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1.
Section 641 of the California Evidence Code,
classified as a Thayer presumption, provides that "[a] letter
correctly addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been
received in the ordinary course of mail." Suppose a California
tenant slips in the hallway of her apartment building and breaks her
collarbone. She files a diversity suit against her out-of-state
landlord for medical costs and lost wages. To prove negligence, the
tenant testifies that three weeks before the accident she mailed the
landlord a correctly addressed, properly stamped letter complaining
that the hallway was slippery. The landlord testifies he never
received the letter. The tenant asks the judge to instruct the jury
that, if they conclude that her letter was correctly addressed and
properly mailed, they must find that it was received in the ordinary
course of the mail. Should the judge give the instruction?
2.
Section 667 of the California Evidence Code, classified as a
Morgan presumption, provides that "[a] person not heard from in five
years is presumed to be dead." Suppose a testator in California
leaves his house to his son, Saul, for the duration of Saul's
life, but provides that on Saul's death the property will go to the
State of California. Six years later the state sues Saul's wife, who
is living in the house, for possession. The state introduces
evidence that no one has heard from Saul for the past five years.
T he defendant testifies that she received a telephone call from Saul
eight months ago. What instruction, if any, should the judge give
the jury regarding the presumption?
3.
Section 636 of the California Evidence Code, classified as a
Thayer presumption, provides that "[t]he payment of earlier rent or
installments is presumed from a receipt for later rent or
installments." Suppose a California construction company buys a
bulldozer from an out-of-state vendor. The bulldozer repeatedly
breaks down, and five years after the purchase the construction
company brings a federal diversity action against the vendor,
alleging breach of warranty. The plaintiff introduces the purchase
contract, which calls for payment in four annual installments, and a
receipt for payment of the fourth installment. The defendant claims
in its pleadings that the first three installments were never paid,
but introduces no evidence to this effect and does not challenge the
authenticity of the receipt. Is the plaintiff entitled to a directed
verdict on the question of its payments for the bulldozer?
1. A federal statute passed in 1984 purports to
impose on criminal defendants "the burden of proving the defense of
insanity by clear and convincing evidence." 18 U.S.C. §17(b). Is this
statute constitutional?
2. In January 1980, police in Santa Cruz, California, executed a
search warrant at a second-hand store called Betty Boop's Junque Shop
and found a variety of stolen property. The proprietors of the store
were prosecuted for receiving stolen property. The elements of the
offense are receiving property that has been stolen, and knowing the
stolen nature of the property at the time of receiving it. The trial
judge instructed the jury on the elements of the offense, the
presumption of innocence, and the definition of reasonable doubt.
Relying on a statutory presumption, the judge also instructed the jury
that if it found (1) that the defendants were dealers in second-hand
merchandise, (2) that they had bought or received property under
circumstances that should have prompted a reasonable inquiry regarding
whether the seller had a legal right to sell it, and (3) that they had
failed to make such an inquiry, "then you shall presume that
defendants bought or received such property knowing it to have been
stolen unless from all the evidence you have reasonable doubt that
defendants knew the property was stolen."
When the jury asked regarding the presumption, the judge responded
as follows: "There are two kinds of presumptions. One is a conclusive
presumption that if you have the presumption, that's it, you don't go
any further. This isn't that kind of presumption. It's what's called a
rebuttable presumption, because you have the presumption, presume to
know that the property was stolen, but they can go forward and raise a
reasonable doubt that they actually knew that. So you still do have
that question. Basically, it boils down to are you satisfied that they
acquired the property or retained the property knowing it was stolen,
or do you have a reasonable doubt."
Did these instructions violate the Federal Constitution? (The
California Supreme Court gave its answer in People v. Roeder,
189 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1983).)
1. Suppose a calendar manufacturer sues a rival for patent
infringement, based in part on the fact that the rival's calendar,
like the one the plaintiff has recently patented, is secured to the wall
by a punched hole at the top. The defendant asks the court to take
judicial notice of the fact that calendars have had this feature for
many years, and the plaintiff objects. How should the court rule?
2. Suppose a
spectator at a minor league baseball game gets hit by a line drive and
sues the ballpark for negligence, alleging failure to post adequate
warnings. The ballpark asks the judge to take judicial notice of the
fact that the hazard of being hit by a ball at a professional baseball
game is well known, and the plaintiff objects. How should the judge
rule?
3. Suppose a criminal defendant moves
to suppress evidence found during a patdown search and alleges the
police lacked reason to suspect he was armed. The government proves
the police had reason to suspect the defendant was selling cocaine and
asks the judge to take judicial notice of the fact that drug dealers
often carry weapons. The defendant objects. How should the judge
rule?
4. In a prosecution for robbery of a federally insured
bank, suppose the government asks the judge to instruct the jury that
Bank of America—a branch of which the defendant is alleged to have
robbed—is federally insured. The defendant objects. What
instruction, if any, should the judge give? What if the defendant is
alleged to have robbed a branch of Coast Federal Bank, and the
government asks the court to take judicial notice of the fact that
federal law requires any bank with "Federal" in its name to be
federally insured?
5. For
purposes of determining the admissibility of DNA identification
evidence, can a court take judicial notice of the general reliability
of the technology employed, without holding an evidentiary hearing?
(Several courts have said yes. See United States. v.
Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1447 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1062 (1994); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786,
799 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Shea,
957 F. Supp. 331,
347 (D.N.H. 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998).
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