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<title>Law and Tech Research feed - Property</title>
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    <title>Space Resources, Common Property, and the Collective Action Problem </title>
    <description><![CDATA[The subjects of lunar mining, asteroidal resource extraction, and orbital solar power are again attracting considerable attention, leading to more discussion of space property rights regimes. This article discusses both private-property regimes and centralized regulatory regimes of the sort envisioned by the 1979 Moon Treaty, and also notes that private property regimes may actually be both more productive of wealth and more beneficial for the space environment than centralized regulatory schemes. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10383.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 05 Nov 2007 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>A Transactional View of Property Right </title>
    <description><![CDATA[Property rights and contract law are two of our most basic legal categories. Many legal scholars describe what makes them different; this Essay describes how they work together to promote economic exchange. Incorporating the insights of both "transaction cost" and "new property rights" economics, it identifies two crucial contributions that property rights make to real-world contracting: (1) precontractual liability, or protection for disclosure of sensitive information in the period leading up to contract formation; and (2) enforcement flexibility after a contract is executed, in the form of many subtle but important advantages that accrue to a contracting party who also holds a property right. This Essay argues that property's "transactional" role is growing in importance, as the "new economy" ushers in a more transaction-intensive industrial structure featuring greater numbers of smaller, more specialized firms. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10377.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2005 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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    <title>Property Rights Theory and the Employed Inventor </title>
    <description><![CDATA[This paper explains and defends the legal rules governing employed inventors in the United States. In particular, it justifies the oft-criticized propensity of courts to defer to apparently one-sided "pre-invention assignment" agreements that give corporate employers broad rights in the inventions their employees make during (and in some cases briefly following) employment. It also explains legal default rules that operate in the absence of contracts. All of these rules make eminent sense from the perspective of transaction cost economics and property rights theory. Since most corporate inventing involves large teams of researchers, and in many cases produces numerous individual patents covering various components of a single R&amp;D project, corporate inventing can be seen as the product of numerous highly complementary inputs. Permitting each employee to own the patents resulting from his or work would result in complex bargaining problems, and in many cases holdups. As predicted/recommended by both transaction cost (Williamson; Klein, Crawford &amp; Alchian) and property rights (Hart; Grossman &amp; Hart) theory, the law thus strongly favors an integrated ownership structure (i.e., employer ownership) where complementary inventions are likely. The paper goes on to point out, however, that there are several oft-overlooked counterweights to the traditional pro-employer bias of this area of the law. Changing practices favoring out-sourcing and other contractual arrangements -- as opposed to traditional employment -- receive more generous treatment, and should. Also, because of difficulties involved in proving when an invention was actually made, there is a hidden "exit option" in favor of employees which allows them in many cases to leave the employer to flesh out a promising new technology. Putting the law of employee inventions in context, then, provides a strong counterargument to the traditional critique that this area of law is overly generous to employers. ]]></description>
    <link>http://www.law.berkeley.edu/10392.htm</link>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 1997 09:00:00 -0400</pubDate>
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