| Stipulated reversal is a procedure whereby
litigants, typically during the pendency of an
appeal and in order to facilitate settlement, ask
the appellate court to dispose of the case by
reversing the trial court's judgment rather than
dismissing the appeal. In Neary v. Regents of
University of California, the California
Supreme Court broadly endorsed this procedure by
holding that appeals courts should grant
stipulated reversal requests absent extraordinary
circumstances such as a compelling public
interest. Neary has been widely
criticized, particularly insofar as stipulated
reversal negates the issue preclusive effect of a
trial court judgment so reversed. Under current
collateral estoppel doctrine, a party found
liable, for example, for manufacturing a
defective product in an initial action is
precluded from contesting the issue of
defectiveness in later actions brought by
different plaintiffs. However, if the initial
action is reversed by stipulation, the first
judgment has no preclusive effect in later
actions. This Comment examines the relationship
between stipulated reversal under Neary
and the preclusive effects of judgments. The
author concludes that, notwithstanding the Neary
presumption in favor of stipulated reversal, a
judgment's collateral estoppel effects provide a
sufficiently compelling public interest to
support an appellate court's decision to deny a
request for stipulated reversal. In particular,
the author argues that preserving a judgment's
preclusive effects: 1) promotes judicial economy
by encouraging settlement and avoiding
repetitious litigation of identical issues; 2)
prevents inconsistent judgments which undermine
the integrity of the judicial system; and 3)
avoids the appearance of manipulation of the
judicial system by wealthy litigants, who can use
stipulated reversal to "purchase"
additional chances to relitigate issues already
decided against them.
|