By
Peter Lyman †
The economic institutions and
practices that Article 2B seeks to regulate-electronic commerce, knowledge management,
and information markets-are changing faster than the tools and concepts that
policy makers are using to frame the debate. By describing and analyzing research
relating to the nature of "information" and the components of the
"digital economy," this Article suggests a new conceptual ground and
common language for regulation of these new social and economic structures.
In this way, this Article seeks to encourage a dialogue between the legal community,
policy makers, modern industry, and social scientists.
Two elements are crucial to the formation of a productive interdisciplinary
encounter. First, it is important that the participants in the Article 2B
debate recognize that digital information is not simply a new kind of intellectual
property that is difficult to regulate because easily copied. Rather, it is
also a new kind of economic capital, and an emerging medium for innovative
corporate, political, and cultural behavior. Second, the "digital economy"
itself is not just a new economic market, just as surely as the Internet is
not merely a new distribution channel. Instead, digital technology is transforming
the nature and function of the corporation and every sector of the economy.
In order to effectively and efficiently regulate the economic structures that
digital information technology makes possible, the participants in the Article
2B debate need to recognize that the use of such technology has social as
well as economic repercussions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
II. WHAT IS INFORMATION? 1068
III. WHAT IS A DIGITAL ECONOMY? 1075
A. WHAT FORM WILL THE CORPORATION TAKE IN A NETWORK SOCIETY? 1076
1. THE "NETWORK ENTERPRISE" IS A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW, POST-INDUSTRIAL, ORGANIZATIONAL PARADIGM. 1076
2. INNOVATION IS THE PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF THE NETWORK ENTERPRISE. 1077
3. GLOBALIZATION WITH BORDERS? 1078
B. WHAT IS A DIGITAL MARKETPLACE? 1079
IV. ARTICLE 2B AS INFORMATION
POLICY 1080
A. THE DEATH OF THE RESEARCH LIBRARY. 1081
B. A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS. 1083
1. A COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE 1084
2. A MARKETPLACE. 1085
3. TRANSACTION MECHANISMS. 1086
4. DELIVERABLES. 1086
5. SUMMARY: THE COMMONALITY OF CODE ACROSS THESE LEVELS. 1086
V. CONCLUSION 1086
I. Introduction
The legal debate to formulate commercial laws to govern the information
economy is the most sustained and serious exploration of the policy implications
of the information age thus far. The dialogue is remarkably interdisciplinary-each
side shaping its view of the best regulatory regime upon different assumptions
about the future social and economic dynamics of the information age. Yet this
social analysis is tacit at best, and rarely grounded in empirical social science
research. While legal disagreements about the nature and dynamics of the information
age often mirror the debates of the social science research community, the difference
is that while social scientists are debating about the right questions, the
legal community is already debating about the right answers. Is it too soon
to know how to regulate cyberspace? Has a debate about the right answers pre-empted
a debate about the right questions? If so, what are the right questions? This
Article is intended to broaden the Article 2B debate by exploring the possible
links between current social science research and the social and economic assumptions
underlying the various legal positions.
Perhaps the most subtle judgment the legal community must make is how well
the concepts and techniques that have been developed to describe, analyze, and
regulate our economic life in an industrial age will apply to cyberspace. Will
information technology be the cause of fundamentally new social and economic
innovations, requiring new concepts and an experimental approach to defining
a new legal regime? Or will the digital economy present new variations on social
behavior, requiring primarily new applications of established methodologies?
Within the social science community, there is significant disagreement about
whether information technology will be different in kind from other communication
media, such as the telephone or broadcasting, and, if it is, whether it will
require new analytical concepts and methods. I will focus upon issues
concerning the use and dynamics of networked information that are particularly
relevant to Article 2B debate's consideration of legal regimes to regulate the
digital economy.1
Commentators have examined many aspects of the movement toward information
technologies. For example, sociologist Karen A. Cerulo argues that information
technologies extend the process of innovation begun by industrial technologies,
observing that, "Like the railroad and the telegraph, the new technologies
have redefined space, place and time."2
And yet, the inseparable relationship between "information," cognition,
and human experience suggests that printing technology, not transportation,
is a better analogy. Thus Cerulo concludes, "In doing so, technology has
provided us with new sites of empirical experience and it has re-configured
the complex ties that bind the social and cognitive worlds."3
Given this essentially new mediated dimension of human experience, she
asks, what are the implications for the traditional methodological assumption
"that physical co-presence provides the standard by which to judge
the importance, the form, and the quality of all other varieties of exchange?"4
Cerulo concludes that our basic assumption that "direct" is superior
to "mediated" experience must change, as must our basic concepts and
methods for analyzing the dynamics of social relations. Psychoanalyst Sherry
Turkle similarly has described the way that software and network communications
are transforming the psychology of personality formation.5
Turkle concludes that "virtual life" is emotionally and intellectually
part of "real life," and asks whether traditional concepts of the
self and human identity are sustainable.
The economic implications of this conceptual shift are illustrated by Belgian
banker Bernard Lietaer's argument that fundamental economic realities have already
changed. Lietaer states that "the development of electronic commerce can
be seen as simply the rest of the economy joining in the virtual space where
money has been functioning already for the past two or three decades."6
If we are to develop workable fiscal tools for a global economy comparable to
the monetary supply controls with which national economies have managed domestic
economies, he argues, we must study the new kinds of exchange (especially network
barter and gift exchange) that are developing within electronic virtual communities.
That is, we must discover what a digital economy is-it cannot be legislated
in the first instance.
The Article 2B debate explores parallel questions about the portability of
traditional legal concepts to cyberspace: whether copyright or contract law
is more adaptable to new forms of information, whether Article 2B can regulate
new modes of authorship and publication, and whether it can apply to new kinds
of social contexts. Some Article 2B writers have sounded notes of caution regarding
whether we know enough to regulate cyberspace. For example, Michael Froomkin
comments, "If we are perhaps beyond the point of experiment and prototype
and into the roll-out period, we are still at version 1.0."7
Thus the first question the legal community may need ask for itself may resemble
that faced by the telecommunications industry nearly a decade ago: "How
can sufficient experimentation and learning with the new technologies be guaranteed
so that demand for advanced applications can be effectively generated?"8
In a practical sense this would focus the Article 2B debate on defining a social
policy to promote innovation and the development of new markets, and would contextualize
it within the broader constitutional goal of promoting progress in the useful
arts and sciences.
Although social science research about economic and social relationships in
cyberspace is necessarily still very new, a dialogue between law and social
science may help to clarify two questions that seem to be near the heart of
the debate about the proper management of intellectual property in digital works:
What is information? The need for a new legal regime to govern the
digital economy emerged primarily because of the problem of illegal copying
of software and other digital works. But upon further examination, regulations
of digital technology raise important new questions concerning the use of software
as a medium for social control. Discussion of any regulatory regime for the
digital economy is therefore, in part, political, because such regulation will
structure the new social formations that will take shape around the creation
and use of digital information.
What is a digital economy? Digital networks were first described as
"information highways," a comforting metaphor suggesting that networks
were like the distribution technology of an industrial society, one regulated
by the Commerce Department and established commercial codes. But is a network
like a highway? Is information a commodity? Although digital networks may become
important distribution channels for information "commodities," a new
distribution channel does not in itself constitute something that deserves to
be called a market, an industry, or an economy. In this respect the U.S. Department
of Commerce paper on "The Emerging Digital Economy"9
oversimplifies the problem of regulating e-commerce. In reporting impressive
growth in digital commerce, it presents aggregate data that do not differentiate
between various kinds of electronic commerce involving different kinds of digital
information, nor does it define a strategic framework for information policy
that could provide a context for specific regulatory discussions such as Article
2B. As this Article will demonstrate, there is not one regulatory problem for
Article 2B to solve, but many.
In all, the Article 2B debate is remarkably thoughtful, and yet, like most
discussions about information policy, uses language about 'information,' the
'network,' and a 'digital economy' as if these words refer to something already
well understood. On the contrary, network technology is still evolving rapidly,
commercial software is often experimental, and the social and economic formations
for which we use labels like "digital economy" are very early in their
development.10 The danger
is that a legal regime intended to strengthen the digital economy could inhibit
its growth and resiliency in the global economy if it does not fully understand
its structures, dynamics, and needs.
The definition of the concept of information must be at the heart of
any information policy. The Article 2B drafters recognized this need in distinguishing
between "information," defined as machine to machine communication,
and "information content," defined as that information which is perceived
by humans.11 Among the critics
of this distinction, Michele Kane is concerned about the status of computer
programs as both "information" and as "information content,"
and whether ambiguities at the boundary may give rise to confusion about a warranty
of merchantability.12 Jane
Ginsburg is concerned with the political implications of a syllogism that would
generalize from software to all works expressed in digital format, changing
our concept of authorship and the relationship between author and publisher
or distributor.13 And Jessica
Litman argues that public and private domains traditionally differentiated by
copyright would be joined by a contract regime, arguing that Article 2B "contemplates
the assertion of rights over material-ideas, facts, information-that the copyright
law provides may not be privately owned."14
Here, the Article 2B debate engages the most fundamental questions of the
sociology of information. What are the social and psychological implications
of a new medium for the representation of knowledge that had been previously
instantiated in different physical media? And beyond this, what are the implications
of entirely novel modes of representation of information, such as simulation
or visualization tools? What are the consequences of these differences for our
notion of authorship and reading, for the creation and use of knowledge, and
of property and power?
Manuel Castells's book "The Rise of the Network Society"15
describes the nature and dynamics of the information economy in comprehensive
terms that may help focus the issues, just as Daniel Bell's "The Coming
of Post-Industrial Society"16
did in earlier decades. At its heart is the description of an historic change
in the relationship between information and the economy:
The contemporary change of paradigm may be seen as a shift from a technology
based primarily on cheap inputs of energy to one predominantly based on cheap
inputs of information derived from advances in microelectronic and telecommunications
technology. ... Information is its raw material: these are technologies to act
on information, not just information to act on technology, as was the case in
previous technological revolutions.17
Castells's thesis helps clarify why the concept of information has been difficult
to define in the debate over Article 2B. Is the economic
value of information that of a commodity, something produced for commercial
purposes, or is it better understood as a raw material?18
If it is not a commodity, is it better conceived of as a flow, a service, or
a utility? Does information itself add value, or is it the innovative use of
information that is the origin of economic value? If so, how might this change
the relative position of producers and consumers of information property in
an information economy?
This reversal of the relationship between information and tools, making information
the raw material for technological processing, has profound implications for
the Article 2B discussion. At the birth of capitalism, printed books were one
of the first manufactured commodities exchanged in international trade, giving
birth to copyright laws intended to regulate commerce in books.19
In a network age, as broadcast media have taught us, it is difficult to treat
a signal as a commodity. Hence, Castells argues that information flows may be
the origin of wealth in an information economy, not information commodities.
In defining the nature of "information content" in a network age,
then, it may not be best to begin by transforming digital signals into commodities,
whether through the construction of legal fictions or technological encapsulations
(e.g., cryptolopes). This approach suggests that "information content"
may be an entirely new category of knowledge, resembling what we now call data,
because its value is derived from its use in a particular social context, not
its content per se.
There would be profound legal implications to this kind of a shift in the
culture of information. Copyright doctrine, in protecting the expression
of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves, has always balanced property rights
("expressions of ideas") with the cultural domain ("ideas").
For this reason, critics of Article 2B frequently argue that copyright law is
more sensitive to the cultural and political dimension of information than contract
alone can be. Castells's argument supports this point of view in postulating
an inalienable link between information and the quality of life: "Because
information is an integral part of all human activity, all processes of our
individual and collective existence are directly shaped (although certainly
not determined by) the new technological medium."20
Software, on the other hand, is an abstract machine for data and information
processing, and can be viewed as a political device because it serves as a mediating
technology for communication between people. If digital signals have value within
the context of information flows, the distinction between software ("information"
in the Article 2B sense) and information content becomes ambiguous. The problematic
public and cultural implications of the concept of "information" (in
the sense defined by Article 2B as communication between machines) appears most
clearly in Julie Cohen's use of Lawrence Lessig's description of digital code
as privatized law, or "code as code." In Lessig's description, code
"constitutes itself as an inexorable arbiter of permissible conduct,"
one "that need not fit with, or respect, public law."21
Pam Samuelson has made the same point in reminding members of the Association
of Computing Machinery of their social responsibility as programmers: "Programmers
may not realize it, but computer programs are privately constructed regulatory
regimes. In these governance systems, some activities are authorized, while
others are, by technical means, forbidden .... Code as code may be 'an efficient
means of regulation', but it doesn't always produce socially optimal results."22
In contrast to the Article 2B definition, sociologists and economists see software
not simply as machine to machine communication, but rather as a key to understanding
the relationship between technology, productivity and discipline in the workplace,
privacy and surveillance in civil society, and, ultimately, structure in the
economy.
British sociologists Geoff Cooper and Steve Woolgar also raise issues relating
to the public interest in code as code in their presentation of the British
Economic and Social Research Council's program of research into the interaction
between technology and society:
In this way of thinking, technology is congealed social relations-that is,
a frozen assemblage of the practices, assumptions, beliefs, language and so
on involved in its design and manufacture. Technology is thus a cultural artefact
[sic] or system of artefacts [sic] which provides for certain new ways of acting
and relating. The apposite slogan is that technology is society made durable:
technology re-presents a form of social order (a defined concatenation of social
relations) in material form. It freezes and offers this fixed version of social
relations such that its adequately configured users re-enact the set social
arrangements. They can only 'adequately' (that is, socially accountably) use/make
sense of the technology as they conform to the community
of social relations which the technology makes available.23
In describing the design of a new computer, Woolgar demonstrates that hardware
is also "code" which has been stored in silicon form, and argues that
software in any format is inherently a form of social engineering-a process
he describes as "configuring the user."
[T]he design and production of a new entity (a new range of microcomputers)
amounts to a process of configuring its user, where 'configuring' includes defining
the identity of putative users, and setting constraints upon their likely future
actions .... As a result of this process, the new machine becomes its relationships
with its configured users.24
Software, understood from this perspective, is a relation between a machine
and its human user because technology imposes a social
discipline upon its users, which they, as users, would call "skills."
An analysis of the consequences of "code as code" for the social
structure of the digital economy can be seen in the "productivity paradox"
-that is, the empirical observation that the introduction of information technology
has not seemed to increase the productivity of knowledge workers. Erik Brynjolfsson
defines three dimensions within which a solution to the productivity paradox
might be found.25 First,
he notes that perhaps this "paradox" is in fact a measurement problem,
since the outcomes of work mediated by information technology may not fit traditional
categories. For example, bank productivity has been measured by outcomes such
as the number of transactions by written checks; today the use of checks has
been sharply reduced by the number of credit and debit card transactions. Or,
secondly, productivity gains might only follow the reorganization of work processes,
since the use of information technology might require very different work cultures,
requiring new kinds of skills and incentives. Third, information technology
may create new kinds of economic value (such as timeliness, or customized service),
changing the very nature of the enterprise. Brynjolfsson's analysis suggests
there is a mutually defining relationship between code, the organization and
culture of work, and economic productivity. "Information" is more
than machine to machine communication; rather, it is inherently linked to human
behavior as it is experienced in organizational and psychological terms. And
the use, social context, and format of "information content" (such
as ATM transactions) are inherently structured by code.
Precisely these kinds of innovations in the organizational forms of the economy
were discussed at a recent conference on "Knowledge and the Firm,"
hosted by the Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization at UC Berkeley.
Innovation was defined as the key to the production of wealth in the corporation
of the future: "The fundamental bases of wealth creation are changing.
Intellectual capital is the key to creating and appropriating wealth."26
This premise led to two conclusions of importance to the Article 2B debate.
First, and as discussed below, networks now make possible new modes of corporate
organization that will be the foundation of the digital economy. And second,
it was argued that the creator of information content in cyberspace may not
be the "author" in any traditional sense, but the new kinds of social
collectives made possible by network communication-the "network enterprise,"
"communities of practice," and "virtual communities."
These "communities of practice" are the informal organizations of
professionals with shared goals, specialized knowledge and skills, that may
be extended over space and time by information technology.27
Research in the field, reports one review of the literature,
has ranged from the effectiveness of the invisible colleges in the progress
of the scientific enterprise, to the roles of cliques in the functioning of
bureaucracies. In between, they run the gamut from informal networks of cooperation
among chemists working for competitive pharmaceutical industries, to back channel
exchanges between members of the foreign offices of adversary countries and
the appearance of gangs in schools and prisons.28
Because computer networks enable such communication, on an unprecedented scale
and depth, the idea of communities of practice is rapidly becoming the theoretical
foundation of new theories of social organization, particularly in work focusing
on the corporation of the future. That is, "communities of practice"
are about the use of networked information in the practice of
knowledge, and as such, suggest the possible shape of the information
markets of the future.
A particularly striking passage describes the leading-edge scientific research,
which has profound implications for the way we think about the nature of intellectual
property management and its relationship to the larger constitutional goal of
progress in the sciences and useful arts. Describing authorship in biotechnology,
Don Cohen says:
[T]he complexity and rapid pace of research means that advances
are necessarily made by large teams connected by their interlocking areas of
expertise rather than by employment at the same institution or location.
Thus ... a recently published paper on the DNA sequence of yeast chromosomes
listed 133 authors from 85 institutions. In the biotech industry, collaborative
networks are becoming the places where important intellectual activity occurs;
belonging to them is essential to success in an industry that exists on the
frontier of developing knowledge. ... These virtual teams point to the future
shape of knowledge work in general, which some predict will be accomplished
by widely dispersed groups and individuals woven into communities of practice
by networks, groupware and a complex common task.29
The biotechnology paper mentioned by Cohen was written by Walter
Powell, and describes collaborative research across both corporate and national
boundaries, illustrating the role of information flows in the innovation process
in a networked society.30
A similar contention was recently made in an article in Science Magazine,
which argued that recently proposed database protection legislation would overprotect
information, and so inhibit the progress of science.31
The notion of "communities of practice" expands upon the idea that
networked communication creates a sense of "virtual community." The
term "virtual community" describes the feelings of social solidarity
made possible by network software, such as e-mail, Internet relay chat (IRC),
bulletin boards, multi-user domains (MUDS), and MOOS (MUDS object oriented).32
For example, SeniorNet is an organization using digital network services to
link together elderly people, many of whom live alone, into a vibrant on-line
community. Studies of the use of SeniorNet services suggest that it is not on-line
information (e.g., databases) that sustains a sense of community, but rather
the interactive services (such as e-mail and on-line chat groups) that SeniorNet
provides.33 This illustrates
the point that it is information as flow, not as commodity, that creates value
in the digital economy.
This exploration of the meanings of "information" suggests that
a one-dimensional legal code will fail to regulate effectively the many kinds
of digital information, in all the many social contexts and uses in which economic
value is created. For one thing, it is networked information that is
distinctively new, not digital information. Other aspects of "the digital
economy" described by the Commerce Department report do not raise fundamentally
new kinds of regulatory problems. CD-ROMs, for example, contain digital documents,
but are distributed in commodity form like any other product. Similarly, "hybrid"
digital commerce, such as that performed by on-line retailers such as Amazon.com,
that sells print books through network transactions, does not require a revised
understanding of economic transactions (other than, perhaps, new privacy issues
derived from the commercialization of data about on-line consumer behavior).
Article 2B fails to recognize that the information economy will involve transactions
in various kinds of information, and so will obscure the fundamentally different
legal needs present in different information markets.
III. What is a digital economy?
The initial problem to be solved by Article 2B was to develop a commercial
code for the use of the Internet as a distribution channel for software and
digital publications. In the first instance, the success of this project rests
upon an understanding of the use and dynamics of different kinds of digital
information as deliverable products. The first part of this Article raises fundamental
questions about whether digital signals can and should be treated simply as
commodities, and found little empirical support for the proposed distinction
between information and information content. But there is a second dimension
to this problem as well: to regulate the "Internet economy," it is
essential to begin by exploring the nature of "the Internet" as an
economic organization, not simply as a technical infrastructure or distribution
channel.
Current social science research suggests that the Internet is accelerating
changes in the nature and structure of the economy itself, not just introducing
a new distribution channel into the established structure. In this section the
image of the Internet as an "information highway" or distribution
channel will be questioned by describing social science research into two kinds
of economic formations that appear consistent with the idea of a "knowledge
economy" emerging in cyberspace. First, this Article will consider the
"network enterprise," which may be described as a new form of corporation
or industry that is changing not only the digital economy, but the manufacturing
economy as well. Second, it will discuss the emerging social structure of the
digital marketplace-that is, the possible emergence of new forms of consumer
behavior that may shift the balance of market power from the rights holder to
the consumer. But these findings do not necessarily support a simplistic "information
revolution" thesis envisioning the replacement of an industrial economy
by a new information economy. Thus far the process of change seems to reflect
different kinds of transformations within each sector of the economy, including
manufacturing, as much as the growth of a new sector called "the digital
economy." Thus the Article 2B policy choices should reflect a careful analysis
of the differential impact that information technology will cause in each industry
and economic sector, one at a time.
A. What form will the corporation take in a network society?
Alfred Chandler, a leading business historian, argues that the modern
corporation took shape at the turn of the 20th century, reflecting dramatic
improvements in the technology of communication, production and transportation.
Today's business theory is centrally concerned with exploring the impact of
information technology upon the shape and dynamics of the corporation economy
as it grows more complex and diffuse. Manuel Castells's offers three
propositions that provide a sociological description of the dynamics of a knowledge
economy that may serve to provoke interesting questions for the Article 2B debate.
1. The "network enterprise" is a fundamentally new, post-industrial,
organizational paradigm.
As a consequence of the open architecture of the Internet, the "network
enterprise" makes possible a flexible organization, one very unlike the
hierarchical forms of authority and control in industrial society. Castells
argues, "Not only processes are reversible, but organizations and institutions
can be modified, and even fundamentally altered, by rearranging their components."34
Thus the network enterprise implies not only a system of distribution
for digital products, but even more important, the transformation of manufacturing
itself. Thus Borrus and Zysman describe the emergence of "cross-national
production networks" (CPNs)-that is, manufacturing organizations which
coordinate the means of production by outsourcing, rather than owning them.35
CPN is a label we apply to the consequent dis-integration of the industry's
value chain into constituent functions that can be contracted out to independent
producers wherever those companies are located in the global economy. ... The
networks permit firms to weave together the constituent elements of the value-chain
into competitively effective new production systems, while facilitating diverse
points of innovation. But even more importantly, CPN's have turned large segments
of complex manufacturing into a commodity available in the market.36
While Fordism was characterized by the technical division of labor using privately
owned industrial capital, making possible mass production, today manufacturing
is characterized by customization of product design, and outsourcing of the
production process itself. Compaq Computer, which builds only to fill a network
order, and contracts out production to a company that assembles many other brands
of computers, is a good example of such a "network enterprise." Companies
like Federal Express have had a similar revolutionary impact upon distribution.
2. Innovation is the primary economic activity of the network enterprise.
Castells argues that the primary source of economic power in the network
society will not be the manufacturing and distribution of commodities, but innovation
and the customization of products.
Value added is mainly generated by innovation, both of process and products.
... Innovation is itself dependent upon two conditions: research potential and
specification capability. That is, new knowledge has to be discovered, then
applied to specific purposes in a given organizational or institutional context.
Custom design is critical for microelectronics in the 1990s; instant reaction
to macroeconomic changes is fundamental in managing the volatile financial products
created in the global market.37
The larger economic context of the Article 2B discussion, then, might well
be its consequence for innovation and organizational flexibility in a knowledge
economy. This would shift the focus away from the application of a theory of
property rights based in the natural rights argument of early capitalism, which
assumes that innovation is a matter of producing new intellectual property.
Castells's research began by asking how and why technical innovation occurs.
As an urban sociologist he first turned to major world cities as the classic
social milieu of innovation. Yet, as Castells found, the San Francisco Bay Area,
though not one of the world's largest metropolitan regions, has been home to
both the computer and biotechnology industries' revolutions. Innovation in the
modern world, he argues, is the product of a "milieu of innovation,"
characterized by a free flow of ideas.38
In the case of Silicon Valley, it is the proximity of research universities
(Berkeley, UCSF, and Stanford) and the development of a culture of entrepreneurship
supported by venture capital that creates a critical mass of information for
innovation. Yet, it is not information per se that is the central analytic
concept of the network enterprise, nor flexible institutional form alone, but
the flow of information; this flow is in turn the key to progress
in the useful arts and sciences in an information society. Thus, Castells suggests
that our traditional sense of geographic place should be replaced by an understanding
of "the space of flows"-that is, the information flows that determine
the wealth or poverty of a given neighborhood, city, region or nation.39
What is the relationship between the space of flows, the free flow of ideas,
and the proposed contract regime? If indeed it is the flow of ideas that determines
innovation and wealth, then Article 2B tends to commercialize and privatize
political questions concerning progress in the useful arts and sciences by placing
economic control into the hands of international corporations. But more importantly,
if the protection of intellectual property is defined as the primary policy
goal, whether by copyright or contract, the nature of the Internet as a "space
of flows" will be transformed by encryption and other technological controls,
turning signals into commodities by limiting access. Will the economic benefit
of the network be fatally compromised-that is, will protection inhibit the flexibility
making possible the "network enterprise" itself?
3. Globalization with borders?
It is often stated that the network economy is global, but Castells
argues that there is a fundamental difference between the global economy and
the industrial world economy we have previously experienced. The global economy
has the "capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale,"
while the world economy that has developed over the past two centuries has organized
"capital accumulation ... throughout the world."40
This global scale of the network economy threatens to transcend regulation due
to both the temporal pace and spatial scope of the network enterprise.41
If the flow of information on the network is replaced with technological control
and surveillance aimed at protecting intellectual property, it is certainly
not impossible to see multi-national corporations replacing the nation state
as the central actors in the new economic order.
B.
What is a digital marketplace?
While the Article 2B debate focuses on the rights of the owners of
digital property, it pays little attention to consumers' use of information,
consumers' rights, and consumers' access to possible sources of economic power.
But it is consumers who make markets, not rights holders alone. If the sociology
of information suggests that the network expands the range of civil society,
and that the author of the future may well be a community, what, then, will
digital markets look like-how will the consumer of digital products use
the network?
One economic historian describes the Internet as "a new economic space,"
stating,
[t]he vast mass of information, images, and opinions on the Internet is accessible
to any computer owner with even a relatively low-cost connection. It is an interactive
communications medium through which the user travels virtually; by accessing
the Internet, information that would have taken much time and even physical
effort to find, is now almost instantly available. The traditional marketplace
... is now accessible to everywhere, simultaneously.42
How does this distribution system and consumer information system become an
economy?
It might be argued that networks indeed make possible virtual communities,
but that this merely impacts social relations, not the economy.43
John Hagel and Arthur Armstrong reject such a limited view of a network economy,
arguing that access to information will shift market power from the producer
to the consumer, and that therefore the key to business success in the information
age will be the use of virtual community technology to create customer loyalty:
As virtual communities tip the balance of power in commercial transactions
toward the customer, they'll provide a powerful vehicle for vendors to deepen
and broaden their relationships with customers. This is likely to affect the
way traditional businesses are run in 'physical space' as well as in the virtual
world ... In fact, ownership of customer relationships as a whole is likely
to be thrown up for grabs by the emergence of virtual communities.44
While Article 2B imagines a scarcity-based marketplace
tightly controlled by information owners, some network entrepreneurs imagine
the consumer living in an information rich environment in which vendors must
compete to provide community services in order to sell products. This prediction
was not based upon any systematic analysis of digital commerce, for even the
basic economic indicators needed to perform such research have not yet been
defined. But it does suggest that Article 2B's focus upon the rights of property
owners should be complemented by an interest in the power of consumers in the
development and dynamics of the digital marketplace. Indeed, information about
the use of networked information by consumers has become the first successful
cash crop of the Internet economy, but has also raised issues involving consumers'
right to privacy, acceptable means of surveillance, and the ownership of surveillance
data.
IV. Article 2B as Information Policy
This paper has explored two questions about the nature of an information
society that underlie the Article 2B debate, yet are rarely formulated directly
by commentators, namely: (1) What is information? and (2) What is a digital
economy? Seen from the perspective of social science, the Article 2B debate
has become too focused upon legal technique-the means by which, and degree to
which, intellectual property should be protected in an information economy-and
is too little aware of its implications for American information policy as a
whole. Seen as an information policy, the legal debate about Article 2B must
consider the social dynamics of code as code and the emerging social relations
in cyberspace-the "network enterprise" and "virtual communities"
of consumers-before imposing regulations that may inhibit the development of
these new economic formations. Only by integrating legal analysis with some
understanding of the social relations that are developing around network technology
might the drafters of Article 2B succeed in crafting a legal regime that truly
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts.
The Article 2B argument is ultimately tangled because it contemplates changes
so fundamental that it engages every level of a comprehensive information policy.
In conclusion, this Article will illustrate the way that Article 2B changes
American information policy by examining the impact of a contract regime upon
the research library, the institution developed over the past century to promote
progress in the useful arts and sciences. And, since Article 2B is an information
policy masquerading as an application of the commercial code to a new distribution
channel, the quality of the debate will be measured against the four dimensions
any information policy for a digital economy must achieve.
A. The death of the research library.
Alfred D. Chandler points out that the history of the corporation,
and thereby the shape of economic power, directly reflects the history of control
over "information flows," which he calls "paths of learning."45
Ultimately Article 2B is a debate about concentration of economic power. The
information age may well pose unprecedented monopoly problems if the control
of information flows is privatized because today the basic "know how"
about code is concentrated in a few corporations. In the past, Chandler argues,
most industries were characterized by multiple paths of learning, which ensured
competition; today while biotechnology is characterized by multiple information
flows, as was illustrated by the "community of practice" described
earlier, information technology is characterized by increasing concentration
of power over the information infrastructure.46
Social science research has largely concentrated upon social formations in
the public portion of the World Wide Web, while the Article 2B discussion has
focused upon commercial information resources, licensed and perhaps protected
by password and encryption. These parallel realities are not necessarily in
conflict, although they are different. All markets consist of a mix of what
anthropologists call gift exchange and market exchange. The two are not opposites,
but are inter-related and symbiotic: exchange within the family tends to be
characterized by gift exchange, for example, but families interact with the
economy through market exchange. Today the Internet includes many varieties
of gift exchange, such as shareware and freeware (e.g. Linux, Apache), along
with varieties of market exchange, such as software that can be downloaded but
requires a keyword to activate. The problem is at the boundary, when public
domain information or software is privatized ("enclosure"), and private
information property is copied illegally ("software piracy").
In the print world, this boundary has been managed by copyright laws, particularly
fair use and the first sale doctrine, which has made possible the modern public
research library as a boundary maintenance institution, buying information in
the market, but loaning it within a gift culture.47
The public research library has governed the information flow for innovation
and research for the past century, and, together with the Land Grant University,
has served as the core of American information policy in the age of industrialization.
But this strategy is now becoming endangered by the enclosure of the public
domain. Today the digital library is still a hybrid of gift and market exchange,
as libraries digitize works that are out of copyright or produced for the public
domain. But many current publications, particularly scientific journals, are
regulated by contractual terms that do not permit sales to libraries, but instead
only license the use of their "information content." Indeed, the term
"information content" was designed by the publishing industry to signify
that they have become merchant bankers in intellectual property; the business
of publishing now concerns ownership of information flows, the licensing of
the use of information. Publishers' contracts generally forbid the use of digital
documents in the traditional library gift economy, such as circulation outside
of the institutional license or inter-library loan. Research information flows
in the digital library of the future will likely be governed on a per capita
or fee for service basis.
There are costs and benefits in this vision of the information economy, as
the Article 2B discussion has revealed. The benefits include economic incentives
to develop high quality networked information, and, in principle, universal
access to research information nearly anywhere in the world through the Internet.
The cost is that, in practice, access to information will be governed by the
ability to pay, and, given the increasing commercialization of scientific publishing,
the price of journals will continue to increase at double-digit annual rates.
Previously, fair use based information policy had subsidized information access
in the name of the public interest in education. Today, universal access is
being defined as access to the Internet itself, rather than to educational content.
Will there be an Internet equivalent to the bandwidth reserved for public interest
broadcasting?
In many ways Article 2B merely formalizes the transition from an information
policy based on public libraries to a system of "universal access"
modeled after telecommunications, in which public access to information flow
technology is subsidized, but information services are paid for by the consumer.
This has become a legitimation crisis, as few funding authorities have been
willing to increase library budgets at a double-digit annual rate simply to
subsidize free access to information. Hence, today, library collections represent
an increasingly smaller proportions of published information. The research library
of the future is likely to become a repository of public domain information
(including, at least for the moment, government information), and access to
licensed information on a fee-for-service basis. The primary unsolved problem
in this scenario is the funding of archives: in the past, libraries have preserved
and stored printed information as an archive of the history of knowledge; as
information loses its commercial value, it is unlikely that commercial rights-holders
will subsidize its continued existence. Only late in its evolution has the Article
2B debate begun to address the role, if any, of public interest subsidies for
libraries and education. In the absence of a concept of the public interest,
there should be an accounting of the consequences for a democratic society of
the enclosure of the domain of publicly accessible information.
B. A Framework for Further Analysis.
Bar and Murase have defined four basic levels of function which must
exist in any system of commerce, whether conventional or electronic, posing
linked yet differentiated kinds of technological and regulatory challenges.48
Their "levels" might serve as a helpful framework for organizing an
analysis of the Article 2B debate:
Commercial activities, whether conventional or electronic, involve four basic
levels: a communication infrastructure, carrying messages about prices,
quantities, service or product characteristics; a marketplace, the market
coordination environment within which buyers meet sellers and negotiate; transaction
mechanisms to send, execute and settle orders (including payments); and deliverables,
the service or merchandise being exchanged.49
The Article 2B debate engages each of these levels of discourse at different
times, reminding us that the present legal debate implies the formation of a
comprehensive economic policy for emerging markets. But this larger context
is often lost for one of three reasons. First, there may be confusion about
the level of commercial infrastructure involved, or the implications of an argument
made at one level for policy at another level. Second, examples of "the
digital economy" often confuse "indirect" or "hybrid"
e-commerce, such as the electronic ordering of tangible goods (sometimes called
"network aided conventional commerce"), with "direct" e-commerce,
the on-line delivery of e-goods, where all four levels are electronic. And finally,
national debates about policy regulation of electronic commerce necessarily
occur within the broader context of global competition, because the scope of
the network economy is international. For this reason, even a commercial code
may require global coordination through trade and treaty negotiations, given
that the scope of the network economy transcends traditionally national legal
jurisdictions.
1. A communication infrastructure
The infrastructure that makes communication and transportation possible
is the precondition of all commerce; as Bar and Murase describe this level,
"widespread diffusion of electronic commerce requires an advanced network
infrastructure that can be accessed equitably and on a technologically neutral
basis. ... Governments must therefore set ground rules that guarantee infrastructure
access, network interoperability, and technical standards."50
As we have seen, however, "code as code" is not simply a matter of
network management, but shapes and regulates conduct and organizations as well.
Therefore, there can be no such a thing as a "technologically neutral basis"
of access. These social contexts are illustrated by this definition of the word
"computer" in a review of the literature: "Computers, in this
review, refer to substantially more than the basic machines associated with
computing. Computer technology is a 'package' that encompasses a complex, interdependent
system comprised of people (computer specialists, users, managers), hardware
(computer mainframes, peripherals, telecommunications gear), software (operating
systems, utilities and application programs), techniques (management science
models, procedures, organizational arrangements), and data."51
Inevitably, then, issues of economic power and monopoly will arise when technical
standards and practices are allowed to be proprietary.
"A network marketplace," then, "is created upon
this infrastructure by defining, through software configuration, the
rules of market participation and coordination."52
But Bar and Murase continue, "Policies defining a 'Commercial Code' for
e-commerce, as well as ground rules for privacy or taxation, will critically
shape the emerging e-marketplace."53
The notion of an e-marketplace has been the goal of the Article 2B debate, although
there has been relatively little discussion of consumers' rights or the creation
of new markets. The issue of taxation policy has been recognized as an important
economic factor, but one that is separable in principle from either commercial
codes or copyright policy. The issue of privacy has come up primarily within
the context of self-help, rather than in terms of a user's ability to control
access to personal data generated in using networked information. In general,
Bar and Murase contrast American policy, an "approach that relies heavily
on industry self-regulation and ex-post legal remedies," with European
Union policy, "a comprehensive regulatory regime that provides ex-ante
legal protection for consumers."54
This contrast resonates with Cohen's statement that "the drafters are far
more concerned with intangible harms to commercial interests than with intangible
harms to individuals."55
These factors provide good examples of why code must be understood as "frozen
social policy," and as raising issues of the public interest as much as
private property rights.
The third level consists of "the electronic transactions that
occur within the network marketplaces [that] require guarantees about data security
and support for electronic payments ...."56
At this level the Article 2B debate has not engaged the global dimensions of
information policy, particularly international debates concerning data security.
For example, American insistence upon export controls over encryption technologies
and "back doors" accessible to U.S. national security agencies is
perceived by Europeans as a thinly disguised trade barrier.
Finally, "in cases where the deliverables themselves are electronic
(e.g., software sold over the Internet), e-commerce will also involve policies
about intellectual property rights and content regulation."57
The Article 2B debate is centrally focused on the adequacy of the definitions
of deliverables as "information" and "information content,"
as well as issues concerning the coordination between federal laws concerning
copyright and state commercial codes.
5. Summary: The commonality of code across these levels.
Although parsing the problem in these four levels is helpful in gaining
a sense of the place of the Article 2B debate in a comprehensive information
policy, it is striking that there is also a commonality across the four levels
of analysis. At each level the digital economy is dependent upon code. Whether
software-based or instantiated in silicon, code determines both the means and
the mode of production, and therefore it is the key to wealth and power in an
information society. Indeed, a vision of an information society is the real
subject of the Article 2B debate, even if it is only occasionally visible as
such.
V. Conclusion
This paper has argued that the Article 2B debate, like all discussions
of "the computer revolution," has become trapped in its own metaphors-metaphors
about "information highways" and the "knowledge economy."
The first stage of every process of historical change must necessarily use metaphors
from the past, but they are at best heuristic.
Social science research has been presented in this paper as a test of these
heuristics, and has identified two important concerns. First, while software
code is the infrastructure of the new economy, it is not simply a commodity
like other forms of capital investment; it is also a communications medium that
engages important political interests. Second, the knowledge economy does not
replace the industrial economy in any simple sense; rather each economic sector
is being transformed according to its own logic, and therefore regulatory policy
must be modest and incremental. Unfortunately, the Article 2B debate has most
often failed to appreciate and respond to these concerns.