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The Line Item Veto Case and the Separation of Powers |
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Matthew Thomas Kline |
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| In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act because it upset the finely wrought law-making process provided for in the Constitution's Presentment Clause. This Comment argues that the Court reached the right result in Clinton, but for the wrong reason. The Act gave the President the power to cancel certain budgetary items, thus vesting more law- execution power in the executive. Properly understood, the Act did not expand or alter the President's limited law-making veto power, as it is defined in the Presentment Clause. This Comment argues that the Act's reshuffling of power did, however, violate the separation-of-powers principle--one of the core political tenets upon which our government of limited powers rests. This Comment further contends that the Court should not have relied upon even an expansive interpretation of the Presentment Clause to strike down the Act, because as case law and history teach, the clause is directed at curbing the expansion of Congress's power, not that of the President. Rather, the Court should have examined in their full light the fundamental separation-of-powers issues at play. After determining whether the shift in power presented the several indicia of a separation-of-powers violation, the Court should have struck down the Line Item Veto Act on explicit separation-of-powers grounds, thus vindicating the long-term liberty interest that the principle centrally serves to safeguard. | |
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Copyright
© 2000 by California Law Review, Inc. |
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