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Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Disparate Restrictions on Attorney's Fees |
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| Plaintiffs who prevail in certain civil rights actions, including those brought against state and local officials, can recover their "reasonable" attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. за1988. In calculating the fee award, courts typically apply the prevailing market rate for the attorney's services, multiplying that rate times the number of hours the attorney "reasonably expended" on the case. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), enacted in 1996, substantially reduced the attorney's fees that prisoners can recover under за1988 in lawsuits brought to vindicate their constitutional or other civil rights. The PLRA places a cap, currently $112.50, on the hourly rate at which attorneys representing prisoners can be reimbursed through the fee award. In addition, the PLRA limits the fee award in cases in which a prisoner recovered monetary relief to 150% of the monetary judgment. This latter limitation will, in particular, result in minuscule fee awards in many civil rights cases brought by prisoners. The differential treatment of prisoners under за1988 tests the boundaries of equal protection. Four governmental interests, extrapolated from the PLRA's legislative history, might be invoked to defend the fee restrictions' constitutionality. This Article examines the interests purportedly undergirding the restrictions, concluding that the interests are either not legitimate or, in any event, do not support the distinction drawn between prisoners who bring meritorious civil rights claims and nonprisoners who bring such claims. If the question of the constitutionality of these restrictions were to come before the Supreme Court, the Court's decision would reveal whether the rational basis test is, in truth, "toothless," despite the Court's protestations to the contrary. | |
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Copyright
© 1997 by California Law Review, Inc. |
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