+Berkeley Electronic Press (bePress), Hurricane Katrina and Economic Loss (provided by: Berkeley Electronic Press)
Disasters & the Law
UC Berkeley School of Law
25 entriesexpand all
+Brookings Institution, Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go from Here? (September 8, 2005) (PDF — 196K)
+Center for Public Integrity, Katrina Watch
For fifteen months following Hurricane Katrina, The Center for Public Integrity highlighted the best coverage of Hurricane Katrina's aftermath and tracked government contracts awarded for cleanup and reconstruction. "The Katrina Watch project presents original reports by the Center for Public Integrity and an archive of links to information culled from media and government Web sites." -Center for Public Integrit, Katrina Watch
+Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Public Health Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - Louisiana, 2005 (PDF — 535K)
+Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Public Health Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - United States, 2005 (PDF — 501K)
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Katrina/Rita: The 5th Commemoration, August 29, 2010; September 24, 2010
"Throughout this post-Katrina period, FEMA has remained dedicated to helping Louisiana families and communities recover. To date, in partnership with and in support of the state of Louisiana, we have provided more than $15.2 billion in assistance. We maintain our steadfast commitment to the resilient survivors of Louisiana as they continue along the path to full recovery.
"So, on the 5th anniversary of this unprecedented event, we can say that a lot has been accomplished, but we an also say that a lot remains to be done. FEMA is committed to being here for as long as it takes to fully recover, and we’re working to do so in a way that builds, sustains and improves south Louisiana’s capability to protect against future hazards."—Mike Karl, EMA Louisiana Recovery Office Interim Director, "Unprecedented Disaster, Unprecedented Recovery."
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Myths & Facts About FEMA Housing Following Katrina (FNF-08-046) (May 26, 2008)
+Frey, William H., Audrey Singer & David Park, The Brookings Institution, Metropolitan Policy Program, Resettling New Orleans: The First Full Picture from the Census (September 12, 2007) (PDF — 6.3M)
+Goldman, Lynn & Christine Coussens, Rapporteurs, Roundtable on Environmental Health Sciences, Research, and Medicine, Environmental Public Health Impacts of Disasters: Hurricane Katrina, Workshop Summary (provided by: National Academies Press) (2007)
+Gordon-Murnane, Laura, Government Contracts and Katrina (BNA's Web Watch) (February 2006)
+Internet Archive, Hurricane Katrina & Rita Web Archive
+Issues in Legal Scholarship, Berkeley Electronic Press (bePress), Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery
+Luther, Linda, Congressional Research Service (CRS), NEPA and Hurricane Response, Recovery, and Rebuilding Efforts (September 28, 2005) (PDF — 59K)
+Natural Hazards Review, Natural Hazards Review
+Office of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Broken Promises: The Republican Response to Katrina (August 23, 2006)
+Peek, Lori (Editor), Children, Youth and Environments Center for Research and Design, Special Issue: Children and Disasters Children, Youth and Environments Journal, v. 18, no.1 (2008)
+President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), Homeland Security Roundtable, Compendium of OIG Hurricane Oversight in the Gulf States (December 12, 2005) (PDF — 3.77M)
+President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) & Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE), Oversight of Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery: A 90-Day Progress Report to Congress (December 30, 2005) (PDF — 3.84M)
+Remnick, David, High Water: How Presidents and Citizens React to Disasters (Letter from Louisiana) New Yorker (October 3, 2005)
+United States Deparment of the Interior (DOI), Office of Inspector General, DOI's 2005 Hurricane Relief Expenditures (Report no. C-IN-MOA-0004-2006) (March 2007) (PDF — 697K)
"The devastating hurricanes of 2005 had a two-fold impact on DOI. First, DOI was called upon to assist in the federal relief efforts under the National Response Plan (NRP). Second, DOI's bureaus were greatly affected by the disasters. DOI sustained significant damage to 12 parks and preserves, 86 refuges, 68 water monitoring gauges, and the Mineral Management Service's (MMS) Gulf of Mexico Regional Office. As of September 30, 2006, DOI spent approximately $104 million on hurricane relief and recovery. This included approximately $61 million for NRP activities and $43 million to respond to and address internal damage.
"We are pleased to report that overall, the bureaus effectively managed their 2005 hurricane-related expenditures. Given the magnitude of the damage sustained to the Gulf Coast and DOI facilities, the issues we identified through our expenditure testing were relatively insignificant, and the bureaus performed well."—Earl E. Devaney, Inspector General.
+United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of Inspector General, Emergency Response to Hurricaine Katrina: Use of the Government Purchase Card (OEI-07-06-00150) (May 2007) (PDF — 709K)
"The Government purchase card program was designed to save the Government money by avoiding costly paperwork and to expedite the process of making purchases. In response to Hurricane Katrina, Public Law 109-62 authorized agencies to streamline certain purchasing requirements for procurement of supplies or services to support rescue and relief operations. This report (1) determines whether Government purchase card purchases related to Hurricane Katrina complied with requirements for the use of the card and (2) identifies lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina purchases to assist in the administration of the Government purchase card program during future emergency situations.
"We found that 15 percent of purchases did not comply with purchase card requirements. Additionally, cardholders had questions and concerns regarding some purchases and over half of cardholders expressed the need for additional written guidance regarding emergency purchasing procedures. Lastly, we found that Hurricane Katrina purchase data contained inaccuracies.
"We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management provide additional written guidance on emergency purchasing procedures. We also recommend that ASAM require training on emergency purchasing procedures. Finally, we recommend that ASAM develop a tracking system for monitoring Government purchase card purchases during emergency situations. In its comments to the draft report, ASAM concurred with our recommendations and stated that it has set a course of action to strengthen the Department of Health and Human Services' purchase card program."
+United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General, Review of FEMA's Use of Proceeds From the Sales of Emergency Housing Units (PDF — 424K)
"Starting in fiscal year 2005, and continuing through early 2007, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials used funds received from the sale of used travel trailers and mobile homes to partially finance the operations of a dozen Emergency Housing Unit (EHU) sites in seven states. However, more than $13.5 million of the sales proceeds were expended for ineligible purchases. This occurred because FEMA program officials failed to ensure that the EHU expenditures met General Services Administration (GSA) regulations on the use of sales proceeds.
"Proceeds from the sale of government property are restricted-use funds that can be used for the purchase of a select group of replacement type items within a specified time. GSA regulations specify conditions that must be met in order to participate in the program, and if not met, an agency must return proceeds to the United States Treasury.FEMA officials used approximately one half of the sales proceeds, or about $13.5 million, on ineligible expenditures including (1) contracts to support and equip storage sites, (2) replenishment of purchase card accounts, and (3) travel expenses. These purchases generally represented operating expenses of the EHU sites, but were ineligible expenditures under GSA regulations. Because of the unbudgeted nature of these funds and the need for better oversight and control, unnecessary and uneconomical purchases were made.
"FEMA requested this review in early 2007 and FEMA's Disaster Finance Center initiated its own detailed review concurrently. The Disaster Finance Center review, completed in June 2007, concluded that most of the sales proceeds were used for ineligible purposes or not used within prescribed timeframes. The Disaster Finance Center recommended that appropriate fund account adjustments be made and that improperly used funds be returned to the U.S. Treasury. We concur with the Disaster Finance Center recommendations and make additional recommendations to prevent misuse in the future."—Executive Summary
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Disaster Housing: Implementation of FEMA's Alternative Housing Pilot Program Provides Lessons for Improving Future Competitions (Report for Congress) (August 31, 2007) (PDF — 1.35M)
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's Administrative and Collaborative Capacity Should Improve National Disaster Response (PDF — 8M)
"Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides. EMAC's membership has increased from a handful of states in 1995 to 52 states and territories today, and EMAC members have used the compact to obtain support for several types of disasters including hurricanes, floods, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The volume and variety of resources states have requested under EMAC have also grown significantly. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, New York requested 26 support staff under EMAC to assist in emergency management operations; whereas, in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, approximately 66,000 personnel—about 46,500 National Guard and 19,500 civilian responders— were deployed under EMAC from a wide variety of specialties, most of whom went to areas directly impacted by the storms.
"While the EMAC network has developed a basic administrative capacity,opportunities exist for it to further build on and sustain these efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from experiences and developing a 5-year strategic plan. However, the EMAC network can enhance its administrative capacity by improving how it plans, measures, and reports on its performance. FEMA provided $2 million to help build this capacity in 2003, but the agreement has recently expired. FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a new 3-year cooperative agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the EMAC network's ability to support its collaborative efforts." —What the GAO found.
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to Disaster Preparedness, Response and Reconstruction