1997 Julie E. Cohen.

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Email: cohen@law.pitt.edu. J.D. 1991, Harvard Law School. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a March 1997 conference on the WIPO Copyright Treaty co-sponsored by the American Committee for Interoperable Systems and Santa Clara University School of Law. I would like to thank the participants in that conference, in particular Peter Jaszi and Pamela Samuelson, for their thought-provoking comments, and Tom Zagorsky for research assistance.

1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10-12, 177-78, 230 (1995) [hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER]; Jon Bing, The Contribution of Technology to the Identification of Rights, Especially in Sound and Audio-Visual Works: An Overview, 4 INT'L. J. L. & INFO. TECH. 234, 235-36 (1996); CHRISTOPHER BURNS, INC., COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT AND THE NII: REPORT TO THE ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS 15-16 (1996); Mark Stefik, Letting Loose the Light: Igniting Commerce in Electronic Publication, in INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS 219, 220-22 (Mark Stefik, ed., 1996) [hereinafter Stefik, Letting Loose the Light] ("[C]omputers need not be blind instruments of copyright infringement. Properly designed digital systems can be more powerful and flexible instruments of trade in publications than any other medium.").

2. See Charles Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE KNOWRIGHT '95 CONFERENCE 85, 97-101 (Klaus Brunnstein & Peter Paul Sint, eds., 1995); Stefik, supra note 1, at 226-34; Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 138, 139-40 (1997) [hereinafter Stefik, Shifting the Possible]; INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF REPRODUCTION RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES, DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES, (visited April 17, 1997) <http://www.ncri.com/articles/rights_management/> [hereinafter IFRRO REPORT].

3. See Bing, supra note 1, at 261-66; BURNS, supra note 1, at 17-21, 30-35; Clark, supra note 2, at 97-101; Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 142; IFRRO REPORT, supra note 2.

4. See, e.g., National Information Infrastructure: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (May 7, 1996) (testimony of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive Coalition), available in WESTLAW, USTestimony database; Copyright Protection on the Internet: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (Feb. 7-8, 1996) (statements on Feb. 7, 1996 of Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice President, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.; Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.; Jack Valenti, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; and statement on Feb. 8, 1996 of the Association of American Publishers), available in WESTLAW, USTestimony database; see also NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 230 (endorsing anti-tampering legislation for that reason).

5. NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 1.

6. National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act, S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter NIICPA].

7. See Digital Future Coalition, collected position statements, letters, and press releases (visited April 5, 1997) <http://www.ari.net/dfc/>.

8. NIICPA, supra note 6, at 4 ( proposed 1201 of the Copyright Act).

9. Id. 1202.

10. Id. 1203(c)(2).

11. Id. 1203(c)(3).

12. Id. 1203(c)(4).

13. Id. 1203(b)(4)-(5).

14. Id. 1203(b)(2).

15. Id. 1203(b)(6).

16. Id. 1204.

17. U.S. Department of Commerce, Protocol to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (proposed), Submitted to Committees of Experts by Bruce Lehman, Ass't Sec. of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, November 29, 1995 (on file with author); see Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 61, 62-64 (quoting statement by Bruce Lehman, chair of the working group that produced the NII White Paper and head of the United States delegation to WIPO, that characterized the treaty process as "a second bite at the apple").

18. World Intellectual Property Organization, Chairman of the Committees of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention and on a Possible Instrument for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, Art. 13 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Basic Proposal].

19. Id. Art. 13, cmt. 13.03.

20. Id. Art. 13, cmt. 13.05.

21. Id. Art. 13, cmt. 13.06.

22. Seth Greenstein, News from WIPO: Day Seven-The Audio Visual Debate, and What's Fair Is Fair Use (visited Apr. 5, 1997) <http://www.hrrc.org/wr_12-10.html> (reporting comments by delegates).

23. Id.; John Browning, Africa 1 Hollywood 0, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 61, 186 ("Japan and other Asian nations were up in arms about proposals that would effectively have turned the consumer electronics industry into a branch of publishing.").

24. World Intellectual Property Organization, Provisional Treaty on Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 11, 53 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 155, 156 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Provisional Treaty]. This language was drafted by the African delegates, who emerged during the negotiations as a critical, and thoughtful, voting bloc. See Browning, supra note 23, at 186.

25. WIPO Basic Proposal, supra note 18, Art. 14.

26. Id. Art. 14, cmt. 14.04.

27. Id. Art. 14, cmt. 14.05.

28. See Greenstein, supra note 22.

29. WIPO Provisional Treaty, supra note 24, Art. 12, at 156.

30. This appears to be the consensus view. See Samuelson, supra note 17, at 180; Clinton Administration is Undecided on Implementing Steps for WIPO Treaties, 53 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 241, 242 (1997) [hereinafter Implementing WIPO Treaties].

31. According to Prof. Samuelson, implementing legislation would be necessary only for Article 12, regarding RMI. Samuelson, supra note 17, at 180. Article 12 defines RMI to include "information which identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the work, or information about terms and conditions of use of the work . . . " WIPO Provisional Treaty, supra note 24, at 156. Removal or alteration of the first three items would be actionable under 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the use in commerce of "any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" that is likely to confuse consumers as to the origin or sponsorship of a product or service. 15 U.S.C.A. 1125(a)(1) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 105-4, approved Mar. 3, 1997). However, 43(a) does not appear to cover removal of information about terms and conditions of use.

As to Article 11, Prof. Samuelson believes that the doctrine of contributory copyright infringement already provides the required "adequate and effective" remedy against circumvention of CMS. Conversation with Pamela Samuelson, Law Professor, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley (Mar. 14, 1997). The doctrine extends infringement liability to knowing purveyors of technologies that have no "substantial noninfringing use." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441-42 (1984); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). For the reasons discussed in part III.B, infra, I do not believe that the "substantial noninfringing use" doctrine alone can resolve the problem of tampering with CMS.

32. Implementing WIPO Treaties, supra note 30, at 242.

33. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 104th Cong., NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 2441 106 (Draft Comm. Print 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter NIICPA Draft Committee Print].

34. Id. 1201.

35. Id. 1202.

36. Id. 1203(d).

37. Id. 1204(a)-(b).

38. WIPO Provisional Treaty, supra note 24, at 156.

39. NIICPA, supra note 6, 1201.

40. NIICPA Draft Committee Print, supra note 33, 1201(a) (emphasis added).

41. See NIICPA, supra note 6, 1201-02. The draft committee version tightens this standard slightly, but not far enough. See text accompanying notes 54-55, infra.

42. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1984).

43. Id. at 441.

44. Id. at 442.

45. See, e.g., David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, SCI. AM., Aug. 1992, at 96, 96-97 (visited Apr. 26, 1997) <http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/Chaum/sciam.html>; A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 453-71 (1996).

46. See Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-28 (9th Cir. 1992); DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1188-91 (N.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1104-34 (1995) [hereinafter Cohen, Reverse Engineering].

47. See Browning, supra note 23, at 186 (noting objections to proposed Article 13 of the WIPO treaty on this basis).

48. 17 U.S.C. 1002(c) (1994).

49. 47 U.S.C.A. 605(e)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Nov. 1996).

50. Thomas C. Vinje, A Brave New World of Technical Protection Systems: Will There Still Be Room for Copyright?, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 431, 433 (1996).

51. See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 22 (reporting on proposals made during the WIPO Diplomatic Conference by the African Group-Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia-and by Singapore); Vinje, supra note 50, at 435. The European Community's directive on the legal protection of computer software, which contains a provision regarding circumvention of devices used to protect computer programs, employs a "sole intended purpose" test. See Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 7(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.

52. See 17 U.S.C. 501(a) (1994).

53. See WIPO Basic Proposal, supra note 18, Art. 13, cmt. 13.03.

54. NIICPA Draft Committee Print, supra note 33, 1202(a).

55. Id. 1201(a).

56. 17 U.S.C. 106 (1994).

57. See Id. 107 (1994).

58. See Id. 108 (1994).

59. See Id. 110 (1994).

60. 499 U.S. 340, 347-50 (1991) (requiring originality in "selection or arrangement" of data in order for a compilation to gain copyright protection).

61. WIPO Provisional Treaty, supra note 24, Art. 11, at 156.

62. NIICPA, supra note 6, 1201.

63. See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 231-32 (noting that proposed legislation targets circumvention "without authority" and that the applicable "authority" may be the author's permission or limitations upon the author's rights under the Copyright Act).

64. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 1, at 17-21, 29-36; Clark, supra note 2, at 99; Carol Risher, Libraries, Copyright and the Electronic Environment, Position Paper on Behalf of the International Publishers Copyright Council on the Occasion of the IPA 25th Congress, Barcelona, April 1996 (visited Apr. 5, 1997) <http://www.ipa-uie.org/ipcc_bcn.html>; see also Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 147-49.

65. NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 58, 191-92.

66. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 66-69, 137-63 (1997) (noting the vulnerability of noncopyrightable information products to appropriation by others, and arguing for the creation of a new intellectual property paradigm designed to balance the competing considerations of incentives to innovate and public access to information); J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 517-20 (1995) (same).

67. Regarding the "equitable rule of reason" that governs in fair use cases, see H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).

68. See Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 156 (observing that the "stakeholders in digital property" include consumers and librarians).

69. 17 U.S.C. 109(a) (1994); Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 145-46; see also, id. at 152-53 (noting that CMS could be designed to release digital works when the term of copyright expires).

70. See BURNS, supra note 1, at 34-35; see also id. at 16 (noting that CMS "might be resisted by users who . . . get no benefit from" them, without acknowledging that "users"-i.e., the public-may suffer any losses other than "functional disadvantages" and "complexity").

71. See Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 149.

72. The White Paper observes that "the fair use doctrine does not require a copyright owner to allow or to facilitate unauthorized access or use of a work." NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 231. This formulation avoids (or perhaps evades) the real question: whether copyright owners may obstruct lawful access or use of a work. For more discussion of this point, see Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 111-12 (1997).

73. See 18 U.S.C.A. 1030(a)(5), 2701 (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 104-333, approved Nov. 12, 1996).

74. I am indebted to Professor Larry Lessig of The University of Chicago Law School for naming this proposition the "Cohen Theorem." Electronic mail from Larry Lessig to recipients of list CO-E-CONF (Nov. 11, 1996) (proceedings of 25-person online focus group convened by the United States Copyright Office, as part of its "Project Looking Forward," to discuss the future course of Internet technology and its implications for copyright) (on file with author).

75. NIICPA, supra note 6, 1203(b)(2), (b)(6).

76. Id. 1203(c)(2); see Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 991 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously].

77. NIICPA, supra note 6, 1204(a).

78. See 17 U.S.C. 506(a) (1994); 18 U.S.C.A. 2319 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 104-333, approved Nov. 12, 1996).

79. One of the first discussions of CMS to appear in the popular media was Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, 188-89.

80. See, e.g., Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2; IFRRO Report, supra note 2.

81. NIICPA, supra note 6, 1201-1202.

82. See, e.g., David A. Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forms, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 401 (1992); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses]; Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311 (1995); Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden, On Line Software Distribution: New Life for 'Shrinkwrap' Licenses?, COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1996, at 1; Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 290-93 (1995); Michael G. Ryan, Offers Users Can't Refuse: Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105 (1989); Richard H. Stern, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51, 55 (1985).

83. But see David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992) (providing exhaustive analysis of the copyright preemption issue).

84. See National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding defense of copyright preemption of state law misappropriation claim); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting defense of copyright preemption of state law breach of contract claim); I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (April 11, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v1i1/hardy.html>; Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 82, at 1255-59, 1266-74; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995); Elkin-Koren, supra note 72.

85. See U.C.C. Art. 2B: Licenses 2B-308 (Proposed Draft March 21, 1997), available from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (visited April 18, 1997) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/ucc2b397.htm> [hereinafter Draft Article 2B]; Dan Goodin, Seeking New Rules for a New Game: Commercial Code Meets the Digital Age, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at 2; Raymond T. Nimmer, UCC Revision: Information Age in Contracts, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 17 (Dec. 12, 1996).

86. Draft Article 2B, supra note 85, 2B-314(a)(4); see also id. 2B-314(a)(1)-(3) (allowing automatic termination of use of the licensed information upon expiration of the license term if the license so provides, if the electronic system provides "reasonable notice," or if the information is licensed for short-term use).

87. See 17 U.S.C. 301(a) (1994); H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748 (stating no intent to preempt state contract law generally); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to find preemption of challenged contract term but declining to hold that any contract term escapes preemption as a matter of law); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 991 F.2d 426, 431-35 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 82, at 1257-58, 1259-72; O'Rourke, supra note 84, at 518-55; Rice, supra note 83, at 604-21.

88. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

89. Id. at 1454.

90. See Rice, supra note 83, at 622-26 ("It is at least reasonable to argue that reverse engineering is, in most instances, necessarily precluded under a negotiated agreement not to disclose or use trade secret information except as required for computer program installation, adaptation, maintenance or use.").

91. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1611-13 (1995) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943)) (discussing power disparities surrounding use of standard-form contracts to augment intellectual property rights); Rice, supra note 83, at 595 (applying "private legislation" analysis to restrictive software license terms); Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 76, at 1001-02 (applying "private legislation" analysis to CMS); cf. O'Rourke, supra note 84, at 541-55 (arguing that, generally speaking, even mass-market licenses restricting decompilation should survive preemption analysis, but recognizing exception when copyright owner "has obtained near monopoly power in the relevant market," as measured by antitrust analysis).

92. This reasoning is implicit in the Seventh Circuit's decision in ProCD. See 86 F.3d at 1455 (observing that ProCD's license terms would not bar other vendors from compiling and offering the same material); see also, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1019-21, 1028-36 (1994).

93. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996) ("Code is an efficient means of regulation. . . . One obeys these laws as code not because one should; one obeys these laws as code because one can do nothing else. . . . In the well implemented system, there is no civil disobedience."); Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 107, 125-31 (arguing that repeat players in the contracting process enjoy "simply overwhelming" advantages in implementing the self-help strategies of their choice).

94. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: the Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine 75 N.C. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 1997) (visited May 7, 1997) <http://members.aol.com/tombell/FullFared.html>; Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 82, at 1273-74; 1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1.01[B], at 1-16.1 (discussing judicially imposed election of remedies as alternative to holding contract term preempted).

95. Trotter Hardy argues that in light of the low costs of protecting and transacting in digital content, the current copyright paradigm is an inefficient method of protecting property entitlements and should be replaced with a pure private property rights regime. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 217, 236-52 (1996). He maintains that conceiving the public law of copyright to represent a variety of stakeholders (including the public) creates a form of group ownership, the inefficiency of which manifests itself in the lengthy, costly legislative process. See id. at 253-58. This analysis misses the point for two reasons. First, Congress "assumes" that copyright has multiple stakeholders because the Constitution requires it. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985) ("First Amendment protections . . . [are] embodied in the Copyright Act's distinctions between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and in the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use.").

Second, and more fundamental, Hardy's analysis follows only if one assumes that the "point" of copyright is to provide maximum incentives to information creators and thus, necessarily, maximum protection for property entitlements. See Hardy, supra, at 220-23 (assuming just this, and discarding from his "taxonomy of incentives" those that do not fit within this model). Nowhere does Hardy acknowledge, much less justify, these assumptions. I (and many others) would argue for a more generous conception of copyright's purpose, and would contend that a maximum-incentives regime is not-and certainly has not been proven to be-the best-suited to advancing the ultimate goals that copyright seeks to further. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'"(quoting U.S. CONST. Art. I, 8, cl. 8)); Cohen, Reverse Engineering, supra note 46, at 1104-24 (arguing that the purpose of copyright is not merely to disseminate works to the public as consumers, but to foster access to works by the public as creators, and that a maximum-protection regime does not serve this purpose); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1995) (same); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (same); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (arguing that a purpose of copyright is to promote the deliberation and debate constitutive of a robust democratic public sphere, and that a maximum-protection regime does not serve this purpose); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996) (same).

96. Mark Stefik appears to agree. See Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 156 (recognizing that CMS implicate social policy and advocating the creation of a Digital Property Trust, governed by representatives from all of the affected constituencies, to guide the development of CMS).

97. IFRRO Report, supra note 2, 3.1.1; see also BURNS, supra note 1, at 17-21, 31-35 (1995); Stefik, Letting Loose the Light, supra note 1, at 228-38; Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 2, at 140-41.

98. IFRRO Report, supra note 2, 3.2.

99. BURNS, supra note 1, at 32; see also Mary G. Smith & Robert Weber, A New Set of Rules for Information Commerce-Rights-Protection Technologies and Personalized-Information Commerce Will Affect All Knowledge Workers, COMM. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1995, at 34, 36-37.

100. BURNS, supra note 1, at 32; see also Stefik, Letting Loose the Light, supra note 1, at 241 (describing the creation of transaction repositories and electronic clearinghouses to process CMS charges).

101. See Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 76, at 985-86; Froomkin, supra note 45, at 484-88; Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 200-06 (1992); Debra Aho Williamson, Smart Agents Build Brains Into Net Ads: More Companies Tap Technology to Better Target Web Users Who Visit Their Sites, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 8, 1996, at 26. For an example of an existing Internet-based content vendor that conducts "push" marketing based on customized consumer profiles unless the consumer expressly "opts out" of this activity, see the World Wide Web site of CDNow, <http://cdnow.com/>; see also Donna Hoffman, et al., Social Issues Raised by the Commercial Development of the Net, Panel Presentation at The Seventh Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (March 12, 1997) (presentation by Jason Olim, President of CDNow).

102. See Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 76, at 1006-07; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 346, 400 (1995); cf. Netanel, supra note 95, at 347-62 (arguing that the widespread dissemination of works of authorship facilitated by copyright creates and enhances deliberation and debate among citizens).

103. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 09.25.140 (1994); CAL. GOV'T CODE 6254(j) (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, 10002(12) (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 81, para. 1201 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW 4509 (McKinney 1992). See also Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 76, at 1031-32 n.213 (listing state legislation passed to protect the identities of library patrons).

104. Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 76, at 1003-30.

105. 17 U.S.C. 1002(c) (1994).

106. See Froomkin, supra note 45, at 415-20, 459-70 (discussing anonymous-payer digital cash); Smith & Weber, supra note 99, at 36 ("To protect the privacy of individuals . . . the usage data can be aggregated or made anonymous before it reaches rights holders."); cf. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 181-83 (1995) (observing that the most effective way to protect individual privacy in the digital age is to design technological tools so that they prevent or limit the identification of individuals); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 43-44 (1995) (suggesting that "physical realities that hinder others in gathering information about or experiences of you" provide more effective protection than privacy laws that attempt to compensate for the ease of information gathering).

107. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 1, at 36 (characterizing privacy concerns as "market acceptance problems"). But see Proceedings of the First IMPRIMATUR Consensus Forum 86-90 (1996), (visited April 18, 1997) <http://www.imprimatur.alcs.co.uk/html/ page15.htm> (concluding that the European IMPRIMATUR project to develop a standardized model for CMS should recognize reader privacy as a fundamental right and build "Privacy-Enhancing Technologies" into the CMS model).

108. Recent presentations at the 1997 Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy indicate that self-policing initiatives are underway, motivated at least in part by a desire to avoid government regulation. The most promising of these initiatives appears to be ETrust, an effort to create a taxonomy of privacy policies and rating symbols that convey information on privacy practices to consumers. For information on ETrust, see the organization's World Wide Web site at <http://www.etrust.org/>.


110. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; DENNIS CAMPBELL & JOY FISHER, EDS., DATA TRANSMISSION AND PRIVACY (1994) (surveying status of privacy protection in 19 European, Asian, and North American countries).

111. 18 U.S.C.A. 2710 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 104-333, approved Nov. 12, 1996); see Reidenberg, supra note 101 (outlining and critiquing the piecemeal privacy protection available against private-sector collection, use, and sale of personal information); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1996) (same).

112. Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 98, 105th Cong. 2 (1997).

113. Id. 4(1).

114. Cohen, Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 76, at 1031-38.