†© 1999 Joel Michael Schwarz.
† Assistant Attorney General, State of New York. As a member of the Attorney General's Internet Bureau, the author successfully prosecuted and secured the first decision in the country holding that Internet gambling violates state and federal law. (People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999)). He also serves on the Subcommittee on Internet Gambling of the National Association of Attorneys General and has testified on Internet gambling before the Public Sector Gaming Commission. Any opinions and/or observations expressed herein as furnished by the author are his alone and are not to be construed in any fashion, either directly or indirectly, as the formal or informal opinions of the New York State Attorney General's Office or the New York State Attorney General, who will not be bound thereby. The author would gratefully like to acknowledge the assistance of Assistant Attorneys General Jean Marie Cho, William H. Mohr and Eric Wenger, as well as David Allweiss, Joshua Bauchner, Raymond Osterbye, Michelle Rice, and Irene Vomvolakis.
1. COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, FINAL REPORT 1 (1976).
2. See Kenneth A. Freeling & Ronald E. Wiggins, Despite Tough Talk From Prosecutors, and Despite Indictments of Those Charged With Internet Gambling, No Court Has Held That U.S. Law Prohibits Such Betting, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 30, 1998, at B7; see also Elliott Almond, Borderless Betting, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1999, at D1; Ian Plumley, Visions of New Gaming, LA FLEUR'S LOTTERY WORLD, May 1998, at 15.
3. See Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU ch. II (Jan. 1997) <http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/crb97003.html>.
4. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 213 (N.Y. 1964) ("The New York constitutional provisions were adopted with a view toward protecting the family man of meager resources from his own imprudence at the gaming tables."); Roland v. United States, 838 F.2d 1400, 1402 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Martinez, 978 F. Supp. 1442, 1447-48 (D. N.M. 1997); see also Davan Maharaj, Web Bettors Push Odds With Credit Card Debt, L.A. TIMES, November 22, 1999, at A1, A7 (Fred Marino, a California man who has more than $100,000 in credit card gambling bills, said that he felt he "had to gamble to make [his] losses back up" and that he "ended up maxing out all [his] cards and losing [his] home.").
5. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels, 203 N.E.2d at 213 (noting that unsupervised, unregulated gambling "affords no protection to customers and no assurance of fairness or honesty in the operation of the gambling devices"); DeMarco v. Colorado Ltd. Gaming Control Comm., 855 P.2d 23, 26 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the Gaming Act provides detailed regulation of those involved in the legalized gambling industry, in order "to assure that honest wagering actually takes place and to maintain public confidence that such is the case"); People v. Busco, 46 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1942) (holding that the Penal Law prohibition against gambling was enacted to completely eliminate professional gambling which is "injurious to the morals and welfare of the people").
6. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 338 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The social problems encompass rises in organized crime, violence, embezzlement, fraud ... theft...."); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Validity, Construction & Application of 18 U.S.C.A § 1955 Prohibiting Illegal Gambling Businesses, 21 A.L.R. FED. 708 §1[c] (1974) (setting forth the Congressional findings which led to passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955); Meg Vaillancourt, Cellucci Cool to Expansion of Gaming, But Gambling Issue May Heat Up Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 1999, at E2 ("Reilly also expressed concerns that expanded gambling could lead to an influx of organized crime in the state.").
7. See, e.g., Carver, Inc. v. State, 672 So.2d 1141, 1143-44 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming administrative revocation of a video gaming license based upon its finding that a young child was allowed to play or operate a video gaming device in violation of a statute prohibiting minors from playing such devices); Pando ex rel. Pando v. Fernandez, 485 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1984). See generally Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 149 F.3d 334.
8. See Anthony Cabot, A Primer on the Legality of Gambling on the Internet, ANDREWS GAMING INDUSTRY LITIG. REP. 3, 4 (Sept. 1997) (noting that online gambling "is the equivalent to placing slot machines in millions of homes"); see also Stevie A. Kish, Betting on the Net: An Analysis of the Government's Role in Addressing Internet Gambling, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 449, 453 (1999); John T. Fojut, Ace in the Hole: Regulation of Internet Service Providers Saves the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 155, 161-62 (1997).
9. See generally Wendy R. Leibowitz, Senate Bans Most 'Net Gambling; Many Bet on Poor Enforcement, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B6. See also Anthony Cabot, Internet Gambling in the Information Age, 7 NEV. LAW. 20, 21 (1999).
10. See Cabot, supra note , at 3 (noting that with the advent of Internet gambling, "the gambling industry is [essentially] left in the hands of every shyster or con artist who can afford a computer and a programmer").
11. See Brad Knickerbocker, For Many Teens, Gambling Starts at Home. First It's a Scratch of a Lotto Ticket. Eventually It Could be Stealing to Support An Addiction, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 1999, at 3; see also Fojut, supra note , at 161-62; Kish, supra note , at 451.
12. See Mark G. Tratos, Gaming on the Internet, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 101, 114 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches About Internet Regulation, 32 INT'L LAW. 1115, 1118-20 (1998).
14. See ACLU v. Reno (CDA I), 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15. An interactive computer service is "any information service, system, or access software provider that uses a public communication infrastructure or operates in interstate or foreign commerce to provide or enable computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet." S. 692, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (1999).
16. See generally CDA I at 833. See also Peter Brown, Regulation of Cybercasinos and Internet Gambling, 547 PLI/PAT 9, 12-13 (1999).
17. See Jose Martinez, A Gambler in Boston Laid 45 Grand on This Weekend's Football Games, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 2, 1998, at 3. See generally Freeling & Wiggins, supra note .
18. See generally Almond, supra note . See also James Rutherford, Special Report: Internet Gambling: The Newest Casinos, CASINO PLAYER, Dec. 1997, at 36, 36 ("Right now, somewhere out there in that wondrous global supermarket they call the World Wide Web-just a mouse click away on your home computer-the cards are snapping, the reels are spinning, the dice are rolling. About 60 'casinos' are up and running on the Internet, ready to take your bets for real money ....").
19. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note ; Almond, supra note .
20. See generally Freeling & Wiggins, supra note , at B7 ("The Internet can be much more effective than the telephone for interstate gambling. The Internet's reach makes possible practically unlimited simultaneous multi-channel communications. The potential number of bettors who can access a Web-based service is limited only by the number of connections to the Web and the service's ability to handle traffic."). See also People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999).
21. See Almond, supra note , at D1 ("Web surfers can wager on horse racing in Germany or place a bet in Australia, Antigua and a host of other countries without anyone being the wiser."). See also Fojut, supra note , at 169.
22. See Martinez, supra note .
23. See generally Martinez, supra note , at 3 ("From the security of his home computer, Mr. Surething logged onto a half-dozen sportsbook sites in England, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Antigua."); Freeling & Wiggins, supra note , at B7.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994).
25. Id. § 1952; see also World Interactive, 1999 WL 591995 at *6; Brown, supra note , at 21-23; Mark G. Tratos, supra note , at 104-05 (1997).
In addition to the Wire and Travel Acts, the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act (also known as the "Wagering Paraphernalia Act") prohibits the interstate or international transportation of wagering paraphernalia in furtherance of a gambling enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (1994). See also Brown, supra note , at 23-24; The Gambling Devices Transportation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1994). For example, an Internet gambling enterprise might be said to have sent a gambling "device" in foreign commerce in violation of the Wagering Paraphernalia Act if the computer servers for the Internet casino are purchased domestically and then shipped offshore. See generally Rutherford, supra note . Courts have also found gambling enterprises vicariously liable under the Act. See United States v. Zambito, 315 F.2d 266, 267 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 924 (1963). As such, the online casino which solicits United States residents to fund wagering accounts via the mailing of a check, or other such means, could arguably be said to be in violation of the Wagering Paraphernalia Act.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994).
27. Id. § 1081.
28. Id. § 1952(a)-(b).
29. See United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Burke, 495 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); United States v. Hanon, 428 F.2d 101, 108 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971); United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907, 916 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
30. United States v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045, 1049 (4th Cir. 1970); see also Bass v. U.S., 324 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1963).
31. See, e.g., Fojut, supra note , at 157.
32. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631.
33. Id. at 2633.
34. 209 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
35. See id. at 916 (citing Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925)); see also Kish, supra note . As the Smith Court noted in dicta, Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce is not in any way limited to only certain forms of media. 209 F. Supp. at 916.
36. 235 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
37. Id. at 296-97. This rationale was likewise adopted by the court in World Interactive when it ruled that "the Interstate Commerce Clause gives Congress the plenary power to regulate illegal gambling conducted between a U.S. and a foreign location" and as such "[g]ambling conducted via the Internet ... is indistinguishable from any other form of gambling." People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999).
38. 799 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 229; see also Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1968); Borgese, 235 F. Supp. at 297-98.
40. 1999 WL 591995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999).
41. Id. at *7.
42. Since the website in World Interactive, as well as many other gambling websites, required the user to download software to a computer prior to entering into and registering with the casino, the court reasoned that this created a "virtual casino within the user's computer terminal." Id. at *6.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (amended 1966).
46. Id.
47. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 225.05-225.20 & 225.30 (McKinney 1999).
48. See People v. Kim, 585 N.Y.S.2d 310, 313 (Crim. Ct. 1992).
49. See People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999); see also Brown, supra note , at 20.
50. See generally N.Y. CONST. art. I.
51. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.
52. Id.
53. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24(1) (amended 1993).
54. See id. § 24 (3)-(6).
55. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 945.02 (West 1996).
56. Id. § 945.03.
57. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-30-1-1 (West 1991).
58. See id. § 4-31-1-2.
59. Id. § 4-32-1-2.
60. See id. §§ 4-33-1-1 & 4-33-9-1 (permitting riverboat gambling only in certain areas).
61. See IND. CODE ANN. § § 35-45-5-1 to -10 (West 1991).
62. Id. §§ 35-45-5-1 to -2.
63. See id. §§ 35-45-5-3 to -4.
64. See 98-8 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 3 (1998); Brown, supra note 16, at 19-20; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-5-1 to -4.
65. See 98-8 Op. Att'y Gen. at 3.
66. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 2 (1998).
67. See id. para. 2(A)-(E).
68. Id. at para. 2D (emphasis added).
69. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-1 (West 1995).
70. See id. §§ 2C:37-2-4, 7.
71. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.010-463.720 (Michie 1997 Cumulative Supp.) (providing that gambling is authorized in the state, but only upon the issuance of a license, and is subject to "strict" regulations and any restrictions provided for by the legislature).
72. Id. § 464.010.
73. See id. § 463.0152.
74. NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 24; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 462.125 & 462.140 (Michie 1997).
75. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.450 (Michie 1997).
76. Id. § 465.091; see also Brown, supra note 16, at 15.
77. Id. §§ 465.092 & 465.094.
78. Even with regard to activities on Native American reservations, traditionally an area where great deference has been granted since the reservations are considered to be sovereign entities within the United States, federal regulations still require explicit state statutory approval before a given type of gambling may be conducted. See The Indian Gaming Regulation Act, (hereinafter "IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (1994). According to IGRA, before a Native American tribe may host casino gambling on the reservation, the tribe must first enter a state compact permitting said activity. See id. §§ 2703 & 2710(d)(1). Thus, even though the gambling operations are considered to occur on sovereign soil, explicit state authorization is still required. It would be quite sophistic to permit a private Internet gambling business to operate online without explicit state statutory authorization, while a sovereign entity, such as a Native American tribe, is required to seek explicit state approval and statutory authority before engaging in the exact same activity on its own reservation. Similarly, it would be irrational to subject a privately-owned Internet gambling business to gambling regulations which are less stringent than those enforced against Native American tribes.
79. See Brown, supra note 16, at 18-21 ("In three of these states, California, Indiana and Kansas, the Attorneys General have expressly held that any gambling activity not otherwise allowed by law would, if conducted over the Internet, fall within the ambit of their state's existing statutory framework and therefore be illegal.").
80. See, e.g., People v. Kim, 585 N.Y.S.2d 310, 312 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (holding that the use of a computer system to transmit orders for out-of-state lottery tickets was illegal since "[a]ll forms of gambling are illegal in New York except those expressly authorized by the New York Constitution"); Seaside Futures, Inc. v. State, No. W-62930-88 slip op. at 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1989) aff'd, A-3320-88T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 2, 1989) (holding that an injunction was warranted against the computer transmission of requests for out-of-state lottery tickets because "[g]ambling activity in this state by the terms of our state constitution and by our common law is illegal unless it is authorized by constitutional amendment"); State v. Fiola, 576 A.2d 338, 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that the defendants' business constituted gambling activity within the state of New Jersey, and thus violated the state's gambling laws, since the New Jersey Constitution prohibits any type of gambling unless the constitution has been amended to explicitly permit the specific type of gambling); United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant's argument that the Wire Act did not apply to him because gambling information had been transmitted to him in Massachusetts, and there were apparently no laws in Massachusetts which explicitly forbade the transmission of wagers into the state, instead holding that although § 1084(b) permits the transmission of gambling-related information when gambling is explicitly authorized in both the sending and receiving states, it was never intended to authorize gambling when only one of the two locales permits gambling).
81. See Almond, supra note , at D1 ("Cohen's attorneys argued in court documents that World Sports Exchange (www.wsex.com) is fully licensed and legal in Antigua and the defendant never hid his operation."); Fojut, supra note , at 169.
82. See Rutherford, supra note , at 40 ("Proponents of unfettered Internet communication maintain that these laws are obsolete. They say the nature of the technology is such that global computer gambling takes place not in the country where the gambler resides but on the host computer, which is located in a country where, presumably, the gambling is licensed and legal.").
83. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
84. See Galvin v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
85. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
86. Id. at 316-19; see also Brown, supra note , at 36-37.
87. World Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297.
88. Bross Utils. Serv. Corp. v. Aboubshait, 489 F. Supp. 1366, 1371-72 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 559 (2nd Cir. 1980); see also Scherr v. Abrahams, 1998 WL 299678 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (denying jurisdiction although the defendant's website allowed users to contact him via e-mail, and he sent his publication to users via e-mail).
89. See Hearst v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). Over time, a "sliding scale" test has developed for purposes of assessing jurisdiction based upon activities that occur over the Internet. See American Homecare Federation, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (D. Conn. 1998). In essence, there are three points on this "sliding scale" spectrum. See id. At one end of the scale is the passive website which contains only information and offers no interaction with the visitor. See id. At this end of the scale, the assertion of jurisdiction will likely be declined. See id. In the middle of the scale are websites where information is exchanged between the site operator and the visitors, including downloadable files or links to other websites. See id. It is in the middle of this scale where the circumstances which will lead a court to assert jurisdiction are most ambiguous. At the other end of the spectrum are the sites that engage in substantial activity within a forum state, such as: 1) sales; 2) solicitations; 3) acceptance of orders; 4) links to other sites; 5) product lists; or 6) the transmission of files. See id. at 113-14. It is these sites that will most likely provide a court with ample reason to assert jurisdiction.
90. See, e.g., Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (conferring general jurisdiction over the company, which in addition to hosting an Internet website within the state, also conducted business there).
91. 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd by an equally divided court, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
92. Specifically, the court asserted jurisdiction based upon proof that at least 248 computers located in Minnesota accessed and received transmissions from the website, Minnesota computers were among the 500 computers that most often accessed the website, and persons from throughout the United States, including Minnesota, called the phone numbers advertised on its Internet gambling website. Id. at 718-19.
93. See id. at 721.
94. See id.
95. 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
96. See id. at 743-44.
97. See Fojut, supra note , at 169.
98. See infra Part IV.B.
99. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 20.10(4) & 20.20 (McKinney 1992).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE