1 Digital information is data in the form of pieces, i.e., bits of digits. G. MCWHORTER, UNDERSTANDING DIGITAL ELECTRONICS, 244 (1984).

2 Electronic analog information is information represented by a variable property of electricity, such as voltage, current, amplitude of waves or pulses, or frequency of waves or pulses. See id.

1 Howe, The Composer and Computer Music, in THE LIBERATION OF SOUND 276 (H. Russcol, ed. 1972).

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 See, G. VELTON, THE ROCK SYNTHESIZER MANUAL 109 (1986).

5 Franckling, Digital Technology is Changing the Scope of Music, UPI, June 6, 1986. See also, G. VELTON, supra note 6, at ___; Howe, supra note 3; M.V. MATHEWS, TECHNOLOGY OF COMPUTER MUSIC 2-4 (1969); H. CHAMBERLIN, MUSICAL APPLICATIONS OF MICROPROCESSORS 106-8 (1980); W. BUXTON AND G. FEDORKOW, THE STRUCTURED SOUND SYNTHESIS PROJECT ___ (1981).

Every sound has a frequency (rate of vibration) and an amplitude (intensity of vibration). The frequency of sound is measured in cycles per second, called Hertz (abbreviated Hz). One cycle per second is 1 Hz, and a thousand cycles per second is one kiloHertz (1 kHz). A sound's frequency determines its pitch. Pitch is expressed as musical notes (A, A#, etc.). As an example, if you play an A above middle C on a piano, the strings vibrate back and forth 440 times a second (440 Hz). If you play the same sound into a microphone, it produces an electrical current that alternates every 1440th of a second and would produce a 440 Hz reading on a digital frequency counter.

Each cycle has a constantly changing amplitude and timbre. Timbre is determined by the shape of each wave, called the waveform. A waveform is basically a graphic representation of the variations in amplitude over the time it takes to complete one cycle.

Each note is actually a complex combination of simple waves, each different in frequency and amplitude. The simplest waveform is the sine wave. Digital synthesizers allow the musician to create more complex waveforms by combining various sine waves.

The amplitude of the sound will determine how high a signal the digital representation should be capable of measuring, and the frequency response will determine how many time intervals one second of sound will be broken into. Since the representation of one sound or vibration requires at least these two impulses, to digitally encode a tone of 15,000 cycles per second (most people cannot hear a tone above 15 kHz) would require 30,000 discrete values or samples per second. Understandably, it takes a rather powerful computer with a fast CPU board to achieve this high packing density without distortion. The data rate for any degree of high fidelity must approach the order of microseconds.

6 Mitchell, Digital Revolution Comes to HiFi, HIGH TECH., Jan. 1982, at 70.

7 See, Powell, The Challenge of Music Software, BYTE, Jun. 1986, at 145.

8 Id.

9 Mitchell, supra note 8, at 70 (the advantages of digital recording over FM and analog methods).

10 G. VELTON, supra note 6, at 16.

11{N12}} Id. at 9.

13 Id. at 16, 102. See, Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at C23, col. 4. When first introduced the Fairlight cost $30,000; today the same level of sampling technology costs only about $1,500.

14 Pareles, supra note 15. The Synclavier is available today in 8- to 128-voice versions with a 32-track sequencer and a computer stored separately from the instrument itself. Sounds are stored on floppy disks or on optional hard disk drives. It has an impressive 100 kHz sampling rate (the frequency at which a sampled waveform is quantized). The Synclavier, which can cost as much as $300,000, is used by musicians such as Stevie Wonder and Frank Zappa.

15 Id.

16 The Casio SK-1 sells for under $70 list price. The more serious model, Casio FZ1, priced at $1800, will store up to 64 sounds on a built-in 3 12-inch floppy disk and play them back over five octaves on a full scale keyboard. Sound segments up to 14 seconds long can be captured and the signals are sent back out in MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) standard. MIDI is a hardware standard which lets synthesizers share information with other instruments regardless of the manufacturer.

17 The musician could also discover the sound he wants on someone else's CD, or the sound could be taken from a prior recording, or from a sample given to him by a friend.

18 A relatively sophisticated sampler's memory would be filled in a matter of seconds as digital sound is cut up into about 41,000 separate "numerical samples" each second. Digital Technology is Changing the Scope of Music, INFOWORLD, Apr. 30, 1984, at 32.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is It Theft?, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1.

22 Pareles, supra note 15.

23 Miller, High-Tech Alteration of Sights and Sounds Divides the Arts World, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1.

24 Pareles, supra note 15.

25 See supra notes 19-22, and accompanying text.

26 Dupler, supra note 23, at 74; Pareles, supra note 15.

27 Pareles, supra note 15.

28 Id.

29 Id.; Dupler, supra note 23, at 1; see also Miller, supra note 25, at 25, col. 2.

30 See Drake, Digital Sampling: Looming Copyright Problems, BC Cycle (UPI), May 8, 1987. Rap music, for example, is based on appropriating bits of music by having a DJ repeatedly play a section of other records as bakground. In 1986, the Beastie Boys tried to use the Beatles' "I'm Down" as a basis for rap. They were warned to abandon the idea by Michael Jackson, who owns the publishing rights for that song. It is not clear whether the sampling issue formed part of their decision, but the Beastie Boys backed down.

31 Miller, supra note 25.

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id. Baker's allusion to collages is less fortunate than he might think. Collages, that is motages (artistic compositions of juxtaposed heterogenous images) are not clearly unprotected by copyright law. Infringement actions have been brought against such artists such as Robert Rauschenberg, Larry Rivers and Andy Warhol for incorporating previously published images into their own works of art. These cases were settled before trial. Note, Copyright, Free Speech and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1568 (1984).

38 Miller, supra note 25.

39 Id.

40 Pareles, supra note 15.

41 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

42 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 at 1-32 (1987).

43 The law of copyright is codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1987).

44 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.10 at 2-141 (1987). See also Act of Oct. 15, 1971 (P.L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391).

45 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1987).

46 Id.

47 Id. Cf. Innovative Concepts in Entertainment, Inc. v. Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., 576 F.Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (a computer chip may constitute a sound recording if sounds are fixed therein).

48 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(7), 301(c) (1987). Public distribution constitutes publication. See 1 M. NIMMER, 1987 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 406[A] at 4-34, § 401[A][1] at 4-3 (1987).

49 See Dawling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 211 n.4 (1985) (dictum) (Congress extended federal copyright to sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972).

50 See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.10[A] at 2-143 nn.15-19, § 4.06[A] at 4-34 (1987). See also The Sound Recording Amendment, P.L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) [hereinafter The Sound Recording Amendment]. Publication required public distribution of the recording. Furthermore, to trigger statutory copyright protection the copies also had to bear a form of notice. This form of notice was the same as that required under the current Act: the letter P in a circle, the year of first publication of the sound recording, and the name of the owner of the copyright. But note, such a recording could obtain statutory copyright by registration as an unpublished work.

51 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 14.06[A] at 4-35 (1987).

52 Id. If such recordings were published and did bear the proper notice, they will continue to be protected under statutory copyright until 75 years after publication, or until 50 years after the author's death. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 4.01[B] at 4-6 nn.29-30 (1987). For common law protections, see Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, U.S. Copyright Office Study No. 26.

53 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1987).

54 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.10[A] at 2-143 (1987).

55 Id. quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP].

56 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.10[A][3] at 2-149 (1987).

57 H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 56.

58 Barry, Legal Aspects of Digital Sound Sampling, Recording EngineerProducer, Apr. 1987, at 60-61.

59 Id.

60 1 M NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 210[A][3] at 2-150.

61 Id.; See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-05 (1987).

62 Barry, supra note 60.

63 Id. As an example, Frank Zappa hires musicians at $100 an hour to play samples into the Synclavier. The musicians sign releases which describe the purpose of the session. Album information credits the musicians who were sampled. See Torchia, Sampling Realities: Frank Zappa's Experience With His Recent `Jazz From Hell' Album, Recording EngineerProducer, Apr. 1987, at 64.

64 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1987).

65 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1987).

66 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1987). It is a defense to an infringement suit that the plaintiff has failed to register prior to instituting the action. Furthermore, statutory damages are not recoverable for infringement that occurs prior to registration. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2). Registration also plays an important function under 17 U.S.C. § 405(A)(2) in curing a failure to properly affix notice of copyright to publicly distributed copies.

67 Barry, supra note 60, at 62.

68 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.05 (1987).

69 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 114 (1987). See also, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1987) (other limitations on these rights). There is no public performance right.

70 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1987).

71 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1987). For duration of copyright, generally, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-05 (1987).

72 H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 51; Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985); Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).

73 H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 51.

74 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).

75 Lithographic Co. v. Saron, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).

76 1 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.01[B] at 2-15 (1987).

77 140 F. Supp. 729 (1956).

780 Id.

79 Id. at 731.

80 Id. at 732.

81 Barry, supra note 60, at 62.

82 Id.

83 Id.

84 Barry, supra note 60, at 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (1983).

85 Barry, supra note 60, at 62.

86 See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 56.

87 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §143.2 (quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 905, 9087 (3rd Cir. 1975)).

88 1 M NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 143.2 n.107 (quoting Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 268 F.Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd 433 F. 2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970)).

89 2 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] at 2-84 (1987).

90 Bailie v Fisher, 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

91 Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1970).

92 Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

93 2 NIMMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] at 2-85 (1987) (quoting Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1953)).

94 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01[A] at 13-4 (1987).

95 Id.

96 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1987). See Barry, supra note 60, at __.

97 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (1982).

98 Id.

99 Id.

100 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A] at 13-20 (1987).

101 Torchia, Sampling Realities: Frank Zappa's Experience with His Recent 'Jazz From Hell' Album, RECORDING ENGINEERPRODUCER, Apr. 1987, at 64.

102 Id.

103 Comment, Copyright Fair Use - Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 78-9.(quoting M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §141.1 (1966)).

104 Id.

105 Id.

106 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (pattern test); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (pattern test); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (demand test); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. Associate Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985) (demand test); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933) (ordinary observer test); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (modified ordinary observer test, expert analysis entertained only on the question of copying, not on substantiality); Sid & Marty Kroft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (further refinements to ordinary observer test); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (audience educated to medium test); and E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D.C. Minn. 1985) (iterative test). See also Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial Similarity, 22 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 81 (1977); Metzger, Name That Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Musical Plagiarism, 29 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 139 (1984). On the issue of fair use, see generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1987); Comment, Copyright Fair Use - Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73; Lawrence, Fair Use: Evidence of Change in a Traditional Doctrine, 27 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 71 (1982).

107 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A][2] at 13-35 (1987).

108 See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923) (responsible for the "Six Bar Rule"; case implies that a taking of only six bars is not actionable); Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (similarity relating to four bars actionable); Gingg v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 56 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1944) (similarities related to one line, approximately two to four bars, no actionable infringement); Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (similarity in two to four bars actionable). See also Sherman, supra note 108, at 104.

109 Sherman, supra note 108, at 104 (footnotes omitted).

110 Dupler, supra note 23, at 74.

111 A motive is a short musical figure that is not quite a melody.

112 36 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).

113 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).

114 Sherman, supra note 108, at 106.

115 149 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1945).

116 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942).

117 See supra note 108, and accompanying text.

118 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).

119 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A][2], at 13.38 to 13-38.1 (1987) (footnote omitted).

120 Id. at 13-37. If it were otherwise, the defendant would always have a defense if the work were long enough.

121 Sherman, supra note 108, at 111. Sherman urges that in such cases expert witnesses should be called upon to advise the court about which portions of the complaining work are musically significant. Most commentators are critical, with good reason, of the ordinary observer test. Regrettably, the audience-educated-to-the-medium test has rarely been employed by the courts.

122 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).

123 Such was the decision in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) which involved a copying of an accompaniment rather than a melody. Judge Learned Hand, finding note-for-note similarity and the repetition of the copied phrase in the accused work, felt obliged to find for the plaintiff. However, he also found that the plaintiff's piece won its success because of its melody, not because of the copied accompaniment. He called the case "a trivial pother" and awarded only the statutory minimum damages of $250. Sherman, supra note 108, at 106-07.

124 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 436 U.S. 918 (1978). For a discussion of the fixation issues in this case, see 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.10[A][1], at 2-142 n.15 (1987).

125 540 F.2d at 964.

126 Id. The court continued: "The jackets for the individual tapes described the enclosed recordings as `Today's hits as done by your favorite artists. Custom simulated by Sound 8 singers and musicians.'" Id.

127 Id. at 965 n.2. This unexpected holding on the right to create derivative works is due to the expanded concept of fixation applied by the Court. 3 NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[A][2] at 13-35 (1987).

128 See supra note 40, and accompanying text.

129 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05 at 13-63 (1987) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939)). "The [fair use] doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

130 H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).

131 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1987).

132 H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 66.

133 "The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use ... but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis." H.R. REP., supra note 57, at 55-56.

134 See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] at 13-70, and nn.24-26.

135 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980).

136 See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) ("the public welfare will not be defeated if the use of the copyrighted work by another does not in fact reduce the economic benefit to the individual copyright holder"). See also, Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc. v. Brown, 23 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) all holding that an important factor in the determination of fair use is whether the unauthorized use causes a diminution in demand for the copied work.

137 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). Berlin concerned reproduction of a rhyme scheme and some lines verbatim in a Mad Magazine spoof. Fair use as a defense has frequently been upheld in parody cases.

138 Comment, Copyright Fair Use - Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 95-96. See also, 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[B] (1987).

139 Id.

140 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[B], at 13-86 (1987).

141 See supra note 37, and accompanying text.

142 See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, ch. 14 (1987).

143 17 U.S.C. § 50b(a) (1987).

144 See 3 M.NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §15.01, at 15-1 (1987).

145 Barry, supra note 60, at 67.

146 See supra note 126.

149Torchia, supra note 103, at 64.

150Id.