"During the 1918 influenza pandemic, the U.S., unlike Europe, put considerable effort into public health interventions. There was also more geographic variation in the autumn wave of the pandemic in the U.S. compared with Europe, with some cities seeing only a single large peak in mortality and others seeing double-peaked epidemics. Here we examine whether differences in the public health measures adopted by different cities can explain the variation in epidemic patterns and overall mortality observed. We show that city-specific per-capita excess mortality in 1918 was significantly correlated with 1917 per-capita mortality, indicating some intrinsic variation in overall mortality, perhaps related to sociodemographic factors. In the subset of 23 cities for which we had partial data on the timing of interventions, an even stronger correlation was found between excess mortality and how early in the epidemic interventions were introduced. We then fitted an epidemic model to weekly mortality in 16 cities with nearly complete intervention-timing data and estimated the impact of interventions. The model reproduced the observed epidemic patterns well. In line with theoretical arguments, we found the time-limited interventions used reduced total mortality only moderately (perhaps 10-30%), and that the impact was often very limited because of interventions being introduced too late and lifted too early. San Francisco, St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Kansas City had the most effective interventions, reducing transmission rates by up to 30-50%. Our analysis also suggests that individuals reactively reduced their contact rates in response to high levels of mortality during the pandemic."—Abstract.
"The legal system ostensibly plays a central role in disaster prevention, response, and management. Attorneys, members of the judiciary, and decision-makers at every level of government must anticipate and respond to disasters in a coordinated manner. It is increasingly clear, however, that the law is woefully unprepared to handle disasters. A growing community of academics recognizes this problem, and is formulating solutions under the rubric of disaster law. This emerging legal academic field encompasses a wide-ranging, intra- and inter-disciplinary body of thought, research and dialogue which seeks to inform and improve disaster-related decision-making.
"On June 25th, 2007, eighteen law professors and legal practitioners who count disasters among their primary research interests, gathered at U.C. Berkeley Law School to chart disaster law's course for the immediate and long-term future. Appendix A, Workshop Participants and Agenda. Over the course of the day, participants highlighted a wide variety of important intellectual concerns and potential problem-solving strategies regarding disaster management.
"In a series of productive discussions, participants first addressed central normative issues of disaster law, including terminology and the role of the legal academy. The group then addressed four sub-areas of disaster law: international collaboration, social justice, compensation and insurance, and prevention and response. Participants' recommendations for action included the creation of an annual disaster law conference, the integration of disaster law into law teaching, and an increased internet presence.
"This white paper, a record of the milestone June 25th workshop, is intended as a
tool for use by disaster law practitioners and academics in mapping the direction and
future of the field."—Executive Summary.
"On April 19, 2007, the Preventive Defense Project convened a workshop of leading federal government civilian and military officials, scientists, policy experts, and journalists to address the actions that can and should be taken in the 24 hours following a nuclear blast in a U.S. city.
...
"The needed actions by government and the public on the Day After will fall into two categories: actions to recover from the first detonation, and actions to prevent a second detonation. The Workshop addressed both types of action in as much detail, including technical detail, as possible. Topics included emergency response, evacuation and sheltering, immediate radiation effects, follow-on threats to the first nuclear weapon, attribution and retaliation, and the long process of cleanup--especially the uniquely difficult problem of fallout and residual radioactivity."—Foreword.
Three memoranda from Sec. Chertoff to employees of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), detailing reorganization of FEMA in response to the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.
"On September 7, 2005, CREW sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of which FEMA is a component, seeking records related to the federal government's long-term planning for a hurricane on the Gulf Coast as well as its immediate preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. In January 2006, CREW sued to force DHS to comply with the FOIA. The Best Laid Plans is based on the 7,500 records DHS provided in response to CREW's lawsuit.
"Critically, CREW found that FEMA had created a 'Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan' (SLCHP), which forecast a range of specific consequences....
"Nevertheless, despite the comprehensive SLCHP, post-Katrina FEMA documents demonstrate that the plan was never implemented."—Press release.
"Nonprofit organizations are a crucial link in our nation's emergency preparedness and disaster response efforts, but their role is not always well integrated into disaster planning. After both Hurricane Katrina and 9/11, nonprofits provided immediate and longer-term assistance to help people cope with devastating life changes and the emotional aftermath, but the importance of long-term services is not well understood or even acknowledged by victims and policymakers alike. This brief highlights the lessons learned from the Urban Institute's assessment of the American Red Cross September 11th Recovery Program, which provided grants to community-based organizations to provide longer-term case management, mental health services, and other services to facilitate recovery to eligible individuals."—p.1.
"This report summarizes the possible constitutional and statutory authorities and constraints relevant to the use of armed forces, including National Guard units in federal service, to provide assistance to states when a natural disaster impedes the operation of state and local police."—Summary.
A press release announcing launch of a newly designed and automated Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS). DIRS is a voluntary, efficient, webbased system that communications companies, including wireless, wireline, broadcast, and cable providers, can use to report communications infrastructure status and situational awareness information during times of crisis.
Order from the Federal Communications Commission incorporating recommendations of an independent panel regarding dates for implementing emergency backup power systems.
"The Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has released a new reference guide that outlines existing legal requirements and standards relating to access for people with disabilities. A Reference Guide for Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the Provision of Disaster Mass Care, Housing and Human Services is the first of a series of disability-related guidelines to be produced by FEMA for disaster preparedness and response planners and service providers at all levels."—Press release (August 21, 2007)
"This report provides the first full picture of who lived in New Orleans and its region after the hurricanes of 2005, and what types of residents moved in, stayed, or remained displaced one year after the storm. This analysis is critical for moving beyond speculation to informed assessments about how best to serve both existing and displaced households in the aftermath of Katrina and Rita."—Press Release
"The workshop was held to address a number of goals. Among the primary reasons for this meeting was not only to convey compassion for the people of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, but also to ensure their safety and well-being as they reinhabit their homes, noted Goldman. Second, the workshop began a scientific dialogue to understand the impacts of Hurricane Katrina on people's health. Third, it discussed how the public health community can use the dialogue in preparation for future events. The workshop did not consist of lessons learned during the response, but rather was an examination of the science needed to inform the ongoing response to disasters of this magnitude, asserted [Lynn Goldman of the Johns Hopkins University's Bloomberg School of Public Health]."—Summary.
"Public health law has been a quintessentially public law field, centered around a system of administrative agencies. In some respects, the field is moving even closer to the core of governmental functions. Since September 11, the 2001 anthrax attacks and Hurricane Katrina, the conceptual framework of emergency preparedness and response has subsumed ever larger segments of public health policymaking. Emergency planning has become an important discourse of governance, one which reveals a great deal about the operations of state power.
"In this article, I identify three approaches to governance embedded in today's public health law and policy. The first and most traditional approach to governance is that of dominant state authority. What is notable is how this approach is being strengthened by a trend toward greater centralization and hierarchy in infectious disease control, pushing public health into a tighter command and control structure. I describe how this framing process has the effect of melding population health concerns and the security state, as well as insinuating a discourse of emergency response into non-emergency policy-making.
"The second governance model in the public health field is the public-private administrative model. Although public-private models for administrative governance are relatively new to public health compared to many other fields, calls for partnerships with the private sector for the purpose of achieving population health goals are growing. Increasingly, private sector entities are implicated in the state's matrix of collaborative public health institutions.
"The third governance construct is based on the insight from governmentality theory that the state already permeates the private sector even without formal authority; power flows back and forth between public and private entities through a multiplicity of channels and technologies. New federal proposals for 'modern quarantine' provide an example. 'Modern quarantine' policies would depend on the public's instinct to voluntarily sequester themselves in a pandemic, thus utilizing indirect and less coercive methods to control the spread of infectious disease. However, this proposal fails to engage with the full dimensions of the public sector role that would be necessary to enable people to remain at home for three months or more. It cannot succeed without mandates and incentives emanating from the state, a reality which official policy documents have elided."
"From this analysis we can learn a great deal about both current directions in public health policy and about the utility and limitations of new governance theory. The three governance trends taken together exemplify a paradox fundamental to contemporary political debates: how the same apparatus can be intensifying as a security state while at the same time deploying new governance and privatization initiatives. The concept of modern quarantine demonstrates that serious complications lurk beneath the surface when policymakers engage in shallow invocations of new regulatory rhetoric."—Abstract.
"Objective: To strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to coordinate and support humanitarian assistance for disaster reduction and response through:
Integration of programme, resource management and coordination, and
Streamlining and standardization of operational, administrative and financial
practices related to disaster reduction and response."
"IAEM has issued a news release urging the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to work with local and state emergency managers to fix the National Response Framework (NRF). 'IAEM believes that the NRF should serve as the over-arching planning document that identifies the roles and responsibilities of all potential players and the methods by which resources are requested and delivered at all levels,' stated Robert C. Bohlmann, CEM, chairman of IAEM's U.S. Governmental Affairs Committee. 'It is not rocket science—and it does not have to be 800 pages long. The draft NRF that we have reviewed appears to be more like a public relations document rather than a response plan or framework.' Bohlmann testified on Sept. 11 before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, on 'Readiness in the Post Katrina and Post 9.11 World: An Evaluation of the New National Response Framework.'" The site includes links to testimony at the hearing.
"The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance."—What GAO Found.
+Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil Support (Joint Publication 3-28) (September 14, 2007) (PDF — 936K)
"The military will continue to play a vital role in securing the homeland through the execution of homeland defense (HD) and civil support (CS) missions. CS capabilities are derived from Department of Defense (DOD) warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions. CS focuses in a domestic context, but extends beyond the standard domestic definition. DOD contributes to homeland security (HS) by conducting HD operations overseas and in the approaches to the US, and by providing CS for disasters and declared emergencies, to designated law enforcement agencies, and to other activities. DOD emergency preparedness contributes to HD and CS missions since it includes all measures to be taken by DOD in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation's institutions."—Executive Summary.
+Kruger, Lennard G., Specialist in Science and Technology Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States Fire Administration: An Overview (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS20071) (Updated October 10, 2008) (PDF — 70.3K)
"The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) — which includes the National Fire Academy (NFA) — is currently an entity within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The objective of the USFA is to significantly reduce the nation's loss of life from fire, while also achieving a reduction in property loss and non-fatal injury due to fire. The Administration's FY2009 budget proposal requested $40.9 million for USFA, a reduction of 5.5% from the FY2008 level. For FY2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved $43.3 million for USFA, while the House Appropriations Committee approved $44.979 million. The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329) — which contains the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act — provided $44.979 million for USFA. Meanwhile, the United States Fire Administration Reauthorization Act of 2008 (H.R. 4847/S. 2606) was signed into law on October 8, 2008 (P.L. 110-376). This report will be updated as events warrant."—Summary.
+Mazzone, Jason, The Commandeerer in Chief(provided by: SSRN) (Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 64) (February 2007)
"Federalism impedes the government's ability to plan for and respond to emergencies. Emergencies often transcend federalist divisions of power and responsibility, rendering unclear which level of government should respond. Though many emergencies require a coordinated response by local, state, and national government, getting different levels of government to work together in times of crises is difficult. Even when states and localities call for outside assistance, they resist undue federal interference in their affairs; a national government that lacks experience working with local actors on the ground can find it difficult to implement relief programs.
"Hurricane Katrina, causing extensive damage in the Gulf Coast region in August of 2005, vividly illustrated how federalism undermines an effective response to emergencies - with deadly results. Despite years of emergency planning in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and ample warning in the days preceding Hurricane Katrina that it would cause widespread destruction, no government - national, state or local - adequately prepared vulnerable communities. After Katrina struck, the governmental response was inept. Local governments in New Orleans and other towns were overwhelmed, unable even to communicate with their personnel on the scene. State governments found their resources stretched to breaking point. The national government, cautious about appearing too proactive, delayed its response until specifically asked to help. Federal and state personnel, unaccustomed to working together, mounted independent responses to the hurricane's aftermath and operated without the benefits of a single command structure. State officials rebuffed federal requests to assume overall control of the response efforts. While people perished, officials argued about who was actually in charge.
"Future emergencies - an unwarned detonation of a crude nuclear device in an American city, for instance - could easily dwarf Katrina's impact. Given the widely-recognized failures of the government's response to Katrina and the urgent need for reform, some federal officials have proposed a dramatic solution: in a future emergency, rather than try to work with state and local response personnel, the federal government should simply deploy the military to take over the relief effort. Over opposition from every state governor, in October 2006, Congress passed a bill giving the President authority to deploy military forces to states and localities following a natural disaster or other emergency where specified federal interests are put at risk. Though this new law is not a wholesale authorization to use military resources in times of emergencies, critics contend that any domestic deployment of soldiers undermines civil liberties.
"This Article proposes an alternative solution to the problems federalism presents in times of emergencies. The proposal, which I call emergency commandeering, is based on some provisions of the Constitution that are today largely forgotten but that were used regularly in earlier years of the nation. Under my proposal, when the federal government responds to certain kinds of emergencies, it can call into periods of mandatory federal service the emergency response personnel of the state in which the emergency occurs and, if necessary, emergency response personnel from other states. During emergencies, these state employees - police, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, urban search and rescue teams, and public health specialists - would serve with compensation under the command of the President as Commander in Chief. Emergency commandeering allows the national government to mount an effective response, one that draws upon the skills and experiences of state and local personnel, without the hindrance of multiple command structures or other forms of state and local resistance. The Article sets out in detail how emergency commandeering would operate. It also shows why emergency commandeering is authorized by the Constitution, consistent with federalism, and, compared to the alternative of sending the military into our streets, good also for democracy." —Abstract.
"The Stafford Act establishes two incident levels—emergencies and major disasters. Emergencies tend to be smaller events where a limited federal role will suffice. Major disasters are larger events—but this can
run the gamut from a blizzard in Buffalo to a major earthquake in southern California that affects millions. In other words, no distinction, and no special response, is provided in the Stafford Act following catastrophes such as major earthquakes and hurricanes. The Stafford Act should be amended to establish a response level for catastrophic events.
"The Stafford Act does not adequately recognize 21st century threats. For example, the definition of a major disaster does not cover chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks or accidents. The act should further be amended to encompass 21st century threats.
"This report does not focus on the performance of government agencies immediately following a disaster—these have been well documented by others. Rather, this report focuses on the federal role in the long-term recovery and rebuilding process following catastrophes, and what can be done to improve the effectiveness of the federal government in aiding these efforts."—Executive Summary.
"The tool-kit is comprised of six checklists in three categories that address specific contingency planning recommendations
to follow Before, During and After a disruption or crisis situation occurs. The Planning Phase, Before the disaster, describes the process of preparing plans and procedures and testing those plans to prepare for a possible network failure. The Execution Phase, During the disaster, describes a coordinated strategy involving system reconstitution and outlines actions that can be taken to return the IT environment to normal operating conditions. The Final Phase, After the disaster, describes the transitions and gap analysis that takes place after the disaster has been mitigated. The tool-kit also provides an accompanying group activity worksheet, 'Thinking Sideways,' to assist in disaster recovery planning sessions with critical staff."—How to Use the Tool-kit.
"In today's world, emergencies and disasters take many forms, including natural disasters, technological and infrastructure failures, terrorist attacks, and health emergencies such as pandemic disease outbreaks. An effective crisis-management program will encompass five critical components: an assessment of the threats facing the state; development of a plan to mitigate those threats; development of a strategy to prepare for all hazards; a comprehensive and well-tested response plan; and a plan for short- and long-term recovery. This document focuses primarily on the preparedness and response components of a state's crisis-management program."—Executive Summary.
"A comprehensive resource for healthcare planners and practitioners, the new guidance offers information and tools to assist the industry in preparing for and responding to an influenza pandemic. It includes technical information on infection control and industrial hygiene practices to reduce the risk of infection in healthcare settings; workplace preparations and planning issues; and OSHA standards that have special importance to pandemic preparedness planners and responders in the industry."—OSHA News Release (May 21, 2007)
"GAO identified several significant system and logistical challenges that SBA experienced in responding to the Gulf Coast hurricanes that undermined the agency's ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims. For example, the limited capacity of SBA's automated loan processing system—the Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS)—restricted the number of staff who could access the system at any one time to process disaster loan applications. In addition, SBA staff who could access DCMS initially encountered multiple system outages and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. SBA also faced challenges training and supervising the thousands of mostly temporary employees the agency hired to process loan applications and obtaining suitable office space for its expanded workforce. As of late May 2006, SBA processed disaster loan applications, on average, in about 74 days compared with its goal of within 21 days."—What GAO Found.
"The purpose of this memorandum is to report the results of our review regarding FEMA's mission assignments to federal departments and agencies to provide volunteers in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. Our objective was to determine whether the volunteer service program was managed efficiently and effectively. We and other Inspectors General from the participating agencies conducted interviews of agency points of contact (POCs) and volunteers....
"The volunteer service program was initiated in a short time frame and with limited prior experience or planning, but was generally implemented efficiently and effectively, and provided needed resources to assist with relief efforts. Volunteers overwhelmingly cited their service as particularly rewarding. However, POCs and volunteers identified several areas that need to be addressed prior to the next hurricane season to improve the efficacy of the volunteer service program."—
"This testimony addresses the [federal executive boards']emergency support roles and responsibilities, their potential role in pandemic influenza preparedness, and some of the key challenges they face in providing emergency support services."—Why GAO Did This Study
"This testimony addresses (1)federal leadership roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic, (2) our assessment of the Strategy and Plan, and (3)opportunities to increase clarity of federal leadership roles and responsibilities and improve pandemic planning."&mdash:Why GAO Did This Study
"My testimony is organized in terms of three points in time. First, I discuss observations made by some researchers and practitioners concerning the ways in which post-September 11 policy and programmatic changes were adversely affecting FEMA's ability to respond in future major disaster events. Second, I briefly review assessments of FEMA's performance during hurricane Katrina, as well as post-Katrina reforms. Third, I suggest changes that have the potential for enhancing FEMA's ability to reduce losses in future disaster events. With little notice in terms of developing testimony, I have relied a great deal on my own experience and writings. Nonetheless, I believe that my comments accurately reflect what many in the research and practice communities have observed over the past six years."—Testimony.
+United States Deparment of the Interior (DOI), Office of Inspector General, DOI's 2005 Hurricane Relief Expenditures (Report no. C-IN-MOA-0004-2006) (March 2007) (PDF — 697K)
"The devastating hurricanes of 2005 had a two-fold impact on DOI. First, DOI was called upon to assist in the federal relief efforts under the National Response Plan (NRP). Second, DOI's bureaus were greatly affected by the disasters. DOI sustained significant damage to 12 parks and preserves, 86 refuges, 68 water monitoring gauges, and the Mineral Management Service's (MMS) Gulf of Mexico Regional Office. As of September 30, 2006, DOI spent approximately $104 million on hurricane relief and recovery. This included approximately $61 million for NRP activities and $43 million to respond to and address internal damage.
"We are pleased to report that overall, the bureaus effectively managed their 2005 hurricane-related expenditures. Given the magnitude of the damage sustained to the Gulf Coast and DOI facilities, the issues we identified through our expenditure testing were relatively insignificant, and the bureaus performed well."—Earl E. Devaney, Inspector General.
"During the hurricane, personnel and the facility lost communications capabilities and the testing mission was not readily available for client use because no alternate means of testing was available. As a result, the [Defense Information Systems Agency Continuity of Operations and Test Facility (DCTF)] testing mission was halted for 3 weeks following Hurricane Katrina (finding A). Also, the Command and Control Guard system, located at DCTF, could not continue real-time data processing following Hurricane Katrina. As a result, U.S. Army Europe, one of the primary DCTF Command and Control Guard users, lost real-time logistics data for 19 days (finding B). (See the Findings section of the report for the detailed recommendations). We identified internal control weaknesses at the DISA DCTF and the Global Combat Support System Program Management Office over the planning and protection of information technology resources."—Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, one of seven U.S. uniformed services, is made up entirely of officers commissioned on the basis of their health-related training. Agencies within and outside the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) employ Corps officers to provide health care and related services in health professional shortage areas. In addition, the Secretary of the
Department has the authority to deploy the Corps in response to public health emergencies. Hence, Corps officers must simultaneously fulfill their responsibilities to their employer agency and to the Corps.
"In August and September 2005, respectively, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast. In response to health care and public health needs in the affected areas, the Corps carried out the largest deployment in its 207-year history. More than 2,100 officers worked with State, local, and private agencies in response to the hurricanes.
Since 2003, the Corps has been engaged in a continuous effort to improve its response capacity. On January 18, 2006, the Secretary
announced the latest phase in this effort, in which the Corps will increase the number of officers by 10 percent, create a team-oriented
deployment process, and improve the recruitment process.
"Commissioned Corps officers deployed in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita provided valuable services, but the Corps could improve its response to public health emergencies. The Commissioned Corps provided valuable support to States, but more officers—especially nurses, mental health professionals, and dentists— were needed. While most deployed officers met Corps readiness standards, many lacked experience, effective training, and familiarity with response plans. Agencies were unwilling or unable to allow some officers to deploy, while logistical difficulties delayed others' arrival in the field. Confusion surrounded some officers' arrival, but most field assignments were appropriate and officers felt safe at their locations. Most officers were equipped adequately, but some lacked working communications devices and other basic tools. Many officers personally incurred mission-related expenses and some were not reimbursed promptly, which could affect their ability to deploy to future public health emergencies." —Executive Summary.
"The Government purchase card program was designed to save the Government money by avoiding costly paperwork and to expedite the process of making purchases. In response to Hurricane Katrina, Public Law 109-62 authorized agencies to streamline certain purchasing requirements for procurement of supplies or services to support rescue and relief operations. This report (1) determines whether Government purchase card purchases related to Hurricane Katrina complied with requirements for the use of the card and (2) identifies lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina purchases to assist in the administration of the Government purchase card program during future emergency situations.
"We found that 15 percent of purchases did not comply with purchase card requirements. Additionally, cardholders had questions and concerns regarding some purchases and over half of cardholders expressed the need for additional written guidance regarding emergency purchasing procedures. Lastly, we found that Hurricane Katrina purchase data contained inaccuracies.
"We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management provide additional written guidance on emergency purchasing procedures. We also recommend that ASAM require training on emergency purchasing procedures. Finally, we recommend that ASAM develop a tracking system for monitoring Government purchase card purchases during emergency situations. In its comments to the draft report, ASAM concurred with our recommendations and stated that it has set a course of action to strengthen the Department of Health and Human Services' purchase card program."
"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.
"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Bureau of Minority Health Access (Louisiana) to address the State's health and housing needs. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Louisiana. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.
"The audit is one of several reviews of procurements by the Program Support Center (PSC) and other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
"The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provide, among other things, that HHS agencies award each contract to a responsible party and document compliance with requirements for full and open competition and the determination that the price was fair and reasonable.
"As part of HHS's hurricane relief operations, PSC awarded a contract to the Mississippi Department of Health, Office of Health Disparity Elimination (Mississippi) to address the State's health and housing needs. Our objective was to determine whether PSC complied with FAR and HHSAR requirements during the award process involving Mississippi. PSC complied with the requirements."—Executive Summary.
"At the request of Senators Byron L. Dorgan and Mary L. Landrieu, we reviewed FEMA's award of 36 contracts worth $3.6 billion for the maintenance and deactivation of travel trailers and manufactured housing needed after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita....
"Overall, FEMA contracting officials treated bidders fairly during the bid process. However, to fully realize its goal of maximizing local participation, they should have established better criteria for determining whether a bidder was a local firm. They also should have analyzed prices more thoroughly before awarding the contracts to ensure that costs were reasonable.
"The Senators ask us to provide answers related to the following topics:
Destruction of bidding material
Information provided to bidders
Wide range of cost estimates among winning bidders
Qualifications of winning bidders
Public availability of winning bids and post-award meetings
Adequacy of services provided to travel trailer residents
Award of four $100 million contracts to a joint venture"
"Law enforcement efforts to provide public safety and security, and detect disaster assistance fraud, are complicated by: (1) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) concerns about improperly disclosing Privacy Act-protected information; and (2) the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, which prevents federal Inspectors General from expeditiously conducting computer matches among recipients of disaster assistance.
"We are recommending that the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Add specific routine uses to the System of Records Notice that authorizes the disclosure of FEMA disaster recovery assistance files for the purpose of locating registered sex offenders and fugitive felons in the aftermath of a disaster.
Develop and execute agreements with DOJ, the coordinator for Public Safety and Security under the National Response plan, to provide appropriate law enforcement entities direct access to FEMA disaster recovery assistance files for public safety and security efforts, including identifying the whereabouts of registered sex offenders and fugitive felons.
Collaborate with DOJ to develop protocols, procedures, and processes to facilitate the appropriate sharing of information from FEMA disaster recovery assistance files among federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that are responsible for ensuring public safety and security following a disaster.
"The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) experienced near-constant organizational change from fiscal years 2001 through 2005 that caused considerable flux in FEMA's resources. During this period, the most significant change occurred in March 2003 when FEMA transitioned from an independent agency to a component of the newly created DHS....
"FEMA also contributed to DHS start-up costs and ongoing expenses, which reduced funds available for FEMA's operating expenses. Though FEMA would have incurred some of these costs as an independent agency, evidence suggests that FEMA may have been assessed a disproportionate amount relative to several larger DHS entities....
"FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategies—such as succession planning or a coordinated training effort—which are integral to managing resources...."
"The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recent 4 year anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since its establishment. DHS began operations in March 2003 with the mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce vulnerabilities, minimize damages from attacks, and aid in recovery efforts. GAO has reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the nation's security."—Why GAO Did This Study. Includes assessment of emergency preparedness and response.
"This report examines (1) the processes FEMA followed for soliciting and evaluating AHHP project proposals, and for selecting projects for funding and determining the funding amounts;(2) how FEMA's processes compare with those of other agencies that carry out similar similar types of competitive grant programs; and (3) how the group of projects FEMA selected for AHHP funding, as well as other funding options, addresses the goal of identifying alternative forms of disaster housing." p.1
"As the first to respond to natural disasters, domestic terrorism, and other emergencies, public safety agencies rely on timely communications across multiple disciplines and jurisdictions. It is vital to the safety and effectiveness of first responders that their electronic communications systems enable them to communicate with whomever they need to, when they need to, and when they are authorized to do so. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, (1) the extent to which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding and technical assistance has helped to improve interoperable communications in selected states and (2) the progress that has been made in the development and implementation of interoperable communications standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed grant information, documentation of selected states' and localities' interoperability projects, and standards documents."—Why GAO Did This Study.
"The mass destruction and displacement of people caused by the hurricanes created new challenges, including an unprecedented demand for services from these five programs. The demand for food stamps and UI benefits, and the disaster assistance they provide, rose sharply. New evacuee policies were created to provide food stamps and TANF assistance to evacuees nationwide. In contrast, Social Security and SSI had a significant increase for replacement benefits, but did not have a large increase in new applications.
"Disaster plans, flexible service delivery options, and access to contingency funding facilitated response, but not all programs had these elements in place. The federally administered Social Security and SSI programs had service delivery disaster plans in place to meet demand. However, such strategies were sometimes lacking for the state-administered Food Stamp, UI, and TANF programs. Flexible service delivery options such as 800 numbers and Internet application services and debit cards for issuing benefits expedited services. Last, access to contingency funding was key to facilitating disaster response."—What GAO Found.
"Six years after the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), concerns persist about health effects experience by WTC responders and the availability of health care services for those affected. Several federally funded programs provide screening, monitoring, or treatment services to responders. GAO has previously reported on the progress made and implementation problems faced by these WTC health programs."—-Why GAO Did This Study
Full committee hearing with testimony from representatives of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, Government Accountability Office, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, International Association of Firefighters, and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality regarding health risks to first responders to catastrophic disasters. Includes links to pdfs of Statement of Committee Chairman and Testimonies and to audio download.
The hearing will focus on "the changes FEMA has undergone and not undergone in order to ensure that the federal government is prepared for and ready to respond to the next catastrophic disaster. The hearing will also examine the disaster preparedness roles for other relevant agencies within federal, state, and local government." Links to testimony of individual witnesses are included.
"This paper was presented at DePaul University in March 2006, as part of a Symposium on Shaping a New Direction for Law and Medicine: An International Debate on Culture, Disaster, Biotechnology & Public Health. Following the catastrophic events of 2005, including Hurricane Katrina, Pakistani Earthquakes, bird flu transmission to human populations, and the real threat of bioterrorism, government struggled in the aftermath to make sense of the devastation and human displacement. Medical teams, try as they might, are not always prepared and alerted as to how best investigate and quickly render assistance. The Symposium addressed the role of government, policy-makers, community organizations, the World Health Organization and other key players in properly situating and providing relief to respond to these issues. My paper describes both the immediate and lasting impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Region's health care infrastructure and recommends approaches to prevent similar devastating effects in future disasters." —Abstract.
