+108th Congress, National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2004, P.L. 108-360 (PDF — 101KB)
Disasters & the Law
UC Berkeley School of Law
41 entriesexpand all
+109th Congress, Coast Guard Hurricane Relief Act of 2005, P.L. 109-141 (PDF — 38K)
+109th Congress, Flexibility for Displaced Workers Act (PDF — 49K)
+109th Congress, Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005
+109th Congress, Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
+109th Congress, TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005, P.L. 109-68 (PDF — 53K)
+109th Congress, Tsunami Warning and Education Act, P.L. 109-424 (PDF — 43K)
+Amy Liu, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Metropolitan Policy Program & Allison Plyer, Deputy Director, Greater New Orleans Nonprofit Knowledge Works, Brookings Institution and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, The New Orleans Index at Five (August 2010)
+Baumrucker, Evelyne, et al., Congressional Research Service (CRS), Hurricane Katrina: Medicaid Issues (PDF — 113K)
"This report, which will be updated as events warrant, discusses the following:
- Medicaid's rules on eligibility, benefits, and financing in the context of current questions and issues raised by Hurricane Katrina.
- Recent state actions in response to Medicaid issues raised by the hurricane.
- Federal Medicaid waiver authority, including information on current activity in this area and the New York Disaster Relief Medicaid waiver granted in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
- Current federal legislation related to Medicaid and Hurricane Katrina relief efforts."
+Bea, Keith, Coordinator, Specialist, American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), et al., Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33729) (November 15, 2006) (PDF — 237K)
+Bea, Keith, Specialist, American National Government, Government and Finance Division & Henry Hogue, Analyst, American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), FEMA Reorganization Legislation in the 109th Congress (September 1, 2006) (PDF — 189KB)
"Members of Congress have introduced legislation in both the House and Senate to alter federal emergency management organizational structures and responsibilities, amend authorities that guide federal action, impose emergency management leadership qualification requirements, and make other changes. The proposals are based upon investigations conducted on the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other entities in the response to Hurricane Katrina in the fall of 2005.
"Some observers reduce the matter to one basic question: 'Should FEMA remain within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or should the agency regain the independent status it had before the creation of DHS?' The issue, however, is more complex than just one of organizational placement."—Summary.
+Bourne, Marko, Director, Office of Policy & Program Analysis, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Hurricaine Katrina Multitier Contracts (June 2008) (OIG 08-81) (PDF — 603K)
"We initiated this audit in response to Congressional concerns that, in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, multitier subcontracting (1) increased costs to the government, (2) limited opportunities for small and local businesses to participate in response and recovery efforts, and (3) resulted in layers of subcontractors being paid profit and overhead while adding little or no value to the work performed under the contract. Our objectives were to determine the validity of these concerns, as well as to determine the potential effect Section 692 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 could have on future disaster contracting.
"It does not appear that multitier subcontracting, as an isolated factor, caused significant increases in costs to the government, nor did it reduce subcontracting opportunities for small and local businesses. The prime contractors subcontracted a significant amount of the value of their contracts to small and local businesses.
"Although FEMA relied on large national prime contractors, initially preventing small and local businesses from participating as prime contractors themselves, the national prime contractors generally did well hiring small and local subcontractors. However, because subcontractor invoices generally do not include specific information on lower tier subcontractors, we could not determine how many layers of subcontracting existed on contracts or whether any layers involved contractors charging profit without contributing substantially to the work being performed on the contract.
"Although Section 692 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 would limit subcontracting to 65% of total contract costs, nothing in this legislation specifically restricts the number of tiers of subcontractors. Further, by limiting subcontracting, Section 692 could restrict funding available to small and local businesses while potentially impairing FEMA's ability to respond quickly to future catastrophic disasters. The Department of Defense has promulgated less restrictive rules to control multitiering that reduce the risks inherent in Section 692. Therefore, we recommend FEMA officials work with DHS officials, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and Congress to promulgate less restrictive rules over multitier contracting." —Executive Summary.
+Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates (PDF — 1216K + 29)
+Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security, United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 and of Additional Changes Pursuant to sect. 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PDF — 4.47M)
+Chertoff, Michael, Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA/Preparedness Transition: Information for Employees (January 16-18, 2007) (PDF — 51K)
+The Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers, An Analysis of Catastrophic Risk Insurance Proposals (PDF — 461K)
"In reviewing various proposals to cover risk relating to natural or man-made catastrophes, the report focused on approaches to deal with natural disasters: H.R. 4366, the Homeowners' Insurance Protection Act of 2005; H.R. 846, the Homeowners' Insurance Availability Act of 2005 (HIAA); and tax deductible reserves.
"In addition, the authors looked at both the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) and the extension of TRIA that was passed in 2005. That law, which provides a federal backstop for the commercial insurance industry in the event of a terrorist attack, will expire at the end of 2007 unless it is extended again.
"The study presents arguments advanced by advocates and critics of each of the proposals and assesses each in terms of potential effectiveness, analyzing the options but not endorsing any of the potential approaches." —Press release.
+Crockett, Danielle, The Insurrection Act and Executive Power to Respond with Force to Natural Disasters (UC Berkeley School of Law, Law 224.9, Disasters & the Law, Spring 2007) (PDF — 172K)
"In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Congress amended the Insurrection Act of 1807. The Act enables the President to deploy the military 'to suppress, in any State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy.' The amended Act expands the language of the original Act to include natural disasters, epidemics, or other serious public health emergencies, terrorist attacks or incidents, or other conditions. Opponents of the amendment, most notably all fifty governors, criticize the amendment as a presidential power grab aimed at suppressing the power of the states and increasing the role of the military in domestic affairs.
This paper argues that the amendment to the Insurrection Act does not affect the President's existing powers to deploy the military domestically. Instead, this paper argues that the amendment merely clarifies the situations that justify the use of the military to respond to domestic disorder. An analysis of the historical use of the Act and the Act's language indicates that justification for presidential action prior to the amendment focused on the extent, rather than the source of the domestic disorder. The changes made in October of 2006 provide explicit examples of situations that may lead to events of public disorder justifying the President's invocation of the Act's authority. In addition, political and historical limitations, along with limitations in the Act itself, will restrict presidential abuse of the power. Thus, the uproar over the recent changes to the Insurrection Act and the fears of martial law are unfounded."—Abstract.
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FEMA Strategic Plan
+Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Incident Management System
+FEMA Law Associates, PLLC, Legal and Regulatory Support in Emergency Management and Homeland Security
+Henjum, Matt, The Clarksburg Old Sugar Mill Project: Proposed Residential Development in the Delta's Primary Zone (UC Berkeley School of Law, Law 224.9, Disasters & the Law, Spring 2007) (PDF — 100K)
"The vulnerability of California's Delta region to massive flooding stands as one of the state's most urgent policy issues. One of the state's few tools in place to curb urbanization in the Delta is the Delta Protection Act. Adopted in 1992, the Act created the Delta Protection Commission as the regulatory body charged with overseeing development in the Delta. Reflecting a spirit of political compromise, however, the Act limits the jurisdiction of the Commission to the Delta's primary zone while development in the secondary zone goes unregulated. The Delta Protection Commission was called into action for the first time in the fall of 2006 when the Yolo County Board of Supervisors approved a plan for residential development on land presumed to be within the primary zone. In February of 2007 the Commission voted to officially reject the development as a violation of the Delta Protection Act. The primary basis for the Commission's decision was that the Old Sugar Mill Project would 'expose the public to increased flood hazards.' The Commission's decision is, however, appealable in court, and, reflecting the Commission's grossly insufficient regulatory authority, it is uncertain whether the decision will withstand a legal challenge.
"Even if the Delta Protection Commission's decision is ultimately upheld in court, however, the Clarksburg situation demonstrates the irrationality, and unacceptability, of California's Delta land-use regulatory scheme. At present, developments that pose a clear risk to public safety and the long run health of both the Delta and state economy go unchallenged simply because certain land is designated as the secondary zone and, thus, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of local governments. In order to alleviate this untenable situation California must create a dominant regulatory body with the authority to strictly oversee land-use throughout the Delta region."—Abstract.
+Holt, Mark & Anthony Andrews, Specialists in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities (CRS Report for Congess, Order Code RL34331) (January 18, 2008) (PDF — 96K)
"The physical security of nuclear power plants and their vulnerability to deliberate acts of terrorism was elevated to a national security concern following the events of September 11, 2001.
"Title VI of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 regarding nuclear security amended the Atomic Energy Act with the addition of new provisions for security evaluations and rulemaking to revise the 'Design Basis Threat.' The act included provisions for fingerprinting and criminal background checks of security personnel, their use of firearms, and the unauthorized introduction of dangerous weapons. The designation of facilities subject to enforcement of penalties for sabotage expanded to include treatment and disposal facilities.
"As part of security response evaluations, the act requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct 'force-on-force' security exercises at nuclear power plants at least once every three years, and revise the 'design-basis threat' to consider a wider variety of potential attacks.
"The NRC has strengthened its regulations on nuclear power plant security, but critics contend that implementation by the industry has been too slow and that further measures are needed. Vulnerability to a deliberate aircraft crash remains an outstanding issue, as the latest NRC rulemaking addresses only newly designed plants. Shortcomings in the performance of security contractors has drawn the attention of Congress.
"This report will be updated as events warrant."—Summary.
+Kruger, Lennard G., Specialist in Science and Technology Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States Fire Administration: An Overview (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS20071) (Updated October 10, 2008) (PDF — 70.3K)
+Liu, Edward C., Legislative Attorney American Law Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Would an Influenza Pandemic Qualify as a Major Disaster Under the Stafford Act? (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL34724)(October 20, 2008) (PDF — 112K)
"This report provides a legal analysis of the eligibility of an influenza pandemic (flu pandemic) to be declared by the President as a major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. In 1997, the discovery of a virulent H5N1 strain of avian influenza (bird flu) raised the possibility of a flu pandemic occurring in the United States. In such an event, the Stafford Act could provide authority for federal assistance. Although it is widely agreed that emergency assistance under the Stafford Act could be provided by the President in the event of a flu pandemic, questions remain as to whether major disaster assistance would be available. An analysis of the Stafford Act suggests that this issue was not addressed by Congress when it drafted the current definition of a major disaster, and that neither inclusion nor exclusion of flu pandemics from major disaster assistance is explicitly required by the current statutory language.
"In the 109th Congress, ? 210 of S. 3721 would have made any outbreak of infectious disease explicitly eligible for major disaster assistance, but it was not enacted."—Summary.
+Mason, Byron, National Research Council, Law, Science & Disaster: Summary of the October 18, 2005 Workshop of the Disasters Roundtable (National Academies Press) (2006)
+Moss, Mitchell L. & Charles Shelhamer, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University (NYU), The Center for Catastrophe Preparedness & Response, The Stafford Act: Priorities for Reform (Cities, Communications and Catastrophe: Improving Robustness and Resiliency) (2007) (PDF — 440K)
"The Stafford Act establishes two incident levels—emergencies and major disasters. Emergencies tend to be smaller events where a limited federal role will suffice. Major disasters are larger events—but this can run the gamut from a blizzard in Buffalo to a major earthquake in southern California that affects millions. In other words, no distinction, and no special response, is provided in the Stafford Act following catastrophes such as major earthquakes and hurricanes. The Stafford Act should be amended to establish a response level for catastrophic events.
"The Stafford Act does not adequately recognize 21st century threats. For example, the definition of a major disaster does not cover chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks or accidents. The act should further be amended to encompass 21st century threats.
"This report does not focus on the performance of government agencies immediately following a disaster—these have been well documented by others. Rather, this report focuses on the federal role in the long-term recovery and rebuilding process following catastrophes, and what can be done to improve the effectiveness of the federal government in aiding these efforts."—Executive Summary.
+Moss, Mitchell; Charles Schellhamer; David A. Berman, The Stafford Act and Priorities for Reform Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Vol. 6 Issue 1 Article 13 (2009) (PDF — 268K)
+Platt, Rutherford H., Learning From Disasters: The Synergy of Law and Geography (Environmental Law Reporter, Volume 38, Issue 3, Page 10150) (March 2008) (PDF — 403K)
+Relyea, Harold C., Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), National Emergency Powers (PDF — 84K)
+Relyea, Harold C., Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Organizing for Homeland Security: The Homeland Security Council Reconsidered (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22840) (March 18, 2008) (PDF — 69K)
+Schwab, Anna K. & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Environmental Law Reporter, Volume 38, Issue 3, Page 10171) (March 2008) (PDF — 463K)
+Sobel, Russell S., Christopher J. Coyne, & Peter T. Leeson, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, The Political Economy of FEMA: Did Reorganization Matter? (January 25, 2008) (PDF — 328 K)
+United States Code, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
+United States Department of Defense, DOD Directive 3025.1: Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies within the United States (January 15, 1993) (PDF — 66K)
+United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (February 28, 2003)
+United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Treatment of Data Influenced by Exceptional Events (40 CFR Parts 50 and 51, Final Rule) Federal Register, v.72, no.55, pp. 13560-13581 (March 22, 2007)
+United States House of Representatives, H.R. , Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act (PDF — 115K)
+United States National Response Team (NRT), United States National Response Team (NRT)
"The U.S. National Response Team (NRT) is an organization of 16 Federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents. The Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) serve as Chair and Vice Chair respectively. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) and the Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR part 300) outline the role of the NRT and Regional Response Teams (RRTs). The response teams are also cited in various federal statutes, including Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) ??? Title III and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act [HMTA]."—Website.
Website includes section on applicable laws, regulations, and directives.
+United States Senate, S. 1766, Louisiana Katrina Reconstruction Act (PDF — 772K)