+Berkeley Electronic Press (bePress), Hurricane Katrina and Economic Loss (provided by: Berkeley Electronic Press)
Disasters & the Law
UC Berkeley School of Law
23 entriesexpand all
+Buxbaum, Jeremy & Erin Ziegler, Giving and Taking: Regulating Land Development in Post-Katrina New Orleans (UC Berkeley School of Law, Law 224.9, Disasters & the Law, Spring 2006) (PDF — 89K)
"It is likely that in some heavily damaged parts of New Orleans redevelopment will be restricted, either temporarily, or even permanently. The possibility of such restrictions immediately gives rise to the following question: Will restrictions on development in New Orleans effect compensable regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? In this paper, we try to answer that question, or to at least provide a framework for answering it. We conclude, although cautiously, that it is more likely than not that temporary restrictions will not effect compensable takings because property owners still have economically valuable interests, while it is more likely than not that permanent restrictions will result in compensable takings because of owner expectations and a lack of reciprocity of advantage.
"We have three primary goals. First, we summarize the proposal for redevelopment which explicitly allows for the possibility of moratoria on redevelopment in certain neighborhoods. Second, we situate the current case law on this issue within the larger context of takings jurisprudence. Understanding the courts' trends on this issue, if any are discernible, will be indispensable in trying to get a sense of how courts would rule in litigation that might arise out of regulating redevelopment in New Orleans. Third, we give an analysis of how current holdings on takings issues might apply to the situation in New Orleans. Because of the complexity of takings jurisprudence, and because of the somewhat unusual nature of the situation in New Orleans, it is difficult to make a confident prediction about how such claims would come out."—Abstract.
+Center for Public Integrity, Katrina Watch
For fifteen months following Hurricane Katrina, The Center for Public Integrity highlighted the best coverage of Hurricane Katrina's aftermath and tracked government contracts awarded for cleanup and reconstruction. "The Katrina Watch project presents original reports by the Center for Public Integrity and an archive of links to information culled from media and government Web sites." -Center for Public Integrit, Katrina Watch
+Daniels, Ronald J., Donald F. Kettl, & Howard Kunreuther (Editors), On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina
"Hurricane Katrina not only devastated a large area of the nation's Gulf coast, it also raised fundamental questions about ways the nation can, and should, deal with the inevitable problems of economic risk and social responsibility. This volume gathers leading experts to examine lessons that Hurricane Katrina teaches us about better assessing, perceiving, and managing risks from future disasters.
"In the years ahead we will inevitably face more problems like those caused by Katrina, from fire, earthquake, or even a flu pandemic. America remains in the cross hairs of terrorists, while policy makers continue to grapple with important environmental and health risks. Each of these scenarios might, in itself, be relatively unlikely to occur. But it is statistically certain that we will confront such catastrophes, or perhaps one we have never imagined, and the nation and its citizenry must be prepared to act. That is the fundamental lesson of Katrina.
"The 20 contributors to this volume address questions of public and private roles in assessing, managing, and dealing with risk in American society and suggest strategies for moving ahead in rebuilding the Gulf coast."—Publisher's Description.
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), How FEMA is Helping the Gulf Coast Rebuild (2007)
+Fessler, Pam, Much Long-Term Katrina Recovery Aid Unspent Morning Edition, National Public Radio (NPR) (August 29. 2007)
+Gordon-Murnane, Laura, Government Contracts and Katrina (BNA's Web Watch) (February 2006)
+Gordon-Murnane, Laura, Small Business Disaster Relief and SBA Loans (BNA's Web Watch) (May 2007)
+Inniss, Lolita Buckner, A Domestic Right of Return? Race, Rights, and Residency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (provided by: SSRN) (Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper No. 07-143) (Boston College Third World Law Journal, Vol. 27, p. 1, 2007)
+Insurance Information Institute (III), I.I.I. President Dr. Robert Hartwig expresses concern about insurers' future amid legislative/regulatory changes, litigation in testimony before Congress
+Issues in Legal Scholarship, Berkeley Electronic Press (bePress), Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery
+Jadacki, Matt, Deputy Inspector General, Office of Disaster Assistance Oversight, United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General, Congressional Inquiry Regarding Southwest Charter Lines, Inc. (OIG-07-47) (May 2007) (PDF — 180K)
+Lawrence, Steven, Director of Research, Foundation Center, Snapshot of Philanthropy's Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes (PDF — 379K)
+Natural Hazards Review, Natural Hazards Review
+Overby, A. Brooke, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans (provided by: SSRN) (Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 07-04) (Boston College Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2007)
"Hurricane Katrina, the largest disaster in the history of the United States, caused widespread property destruction throughout the Gulf Coast, but particularly in the city of New Orleans. Although the storm created an environment which facilitated increased mortgage defaults in the area, the Article analyzes data from the Orleans Parish Recorder of Mortgages Office and from the Orleans Parish Civil District Court and concludes that foreclosure filing rates in the year after Katrina in fact decreased significantly from the rates for the corresponding period in the year prior to the storm. This result is contrary to what would normally be expected in a usual mortgage lending market, where an increase in the rate of mortgage default would lead to an increase in the rate of foreclosure.
"The Article evaluates in detail the legal and market responses to mortgage default after the storm that contributed to the reduction in foreclosure actions in Orleans Parish in the year after Katrina. Secondary mortgage market initiatives provided the principal means for mortgage relief, because Louisiana debtors received little in the way of formal legal relief. Even though secondary market responses were successful in protecting mortgage debtors after Katrina, their limitations in scope make them inadequate to address the years of financial distress that might likely follow any disaster of the magnitude of Katrina. Thus, while the Katrina experience demonstrates that secondary market interventions can effectively reduce debtor distress after a major disaster, such interventions should not been seen as a substitute for more traditional legal responses to address mortgage debtor distress after disasters or other economic crises." —Abstract.
+Pike, Jennifer, Research Director, Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Spending Federal Disaster Aid: Spending Federal Disaster Aid in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2007)
+Rapp, Geoffrey Christopher, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation (provided by: SSRN) (Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 94, p. 535, 2005-2006) (PDF — 160K)
+Taylor, Gene, U.S. Representative (D MS-04) & U.S. Representative Charlie Melancon (D LA-03), Response, Relief, and Recovery: Katrina and Beyond, Recommendations for Legislative Action (PDF — 394K)
+United States Department of Defense, Inspector General, Contract Administration of the Ice Delivery Contract Between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers During the Hurricane Katrina Recovery Effort (PDF — 698K)
"The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting requested a review on the administration of the ice delivery process between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Specifically, we limited our review to only the administration of the ice delivery process during the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort. The report also addresses other matters identified during our review of the administration of the 2003 ice delivery contract. We issued DoD Inspector General Report No. 2006-116, 'Ice Delivery Contracts Between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,' on September 26, 2006. That report addressed Congressman Bennie Thompson's concerns on the award of the ice delivery contracts between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This report addresses the administration of the 2003 ice delivery contract related to the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort....
"The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Charleston District did not effectively administer the 2003 ice delivery contract for the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort. The Corps Charleston District did not provide adequate training and guidance for invoice processing over the National Ice/Water Mission. They made inaccurate or inadequately supported payments on 142 of the 342 invoices received in the amount of about $262,000."—Executive Summary.
+United States Department of Defense, Inspector General, Financial Management of Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Report No. D-2007-081) (April 6, 2007)
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to Disaster Preparedness, Response and Reconstruction
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and Other Health Care Needs (Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-07-67) (February 2007) (PDF — 1.65M)
"In February 2006, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) appropriated $2 billion for certain health care costs related to Hurricane Katrina through Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) was charged with allocating the $2 billion in funding to states directly affected by the hurricane or that hosted evacuees.
"GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. In this report, GAO examined: (1) how CMS allocated the DRA funds to states, (2) the extent to which states have used DRA funds, and (3) whether selected states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—anticipate the need for additional funds after DRA funds are expended."—Why GAO Did this Study.
+United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federally Funded Programs Have Helped to Address the Needs of Gulf Coast Small Businesses, but Agency Data on Subcontracting Are Incomplete (Report to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, GAO-10-723) (July 2010) (PDF — 2.14M)