1	DRM, Black Boxes, and Public Policy Edward W. Felten Dept. of Computer Science Princeton University felten@cs.princeton.edu
2	DRM and the Black Box Device must be a “black box” that user cannot analyze or examine. “secure execution environment” “appliance” “robustness” Combination of tech and law makes the box black. Device engineered to be “armored” Black box design may be mandated by law Possibly backed by laws that ban analysis, tinkering, or discussion
3	Technology and Public Policy Important public policy questions depend on understanding technology. Especially true right now for DRM Bans on understanding technology cripple the public debate about these issues.
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5	Total Information Awareness FBI, CIA want to mine commercial databases. security vs. privacy tradeoff Advocates claim: Don’t worry about abuses by rogue agents; DRM methods can prevent them. Is this true? Need to understand black boxes to know!
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7	Example: Porn Blocking Products claim to block pornographic web sites, without blocking non-porn content. use in schools, libraries, homes? Advocates claim: Don’t worry about overblocking; our block-list is accurate. Is this true? Need to look inside the black box to know!
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9	Example: E-Voting After Florida 2000, push toward computerized voting machines. Convenience and speed vs. risk of fraud Advocates claim: Don’t worry about tampering; DRM methods can prevent it. Is this true? Need to understand black boxes to know!
10	DRM, Black Boxes, and Public Policy Edward W. Felten Dept. of Computer Science Princeton University felten@cs.princeton.edu