By David Friedman †
It is becoming possible for
owners of intellectual property in digital form to use technological protection
instead of, or in addition to, copyright to control the use of their property.
Professor Cohen argues against legal changes designed to facilitate this development;
I argue in favor of them.
Her argument depends in part on conventional attacks on the legitimacy,
hence the enforceability, of mass market contracts, in part on the claim that
such technologies threaten individual privacy and autonomy, in part on the
claim that copyright preempts alternative forms of protection-and should,
since it produces more desirable outcomes.
Economic theory suggests no reason why mass market contracts should be less
enforceable than individually negotiated contracts-and computer technology,
in the form of "click-wrap" contracts, makes it easier than in the
past to create a legally adequate contract in a mass market context. With
the exception of technologies that monitor software use and report it, and
ought, therefore, to be accompanied by suitable warnings, technological protection
of software poses no more threat to privacy or autonomy than traditional forms
of producer control over the characteristics of their products. A private
ordering of the market for intellectual property, based on contract and technological
protection, can be expected to produce both more intellectual property and
greater use of existing intellectual property than the current "one size
fits all" public ordering of copyright law. Current developments in this
direction ought to be encouraged, not discouraged, by the law.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1152
II. THE TECHNOLOGIES 1152
A. MONITORING USE 1153
B. RESTRICTING USE 1153
C. CONTRACT FORMATION 1154
III. COHEN'S ARGUMENTS 1155
A. THE EFFICIENCY OF FORM CONTRACTS 1156
B. IS FREEDOM OF CONTRACT INCONSISTENT WITH COPYRIGHT LAW? 1158
IV. WHAT COHEN LEAVES
OUT 1160
A. PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS 1160
B. TEMPTATIONS TO REPOSSESS 1162
C. ENTERPRISE REPO, INC. 1163
V. IS THE SHIFT
TO PRIVATE ORDERING
A GOOD THING? 1163
A. DOES PRIVATE ORDERING THREATEN INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY? 1164
B. DOES PRIVATE ORDERING PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE? 1167
C. IS COPYRIGHT MORE EFFICIENT THAN PRIVATE ORDERING? 1168
VI. CONCLUSION 1171
Professor Cohen's subject is the legal implications of technologies
for controlling the use of intellectual property in digital form. Most of these
technologies are unfamiliar to the majority of us; some do not yet exist. One
consequence, here as elsewhere in computer law, is that issues and arguments
tend to vanish into a fog of abstractions and (often misleading) metaphors.
In the hope of reducing that problem, I start with a brief sketch of the technologies
being discussed. I then go on to discuss parts of Professor Cohen's argument
that I think are mistaken and conclude with my own views on the proper legal
response to these technologies. Since the draft of Article 2B1
which Cohen attacks is now history, I will ignore the question of whether she
has correctly interpreted its terms and concentrate instead on the more important
issue of what the law ought to be.
I license software from you and fail, in your view, to meet the terms
of our agreement-perhaps I have fallen behind on my monthly payments. Your attempts
to persuade me to correct my failure are unsuccessful. You resolve the problem
by sending a message over the Internet to your software on my machine, instructing
it to cease operation-permanently.
This form of electronic self-help is somewhat misleadingly described, by both
Professor Cohen and the authors of the proposed revision to Article 2B, as "repossession."2
In practice, there is no need to repossess the software, since you can produce
another copy at negligible cost. And, because you have no need to repossess
the software, this form of electronic self-help poses much less threat of either
violence or breach of privacy than does the repossession of physical goods.
There is a second form of technological enforcement to which Professor
Cohen's privacy concerns are more relevant. Imagine that I am a computer programmer
who happens to be an orthodox Jew, with strong views on the subject of working
on the Sabbath. Not only am I unwilling to violate the biblical injunction myself,
I am unwilling to permit anyone else to use the product of my labors to violate
it. I accordingly include in the licensing agreement for my software a term
forbidding the licensee from running the software between sunset Friday and
sunset Saturday.
In order to enforce the restriction, I design my software-which functions
online-to occasionally check date and time; if it discovers that it is being
run on the Sabbath, it sends me a message notifying me of that fact and identifying
the licensee. I respond-Sunday morning-with a message to the software disabling
it and a message to the licensee rebuking him for violating my contract and
God's law.
One can imagine many more
conventional reasons why a licensor might wish to limit the licensee's use of
the licensed software and use technological monitoring of one sort or another
to enforce the restriction. Someone licensing a compilation of information, for
example, might specify in the contract that the information is to be used only
by the licensee and not made available to third parties. Providing the compilation
embedded in a program that monitored usage and reported on it to the licensor
would be one way of checking that the restriction was being obeyed. It would also
be a way of acquiring information about the licensee's activities that he might
prefer to keep secret, hence a potential violation of the licensee's privacy.
There is, however, a third form of technological enforcement that provides
a simpler solution to the problem faced by the Orthodox programmer-or the database
licensor. Instead of monitoring usage, control it. Every time the program boots
up, it checks date and time-and shuts down again if it is being used on the
Sabbath. Program the database to permit only a fixed number of queries per day.
Instead of using technology to monitor and report on usage so that the information
may be used to enforce the contract, use the technology to enforce the contract
directly.
Technological enforcement is not a new idea; early examples include copy protection
of floppy disks and the practice of printing documents in color schemes difficult
to photocopy. What is new is the degree of detailed control over use that such
technologies, as envisioned by companies such as IBM3
and InterTrust,4 promise to
make possible. Ideally, such software could make it possible for creators of
intellectual property to give away their product in encrypted form, enclosed
in a digital container. The container would provide information about its contents,
possibly including free samples, and a price list-so many cents per minute to
watch a multimedia presentation or per query to access a database. Charges might
be conditioned on the form of use as well as the amount-more to print out images
than to view them, a higher price for creating a freely accessible user database
out of a subset of the information in the encrypted database. Payment would
be online using digital cash.
Copy protection was for the most part unsuccessful, in part because it significantly
restricted legitimate uses, and in part because of technological difficulties
in preventing copying.5 More
sophisticated forms of technological enforcement will face similar problems.
If those problems can be overcome, the technology has
the potential to provide, for at least some forms of intellectual property,
self-protection greatly superior in effectiveness and flexibility to the protection
now provided by copyright law-and considerably less costly to enforce.
In addition to technologies associated with enforcement of contracts-shutting
down software from off site, monitoring usage, and controlling usage-there is
one more online technology important to the background of this discussion-the
technology of contract formation. Sellers wish to license their intellectual
property under terms of their own devising; doing so requires a contract with
the buyer. For mass market software, individual negotiation of terms is prohibitively
costly. That problem is solved by form contracts-but there remains the problem
of obtaining legally adequate consent without a lengthy face-to-face transaction.6
One possible solution is a shrinkwrap contract-a set of terms to which the
buyer is held to have assented by opening the container.7
The legal validity of such "assent" is uncertain-as reflected in the
reluctance of some courts to enforce such contracts.8
Even if enforceable, shrinkwrap provides an undesirably inflexible set of terms.
Both buyer and seller could be better off by customizing the terms to that particular
buyer's requirements-if it could be done without unreasonably high transaction
costs.
The solution is to move the transaction to the computer, converting shrinkwrap
to clickwrap. The seller's software provides terms-if desired, a menu of options
with prices. The contracting software-unlike a sticker on a cellophane wrapper-can
require explicit consent for the transaction to proceed. It can even require
the customer to spend a certain number of seconds with the relevant terms on
his computer screen before his assent will be accepted. Hence, clickwrap provides
a form of contract formation more flexible and less legally dubious than shrinkwrap.
Cohen's argument against permitting a shift in the mechanism for enforcing
rights over intellectual property from the public law of copyright to the private
alternatives of contract and technological protection depends on three claims:
1. The case for freedom of contract is problematic in the context of mass
market form contracts.
2. In any case, freedom of contract is limited in this context because it
is preempted by copyright law, and
3. Whether or not it is preempted, it ought to be, because copyright law produces
a more attractive result than freedom of contract.
I believe that all three are mistaken.
A. The Efficiency of Form Contracts
Professor Cohen writes, "In the mass market context, however,
the argument from consent is far too simple. The market system established by
the U.C.C. bears little resemblance to the atomistic market of the neoclassical,
libertarian paradigm ...."9
Later she writes, "In the mass market, consumers are contract takers; they
can refuse to buy, or hold out for a lower price, but they generally cannot
demand a particular package of contract terms or product characteristics."10
Cohen here resurrects the ancient error associated with the term "contract
of adhesion"-the idea that the argument for freedom of contract depends
on contracts being bargained and thus does not apply to the form contracts common
in mass market transactions.
To see why this is an error, consider the situation from the standpoint of
a firm drawing up a form contract under a legal regime recognizing freedom of
contract. It can specify any terms it likes-but those terms only apply if the
other party chooses to sign the contract. The characteristics of what the consumer
is buying include the terms of the contract under which he is buying it; the
less favorable those terms are to him-the more easily, for example, they permit
the seller to repossess the purchased good-the less he will be willing to pay
for the bundle consisting of the good and terms of sale.
Suppose that, with a particular draft of the sales contract, the value of
the product to the buyer, and hence the highest price he will be willing to
pay for it, is $100. The seller11
considers modifying the draft in his favor by adding a term-perhaps an easy
right of repossession-that makes him better off by ten dollars and the consumer
worse off by fifteen. Since the value of the product is fifteen dollars less
under the modified contract, so is the maximum price the consumer will pay.
Adding the term gives the seller a ten dollar gain (lower legal costs if the
sales terms are violated and the product must be repossessed) and a fifteen
dollar loss (reduction in the price he can get from the buyer), for a net loss
of five dollars. He is better off with the original draft.
The generalization of the argument is straightforward. Any term in the contract
that provides a net benefit to the two parties also makes the seller better
off, because gains and losses to the buyer are transferred to the seller through
their effect on the price the buyer is willing to pay. Any term that provides
a net loss makes the seller worse off. Hence, a rational
seller will design an efficient contract-a contract that maximizes the net gain
to buyer and seller combined. No bargaining is required.
The argument is a special case of a more general argument-that producers have
an incentive to design products with an efficient bundle of characteristics.
Putting tires on the wheels of cars, or radios in their dashboards, costs the
seller something. Yet cars come equipped with tires and radios-not because of
any legal requirement that those features be included, but because sellers recognize
the effect of such characteristics on the value of the product to the buyer.
As with any argument for economic efficiency, this one
becomes less rigorous as one shifts to a more elaborate picture of market transactions.
Consumers may make mistakes. Producers with monopoly power may use product characteristics,
including contract terms, as a way of charging a higher price to consumers willing
to pay it-an indirect form of discriminatory pricing-at some cost in efficiency.
But none of this has anything in particular to do with intellectual property
or digital forms thereof-or, for that matter, mass market contracts. These are
qualifications to the general argument for free markets that apply to markets
for bread and beer just as to markets for books and multimedia software. One
reason the qualifications do not destroy the argument is that a more elaborate
picture also allows for ways in which consumers solve problems of imperfect
information-via producer reputation, third party evaluations, and other mechanisms
familiar to us in the context of cars and computers, and equally relevant in
the context of elaborate contracts and technologically protected software.
I do not know if Professor Cohen has considered the empirical question of
whether she is more likely to be cheated in the mass market context of buying
a car or the individually negotiated contract for fixing it, or whether Microsoft
Word is or WYLBUR12 was more
likely to perform as expected. The answer, judging by my experience at least,
is that mass market products are more likely to provide me the characteristics
I want and believe I am getting than more idiosyncratic products. This is in
part because the effect of reputational incentives on the producers of mass
market products and economies of scale in the generation of consumer information
more than outweigh any advantage of being able to represent my preferences in
one-on-one bargaining.
Professor Cohen's argument, if correct, should apply to product characteristics
in general, not just to contract terms. Even a complex contract is a good deal
simpler than, say, a computer or automobile. If consumers cannot be trusted
to make a sufficiently informed decision about contract terms, and we are therefore
better off with the fixed set of terms implied by copyright law, how can they
be trusted to make a sufficiently informed decision about whether to buy a car
with or without a supercharger or a computer whose CPU does or does not have
backside cache?
In arguing against the efficiency of mass market contracts, Cohen sometimes
writes as though bargaining is somehow a good thing-an end in itself. Thus,
we have "[t]he opposite rule, disallowing electronic self-help unless authorized
in a separately-negotiated agreement, probably would encourage more 'bargaining'
in that information providers most likely would offer lower prices to consumers
willing to agree to electronic monitoring."13
This way of putting the argument gets it exactly backwards. The point of choosing
as default terms the terms most parties would bargain to is to avoid of the
cost of bargaining. If you want to encourage bargaining, the way to do it is
to have the legal system set default terms that nobody wants, making it necessary
to negotiate and explicitly agree to every detail of every contract. That may
be a desirable policy from the standpoint of lawyers and law professors, since
it would greatly increase the demand for the services of both, but it is an
undesirable policy from the standpoint of everyone else.
B. Is Freedom of Contract Inconsistent with Copyright Law?
Phrases such as "mass-market contracts that are inconsistent with
copyright"14 and "[l]imits
on information ownership set by the public law of copyright"15
reveal a subtle error in Cohen's argument-the belief that copyright law gives
consumers the right to use information in certain ways. To see in what sense
that is an error, consider Professor Cohen's "fair use" right to quote
the most recent draft of this Article immediately after I finished writing it.
Such quotation is clearly permitted under the fair use exception of the Copyright
Act.16 But since the only
existing copy of the draft was on the hard disk of the computer in my office,
Professor Cohen could not have accessed it, and thus could not have quoted it,
without violating the common law rule against trespass.
What fair use and similar rules provide is not a right
to copy information, but a limit to the creator's right to use copyright law
to prevent such copying. That distinction is unimportant as long as the
only way in which the creator controls his property is through copyright law.
But it matters in contexts, such as trade secret law or technological protection,
where other forms of protection play an important role. Scientific laws are
not patentable-but that does not make it illegal for me to put a lock on the
door of my research laboratory, or legal for my competitor to break in.
In a related vein, Cohen writes, "[the Court] has also held that [states]
may not grant property-like rights in unprotectable inventions .... On
the same reasoning, nor may they confer property-like rights in unprotectable
... works, or in unprotectable aspects or components of otherwise copyrightable
works."17
The legal point is correct-states cannot grant their own equivalent of copyright,
whether under the guise of unfair competition18
or in the form of plug mold statutes.19
But to describe contract as granting "property-like rights" misrepresents
the nature of property. The essential feature of a property right-such as copyright-is
that it is good against the world.20
A contract right is good only against the party that signed the contract. A
licensor can enforce contractual restrictions only against the licensee.
Technological protection is in a third category, neither property nor contract.
The producer of a good may, under ordinary circumstances, design it with whatever
characteristics he likes. If I build a car that will only last for five years,
and tell you it will only last for five years, I am (from your standpoint) achieving
the same result as if I sold you only a five year lease or required, as a condition
of selling you the car, that you agree to junk it after five years. But although
the result is the same, the mechanism is entirely different-I am controlling
my product, not your rights.
Similarly, if I give you my intellectual property inside a digital container
and inform you that in order to access it you must make online payments according
to the attached price list, I am achieving the same result I might have achieved
through a contract or (perhaps) a property rule. But I am doing so through a
non-legal mechanism. To argue that legal rules designed to make self-enforcement
easier are equivalent to the grant of a property right is like claiming that
legal rules permitting farmers to use barbed wire are equivalent to land grants.
Central to Professor Cohen's paper is the special nature of intellectual
property, especially intellectual property in digital form. While she points
out special features of such property when their implications strengthen her
argument, she sometimes fails to do so when they weaken it. Consider three examples:
Cohen writes:
Even the common law of property historically has recognized certain public
rights of access to or across the property of another. Most closely analogous
is the public trust doctrine, which preserves a right of access across privately-owned
land when necessary to reach beaches and other areas that the law considers
to be commonly-owned. Similarly, the exceptions and exclusions in copyright
law preserve public access to the linguistic, cultural, and scientific commons.21
I clear the trees from a piece of land, dig out boulders, pile them into stone
walls, and thus make it suitable for farming. The land becomes, in proper Lockean
fashion, mine. The obvious justification for my ownership is that it is my work
that has given the land value, so it would be unjust-as well as inefficient-to
permit someone else to seize it for his use.
There is an important qualification to that argument, from both the ethical
and the economic perspective. Although the land was less useful before, it was
not entirely useless; other people could walk across it, gather acorns, and-perhaps
most importantly-other people could do what I have just done. Now that it is
my property, those options have vanished. If I acquire unrestricted control
over the land, I am getting more than I have produced-which may be unjust and
may also lead to inefficient rent-seeking as individuals clear land in part
to appropriate its pre-existing value.22
One possible response to this problem is the Lockean proviso that my acquisition
of ownership depends on there being more land- "as much and as good"-left
for others to mix their labor with. The implications of that restriction for
modern society have been discussed by a number of writers.23
A second implication is that if my land happens to block the only access to
a valuable piece of the common land, other people may have an easement-a right
to cross it.
This is a persuasive argument for restricting absolute property rights in
real estate. It has at least some application to other forms of property, such
as cars, to the extent that they consist in part-perhaps a very small part-of
unproduced resources taken from the commons. The one sort of property for which
the argument makes no sense at all is intellectual property.
I read Shakespeare and Twain and Dante, and write my own novel-thus mixing
my labor with the metaphorical cultural commons. Having written my novel, I
tie it up good and tight with contract and technological protection.
Have I taken something out of the commons? No. Shakespeare and Twain and Dante
are still there, just as available to the next author or reader as before I
wrote my novel. In the case of intellectual property, the Lockean proviso is
automatically satisfied-there is always as much and as good, because my use
of intellectual property does not leave any less for the next user. The only
thing I have locked up tight is my own creation.
Cohen quotes Robert Scott when she writes, "The challenge, then,
is to 'design a pattern of reciprocal commitments that effectively constrains
the debtor without unduly tempting the creditor.'"24
She adds:
There are good reasons to think that electronic self-help would create such
risks. As Part I discussed, section 2B-310 would authorize intrusion at the
licensor's sole discretion; in this, it resembles the "confession of judgment"
clauses that Scott condemns as offering too great a temptation "to evade
contractual risks."25
In the case of physical goods, there is an obvious reason why creditors may
be tempted to abuse their right to repossess-they want the goods. If I have
sold you a car and you have paid for it, I may still wish to repossess it (assuming
that, by some form of legal trickery, I can get away with doing so) in order
to sell it again to someone else. But if I sell you a computer program and you
pay me for it, I have no similar temptation-if I want to sell someone else a
copy, I can make another one at virtually no cost. Hence the temptation to abuse
the right of repossession is less for intellectual property than for other forms,
not more, making the argument for restricting that right weaker, not stronger.
Cohen comments on this feature of intellectual property elsewhere in her Article,
when she argues that the right to electronic repossession may not permit the
producer to charge lower prices,26
because "the supply of copies is infinite and virtually costless."27
The premise is correct; the conclusion is not. While repossession gets the producer
nothing, the threat of repossession may result in his getting paid. The more
likely it is that producers will be paid, the lower the price they can and,
in a competitive market, will charge for their goods. One of the virtues of
electronic self-help is that it lowers the cost of enforcement and thus makes
the threat more credible.
Professor Cohen writes, "Imagine, for example, that a team of
high-tech repo men had just used a transporter device to 'beam' your sofa out
of your living room and back to the furniture store. It would be difficult for
the creditor to convince you that no intrusion had occurred."28
How difficult it would be to convince me would depend on how the team managed
the repossession-whether by first beaming itself into my living room before
beaming the sofa out, by merely inspecting my living room and occupants at long
distance in the process of targeting the sofa for removal, or simply by pressing
a button that automatically sent the sofa back to the warehouse. The final case
is the one corresponding most closely to electronic repossession.29
While it might be inconvenient, especially if I happened to be sitting on the
sofa at the time, the appropriate analogy is not to physical repossession but
to a disk crash or software failure "beaming out" my desktop computer
by converting it into an oversized paperweight. I have had the experience, more
than once, of discovering that a timed demo copy of a computer program had timed
out-and while sometimes inconvenient, it did not feel in the least like an intrusion
or a violation of my privacy.
Thus, when Cohen writes that "Article 2B sanctions a degree of intrusion
into private homes and offices that is unprecedented,"30
she ignores the fact that what is being sanctioned is a form of virtual "repossession"
very much less intrusive than the physical repossession covered by the precedents.
V.
Is The Shift to Private Ordering a Good Thing?
On at least one point, I agree with Professor Cohen.31
Article 2B reflects an important shift currently occurring in the ways in which
creators of intellectual property control their works and get paid for their
efforts. The shift is from dependence on the public law of copyright to dependence
on contract and self-enforcement-from a public to a private ordering. Professor
Cohen believes the change is for the worse; I believe it is for the better.
A. Does Private Ordering Threaten Individual Privacy?
One of the arguments Cohen offers is the claim that the shift threatens
important values associated with individual privacy. That claim is false with
regard to two of the three technologies under discussion. The ability to disable
software in response to a perceived breach of the licensing terms poses no more
threat to privacy than a building contractor's ability to call up an employee
working on a job and tell him that, since the customer is refusing to pay, he
should stop working. Software that controls its own usage poses less of a threat
to privacy than any alternative mechanism for enforcing contract terms, because
it does not require any human being to monitor usage.
The claim is true with regard to a third technology-the use of software to
monitor usage and report it to the software's creator. Hence, a producer who
embeds such features in his software ought to be obligated to disclose them
to the purchaser. Subject to such a disclosure requirement, such software poses
precisely the same sort of threat to privacy as any other mechanism by which
A acquires information about B with B's consent and knowledge-a frequent and
probably inevitable occurrence in modern society.32
Cohen appears to recognize the weakness of her privacy argument in the context
of software that enforces restrictions on its use, and falls back on the alternative
claim that even if such software does not violate privacy in any literal sense,
at least it violates autonomy. Thus, she writes, "Privacy protects certain
spaces not only to shield personal behaviors from observation by others, but
also to preserve a zone of autonomy from interference by others."33
She adds, "In a sense, the intrusion (or at least its but-for cause) occurred
much earlier, when the licensor determined that consumers in their private homes
and offices would be allowed to take certain actions but not others."34
The problem with these statements is that a producer necessarily determines
what his product will or will not do in the process of designing it; it is an
odd use of language to describe the failure of a product to do things that I
would like it to do as an intrusion or as interference by others in my zone
of autonomy.
Professor Cohen responds to this line of argument when she writes:
The freedom of contract argument for unfettered electronic regulation of performance
... conflates choice with submission and product capabilities with control of
behavior. Your vacuum cleaner cannot fly, or clean your oven, and you have no
particular right to one that can. However, except in special cases governed
by the patent laws, within private spaces you may use a lawfully-acquired vacuum
cleaner in any way you see fit.35
But applying this to self-enforcing restrictions-my third category of electronic
protection36-confuses "may
use" in the sense of "is not illegal for you to use" with "may
use" in the sense of "others must make it possible for you to use."
If my software turns itself off on the Sabbath, you still may use it
on the Sabbath-but you can't.
In Cohen's sense, product capabilities do control behavior-your vacuum cleaner's
inability to clean your oven restricts your oven cleaning behavior, just as
copy protection built into a computer program restricts your copying behavior.
Perhaps the distinction she intends is between restrictions that exist because
it would be costly to avoid them-by building a vacuum cleaner with an oven cleaning
attachment-and restrictions that exist because the producer of the product does
not want you to use his product in certain ways. That might for some purposes
be an interesting distinction, but lots of existing products already fit into
the second category-and that fact has not in the past been considered legally
problematic.
Consider the original Macintosh computer. It was intended as an easy-to-use
tool for a mass market, including many people who could not be trusted to work
on the machine's internals without injuring either it or themselves. Hence,
instead of designing the case to fasten with ordinary screws, Apple designed
it so that it could only be opened with a set of special tools.37
This was precisely the real-world equivalent of electronic regulation of performance.
I am left wondering whether Professor Cohen believes that Steve Jobs, in designing
the computer that way and selling it to me, intruded into my privacy and violated
my zone of autonomy.
Again, Professor Cohen writes, "In sum, Article 2B proposes to arrogate
to private information providers the power to reach into customers' homes and
offices and literally shape their behavior-in many cases without even the courtesy
of express contractual notice."38
Information providers are not the only ones with that power-Professor Cohen
has it too. When she revised the article to which I am replying, she reached
out into my office and shaped my behavior-forcing me to remove one of my favorite
passages from my response because it no longer applied to her revised version.
And she did it, as best I can recall, without any contract at all. Human beings
are continually shaping each other's behavior-consider the enormous effect that
the inventors of modern computer technology had on both my behavior and Professor
Cohen's. The appropriate limit to such shaping is not an elaborate set of rules
defining what characteristics products (or journal articles) may have, but the
simple rule of mutual consent-if I do not like what she does with her article,
I do not have to write a comment on it. If I do not want to use computers, I
can forgo a new Mac in favor of an abacus and a box of clay bricks.
Cohen writes: "Yet if reasonable expectations are defined solely by the
limits of technological possibility, privacy has a bleak future."39
I agree40-and that is a
good reason to oppose FBI proposals to make mass wiretaps cheap and easy. But
the limitations of privacy that Professor Cohen is currently discussing require
the consent of the victim, whether explicitly by contract or implicitly in the
purchase of a product with known characteristics. Such intrusions will be restricted
not merely by the limits of technological possibility but by what consumers
are willing to put up with-and at what price.
Nothing in present law prevents me from proposing to a key employee or business
partner that he have a small transmitter attached to his leg, even surgically
embedded, in order that I can monitor his movements to make sure he is not visiting
my competitor or absconding to South America. Such a device is well within the
limits of technological possibility. Yet we do not observe such precautions-except
in the involuntary relation between convicts and the criminal justice system.41
We do not observe them because the price I would be willing to pay to buy consent
to such an intrusion is, in almost all cases, lower than the price the other
party would be willing to accept.
B. Does private ordering provide adequate notice?
Throughout this discussion, I have taken it for granted that the transactions
we are considering-in particular, the purchase of software with usage restrictions
embedded in it-are voluntary. Cohen might disagree. She writes, "Effectively,
section 2B-310 would allow information providers to contract around copyright
law without disclosing that fact to users."42
She adds, "Given the severity of the consequences and the inability of
most consumers to evade them, lack of notice of the possibility of electronic
self-help is simply unfair."43
These and similar passages make it sound as though all she wants is full disclosure
by sellers of any restrictions on use built into their products. That seems
a reasonable requirement-one whose only cost is a little extra paper and ink
reproducing a properly designed paragraph of boiler-plate prose or the still
less expensive electronic equivalent.
But Professor Cohen also writes, "It is worth noting, too, that none
of the cases concerning electronic self-help has involved a non-negotiated,
mass-market contract; thus, no court was required to consider whether the 'notice'
afforded consumers by standard-form provisions is enough to validate electronic
self-help."44 She then
goes on to devote much of Part IV of her Article to arguing that, in the context
of mass market contracts, agreement is not really consent.
So the implication of her argument is not that producers should be free to
build electronic self-enforcement into their products, provided they are honest
with their customers about what they are getting-a position with which I would
agree-but rather that no mass market contract the producer can write will provide
sufficient notice to justify such products. What is presented as an argument
in favor of disclosure is in fact an argument against freedom of contract. As
Cohen writes, "The problem here is not lack of 'bargaining' per se, or
even lack of knowledge, but rather lack of consent and inability to affect the
options on the table."45
That might be said with as much, and as little, truth about almost any mass
market consumer product.46
The implication-whether Professor Cohen would accept it I do not know-is that
the characteristics of cars, computers, and television sets, as well as those
of computer programs, ought to be set by the courts or Congress, not by the
market.
C. Is copyright more efficient than private ordering?
So far I have dealt with a line of argument based on issues of privacy,
autonomy, and the like. Cohen's other argument is a broad claim that the inflexible
mechanism of copyright is superior in its results to the more flexible private
alternatives. She writes:
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the copyright system promotes the social
goals of creative progress and public access to creative works in important
ways that the market cannot measure. Because it is difficult to assess creative
potential ex ante, ... and because current information providers may
perceive some works (for example, parodies) as detrimental to their interests,
there is no reason to think that giving information providers control over all
uses of their information products would result in more or better creative progress.
... In this respect, the enhanced accessibility of creative and informational
works under copyright law produces important external benefits that most likely
would be underproduced by a private-law market-based regime. In short, the copyright
regime of limited rights and user privileges not only serves nonmonetizable
and distributional concerns, but those concerns also are central to a particular
understanding of creative and social "progress."47
The argument has two parts. The first is the claim, surely true, that the
market will not produce a perfectly efficient outcome, in part because some
of the benefits from intellectual property cannot be captured by the producer
and so will be ignored in his calculations of what to produce. The second is
the claim, surely false, that the particular set of legal rules imposed by copyright
can be expected to produce a more nearly efficient outcome than the freedom
of contract alternative.48
The claim is false for two reasons. First, and most obviously, the more flexible
regime allows the producer to capture more of the benefit from what he produces-that,
after all, is why sellers of intellectual property would choose to use contract
and self-enforcement instead of relying entirely on copyright. The higher the
return to producing intellectual property the more intellectual property will
be produced. Hence, to the extent that the creation of
intellectual property is a purpose of copyright law, it is a purpose better
served by permitting other options as well.49
Second, and less obviously, the private alternatives to copyright result in
more, not less, use of such intellectual property as is produced. The standard
economic argument against legal protection of intellectual property is that
it results in owners of intellectual property charging a positive price for
its use even though the marginal cost of one more use is zero. Thus, copyright
results in an inefficiently low number of copies.50
Private enforcement does not eliminate that problem but it does reduce it.
The more flexible the pricing options, the easier it is for the seller to charge
a high price to the high-volume, high-value user, and a low price to the low-volume,
low-value user, capturing revenue from the former without losing sales to the
latter.51 The seller of a
database designed to charge by the query can and will make it available both
to the casual user, who uses a few dollars worth of queries a month, and to
the commercial user, who uses a few thousand dollars worth a month. The same
seller, restricted to the terms of copyright, including the doctrine of first
sale, finds that he must charge a single price to all users for unlimited use-and
sets that price at a level that eliminates the casual user.
Cohen is concerned that some uses currently permitted by the doctrine of fair
use will be prohibited, or at least charged for, under the private alternative.
That may well happen. But the doctrine of fair use is constructed in a way that
for the most part limits it to uses whose economic value is low-uses which it
is in the interest of the producer to permit at a low price. Indeed, one economic
justification for the doctrine is that it permits use of intellectual property
in contexts where the transaction cost of licensing is higher than the value
of what is licensed. If the transaction cost is radically reduced, the size
of that category will shrink.
Cohen offers the counterexample of parodies and the like-uses of intellectual
property which the owner might want to prevent rather than charge for. It is
hard to believe that the effect of technological protection on this class of
uses will be significant. Technological protection may prevent me from copying
your work, but it cannot prevent me from viewing it and then writing a critique
or parody. Conceivably, a product's licensing terms could include an agreement
not to publish anything critical about it-but it would then be an adequate critique
to simply publish the existence of such a requirement, a fact that any reader
could easily verify for himself by trying to license the software.52
If the social goal of the copyright system is to promote progress and the
useful arts by increasing the quantity and accessibility of intellectual property,
that goal is an argument in favor of the shift towards private ordering, not
against.
We are left with Cohen's somewhat cryptic references to distributional concerns.
Most intellectual property transactions occur between firms; it is hard to see
how rules that favor firms that consume intellectual property over firms that
produce it (as Cohen apparently believes the current copyright system does,
at least relative to the private alternatives) are likely, on average, to make
rich people poorer and poor people richer, which I presume is what "serves
... distributional concerns"53
is supposed to mean.
Some transactions involve consumption of intellectual property by private
consumers-buying and reading a book, for example. But insofar as the shift to
a private system has any distributional effect on ultimate consumers, it ought
to be in the opposite of the direction Cohen implies.
Private enforcement permits a greater degree of price discrimination. Rich
people are, on average, willing to pay more for things than poor people, and
a well designed set of discriminatory prices requires them to do so.
Cohen's general argument exhibits a feature unfortunately common in arguments
opposing changes that substitute private markets for centralized control. When
considering the attractiveness of the market alternative, she imposes high standards
of proof-any failure of the real world situation to meet theoretical conditions
for perfect economic efficiency is adequate reason to ignore the economic arguments
for the tendency of private markets to produce efficient outcomes. When considering
the alternative ordering-in this case, the one size fits all terms of copyright-no
theoretical argument is offered nor, apparently, needed. It is enough to point
out that in a world where protection is limited to copyright someone, somewhere,
will be able to use some piece of intellectual property for free that he might
have to pay for under a system of self-enforcement.
We are faced with two alternative approaches to organizing the production
and distribution of intellectual property: the public ordering defined by copyright
law and the private ordering implied by freedom of contract and the technologies
of digital monitoring and self-enforcement.
In a fully efficient world, as that concept is understood by economists, every
good, including every possible item of intellectual property, would be produced
if and only if the net costs of producing it were less than the net benefits.
In the real world, under either approach, that objective is unattainable. Real
world markets necessarily omit from their calculations some benefits and some
costs, whether because consumers are imperfectly informed about what they are
consuming or because producers are unable to internalize all benefits, and are
not required to internalize all costs, associated with their production. That
will be as true in the market implied by a private ordering of intellectual
property as it is true in other markets.
Here, as elsewhere, the argument for the market is not that it is perfect,
but that it is less imperfect than the alternatives.
Under the public law of copyright, producers are less able than under private
contract to internalize the value of what they produce, hence less likely to
produce those goods, with those characteristics, that maximize the net benefit
from their activities. Hence the result can be expected to be less, not more,
efficient than under the private alternative.
Seen from the economic standpoint, the fundamental justification for the public
law of intellectual property is a market failure. That failure is not, as Cohen
seems to believe, the failure of producers of intellectual property to take
account of external or nonmonetizable or distributional consequences of their
activity-if that were the problem, the solution would be not copyright, which
suffers from the same problems, but some form of public subsidy.
The market failure that justifies the law of intellectual property is the
difficulty of enforcing a producer's rights in what he produces. It is only
because, in a world where it is difficult for producers to prevent or observe
unauthorized copying, contracts to control the use of intellectual property
are to a large degree unenforceable, that modern law provides a form of property
protection as an alternative. Insofar as digital technology is eliminating that
market failure, we should adapt our legal rules to encourage the change, not
to block it. Cohen would prefer to persuade the cripple who has finally been
cured that he should retain crutches rather than risk the harebrained adventure
of walking.
This final metaphor suggests an important question that neither Cohen nor
(for different reasons) those on the other side of the issue have discussed:
is copyright law becoming obsolete, and, if so, ought it to be abolished? If
the crutch is no longer needed, should we discard it?
My own view is that, in the limited area of online transactions involving
intellectual property in digital form, copyright law will, over the next few
decades, become increasingly irrelevant, in part because better alternatives
will become available, and in part because it will become increasingly unenforceable.54
I leave to some future conference the further implications of that change.