
**TREATY BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON THE REDUCTION
AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START I
TREATY)**

Signed at Moscow on 31 July 1991

Entered into force on 5 December 1994

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability,

Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972; and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

Article II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers;

(b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, including:

(i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(iii) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

(ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(iii) 8050, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

(ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(iii) 6750, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons.

Article III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit.

(b) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit.

2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers:

(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.

(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher.

(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type.

4. For the purposes of counting warheads:

(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the

Establishment of the Data Base Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.

(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead.

(e) For the United States of America, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.

(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers

equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.

(g) Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers.

5. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time.

(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:

(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.

(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty.

(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Such reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party.

(ii) After a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type.

(iii) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

(iv) ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.

(v) SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean.

(vi) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(d) A Party shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;

(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;

(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes.

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that different type as follows:

(a) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:

(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(b) a heavy bomber of one category converted into a heavy bomber of another category provided for in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or into a former heavy bomber, when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires.

9. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.

(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted.

(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a

training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another.

(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.

(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, respectively;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively.

(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as MX;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.

(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3.

(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-1, and B-2;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively.

(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively.

Article IV

1. For ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than:

(i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or

(ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges shall not exceed 25.

2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of

ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall not exceed 40. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20.

(e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 75.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20.

4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten, unless otherwise agreed.

(c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility.

5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30.

6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two.

7. For static displays and ground trainers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature

of this Treaty to no more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on static display prior to signature of this Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50.

9. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms:

(a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.

(b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit.

(c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, provided that:

(i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins;

(ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test range and does not involve movement to any other facility;

(iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in each calendar year; and

(iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is located outside test ranges at any one time.

(d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be

counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.

(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.

10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

11. With respect to locational restrictions on facilities:

(a) Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training facility for ICBMs at which non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

(b) Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

(c) Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area.

(d) Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from any test range.

(e) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training facility for heavy bombers.

12. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit to no more than 30 days.

Article V

1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type;

(b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs;

(c) produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded;

(e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs;

(g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type.

3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have

agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types.

6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs.

7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead.

8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs.

9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this Treaty.

10. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed;

(b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

12. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles;

(b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type;

(c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it;

(d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it.

14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles.

15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.

16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.

17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.

18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices;

(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971;

(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit;

(d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

19. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments;

(b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments;

(c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-

range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based.

24. Each Party undertakes not to convert:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category;

(d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers.

25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines.

26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars.

27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.

29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for:

(a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages;

(b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and

(c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions.

Article VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area.

3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison.

5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails).

6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration.

8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals.

10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time.

12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

Article VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.

2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs.

4. The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*. A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open *in situ*, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Article VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data.

2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.

3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;

(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty;

(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;

(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty;

(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification;

(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information;

(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds;

(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities;

(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and

(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.

4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after receipt.

5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.

6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.

Article IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

Article X

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.

2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including:

(a) the use of encryption;

(b) the use of jamming;

(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional beaming; and

(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles.

3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicle telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages of the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM.

4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test.

5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs each year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in this paragraph.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring.

6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.

8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.

9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed.

10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items.

12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable;

(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and

(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with

paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.

Article XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved half-way out of such fixed structures;

(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or

operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

Article XIII

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal.

(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.

(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.

(g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.

(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:

(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;

(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;

(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or

(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection.

(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.

(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.

(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.

(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:

(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification Protocol;

(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;

(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and

(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms.

In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.

4. When an operational dispersal is completed:

(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations.

(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations.

(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall not count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and

(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

Article XVI

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

...

AGREED STATEMENTS ANNEX

...

First Agreed Statement. The Parties agree, in the interest of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty to third States. The Parties further agree that this Agreed Statement and the provisions of Article XVI of the Treaty do not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XV of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 13 of Article V and subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, which is known to the United States of America as SS-11, may be deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles, provided that such reentry vehicles are not independently targetable.

Fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in connection with the definition of the term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" provided for in the Annex to the Treaty on Terms and Their Definitions, hereinafter referred to as the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path.

Fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the replacement of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs under the provisions of subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall only take place in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require the relocation of existing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. If such relocation is required, the Party planning to construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other Party with the reasons and plans for such relocation in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out such relocation.

...

Eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) With respect to paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty, the strategic offensive arms of each Party shall be based only within its national territory at permanent bases specified in the Treaty that are equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms. The obligations of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not affect the Parties' rights under generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircrafts, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States.

(b) With respect to heavy bombers, the provisions of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not preclude the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the territory of a Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. If a Party stations heavy bombers outside its national territory for a period in excess of 30 days at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30-day period, except that, if a Party has stationed more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party within 48 hours.

(c) The Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

Ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 19(a) of Article V of the Treaty, lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons,

drifting aerostats, and dirigibles shall not be flight-tested with, equipped for, or deployed with nuclear armaments.

...

Nineteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event either Party wishes to develop mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers, the question could be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. . . .

...

Twenty-Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) Issues relating to the concurrent continuous monitoring activities in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty and continuous monitoring in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty, shall be agreed upon, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and within the framework of the Special Verification Commission. An agreement on these issues shall not affect substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under either Treaty.

(b) For the purpose of reaching the agreement provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Agreed Statement, the Parties shall proceed as follows:

(i) During the period when continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is conducted concurrently under the Treaty and under the INF Treaty, the Parties shall ensure the application of continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and of continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty. The engineering site survey provided for in the Treaty will not be conducted at the Votkinsk facility.

(ii) In cases where continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty are identical, those procedures may be performed only once, with the results recorded, as appropriate, in the continuous monitoring report and in the inspection report.

(iii) The Parties shall agree on a list of the specific provisions of the INF Treaty and of the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Agreement, on issues relating to pre-inspection requirements, notifications, activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry, and general provisions related to continuous monitoring that shall be suspended upon entry into force of the Treaty at facilities inspected by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty. Agreement on such a list shall not be considered to be an amendment to the INF Treaty proper and shall not have the effect of amending the INF Treaty. The provisions of the INF Treaty to be suspended may be suspended by making amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement or by being treated as "measures to improve the viability and effectiveness" of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty. The Parties shall also agree upon a list of the specific provisions of the Treaty that, in connection with the suspension of the above-mentioned provisions of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF

Treaty and the Memorandum of Agreement, shall apply from the date of entry into force of the Treaty at such facilities.

(iv) After continuous monitoring activities commence in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, continuous monitoring activities under the Treaty and continuous monitoring activities under the INF Treaty at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant shall be conducted by a team of no more than 30 monitors. Issues related to increasing the quota of monitors for maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and replacement of monitors shall be governed by the provisions of the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty.

(v) Equipment used for the purposes of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant pursuant to the INF Treaty may be used for continuous monitoring pursuant to the Treaty, including after termination of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty, if the purpose of such equipment coincides with the purpose of the equipment under the Treaty. Equipment used exclusively for the purpose of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk facility and the use of which is not provided for under the Treaty shall be used only pursuant to the INF Treaty. Continuous monitoring equipment for use exclusively under the Treaty may also be sent to, and installed at, the Votkinsk facility in accordance with the Treaty.

(vi) Specific issues that may arise in connection with the concurrent application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the framework of the Special Verification Commission.

(c) Concurrent inspections under both Treaties may not be conducted at a facility subject to the Treaty and the INF Treaty. An inspection under one of the Treaties at such a facility shall be conducted no earlier than six days after an inspection has been conducted under the other Treaty at that facility.

...

Thirty-Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for no more than two ballistic missile submarines of the United States of America that are equipped with Poseidon SLBMs and that are modified for use as special purpose submarines, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Such submarines shall be permanently based only at ports that are not submarine bases specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Such ports shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding and shall not be subject to inspection.

(b) In order to demonstrate that the launch tubes on such a submarine do not contain SLBMs, such tubes shall be opened, upon request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when such a submarine is located at the port at which it is permanently based, . . .

...

DEFINITIONS ANNEX

...

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF THE ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE START TREATY (CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION PROTOCOL)

...

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE START TREATY (INSPECTION PROTOCOL)

...

I. General Obligations

For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities by the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members

1. Inspections and continuous monitoring activities shall be conducted by inspectors and monitors. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall be transported to the territory of the inspected Party by inspection airplanes. Inspectors and monitors, as well as aircrew members that operate this airplanes, shall be assigned in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section and subject to provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991.

2. The list of inspectors shall not contain at any one time more than 400 individuals, and the list of monitors shall not contain at any one time more than 300 individuals. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members shall not be limited. Inspectors and monitors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. The Parties shall have the right to change, by mutual agreement, the number of inspectors and monitors that each of these lists may contain. For each proposed inspector, monitor, and aircrew member, the lists shall contain first name, middle name or patronymic, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available.

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VIII. Suspect-Site Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct suspect-site inspections. Following each suspect-site inspection conducted by the inspecting Party, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be reduced by one for that year.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections at each facility specified as subject to suspect-site inspections in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding or in a notification provided in accordance with

paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, if it is provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section.

3. A Party shall specify a facility as subject to suspect-site inspection and provide a notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for:

(a) each facility that after entry into force of the Treaty begins to produce ICBMs or SLBMs as large or larger than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party and is not subject to continuous monitoring, unless otherwise agreed; and

(b) each facility at which continuous monitoring has ceased.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one suspect-site inspection at any one time. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two such inspections each year at the same facility.

5. The Parties may agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to remove a facility from the list of facilities subject to suspect-site inspection.

6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, vehicles, containers, and launch canisters large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site.

7. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

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XII. Close-Out Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at the facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted within 60 days after such notification has been provided, or, for facilities that were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding but not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections. No more than one close-out inspection shall be conducted at each facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM vases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers; and air bases for former heavy bombers.

3. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol no later than 48 hours after its arrival at the point of entry.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two close-out inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same point of entry shall be conducted at any one time.

5. A facility, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall not be subject to any inspection other than a close-out inspection until such an inspection is conducted or until the expiration of the 60-day period provided for such an inspection in paragraph 1 of this Section, whichever occurs earlier. If a facility that is specified in paragraph 2 of this Section is subject to a close-out inspection, that facility shall not be subject to a baseline data inspection.

6. During the course of each close-out inspection, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the elimination procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been completed. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol.

...

XVIII. Inspection Reports and Continuous Monitoring Reports

1. During post-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written inspection report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. Such a report shall be provided no later than two hours after the beginning of the post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at the location where such procedures are carried out, whichever is later. The report shall be factual. . . . The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each party shall retain one copy of the report.

2. Within three days after the end of each month, the monitoring team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written continuous monitoring report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. The report shall be factual. . . . The report shall be signed the monitoring team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.

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Annex 1. Procedures for the Inspection of Covered Objects, Containers, Launch Canisters, Vehicles, and Structures

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Annex 2. Procedures for the Inspection of Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, and SLBM Launchers

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Annex 3. Procedures for Reentry Vehicle Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

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Annex 4. Procedures for Inspections of Heavy Bombers, Former Heavy Bombers, Long-Range ALCMs, and Their Facilities

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Annex 5. Procedures for Continuous Monitoring

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Annex 6. Procedures Relating to Unique Identifiers

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Annex 7. Procedures for Delivering and Examining Equipment and Supplies Transported by Inspection Airplanes . . .

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Annex 8. Equipment for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

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Annex 9. Characteristics and Methods of Use of Equipment for the Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring System

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Annex 10. Types of Inspection Airplanes

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Annex 11. Procedures for Confirming the Dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs

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Annex 12. Size Criteria to be Used During Inspections and Continuous Monitoring

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PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO THE START TREATY (NOTIFICATION PROTOCOL)

...

II. Verification

1. Verification of compliance with provisions of this Protocol shall be by national technical means of verification.

2. To facilitate verification, for an ICBM and SLBM of each new type, two pre-announced flight tests shall be conducted either in the 12-month period prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, or from among the last five flight tests prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty.

3. No more than one pre-announced flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section in any 30-day period.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive

rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

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PROTOCOL ON ICBM AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT (THROW-WEIGHT PROTOCOL)

...

PROTOCOL ON TELEMETRIC INFORMATION (TELEMETRY PROTOCOL)

...

PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty.

I. Composition of the Commission

1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission.

3. The head representatives of the Parties shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission.

4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission.

II. Convening a Session of the Commission

1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 14 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following:

- (a) the questions that the Party intends to raise;
- (b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and
- (c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session.

Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening of the session.

2. A session of the Commission shall be convened as soon as possible after receipt of the response provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.

3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties.

4. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions.

III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission

1. A special session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party to address what the requesting Party considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. Such a request shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(a) the nature of the concern, including the kind and, if applicable, the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern;

(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and

(c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session.

The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place.

2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Such a response shall include either:

(a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session; or

(b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by the requesting Party.

3. The response of the requested Party may also include:

(a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit; or

(b) a proposal for a specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit.

If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session. Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable.

4. Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the Commission, if such a session is held.

5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 30 days.

IV. Agenda

1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the Commission questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required.

3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of questions on the agenda.

V. Work of the Commission

The work of the Commission shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission.

VI. Costs

Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission.

VII. Communications

Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application

1. The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission.

2. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

3. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty,

the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE

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RELATED AGREEMENTS

AGREEMENT ON EARLY EXHIBITIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

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AGREEMENT ON THE EARLY EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS PROPOSED FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

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AGREEMENT ON RECIPROCAL ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISES

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STATEMENTS

US STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING

July 29, 1991

The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

SOVIET STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

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US STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

SOVIET STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom.

It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

SOVIET STATEMENT CONCERNING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION

July 31, 1991

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby confirms that it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation that include the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms.

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Statements on the Relationship of START and ABM Read at a Meeting Between US Ambassador Brooks and Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991

US STATEMENT

[n.d.]

While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

SOVIET STATEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following:

This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.

The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach.

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DECLARATIONS

DECLARATION of the USA Regarding Its Policy Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

July 31, 1991

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The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

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DECLARATION of the USSR Regarding Its Policy Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

...

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year. Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations. Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

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DECLARATION by the USSR Concerning the Tu-22M Medium Bomber

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the Tu-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire. This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding.

The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling.

The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes. The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200.

In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic offensive arms, Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.

Source: Conference on Disarmament document CD/1192, 5 April 1993

See also 1992 Protocol to the 1991 START I Treaty (Lisbon Protocol).
