+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), How FEMA is Helping the Gulf Coast Rebuild (2007)
Disasters & the Law
UC Berkeley School of Law
9 entriesexpand all
+Fessler, Pam, Much Long-Term Katrina Recovery Aid Unspent Morning Edition, National Public Radio (NPR) (August 29. 2007)
+Gordon-Murnane, Laura, Small Business Disaster Relief and SBA Loans (BNA's Web Watch) (May 2007)
+Inniss, Lolita Buckner, A Domestic Right of Return? Race, Rights, and Residency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (provided by: SSRN) (Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper No. 07-143) (Boston College Third World Law Journal, Vol. 27, p. 1, 2007)
+Jadacki, Matt, Deputy Inspector General, Office of Disaster Assistance Oversight, United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General, Congressional Inquiry Regarding Southwest Charter Lines, Inc. (OIG-07-47) (May 2007) (PDF — 180K)
+Overby, A. Brooke, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans (provided by: SSRN) (Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 07-04) (Boston College Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2007)
"Hurricane Katrina, the largest disaster in the history of the United States, caused widespread property destruction throughout the Gulf Coast, but particularly in the city of New Orleans. Although the storm created an environment which facilitated increased mortgage defaults in the area, the Article analyzes data from the Orleans Parish Recorder of Mortgages Office and from the Orleans Parish Civil District Court and concludes that foreclosure filing rates in the year after Katrina in fact decreased significantly from the rates for the corresponding period in the year prior to the storm. This result is contrary to what would normally be expected in a usual mortgage lending market, where an increase in the rate of mortgage default would lead to an increase in the rate of foreclosure.
"The Article evaluates in detail the legal and market responses to mortgage default after the storm that contributed to the reduction in foreclosure actions in Orleans Parish in the year after Katrina. Secondary mortgage market initiatives provided the principal means for mortgage relief, because Louisiana debtors received little in the way of formal legal relief. Even though secondary market responses were successful in protecting mortgage debtors after Katrina, their limitations in scope make them inadequate to address the years of financial distress that might likely follow any disaster of the magnitude of Katrina. Thus, while the Katrina experience demonstrates that secondary market interventions can effectively reduce debtor distress after a major disaster, such interventions should not been seen as a substitute for more traditional legal responses to address mortgage debtor distress after disasters or other economic crises." —Abstract.
+Pike, Jennifer, Research Director, Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Spending Federal Disaster Aid: Spending Federal Disaster Aid in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2007)
+United States Department of Defense, Inspector General, Financial Management of Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Report No. D-2007-081) (April 6, 2007)
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and Other Health Care Needs (Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-07-67) (February 2007) (PDF — 1.65M)
"In February 2006, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) appropriated $2 billion for certain health care costs related to Hurricane Katrina through Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) was charged with allocating the $2 billion in funding to states directly affected by the hurricane or that hosted evacuees.
"GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. In this report, GAO examined: (1) how CMS allocated the DRA funds to states, (2) the extent to which states have used DRA funds, and (3) whether selected states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—anticipate the need for additional funds after DRA funds are expended."—Why GAO Did this Study.