way of affirming an interest in, and facilitating the production of, autonomous individuals.
