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"Two years after Hurricane Katrina decimated the homes of thousands of Gulf Coast residents, the American Association for Justice (AAJ) today released a report exposing how insurance companies systematically denied paying policyholders fair and just claims following this and other natural disasters.

"The report...reveals how insurers collected billions in premiums from policyholders and then stiffed them in their time of greatest need. Shockingly, in the two years since the nation's worst natural disaster, insurance companies have reaped more $100 billion in profits.

"The AAJ called on insurance regulators to immediately initiate investigations into companies that continue to unfairly delay and deny thousands of unresolved claims in light of the obscene profits insurers have pocketed over the past two years. A special AAJ website People over Profits will also enable citizens to contact their state officials with the same demand."—Press release (August 28, 2007)

"Hurricane Katrina was an unprecedented physical and administrative disaster. In addition to the loss of life, human suffering and physical debris left in its wake, there was substantial financial and procedural disorganization in the provision of relief services due to fraud, understaffing, unclear guidelines, and general lack of preparation. This paper explores the problem of fraud after Katrina and offers a solution for providing aid more effectively in the event of a future disaster. This can be achieved through use of Electronic Benefits Technology (EBT) and the centralization of beneficiary demographic databases, which would require much broader information sharing among federal, state, and local governments and non-profits in order to provide faster and broader emergency services and safeguards against fraud.

"Problems will doubtlessly arise because vast information sharing decreases the privacy of victims and leaves them open to criminal prosecution and deportation. In addition, reliance on public databases to provide verification of identification for emergency benefits is likely to aggravate the ability of vulnerable populations, such as undocumented aliens, to obtain aid, which could result in the denial of services to actual residents in great need. An emergency system must therefore endeavor to use EBT and information sharing resources to speed intake and prevent fraud, while not neglecting these vulnerable populations by installing strict privacy regulations and providing victims with the assurance that their information will not be used for any adverse purpose. A fully interoperable EBT system together with advanced planning and increased staffing will almost certainly ensure that the next disaster will not be an administrative tragedy."—Abstract.

"It is likely that in some heavily damaged parts of New Orleans redevelopment will be restricted, either temporarily, or even permanently. The possibility of such restrictions immediately gives rise to the following question: Will restrictions on development in New Orleans effect compensable regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? In this paper, we try to answer that question, or to at least provide a framework for answering it. We conclude, although cautiously, that it is more likely than not that temporary restrictions will not effect compensable takings because property owners still have economically valuable interests, while it is more likely than not that permanent restrictions will result in compensable takings because of owner expectations and a lack of reciprocity of advantage.

"We have three primary goals. First, we summarize the proposal for redevelopment which explicitly allows for the possibility of moratoria on redevelopment in certain neighborhoods. Second, we situate the current case law on this issue within the larger context of takings jurisprudence. Understanding the courts' trends on this issue, if any are discernible, will be indispensable in trying to get a sense of how courts would rule in litigation that might arise out of regulating redevelopment in New Orleans. Third, we give an analysis of how current holdings on takings issues might apply to the situation in New Orleans. Because of the complexity of takings jurisprudence, and because of the somewhat unusual nature of the situation in New Orleans, it is difficult to make a confident prediction about how such claims would come out."—Abstract.

"The legal system ostensibly plays a central role in disaster prevention, response, and management. Attorneys, members of the judiciary, and decision-makers at every level of government must anticipate and respond to disasters in a coordinated manner. It is increasingly clear, however, that the law is woefully unprepared to handle disasters. A growing community of academics recognizes this problem, and is formulating solutions under the rubric of disaster law. This emerging legal academic field encompasses a wide-ranging, intra- and inter-disciplinary body of thought, research and dialogue which seeks to inform and improve disaster-related decision-making.

"On June 25th, 2007, eighteen law professors and legal practitioners who count disasters among their primary research interests, gathered at U.C. Berkeley Law School to chart disaster law's course for the immediate and long-term future. Appendix A, Workshop Participants and Agenda. Over the course of the day, participants highlighted a wide variety of important intellectual concerns and potential problem-solving strategies regarding disaster management.

"In a series of productive discussions, participants first addressed central normative issues of disaster law, including terminology and the role of the legal academy. The group then addressed four sub-areas of disaster law: international collaboration, social justice, compensation and insurance, and prevention and response. Participants' recommendations for action included the creation of an annual disaster law conference, the integration of disaster law into law teaching, and an increased internet presence.

"This white paper, a record of the milestone June 25th workshop, is intended as a tool for use by disaster law practitioners and academics in mapping the direction and future of the field."—Executive Summary.

"This report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) addresses factual questions about the values of properties insured at subsidized rates (hereafter called subsidized properties) under the NFIP. Specifically, it compares the values of the properties covered by subsidized and unsubsidized insurance policies, and it examines in particular the subset of properties that are not primary residences—vacation properties, second homes, or rental properties.

"The analysis uses data on the values of more than 10,000 NFIP-insured properties, sorted into four groups as subsidized or unsubsidized properties in coastal or inland areas."—Summary and Introduction.

"Hurricane Katrina not only devastated a large area of the nation's Gulf coast, it also raised fundamental questions about ways the nation can, and should, deal with the inevitable problems of economic risk and social responsibility. This volume gathers leading experts to examine lessons that Hurricane Katrina teaches us about better assessing, perceiving, and managing risks from future disasters.

"In the years ahead we will inevitably face more problems like those caused by Katrina, from fire, earthquake, or even a flu pandemic. America remains in the cross hairs of terrorists, while policy makers continue to grapple with important environmental and health risks. Each of these scenarios might, in itself, be relatively unlikely to occur. But it is statistically certain that we will confront such catastrophes, or perhaps one we have never imagined, and the nation and its citizenry must be prepared to act. That is the fundamental lesson of Katrina.

"The 20 contributors to this volume address questions of public and private roles in assessing, managing, and dealing with risk in American society and suggest strategies for moving ahead in rebuilding the Gulf coast."

"One of the primary goals of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the prevention, or mitigation, of this country's losses from natural hazards. To achieve this goal, we as a nation need to ask what level of performance do we expect from our buildings during an event such as an earthquake. In order to answer this question, FEMA is exploring the possible development of "performance-based seismic design" criteria. Such criteria could be voluntarily used by this nation's engineers and designers to improve the performance of critical classes of buildings that are currently only designed to a "lifesafety" level to avoid collapse, but would infact probably still suffer significant damage in a design event.

"FEMA contracted with the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) (contract number EMW-92-K-3955, Task 13) to solicit the input of the nation's leading seismic professionals in developing an action plan that could be used to develop performance- based seismic design criteria. This project and the resulting action plan have gone a long way in identifying key issues that will need to be addressed in this process.

"This action plan builds upon a similar effort that FEMA funded in 1993 with the Earthquake Engineering Research Center, now the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER). The end product of that study was a similar plan, "Performance Based Seismic Design of Buildings" (FEMA-283), published by FEMA in September 1996. The material in that plan had an emphasis on the research that would be required, and has in fact been used by PEER inthe last several years as the basis for their research work inthis arena. While this action plan does an excellent job of describing the requirements that would be needed to successfully develop performance based seismic design criteria, FEMA does has some concerns, such as the proposed budget, which exceeds what FEMA is capable of devoting within the recomended time frame. FEMA is planning to identify some of the key elements of the plan and to begin to address them through a series of projects under its Problem Focused Studies program. However, without additional specific funding for this plan, it will be very difficult to accomplish the entire plan. To avoid further delay, FEMA has decided to publish this document as a "final draft for informational purposes only. Publication of this document in no way obligates this or any other Federal agency to any portion of plan contained herein. The information and opinions contained in this document are solely those of EERI and the project participants and do not necessarily represent the views of FEMA.

"In closing, FEMA sincerely wishes to express its, gratitude to all who were involved in this project. The results of their hard work will play an important role as this country moves forward towards performance-based seismic design and reducing the losses suffered by this nation's citizens after the next earthquake."—Foreward.

"The series of recent large-scale catastrophes casts doubt on the ability of the private insurance and reinsurance markets alone to absorb losses resulting from large-scale disasters in the future. And 'mega-risks' are beyond the capacity of the insurance industry or even governments to insure and clearly call for privatepublic partnership and international co-operation.

"Preparing to deal effectively with the hugely complex threats of the 21st century and their financial consequences is a major challenge for decision makers in government and the private sector alike, and one that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency."—The issues at stake.

"Five years later, Hurricane Katrina remains the largest single loss event in the history of the global insurance industry, causing an estimated $41.1 billion in insured damage ($45.1 billion in 2009 dollars) and 1.7 million claims across six states. Louisiana and Mississippi were the hardest-hit states.

"This number does not include $16.1 billion in losses from flooding insured by the national flood insurance program (nfip), or the $2 billion to $3 billion of insured damages to offshore energy facilities.

"Damage from Hurricane Katrina shattered the previous record for a natural catastrophe event set in 1992, when Hurricane Andrew caused $15.5 billion in insured losses at the time it occurred ($22.2 billion in 2009 dollars), with 790,000 claims in three states."—Introduction.

"The single largest loss in the history of the insurance industry occurred two years ago this month when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, causing $40.6 billion in insured damage. Nearly two years later, the overwhelming majority of claims have been settled.

"Insurance companies have paid an estimated $40.6 billion to policyholders on 1.7 million claims for damage to homes, businesses and vehicles in six states. By contrast, Hurricane Andrew, the previous record holder, resulted in $15.5 billion in losses in 1992 ($22.2 billion in 2006 dollars) and 790,000 claims."—Press Release

"This paper describes how America's National Flood Insurance Program came into existence and seeks to answer the question of why private flood insurance never developed in the United States on a significant scale. It consists of three sections. The first section attempts to provide a brief theoretical framework for thinking about flood insurance. It describes what flood insurance does and presents a theory as to how it ought to work. The second section provides the early history of the flood insurance program. It outlines how the federal government first took on the responsibility of protecting the nation from flooding and how Congress failed in its first effort to offer federal flood insurance. The third section explains how America got the system of flood insurance that it has today. It explains how the Tennessee Valley Authority, U.S. Geological Survey, and a variety of local governments gathered enough risk data to make federal flood insurance palatable to Congress, how Congress implemented a program, and then stripped it of its risk-based character.

The paper reaches a simple conclusion: Flood insurance, in its current form, did not emerge as a result of market failure. While some factors, including the role of state regulation, remain undetermined, the current situation represents an example of what economists call 'government failure.'"—Executive Summary.

"Much of the risk perception literature relies on the important but unstated assumption that manipulating public opinion to conform to scientific assessments of risk could help the public and, in turn, policymakers make better decisions about whether and how to regulate. This paper argues that the assumption fails in the context of certain 'multilayered' risks, or risks that pose tiered policy choices—not just whether to regulate in the first instance, but how to respond to derivative risks arising from the first set of regulatory changes. Examining the debate about the role of nuclear power in the United States' approach to climate change, the paper observes that first- and second-tier risks often differ in character, or require different types of regulatory solution (market-based versus command-and-control). Due to these variations, the public may hold starkly different views about regulation of each tier, and those views may be differently 'sticky'—that is, differently susceptible to persuasion.

"In the context of the nuclear power debate, this tiering of opinion has perverse implications. The first-tier risks of nuclear power are those associated with individual reactors, including the risks of accident or terrorist attack; the second-tier risks are those associated with mining, transport, processing, storage, and disposal of radioactive materials. Recent work asserts that despite entrenched public fear of nuclear power, it may be possible to induce people to support construction of low-emissions reactors as a strategy for mitigating climate change. But even if policymakers could employ the risk education strategies discussed in the literature to shift public opinion in favor of economic incentives for nuclear reactor development, there is no reason to think such strategies would be equally effective at changing attitudes toward second-tier risks and the command-and-control regulations necessary to address them. To the contrary, many people would likely continue to oppose certain types of government action on these latter problems, even assuming the complete success of the hypothesized first-tier education strategy. As a result, the United States could find itself with a thriving nuclear power sector, but without the political will to address the grave collateral risks.

"These observations lead to two conclusions, one related to the nuclear power example, and one to risk regulation more broadly. First, differently sticky public attitudes toward first- and second-tier nuclear risks and their regulatory solutions may defeat any effort to respond to climate change by significantly and safely increasing U.S. reliance on nuclear power. Second, efforts to change public risk perceptions may not advance a regulatory agenda, and may even prove counterproductive. Specifically, where multiple risk layers exist, a successful first-tier education effort and consequent policy changes could create or expose second-tier risks that defy regulatory solution, leaving policymakers stranded at the abrupt and unexpected end of a half-built bridge. Depending on the gravity of the second-tier risks, this regulatory dead end could be one that neither policymakers nor the public would have chosen ex ante."—Abstract.

"As the United States sees more and more property damage result from domestic disasters it quickly becomes apparent that the insurance industry as it exists cannot provide sufficient economic relief from natural disasters. This paper begins with a brief overview of the problem that Katrina has left the Gulf Coast and as a result the rest of the nation. Subsequently Katrina will be compared to other natural catastrophes in terms of economic issues.

"The second main portion of this article discusses the problem of catastrophe insurance. Two possibilities for reform are discussed. These are (1) a change to the tax structure that inhibits insurance companies from maintaining the large cash reserves required for catastrophe coverage and (2) a reformation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)."—Abstract.

"While insurers' dominant response to rising catastrophe losses has been to withdraw from at-risk areas and raise prices, both of these reactions have limited potential and could ultimately lead to a shrinking business and a backlash from consumers, investors, and regulators. Insurers themselves acknowledge that a more proactive approach is needed....

"With this in mind, a vanguard of insurers have begun to take concrete actions that generate well earned profits while maintaining insurability and protecting their customers from extreme weatherrelated losses, as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Many of these strategies are already in practice, providing benefits and savings for insurers and their customers. We identified 190 real-world examples, provided by 104 insurers, brokers, and insurance organizations from 16 countries employing one or more of these methods. More than half of the examples come from U.S. companies. In addition to offering new products and services, these insurers are leading by example with in-house energy management programs, investments in the clean-technology sector, and climate change disclosures. They are also participating in the process of enhancing scientific understanding of climate change's impacts, building public awareness, and participating in the public policy process. Insofar as these strategies are profitable for insurers, they represent 'no-regrets' opportunities irrespective of their climate-related benefits."—Executive Summary

"Many Mississippi homeowners who suffered property damage in Hurricane Katrina had insurance policies containing exclusions that denied recovery for damage caused by water. The Attorney General of Mississippi filed suit in response, attempting to declare these water damage exclusions void as against public policy. This paper examines the merits of the suit, addressing the central legal and economic reasons why the suit will likely be unsuccessful. The paper then proposes prescriptive measures, including changes to the National Flood Insurance Program and possible implementation of a federal comprehensive natural disaster insurance program, which may facilitate more efficient and widespread flood insurance coverage in the future."—Abstract.

"Losses from hurricane catastrophes have accelerated in recent years, with seven of the top nine hurricanes ranked by insured losses occurring during 2004 and 2005. Hurricane losses have affected the availability of insurance in coastal states and contributed to enormous growth in state residual wind markets. Of particular policy concern is the possibility that homeowners, businesses and insurance companies are not investing in the efficient amount of mitigation to reduce hurricane losses.

"This paper examines some of the potential barriers to the adoption of efficient mitigation and reviews specific state insurance regulation and legislation that impedes and encourages mitigation. Premium discounts and hurricane deductibles, which are waived if property owners invest in mitigation, provide incentives for mitigation, but mitigation discounts mandated by legislators potentially could represent disguised insurance subsidies. Irrationalities in decision-making such as low-probability event bias, myopia, and inertia might make it difficult for insurers to convince property owners to invest in mitigation. But this is not different in type from the problem entrepreneurs face in general in making consumers aware of the value of products. Restrictions on contractual mechanisms insurance companies can use to encourage mitigation, like requiring mitigation as a condition for renewal of coverage or funding mitigation after a disaster through long term loans or contracts, could prevent insurers from using effective incentives for mitigation, and could reduce the supply of insurance in coastal areas."—Abstract.

"The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting requested a review on the administration of the ice delivery process between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Specifically, we limited our review to only the administration of the ice delivery process during the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort. The report also addresses other matters identified during our review of the administration of the 2003 ice delivery contract. We issued DoD Inspector General Report No. 2006-116, 'Ice Delivery Contracts Between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,' on September 26, 2006. That report addressed Congressman Bennie Thompson's concerns on the award of the ice delivery contracts between International American Products, Worldwide Services and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This report addresses the administration of the 2003 ice delivery contract related to the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort....

"The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Charleston District did not effectively administer the 2003 ice delivery contract for the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort. The Corps Charleston District did not provide adequate training and guidance for invoice processing over the National Ice/Water Mission. They made inaccurate or inadequately supported payments on 142 of the 342 invoices received in the amount of about $262,000."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Bureau of Minority Health Access (Louisiana) to address the State's health and housing needs. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Louisiana. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Mississippi Department of Health, Office of Health Disparity Elimination (Mississippi) to address the State's health and housing needs. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Mississippi. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Nevada Hospital Association (the Association) to furnish a 100-patient mobile hospital unit for hurricane victims. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving the Association. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Tennessee Department of Health, Office of Minority Health (Tennessee) to address the State's health and housing needs. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Tennessee. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Texas Department of State Health Services, Office for the Elimination of Health Disparities (Texas) to address the State's health and housing needs. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Texas. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to Doleac Electric Company, Inc. (Doleac), to repair electrical lines on the site of a portable hospital unit that furnished emergency medical services to hurricane victims. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Doleac. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.

"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to Pamela Gilyard Catering Services (Gilyard Catering) to furnish meals for HHS staff engaged in hurricane relief efforts. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Gilyard Catering. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.

"At the request of Senators Byron L. Dorgan and Mary L. Landrieu, we reviewed FEMA's award of 36 contracts worth $3.6 billion for the maintenance and deactivation of travel trailers and manufactured housing needed after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita....

"Overall, FEMA contracting officials treated bidders fairly during the bid process. However, to fully realize its goal of maximizing local participation, they should have established better criteria for determining whether a bidder was a local firm. They also should have analyzed prices more thoroughly before awarding the contracts to ensure that costs were reasonable.

"The Senators ask us to provide answers related to the following topics:

• Destruction of bidding material
• Information provided to bidders
• Wide range of cost estimates among winning bidders
• Qualifications of winning bidders
• Public availability of winning bids and post-award meetings
• Adequacy of services provided to travel trailer residents
• Award of four $100 million contracts to a joint venture"

"In February 2006, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) appropriated $2 billion for certain health care costs related to Hurricane Katrina through Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) was charged with allocating the $2 billion in funding to states directly affected by the hurricane or that hosted evacuees.

"GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. In this report, GAO examined: (1) how CMS allocated the DRA funds to states, (2) the extent to which states have used DRA funds, and (3) whether selected states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas—anticipate the need for additional funds after DRA funds are expended."—Why GAO Did this Study.

"In our December 6, 2006, testimony, GAO stated that FEMA made tens of millions of dollars of potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments associated with both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include $17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case, FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano, Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance.

"FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who claimed damages to the same property from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for [FEMA's Individuals and Households Program]. For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation indicating their ineligibility.

"Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November 2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in overpayments and collected about $7 million."—What GAO Found.

"NFIP paid an unprecedented dollar amount for a record number of claims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Congress increased NFIP's borrowing authority with the U.S. Treasury from a pre-Katrina level of $1.5 billion to about $20.8 billion in March 2006, but FEMA will probably not be able to repay this debt on annual premium revenues of about $2 billion. As of May 2006, NFIP had paid approximately 162,000 flood damage claims from Hurricane Katrina and another 9,000 claims from Hurricane Rita. Most paid claims were for primary residences where flood insurance was generally required....

"FEMA has made progress but has not fully implemented the NFIP program changes mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act. For example, 15 states had adopted minimum education and training requirements for insurance agents who sell NFIP policies, as of October 2006."—What GAO Found.

"The number of federal flood insurance policies in force nationwide increased 36 percent from 1997 through 2006, but most homeowners at risk of flooding still lacked such insurance. While average insurance amounts (per policy) increased 78 percent from 1997 through 2006—consistent with rising home values—the average premium decreased 3 percent from 1997 through 2006, likely driven in part by the increase in policies sold in moderate- to low-risk areas. Conversely, loss amounts fluctuated by year, peaking at more than $17.7 billion in 2005. Seventy-nine percent of the funds paid out through NFIP from 1997 through 2006 were for hurricane-related claims, but the percentages in individual years varied widely (correlating with hurricane activity). Finally, the extent of claim payments attributed to repetitive loss properties (those with two or more claims in a rolling 10-year period) increased from 1997 through 2006, from $3.7 billion to nearly $8 billion, with the most significant increases resulting from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.

"Because of data limitations, GAO was not able to determine the actual number of properties acquired through FEMA mitigation programs, which are intended to minimize the damage and financial impact of floods. Information on completed mitigation projects (which encompass multiple properties) indicates that about one-third of properties approved for acquisition from 1997 to 2006 were acquired. However, these data are limited because they do not include a count of properties acquired in ongoing projects. Projects may take several years to complete, and FEMA does not report properties acquired until a project is complete. Further, FEMA collected property acquisition data (for completed projects) in an ad hoc manner because FEMA's grants management system lacks the capability to record acquisition data. As a result, FEMA cannot readily determine the extent to which flood-damaged and repetitive loss properties have been acquired through its mitigation programs.

"Lack of monitoring records, inconsistent application of procedures, and lack of coordination have diminished the effectiveness of FEMA monitoring of NFIP-related contracts. While federal internal control standards state that records should be properly maintained, FEMA did not consistently follow its monitoring procedures for preparing or maintaining monitoring reports and was unable to provide copies of the majority of monitoring reports GAO requested. Further, FEMA offices did not coordinate information and actions relating to contractor deficiencies and payments. In some cases, key officials were unaware of decisions on contractor performance. As a result, FEMA cannot consistently ensure adherence to contract requirements and lacks information critical for effective oversight of key contractors. Given the reliance of NFIP upon contractors, it is important that FEMA have in place adequate controls that are consistently applied to all contracts." — What GAO Found.

Judge Jack B. Weinstein, senior federal judge in the Eastern District of New York, has presided over many of the landmark mass tort cases involving Agent Orange, DES, asbestos litigation, repetitive stress injury, and other environmental toxic torts. He published his landmark decisions in these cases as well alongside articles he has written analyzing the problems relating to complex mass tort litigation. The book documents prominent features of mass tort litigation, and Judge Weinstein's views concerning the most fair and efficient resolution of these massive litigations.

Chapter 2 deals specifically with "The Law's Reaction to Disasters", discussing various types of disasters, jurisdictional issues, "desirable conditions for disaster management by courts", procedural tools and models, and proposing a national disaster court.