+American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Section of State & Local Government Law & Section of Admininstrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Hurricane Katrina Task Force Subcommittee Report (February 2006) (PDF — 453K)
Disasters & the Law
UC Berkeley School of Law
29 entriesexpand all
+American College of Emergency Physicians, Emergency Medicine One Year After Katrina (August 2006) (PDF — 106K)
- "More than half (52%) report very little or no progress in the recovery of the emergency care system.
- Three-fifths (60%) report their emergency departments are not functioning to the extent they had before the storms.
- Two-fifths (32%) remained upbeat about their own emergency departments, saying they are functioning to the extent they had before the storms.
- Sixty-five percent say that their patients were being harmed because they must wait for treatment.
- Thirty-six percent say that if the recovery were not sufficiently improved by the second year anniversary, they would consider leaving to practice in another state." —Summary.
+Bea, Keith, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Disaster Evacuation and Displacement Policy: Issues for Congress (Updated August 17, 2006) (PDF — 44KB)
+Binder, Denis, The Role of Statutes, Regulations and Professional Standards in Emergency Responses (provided by: SSRN) (May 23, 2006)
"The tragedies of 9/11 and Katrina bring to the fore the need for emergency action planning. Government has responded by enacting statutes and ordinances, and issuing regulations. Industry has responded through the promulgation of professional standards, especially NFPA 1600, which was highly praised by the 9/11 Commission. The National Fire Protective Association is one of the most prominent private standards setting organizations nationally and throughout the world. Its standards and codes are often incorporated into statutes, ordinances, and regulations.
"This article outlines the role these sources of legal authority should play in establishing legal standards for emergency responses. It looks to both traditional legal precedence and the case law which has evolved around NFPA standards.
"Unlike many earlier articles, this essay emphasizes that statutes, ordinances, regulations, and professional standards only set the floor for legal liability. The common law duty of reasonable care under the circumstances may impose a higher duty of care based upon the reasonable foreseeability of the risk." —Abstract.
+Chhean, Chhunny & Puneet Kakkar, Primed & Prepared: Updating the Stafford Act for a Coordinated National Response (UC Berkeley School of Law, Law 224.9, Disasters & the Law, Spring 2006) (PDF — 188K)
"Hurricane Katrina revealed fundamental problems with our nation's ability to respond to natural disasters. Not only did Katrina overwhelm governments at all levels in their abilities to respond to the disaster, but it also revealed their inadequate emergency preparation and response plans. There was a failure among local, state and federal levels to effectively optimize assistance and resources coming from other states and the federal government.
"This paper advocates an amended Stafford Act to include three solutions that are crucial to strengthening national preparedness for future disasters. First, local jurisdictions and states should be required to develop comprehensive disaster preparedness and response plans, consistent with a national framework, that enable them to effectively manage complex disasters. Second, the federal government needs to harmonize its disaster-relief infrastructure and consolidate natural emergency preparedness and response functions in the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security. Finally, the Stafford Act should include a contingency plan for a catastrophe so large it renders traditional emergency management impracticable.
"While these structural changes for national preparedness can be implemented by executive order as governmental reports and studies have suggested, this paper stresses the importance of enacting these recommendations in legislation. The Stafford Act is the touchstone of federal disaster relief. Updating the Stafford Act to include a national framework for disaster response, the federal infrastructure for disaster management under the leadership of DHS, and the framework for the nation's response to catastrophic incidents, will achieve clarity and permanency for all parties involved. Updating the Act as suggested will ensure that the country shall be primed and prepared for future disasters."—Abstract.
+Davis, Lois M., Louis T. Mariano, Jennifer E. Pace, Sarah K. Cotton & Paul Steinberg, RAND National Defense Research Institute, Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations? (2006) (PDF — 1.2M)
+Dougherty, Candidus, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government's Alibi for the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (provided by: SSRN) (January 1, 2006)
"This Article analyzes how the government's blame of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) for its late response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster was misplaced. Part I starts with a brief history of the military's role in domestic law enforcement and chronicles how, throughout history, standing armies have crept into civilian law enforcement. It discusses how for centuries, governments have treated their standing armies as necessary evils - depending on the military for national defense while at the same time fearing its power to oppress if improperly unleashed. In fact, the encroachment of federal troops on the voting rights of the Reconstruction South was the impetus for the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) in 1878.
"Part II teases out the convoluted process of analyzing military action under the PCA. It lays out how courts interpret the statute as well as the constitutional, Congressional and common law exceptions to the PCA. Part III applies the PCA to the situation in New Orleans, concluding that the PCA was not implicated because the military's role was to provide food, water, medical care and transportation out of the city and not to enforce the law. This section also details the various sources of authority that would have permitted the use of the military in a law enforcement capacity in New Orleans immediately after Katrina.
"Lastly, the Conclusion discusses what the PCA means today and whether we still have a need for such a law. The author concludes that we do need a PCA-like law, but we need one that is more potent. We have traversed through a cycle of authority that gradually progresses from absolute civilian control of the military to virtual control of the military and then back again. We are on the upswing of this cycle, and we need a PCA with teeth in order to protect us from repeating history and from ending this chapter of increasing military authority in disaster."—Abstract.
+Duke Law Journal, "36th Annual Duke Administrative Law Conference -- Administrative Law and Emergency Management: Katrina and Beyond" (March 24, 2006) (webcast)
+Gordon-Murnane, Laura, Emergency National Preparedness (BNA's Web Watch) (December 2006)
+Gordon-Murnane, Laura, Government Contracts and Katrina (BNA's Web Watch) (February 2006)
+Hanly, Beverly, Storm Communications No Big Easy Wired News (August 3, 2006)
+Inomata, Tadanori, Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations, Towards a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Disaster Response and Reduction: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster (A/61/699-E/2007/8) (JIU/REP/2006/5) (2006)
- Integration of programme, resource management and coordination, and
- Streamlining and standardization of operational, administrative and financial practices related to disaster reduction and response."
+Jenkins, William O., Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement (Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives) (May 9, 2006) (PDF — 250K)
+Kosar, Kevin R., Analyst in American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Congressional Charter of the American National Red Cross: Overview, History, and Analysis (RL33314) (March 15, 2006) (PDF — 109K)
+Lister, Sarah A., Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology, Domestic Social Policy Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority and Funding (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33579) (July 28, 2006) (PDF — 144K)
+Office of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Broken Promises: The Republican Response to Katrina (August 23, 2006)
+Silverman, Randy, Toward a National Disaster Response Protocol (provided by: Project Muse) Libraries & the Cultural Record, v.41, no.4 (Fall 2006), pp. 497-511
+State of California, Little Hoover Commission, Safeguarding the Golden State: Preparing for Catastrophic Events (Report No. 184) (April 2006) (PDF — 1.59M)
+United States Conference of Mayors, Homeland Security Monitoring Center, Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post Katrina: The State of America's Readiness, a 183-City Survey (2006 Survey on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness) (July 26, 2006) (PDF — 218K)
+United States Congress, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 15, 2006)
+United States Deparment of the Interior (DOI), Office of Inspector General, DOI's 2005 Hurricane Relief Expenditures (Report no. C-IN-MOA-0004-2006) (March 2007) (PDF — 697K)
"The devastating hurricanes of 2005 had a two-fold impact on DOI. First, DOI was called upon to assist in the federal relief efforts under the National Response Plan (NRP). Second, DOI's bureaus were greatly affected by the disasters. DOI sustained significant damage to 12 parks and preserves, 86 refuges, 68 water monitoring gauges, and the Mineral Management Service's (MMS) Gulf of Mexico Regional Office. As of September 30, 2006, DOI spent approximately $104 million on hurricane relief and recovery. This included approximately $61 million for NRP activities and $43 million to respond to and address internal damage.
"We are pleased to report that overall, the bureaus effectively managed their 2005 hurricane-related expenditures. Given the magnitude of the damage sustained to the Gulf Coast and DOI facilities, the issues we identified through our expenditure testing were relatively insignificant, and the bureaus performed well."—Earl E. Devaney, Inspector General.
+United States Department of Defense, Inspector General, The Effects of Hurricane Katrina on the Defense Information Systems Agency Continuity of Operations and Test Facility (Report No. D-2007-031) (December 12, 2006) (PDF — 1.02M)
+United States Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Financial Management: Financial Management of Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts at Selected DoD Components (D-2006-118) (September 27, 2006) (PDF — 1.56M)
+United States Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audit Services, The Department of Energy's Use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Audit Report, DOE/IG-0747) (December 2006) (PDF — 276K)
"The Department of Energy's Strategic Petroleum Reserve consists of underground caverns currently holding nearly 700 million barrels of crude oil. The Reserve's primary energy security mission is to maintain drawdown readiness to mitigate the impact of a severe crude oil supply disruption. To achieve this goal, the Reserve must be prepared to promptly restore operations and schedule the flow of crude oil to refineries, even in the midst of a major disaster. The Reserve sites are located in the heart of the Gulf Coast region of the United States, an area prone to hurricanes and major storms. In such an environment, continuity of operations is especially challenging....
"We found that the Department used the Reserve and its assets with great effectiveness to address emergency energy needs in the crisis surrounding Katrina and Rita. Despite being in the path of the hurricanes' destruction, the Reserve promptly fulfilled requests for oil from refineries suffering from storm-induced supply shortages. Within four days of Hurricane Katrina's landfall, oil was sent to requesting refineries. Overall, the Reserve provided almost 21 million barrels of crude oil to refiners through loans and sales. To their credit, the Reserve's management and staff reacted magnificently under extremely difficult circumstances."—Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, Memorandum for the Secretary (December 5, 2006)
+United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Mangement Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina (OIG-06-32) (March 2006) (PDF — 2.44M)
+United States Department of Transportation, in cooperation with the United States Department of Homeland Security, Report to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation (June 1, 2006) (PDF — 6.45M)
+United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Vision for New FEMA: The Nation's Preeminent Emergency Management Agency (December 12, 2006) (PDF — 246K)
- Incident Management
- Operational Planning
- Disaster Logistics
- Emergency Communications
- Service to Disaster Victims
- Continuity Programs
- Public Disaster Communications
- Integrated Preparedness
- Hazard Mitigation
+United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (May 2006) (PDF — 61.3M)
+Weeks, Elizabeth A., After the Catastrophe: Disaster Relief for Hospitals (provided by: Westlaw) North Carolina Law Review v.85 pp. 223-300 (December 2006)