* Candidate for J.D. 1990, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1983, University of Washington. This comment received second prize in the 1989 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.

1 In 1966, the President's Commission on the Patent System recommended that computer programs per se be excluded from patent protection. This recommendation was based in part on the Patent Office's inability to deal with the administrative burden of examining such claims. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 14 (1966). See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

2 Maier, Software Protection--Integrating Patent, Copyright and Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 151, 157 (1987). Although the Patent Office does not track software-related patents as a separate category, attorneys and industry executives claim that top U.S. companies have doubled, and even quadrupled, the number of applications they file. Bulkeley, Will Software Patents Cramp Creativity?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989, at B1, col. 5. IBM alone files approximately 200 software-related patents each year. Id.

3 Bulkeley, supra note 2, at B1, col. 3. Patents are also used for defensive purposes. "We use patents principally as trading material for our own freedom of action in the marketplace." Id. at B1, col. 5 (statement of Roger S. Smith, IBM's director of intellectual property law). See also Fisher, Software Industry in Uproar over Recent Rush of Patents, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, at 1, col. 5.

4 Section I, infra, defines and describes this subject matter in greater detail. Briefly, the look and feel of computer software audiovisual displays refers to "the sequence of the screens and the choices presented, the layout of the screens, and the method of feedback to the user ...." Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1986).

5 See, e.g., the following patents which, if litigated, are likely to involve issues of computer software look and feel: U.S. Patent No. 4,823,108 issued Apr. 18, 1989 to Gary W. Pope and assigned to Quarterdeck Office Systems, for an "improved display system and memory architecture and method for displaying images in windows on a video display"; U.S. Patent No. Re. 32,632, issued Mar. 29, 1988 to William D. Atkinson and assigned to Apple Computer, Inc., for a "display system" composed of pull-down menus used in conjunction with the Apple mouse; U.S. Patent No. 4,646,250 issued Feb. 24, 1987 to John F. Childress and assigned to IBM, for a "data entry screen for an interactive data entry system" that provides a means of identifying to the user fields where data may be entered and fields where data must be entered; U.S. Patent No. 4,486,857 issued Dec. 4, 1984 to Paul C. Heckel and assigned to Quickview Partners, for a "display system for the suppression and regeneration of characters in a series of fields in a stored record."

6 Beutel, Trade Dress Protection for the "Look and Feel" of Software: A New Source of Proprietary Rights Protection for the Software Industry?, 5 COMPUTER LAWYER, Oct. 1988, at 2.

7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The Lanham Act codifies U.S. trademark law.

8 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).

9 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982 and Supp. V 1987).

10 Computer programs are usually seen as a set of statements or instructions. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). But courts and agencies must routinely distinguish specific manifestations of programs from programs per se. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980) (algorithms contained in program instructions); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (the look and feel of computer software audiovisual displays); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (data input formats); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 23 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] (data bases, e.g. encyclopedias or dictionaries, stored in magnetic form and accessed by a computer program); 53 Fed. Reg. 38,110 (1988) (policy decision on copyrightability of digitized typefaces stored in computer programs).

11 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (total concept and feel of television shows and commercials); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (total concept and feel of greeting cards).

12 Written programming instructions (or "source code") was the subject of Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), and is outside the scope of this comment.

13 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 465 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127.

14 Other elements of the computer system, such as the keyboard, central processing unit, memory storage devices, video display, printers, etc., may be involved in the process of achieving the desired result. To the extent that they interact with the user directly, they are part of the user interface (e.g., pressing keys on the keyboard to issue a command).

15 For examples of dynamic aspects of a user interface, see infra Appendix, Figures ____, _____, and accompanying text.

16 LaPlant, Mac `Look and Feel' Legal Issues Remain Unclear, InfoWorld, Jan. 5, 1987, at 23.

17 Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. at 1137.

18 J. Koltnow, Who Can Use the Macintosh Interface?, OUTSIDE APPLE, Oct. 1986 (emphasis added) (a newsletter published by Apple Computer, Inc., for outside developers).

19 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).

20 Id.

21 O'Connor, Software Firms Fear Patents May Stifle Innovation, San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 6, 1989, at 1A, col. 5.

22 CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, at 38.

23 See O'Connor, Don't Expect Japan's Start to Rise on the Software Industry Horizon, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 12, 1989, at 1F, col. 1. "For all their efforts elsewhere, the Japanese have yet to unravel the enigmatic software business, and it doesn't appear likely they will anytime soon." Id. (assessment of Heidi Roizen, president of the Software Publishers Association). "The Japanese, Roizen maintains, don't grasp many aspects of this process and fail to deliver in key respects, such as user interfaces." Id. at 1F, col. 3.

24 Beutel, supra note 6, at 2 ("So called 'Human Factors Engineering' has become a critical and increasingly expensive aspect of new software development"); see also Ranney, 'Look and Feel' Discussed as Major Copyright Issue, InfoWorld, Nov. 11, 1985, at 13.

25 See Bonner, User Interface Wars: The Next Wave, PC COMPUTING, Nov. 1988, at 74 ("By all accounts, standardized graphics-based operating environments will rule the computer marketplace by the early 1990's").

26 Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.), rev'd, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).

27 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). Unlike the Patent and Copyright Acts, constitutional authority for the Lanham Act comes from the Commerce Clause. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91 (1879). The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "To regulate Commerce ... among the several States ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

28 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The section prohibits:

[U]se in connection with any goods or services, ... [of] a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, ....

Id. The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 amended Section 43(a), effective November 16, 1989, to clarify that false statements about another person's product are actionable. See S. REP. NO. 100-515, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5603.

29 Beutel, supra note 6, at 2.

But [Section 43(a)] should be construed to include only such false descriptions or representations as are of substantially the same economic nature as those which involve infringement or other improper use of trademarks.

Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). See also Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).

30 Trade dress traditionally has been defined as the "packaging, size, shape, color, design, or name which has been affixed to goods or services." Beutel, supra note 6, at 3. See also Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 688 n.70 (1984). In recent years courts have extended trade dress protection to, among other things, imitation of the features of a product where those features are "nonfunctional." Id. at 688 n.71.

31 See Bauer, supra note 30, at 681.

32 Beutel, supra note 6, at 3.

33 A plaintiff might not be required to establish secondary meaning if the trade dress of their product is "inherently distinctive." See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). Accord AmBrit Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Blau Plumbing, Inc., v. S.O.S. Fix-it Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986).

34 See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Beutel, supra note 6, at 3.

35 Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1981). Moreover, Professor McCarthy described secondary meaning this way:

Take as an example, a descriptive word like BEST for milk. ... [The] descriptive connotation [i.e., "highest quality"] is the "primary meaning" of the word "best." Extensive advertising and sales, over a period of time, by the seller of BEST milk may give the word "best" a new and different meaning to milk buyers. ... That is, BEST serves as a commercial symbol identifying the milk of one source and serving to distinguish that milk from milk sold by all other dairies. ... This new, trademark function of the descriptive word "best" is called the "secondary meaning" of "best" ....

1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 15:2 (2d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).

36 See, e.g., Stewart v. Hudson, 222 F. 584 (E.D. Pa. 1915).

[B]ecause of the rapid development of the automobile business itself, it has produced such an alertness of mind toward everything connected with it, and a readiness and willingness to accept and adopt novelties, that there is the same relative difference in the speed with which the reputation of builders and others may be acquired and lost, and good wills grow up and decline.

Id. at 586.

37 Beutel, supra note 6, at 4.

38 This trend is away from this characteristic, however, even in the IBM PC market. See Bonner, User Interface Wars: The Next Wave, PC COMPUTING, Nov. 1988, at 72.

39 For an illustration and a description of 1-2-3, see infra Appendix, Figure 3, and accompanying text.

40 Over time, however, other developers appropriated the interface for various products. The subsequent failure of Lotus to prevent these appropriations could leave it vulnerable on two counts. First, the existence of non-Lotus products using the interface weakens the identification consumers make with respect to Lotus as the sole developer of products with the Lotus interface. Second, inaction by Lotus may subject it to a defense of laches.

41 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984) (Lindy Pen 1) (quoting Alpha Industries, 616 F.2d at 443) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985)).

42 Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1221 (8th Cir. 1976). However, it may be relevant evidence to support a finding of secondary meaning, i.e., deliberate copying of trade dress suggests that it has secondary meaning, which is why it was copied. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d at 844.

43 Compare Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (different names of restaurants was not enough to obviate potential confusion) with Digital Equip. Corp. v. C. Itoh and Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 598 (D.N.J. 1985) (brand labelling sufficient to avoid confusion, in light of sophistication of end users, sales methods employed, and high costs of goods).

44 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 8:2 (2d ed. 1984).

45 Beutel, supra note 6, at 4.

46 Perhaps "vicarious" exposure might result, when the person on whom the buyer relies for a recommendation has been exposed to the product's look and feel in some way.

47 For example, exposure may take the form of a product demonstration before purchase, or "screen shots" in brochures, advertising, or press reviews of the product.

48 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring).

49 See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A 1961); Truck Equipment Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1219-20 n.12 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Bauer, supra note 30, at 688 n.71.

A monopoly exists when there is only one seller. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 37 (1988). "Market" monopoly must be distinguished from what might be called a "product" monopoly. Statutory protection under the Lanham, Copyright, and Patent Acts secures certain exclusive rights in a product to producers, authors, and inventors. They are protected as the sole source of the product, and therefore have a monopoly on the product. Where barriers, such as legal protection, make it impossible for competing firms to enter the market with the same type of product, the producer, author, or inventor has a market monopoly, i.e., the supplier and the industry are the same. See id. at 38.

50 Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982).

51 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987)

52 Id.

53 See supra Section I.A.

54 For an illustration and description of pull-down menus, see infra Appendix, Figure ___, and accompanying text.

55 Examples of programs that have no menus include operating systems such as MS-DOS and UNIX, some programming languages such as BASIC on the IBM PC, and entertainment programs such as "text adventures." The IBM PC version of WordPerfect, a popular word processor, displays no main menu, although submenus appear after initial commands are selected.

56 Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1987).

57 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J., concurring).

58 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1337.

59 See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844 (1981) (arbitrary colors, chosen for capsules containing a drug, came to be used by resellers and consumers to distinguish dosages of the drug). In Inwood Laboratories, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that the feature was functional, and now that the patent for the drug had expired manufacturers of generic products could produce the drug and had a "legitimate reason" for using the same colors. Id. at 858 n.20. It seems unlikely, however, that the result would be the same if the plaintiff's drug had just been released with arbitrary colors, before the market had come to rely on the color markings as a way to distinguish dosages.

60 See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1963) ("[T]o grant ... a legally protected monopoly offends the constitutional plan of a competitive economy free from patent monopolies except where there are patentable `Discoveries.'") (Black, J., dissenting); Sicilia Di Ri Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984) (ultimate inquiry in functionality analysis is whether protecting a feature will hinder competition), reh'g denied, 736 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1984)); In re Morton-Norwich Prods. 671 F.2d at 1341 ("the effect upon competition `is really the crux of the matter'"); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d at 1218 ("The question in each case is whether protection against imitation will hinder the competitor in competition"); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) ("Under such circumstances, since effective competition may be undertaken without imitation, the law grants protection"); Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky .73, 102, 4 Ky. L. Rptr. 759, 776 (1883) ("Care should be taken not to interfere with the freedom of trade, or to foster monopolies ...").

61 See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 49, at 144-45. The ability to identify a product's producer reduces a consumer's search cost. Moreover, it is probably the case that a generic item is of lower quality than a brand name item. For example, the average quality of various consumer goods fell in the Soviet Union after the abolition of marks identifying the producing plant. Id. at 144.

On the other hand, some economists say that resources devoted to product differentiation amount to a social waste, obscuring what are otherwise identical products. Id. at 145.

62 In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1340; Vaughn Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Green Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).

63 See supra note 49, and accompanying text.

64 See supra Section I.B., for a discussion of the benefits of a standard user interface. For these reasons consumers are likely to shun non-standard products.

65 For instance, it may be costly for users to invest the money and time to learn a new user interface. Where a product has enjoyed a very large market share, and where retraining costs are sufficiently high, the market may be unwilling to accept competitive products unless they offer a similar user interface. If protection is granted here, the vendor is given a de facto monopoly.

Such a result is, however, inappropriate under trademark law. No returns above those from producer identification should result from trademark protection. See Burgunder & Heckman, An Emerging Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 229, 230 (1987).

66 See CONTU REPORT, supra note 10, Appendix H, at H-3 (studies commissioned by CONTU recommended a duration of copyright protection from two to 14 years).

67 Id. at 44-45.

68 See Bonner, supra note 25, at 74.

69 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The enabling constitutional grant of authority comes from the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause contains a grant of authority as well as limitations on that power. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1965).

70 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1988).

71 See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).

72 See Data E. USA, Inc. v. EPYX, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. *Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).

73 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).

74 This follows from Professor Nimmer's conclusion that ideas in written form are a writing within the meaning of the Constitution. See infra note 76. Even if look and feel involves a synergism of displays, or a "gestalt," it is nonetheless embodied within an audiovisual work.

75 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). This section was intended to codify, unchanged, the common law idea expression dichotomy as a limit on copyrightable subject matter. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5670 [hereinafter H.R. REP.].

76 This limitation on copyrightable subject matter is an issue of statutory application. Professor Nimmer maintains this is not a requirement of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution:

[T]here seem to be no valid constitutional grounds for denying to an idea the status of a writing. ... Within this frame of reference it seems axiomatic, hardly requiring argument or authority, to conclude that an idea in written form is a writing.

1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[D] (1988).

77 See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.); see also Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 126 (1980); Comment, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.: "Look and Feel" Copyright Protection for the Display Screens of an Application Microcomputer Program, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 105, 108 (1987).

78 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).

79 See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1988).

80 Peter Pan Fabrics Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d at 489 (emphasis added).

81 "O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, How can we know the dancer from the dance?" W. B. YEATS, Among School Children, in W.B. YEATS: THE POEMS 217 (Finneran ed. 1983).

82 Whether particular ideas and expressions have merged has been called a "somewhat metaphysical issue." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).

83 A similar proposal advocates the adoption by copyright law of trademark's doctrine of genericism in the context of computer software. See Burgunder & Heckman, An Emerging Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 229 (1988). Proving "genericism" would require a more rigorous showing of anticompetitive effect than would "de jure functionality" or its counterpart, "de jure idea" as discussed here.

84 Conventional economics theory holds that where it is costly to prevent non-paying beneficiaries from consuming a commodity, the private market may provide sub-optimal amounts of the public good. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 49, at 113. However, "the standard theory ignores the possibility that there may be alternative, less direct means" for rewarding innovation. Id. at 114. In the case of software look and feel, developers may be sufficiently motivated to innovate where their main interest is selling a software program, or computer, rather than a user interface per se. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 344-345 (1970).

85 See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1986); Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 458 (N.D. Ga. 1987). To the extent that there are other purposes of copyright law this proposal is not inconsistent. Other purposes are "to promote learning, culture and development." Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d at 1235.

The purpose is to grant enough, but not too much, protection such that, in the long term, optimal amounts of "ideas" are produced and available for public use. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 49, at 135.

A copyright law, ... may represent one way of resolving the conflict between the need for book revenues high enough to secure adequate production and book prices low enough not to interfere with widespread dissemination of what is written.

Breyer, supra note 84, at 282.

86 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 971, 975 (1989) (O'Connor, J.).

87 Evaluating the effects on competition should be more familiar territory for courts than deciding whether a window "exploding" from an icon in a computer display is an idea or the expression of one. (For an illustration of this phenomenon, see infra Appendix, Figure 4, and accompanying text.)

88 While decisions would continue to be ad hoc, they would involve judicial inquiry into competition, not metaphysics, and consequently litigants should be better able to predict trial outcomes.

Predictability may be all there is to the law. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." O.W. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).

Further, predictability of protection will itself promote free trade.

One well-confirmed result in the literature on bargaining is that bargainers are more likely to cooperate when their rights are clear, and less likely to agree when their rights are ambiguous.

R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 49, at 100 (footnote omitted).

89 This approach is appropriate in a dispute between competing software developers in a single computer market, such as that of the Macintosh. A more difficult question arises in a case where, for example, a company such as Apple Computer claims software developers for other computers infringe the copyrights Apple holds in software products it developed for its computers. Enforcing Apple's copyright claims will not unduly hinder competition in the market for Apple's software products (since the alleged infringers have developed products for other computers). However, since Apple is asserting its rights beyond the Macintosh market, it is appropriate to analyze the competitive effects of protection on all markets in which Apple asserts its claims. (That greater market sphere of "microcomputers," however, cannot be characterized at this time as having adopted a standard user interface; where such alternative means of producing competitive user interfaces exists, protection for Apple's copyrights is less likely to unduly burden competition.)

90 For an illustration and description of the type of disk icons discussed here, see infra Appendix, Figure 4, and accompanying text.

91 For an illustration and description of a tool icon, see infra Appendix, Figure 5, and accompanying text.

92 At this point it is worthwhile to distinguish the analysis of this proposal from a traditional inquiry of whether idea and expression have merged. Merger denies protection to an expression whenever there is only one way, or very few ways, to express an idea. This comment proposes an analysis that would deny protection when, for any reason, such protection would unduly hinder competition. There may be de facto ideas capable of expression in myriad ways, only one of which is palatable to the market. Similarly, there may be a de facto idea that can be expressed in only one way, but because of the availability of substitutes or for other reasons is protectable because such protection will not unduly hinder competition in a generally defined market.

This "icon" example demonstrates how a competition-oriented analysis produces results that are consistent with precedent, yet avoid the problems of metaphysical analysis.

93 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).

94 While Jefferson was active in establishing the patent system after the adoption of the Constitution, authorship of the empowering constitutional provision has been attributed to James Madison and Charles C. Pinckney. See Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 445 (1930).

95 Annotation, Patentable Subject Matter, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1197, 1200 (1980).

96 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).

97 Annotation, supra note 95, at 1202.

98 Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS & LAW 1, 7 (1977).

99 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1977) ("The plain language of Section 101 does not answer the question").

100 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (5th ed. rev. 9, Sept. 1988).

An "apparatus" claim will be analyzed as a process claim unless it can be demonstrated the apparatus claim is drawn to a specific machine, distinguishable from other machines capable of performing the identical functions. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see also In re Walter 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). For the purposes of this paper, only the general process claim analysis will be discussed, recognizing a slightly different analysis might apply where a claim is drawn to a specific apparatus.

101 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982).

102 WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1434 (2d ed. 1983).

103 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Part of this process is illustrated and described in the Appendix; see infra Appendix, Figures 1-A and 1-B.

104 In re Johnson, 200 U.S.P.Q. 199, 210-11 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See also PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 100.

105 The look and feel-related patents that have been issued are evidence that the Patent Office considers such processes proper subject matter for utility patents. See supra note 5.

106 In particular factual situations, other doctrines of exclusion might be implicated, such as those pertaining to abstract ideas or methods of doing business.

107 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (process for curing rubber which includes in several steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer).

108 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

109 The Court has used the term "algorithm" in the sense of a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem ...." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).

110 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245; see also White & Redano, Patent Opportunities for Software-Related Subject Matter, 4 COMPUTER LAWYER, July 1987, at 13.

The second step of the Freeman test has been modified by In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982) and In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).

111 See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986), where defendant copied plaintiff's audiovisual look and feel without, for all intents and purposes, access to plaintiff's source code; defendant "reverse engineered" the program.

112 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 100.

113 See In re Hansen, 154 F.2d 684, 686 (C.C.P.A. 1946); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934). See also In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969).

114 In re Hansen, 154 F.2d at 686.

In early decisions, it appears that most attempts to patent printed matter involved arrangements of information designed to implement a business system; consequently the development of the printed matter exclusion was closely related to the doctrine excluding methods of doing business from patentable subject matter. See Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 965 (1986).

115 In re Hansen, 154 F.2d at 685.

116 In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

117 154 F.2d at 685.

118 Two commentators, after discussing In re Gulack, declared: "This holding could be characterized as an affirmance of the potential patentability of `look and feel' presentations of data." White & Redano, supra note 110, at 20 (1987).

119 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS, § 1.03[6] (1988); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).

120 See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). Professor Chisum maintains that this language in Cochrane was dictum, and when taken in context was intended as an inclusive description, not a preclusive description (i.e., processes that operate in such a way are patentable, but are not the only processes that may be patented). See Chisum, supra note 114, at 967 n.30.

121 In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951). In discussing this case, Professor Chisum cautions that "[o]ne must naturally be leery of a proposition which a court can justify only by reference to its self-evident truth." Chisum, supra note 114, at 968 n.35.

122 See Bender, Computer Programs: Should They be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 255-56 (1968).

123 For example, this objection was avoided in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980), where software and computers were used in conjunction with other steps and devices to cure rubber. A process manifest in the audiovisual displays of a computer software program, however, is not likely to reduce physical matter to a different state or thing. But see infra note 124, and accompanying text.

124 One might argue this example goes too far and would make such things as television shows patentable. Television shows as such, however, are not fairly called processes, and therefore do not come within the broad language of 35 U.S.C. § 101. On the other hand, a user interface implemented through audiovisual displays is fairly called a process.

125 In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).

126 See Chisum, supra note 114, at 967-92; von Spakovsky, von Spakovsky & Graffeo, The Limited Patenting of Computer Programs: A Proposed Statutory Approach, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 27, 31 (1985-1986).

127 See Chisum, supra note 114, at 969 (citing In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).

128 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).

129 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893. The court in Musgrave noted that steps involving the exercise of subjective judgment without restriction might violate the definiteness of disclosure requirements in 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id.

130 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 889-90.

131 409 U.S. 63 (1972).

13132 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).

13233 Chisum, supra note 114, at 981.

13334 Id.

13435 See supra note 132, and accompanying text.

13536 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).

13637 Id. at 588 n.9 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)).

13738 Id.

13839 450 U.S. 175 (1981).

13940 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.

14041 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948))).

14142 Professor Chisum notes that "a process consisting partially or wholly of `mental steps' does not exist in nature and can be quite specific"; consequently there was no basis for the Court in Benson to lump mental steps with phenomena of nature or abstract concepts. See Chisum, supra note 114, at 981.

14243 See In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (a means of allowing a computer to process commands in any order received, rather than sequentially); In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (a seismic prospecting method); In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (a means of translating between natural languages, e.g., from Russian to English); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (a process of typesetting using concatenation points to position characters); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (a time sharing method for operating computer programs simultaneously); Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (a methodology to effectuate a highly efficient business system).

14344 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889-90 (1970). See also supra note 129, and accompanying text.

14445 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).

14546 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).

14647 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).

14748 Act of August 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 544.

14849 See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982).

149 See Powers Control Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS §1.04[2][d] (1988).

15051 Kluth & Lundberg, Design Patents: A New Form of Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER LAWYER 1 (Aug. 1988).

15152 It appears that the Patent and Trademark Office has since reversed its opinion, and currently maintains that computer software video displays are not within the statutory subject matter of design patents. Statement of Gerard Goldberg, Group Director, Group 230, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at Prentice-Hall Conference on Patent Protection for Computer Software: The New Safeguard, in San Francisco, Cal. (September 25, 1989).

15253 See Kluth & Lundberg, supra note 151, at 1.

15354 In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1967).

15455 See Kluth & Lundberg, supra note 151, at 3.

15556 Powers Control Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

15657 D. CHISUM, supra note 150.

15758 Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1933) (invalidating a design patent covering a combination ash receiver and electric lighter for use in automobiles).

15859 D. CHISUM, supra note 150.

It is unclear whether this concern for protecting the scope of utility patent protection extends to the Copyright Act or the Lanham Act.

A strong argument may be made that the statutory scope of protectable subject matter is mutually exclusive in the case of utility patents and copyrights. The Constitution expressly distinguishes between science, authors, and writings on the one hand, and useful arts, inventors, and discoveries on the other. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Further, the codification of the idea expression dichotomy expressly excludes from copyright protection any "process" or "discovery," mirroring the Patent Act and its constitutional grant of power. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).

Nonetheless, courts have often held that patent, copyright, and trademark laws stem from different concepts, offer different kinds of protection, and are not mutually exclusive. See In re Penthouse Int'l, 565 F.2d 679, 683, n. 3 (C.C.P.A. 1977). See also 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:1 (2d ed. 1984).

The Lanham Act, on the other hand, was enacted under a broader authority: the Commerce Clause. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91 (1879). Decisions regarding trademark law's doctrine of functionality do not reflect a deference to the Patent Act; rather they are concerned with the effect of protection on competition. See supra Section II.C. Consequently, a process which was also a product feature could conceivably qualify for both trade dress and utility patent protection.

15960 See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("The ... designer of any program that performed the same functions as `Print Shop' had available a wide range of expression governed predominantly by artistic ... considerations"); see also infra Appendix, Figures 1-A and 1-B (illustrations of "Print Shop").

16061 Presentation by Cathy Hemingway, Ph.D., at the West Coast Computer Fair, in San Francisco, Cal. (March 17, 1989) (Dr. Hemingway is Vice President of Sobell Associates and a user interface consultant to Sun Microsystems).

16162 Compare the requirement here of "nonfunctional" to that of trademark law ("nonfunctional"), see supra Section II.C., and that of copyright law ("expression, not idea"), see supra Section III.A.

16263 See supra notes 49 and 85, and accompanying text.

16364 Although design patents are subject to the additional tests of novelty, nonobviousness, etc., these tests are applied to the subject matter of the design patent (the ornamentation). Where, as a practical matter, protection of ornamentation also results in protection of subject matter within the scope of utility patents, a utility patent-in-effect is obtained, while only the ornamentation, not the machine or process, has been evaluated for novelty, nonobviousness, and so on.

16465 For the source of this distinction, see the discussion of the doctrine of functionality in trademark law, see supra Section II.C., and accompanying text. For a similar proposal made by this paper in the context of copyright's idea expression analysis, see supra Section III.B.

16566 See Parker & Flynn, Apple Microsoft Suit Ruling Fails to Clear Contract Issue, InfoWorld, Mar. 27, 1989, at 93, col. 5.

16667 User interfaces that predate the subject of Xerox's design patents would normally have no reason to fear the patents' validity. Such interfaces would be part of the prior art, and Xerox's work must be sufficiently novel and nonobvious in light of such prior art.

16768 See the discussion on this issue supra, Section IV.A.