Abstract: Although
No Child Left Behind aims to close the achievement gap that parallels race and
class, some of its key provisions are at odds with successful high school
reforms that are overhauling the large comprehensive high schools that have
failed students of color and low-income students in urban areas. While small,
restructured schools are improving graduation and college-going rates, NCLB
accountability provisions create counter-incentives that encourage higher rates
of dropout and push out, especially for English language learners, which
creates obstacles to staffing arrangements that allow for greater
personalization, and discourage performance assessments that cultivate higher
order thinking and performance abilities. This article proposes specific
amendments to NCLB that could help to achieve the goals of high-quality,
equitable education by recruiting highly qualified teachers and defining such
teachers in appropriate ways; rethinking the accountability metrics for
calculating Adequate Yearly Progress so that schools have incentives to keep
students in rather than pushing them out; and encouraging the use of
performance assessments that can motivate ambitious intellectual work.
Civil Rights
advocates hailed the 2001 reauthorization of the ESEA, optimistically entitled “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB), as a step forward in the long battle to improve
education for those children traditionally left behind in American schools – in
particular, students of color and those living in poverty, new English
learners, and students with disabilities. The broad goal of NCLB is to raise
the achievement levels of all students, especially underperforming groups, and
to close the achievement gap that parallels race and class. The Act intends to
do this by focusing schools’ attention on improving test scores for all groups
of students, providing parents’ more educational choices, and ensuring better
qualified teachers. This paper looks at how elements of NCLB support or
undermine the current national movement to reform high schools – a movement
that advances similar goals but approaches them from a different perspective. It proposes specific amendments to the Act that could help to achieve the goals
of high-quality, equitable education for all youth.
The Need for High School
Reform
Of all the ways in
which urban school children are being left behind, their experiences in large,
factory-model high schools are, arguably, the most egregious. In fact, in many
such schools, young people are not only left behind but actively thrown
overboard. In urban areas, dropout rates from large comprehensive high
schools are typically 50% or more. These schools are structured as huge warehouses,
often housing 3,000 or more students in an organization focused more on the
control of behavior than the development of community. With a locker as their
only stable point of contact, a schedule that cycles them through a series of 7
or more overloaded teachers, and a counselor struggling to serve the
"personal" needs of several hundred students, teenagers struggling to
find connections have little to connect to. Heavily stratified within, and
substantially dehumanized throughout, most students experience such high
schools as non-caring or even adversarial environments where "getting
over" becomes important when "getting known" is impossible. For
adults, the capacity to be accountable for the learning of 150 to 200 students
daily – students whom they do not share with other teachers – is substantially
constrained by the factory model structure that gives them little control over
or connection to most of what happens to the students that they see only
briefly.
For more than 40 years,
large urban high schools have been critiqued for their impersonal structures;
their fragmented curricula; their segregated and unequal program options; and
their inability to respond effectively to different student needs (Barker and
Gump, 1964; Goodlad, 1984; Lee, Bryk, and Smith, 1993; Powell, Farrar, and
Cohen, 1985; Sizer, 1984). A number of recent studies have found that, other
things equal, smaller schools appear to produce higher achievement (Haller,
1993; Howley, 1989; Howley & Huang, 1991); lower dropout rates (Pittman
& Haughwout, 1987); lower rates of violence and vandalism (Garbarino,
1978; Haller, 1992); more positive feelings about self and school, and more
participation in school activities (Fowler, 1992; Green & Stevens, 1988;
Howley & Huang, 1991; Lindsay, 1982, 1984). These outcomes generally
appear more pronounced for students who are traditionally lower-achieving (Lee
& Smith, 1993; 1995).
A number of small urban
schools serving high-need students have experienced striking success,
graduating more than 90% of their students and sending equal shares to college
(see, for example, Bensman, 1987; Darling-Hammond, 1997; Darling-Hammond,
Ancess, & Ort, 2002; Fine, 2005). School size is not the only thing that
may make a difference in student achievement, however. A number of studies
have found that, all else equal, schools have higher levels of graduation and
academic achievement – especially for traditionally low-performing students –
when they create smaller, more personalized units in which students see a
smaller number of teachers over a longer period of time and teachers work
together with a smaller cohort of students (Braddock & McPartland, 1993;
Gottfredson & Daiger, 1979; Lee, Bryk, and Smith, 1993; Wehlage, et al.,
1989). Researchers suggest that in such “communitarian” schools, students are
better known and faculty develop a more collective perspective about their work
(for reviews see Lee, Bryk, and Smith, 1993; Newmann & Wehlage, 1995).
In response to
these kinds of findings, major reforms of comprehensive high schools are
underway in many cities, in part with the assistance of the federal government
through the Small Schools Act and charter school development funds and with the
help of philanthropists like the Gates Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Knowledge Works and others. Most of the high schools in New York City have been
transformed from large zoned high schools to new small schools or campuses
comprised of small learning communities. Many other cities are following suit,
including Austin, Cleveland, Columbus, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and others.
NCLB has a complex relationship with these reforms, both helping and hindering
the efforts that are underway to remake the most dysfunctional element of the
American schooling system.
Elements of High-Performing
Urban High Schools
Not all small schools
are equally successful. Those that have implemented fewer personalizing
features and less intensive changes in instruction have not produced
significant benefits (McMillan, Sipe, & Wolf, 1994; Raywid, 1990, 1995;
Wehlage, Smith, & Lipman, 1992). Schools that are dramatically more
effective have instituted important changes in organization and instruction.
In addition to smaller learning communities where students are well-known,
research suggests that at least the following four elements are critically
important:
Personalization achieved through teams of teachers working with shared groups of students –
usually numbering no more than 80 and sometimes over multiple years – and
through “advisories” in which each teacher takes responsibility for about 15
students for whom he or she serves as advocate, counselor, and primary family
contact. These smaller pupil loads are achieved, in part, through offering
longer block classes, some of them interdisciplinary (e.g. Humanities courses
that combine English and social studies) which allow teachers to teach fewer
students for longer blocks of time.
Well-qualified
teachers supported by ongoing peer collaboration and professional development.
Successful schools have teachers who have both solid academic backgrounds and
who are fully prepared and certified for teaching, including skills for
teaching students with special needs, English language learners, and the wide
range of other students they encounter (for a review, see Darling-Hammond,
2000). Furthermore, these teachers create strong, coherent curriculum by
having time in their schedules to plan together around both subject matter and
students and to pursue ongoing professional development that hones their
abilities to reach all students.
A
common core curriculum organized around performance-based assessment, which
engages students with work that resembles what they will do outside of school
and challenges them intellectually. Most highly effective urban schools
require students to complete portfolios and performance tasks in which they
must conduct significant research, design and carry out science experiments,
amass and analyze evidence, apply math skills to real-world problems in
engineering, physics, topography and other fields, and demonstrate competence
in writing and the arts. Students revise their work in response to feedback
guided by performance standards, and they defend their work before committees
of teachers and external judges, much like a dissertation.
Supports
for struggling students – Students are not tracked in these schools, but
are supported in a variety of ways to meet the demands of an intellectually
engaging and challenging curriculum. Teachers use of a wide repertoire of
instructional strategies to adapt to students’ needs. Most schools also
routinely offer a wide range of supplementary services, like after school and
Saturday homework support and tutoring for all students who need additional help.
They also use special education models that push-in expert teachers to the core
classroom and provide resource room supports for students to be assisted in
completing the same challenging work that other students are assigned, rather
than pull-out classrooms where students are kept busy with workbooks and lower
level tasks. These strategies differ from those in traditional high schools
by avoiding unnecessary tracking and by integrating supplementary supports into
the core curriculum, rather than offering disconnected services that fragment,
rather than concentrate, effort.
These practices are not
only found in case studies tracking small groups of schools (e.g.
Darling-Hammond, Ancess, & Ort, 2002; Newmann & Wehlage, 1995; Wehlage
et al., 1989), but also in large-scale studies. For example, a recent study of
820 high schools in the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) found that
schools that had restructured to personalize education and develop
collaborative learning structures for adults and students produced
significantly higher achievement gains that were also more equitably
distributed (Lee & Smith, 1995). The schools’ practices included keeping
students together in the same advisory group over multiple years, establishing
smaller functional units within schools, forming teaching teams, assuring
common planning time for teachers, involving staff in schoolwide problem
solving, involving parents, and fostering cooperative learning.
Furthermore, in a study
of more than 2,000 students within 23 restructured schools, Newmann, Marks, and
Gamoran (1995) found higher levels of achievement on complex performance tasks
for students who experienced what these researchers termed “authentic pedagogy”
– instruction focused on active learning in real-world contexts calling for
higher-order thinking, consideration of alternatives, extended writing, and an
audience for student work. A recent analysis of NELS data found that students
in restructured schools where “authentic instruction” was widespread experienced
greater achievement test gains (Lee, Smith, & Croninger, 1995).
High
School Reform and No Child Left Behind
The efforts of No
Child Left Behind to support more equitable education have leveraged important
attention to school reform and to the relative success of students of color and
low-income students who have traditionally been poorly served by comprehensive
high schools. This spotlight on the achievement of different groups of
students within large schools has been useful to focus attention on
inequalities not only in the cities, but also in suburban and rural communities
where deeply entrenched tracking systems relegate most of those who attend
“integrated” schools to the lower tracks where they often receive less
challenging and lower quality instruction from less well-qualified teachers.
At the same time,
the complicated rules that have accompanied No Child Left Behind have
unintentionally made it more difficult for many heroic schools in low-income
neighborhoods to do their work well and to keep the neediest students in school
and moving toward productive futures. Some key elements of redesigned high
schools that are associated with greater success for students who have
traditionally been left behind are not reinforced by the law. In part this is
because NCLB was not conceptualized with new model schools in mind. Many of
its provisions implicitly assume high schools will continue to operate more or
less as they have in the past -- for example, with the factory model’s highly
specialized departmental structures, which contribute to a fragmented
experience for students and a large pupil load for teachers, and with
standardized tests that are easily scored but not representative of the kinds
of thinking and performance skills students actually need to succeed at work
and in higher education. As I describe below, these assumptions have led to
incentives in the law that undermine some important practices of successful,
redesigned schools, especially their ability to offer more personalized,
interdisciplinary instruction and their ability to organize teaching and
learning around intellectually ambitious performance assessments.
In addition,
although the law’s rhetoric about “highly qualified teachers” and “adequate
yearly progress” in student achievement sets important goals, the legislation
lacks resources and incentives for developing and recruiting high-quality
teachers for urban schools, and it lacks incentives for keeping struggling
students in high school. Indeed, it punishes schools that enroll the neediest
students and keep them in school, while rewarding schools that select them
out. Addressing these unintended negative consequences as well as the
disjunctures between the law and useful high school reforms requires particular
attention to two major areas of NCLB:
The definition and development of
“highly qualified teachers,” and
The design of testing and
accountability regulations.
Each of these areas is described
below, followed by recommendations for amendments that will enable more high
schools to leave no child behind.
Ensuring Highly Qualified
Teachers
One of the most
important aspects of No Child Left Behind is that it requires all schools to
provide “highly-qualified teachers” to all students by 2006. This requirement
– that all teachers be fully certified and show competence in the subject areas
they teach as well as demonstrated teaching skills – is intended to correct the
longstanding problem that schools serving our neediest students typically have
the least experienced and well-qualified teachers, even though such students
need our most skilled teachers if they are to learn what they need to know.
And it is a problem that can be solved. What often looks like a teacher
shortage is actually mostly a problem of getting teachers from where they are
trained to where they are needed and keeping teachers in the profession,
especially in central cities and poor rural areas. About one-third of beginners
leave teaching within five years, and those with the least preparation and the
least access to mentoring leave soonest (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003).
In low-income
schools suffering from even higher turnover rates, producing more teachers –
especially through fast-track routes that tend to have high attrition – is like
spending enormous amounts of energy filling a leaky bucket rather than fixing
it. Yet, NCLB also encourages the creation of alternative certification
pathways – some of which skirt key elements of teacher learning – and
regulations allow teachers to be deemed “highly qualified” as soon as they
enter such programs, rather than when they complete them and demonstrate they
are competent. Perversely, on the other hand, many well-prepared and highly
successful teachers are deemed not highly qualified because they teach
in multiple subject areas and do not have majors or have passed tests in all of
them. The interdisciplinary teaching that is so central to many successfully
redesigned high schools – as well as to small schools in many rural and urban
areas – is jeopardized by the current administration of the law.
NCLB’s emphasis on
highly qualified teachers has been generally helpful and productive – and many
states are investing in the preparation and recruitment incentives needed to
produce and better distribute well-prepared teachers where they are needed.
Initiatives have included pre-college recruitment programs, subsidies for
preparation, especially for candidates in high-need fields, allowing retirees
to teach without losing benefits, license reciprocity, and even (rarely) pay
incentives for teaching in high-need schools. However, these efforts, while
increasing overall quality and equalizing distribution to some extent, have not
always solved shortages in the most hard-to-staff urban and rural schools. In
most cases, this will require more aggressive measures to improve working
conditions in these schools and more systemic reforms of inadequate and unequal
school funding systems that will, in turn, enable more competitive and
equitable salaries across districts. Meanwhile, some states have
unfortunately spent more energy seeking to avoid the law’s intentions – for
example by defining teachers on emergency permits as highly qualified – than
actively pursuing the Act’s goals. As a consequence, poor and “minority”
students are still disproportionately taught by under-qualified teachers
(Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Shields et al., 2003).
Although NCLB
specifies that states demonstrate in their plan what they are doing and the
progress they are making toward ensuring that poor and minority students are
not taught by unqualified, inexperienced or “out of field” teachers at higher
rates compared with other children, this requirement for equitable access to
well-prepared teachers is often overlooked by states, and has not been a focus
of federal enforcement. Thus, the first area for attention is teacher
quality. In this area the goal of the law should be to provide the subsidies
and incentives needed to attract well-qualified teachers to urban schools, while
not defining teacher quality so narrowly as to impede restructuring of the
curriculum that supports engaging and personalized instruction.
1. The
federal government should pay more attention to enforcing the equity provisions
of NCLB for reducing disparities in access to qualified teachers for students
of color and low-income students. One of the great ironies of the
federal education programs designed to support the education of low-income
students and those with special needs is that poor schools have often served
these students with unqualified teachers and untrained aides, rather than the
highly skilled teachers envisioned by federal laws. The very purpose of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act – to ensure greater opportunities for
learning for these students – has often been undermined by local inability or
unwillingness to provide them with teachers who have the skills to meet their
needs. An additional irony of the administration of NCLB is that the federal
attention to test scores and penalties has not been matched by attention to the
equitable provision of qualified teachers – the key resource for learning. The
Department of Education should require states to report on their progress in
closing the teaching gap as well as the achievement gap among schools serving
different groups of students, and to develop, with public input, plans that
will increase the provision of truly qualified teachers to students in
high-poverty and high-minority schools. States and districts should publish a
Teacher Quality Index alongside their accountability reports evaluating
progress toward providing qualified teachers to students in different kinds of
schools.
2. The law
and regulations should create appropriate allowances for multi-disciplinary and
interdisciplinary teaching, which are a necessity in many small schools
and districts and an advantage in reforming secondary schools. The Act’s
current regulatory strategy is to require a major or passage of a subject
matter test in each subject taught, in addition to full certification and
demonstration of teaching skills. While this seems straightforward, it turns
out to be highly problematic in small schools in remote rural areas – where a
single teacher may teach every grade level and subject area – and in redesigned
middle and high schools – where interdisciplinary teaching allows both the
curriculum integration that makes learning more authentic and allows teachers
to have a smaller pupil load, so that they can individualize instruction.
Small schools that use interdisciplinary configurations – such as Humanities
courses combining Literature with History – with block schedules can cut pupil
load from 150 or more students per teacher to as few as 40 or 50 students per
teacher, without additional funding, thus allowing much greater attention to
pupil learning (Darling-Hammond, 1997).
Many states have
developed sensible certification laws for handling these kinds of real-world
situations in ways that evaluate subject matter knowledge and teaching skills
appropriately, and some have developed certification rules that specifically
take into account interdisciplinary or multi-disciplinary teaching. Current
steps to increase flexibility in this regard have postponed but not resolved
these concerns for rural schools, and have not addressed the issue for small
urban high schools that have been redesigned, personalized and integrated their
instruction. The federal government should delegate to the states the
ascertainment of subject matter competence for teachers in these categories,
through their certification systems, rather than trying to specify from Washington the only means for teachers to meet the intent of the law.
3. The
administration of the Act needs to be strengthened to ensure that teachers are
not labeled as “highly qualified” until they have completed preparationand
demonstrated that they have mastered essential teaching skills. While
the NCLB is often viewed as overly prescriptive regarding how subject matter
knowledge is to be demonstrated, it is far too lax regarding the demonstration
of teaching ability, allowing individuals to be deemed “highly qualified” the
moment they enter an alternative certification program rather than when
they have finished a program and demonstrated their competence. While some
excellent alternative certification programs have been constructed, the range
of program quality is extremely wide. Unfortunately, many programs do not
provide student teaching or coursework in essential areas like student learning
and development, specific subject matter teaching methods, or the teaching of
special needs students. All of these are areas of learning that are associated
with greater teacher effectiveness (Darling-Hammond & Bransford, 2005).
Furthermore, many place candidates in classrooms as teacher of record after a
few weeks of summer training and long before they have encountered much of the
coursework the program offers. Promised mentoring does not always appear.
This happens almost exclusively in high-need schools serving the most
disadvantaged students.
For these reasons,
candidates in many alternative routes are less effective in their initial years
of teaching than those who enter having completed their preparation (Boyd et
al., 2005; Darling-Hammond, Holtzman, Gatlin, & Heilig, 2005), and they
have higher attrition rates (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003). Candidates
who do not receive student teaching and critical areas of coursework are twice
as likely to leave teaching after the first year, adding to the instability
that plagues so many high-need schools. Typically, this attrition is greatest
in low-income secondary schools. To call teachers who have not completed their
training “highly qualified” is not only dishonest, it is a disservice both to
teachers recruited into lower-quality programs and to their students.
Prospective
teachers rely on those who regulate preparation to ensure that the programs
they are recruited into are adequate to prepare them to succeed. When that
does not happen, they flounder and feel inadequate, often leaving in despair
rather than continuing in the profession. Although the regulations call for
alternative routes to meet specific standards, many programs are not accredited
and few states enforce the federal standards. This disadvantages all schools
that hire such teachers and the students they serve. If states can fool the
public into believing that they are using highly qualified teachers when they
are not, this also reduces pressures for them to put in place the necessary
incentives to recruit truly prepared teachers, thus leaving schools with
insufficient supports to solve their staffing problems.
NCLB should
recognize all teachers as “highly qualified” only when they have completed a
solid program of preparation, whether “traditional” or “alternative,” and
should require that alternative certification programs, like other programs,
meet accreditation standards that incorporate the Act’s regulatory standards
regarding acceptable alternatives (regulations which are currently
unenforced). In addition, as described below, greater incentives are needed to
develop high-quality preparation programs that prepare teachers in high-need
communities to work in redesigned high schools and to subsidize candidates so
that they can afford to take the time they need to be well-prepared.
4. Greater
federal supports and incentives are needed to recruit and prepare highly
qualified teachers and to distribute them to the schools where they are most
needed. There is no need for large numbers of schools in the United States to experience teacher shortages or to have to hire individuals who lack
preparation to teach. There are actually at least 3 or 4 times as many
credentialed teachers in the U.S. as there are jobs, and many states and districts
have surpluses (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003). Not surprisingly, however,
teachers are less likely to enter and stay in teaching where salaries are lower
and working conditions are poorer. They are also more than twice as likely to
leave if they have not had preparation for teaching and if they do not receive
mentoring in their early years on the job. These
are problems that can be solved. States and districts that have increased and
equalized salaries to attract qualified teachers, created strong preparation
programs so that teachers are effective with the students they will teach, and
provided mentors have shown how we can fill classrooms with well-prepared
teachers (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003).
But
solving this problem everywhere requires a national agenda. The distributional
inequities that lead to the hiring of unqualified teachers are caused not only
by disparities in pay and working conditions, but also by interstate barriers
to teacher mobility, inadequate recruitment incentives to distribute teachers
appropriately, and fiscal conditions that often produce incentives for hiring
the least expensive rather than the most qualified teachers. And while the nation actually produces far more new
teachers than it needs, some specific teaching fields experience real
shortages. These include teachers for children with disabilities and those with
limited English proficiency, as well as teachers of science and mathematics.
Boosting supply in the fields where there are real shortfalls requires
targeted recruitment and investment in the capacity of preparation for
institutions to expand their programs to meet national needs in key areas.
While No Child
Left Behind sets an expectation for hiring qualified teachers, it does not yet
include the policy support to make this possible. In other high-achieving
nations that we consider peers or competitors, teachers receive a much more
extensive preparation (usually 2 to 3 years of graduate level teacher
education) entirely at government expense, including tuition and living
expenses. Schools that support teachers’ clinical training are overstaffed to
ensure that they have adequate supports and governments support high-quality
intensive mentoring in the first years of teaching (Darling-Hammond, 2005). The
U.S. has adopted none of these policies on a wide scale, and schools –
especially those serving high-need students -- suffer from the inconsistent
training and lack of support their teachers receive.
The federal
government should play a leadership role in providing an adequate supply of
well-qualified teachers just as it has in providing an adequate supply of
well-qualified physicians for the nation through the Medical Manpower Act and
the Health Professions Education Assistance Act. These have supported medical
training, created and strengthened teaching hospitals, provided scholarships
and loans to medical students, and created incentives for physicians to train
in shortage specialties and to locate in underserved areas. Similar federal
initiatives in education were effective during the 1960s and ‘70s but were
eliminated in the 1980s. We need a federal teacher policy that will:
recruit substantial numbers of new teachers who prepare to
teach in high-need fields and locations (50,000 annually),through service
scholarships and forgivable loans that allow them to receive high quality
teacher education and pay it back through service in teaching;
reduce barriers to interstate mobility by supporting the
development of a national license based on a performance assessment of teaching
skills, so that teachers can more easily move from places with surpluses to
areas with shortages (National Academy of Education, 2005);
strengthen teachers' preparation through incentive grants
to schools of education to create professional development schools, like
teaching hospitals, to train prospective teachers in urban areas and to expand
and improve programs to prepare special education teachers, teachers of English
language learners, and other areas where our needs exceed our current capacity;
and
improve teacher retention and effectiveness by ensuring
they have mentoring support during the beginning teaching stage when 30 percent
of them drop out (for a discussion, see Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; NAE,
2005).
Some universities
have designed and launched new and redesigned high schools to serve as
professional development schools (PDS) for the training of their teachers.
These PDS sites allow new teachers to learn to practice effectively in these
kinds of schools specifically – and provides a critical pipeline for staffing
and expanding high-performance high schools that are quite different from the
organizations they are replacing. The recently drafted TEACH Act includes
provisions to support such professional development schools and has introduced
other elements of such a Marshall plan for teaching. However, a sustained
effort to build a national infrastructure has not been mounted. Although Title
II of NCLB includes some of these ideas, they are not part of a coherent,
integrated plan; they are not adequately funded; and they do not take account
of the necessary federal role in developing a national labor market for
teachers.
Of all the
problems facing the nation’s schools, this problem is one of the most solvable
if a purposeful set of initiatives is developed. For the equivalent of one
week’s combat costs in Iraq, the nation could completely eliminate teacher
shortages and produce a more competent teaching force, providing top quality
preparation for enough new teachers annually to fill all of the vacancies
currently filled by underprepared teachers -- and mentor all of the new
teachers who are hired over the next five years. (For details, see
Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003). To ensure that schools can hire “highly
qualified teachers,” this kind of focused initiative is needed.
Fixing Testing and
Accountability Provisions
The goals of No
Child Left Behind are to improve achievement for all students, to enhance
equity, and to ensure more qualified teachers. However, its complex
regulations for showing “Adequate Yearly Progress” toward test score targets
aimed at “100% proficiency” have created a bizarre situation in which most of
the nation’s public schools will be deemed failing within the next few years –
even many that already score high and those that are steadily improving from
year to year. Ironically, states that use more ambitious tests and have set
higher standards for themselves will experience greater failures than those
with low standards, and many have abandoned assessments that measure critical
thinking and performance, just as the labor market increasingly demands these
kinds of skills.
The accountability
provisions of NCLB have been the subject of much analysis and considerable
protest. In particular, the requirement that schools make “adequate yearly
progress” toward annual test score goals for every school – until 100% of
students score at the “proficient” level on state tests by the year 2014 – was
set without an understanding of what this goal would really mean. Recent
studies have suggested that, even under the most optimistic scenarios, at least
80% of schools in most states will have failed to achieve “AYP” by 2014 (see,
for example, Wiley, Mathis, & Garcia, 2005) and in diverse states like
California, 99% of schools are expected to “fail” by this date (Packer,
2004).
One fundamental
problem is that the Act’s goals are unrealistic. Using a definition of
proficiency benchmarked to the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP), one leading measurement expert has calculated that it would take
schools more than 160 years to reach such a target in high school mathematics
if they continued the fairly brisk rate of progress they were making during the
1990s (Linn, 2003). In addition to these unrealistic goals there are several
especially problematic aspects of NCLB for diverse urban schools, especially
high schools, which create strong disincentives for high quality instruction
and for efforts to keep the most vulnerable students in school. These include
the following:
Disincentives for using intellectually ambitious performance
assessments;
A “diversity penalty” experienced by schools serving many groups
of high-need students, especially for assessing the progress of English language
learners; and
Incentives for pushing students out of school in order to boost
test scores.
The necessary changes to address
these problems are described below.
5.The
law and regulations should encourage states and schools to use performance assessments
that motivate ambitious intellectual work and are better measures of serious
high school learning. As noted earlier, performance assessments that
require students to evaluate and solve complex problems, conduct research,
write extensively, and demonstrate their learning in projects, papers, and
exhibitions have proven key to motivating students and attaining high levels of
learning in redesigned high schools. These kinds of assessments are the norm
in European and Asian high schools, whose examination systems rely on essays
and oral examinations, as well as student work products, rather than multiple
choice tests. Although No Child Left Behind explicitly calls for the use of
multiple measures to evaluate student and school progress, it has been administered
in ways that reduce the options for states to maintain robust assessment
systems that go beyond multiple choice tests, and does not encourage states to
evaluate schools based on multiple measures of learning that include
performance tasks. Thus, one of the first perverse consequences of NCLB was
that many states that created forward-looking assessment systems during the
1990s have begun to abandon them, since they are more costly than machine
scored multiple choice tests, and do not fit the federal mandate for annual
testing that allows students and schools to be ranked and compared.
For example,
NCLB’s test requirements and costs caused Maryland to drop its sophisticated
performance assessment system and Maine to eliminate performance assessments in
some fields, as well as its teacher scoring process which provided strong
professional development. Oregon fought to get the Department of Education to
allow it to use its sophisticated computer-based adaptive testing system for
the purposes of both diagnosis for instruction and standards-based assessment
it was designed to serve. States like Nebraska that previously used only
performance assessments to evaluate student learning have been forced to adopt
norm-referenced standardized tests to meet the law’s requirements (Erpenpach et
al., 2003). States that have built systems relying on multiple measures
including performance assessments at the school level have received strong
discouragement from the Department of Education. For example, federal
officials have discouraged several New England states from developing
performance-based assessments as part of their high school graduation systems
and recently suggested that Connecticut reformulate its sophisticated
performance testing system to use only multiple choice items that could be
easily scored by computer when the state asked for a waiver, on fiscal grounds,
from adding more grades to its testing programs. (Connecticut is now suing
the federal government for the funding necessary to maintain its high quality
system of performance assessments).
Relatively few
states now encourage high schools to engage in performance assessments or
acknowledge such assessments in state accountability systems, thus reducing the
incentives for schools to focus on higher order thinking and performance
skills. The administration of NCLB has pushed states back to the lowest
common denominator in testing, undoing progress that had been made to improve
the quality of assessments and delaying the move from antiquated
norm-referenced, multiple-choice tests to more thoughtful systems that measure
and develop important kinds of performance and learning.
Analysts have
raised many concerns about how the law’s requirements are leading to a narrower
curriculum; to test-based instruction that ignores critical real world skills,
especially for lower-income and lower-performing students; and to less useful
and engaging education (Darling-Hammond, 2004; Erpenpach et al., 2003;
Sunderman & Kim, 2004; Wood, 2004). These influences on assessment not
only reduce the chances that schools will be able to focus on helping students
acquire critical thinking, research, writing, and production abilities; they
also reduce the opportunities that students who learn in different ways and
have different talents will have to show what they have learned.
Amendments to the
law and regulations should encourage rather than discourage the use of
diagnostic assessments and high-quality state or local performance assessments
as a key part of state accountability systems aimed at improving curriculum and
teaching. Unless more federal funds are available to support high-quality
annual testing that includes performance components, the requirement for annual
testing should be relaxed so that states can afford to maintain such
high-quality assessments. And evidence about school progress should be
expanded to include information from multiple measures, including performance
assessments and information about student learning opportunities and progression
through school.
6. The law
needs to be amended so that AYP calculations accurately assess student progress
– including the progress of English language learners and students with
disabilities -- and do not penalize small schools serving the most diverse
student bodies. NCLB requires that schools be declared “failing” if
they fail to meet test score targets for each subgroup of designated students
annually. It requires the largest gains from lower performing schools,
although these schools serve needier students and generally have fewer
resources than those serving wealthier and higher scoring students.
Two separate teams
of researchers have found that schools serving poor, minority, and LEP students
and those with a greater number of subgroups for which they are held
accountable experience what researchers have called a “diversity penalty”
(Novak & Fuller, 2003; see also, Sunderman and Kim, 2004), even when they
show large test score gains for low-income and minority students. This occurs
because schools must meet test participation rates and test score gains for
each subgroup on each test to “make AYP”, with each racial/ethnic and income
group, plus English language learners and students with disabilities, counted
separately. Thus, a diverse school responsible for several tests each year
might need to meet more than 30 separate targets, while a homogenous school
serving few low-income students or English language learners might need to show
progress in only 5 or 6 categories.
Of two schools with
identical overall gains, one may easily make adequate yearly progress while the
other, more diverse school, does not. Even if students in every single
subgroup make gains, the gains made by one group may be smaller than required,
or a single subgroup may have 94% of students take one test in one grade rather
than the required 95%. In some small schools, the absences of just a couple of
students – or requested waivers from tests by a couple of parents -- can cause
participation rates to dip below 95%. In one small school with a large
immigrant population in California, for example, the month-long absence of
three migrant students who returned to Mexico with their parents was enough to
cause the school, which experienced large test score gains for all subgroups,
to fail to make AYP. (In a subgroup of 50, having 3 students absent puts the
participation rate just below 95%.) Small schools with many subgroups serving
transient populations are especially vulnerable to this problem. Many schools
with strong, consistent gains for all groups nonetheless are falsely labeled
failing because of this system.
Perverse outcomes
are frequently reported. For example, in schools closing the achievement gap,
the gains made by African American and Latino students or low-income students
may be quite steep while the gains made by high-scoring white students or
higher income students who are already near the test ceiling are not as large,
so the school is penalized for actually beginning to close the achievement gap
(Darling-Hammond, 2004). In schools that serve special education students,
allowing more than a few of them to be tested in accordance with their
individualized education plans will cause the school to fail to make AYP, even
if all groups have improved, including special needs learners.
Schools that serve
large numbers of new English language learners (what the law calls “Limited
English Proficient” (LEP) students) and students with disabilities are subject
to the most nonsensical rules, which guarantee that they cannot ultimately meet
the law’s standards. Since students are assigned to these subgroups because
they cannot meet the proficiency standard, and they are typically removed from
the subgroup when they do meet the standard, these schools will not ever be
able to meet the 100% proficiency benchmark the law has set.
For example,
section 9101(25)(D) of NCLB defines a LEP student as one “whose difficulties in
speaking, reading, writing, or understanding the English language may be
sufficient to deny the individual — (i) the ability to meet the State's
proficient level of achievement on State assessments described in section
1111(b)(3)….” It seems not to have occurred to policymakers that ordering
schools to show 100% proficiency for students in a subgroup that by definition
scores below that level on state tests creates an impossible goal.
Furthermore, as students gain proficiency in English, they are transferred out
of this subgroup within a short time, thus, it is impossible for 100% of this
subgroup ever to reach proficiency. (Although the Department of Education in
2004 allowed the scores of LEP students who move out of LEP status to “count”
toward the LEP category for an additional year, this change only postpones but
does not address the fundamental problem.)
For schools and
districts that serve substantial numbers of LEP students, this imposes a
ceiling on their overall performance as well as the performance of the
subgroup. At some point it will be impossible to make the required gains
because of how this subgroup is defined under the law. Some advocates have
suggested that States be able to count scores of students who are classified as
LEP in the AYP calculations for this subgroup as long as they stay in a school
(even after they become proficient in English – and presumably come within
reach of achieving proficiency on the state content tests). However, the US
Department of Education has not approved this definition (Erpenpach,
Forte-Fast, & Potts, 2003).
The same issues
pertain to the testing of students with disabilities and to the schools that
serve them. Many such students who cannot demonstrate their learning on
grade-level tests have individualized education plans that prescribe different
assessments for charting their progress, including “instructional level”
tests. Initially, the Department of Education ruled that using such tests is
permissible only if the results are counted as “non-proficient” or, for one
year only, if they apply to fewer than 1% of all test-takers. Although the Department
of Education is currently allowing some states, at the Secretary’s discretion,
to offer modified assessments based on modified standards to an additional 2%
of students, this does not ensure that all students can and will be offered
appropriate assessment opportunities, and not all states have been granted this
flexibility. In addition to the fact that this appears to violate special
education laws, schools that serve large numbers of special education students
will always be penalized in their AYP rankings. Furthermore, because
disabilities are correlated with poverty (which is linked to poor prenatal and
childhood health care, low birth weight, poor nutrition, lead poisoning,
maternal substance abuse, and many other conditions that predict learning
problems), this rule punishes schools that serve large numbers of low-income
students.
Amendments to the
law and regulations need to credit gains in each subgroup without applying
mechanistic rules for targets, allow the appropriate IEP testing of special
needs learners in all cases, require appropriate modes of testing for all
English language learners – in line with published professional testing
standards -- and either abandon the impossible 100% proficient rule for this
subgroup or modify it to pertain only to ELL learners who have had a reasonable
amount of time to learn English (e.g. at least 3 years), keeping all of these
ELL learners in the subgroup throughout their school careers for the purpose of
calculating progress. In addition, the admirable goal of tracking subgroup
progress can and should be accomplished without using a complex system of rigid
targets for both scores and participation rates that sets 30 or more categories
encompassing each demographic group on each test on each grade level, any one
of which can cause a school to fail AYP.
7. The
flawed system of measurement – which tracks group averages rather than
value-added learning gains – should be changed so as to eliminate current
incentives to push out students in order to raise scores.Perhaps the
most adverse, unintended consequence of NCLB’s accountability strategy is that
it undermines safety nets for struggling students rather than expanding them,
and it creates incentives for such students to be kept out or pushed out of school.
As low-scoring students disappear, test scores go up. This is because targets
are measured in terms of average achievement for non-comparable groups, rather
than in terms of actual student growth. In combination with the “diversity
penalty” described above, this creates a “double hit” in the NCLB
accountability system for schools serving many high-need students – especially
if they succeed in keeping struggling students in school (Kim & Sunderman,
in press). The problems with this approach are especially dangerous in high
schools: Because the law does not require tracking student progression and
graduation rates, and because it requires inappropriate testing of ELL and
special needs students, the most expedient thing for schools to do to get their
scores up is to allow or even encourage such students to leave.
Table 1 shows how
this operates. At “King High School,” average scores increased from the 70th
to the 72nd percentile between the 2002 and 2003 school year, and
the proportion of students in attendance who met the standard (a score of 65)
increased from 66% to 80% -- the kind of performance that test-based
accountability systems, including NCLB, celebrate and reward. Looking at
subgroup performance, the proportion of Latino students meeting the standard
increased from 33% to 50%, a steep increase. However, not a single student
at King improved his or her score between 2002 and 2003. In fact, the scores
of every single student in the school went down over the course of the
year. How could these steep improvements in the school’s average scores and
proficiency rates have occurred? A close look at Table 1 shows that the major
change between the two years was that the lowest-scoring student, Raul,
disappeared. As has occurred in many states with high stakes-testing
programs, students who do poorly on the tests – special needs students, new
English language learners, those with poor attendance, health, or family
problems – are increasingly likely to be excluded by being counseled out, transferred,
expelled, or by dropping out.
Table
1
King Middle School: Rewards or Sanctions?
The
Relationship between Test Score Trends and Student Populations
2003-04
2004-05
Laura
100
90
James
90
80
Felipe
80
70
Kisha
70
65
Jose
60
55
Raul
20
Ave.
Score = 70
%
meeting standard = 66%
Ave.
Score = 72
%
meeting standard = 80%
If this school had
been judged using a “value-added” index that looked at the changes in
individual students’ scores from one year to the next, it would have been clear
that the students’ scores decreased by 8 percentile points on average rather
than registering an apparent, but illusory, gain caused by changes in the
student population. Recent studies have found that systems that reward or
sanction schools based on average student scores (rather than looking at the
growth of individual students) create incentives for pushing low-scorers into
special education so that their scores won't count in school reports (Allington
and McGill-Franzen, 1992; Figlio & Getzler, 2002), retaining students in
grade so that their grade-level scores will look better (Jacob, 2002; Haney,
2000), excluding low-scoring students from admissions (Smith et al., 1986), and
encouraging such students to leave schools or drop out (Haney, 2000; Orfield
& Ashkinaze, 1991; Smith et al., 1986). Studies have linked dropout rates
in many states and cities to the effects of grade retention, student
discouragement, and school exclusion policies stimulated by high stakes tests
(Haney, 2002; Advocates for Children, 2002; Jacob, 2001; Lilliard &
DeCicca, 2001; Heubert & Hauser, 1999; Orfield & Ashkinaze, 1991;
Roderick et al., 1999; Wheelock, 2003).
Meanwhile, steep
increases in test scores have often occurred in schools with the highest rates
of grade retention and dropout. For example, Wheelock (2003) found that, in
addition to increasing dropout rates, Massachusetts high schools receiving
state awards for gains in 10th grade pass rates on the state tests
showed substantial increases in prior year 9th grade retention rates
and in the percentage of “missing” tenth graders. A similar relationship
between 9th grade retention and dropouts and school rankings was
found in a Texas study (Heilig, 2005). Schools that work hard to keep
struggling students in school are disadvantaged by accountability systems like
those encouraged by NCLB. Paradoxically, NCLB’s requirement for disaggregating
data and tracking progress for each subgroup of students increases the
incentives for eliminating those at the bottom of each subgroup, especially
where schools have little capacity to improve the quality of services such
students receive.
The consequences
for individual students who are caught in this no-win situation can be tragic,
as most cannot go on to further education or even military service if they fail
these tests, drop out, or are pushed out to help their schools’ scores look
better. The consequences for society are also tragic, as such policies lead to
more students leaving school earlier – some with only a 7th or 8th
grade education -- without the skills to be able to join the economy. These
students join what is increasingly known as a “school-to-prison pipeline” (Wald
& Losen, 2003) carrying an increasing number of undereducated youth almost
directly into the criminal justice system. Indeed, prison enrollments have
tripled since the 1980s and the costs of the criminal justice system have
increased by more than 600% (while public education spending grew by only 25%
in real dollars). More than half of inmates are functionally illiterate and
40% of adjudicated juveniles have learning disabilities that were not diagnosed
or treated in school (Darling-Hammond, 2004).
The annual costs
of incarceration are 3 to 5 times the cost of educating the same individuals in
schools years earlier, and the annual costs of dropouts are extremely high.
For example, Rumberger estimates the partial costs of one year of dropouts in California at $18 billion – counting only lost governmental income and incarceration
costs. Increasingly, this growing strain on the economy deflects resources
away from the services that could make people productive. If test scores are
increased by pushing students out of school, the end result is not higher
levels of education in the society.
Addressing this
problem will require using value-added measures of individual student progress
rather than cross-sectional averages that compare one year’s average scores to
the next. It will also require placing a value on keeping students in school
as part of the accountability system, greater investments in improving the
capacity of schools to teach, not just to test, struggling students, and
appropriate means for assessing students with special needs.
While these are
troubling aspects of the law’s implementation, one could also argue, quite
legitimately, that at least some of the schools identified as “needing
improvement” (a designation that changes to “failing” if targets are not met
after 3 years) indeed are dismal places where little learning occurs, or are
complacent schools that have not attended to the needs of all of their students
– schools that need to be jolted into action to change. And, it is fair to
suggest that underserved students in such schools deserve other choices if they
cannot change.
These important arguments are part
of the law’s theory of action: that low quality schools will be motivated to
change if they are identified and shamed, and that their students will be
better served if given other educational options. These outcomes may in fact
occur in some cases. The problem is that the law actually works in even more
cases to label schools as failing even when they are succeeding with the very
students the law wants to help, and it creates incentives that can reduce the
quality of education such schools can provide.
How might the goal
of improving schools actually, paradoxically, undermine them? Evidence
suggests that applying “failing schools” labels to low-scoring schools that
serve low-income students actually reduces the schools’ ability to attract and
keep qualified teachers. For example, in North Carolina, analysts found that
the state labeling system made it more difficult for the neediest schools to
attract or retain the high-quality teachers (Clotfelter et al., 2003).
Florida’s use of aggregate test scores, unadjusted for student characteristics,
in allocating school rewards and sanctions led to reports that qualified
teachers were leaving the schools rated “D” or “F” in droves, to be replaced by
teachers without experience or training (DeVise, 1999). As one principal
queried, “Is anybody going to want to dedicate their lives to a school that has
already been labeled a failure?” NCLB’s approach of labeling schools and
threatening staff dismissals has been reported as a disincentive for qualified
staff to stay in high-need schools when they have options to teach in better
resourced and better regarded schools with more affluent students (Tracey,
2005).
Fixing
NCLB
If we are to
achieve the noble goals of NCLB, the law must be amended so that states have
flexibility and encouragement to use thoughtful performance assessments and so
that tests are used diagnostically for informing curriculum improvements rather
than for punishing students or schools. Learning progress should be evaluated
on multiple measures – including such factors as attendance, school progress
and continuation, course passage, and classroom performance on tasks beyond
multiple choice tests. Furthermore, within a multiple measures system, gains should
be evaluated with “value-added” measures showing how individual students
improve over time, rather than solely by school averages that are influenced by
changes in who is assessed.
Rather than using
unrealistic targets to evaluate schools, schools should be evaluated in terms
of their ongoing contribution to learning progress for students. The system
should ensure appropriate assessment for special education students and English
language learners and credit for the gains these students make over time.
While progress for subgroups of students should be reported, these reports
should include evidence about continuation and success in school as well as
academic achievement for members of each group. Determinations of school
progress should be constructed to reflect a better grounded analysis of
schools’ actual performance and progress rather than a statistical gauntlet
that penalizes schools serving the most diverse populations. These reporting
changes should be designed to ensure that schools that are identified as
failing are indeed those that are offering poor education, not those merely
caught in a mathematical mousetrap. And progress should be gauged against
sensible benchmarks for success. As policy analyst Bruce Fuller (2004) notes
of the law’s current 100% proficiency standard:
Would government
ever require automakers to produce emissions- free cars in the space of a
decade, then shut down companies that failed to meet a pie-in-the-sky goal? Of
course not! Better to set demanding yet pragmatic standards and require clear
signs of progress. Schools should be rewarded for elevating achievement levels
by some degree, rather than penalized for not meeting an absolute, unrealistic
standard. The ideal level of proficiency for all -- just like emissions-free
cars -- could then be approached gradually, over time.
Most important,
schools that are struggling should receive intensive help to strengthen their
staffs and adopt successful programs. Definitions of “highly qualified
teachers” should ensure that candidates are fully prepared and have
demonstrated competence before they receive such recognition. At the same
time, such definitions should not create straitjackets that prevent the
inter-disciplinary teaching that can create more engaging and coherent
curriculum and that enables small schools to personalize instruction. Full
funding of NCLB should include supports and incentives for preparing
well-qualified teachers and getting them to the schools where they are needed,
including a major federal initiative to underwrite strong preparation and
recruitment incentives for well-qualified teachers who will teach in high-need
schools. With this in place, states should be held accountable for providing
highly qualified teachers to all students – a more important element of genuine
accountability than the requirements for more frequent testing.
In addition to
incentives for recruiting and retaining high quality teachers in the places
where they are most needed, fixing No Child Left Behind will require a new
approach to measuring and supporting school success. This approach should:
· Replace the counterproductive federally-mandated “AYP” formula
with less rigid and more instructionally useful state accountability systems
designed to support and assess student progress through multiple measures,
including performance assessments, attendance, and student continuation and
graduation from school.
Encourage rather than discourage the use of diagnostic
assessments and high-quality state or local performance assessments as a key
part of state accountability systems aimed at improving curriculum and teaching
rather than punishing schools.
Evaluate gains using "value-added" approaches that
assess the progress of individual students, not changes in average student
scores that penalize schools that serve the neediest students or encourage
schools to push out low-scoring students.
Appropriately assess the progress of English language learners
and students with disabilities based on professional testing standards and ‘count’ the gains of these students throughout their entire school careers,
rather than only for the time they are classified in these categories.
These changes will
reward the efforts of those high schools that have redesigned themselves to
better serve the students who are routinely left by the way side in their
adolescent years, rather than penalizing or obstructing their efforts to keep
students in school and enable them to learn in rigorous and relevant ways. If
we really want to Leave No Child Behind, the law should create “two-way
accountability” – accountability to parents and children for the quality of
education they receive as a means for greater learning for all.
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