|
This Article offers a retrospective on the Rehnquist Court.
It argues that the Rehnquist Court has been pursuing a coherent
jurisprudence that invigorates decentralization and the private
ordering of social norms that Alexis De Tocqueville celebrated
in Democracy in America as being the essence of the social
order generated by our original Constitution. In four disparate
areas—federalism, freedom of association, the religion clauses,
and the balance of power between juries and judges—the Court
is helping sustain a civil order that bubbles up from state
governments or from citizens voluntarily gathered together or
randomly selected.
The Article is the first to seek to do for the Rehnquist Court
what John Hart Ely did for the Warren Court in Democracy and
Distrust—ground the full range of its jurisprudence in a coherent
theory of governance. Ely saw the Warren Court as an attempt
to constitute a functioning majoritarian democracy and improve
its outputs. But in our era political theories, such as public
choice, have shown that the disproportionate influence of special
interest groups and the inattention of the general citizenry
can prevent centralized democracy from measuring majority will
and producing good social norms. In contrast, the kind of decentralized
civic order described by Tocqueville engages the citizen and
restrains special interests through competition, whether the
competition is among different states or among different associations.
The Rehnquist Court jurisprudence is designed to sustain this
more decentralized system of order by protecting the autonomy
of decentralized “discovery machines” for social norms, like
mediating institutions and state government, from the encroachments
of more centralized power.
|