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Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII |
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Tristin K. Green |
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| Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to combat racism in America. The Act has since served as an important tool in fighting discrimination in the workforce. In particular, Title VII of the Act provides that a person's protected group status must be irrelevant to employment decisions. Title VII's effectiveness has been diluted, however, by confusion surrounding the overarching framework and methods of proof available to a plaintiff who relies on circumstantial evidence to prove his case. Because discrimination today is rarely overt, a coherent framework for identifying discrimination in its more subtle forms through circumstantial evidence is essential if Title VII is to retain its force. This Comment proposes such a framework. It argues that the McDonnell Douglas framework, created by the Supreme Court in 1973 to aid in adjudicating individual disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence, encompasses two already-recognized methods of proof as alternate methods through which the plaintiff can establish an inference of discrimination. In doing so, it sets out a novel interpretation of the relationship between the existing framework and methods of proof, and provides renewed strength to an oft-used but poorly understood doctrine. | |
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Copyright
© 1999 by California Law Review, Inc. |
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