+Comptroller General of the United States, Cost, Schedule and Performance Problems of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project (Corps of Engineers [Civil Functions], Department of the Army) (August 31, 1976) (PDF — 1.73M)
Disasters & the Law
UC Berkeley School of Law
11 entriesexpand all
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Katrina/Rita: The 5th Commemoration, August 29, 2010; September 24, 2010
"Throughout this post-Katrina period, FEMA has remained dedicated to helping Louisiana families and communities recover. To date, in partnership with and in support of the state of Louisiana, we have provided more than $15.2 billion in assistance. We maintain our steadfast commitment to the resilient survivors of Louisiana as they continue along the path to full recovery.
"So, on the 5th anniversary of this unprecedented event, we can say that a lot has been accomplished, but we an also say that a lot remains to be done. FEMA is committed to being here for as long as it takes to fully recover, and we’re working to do so in a way that builds, sustains and improves south Louisiana’s capability to protect against future hazards."—Mike Karl, EMA Louisiana Recovery Office Interim Director, "Unprecedented Disaster, Unprecedented Recovery."
+Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS), Hurricane Ike: Nature's Force vs. Structural Strength (PDF — 2.65 MB)
"IBHS puts forth key fndings and recommendations for reducing future property losses in all hurricane-exposed areas. The three key fndings and recommendations are based on both post-Ike IBHS feld research on the Bolivar Peninsula and a thorough review of building code requirements – and laid out in much more detail in the full research report.
A Texas-specifc hurricane retroft guide based on the research fndings following Hurricane Ike can be found in this report. Geographically specifc hurricane retroft solutions for property owners and residents in other states along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts are in development and will be published by IBHS in 2010." — Executive Summary
+Issues in Legal Scholarship, Berkeley Electronic Press (bePress), Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery
+National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Hurricane Katrina Report Card (August 2007) (PDF — 215K)
"Two years after Hurricane Katrina much has become clear. We know that the devastation in New Orleans and surrounding areas was less a natural than a man-made disaster. Katrina's surge into New Orleans was the direct result of poorly constructed levees, an ill-conceived navigation channel, and the destruction of millions of acres of coastal wetlands. Furthermore, the storm's intensity itself was fueled by unusually warm waters in the tropical Atlantic due, in part, to global warming pollution.
"How have Congress and the Administration responded to these lessons of Katrina and addressed the chief causes of its tragic aftermath? A report card is due on the federal government's response to global warming, reforming the Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and restoring the wetlands along the Gulf Coast that act as a natural buffer to storms."—Introduction
+Natural Hazards Review, Natural Hazards Review
+Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Homeland Security Digital Library, Hurricane Katrina: Five Years Later
+Peek, Lori (Editor), Children, Youth and Environments Center for Research and Design, Special Issue: Children and Disasters Children, Youth and Environments Journal, v. 18, no.1 (2008)
+President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), Homeland Security Roundtable, Compendium of OIG Hurricane Oversight in the Gulf States (December 12, 2005) (PDF — 3.77M)
+United States Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET), Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System: Draft Final Report of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (Final Draft, Subject to Revision) (June 1, 2006)
- Volume I: Executive Summary and Overview ? Summary of findings and lessons learned. Overview of performance evaluation activities and reports.
- Volume II: Geodetic Vertical and Water Level Datums ? Update of geodetic and water level references for the region and determining accurate elevations for all critical structures.
- Volume III: The Hurricane Protection System ? Documentation of the character of the hurricane protection system, including the design assumptions and criteria, as built and maintained condition.
- Volume IV: The Storm ? Determining the surge and wave environments created by Katrina and the time history and nature of the forces experienced by protection structures during the storm.
- Volume V: The Performance ? Levees and Floodwalls ? Understanding the behavior of individual damaged structures and development of criteria for evaluation of undamaged sections. Providing input to repairs and ongoing design and planning efforts.
- Volume VI: The Performance ? Interior Drainage and Pumping ? Understanding the performance of the interior drainage and pumping systems with regard to extent and duration of flooding. Examination of scenarios to understand system-wide performance.
- Volume VII: The Consequences ? Determination of the economic, human safety and health, environmental, and social and cultural losses due to Katrina. Examination of scenarios to understand implications of losses and possible recovery paths on future risk.
- Volume VIII: Risk and Reliability ? Determination of the inherent risk for all parts of the system prior to and following Katrina. Provision of capability for risk-based decision support for continuing improvement and development of hurricane protection.
- Volume IX: Supporting Appendices ? Documentation of information resources and management, program management, and communications."
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to Disaster Preparedness, Response and Reconstruction