L12.3506 – ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS

Daniel Rubinfeld, Fall 2009
New York University, School of Law
Wednesday, 4:00 - 5:50 FH316

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/Profile/coursesindex.html

On Reserve:

Carlton & Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 4th ed., 2004, Addison-Wesley.

Eisenach & Lenard, eds., Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, 1999, Kluwer.

Kwoka & White, eds., The Antitrust Revolution, 5th ed., 2009, Oxford University Press.

Pindyck & Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 7th ed., 2008, Prentice-Hall.

 

READING ASSIGNMENTS

I. Analysis of Mergers

Aug. 26  Introduction to Antitrust Law
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Antitrust Policy,” International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 1: 553-60, Elsevier Science Ltd. (2001).

Sept. 2   The Merger Guidelines: Market Definition
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission” (http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm).

Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Market Definition with Differentiated Products: The Post-Nabisco Cereal Merger,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2000, pp.163-182.

Daniel Rubinfeld, “Market Definition,” Notes. 

Sept. 16  Market and Monopoly Power
Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Lande & Steven Salop, “Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law,” 76 Georgetown Law Journal, 1987, pp. 241-269.

Jonathan B. Baker and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique,” 1 American Law and Economics Review, 1999, pp. 386-405.

Sept. 23  Unilateral Effects Analysis - Differentiated Products Mergers
Ivaldi, et. al, “The Economics of Unilateral Effects,” pp., 3-26, Interim Report for DG Competition, November 2003. [Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/studies_reports/studies_reports.html]

Serdar Dalkir and Frederick R. Warrant-Boulton, “Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of Mergers:  Staples-Office Depot (1997),” in Kwoka and White, 4th Edition, pp. 52-72.

Effects of Mergers with Differentiated Products,” (with Roy J. Epstein) Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission, October 7, 2004, pp. 28-44. [Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/studies_reports/studies_reports.html]

Sept. 30  Tacit Collusion and Coordinated Effects
Ivaldi, et. al, “The Economics of Tacit Collusion,” Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission, March, 2003, pp. 4-57.

Severin Borenstein, “Rapid Price Communication and Coordination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994),” in Kwoka and White, 4th Edition, pp. 310-326.

John M. Connor, "Global Cartels Redux: The Lysine Antitrust Litigation (1996)," in Kwoka and White, 5th Edition, pp. 300-328.


II. Intellectual Property

Oct. 7   Raising Rivals Costs: Exclusionary Practices
Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop, “Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 96, Dec. 1986, pp. 223-253.

Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Robert Maness, “The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust,“ in Francois Leveque and Howard Shelanski (eds.), Antitrust, Patents and Copyright: EU and US Perspectives, pp.85-102, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. (2005).

Oct. 14    Essential Facilities and Refusals to Deal
Carl Shapiro, “Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63, 1995, pp. 483-511.

Dennis W. Carlton, “A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 68, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 659-683.

Oct. 21    Joint Ventures
Gregory J. Werden, “Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 66, 1998, pp. 701-735.

FTC / DOJ Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors, April 2000
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf

Oct. 28   Pharmaceuticals:  Patent Litigation Settlements  
Robert D. Willig and John P. Bigelow, “Reverse Payments in Settlements of Patent Litigation; Schering-Plough, K-Dur, and the FTC (2005),” in Kwoka and White, 5th Edition, pp. 248-275.  

Schering-Plough Corporation, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Agency No. FTC 9297, March 8, 2005.


III.  High Technology Applications

Nov. 4  The Microsoft Case
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Maintenance of Monopoly: U.S. v. Microsoft,” in Kwoka & White, 5th Edition, pp. 530-557.

U.S. vs. Microsoft Corp, Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (6/28/01) (http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200106/00‑5212a.txt)

Nov. 11  Bundling
LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (Third Circuit 2003) (en banc) (http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/001368p1.pdf).  

Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “3M's Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective,” 72 Chicago Law Review, 2005, pp. 1-22.  

Nov. 18  Exclusionary Conduct  
Douglas Melamed, “Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct – Are there Unifying Principles?Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 73, No.2, 2005, pp. 375-412.

Aaron S. Edlin and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The ‘Big Deal’ Bundling of Academic Journals,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2004, pp. 119-157.

Nov. 25   Class Certification  
James F. Nieberding and Robin Cantor, “Price Dispersion and Class Certification in Antitrust Cases:  An Economic Analysis,” Journal of Legal Economics, 14(2), 2007, pp. 61-84.

John H. Johnson and Gregory K. Leonard, “Economics and the Rigorous Analysis of Class Certification in Antitrust Cases,” Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3(3), June 2007, pp. 341-356.

Nov. 30  (Tentative) Current Policy Issues