"The key emergency management and homeland security statutes for the state of California include the Emergency Services Act, the Disaster Recovery Reconstruction Act and the Disaster Assistance Act. These statutes allow the governor to declare an emergency, provide funds to small businesses and residents for disaster recovery, plan for and mitigate the effects of disasters, and establish a process for the continuation of government should gubernatorial or legislative vacancies occur as the result of a disaster. Although California is not a member of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact the legislature has enacted intrastate mutual aid agreements; the governor has authority to enter into interstate agreements. Other statutes address issues such as disaster dog teams, state employees volunteering for emergency service and agricultural terrorism."—Summary.
"To a considerable extent, state statutory authorities appear to be relatively uniform. All state statutes provide considerable discretionary authority to the governor in emergency situations. Also, since federal law requires or encourages certain actions, all states have enacted similar laws in some areas, such as the establishment of state and local entities with responsibility for hazardous material or chemical incidents or the acceptance of federal disaster assistance. Some differences
exist among the state authorities, such as the types, amount, and conditions under which aid is to be provided to disaster victims. Also, some states have enacted provisions to ensure that nonfederal funds are made available for preparedness or recovery, while others rely upon federal sources, with state funds authorized to meet cost share requirements."—Summary.
"Hurricane Katrina revealed fundamental problems with our nation's ability to respond to natural disasters. Not only did Katrina overwhelm governments at all levels in their abilities to respond to the disaster, but it also revealed their inadequate emergency preparation and response plans. There was a failure among local, state and federal levels to effectively optimize assistance and resources coming from other states and the federal government.
"This paper advocates an amended Stafford Act to include three solutions that are crucial to strengthening national preparedness for future disasters. First, local jurisdictions and states should be required to develop comprehensive disaster preparedness and response plans, consistent with a national framework, that enable them to effectively manage complex disasters. Second, the federal government needs to harmonize its disaster-relief infrastructure and consolidate natural emergency preparedness and response functions in the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security. Finally, the Stafford Act should include a contingency plan for a catastrophe so large it renders traditional emergency management impracticable.
"While these structural changes for national preparedness can be implemented by executive order as governmental reports and studies have suggested, this paper stresses the importance of enacting these recommendations in legislation. The Stafford Act is the touchstone of federal disaster relief. Updating the Stafford Act to include a national framework for disaster response, the federal infrastructure for disaster management under the leadership of DHS, and the framework for the nation's response to catastrophic incidents, will achieve clarity and permanency for all parties involved. Updating the Act as suggested will ensure that the country shall be primed and prepared for future disasters."—Abstract.
"At the core of the set of challenges that confront national, state, and local government officials concerning homeland security national preparedness public policy are a set of assumptions, upon which current and evolving policies are based, that are suspect if not fatally flawed. The policy outcomes resulting from these faulty assumptions (and facilitated by hindering institutional pathologies, misguided policies, and bad policy instruments) have left the nation less prepared than is possible had forward-thinking, aggressively applied modern public management models been used as the foundation upon which national preparedness could be established. The assumptions brought into focus in this article are:
"1. There is an idealized level of national preparedness; achieving a prescribed level of preparedness to respond to events of national significance, whether man-made or natural in origin, is possible based on current or foreseeable resource levels.
"2. The federal government is obliged to direct the development of national preparedness policy to ensure that state and local governments are working toward policy compliance and are providing full accountability for grant funds.
"3. Current homeland security public policy is coherent, embraces an all-hazards
approach to national preparedness and reflects the comprehensive involvement
of state and local governments in its development, deployment, and
implementation.
"After a brief discussion of research methodology, this article traces the evolution of national preparedness policies and describes the institutional pathologies and policy instruments that have inhibited national preparedness. The next section provides analysis related to the research and an explanation of why the assumptions identified above are flawed. Finally, recommendations are offered that might allow the next administration and those with public safety, emergency management, and homeland security responsibilities at the state and local level insights into building community resilience and governance capacity that raises preparedness to as high a level as possible." —Introduction.
This set of audio files contains presentations by Adam Doerr, Opening Remarks; Ben Depoorter: "Political Externalities & the Response of Government to Disasters"; Richard Schmalbeck and Ellen Aprill: "Disaster Relief, Tax Policy, and the Federal Action Imperative";
Commentaries by Arti Rai and Lawrence Zelenak;
Jim Rossi: "State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis" Presentation and Q&A; Keynote Speaker: Dr. Robert Kadlec; "Risk Assessment and the Hazards of Hindsight" Discussion and Q&A with Matthew Adler, Douglas Kysar, and Thomas McGarity.
"FEMA should be commended for formulating the "Federal Response Plan" after its experiences with Hurricane Hugo and Loma Prieta. The Plan provided the framework fo numerous Federal agencies' response to Hurricane Andrew. However, Andrew demonstrated that the Plan needs substantial refinements to deal with a disaster of such extraordinary magnitude, particularly in the first few days when broad assistance was so vitally needed but slow in arriving. Several such refinements come directly from lessons learned with Hugo and Loma Prieta, described in the FEMA report of May 1991 on this subject. That report specifically commented that the Federal Government may be the principal responder when a catastrophic disaster overwhelms the State and local governments' ability to respond. FEMA management failed to systematically follow up on the more important problem areas described in that report.
"A key lesson is the need to clarify or expand legal authority for Federal agencies to act quickly, instead of waiting for specific requests for aid from the States. In 1991 FEMA officials proposed legislation that would have somewhat expanded Federal authority, but they gave up when the proposal was not approved for submission to Congress. The weakness of the "Federal Response Plan" and Federal agencies' performance in south Florida are caused primarily by the perception of inadequate authority on such a fundamental issue involving its capability to perform promptly in a catastrophic disaster situation. This issue takes on even more importance in a situation such as Andrew, when many State and local officials could not identify their requirements for Federal assistance, further contributing to victims' suffering.
"We believe this unresolved question of authority would lead FEMA officials to approach the next catastrophic disaster largely in the same way they did Hurricane Andrew, with consequent delay in meeting victims' immediate needs. Mindful that the next hurricane season is but six months away, we present numerous findings and recommendations for improving the Federal response. ...."—Executive Summary.
"In fall 2005, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma devastated areas along much of the Gulf Coast, resulting in greater demand for food stamps by millions of Gulf Coast State residents and evacuees.
"During disasters, USDA delivers emergency food assistance in two ways. Initially, emergency food commodities are provided to shelters, to other mass feeding sites, and directly to households when normal commercial channels of food distribution may be disrupted. USDA also issues emergency food stamps through the Disaster Food Stamp Program (DFSP), an extension of the regular Food Stamp Program. Under the DFSP, eligibility requirements are temporarily relaxed so that benefits can be quickly provided to households that may not ordinarily qualify for food stamps but suddenly need food assistance.
"The Federal response to the disasters has received much attention; information about food stamp use will help provide a more complete picture of the use of public assistance both during and after the hurricanes. To provide this information, we examined the effect of the hurricanes on food stamp caseloads and benefits issued.
"One effect of the hurricanes was a dramatic spike in both Food Stamp Program caseloads and benefits issued. In November 2005, 29.7 million people received food stamps, the largest number ever to receive food stamps in a single month and about 4 million—or 15 percent—more than just 3 months earlier." —Report Summary
Links to report summary and full report in PDF format.
"This Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza further clarifies the roles and responsibilities of governmental and non-governmental entities, including Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities and regional, national, and international stakeholders, and provides preparedness guidance for all segments of society. The Plan addresses the following topics:
U.S. Government Planning and Response
International Efforts and Transportation and Borders
"The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance."—What GAO Found.
"A flu pandemic is a worldwide epidemic of an influenza virus. As such, the United States’ response to a flu pandemic would have both international and domestic components. Additionally, the domestic response effort would include contributions from every governmental level (local, state, tribal, and federal), non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. This report will focus largely on the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in supporting the nation’s domestic response effort, although it will also touch on DOD’s international role." — Introduction
"The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an agreement among member states to provide assistance after disasters overwhelm a state's capacity to manage consequences. The compact, initiated by the states and coordinated by the National Emergency Management Association, provides a
structure for requesting emergency assistance from party states. In 1996 Congress approved EMAC as an interstate compact (P.L. 104-321). EMAC also resolves some, but not all, potential legal and administrative obstacles that may hinder such assistance at the state level. EMAC also enhances state preparedness for terrorist attacks by ensuring the availability of resources for fast response and facilitating multi-state cooperation in training activities and preparedness exercises.
"In June of 2008, a bill to reform mutual aid agreements for the National Capital Region (P.L. 110-250) was enacted to expand the types of organizations and agencies in the region that are authorized to enter into agreements and ease the requirements for agents and volunteers to respond to an incident. Legislation in the 110th Congress (S. 1452) would require EMAC to ensure that licensed mental health professionals with expertise in treating vulnerable populations are included in the leadership of the National Disaster Medical System and are available for deployment with Disaster Medical Assistance Teams.
"This report will be updated as events warrant. This report is an update based upon a previous report written by Keith Bea, Specialist in American National
Government."-Summary.
"Mutual aid is a key component of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides the framework for emergency response. The federal government now directly supports the establishment of local mutual aid agreements with federal resources and has embarked on a National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative."—Executive Summary.
+McCarthy, Francis X., Analyst in Emergency Management Policy, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer (RL 34146)(March 18, 2010) (PDF — 265K)
"The amount of assistance provided through presidential disaster declarations has exceeded $100 billion. Often, in recent years, Congress has enacted supplemental appropriations legislation to cover unanticipated costs. While the amounts spent by the federal government on different programs may be reported, and the progress of the recovery can be observed, much less is known about the process that initiates all of this activity. Yet, it is a process that has resulted in an average of more than one disaster declaration a week over the last decade.
"The disaster declaration procedure is foremost a process that preserves the discretion of the governor to request assistance and the President to decide to grant, or not to grant, supplemental help. The process employs some measurable criteria in two broad areas: Individual Assistance that aids families and individuals and Public Assistance that is mainly for repairs to infrastructure. The criteria, however, also considers many other factors, in each category of assistance, that help decision makers assess the impact of an event on communities and states."—Summary.
"EMAC, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through EMAC, a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement. The EMAC mutual aid agreement and partnership between the member states exist because from hurricanes to earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste spills, and terrorist attacks to biological and chemical incidents, all states share a common enemy: the threat of disaster.
"EMAC is the first national disaster-relief compact since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950 to be ratified by Congress. The strength of EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it from other plans and compacts lies in its governance structure, its relationship with federal organizations, states, counties, territories, & regions, and the ability to move just about any resource one state has to assist another state, including medical resources."—What is EMAC?
+Relyea, Harold C., Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), National Emergency Powers (PDF — 84K)
"With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Indeed, both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Furthermore, since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to declare formally the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority, activated by the declaration, would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report, which is updated as events require."—Summary.
"Natural disasters and acts of terrorism have placed a spotlight on the ability of health care providers to surge in response to catastrophic conditions. This paper reviews the status of efforts to develop the capacity
and capabilities of the health care system to respond to disasters and other mass casualty events. Strategies for adapting routine medical practices and protocols to the demands posed by extraordinary circumstances and scarce
resources are summarized. Existing federal roles, responsibilities, and assets relative to the contributions of state and local government and the private sector are described, including specific programmatic activities such as the Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and the Hospital Preparedness Program. Opportunities for federal policymakers
seeking to strengthen and expedite preparations for medical disaster response are highlighted." —Overview.
"This report provides a brief overview of selected legal issues including emergency measures, civil rights, liability issues, and employment issues.
There are a number of emergency measures which may help to contain or ameliorate an infectious disease outbreak. The Public Health Service Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the Stafford Act contain authorities that allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the President to take certain actions during emergencies or disasters. While the primary authority for quarantine and isolation in the United States resides at the state level, the federal government has jurisdiction over interstate and border quarantine. The federal government also issues recommendations regarding such activities as school closures and vaccination programs. States and local governments have the authority to initiate emergency measures such as mandatory vaccination orders and certain nonpharmaceutical interventions such as school closures, which may lessen the spread of an infectious disease. The International Health Regulations adopted by the WHO in 2005 provide a framework for international cooperation against infectious disease threats." — Introduction
"Mayors acknowledge that more must be done at every level of government to make sure that cities, and the nation, are able to respond to the growing challenges of homeland security and emergency response. 'This new survey shows that we must further strengthen our partnership with the federal government to make sure that our
domestic "first preventers" and "first responders" have the resources and training they need to succeed, and that
all necessary federal support is ready in the event of a major disaster,' [Conference of Mayors President, Dearborn Mayor Michael] Guido said."—Press Release.
"This Directive is issued to establish military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) policy and program guidance governing the use of Reserve component (RC) members in providing military support and assistance to civil authorities. The Directive also establishes DoD policy for the management of EPLO programs in each of the Military Departments."—Summary.
"This Directive updates policy and responsibilities governing planning and response by the DoD Components for military assistance to Federal, State, and local government (including government of U.S. territories) and their law enforcement agencies for civil disturbances and civil disturbance operations, including response to terrorist incidents, which hereafter are referred to cumulatively as 'Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.' "—Summary.
"This Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for providing military assistance to civil authorities. Supersedes reference Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 'Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,' December 12, 1995. Cancels reference Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 'Support of Civil authorities in airplane Hijacking Emergencies,' July 29, 1972 and AR 385-70/AFR 55-13/OPNAVINST 3710.18B, 'Unmanned Free Balloons and Kites, and Unmanned Rockets,' December 13, 1965."—Summary.
"Recognizing the need for an overarching emergency communications strategy to address these shortfalls, Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to develop the first National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 United States Code 101 et seq.), as amended, calls for the NECP to be developed in coordination with stakeholders from all levels of government and from the private sector.
In response, DHS worked with stakeholders from Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies to develop the NECP—a strategic plan that establishes a national vision for the future state of emergency communications."—Executive Summary.
"The plan that establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents." — FEMA website
"To conduct this work, we analyzed the text of the Post-Katrina Act and identified well over 300 discrete provisions within the legislation that call for DHS or FEMA action to implement requirements or exercise authorities—or to be prepared to do so under the appropriate conditions. We reviewed agency documents and discussed the act’s implementation with numerous senior-level program officials at FEMA and DHS to identify actions FEMA and DHS have taken in response to the act’s provisions. To determine the status of the Post-Katrina Act’s implementation, we compared the actions described in agency documents and reported by knowledgeable officials with the discrete provisions we had identified as requiring agency action to implement. We also identified areas to be addressed, where no or little action had been taken. In addition, when agency officials reported challenges to us in implementing a particular section, we included that information as well." — Scope, Methodology & Limitations
"Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides. EMAC's membership has increased from a handful of states in 1995 to 52 states and territories today, and EMAC members have used the compact to obtain support for several types of disasters including hurricanes, floods, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The volume and variety of resources states have requested under EMAC have also grown significantly. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, New York requested 26 support staff under EMAC to assist in emergency management operations; whereas, in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, approximately 66,000 personnel—about 46,500 National Guard and 19,500 civilian responders— were deployed under EMAC from a wide variety of specialties, most of whom went to areas directly impacted by the storms.
"While the EMAC network has developed a basic administrative capacity,opportunities exist for it to further build on and sustain these efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from experiences and developing a 5-year strategic plan. However, the EMAC network can enhance its administrative capacity by improving how it plans, measures, and reports on its performance. FEMA provided $2 million to help build this capacity in 2003, but the agreement has recently expired. FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a new 3-year cooperative agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the EMAC network's ability to support its collaborative efforts." —What the GAO found.
"The mass destruction and displacement of people caused by the hurricanes created new challenges, including an unprecedented demand for services from these five programs. The demand for food stamps and UI benefits, and the disaster assistance they provide, rose sharply. New evacuee policies were created to provide food stamps and TANF assistance to evacuees nationwide. In contrast, Social Security and SSI had a significant increase for replacement benefits, but did not have a large increase in new applications.
"Disaster plans, flexible service delivery options, and access to contingency funding facilitated response, but not all programs had these elements in place. The federally administered Social Security and SSI programs had service delivery disaster plans in place to meet demand. However, such strategies were sometimes lacking for the state-administered Food Stamp, UI, and TANF programs. Flexible service delivery options such as 800 numbers and Internet application services and debit cards for issuing benefits expedited services. Last, access to contingency funding was key to facilitating disaster response."—What GAO Found.
